On Faith and Belief

(c) 2024; 2025 Bart A. Mazzetti

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1. The principal objects of belief.

Cf. According to the Roman Catechism:

“The Catechism of the Council of Trent,” known as the “Roman Catechism” (and so called
throughout this book), thus introduces the explanation of the twelve Articles of the Creed:

“The Christian religion proposes to the faithful many truths which either singly or all
together must be held with a certain and firm faith. That which must first and necessarily
be believed by all is that which God Himself has taught us as the foundation of truth and
its summary concerning the unity of the Divine Essence, the distinction of Three Persons,
and the actions which are by particular reason attributed to each. The pastor should teach
that the Apostles’ Creed briefly sets forth the doctrine of these mysteries. . . .

The Apostles’ Creed is divided into three principal parts.

The first part describes the First Person of the Divine Nature and the marvellous work of the
creation. The second part treats of the Second Person and the mystery of man’s redemption.
The third part concludes with the Third Person, the head and source of our sanctification.

The varied and appropriate propositions of the Creed are called Articles, after a com-
parison often made by the Fathers; for just as the members of the body are divided by
joints (articuli), so in this profusion of faith whatever must be distinctly and separately
believed from everything else is rightly and aptly called an Article” (Part I, Chapter I,
4). (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 1, art. 6 (tr. Laurence Shapcote, O.P.):

Reply to Objection: 1. Some things are proposed to our belief are in themselves of faith,
while others are of faith, not in themselves but only in relation to others: even as in sciences
certain propositions are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in
order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists in those things which
we hope to see, according to He 11,2: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for,”
it follows that those things are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal
life. Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition reads: The
Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc.], the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation, and
the like: and these are distinct articles of faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy
Writ are proposed to our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifesta-
tion of those mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead
man rose again at the touch of Eliseus’ bones, and the like, which are related in Holy
Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and
such things should not form distinct articles. (emphasis added)

Cf. ibid., art. 7, c.:

I answer that The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the doctrine of faith, as
self-evident principles to a teaching based on natural reason. Among these principles
there is a certain order, so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles
are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: “The same thing cannot be affirmed
and denied at the same time,” as the Philosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9).

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 In like manner all the articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of
faith, such as God’s existence, and His providence1 over the salvation of man, according
to He 11: “He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them
that seek Him.” For the existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God
eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in His providence includes all
those things which God dispenses in time, for man’s salvation, and which are the way to
that happiness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are
contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes belief in the
Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth.2 (emphasis added)

2. On the division of the Creed into articles.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 1, art. 8, c. (tr. Laurence Shapcote, O.P.):

I answer that, As stated above (Articles [4],6), to faith those things in themselves belong,
the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, and by which we are brought to eternal
life. Now two things are proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the
Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation,
“by Whom we have access” to the glory of the sons of God, according to Rm 5,2. Hence
it is written (Jn 17,3): “This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God,
and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.” Wherefore the first distinction in matters of
faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to the mys-
tery of Christ’s human nature, which is the “mystery of godliness” (1Tm 3,16).

Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are proposed to our belief: first,
the unity of the Godhead, to which the first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons,
to which three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly, the works proper
to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order of nature, in relation to which the article
about the creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to which
all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in one article; while the third
refers to the order of glory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning
the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven articles referring to the
Godhead. In like manner, with regard to Christ’s human nature, there are seven articles, the
first of which refers to Christ’s incarnation or conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the
third, to His Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the fifth, to His
resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His coming for the judgment, so that
in all there are fourteen articles. Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to
the Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the three about the three
Persons; because we have one knowledge of the three Persons: while they divide the article
referring to the work of glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the glory
of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into one article. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIa-IIae, q. 174, art. 6, c, (tr. Laurence Shapcote,
O.P.):

Whether the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on?

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See Thomas’s Prologue to his Literal Exposition on Job, given below.
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Consequently, as St. Thomas explains (Cf. Super Boethium De Trinitate by Thomas Aquinas, q. 5, art. 4, ad
6), “…faith, which is in a way the habit of the principles of theology, has for its object the First Truth itself,
and yet the articles of faith contain certain other things relating to creatures insofar as they have some con-
nection with the First Truth…,” (emphasis added)
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<…>

I answer that, As stated above (Article [2]), prophecy is directed to the knowledge of
Divine truth, by the contemplation of which we are not only instructed in faith, but also
guided in our actions, according to Ps. 42:3, “Send forth Thy light and Thy truth: they
have conducted me.” Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the true
knowledge of God, according to Heb. 11:6, “He that cometh to God must believe that He
is”; secondly, in the mystery of Christ’s incarnation, according to Jn. 14:1, “You believe
in God, believe also in Me.” Accordingly, if we speak of prophecy as directed to the Godhead
as its end, it progressed according to three divisions of time, namely before the law, under the
law, and under grace.

For before the law, Abraham and the other patriarchs were prophetically taught things perti-
nent to faith in the Godhead. Hence they are called prophets, according to Ps. 104:15, “Do no
evil to My prophets,” which words are said especially on behalf of Abra-ham and Isaac.

Under the Law prophetic revelation of things pertinent to faith in the Godhead was made in a
yet more excellent way than hitherto, because then not only certain special persons or families
but the whole people had to be instructed in these matters. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex.
6:2,3): “I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God
almighty, and My name Adonai I did not show to them”; because previously the patriarchs
had been taught to believe in a general way in God, one and Almighty, while Moses was more
fully instructed in the simplicity of the Divine essence, when it was said to him (Ex. 3:14): “I
am Who am”; and this name is signified by Jews in the word “Adonai” on account of their
veneration for that unspeakable name.

Afterwards in the time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by the Son of God
Himself, according to Mt. 28:19: “Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name
of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.”

In each state, however, the most excellent revelation was that which was given first. Now
the first revelation, before the Law, was given to Abraham, for it was at that time that men
began to stray from faith in one God by turning aside to idolatry, whereas hitherto no such
revelation was necessary while all persevered in the worship of one God. A less excellent
revelation was made to Isaac, being founded on that which was made to Abraham. Wherefore
it was said to him (Gn. 26:24): “I am the God of Abraham thy father,” and in like manner to
Jacob (Gn. 28:13): “I am the God of Abraham thy father, and the God of Isaac.” Again in the
state of the Law the first revelation which was given to Moses was more excellent, and on this
revelation all the other revelations to the prophets were founded. And so, too, in the time of
grace the entire faith of the Church is founded on the revelation vouchsafed to the apostles,
concerning the faith in one God and three Persons, according to Mt. 16:18, “On this rock,” i.e.
of thy confession, “I will build My Church.”

As to the faith in Christ’s incarnation, it is evident that the nearer men were to Christ, whether
before or after Him, the more fully, for the most part, were they instructed on this point, and
after Him more fully than before, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 3:5).

As regards the guidance of human acts, the prophetic revelation varied not according to the
course of time, but according as circumstances required, because as it is written (Prov. 29:18),
“When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad.” Wherefore at all times men
were divinely instructed about what they were to do, according as it was expedient for the
spiritual welfare of the elect. (emphasis added)
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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Primam Decretalem (On the First Decretal of Gregory IX)
(tr. B.A.M.):

…In the last place one must consider that the articles of the Christian Faith are reckoned by
some to be fourteen, but by others, twelve. For according to those who reckon them to be
fourteen, seven articles pertain to the Godhead, but seven to the humanity [of Christ]. But
those which pertain to the Godhead are distinguished as follows:

There is one article on the unity of the divine essence, which the Symbol touches on when he
says: I believe in one God. A second concerns the Person of the Father, which is touched on
when it says: the Father, the Almighty. A third concerns the Person of the Son, which is
touched on when it says: and in Jesus Christ His Son. A fourth concerns the Person of the
Holy Spirit, which is touched on when it says: And in the Holy Spirit. A fifth concerns the
effect by which we are created in nature, which is touched on when it says: Creator of heaven
and earth. A sixth concerns God’s effect according as we are created again in grace, which is
touched on when it says: the Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints, the forgive-
ness of sins; the reason being that by grace we are gathered into the unity of the Church, we
communicate in the sacraments, and we obtain the forgiveness of sins. A seventh article con-
cerns God’s effect by which we are perfected in the being of glory both with respect to the
body and with respect to the soul; and this is touched on when it says: the resurrection of the
flesh, the life everlasting.

But the seven articles pertaining to the Incarnation are distinguished as follows:

The first concerns the conception of Christ, which is touched on when it says: who was con-
ceived by the Holy Spirit. But the second concerns His birth, which is touched one when it
says: born of the Virgin Mary. The third concerns His passion, which is touched on when it
says: suffered, died, and was buried. The fourth concerns his descent into hell [: he descen-
ded into hell]; the fifth His resurrection [: the third day he rose again from the dead]; the
sixth His ascension: he ascended into Heaven; the seventh His return in judgment: He will
come again to judge the living and the dead.

But others holding there to be twelve articles, put down one article concerning the Three
Persons; and the article concerning the effect of glory they divide into two, so that there is one
article concerning the resurrection of the flesh, and another concerning eternal life: and thus
the articles pertaining to divinity are six. Again, they include the conception and birth of Christ
under one article; and so the articles concerning His humanity are also six, so that all told they
are twelve. (emphasis added)

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PROLOGUE TO JOB: The Brian Mullady & Anthony Damico Translations.

THE COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS Prologue

AQUINAS
ON THE BOOK OF JOB
PROLOGUE

Just as things which are generated naturally Just as in the case of things which are generated
reach perfection from imperfection by small naturally there is a gradual development from
degrees, so it is with men in their knowledge of the imperfect to the perfect state, so it happens
the truth. For in the beginning they attained a in the case of men with respect to the knowledge
very limited understanding of the truth, but later of truth; for in the beginning what they have
they gradually came to know the truth in fuller attained of the truth is slight, but afterwards,
measure. step by step as it were, they come to some fuller
measure of the truth.

Because of this many erred in the beginning For this reason it has happened that, from the
about the truth from an imperfect knowledge. beginning, many men have erred because of
imperfect knowledge concerning the truth.

Among these, there were some who excluded Among them were some who denied the exis-
divine providence and attributed everything to tence of divine providence and attributed to
fortune and to chance. Indeed the opinion of fortune and chance everything that occurred. In
these first men was not correct because they fact, the opinion of earlier men inclined so
held that the world was made by chance. This is strongly to this position that they attributed to
evident from the position of the ancient natural chance the things which are generated naturally,
philosophers who admitted only the material as one can perceive from the positions of the
cause. early natural philosophers, who posited a
material cause only.

Even some later men like Democritus and Some of the later philosophers also, such as
Empedocles attributed things to chance in most Democritus and Empedocles, attributed the
things. majority of occurrences to chance.

But by a more profound diligence in their con- But the diligence of later philosophers examin-
templation of the truth later philosophers ing the truth with sharper insight has shown
showed by evident proofs and reasons that with evident proofs and arguments that natural
natural things are set in motion by providence.3 things are controlled by providence; for one
For such a sure course in the motion of the would not find such a reliable course in the
heavens and the stars and other effects of nature movement of heaven and of the stars and in the
would not be found unless all these things were other effects of nature unless all these things
governed and ordered by some intellect trans- were ordained and governed by some super-
cending the things ordered. eminent intelligence.

Therefore after the majority of men asserted the Although the opinion of the majority of men
opinion that natural things did not happen by was confirmed in the belief that natural things
chance but by providence because of the order were driven not by chance but by providence
which clearly appears in them, a doubt emerged because of the order which manifestly appears
among most men about the acts of man as to in them, doubt emerged among most men con-
whether human affairs evolved by chance or cerning the actions of men. Did human affairs
were governed by some kind of providence or a proceed by chance, or were they governed by
higher ordering. some providence or superior ordinance?
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This doubt was fed especially because there is Indeed, the fact that no certain order appears in
no sure order apparent in human events. For human events especially fostered this doubt.
good things do not always befall the good nor For good things do not always happen to good
evil things the wicked. men or bad things to bad men.

On the other hand, evil things do not always On the other hand, neither do bad things always
befall the good nor good things the wicked, but happen to good men or good things to bad men.
good and evil indifferently befall both the good Rather, both good and bad things happen to
and the wicked. good and bad men indifferently.

This fact then especially moved the hearts of This fact, then, is what has especially moved the
men to hold the opinion that human affairs are hearts of men to the opinion that human affairs
not governed by divine providence. are not ruled by divine providence.

Some said that human affairs proceed by chance Some say that human affairs proceed by chance
except to the extent that they are ruled by human except insofar as they are ruled by human
providence and counsel, others attributed their providence and planning; others attribute their
outcome to a fatalism ruled by the heavens. outcome to celestial fate.

This idea causes a great deal of harm to man- This opinion, however, is found to be especially
kind. For if divine providence is denied, no harmful to the human race, for if divine provi-
reverence or true fear of God will remain among dence is taken away, no reverence for or fear of
men. Each man can weigh well how great will God based on truth will remain among men.
be the propensity for vice and the lack of desire Anyone can discern easily enough how great an
for virtue which follows from this idea. For apathy toward virtue and a proneness to vice
nothing so calls men back from evil things and follow from this condition. For nothing calls
induces them to good so much as the fear and men back from wickedness and leads them
love of God. toward good so much as fear of and love for
God.

For this reason the first and foremost aim of For this reason, the first and most important
those who had pursued wisdom inspired by the concern of those who pursued wisdom in a
spirit of God for the instruction of others was to divine spirit for the instruction of others was to
remove this opinion from the hearts of men. So remove this belief from the hearts of men.
after the promulgation of the Law and the Therefore, after the giving of the Law and the
Prophets, the Book of Job occupies first place Prophets, the Book of Job is placed first in the
in the order of Holy Scripture, the books number of the Hagiographa, that is, the books
composed by the wisdom of the Holy Spirit for written wisely through the Spirit of God for the
the instruction of men. The whole intention of instruction of men, the whole intention of which
this book is directed to this: to show that human turns on showing through plausible arguments
affairs are ruled by divine providence using that human affairs are ruled by divine prov-
probable arguments. idence.

The methodology used in this book is to Now in this book the author proceeds to
demonstrate this proposition from the sup- demonstrate his proposition from the sup-
posetion that natural things are governed by position that natural things are governed by
divine providence. divine providence.

The affliction of just men is what seems especi- Now what especially seems to impugn God’s
ally to impugn divine providence in human providence where human affairs are concerned
affairs. For although it seems irrational and con- is the affliction of just men, for although it
trary to providence at first glance that good seems at first sight unreasonable and contrary to
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things sometimes happen to evil men, never- providence that good things should some-times
theless this can be excused in one way or happen to bad men, it can be excused in one way
another by divine compassion. or another as the result of divine mercy.

But that the just are afflicted without cause But that just men should be afflicted without
seems to undermine totally the foundation of cause seems to undermine totally the foundation
providence. Thus the varied and grave afflict- of providence. Therefore, there are proposed for
tions of a specific just man called Job, perfect in the intended discussion as a kind of theme the
every virtue, are proposed as a kind of theme for many grave afflictions of a certain man, perfect
the question intended for discussion. in every virtue, named Job.

But there were some who held that Job was not Now there have been some men to whom it has
someone who was in the nature of things, but seemed that the Job in question was not some-
that this was a parable made up to serve as a thing in the nature of things but that he was a
kind of theme to dispute providence, as men kind of parable made up to serve as a theme for
frequently invent cases to serve as a model for a debate over providence, the way men often in-
debate. Although it does not matter much for vent hypothetical cases to debate over them.
the intention of the book whether or not such is And although it makes little difference one way
the case, still it makes a difference for the truth or another to the intention of the book, it is im-
itself. portant as far as the truth itself is concerned.

This aforementioned opinion seems to contra- For the opinion that Job was not a man in the
dict the authority of Scripture. In Ezechiel, the nature of things seems to be contrary to the
Lord is represented as saying,” If there were authority of Sacred Scripture, for in Ezekiel
three just men in our midst, Noah, Daniel, and 14:14 the Lord is represented as saying, “If
Job, these would free your souls by their those three men—Noah, Daniel, and Job—are
justice.” (Ez. 14:14) Clearly Noah and Daniel in that land, they will free their souls by their
really were men in the nature of things and so justice.” Now it is manifest that Noah and
there should be no doubt about Job who is the Daniel were men in the nature of things. For this
third man numbered with them. Also, James reason there should be no doubt about the third
says, “Behold, we bless those who preservered. man named along with them, namely, Job. Also,
You have heard of the suffering of Job and you in James 5:11 is said, “Look! We bless those
have seen the intention of the Lord.”(James who have endured; you have heard of Job’s
5:11) Therefore one must believe that the man suffering and have seen the Lord’s purpose.”
Job was a man in the nature of things. So, then, one must believe that Job was a man
in the nature of things.

However, as to the epoch in which he lived, Now it is not our present intention to discuss the
who his parents were or even who the author of time in which Job lived or his parentage, even
the book was, that is whether Job wrote about the authorship of this book, whether in fact Job
himself as if speaking about another person, or himself wrote it about himself as if speaking of
whether someone else reported these things another or someone else related these incidents
about him is not the present intention of this about him. For we intend briefly as far as we are
discussion. With trust in God’s aid, I intend to able, having trust in divine help, to expound
explain this book entitled the Book of Job according to the literal sense that book which is
briefly as far as I am able according to the literal entitled Blessed Job.
sense.

The mystical sense has been explained for us Blessed Pope Gregory has already disclosed to
both accurately and eloquently by the blessed us its mysteries so subtly and clearly that there
Pope Gregory so that nothing further need be seems no need to add anything further to them.
added to this sort of commentary.
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References:

Commentary on the Book of Job by Thomas Aquinas, translated by Brian Mullady.

www.opwest.org/Archive/2002/Book_of_Job/tajob.html
edited and html-formatted by Joseph Kenny, O.P.

The Literal Exposition on Job: A Scriptural Commentary Concerning Providence (AAR

Classics in Religious Studies Series). Thomas Aquinas. Anthony Damico, Translator; Mar-
tin D. Yaffe, Interpretative Essay (1st Edition, 1989).

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3. The definition of faith according to Hebrews 11:1.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 14, art. 2, obj. 1 (tr. Alfred
J. Freddoso):

In Hebrews 11:1 the Apostle says that faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the
argument (argumentum) of things that are not apparent.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 67, art. 3, c. (tr. Laurence Shapcote, O.P.):

Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is in-
cluded in its definition; faith being defined as “the substance of things to be hoped for, the
evidence of things that appear not” (Heb. 11: 1). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.):
“Where is faith? Believing without seeing.” But it is an imperfect knowledge that is of things
unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith:
therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the
same.

Cf. Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews by Saint Thomas Aquinas translated by
Fabian R. Larcher, O.P., Lesson on Heb 11-1:

11-1
Heb. 11:1
1 Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.

551. – Above, the Apostle showed Christ’s superiority in many ways by preferring Him to the
angels, to Moses and to Aaron, and advised the faithful to be united to Christ. Since this union
consists principally in faith and begins with faith: ‘That Christ may dwell by faith in your
hearts’ (Eph. 3:17), the Apostle proceeds to recommend this faith and does three things: first
he describes faith; secondly, he gives various examples of it (v. 2); thirdly, he exhorts them to
the things which pertain to faith (chap. 12).

552. – He gives a definition of faith which is complete but obscure. Hence, it should be
noted that in attempting to define any virtue perfectly, one must mention its proper matter with
which it deals, and its end; because habits are recognized by their acts, and acts by their
objects. Therefore, it is necessary to mention the act and its order to its object and end. Thus,
the definition of courage must mention its proper matter with which it deals, namely, fears and
aggressions, and its end, which is the good of the republic. Now, since faith is a theological
virtue, its object and end are the same, namely, God. First, he mentions its order to the end;
secondly, its proper matter (v. 1b).

553. – But it should be noted that the act of faith is to believe, because it is an act of the intellect
narrowed to one thing by the command of the will. Hence, to believe is to cogitate with assent,
as Augustine says in The Predestination of the Saints. Therefore, the object of faith and of the
will must coincide. But the object of faith is the first truth, in which the end of the will
consists, namely, happiness. But it is present one way on earth, and another way in heaven,
because on earth the first truth is not possessed and, consequently, not seen: for in regard to
things that are above the soul, to possess and to see are the same, as Augustine says in Book
of 83 Questions. Hence, they are only hoped for: ‘But hope that is sees in not hope. For what
a man sees, why does he hope for?’ (Rom. 8:24).
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 Therefore, the first truth, not seen but hoped for, is the end of the will on earth and, con-
sequently, is the object of faith, because its end and object are the same. But the ultimate
end of faith in heaven, which we tend toward by faith, is happiness, which consists in the
clear vision of God: ‘This is eternal life: to know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ
whom you have sent’ (Jn. 17:3). But such is the hope of believers: ‘He has regenerated us
unto a lively hope’ (1 Pt. 1:3). The end, therefore, of faith on earth is the attainment of the
thing hoped for, namely, of eternal happiness; hence, he says, of things hoped for.

554. – But a question arises: since faith is prior to hope, why is it defined in terms of hope?
For it is customary to define the later by the previous, and not vice versa. I answer that the
answer should be obvious from what has been said, namely, that the object and end of faith
are the same. Therefore, since the attainment of the things hoped for is its end, it must also be
its object. For it has been stated above that a habit must be defined by the order of its act to its
object. But the true and the good, even though when considered in themselves are convertible
as far as their supposits are concerned, differ in conception. Hence, they are diversely related
to each other, because the true is a good and a good is true. In like manner, the intellect and
will, which are distinguished on the basis of the distinction between the true and the good,
have a diverse relationship to each other. For inasmuch as the intellect apprehends truth and
anything contained in it, the true is a good; hence, the good is under the true: but inasmuch as
the will moves, the true is under the good. Therefore, in the order of knowing, the intellect is
prior; but in the order of moving, the will is prior. Therefore, because the intellect is moved to
the act of faith by the command of the will, in the order of moving, the will is prior. Therefore,
the prior is not being defined in terms of the later, because, as has been stated, in the definition
of faith, the order of the act to its object, which is the same as the end, must be mentioned. But
the end and the good are the same, as it says in Phys. II. But in the order to the good, the will,
which is the subject of hope, is prior.

555. – But why not say, ‘of things to be loved,’ rather than of things to be hoped for? The
reason is because charity is concerned with things that are present or absent. Therefore,
because the unpossessed end is the object of faith, he says, of things to be hoped for. Nor does
it make any difference that the thing to be hoped for is also the object of hope, because it is
necessary that faith be ordained to an end, which coincides with the object of those virtues by
which the will is made perfect; since faith pertains to the will as moved by the intellect.

556. – But since faith is one virtue, because it is called one habit (for its object is one), why
not say ‘of the thing to be hoped for,’ instead of things to be hoped for? I answer that happi-
ness, which is essentially one thing in itself, because it consists in the vision of God, is the
principle and root from which the many good things contained under it are derived: for
example, the characteristics of the body, companionship with the saints, and many other good
things. Therefore, in order to show that all these pertain to faith, he speaks in the plural.

557. – The word, substance, which appears in the definition, can be explained in a num-
ber of ways: in one way, causally, and then it has two senses: one which is substance
[explained effectively],1 i.e., making the things hoped for be present in us. This it does in
two ways: in one way, by meriting, as it were; for from the fact that a person makes his intellect
captive and submissive to the things of faith, he deserves some day to see the things he hopes
for: for vision is the reward of faith. In another way, as though by its property, bringing it
about that what is believed really to lie in the future, be somehow already possessed, provided
one believe in God.

1
I have added these words in light of the corresponding member he gives second: “In another way, we can
explain the word, substance, essentially”.
11
In another way, we can explain the word, substance, essentially, as if faith is the sub-
stance, i.e., the essence of things to be hoped for. Hence, in Greek it is defined as ‘the
hypostasis of things to be hoped for.’ For the essence of happiness is no less than the vision
of God: ‘This is eternal life: that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ
whom you have sent’ (Jn. 17:3). Hence, in the book, On the Trinity, Augustine says: ‘This
contemplation is promised to us; the end of all actions.’ Therefore, the full vision of God is
the essence of happiness. We also see this in the liberal sciences, which, if a person wishes to
learn them, he must first accept its principles, which he must believe when they are delivered
to him by the teacher. For a learner must believe, as it is stated in 1 Posterior Analytics. And
in those principles the entire science is somehow contained, as conclusions are contained
in their principles, and an effect in its cause. Therefore, one who has the principles of a
science, say geometry, has its substance. And if geometry were the substance of happiness, a
person who possessed the principles of geometry would, in a sense, have the substance of
happiness. But our faith consists in believing that the blessed will see and enjoy God.
Therefore, if we will to reach that state, it is necessary that we believe the principles of
that knowledge. And these principles are the articles of faith, which contain the summary
of this knowledge, because the vision of the triune God makes us happy. And this is one
article; hence we believe this. Consequently, he says, the assurance [substance] of things to be
hoped for: ‘We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to fact’ (1 Cor. 13:12).
As if to say: we shall be happy when we see face to face that which we now see in a glass and
in a dark manner. In these words is shown the relationship of the act of faith to its end, because
faith is ordained to things to be hoped for, being, as it were, a beginning in which the
whole is, as it were, virtually contained, as conclusions in principles.

558. – Then when he says, the conviction [evidence] of things that appear not, he touches the
act of faith in regard to its proper matter. But the act proper to faith, even though it is in relation
to the will, as has been said, is nevertheless in the intellect, as in a subject, because its object
is the true, which properly pertains to the intellect. But there is a difference among the acts of
the intellect: for some are habits of the intellect which imply complete certitude and perfect
understanding of that which is understood, as is clear in the habit of under-standing, which is
the habit of first principles, because one who understands that every whole is great than its
part sees this and is certain. But the habit of science also does this: thus the habits of
understanding and of science will produce certitude and vision. But there are others which
beget neither, namely, doubt and opinion. But faith is midway between these: because, as has
been stated, faith produces assent in the intellect which can be caused in two ways: in one
way, because the intellect is moved to assent because of the evidence of the object which is
per se knowable, as in the habit of principles, or known through something else, which is per
se knowable, as in the science of astronomy. In another way, it assents to something not
because of the evidence of the object, by which it is not sufficiently moved (hence it is not
certain), but it either doubts, namely, when there is no more evidence for one side than for the
other; or it opines, if it does have reason for one side, but without satisfying the intellect, so
that there is fear in regard to the opposite side. But faith does not suggest either of these
absolutely: because there is no evidence, as there is in understanding and science, nor is there
doubt, as in doubt and opinion; but it fixes on one side with certainty and firm adherence by a
voluntary choice. But this choice rests on God’s authority, and by it the intellect is fixed, so
that it clings firmly to the things of faith and assents to them with the greatest of certainty.
Therefore, to believe is to know with assent. Therefore, the proper matter of the habit of faith
are things that appear not. For appearance has knowledge, but not faith, as Gregory says. But
the act of faith is certain adherence, which the Apostle calls evidence, taking the cause for the
effect, because evidence produces faith about a doubtful matter. For evidence is the reason for
believing a doubted thing. Or if we follow the etymology of the word, evidence (argument),
which means arguing the mind, then he is taking the effect for the cause, because the mind is
12
compelled to assent because of the thing’s certainty. Hence, it is called the evidence of things
that appear not, i.e., a sure and certain apprehension of things it does not see. Now, if someone
were to reduce those words to their correct form, he could say that faith is a habit of the mind
by which eternal life is begun in us and makes the intellect assent to things that it does not see.
Therefore, it is obvious that the Apostle has defined faith completely, but not clearly. [Where
we have evidence another version has conviction, because on God’s authority the intellect is
convinced about things it does not see].

559. – By that definition, faith is distinguished from all the other habits of the intellect. For
the fact that it is called evidence, faith is distinguished from opinion, doubt and suspicion, be-
cause these three do not cause the intellect to adhere to something firmly. By the words, of
things to be hoped for, it is distinguished from ordinary faith which is not ordained to hap-
piness. For by proper definition a thing is made known and distinguished from all else, as in
this case; hence, all the others are reduced to it.

560. – But it seems incorrect to say, of things that appear not, as it says in Jn (20:26): ‘Thomas
saw and believed.’ Furthermore, we believe that there is one God, a fact which is demonstrated
by philosophers. I answer that faith is taken in two senses: in the proper sense, it is concerned
with things not seen and not known, as is clear from the above. But inasmuch as there cannot
be greater certainty of a conclusion than of the principle from which it is drawn, because
principles are always more certain than the conclusions, it follows that since the principles of
faith are not evident, neither are its conclusions. Hence, the intellect does not assent to the
conclusions as to things known or seen. But taken in a general sense, it excludes all knowledge
that is certain; that is the sense in which it is taken by Augustine in the Gospel Questions,
when he says that faith is concerned with things that are seen. But the Apostle is speaking in
the first sense. Furthermore, it must be said of Thomas that, as Gregory says, he saw one thing
and believed something else: for he saw the humanity and believed the divinity. To the
objection based on demonstration, the answer is that nothing prohibits one thing being seen
by one person and believed by another, as is obvious in diverse states. For what is not seen on
earth is seen by the angels. Therefore, what I believe, an angel sees. Similarly, what is seen by
the prophets, for example, that God is one and incorporeal, must be believed by the illiterate;
just as an illiterate person believes in an eclipse which an astronomer sees. However, in such
matters faith is taken in a different sense. But there are some things which absolutely transcend
the state of the present life; and in regard to these there is faith in the strict sense. (emphasis
added)

13
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 14 (“On faith”) (tr. Alfred
J. Freddoso).

Article 1: What is it to believe?

Now it is claimed by Augustine in On the Predestination of the Saints [chap. 2], and it is
maintained in the Gloss on the passage “Not that we are sufficient to think” (2 Cor 3:5), that
to believe is to cogitate with assent.

HOWEVER, IT SEEMS INAPPROPRIATE TO SAY THIS:

1. One who knows is distinct from one who believes, as is evident from Augustine in On
Seeing God [letter 147, chaps. 2 and 3]. But one who knows, insofar as he knows, cogitates
about something and assents to it. Therefore, believing is inappropriately described when one
claims that to believe is to cogitate with assent.

2. Further, cogitating conveys a sort of investigation. For to cogitate is, as it were, to ‘agitate
[the mind] with’, i.e., to reason discursively and to compare one thing with another. But
investigation is ruled out by the nature of faith. For as Damascene says [in On the Orthodox
Faith II, chap. 2], faith is not an examined consent. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that to
believe is to cogitate with assent.

3. Further, to believe is an act of the intellect. But to assent seems to pertain to desiring; for
we are said to consent to something by means of desire. Therefore, assent does not pertain to
believing.

4. Further, no one is said to be cogitating unless he is actually considering something, as is

evident from Augustine, On the Trinity [chap. 7]. But one is said to believe even if he is not
actually cogitating about anything–e.g., a believer who is sleeping. Therefore, to believe is not
to cogitate.

5. Further, a simple light is a principle of a simple cognition. But faith is a sort of simple light,
as is evident from Dionysius in On the Divine Names, chap. 7. Therefore, the believing that
arises from faith is a simple cognition, and so it is not the sort of cogitation which bespeaks a
comparing cognition.

6. Further, faith as it is commonly spoken of assents to a first truth because of that truth itself.
But one who assents to something by means of a comparison assents to it not because of itself
but because of something else to which he compares it. Therefore, in believing there is no
comparing and hence no cogitating.

7. Further, faith is called more certain than every science and every cognition. But because of
their certitude principles are cognized in the absence of cogitating and comparing. Therefore,
believing occurs in the absence of cogitating.

8. Further, a spiritual power is more efficacious than a corporeal power; therefore, a spiritual
light is more powerful than a corporeal light. But an external corporeal light perfects the eye
so that it immediately cognizes visible bodies when its innate light was not sufficient for this.
Therefore, it is in the absence of any cogitating or comparing that the spiritual light which
comes from God will perfect the intellect so that it cognizes even those things for which natural
reason is not sufficient. And so believing occurs in the absence of cogitating.

14
9. Further, philosophers locate the cogitative power in the sentient part [of the soul]. But to
believe belongs only to the mind, as Augustine says. Therefore, to believe is not to cogitate.
I REPLY:

One should reply that Augustine adequately describes believing. For the essence of believing,
along with its differences from all the other acts of the intellect, can be demonstrated through
this sort of definition of it. This is evident as follows:

I. According to the Philosopher [Aristotle] in On the Soul [III, 5], there are two operations of
our intellect. The first is an operation by which the intellect formulates the simple quiddities
of things, e.g., what it is to be a human being or what it is to be an animal. Now neither the
true nor the false per se are found in this operation, just as they are not found in noncomplex
spoken words. The second operation of the intellect is that in accord with which it composes
and divides by affirming and denying. And it is in this operation that the true and the false are
found, just as they are also found in a spoken complex, which is a sign of this operation.

Now believing is found not in the first operation but rather in the second. For we believe things
that are true and disbelieve things that are false. This is why among the Arabs the first opera-
tion of the intellect is called imagination, whereas the second is called faith, as is evident from
the words of the Commentator [Averroes] in On the Soul III, [comment 21].

II. Now since the possible intellect is, taken by itself, in potency with respect to all intelligible
forms–in just the way that primary matter is in potency with respect to all sensible forms–it is
also, taken by itself, no more determined to adhering to a composition than to adhering to [the
corresponding] division, or vice versa.

However, anything that is determined to two things is such that it is determined to one of the
two only through something that moves it. But the possible intellect is moved by only two
things, viz., (i) by its proper object, which is an intelligible form, viz., what a thing is, as is
claimed in On the Soul III, and (ii) by the will, which moves all the other powers, as Anselm
says [in On Similitudes, chap. 2].

So it follows that our possible intellect is related in diverse ways to the parts of a contradiction.

A. For sometimes it is not inclined more to the one part than to the other. This is either (i)
because of an absence of things that move it, as in the case of those problematic matters
concerning which we have no arguments [one way or the other], or (ii) because of an apparent
equality of the things that move it to the one part and the other. And this is the condition of
one who is in doubt [dubitare], i.e., one who fluctuates between the two parts of the
contradiction.

B. On the other hand, it is sometimes the case that (i) the intellect is inclined more to one part
than to the other, but that (ii) that which inclines the intellect does not move it sufficiently to
determine it totally to the one part. Thus the intellect accepts the one part and yet is always in
doubt with respect to the opposite part. And this is the condition of one who opines [opinari],
i.e., one who accepts the one part of the contradiction with a wariness about the other.

C. Now sometimes the possible intellect is determined in such a way that it adheres totally to
one part. But it is determined in this way sometimes by the intelligible object and sometimes
by the will.

15
i. It is determined in this way by the intelligible object sometimes mediately and sometimes
immediately.

It is determined immediately when the truth of intelligible propositions is infallibly apparent

at once on the basis of the intelligible things themselves. This is the condition of one who
understands principles (intelligere), which are immediately known once their terms are
grasped, as the Philosopher says [in Posterior Analytics I]. And so just on the basis of what a
thing is the intellect is immediately determined to propositions of this sort. On the other hand,
it is determined mediately when, after the definitions of the terms have been grasped, the
intellect is determined to one part of a contradiction by the power of the first principles. And
this is the condition of one who knows [scientifically] (scire).

ii. But sometimes the intellect cannot be determined to one part of a contradiction either
immediately through the definitions of the terms, as in the case of principles, or [mediately]
by the power of the first principles, as in the case of demonstrated conclusions. Instead, it is
determined by the will, which chooses to assent determinately and precisely to one part
because of something that is sufficient to move the will but not sufficient to move the intellect–
and this because it seems good or fitting to assent to that part. And this is the condition of the
one who believes, as when one believes what a man says because it seems proper or beneficial
to do so.

And it is also in this way that we are moved to believe what someone says because the reward
of eternal life is promised to us if we believe; and the will is moved by this reward to assent
to the things that are said, even though the intellect is not moved by what is understood. And
this is why Augustine, [in Commentary on John, chap. 26, “No one can come ...”], says that
an unwilling man is capable of other things, but only a willing man is capable of believing.

III. From what has been said it is evident that assent is not found in the operation of the
intellect by which it formulates the simple quiddities of things, since there is no truth or falsity
there. For we are said to assent to something only when we cleave to it as true. Similarly, one
who is in doubt does not have assent, since he does not cleave to the one part more than to the
other. Similarly, one who opines does not have assent, since his acceptance is not fixed firmly
with respect to one of the two parts. Rather, as Isaac and Avicenna claim, a fixed judgment
(sententia) is a distinct or absolutely certain conception of one of the two parts of a
contradiction; but ‘to assent’ (assentire) is taken from sententia. Now one who understands
(intelligere) does have assent, since he cleaves with absolute certainty to one part; however,
he does not have cogitation, since he is determined to one of the two parts in the absence of
any comparison. On the other hand, one who knows (scire) has both cogitation and assent;
however, the cogitation causes the assent and the assent terminates the cogitation. For on the
basis of the very comparison of the principles with the conclusions he assents to the
conclusions by tracing them back to the principles, and there the movement of the one who is
cogitating is fixed and put to rest. For in knowledge (scientia) the motion of reason begins
from an understanding (intellectus) of the principles and is terminated in that same
understanding by means of a tracing back. And so the person in question does not have the
assent and the cogitation on equal footing, as it were; instead, the cogitation leads to the assent,
and the assent puts the cogitation to rest.

But in faith the assent and the cogitation are, as it were, on equal footing. For the assent is
caused not by the cogitation but, as was said above, by the will. But because the intellect is
not at all terminated in one part in such a way that it is brought to its proper terminus, which
is the vision of something intelligible, it follows that its motion has not yet been put to rest.
Instead, it still has cogitation and investigation concerning those things which it believes, even
16
though it assents to them with absolute firmness. For just taken by itself, the intellect is not
satisfied and it is not terminated in one part; rather, it is terminated only from the outside. And
this is why the intellect of one who believes is said to be captivated. For it is being held fast
by something else’s terminus and not by its own proper terminus (2 Cor 10:5, “... bringing the
intellect into captivity”). This is also why it is the case that in one who believes, though not in
one who understands or knows, there can arise a movement with respect to the contrary of that
which he holds with absolute firmness.

So, then, it is through assent that believing is separated off (i) from the operation by which the
intellect sees simple forms, i.e., quiddities and (ii) from doubt (dubitatio) and (iii) from opinion
(opinio); on the other hand, it is through cogitation that it is separated off from understanding
(intellectus), whereas it is separated off from knowledge (scientia) by the fact that it has
cogitation and assent on an equal footing, as it were.
REPLY TO OBJECTIONS POSED AT THE BEGINNING:

AD 1. The reply to the first objection is evident from this.

AD 2. To the second objection one should reply that the reason why faith is not called an
examined consent is that the assent (or consent) of faith is not caused by an investigation on
the part of reason. However, this does not rule out its being the case that in the intellect of one
who believes there remains some cogitation or investigation concerning the things which he
believes.

AD 3. To the third objection one should reply that the will, though not the intellect, is referred
back to a preceding power, viz., to the intellect. And the reason why assent properly pertains
to the intellect is that it conveys a certain absolute adherence to that to which one assents. On
the other hand, consent properly belongs to the will, since to consent is to ‘think together with
another’, and so consent is said to be ordered to or compared with something that precedes it.

AD 4. To the fourth objection one should reply that because (i) habits are cognized through
acts and because (ii) habits themselves are the principles of acts, habits are sometimes
denominated by the names of their acts. And so the names of the acts are sometimes taken as
proper names, as it were, for the acts themselves, and they are sometimes taken as names for
the habits. So ‘believing’, insofar as it conveys the act of faith, always includes actual
considering, but this is not the case insofar as ‘believing’ is taken for the habit. So one who is
sleeping is said believe insofar as he has the habit of faith.

AD 5. To the fifth objection one should reply that faith includes something of perfection and
something of imperfection. The firmness itself which pertains to assent bespeaks perfection,
whereas what bespeaks imperfection is the lack of vision in virtue of which a movement of
cogitation still remains in the mind of the one who believes. Therefore, that which bespeaks
perfection, viz., assenting, is caused by the simple light, which is faith; but to the extent that
that light is not perfectly participated in, the imperfection of the intellect is not totally removed,
and so the movement of cogitation remains in the intellect without being put to rest.

AD 6. To the sixth objection one should reply that this argument proves or establishes that
cogitation* is not a cause of the assent of faith, but it does not prove that cogitation* does not
accompany the assent of faith.

17
AD 7. To the seventh objection one should reply that ‘certitude’ can convey two things. One
is a firmness of adherence, and in this sense faith is more certain than any understanding or
knowledge, since the first truth, which causes the assent of faith, is a more powerful cause
than is the light of reason, which causes the assent of understanding and of knowledge. But
‘certitude’ also conveys the evidentness of that to which one assents, and faith does not have
certitude in this sense, whereas understanding and knowledge do. And this is why under-
standing does not involve cogitation.

AD 8. To the eighth objection one should reply that the argument would go through
straightforwardly if we participated perfectly in the spiritual light in question–which will
happen in heaven, where we will see perfectly those things which we now believe. But the
fact that the things which that light perfects us to know do not appear manifestly [in our present
state] derives from our defective participation in that light and not from the efficacy of the
spiritual light itself.

AD 9. To the ninth objection one should reply that the cogitative power is that which is the
highest in the sentient part [of the soul], where the sentient part attains to the intellective part
in a certain way, so that it participates in that which is lowest in the intellective part, viz., dis-
cursive reasoning–and this according to the rule of Dionysius in On the Divine Names, chap.
2, that the beginnings of the secondary things are conjoined to the ends of the primary things.
Thus this cogitative power is called particular reason, as is evident from the Commentator in
On the Soul III, [comment 58]. But this is the case only in human beings. In brute animals
natural judgment takes the place [of particular reason]. And so universal reason itself, which
is in the intellective part of the soul, is called cogitation because of a similarity in these opera-
tions.

Translated by
Alfred J. Freddoso
University of Notre Dame

St. Thomas Aquinas: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 14 (“On faith”)

Article 2: What is faith?

In Hebrews 11:1 the Apostle says that faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the
argument (argumentum) of things that are not apparent.

IT SEEMS THAT IT IS INCORRECT TO SAY THIS:

1. No quality is a substance. Faith is a quality, since it is a virtue, i.e., a good quality of the
mind, etc. Therefore, faith is not a substance.

2. Further, spiritual being is added to natural being and is its perfection; hence, it must be
similar to it. But in the natural being of a human being the substance is said to be the very
essence of the soul, which is a first act, but not the power of the soul, which is the principle of
a second act. Therefore, in a spiritual being one should not say that the essence itself is faith
or any other virtue, since a virtue is a proximate principle of an operation and hence perfects
a power. Rather, one should say that the essence is grace, from which (i) spiritual being derives
as from a first act and which (ii) perfects the very essence of the soul.

18
3. Someone will claim that faith is called a substance because it is the first among the different
virtues. – Against this one should reply that virtues are considered in three ways, viz., (i) as
regards their habits, (ii) as regards their objects, and (iii) as regards their powers. But as regards
their habits, faith is not prior to the others. For the definition under discussion seems to be a
definition of faith only insofar as faith is formed, since it is only in this sense that it is the
foundation, as Augustine says; but all the gratuitous virtues are infused simultaneously.
Similarly, as regards their objects, faith does not seem to be prior to the other virtues. For it is
not the case that faith tends toward the true itself, which seems to be its proper object, more
than charity tends toward the highest good or more than hope tends toward what is most
difficult thing or toward the God’s supreme liberality. Similarly, as regards their powers, faith
does not seem to be prior to the other virtues, since all the gratuitous virtues seem to be referred
back to desire. Therefore, faith is in no way prior to the other virtues, and so faith should not
be called the foundation or the substance of the other virtues.

4. Further, things to be hoped for subsist in us more through charity than through faith.
Therefore, the definition under discussion seems to belong to charity rather than to faith.

5. Further, hope is generated from faith, as is evident in the Gloss on Matthew 1:2, since ‘faith’
is posited in the definition of hope. But ‘hope’ is posited in the definition of a thing to be hoped
for. Therefore, if ‘a thing to be hoped for’ is posited in the definition of faith, there will be a
circularity in the definitions–which is absurd, since in that case there will be something that is
prior to and better known than itself. For it will be possible for the same thing to be posited in
the definition of itself when the definitions are substituted for the names [defined], and it will
also be possible for the definitions to be infinite.

6. Further, diverse habits have diverse objects. But a theological virtue has the same thing for
both its end and its object. Therefore, among the theological virtues it is necessary that the
diverse virtues have diverse ends. But a thing to be hoped for is the proper end of hope.
Therefore, ‘a thing to be hoped for’ should not be posited in the definition of faith either as an
object or as an end.

7. Further, faith is perfected more by charity than by hope; that is why it is said to be formed
by charity. Therefore, in the definition of faith one ought to posit the object of charity, which
is a good or a thing to be loved, rather than the object of hope, which is a thing to be hoped
for.

8. Further, faith is related precisely to the articles themselves. But the articles do not all pertain
to things to be hoped for – just one or two do, viz., the resurrection of the flesh and life
everlasting. Therefore, ‘a thing to be hoped for’ should not be posited in the definition of faith.

9. Further, arguing is an act of reason. But faith pertains to things that are beyond reason.
Therefore, it should not be called an argument.

10. Further, in the soul there are two movements, viz., toward the soul and from the soul. Now
in a movement toward the soul the principle is extrinsic, whereas in a movement from the soul
the principle is intrinsic. But it is impossible for the same thing to be both an intrinsic principle
and an extrinsic principle. Therefore, it is impossible for the same movement to be both toward
the soul and from the soul. But cogitation is perfected in a movement toward the soul, whereas
desire is perfected in a movement from the soul. Therefore, neither faith nor anything else can
be both a principle of desire and a principle of cogitation. Therefore, in the definition of faith
it is incorrect to posit both something that pertains to desire, viz., ‘the substance of things to

19
be hoped for’, and something that pertains to cogitation, viz., ‘the argument of things that are
not apparent’.

11. Further, a single habit cannot belong to diverse powers. But the affective power and the
intellective power are diverse powers. Therefore, since faith is a single habit, it cannot pertain
both to cognition and affection; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

12. Further, a single habit has a single act. Therefore, since two acts are being posited in the
definition of faith, viz., (i) to make the things that are hoped for subsist in us, in accord with
which act one says ‘the substance of things to be hoped for’, and (ii) to convince the mind, in
accord with which one says ‘the argument of things that are not apparent’, it seems that faith
is not being correctly described.

13. Further, understanding is prior to desire. But the phrase ‘the substance of things to be
hoped for’ pertains to desire, whereas what is afterwards joined to it, viz., ‘the argument of
things that are not apparent’, pertains to understanding. Therefore, the parts of the definition
in question are incorrectly ordered.

14. Further, what is called an argument is that which induces the mind to assent to something.
But the mind is induced to assent to given things because those things are apparent to it.
Therefore, there seems to be an opposition in the phrase that it is added, when one says ‘the
argument of things that are not apparent’.

15. Further, faith is a kind of cognition. But every cognition is about something that is apparent
to the one who is cognizing. For by means of a cognition something is apparent both in the
sentient part of the soul and in the intellective part of the soul. Therefore, it is inappropriate to
say that faith is of things that are not apparent.
I REPLY:

One should reply that, according to some people, the Apostle intended by this definition to
show not what faith is but rather what faith does.

However, it seems better to reply that this explanation of faith is the most complete definition
of it – not in the sense that it is rendered in the form appropriate to a definition, but rather
because it adequately touches upon all the things that are required for a definition of faith. For
sometimes it is sufficient for even philosophers themselves to touch upon the principles of
[given] syllogisms and definitions, and once these principles are had, it is not difficult to
reduce them to forms that are in keeping with the doctrine of the art [of logic].

Now there are three indications of this point.

I. The first is the fact that all the principles on which the existence of faith depends are touched
upon in the definition under discussion.

For since, as was said above, the condition of one who believes is such that his intellect is
determined to something by his will, whereas the will does nothing except insofar as it is
moved by its object, which is a desirable good and an end, [it follows that] two principles are
required for the end. One [A] is the good that moves the will, and the second [B] is that to
which the intellect assents when the will makes it [assent].

20
A. Now there are two ultimate goods of a human being which move the will primarily as
ultimate ends.

One of these goods is proportionate to human nature, since natural powers are sufficient to
obtain it. And this is the happiness that philosophers have spoken about, be it (i) contemplative
happiness, which consists in the act of wisdom, or (ii) active happiness, which consists
primarily in the act of prudence and derivatively in the acts of the other moral virtues. The
other good for a human being exceeds a proportion to human nature, since natural powers are
not sufficient to obtain it, or even to cogitate about it or desire it; instead, this good is promised
to a human being by God’s liberality alone–1 Corinthians 2:9: “Without you, O God, eye has
not seen the things which you have prepared for those who await you”–and this good is eternal
life. And it is by this good that the will is inclined toward assenting to those things which it
holds on faith; thus it is said in John 6:40, “Whoever sees the Son and believes in him has
eternal life.”

Now nothing can be ordered to an end unless some sort of proportion to the end preexists
in it, a proportion from which there arises in it a desire for the end. And this happens
insofar as a sort of inception of the end comes to exist in it, since it desires nothing except
to the extent that it desires some likeness of that [inception]. And so it is that in human
nature itself there is a sort of inception of that good which is proportionate to [human] nature.
For in human nature there naturally preexist (i) principles of demonstration, known per se,
which are seeds of wisdom, and (ii) certain principles of the natural law, which are seeds of
the moral virtues. Hence, in order for a human being to be ordered toward the good of
eternal life, it is also necessary that a sort of inception of that good should come to exist
in the one who is promised eternal life. But eternal life consists in the full cognition of God,
as is evident from John 17:3: “This is eternal life, that they should know you, the only true
God.” Hence, it is necessary that some inception of this supernatural cognition should
come to exist in us. And this inception comes through faith, which on the basis of an in-
fused light holds fast to things that by nature exceed our cognition.

Now in wholes that have ordered parts it is customary for the first part, in which there
exists an inception of the whole, to be called the substance of the whole, e.g., the founda-
tion of a house and the keel of a ship. This is why the Philosopher claims in Metaphysics
II that if being were a single whole, its first part would be substance. And so it is that
faith, insofar as it is a sort of inception within us of the eternal life that we hope for
because of God’s promise, is called the substance of things to be hoped for. And so here
one touches upon the relation of faith to the good that moves the will when it determines
the intellect.

B. Now the will, moved by the aforementioned good, proposes something that is not apparent
to the intellect as being worthy of its assent, and it determines the intellect to that which is not
apparent in such a way that [the intellect] assents to it. Therefore, just as an intelligible thing
that is seen by the intellect determines the intellect and because of this is said to convince the
mind, so too something that is not apparent to the intellect determines it and induces it
necessarily to assent to it by the very fact that it is accepted by the will. This is why another
reading has ‘conviction’ (convictio), since it convinces the intellect in the way just explained.
And so in saying ‘the argument of things that are not apparent’ one touches upon the relation
of faith to that which the intellect assents to.

So, then, we have (i) the matter or object of faith from the fact that he says ‘about things that
are not apparent’, (ii) the act of faith from the fact that he says ‘the argument’, and (iii) the
ordering of faith to its end from the fact that he says ‘the substance of things to be hoped for’.
21
Now on the basis of the act one also grasps (i) the genus, viz., habit, which is known through
the act, as well as (ii) the subject [of the habit], viz., the mind. And nothing further is required
for the definition of a virtue.

Hence, in accord with what has been said it is easy to formulate the definition in an artful way.
So we may say that faith is a habit of the mind by which eternal life begins in us, a habit which
makes the intellect assent to things that are not apparent.

II. The second indication is that through the definition in question faith is distinguished from
all other things.

For by saying ‘of things that are not apparent’ one distinguishes faith from knowledge
(scientia) and understanding (intellectus). Again, by saying ‘the argument’ one distinguishes
faith from (i) opinion (opinio) and doubt (dubitatio), in which the mind is not convinced, i.e.,
not determined to some one thing, and also from (ii) all habits which are not cognitive. Again,
by saying ‘the substance of things to be hoped for’ one distinguishes [faith in the proper sense]
from (i) faith as it is commonly understood (fides communiter accepta), in accord with which
we are said either to believe that which we strongly opine or to believe in the testimony of
some human being, and also from (ii) prudence (prudentia) and the other cognitive habits,
which are not ordered toward the things to hoped for or which, if they are so ordered, are not
such that a proper inception of the things to be hoped for comes to exist in us through them.

III. The third indication is the fact that none of those who have wanted to define faith has been
able to define it otherwise than by positing this whole definition or some part of it in different
terms.

For when Damascene says, viz., “Faith is the hypostasis of things that are hoped for and the
proof of things that are not seen,” it is manifestly obvious that this is the same thing that the
Apostle says. On the other hand, when Damascene goes on to add, “The unshakable and
unquestionable hope in the things that have been announced to us by God and in the efficacy
of our prayers,” this is a sort of explication of what the Apostle had said, viz., “the substance
of things to be hoped for.” For the things to be hoped for are, first of all, the rewards that have
been promised to us by God and, secondly, any other things we seek from God as necessary
for [obtaining] those rewards, things with respect to which a firm hope is had through faith.
This hope cannot fail, and this is why it is called unshakable; nor can it be justifiably be
reprehended as a vain hope, and this is why it is called unquestionable.

Now when Augustine says, “Faith is a virtue by which things that are not seen are believed,”
and, again, when Damascene says, “Faith is not an examined consent,” and when Hugo of St.
Victor says, “Faith is a sort of certitude of the soul with respect to absent, a certitude that is
superior to opinion and inferior to knowledge,” this is the same thing that the Apostle means
by “the argument of things that are not apparent.” For faith is said to be inferior to knowledge
because, unlike knowledge, it does not include vision, even though it does include firm
adherence; on the other hand, faith is said to be superior to opinion because of the firmness of
the assent. And so faith is said to be inferior to knowledge to the extent that it is of things that
are not apparent, and superior to opinion to the extent that it is an argument. And from what
has been said it is evident [what one should say] about the other [authorities].
Moreover, when Dionysius says, “Faith is the enduring foundation of those who believe,
putting them in the truth and putting the truth in them,” this is the same thing that the Apostle
means by “the substance of things to be hoped for.” For the cognition of truth is a thing to be
hoped for, since beatitude is nothing other than a rejoicing in the truth, as Augustine says in
the Confessions.
22
AD 1. To the first objection one should reply that faith is called a substance not because
it is in the genus of substance, but because it bears a certain similarity to a substance,
viz., insofar as it is a first inception of and, as it were, a sort of foundation for the whole
spiritual life – in just the way that a substance is the foundation of all beings.

AD 2. To the second objection one should reply that the Apostle means to be comparing faith
not to those things that are within us but to those things that are outside us. Now even though
in natural being it is the essence of the soul that is the first thing and the substance with respect
to the powers and the habits and all the resulting things which are in [the soul], one nonetheless
finds a relation to external things not in the essence but primarily in the power; and, similarly,
one finds a relation to external things not in grace [itself] but in virtue, and primarily in faith.
This is why he was not able to say that grace, rather than faith, is the substance of things to be
hoped for.

AD 3. To the third objection one should reply that faith is prior to the other virtues (i) on the
part of its object and (ii) on the part of its power and (iii) on the part of its habit.

It is prior on the part of its object not because it tends toward its object more than the other
virtues do, but because its object naturally moves [the soul] before the object of charity and
the objects of the other virtues do. This is evident from the fact that what is good never moves
the appetite except through the intellect, as is said in On the Soul III. By contrast, in order for
what is true to move the intellect, it does not need any movement on the part of the appetite.
And this is why the act of faith is naturally prior to the act of charity; and the same holds for
the habit of faith, even though [the habit of faith and the habit of charity] exist together when
the faith is formed faith. And for this same reason a cognitive power is naturally prior to an
affective power.

Now faith exists in a cognitive power. This is evident from the fact that the proper object of
faith is the true and not the good. However, faith does in a certain sense have its completion
in the will, as will be explained below in articles 4 and 9.

AD 4. To the fourth objection one should reply that it is already evident from what has been
said that the first inception of the things to be hoped for comes to exist in us not through
charity but through faith. Nor, again, is charity an argument. Thus, the description under dis-
cussion does not in any way belong to charity.

AD 5. To the fifth objection one should reply that since the good that inclines us toward faith
exceeds reason, it does not have a name. And so by a sort of circumlocution one substitutes
‘things to be hoped for’ for [this good]. This frequently happens in definitions.

AD 6. To the sixth objection one should reply that even though every power has an end, which
is its good, nonetheless not every power, but only the will, is related to the nature of an end or
a good insofar as it is good. And this is why the will moves all the other powers; for every
motion begins with the intending of the end. Therefore, even though the true is the end of
faith, still ‘the true’ does not express the nature of an end; hence, it is not the true, but rather
something pertaining to desire, that should be posited as the end of faith.

AD 7. To the seventh objection one should reply that a thing to be loved can be either present
or absent, whereas only what is absent is a thing to be hoped for. Romans 8:24: “For who
hopes for what he sees?” Hence, since faith is of absent things, its end is more properly
expressed by ‘thing to be hoped for’ than by ‘thing to be loved’.

23
AD 8. To the eighth objection one should reply that an article [of the faith] is, as it were, the
matter of faith, whereas a thing to be hoped for is posited not as the matter but as the end.
Hence, the argument does not follow.

AD 9. To the ninth objection one should reply that ‘argument’ (argumentum) is said in
many ways.

For (i) sometimes it signifies the very act of reason by which one reasons discursively
from principles to conclusions. And (ii) because the whole force of an argument consists
in the middle term, the middle term is also sometimes called an argument. Further, (iii)
it is also the case that the introductions to books, which contain a sort of foretaste of the
work that follows, are called arguments. And (iv) because something is made manifest
through an argument, the principle of manifestation, as well as the very light by which
something is cognized, can be called an argument.

And faith can be called an argument in each of these four ways.

It can be called an argument in the first way to the extent that reason assents to something
because it is said by God. And so because of the authority of the speaker an assent is
effected in the one who believes, since in dialectics it is also the case that some arguments
are taken from authority.

Now in the second sense faith is called the argument of things that are not apparent either
(i) to the extent that the faith of believers is a middle term for proving that things that
are not apparent exist, or (ii) to the extent that the faith of our fathers is for us a middle
term that induces us to believe, or (iii) to the extent that faith with respect to one article
is a middle term for faith with respect to another article, in the way that Christ’s
resurrection is a middle term with respect to the general resurrection, as is evident from
1 Corinthians 16:12.

Faith is called an argument in the third sense to the extent that faith is a sort of meager
foretaste of the cognition that we will have in the future.

And faith is called an argument in the fourth sense as regards the light of faith itself,
through which the things believed are cognized. Now faith is said to be beyond reason not
because faith does not involve an act of reason but rather because the reason involved in
faith cannot lead one to see the things which pertain to faith.

AD 10. To the tenth objection one should reply that the act of faith consists essentially in
cognition, and therein lies its perfection as regards its form and species. This is evident from
its object, as was explained in the body of this article. But it is in affection that faith is perfected
as regards its end, since it is because of charity that faith is meritorious with respect to the end.
The inception of faith also lies in affection to the extent that the will determines the intellect
to assent to the things which pertain to faith. But that act of will is neither an act of charity nor
a species of charity, but is instead a certain desire for the promised good. And so it is evident
that faith does not exist in two powers as in a subject.

AD 11. The reply to the eleventh objection is evident from this.

AD 12. To the twelfth objection one should reply that in saying ‘the substance of things to be
hoped for’ one touches upon not the act of faith but only upon its relation to the end. One

24
touches upon the act of faith when one relates faith to its object by saying ‘the argument of
things that are not apparent’.

AD 13. To the thirteenth objection one should reply that that to which the intellect assents
moves the intellect not because of its own power but because of the inclination of the will.
Hence, the good which moves the desire is like a first mover in the act of faith, whereas that
to which the intellect assents is like a moved mover. And this is why in the definition of faith
the relation of faith to the good of the desire is posited before its relation to its proper object.

AD 14. To the fourteenth objection one should reply that faith convinces or induces the mind
not because of the evidentness [evidence] of the matter but rather because of the will’s
inclination, as was explained in the body of this article. Hence, the argument does not follow.

AD 15. To the fifteenth objection one should reply that ‘cognition’ can convey two things,
viz., (i) vision and (ii) assent.

Insofar as it conveys vision, cognition is distinguished from faith. This is why Gregory says
that things that are seen have cognition rather than faith. According to Augustine in On Seeing
God, those things are said to be seen which are present to the senses or to the intellect. But
things that are said to be present to the intellect do not exceed its capacity.
However, as far as the certitude of the assent is concerned, faith is a cognition, a cognition by
virtue of which it can be called a knowledge and a vision, according to 1 Corinthians 13:12:
“We see now darkly through a mirror.” And this is what Augustine says in On Seeing God:
“If it is not improper to say that we know that which we believe most certainly, then from this
it follows that we are rightly said to see with the mind the things that are believed, even though
they are not present to our senses.”

Translated by
Alfred J. Freddoso
University of Notre Dame

25
4. On things not seen as the end of faith.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 14, art. 2, obj. 1 (tr. Alfred
J. Freddoso):

In Hebrews 11:1 the Apostle says that faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the
argument (argumentum) of things that are not apparent.

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 67, art. 3, c. (tr. Laurence Shapcote,
O.P.):

Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is in-
cluded in its definition; faith being defined as “the substance of things to be hoped for, the
evidence of things that appear not” (Heb. 11: 1). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.):
“Where is faith? Believing without seeing.” But it is an imperfect knowledge that is of things
unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith:
therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the
same.

Cf. the first article of the Nicene Creed:

I believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth: of all that is, seen
and unseen.

Now as St. Paul teaches, “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of
things that appear not”—that is, of things unseen. But as the Apostle also teaches, “By faith
we understand that the world was created by the word of God, so that what is seen was made
out of things which do not appear.” (Hebrews 11:3) That is to say, the world was made by
the word of God out of nothing in accordance with the exemplars of each thing, which pre-
existed in the Word.

Now the things which do not appear are the invisible things of God, in accordance with
which we read, “From the creation of the world, the invisible things of God are clearly seen,
being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead”
(Romans 1:20). Hence, “...we look not to the things that are seen but to the things that are
unseen; for the things that are seen are transient, but the things that are unseen are eternal”
(2 Cor. 4:18). But chief among these things is eternal life; for, as St. Thomas states:

1 Corinthians 2:9: “Without you, O God, eye has not seen the things which you have prepared
for those who await you”–and this good is eternal life. And it is by this good that the will is
inclined toward assenting to those things which it holds on faith; thus it is said in John 6:40,
“Whoever sees the Son and believes in him has eternal life.”

26
5. The ordered arrangement of nature as pointing to the existence of God.

Cf. Dionysius the Areopagite, Ep. IX, To Titus, Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, tr.
Colm Luibheid, p. 284:

2. As Paul said and as true reason has said, the ordered arrangement of the whole visible
realm makes known the invisible things of God.3
3
Rom 1:20. [= “From the creation of the world, the invisible things of God are clearly seen,
being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead.”]

Cf. Wisd.13:1-2:

But all men are vain, in whom there is not the knowledge of God: and who by these good
things that are seen, could not understand him that is, neither by attending to the works have
acknowledged who was the workman: but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the
swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon, to be the gods that
rule the world.

Cf. Eusebius of Caesarea: Praeparatio Evangelica (Preparation for the Gospel). Tr. E.H.
Gifford (1903) Book III, Chapter XIV:

So great is the dissonance of the first physical philosophers: such too is their opinion
concerning first principles, assuming, as they did, no god, no maker, no artificer, nor any cause
of the universe, nor yet gods, nor incorporeal powers, no intelligent natures, no rational
essences, nor anything at all beyond the reach of the senses, in their first principles. In fact
Anaxagoras alone is mentioned as the first of the Greeks who declared in his discourses about
first principles that mind is the cause of all things. They say at least that this philosopher had
a great admiration for natural science beyond all who were before him: …and was the first of
the Greeks who stated clearly the doctrine of first principles. For he not only pronounced, like
those before him, on the essence of all things, but also on the cause which set it in motion.
‘“For in the beginning,” he said, “all things were mingled together in confusion: but mind
came in, and brought them out of confusion into order.’” (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Suppl., q. 74, art. 2, obj. 3 (tr. Laurence Shapcote,
O.P.):

Objection 3: Further, this cleansing would seem to consist in purifying the parts of the world
by separating them from one another. Now the separation of the parts of the world from one
another at the world’s beginning was effected by God’s power alone, for the work of
distinction was carried out by that power: wherefore Anaxagoras asserted that the separation
was effected by the act of the intellect which moves all things (cf. Aristotle, Phys. viii, 9).1
Therefore it would seem that at the end of the world the cleansing will be done immediately
by God and not by fire. (emphasis added)

1
On the other hand, “Instead of defining this intellect, which he considered to be separate, as the universal
principle of being, he makes it to be only a distinguishing principle, for he did not hold that the bodies that
were mixed with one another, received being (esse) from the separate intellect; they received from it only
distinctions.” (St. Thomas Aquinas. Treatise on Separate Substances. Translated by F. J. Lescoe (West Hart-
ford, CT, 1959), Chapter I, n. 3) (emphasis added)

27
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, The Catechism of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Apostle’s Creed. In The
Catechetical Instructions of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated with a Commentary by Rev.
Joseph B. Collins, S.S., D.D., Ph.D. Introduction by Rev. Rudolph G. Bandas, Ph.D., S.T.D.
et M. (Baltimore, 1939), What is Faith?, pp 5-8:

The Catechism of St. Thomas Aquinas

The Apostles’ Creed

WHAT IS FAITH?

The Nature and Effects of Faith.—The first thing that is necessary for every Christian is faith,
without which no one is truly called a faithful Christian.[1] Faith brings about four good
effects. The first is that through faith the soul is united to God, and by it there is between the
soul and God a union akin to marriage. “I will espouse thee in faith.”[2] When a man is
baptized the first question that is asked him is: “Do you believe in God?”[3] This is because
Baptism is the first Sacrament of faith. Hence, the Lord said: “He that believeth and is baptized
shall be saved.”[4] Baptism without faith is of no value. Indeed, it must be known that no one
is acceptable before God unless he have faith. “Without faith it is impossible to please
God.”[5] St. Augustine explains these words of St. Paul, “All that is not of faith is sin,”[6] in
this way: “Where there is no knowledge of the eternal and unchanging Truth,
virtue even in the midst of the best moral life is false.”

The second effect of faith is that eternal life is already begun in us; for eternal life is nothing
else than knowing God. This the Lord announced when He said: “This is eternal life, that they
may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent.”[7] This knowledge
of God begins here through faith, but it is perfected the future life when we shall know God
as He is. Therefore, St. Paul says: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.”[8] No one
then can arrive at perfect happiness of heaven, which is the true knowledge of God, unless
first he knows God through faith. “Blessed are they that have not seen and have believed.”[9]

The third good that comes from faith is that right direction which it gives to our present life.
Now, in order that one live a good life, it is necessary that he know what is necessary to live
rightly; and if he depends for all this required knowledge on his own efforts alone, either he
will never attain such knowledge, or if so, only after a long time. But faith teaches us all that
is necessary to live a good life.

It teaches us that there is one God who is the rewarder of good and the punisher of evil; that
there is a life other than this one, and other like truths whereby we are attracted to live rightly
and to avoid what evil. “The just man liveth by faith.”[10] This is evident in that no one of the
philosophers before the coming of Christ could, through his own powers, know God and the
means necessary for salvation as well as any old woman since Christ’s coming knows Him
through faith. And, therefore, it is said in Isaias that “the earth is filled with the knowledge of
the Lord.”[11]

The fourth effect of faith is that by it we overcome temptations: “The holy ones by faith
conquered kingdoms.”[12] We know that every temptation is either from the world or the flesh
or the devil. The devil would have us disobey God and not be subject to Him. This is removed
by faith, since through it we know that He is the Lord of all things and must therefore be
obeyed. “Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may
devour. Whom resist ye, strong in faith.”[13] [5-6]

28
The world tempts us either by attaching us to it in prosperity, or by filling us with fear of
adversity. But faith overcomes this in that we believe in a life to come better than this one, and
hence we despise the riches of this world and we are not terrified in the face of adversity. “This
is the victory which overcometh the world: our faith.”[14] The flesh, however, tempts us by
attracting us to the swiftly passing pleasures of this present life. But faith shows us that, if we
cling to these things inordinately, we shall lose eternal joys. “In all things taking the shield of
faith.”[15] We see from this that it is very necessary to have faith.

“The Evidence of Things that Appear Not.”—But someone will say that it is foolish to believe
what is not seen, and that one should not believe in things that he cannot see. I answer by
saying that the imperfect nature of our intellect takes away the basis of this difficulty. For if
man of himself could in a perfect manner know all things visible and invisible, it would indeed
be foolish to believe what he does not see. But our manner of knowing is so weak that no
philosopher could perfectly investigate the nature of even one little fly. We even read that a
certain philosopher spent thirty years in solitude in order to know the nature of the bee. If,
therefore, our intellect is so weak, it is foolish to be willing to believe concerning God only
that which man can know by himself alone. And against this is the word of Job: “Behold, God
is great, exceeding our knowledge.”[16] One can also answer this question by supposing that
a certain master had said something concerning his own special branch of knowledge, and
some uneducated person would contradict him for no other reason than that he could not
understand what the master said! Such a person would be considered very foolish. So, the
intellect of the Angels as greatly exceeds the intellect of the greatest philosopher as much as
that of the greatest philosopher exceeds the intellect of the uneducated man. Therefore, the
philosopher is foolish if he refuses to believe what an Angel says, and far greater fool to refuse
to believe what God says. Against such are these words: “For many things are shown to thee
above the understanding of men.”[17] Then, again, if one were willing to believe only those
things which one knows with certitude, one could not live in this world. How could one live
unless one believed others? How could one know that this man is one’s own father? Therefore,
it is necessary that one believe others in matters which one cannot know perfectly for oneself.
But no one is so worthy of belief as is God, and hence they who do not believe the words of
faith are not wise, but foolish and proud. As the Apostle says: “He is proud, knowing
nothing.”[18] And also: “I know whom I have believed; and I am certain.”[19] And it is
written: “Ye who fear the Lord, believe Him and your reward shall not be made void.”[20]

Finally, one can say also that God proves the truth of the things which faith teaches. Thus, if
a king sends letters signed with his seal, no one would dare to say that those letters did not
represent the will of the king. In like manner, everything that the Saints believed and handed
down to us concerning the faith of Christ is signed with the seal of God. This seal consists of
those works which no mere creature could accomplish; they are the miracles by which Christ
confirmed the sayings of the apostles and of the Saints. If, however, you would say that no
one has witnessed these miracles, I would reply in this manner. It is a fact that the entire world
worshipped idols and that the faith of Christ was persecuted, as the histories of the pagans also
testify. But now all are turned to Christ—wise men and noble and rich—converted by the
words of the poor and simple preachers of Christ. Now, this fact was either miracle or it was
not. If it is miraculous, you have what you asked for, a visible fact; if it is not, then there could
not be a greater miracle than that the whole world should have been converted without [6-7]
miracles. And we need go no further. We are more certain, therefore, in believing the things
of faith than those things which can be seen, because God’s knowledge never deceives us, but
the visible sense of man is often in error.[21]

(For “Questions for Discussion” see Chapter 6.)

29
ENDNOTES

1. “The Catechism of the Council of Trent,” known as the “Roman Catechism” (and so called
throughout this book), thus introduces the explanation of the twelve Articles of the Creed:
“The Christian religion proposes to the faithful many truths which either singly or all
together must be held with a certain and firm faith. That which must first and necessarily
be believed by all is that which God Himself has taught us as the foundation of truth and
its summary concerning the unity of the Divine Essence, the distinction of Three Persons,
and the actions which are by particular reason attributed to each. The pastor should teach
that the Apostles’ Creed briefly sets forth the doctrine of these mysteries. . . . The Apostles’
Creed is divided into three principal parts. The first part describes the First Person of the
Divine Nature and the marvellous work of the creation. The second part treats of the Second
Person and the mystery of man’s redemption. The third part concludes with the Third Person,
the head and source of our sanctification. The varied and appropriate propositions of the
Creed are called Articles, after a comparison often made by the Fathers; for just as the
members of the body are divided by joints (articuli), so in this profusion of faith whatever
must be distinctly and separately believed from everything else is rightly and aptly called
an Article” (Part I, Chapter I, 4).
2. Osee, ii. 20
3. In the ceremony of administering The Sacrament of Baptism, the priest asks the Sponsor:
N., do you believe in God the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth?”
4. Mark, xvi. 16.
5. Heb., xi. 6.
6. Rom., xiv. 23.
7. John, xvii. 3.
8. Heb., xi. 1.
9. John, xx. 29.
10. Hab., ii. 4.
11. Isa., xi. 9. [7-8]
12 Heb., xi. 33.
13. I Peter v. 8.
14. I John, v. 4.
15. Eph., vi. 16.
16. Job, xxxvi. 26.
17. Ecclus., iii. 25.
18. I Tim., vi. 4.
19. II Tim., i. 12.
20. Ecclus., ii. 8.
21. For the meaning of the word “faith” see the “Catholic Encyclopedia,” vol. V. The necessity
of faith is explained in St. Thomas, “Summa Theologica,” II-II, Q. ii., 3, 4.

30
Cf. IIa-IIae, q. 1

Article One

Whether the Object of Faith is the First Truth

We proceed to the first article thus:

1. It seems that the object of faith is not the first truth. For whatever is proposed for our belief
would seem to be the object of faith, and there are proposed for our belief not only things
pertaining to the Godhead, which is the first truth, but also things pertaining to the humanity
of Christ, to the sacraments of the Church, and to the condition of creatures. Hence not only
the first truth is the object of faith.

2. Again, faith and unbelief have the same object, since they are opposites. Now there can be
unbelief concerning everything in sacred Scripture, since a man is called an unbeliever if he
disbelieves anything which is therein contained. It follows that faith is likewise concerned
with everything in sacred Scripture, which contains many things relating to men, and to other
creatures also. Hence the object of faith is not only the first truth, but also the truth about
creatures.

3. Again, it was said in 12ae, Q. 62, Art. 3, that faith is condivided with charity. Now by charity
we not only love God, who is the supreme good, but love our neighbour also. Hence the object
of faith is not only the first truth.

On the other hand: Dionysius says (In Div. Nom., lect. 5): “Faith is in the simple and eternal
truth.” Now this is the first truth. The object of faith is therefore the first truth.

I answer: the object of any cognitive habit is twofold. It includes what is known materially as
a material object, and also that through which it is known, this being the formal meaning of
its object. In the science of geometry, for example, the conclusions are known materially,
while the principles of demonstration whereby the conclusions are known are the formal
meaning of the science. Now if we are thinking of the formal meaning of the object of
faith, this is nothing other than the first truth. For the faith of which we are speaking
does not assent to anything except on the ground that it is revealed by God. The ground
upon which faith stands is therefore divine truth. But if we are thinking in a concrete way
about the things to which faith gives its assent, these include not only God himself, but many
other things. Such other things, however, are held in faith only because they relate to God
in some way, that is to say, in so far as certain effects of the Godhead are an aid to man
in his endeavour after the enjoyment of God. Thus the object of faith is still in a sense
the first truth, since nothing is an object of faith unless it relates to God; just as the object
of medicine is health, since nothing is considered to be medicine unless it relates to health.

On the first point: the things which pertain to the humanity of Christ, or to the sacraments of
the Church, or to any creature whatsoever, are included in the object of faith in so far as we
are directed by them to God, and in so far as we assent to them on account of the divine truth.

The second point, concerning all the matters related in sacred Scripture, is answered in the
same way.

31
 On the third point: by charity we love our neighbour for God’s sake. Hence the object of
charity is properly God, as we shall affirm later.

Article 2

Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?

Objection: 1. It would seem that the object of faith is not something complex by way of a
proposition. For the object of faith is the First Truth, as stated above (Article [1]). Now the
First Truth is something simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.

2. Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol. Now the symbol does not contain
propositions, but things: for it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: “I believe in God
. . . almighty.” Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a thing.

3. Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1Co 13,12: “We see now through a glass
in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I
am known.” But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is the Divine
Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.

On the contrary Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the mean is in the same
genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and opinion are about propositions, it seems that
faith is likewise about propositions; so that its object is something complex.

I answer that The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now
the mode proper to the human intellect is to know the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated
in the FP, Question [85], Article [5]. Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known
by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other hand, the Divine
intellect knows, without any complexity, things that are complex in themselves. Accordingly
the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First, as regards the thing itself which is
believed, and thus the object of faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which
we have faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the object of faith is
something complex by way of a proposition. Hence in the past both opinions have been held
with a certain amount of truth.

Reply to Objection: 1. This argument considers the object of faith on the part of the thing
believed.

2. The symbol mentions the things about which faith is, in so far as the act of the believer is
terminated in them, as is evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the
believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in science we do not form
propositions, except in order to have knowledge about things through their means, so is it in
faith.

2. The object of the heavenly vision will be the First Truth seen in itself, according to 1Jn 3,2:
“We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as
He is”: hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way of a simple
understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself.
Hence the comparison fails.

32
Article 3

Whether anything false can come under faith?

Objection: 1. It would seem that something false can come under faith. For faith is condivided
with hope and charity. Now something false can come under hope, since many hope to have
eternal life, who will not obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as
being good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be the object of
faith.

2. Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born, according to Jn 8,56: “Abraham your
father rejoiced that he might see My day: he saw it, and was glad.” But after the time of
Abraham, God might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He did,
so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false. Therefore the object of
faith can be something false.

3. Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of Christ, and many continued so to believe,
until they heard the preaching of the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before
He began to preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore something false can
come under faith.

4. Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe that the true Body of Christ is
contained in the Sacrament of the altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly
consecrated, and that there was not Christ’s true Body there, but only bread. Therefore
something false can come under faith.

On the contrary No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to the false, considered as the
evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects
the intellect, as we shall show further on (Question [4], Articles [2],5). Therefore nothing false
can come under it.

I answer that Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by means of the formal
aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen except by means of light, and a conclusion
cannot be known save through the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated (Article [1])
that the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that nothing can come under
faith, save in so far as it stands under the First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as
neither can non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows therefore that
nothing false can come under faith.

Reply to Objection: 1. Since the true is the good of the intellect, but not of the appetitive power,
it follows that all virtues which perfect the intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it
belongs to the nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other hand those
virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not entirely exclude the false, for it is possible
to act in accordance with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what one
is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and charity perfect the
appetitive part, the comparison between them fails. Nevertheless neither can anything false
come under hope, for a man hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this
would be an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he perseveres therein he
will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly. In like manner it belongs to charity to love God,
wherever He may be; so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual whom
we love for God’s sake.

33
2. That “God would not take flesh,” considered in itself was possible even after Abraham’s
time, but in so far as it stands in God’s foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infal-
libility, as explained in the FP, Question [14], Articles [13],15: and it is thus that it comes
under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it cannot be false.

3. After Christ’s birth, to believe in Him, was to believe in Christ’s birth at some time or other.
The fixing of the time, wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a human
conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion through a human conjecture,
but it is quite impossible for a false opinion to be the outcome of faith.

3. The faith of the believer is not directed to such and such accidents of bread, but to the fact
that the true body of Christ is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly
consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow that anything false comes
under faith.

Article 4

Whether the object of faith can be something seen?

Objection: 1. It would seem that the object of faith is something seen. For our Lord said to
Thomas (Jn 20,29): “Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed.” Therefore
vision and faith regard the same object.

2. Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of faith, says (1Co 13,12): “We see
now through a glass in a dark manner.” Therefore what is believed is seen.

3. Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen under every light. Therefore faith
is of things seen.

4. Further, “Every sense is a kind of sight,” as Augustine states (De Verb. Domini, Serm.
xxxiii). But faith is of things heard, according to Rm 10,17: “Faith . . . cometh by hearing.”
Therefore faith is of things seen.

On the contrary The Apostle says (He 11,1) that “faith is the evidence of things that appear
not.”

I answer that Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is believed. Now the intellect
assents to a thing in two ways. First, through being moved to assent by its very object, which
is known either by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the habit of
understanding), or through something else already known (as in the case of conclusions which
are held by the habit of science). Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being
sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an act of choice, whereby it
turns voluntarily to one side rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or
fear of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear of the
other side, there will be faith. Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move
the intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident that neither faith nor
opinion can be of things seen either by the senses or by the intellect.

Reply to Objection: 1. Thomas “saw one thing, and believed another” [*St. Gregory: Hom.
xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him to be God, he made profession of his faith,
saying: “My Lord and my God.”
34
2. Those things which come under faith can be considered in two ways. First, in particular;
and thus they cannot be seen and believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in
general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are seen by the
believer. For he would not believe unless, on the evidence of signs, or of something similar,
he saw that they ought to be believed.

3. The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For just as, by the habits of the other virtues,
man sees what is becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith, the human
mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming to a right faith, and not to assent to
others.

4. Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith, but not of the things themselves that are
believed; hence it does not follow that these things are seen.

Article 5

Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science [*Science is certain
knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration]?

Objection: 1. It would seem that those things that are of faith can be an object of science. For
where science is lacking there is ignorance, since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now
we are not in ignorance of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of such things
savors of unbelief, according to 1Tm 1,13: “I did it ignorantly in unbelief.” Therefore things
that are of faith can be an object of science.

2. Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers employ reasons to inculcate
things that are of faith. Therefore such things can be an object of science.

3. Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of science, since a “demonstration is
a syllogism that produces science.” Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by
the philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth. Therefore things that
are of faith can be an object of science.

4. Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since faith is said to stand between
opinion and science. Now opinion and science can, in a way, be about the same object, as
stated in Poster. i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also.

On the contrary Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that “when a thing is manifest, it is the
object, not of faith, but of perception.” Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of
perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception. Therefore there
can be no faith about things which are an object of science.

I answer that All science is derived from self-evident and therefore “seen” principles;
wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a fashion, seen. Now as stated above (Article
[4]), it is impossible that one and the same thing should be believed and seen by the same
person. Hence it is equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of science
and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that a thing which is an object of
vision or science for one, is believed by another: since we hope to see some day what we now
believe about the Trinity, according to 1Co 13,12: “We see now through a glass in a dark
manner; but then face to face”: which vision the angels possess already; so that what we
believe, they see. In like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or scientific
35
knowledge for one man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of faith,
because he does not know it by demonstration. Nevertheless that which is proposed to be
believed equally by all, is equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things
which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about the same things.

Reply to Objection: 1. Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of faith, for neither do
they see or know them in themselves, nor do they know them to be credible. The faithful, on
the other hand, know them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes
them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (Article [4], ad 2,3).

2. The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstrations;
they are either persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not
impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from the authority
of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is
as well proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles
is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at the outset of this work
(FP, Question [1], Article [2]).

3. Things which can be proved by demonstration are reckoned among the articles of faith, not
because they are believed simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to
matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration must know them first
of all by faith.

4. As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), “science and opinion about the same object can certainly
be in different men,” as we have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one
and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing relatively, i.e. in relation to
the object, but not in the same respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and
the same object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like manner, one may know
by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith, the Trinity. On the other hand, in
one and the same man, about the same object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible
with either opinion or faith, yet for different reasons. Because science is incompatible with
opinion about the same object simply, for the reason that science demands that its object
should be deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object
should be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of
the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why science
and faith cannot be about the same object and in the same respect is because the object of
science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above.

Article 6

Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain articles?

Objection: 1. It would seem that those things that are of faith should not be divided into certain
articles. For all things contained in Holy Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their
multitude, cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous to
distinguish certain articles of faith.

36
 2. Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely, and therefore art should take no
notice of them. Now the formal aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated
above (Article [1]), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be distinguished in
respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice should be taken of a material division of
matters of faith into articles.

3. Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that “an article
is an indivisible truth concerning God, exacting [arctans] our belief.” Now belief is a voluntary
act, since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), “no man believes against his will.”
Therefore it seems that matters of faith should not be divided into articles.

On the contrary Isidore says: “An article is a glimpse of Divine truth, tending thereto.” Now
we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth by way of analysis, since things which in God are
one, are manifold in our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into articles.

I answer that the word “article” is apparently derived from the Greek; for the Greek (arthron)
[*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which the Latin renders “articulus,” signifies a
fitting together of distinct parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are
called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar, articles are parts of
speech which are affixed to words to show their gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric,
articles are parts that fit together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is
composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: “Your passion, your voice,
your look, have struck terror into your foes.” Hence matters of Christian faith are said to
contain distinct articles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the
object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated above (Article [4]).
Consequently any matter that, for a special reason, is unseen, is a special article; whereas
when several matters are known or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to
distinguish various articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God suffered,
and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead, wherefore the article of the
Resurrection is distinct from the article of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was
buried, present the same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to accept the
others; wherefore all these belong to one article.

Reply to Objection: 1. Some things are proposed to our belief are in themselves of faith, while
others are of faith, not in themselves but only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain
propositions are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in order to
manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists in those things which we hope
to see, according to He 11,2: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for,” it follows
that those things are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal life. Such are
the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons,
the omnipotence of God, etc.], the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation, and the like: and these
are distinct articles of faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed
to our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation of those
mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again
at the touch of Eliseus’ bones, and the like, which are related in Holy Writ for the purpose
of manifesting the Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should
not form distinct articles.1

1
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., q. 1, art. 3: Whether this science is speculative or practical (tr. Br. Alexis
Bugnolo): [cont.]

37
2. The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken in two ways: first, on the part of the
thing believed, and thus there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth:
and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles. Secondly, the formal aspect of
matters of faith, can be considered from our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a
matter of faith is that it is something unseen; and from this point of view there are various
distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.

3. This definition of an article is taken from an etymology of the word as derived from the
Latin, rather than in accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it
does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that although faith is exacted of no
man by a necessity of coercion, since belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a
necessity of end, since “he that cometh to God must believe that He is,” and “without faith it
is impossible to please God,” as the Apostle declares (He 11,6).

Article 7

Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?

Objection: 1. It would seem that the articles of faith have not increased in course of time.
Because, as the Apostle says (He 11,1), “faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” Now
the same things are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same things are to
be believed.

2. Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised by man, on account of the lack
of knowledge in those who discovered them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now
the doctrine of faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated in Ep
2,8: “It is the gift of God.” Since then there can be no lack of knowledge in God, it seems that
knowledge of matters of faith was perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time
went on.

3. Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly fashion no less than the operation of
nature. Now nature always makes a beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De
Consol. iii). Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with perfect things, so
that those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it most perfectly.

4. Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us through the apostles, so too, in the
Old Testament, the knowledge of faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came
later, according to Dt 32,7: “Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee.” Now the apostles
were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for “they received them more fully than others,
even as they received them earlier,” as a gloss says on Rm 8,23: “Ourselves also who have the
first fruits of the Spirit.” Therefore it seems that knowledge of matters of faith has not
increased as time went on.

On the contrary Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that “the knowledge of the holy fathers

And as for what is raised in objection, that this science concerns itself with particulars, it is to be said
that it is not concerned with particulars insofar as they are particulars, but insofar as they are examples
of how actions should be done: and this is also used in moral science; because the operations of
particulars are concerned with particulars; hence things pertaining to morals are shown more clearly by
way of particular examples.

38
increased as time went on . . . and the nearer they were to Our Savior’s coming, the more fully
did they received the mysteries of salvation.”

I answer that The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the doctrine of faith, as
self-evident principles to a teaching based on natural reason. Among these principles
there is a certain order, so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles
are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: “The same thing cannot be affirmed
and denied at the same time,” as the Philosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like
manner all the articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such
as God’s existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according to He 11:
“He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek
Him.” For the existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God eternally, and
in these our happiness consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things
which God dispenses in time, for man’s salvation, and which are the way to that happi-
ness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are contained
in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation of
Christ, His Passion and so forth. Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the subs-
tance of the articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on: since what-
ever those who lived later have believed, was contained, albeit implicitly, in the faith of those
Fathers who preceded them. But there was an increase in the number of articles believed ex-
plicitly, since to those who lived in later times some were known explicitly which were not
known explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex 6,2-3):
“I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg.: ‘I am the Lord that
appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob’] . . . and My name Adonai I did not show them”:
David also said (Ps 118,100): “I have had understanding above ancients”: and the Apostle
says (Ep 3,5) that the mystery of Christ, “in other generations was not known, as it is now
revealed to His holy apostles and prophets.”

Reply to Objection: 1. Among men the same things were always to be hoped for from Christ.
But as they did not acquire this hope save through Christ, the further they were removed from
Christ in point of time, the further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the
Apostle says (He 11,13): “All these died according to faith, not having received the promises,
but beholding them afar off.” Now the further off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen;
wherefore those who were nigh to Christ’s advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good
things to be hoped for.

2. Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the part of the teacher, be he one or
many, who makes progress in knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that
takes place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner; thus the master,
who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver it all at once to his disciple from the
very outset, for he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple’s
capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men made progress in the
knowledge of faith as time went on. Hence the Apostle (Ga 3,24) compares the state of the
Old Testament to childhood.

2. Two causes are requisite before actual generation can take place, an agent, namely,
and matter. In the order of the active cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in
this way nature makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not brought
to perfection, except by something perfect already in existence. On the other hand, in the
order of the material cause, the imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from
the imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the active cause, having
perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is likened to matter in receiving the influx of
39
God’s action. Hence, among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from imperfection to
perfection; and, although some men have been after the manner of active causes, through being
doctors of faith, nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for the
common good, according to 1Co 12,7; so that the knowledge of faith was imparted to the
Fathers who were instructors in the faith, so far as was necessary at the time for the instruction
of the people, either openly or in figures.

3. The ultimate consummation of grace was effected by Christ, wherefore the time of His
coming is called the “time of fulness [*Vulg.: ‘fulness of time’]” (Ga 4,4). Hence those who
were nearest to Christ, wherefore before, like John the Baptist, or after, like the apostles, had
a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith; for even with regard to man’s state we find that
the perfection of manhood comes in youth, and that a man’s state is all the more perfect,
whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his youth.

40
Cf. IIa-IIae, q. 4

OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first place, faith itself; secondly,
those who have faith; thirdly, the cause of faith; fourthly, its effects.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) What is faith?

(2) In what power of the soul does it reside?
(3) Whether its form is charity?
(4) Whether living [formata] faith and lifeless [informis] faith are one identically?
(5) Whether faith is a virtue?
(6) Whether it is one virtue?
(7) Of its relation to the other virtues;
(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual virtues.

Article 1

Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped
for, the evidence of things that appear not?”

Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting definition of faith (Heb. 11:1)
when he says: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that
appear not.” For no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a theological
virtue, as stated above (FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore it is not a substance.

Objection 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now things to be hoped for are
the object of hope. Therefore they should not be included in a definition of faith, as though
they were its object.

Objection 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope, since charity is the
form of faith, as we shall state further on (A[3]). Therefore the definition of faith should have
included the thing to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.

Objection 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different genera. Now
“substance” and “evidence” are different genera, and neither is subalternate to the other.
Therefore it is unfitting to state that faith is both “substance” and “evidence.”

Objection 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which it is adduced. Now
a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a
contradiction to speak of “evidence of things that appear not”: and so faith is unfittingly
defined.

On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suffices.

I answer that, Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are not a definition of
faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this definition overlooks none of the points in
reference to which faith can be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the
form of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles of the syllogism, without
employing the syllogistic form.

41
In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are known by their acts, and acts
by their objects, faith, being a habit, should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper
object. Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q[2], AA[2],3), which is an act
of the intellect determinate to one object of the will’s command. Hence an act of faith is
related both to the object of the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the
intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a theological virtue, as stated above
(FS, Q[62], A[2]), has one same thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity,
be in proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated (Q[1], AA[1],4) that the object
of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it
must needs be under the aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the
act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:25):
“We hope for that which we see not”: because to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes
not for what one has already, but for what one has not, as stated above (FS, Q[67], A[4]).
Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is the object of the will, is indicated
by the words: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” For we are wont to call by
the name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when the whole subsequent
thing is virtually contained in the first beginning; for instance, we might say that the first
self-evident principles are the substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in
us the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained in them virtually.
In this way then faith is said to be the “substance of things to be hoped for,” for the reason that
in us the first beginning of things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of faith, which
contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through
seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made evident when we were
speaking of happiness (FS, Q[3], A[8]; FS, Q[4], A[3]).

The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect, considered as the object
of faith, is indicated by the words, “evidence of things that appear not,” where “evi-
dence” is taken for the result of evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere to
a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth of faith is
called “evidence” here. Hence another reading has “conviction,” because to wit, the intellect
of the believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it sees not.
Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to the form of a definition, he
may say that “faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the
intellect assent to what is non-apparent.” In this way faith is distinguished from all other
things pertaining to the intellect. For when we describe it as “evidence,” we distinguish it from
opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect adhere to anything firmly; when
we go on to say, “of things that appear not,” we distinguish it from science and understanding,
the object of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is “the substance of things
to be hoped for,” we distinguish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called, which has
no reference to the beatitude we hope for.

Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of this one given by the Apostle.
For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.: QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that “faith is a virtue
whereby we believe what we do not see,” and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11)
that “faith is an assent without research,” and when others say that “faith is that certainty of
the mind about absent things which surpasses opinion but falls short of science,” these all
amount to the same as the Apostle’s words: “Evidence of things that appear not”; and when
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that “faith is the solid foundation of the believer, establishing
him in the truth, and showing forth the truth in him,” comes to the same as “substance of things
to be hoped for.”

42
 Reply to Objection 1: “Substance” here does not stand for the supreme genus condivided
with the other genera, but for that likeness to substance which is found in each genus,
inasmuch as the first thing in a genus contains the others virtually and is said to be the
substance thereof.

Reply to Objection 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by the will, it must
needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects of those virtues which perfect the will, among
which is hope, as we shall prove further on (Q[18], A[1]). For this reason the definition of
faith includes the object of hope.

Reply to Objection 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the present and of the
absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so adapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for,
since hope is always of the absent and the unseen.

Reply to Objection 4: “Substance” and “evidence” as included in the definition of faith, do

not denote various genera of faith, nor different acts, but different relationships of one act to
different objects, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a thing, make it apparent,
whereas evidence taken from Divine authority does not make a thing apparent in itself, and
such is the evidence referred to in the definition of faith.

Whether faith resides in the intellect?

Article 2

Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the intellect. For Augustine says (De
Praedest. Sanct. v) that “faith resides in the believer’s will.” Now the will is a power distinct
from the intellect. Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds from the will obeying
God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its praise to obedience. Now obedience is in the
will. Therefore faith is in the will, and not in the intellect.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical. Now faith is not in the
speculative intellect, since this is not concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated
in De Anima iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas “faith . . . worketh by
charity” (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is it in the practical intellect, the object of which is some
true, contingent thing, that can be made or done. For the object of faith is the Eternal Truth, as
was shown above (Q[1], A[1]). Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.

On the contrary, Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: “We
see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face.” Now vision is in the intellect.
Therefore faith is likewise.

I answer that, Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be perfect. Now, for the perfection of
an act proceeding from two active principles, each of these principles must be perfect: for it is
not possible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the art, and the saw be well
fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the soul, which is related to opposite objects, a
disposition to act well is a habit, as stated above (FS, Q[49], A[4], ad 1,2,3). Wherefore an act
that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected by a habit residing in each of them.
43
Again, it has been stated above (Q[2], AA[1],2) that to believe is an act of the intellect
inasmuch as the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will and the intellect,
both of which have a natural aptitude to be perfected in this way. Consequently, if the act of
faith is to be perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the intellect: even as
there needs to be the habit of prudence in the reason, besides the habit of temperance in the
concupiscible faculty, in order that the act of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is
immediately an act of the intellect, because the object of that act is “the true,” which pertains
properly to the intellect. Consequently faith, which is the proper principle of that act, must
needs reside in the intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which is described as depending
on the believer’s will, in so far as his intellect assents to matters of faith at the command of
the will.

Reply to Objection 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey but also the intellect
needs to be well disposed to follow the command of the will, even as the concupiscible faculty
needs to be well disposed in order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to be
a habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the assenting intellect.

Reply to Objection 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as evidenced by its object. But
since this object, which is the First Truth, is the end of all our desires and actions, as Augustine
proves (De Trin. i, 8), it follows that faith worketh by charity just as “the speculative intellect
becomes practical by extension” (De Anima iii, 10).

Whether charity is the form of faith?

Article 3

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the form of faith. For each thing derives its
species from its form. When therefore two things are opposite members of a division, one
cannot be the form of the other. Now faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of a
division, as different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore charity is not the form of faith.

Objection 2: Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are in one subject, since
together they form one simply. Now faith is in the intellect, while charity is in the will.
Therefore charity is not the form of faith.

Objection 3: Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now obedience, rather than
charity, seems to be the principle of believing, on the part of the will, according to Rom. 1:5:
“For obedience to the faith in all nations.” Therefore obedience rather than charity, is the form
of faith.

On the contrary, Each thing works through its form. Now faith works through charity.
Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.

I answer that, As appears from what has been said above (FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, Q[18], A[6]),
voluntary acts take their species from their end which is the will’s object. Now that which
gives a thing its species, is after the manner of a form in natural things. Wherefore the form of
any voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to which that act is directed, both because it takes
its species therefrom, and because the mode of an action should correspond proportionately to
the end. Now it is evident from what has been said (A[1]), that the act of faith is directed to
44
the object of the will, i.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which is the end of faith, viz.
the Divine Good, is the proper object of charity. Therefore charity is called the form of faith
in so far as the act of faith is perfected and formed by charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it quickens the act of faith.
Now nothing hinders one act from being quickened by different habits, so as to be reduced to
various species in a certain order, as stated above (FS, Q[18], AA[6],7; FS, Q[61], A[2]) when
we were treating of human acts in general.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But it is not thus that charity
is the form of faith, but in the sense that it quickens the act of faith, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever other virtue might
precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity, as we shall show further on (Q[23], A[8]),
and consequently charity is spoken of as the form of faith.

Whether lifeless faith can become living, or living faith, lifeless?

Article 4

Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith does not become living, or living faith lifeless.
For, according to 1 Cor. 13:10, “when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall
be done away.” Now lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living faith. Therefore when
living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, so that they are not one identical habit.

Objection 2: Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now lifeless faith is dead,
according to James 2:20: “Faith without works is dead.” Therefore lifeless faith cannot become
living.

Objection 3: Further, God’s grace, by its advent, has no less effect in a believer than in an
unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it causes the habit of faith. Therefore when it
comes to a believer, who hitherto had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of faith
in him.

Objection 4: Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), “accidents cannot be altered.” Now
faith is an accident. Therefore the same faith cannot be at one time living, and at another,
lifeless.

On the contrary, A gloss on the words, “Faith without works is dead” (James 2:20) adds, “by
which it lives once more.” Therefore faith which was lifeless and without form hitherto,
becomes formed and living.

I answer that, There have been various opinions on this question. For some [*William of
Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that living and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but
that when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner, when a man
sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit of lifeless faith is infused into him by God.
But it seems unfitting that grace should deprive man of a gift of God by coming to him, and
that a gift of God should be infused into man, on account of a mortal sin.

45
Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have said that living and
lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but that, all the same, when living faith comes the habit
of lifeless faith is not taken away, and that it remains together with the habit of living faith in
the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable that the habit of lifeless faith should remain
inactive in a person having living faith.

We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are one and the same habit.
The reason is that a habit is differentiated by that which directly pertains to that habit. Now
since faith is a perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which pertains to the
intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not pertain directly to faith, so as to be able to
differentiate the habit of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in respect of
something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, and not in respect of something pertaining to the
intellect. Therefore living and lifeless faith are not distinct habits.

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Apostle refers to those imperfect things from which
imperfection is inseparable, for then, when the perfect comes the imperfect must needs be
done away. Thus with the advent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially
“of the things that appear not.” When, however, imperfection is not inseparable from the
imperfect thing, the same identical thing which was imperfect becomes perfect. Thus
childhood is not essential to man and consequently the same identical subject who was a child,
becomes a man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental thereto as stated
above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes living.

Reply to Objection 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable from an animal, because
it is its substantial form, viz. the soul: consequently a dead thing cannot become a living thing,
and a living and a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which gives faith its
form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith. Hence there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins anew to be in a man, but
also as long as faith lasts. For it has been said above (FP, Q[104], A[1]; FS, Q[109], A[9]) that
God is always working man’s justification, even as the sun is always lighting up the air. Hence
grace is not less effective when it comes to a believer than when it comes to an unbeliever:
since it causes faith in both, in the former by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter by
creating it anew.

We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the disposition of the subject,
that grace does not cause faith in one who has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second
mortal sin does not take away grace from one who has already lost it through a previous mortal
sin.

Reply to Objection 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not changed, but its subject,
the soul, which at one time has faith without charity, and at another time, with charity.

Article 5

Whether faith is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue is directed to the good, since
“it is virtue that makes its subject good,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is
directed to the true. Therefore faith is not a virtue.

46
Objection 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue. Now faith, on account
of its imperfection, is not placed among the acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. vi, 3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue.

Objection 3: Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species, as stated above (A[4]). Now
lifeless faith is not a virtue, since it is not connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither
is living faith a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But faith
is numbered among the gratuitous graces (1 Cor. 12:9) and likewise among the fruits (Gal.
5:23). Therefore faith is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Man is justified by the virtues, since “justice is all virtue,” as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is justified by faith according to Rom. 5:1: “Being justified
therefore by faith let us have peace,” etc. Therefore faith is a virtue.

I answer that, As shown above, it is by human virtue that human acts are rendered good; hence,
any habit that is always the principle of a good act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit
is living faith. For since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth at the command
of the will, two things are required that this act may be perfect: one of which is that the intellect
should infallibly tend to its object, which is the true; while the other is that the will should be
infallibly directed to the last end, on account of which it assents to the true: and both of these
are to be found in the act of living faith. For it belongs to the very essence of faith that the
intellect should ever tend to the true, since nothing false can be the object of faith, as proved
above (Q[1], A[3]): while the effect of charity, which is the form of faith, is that the soul ever
has its will directed to a good end. Therefore living faith is a virtue.

On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though the act of lifeless faith is duly
perfect on the part of the intellect, it has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as if
temperance be in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the rational part, temperance is
not a virtue, as stated above (FS, Q[65], A[1]), because the act of temperance requires both an
act of reason, and an act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of faith requires an act of
the will, and an act of the intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect, since it is its perfection: and
consequently faith has a relation to some good in so far as it directs the intellect to the true.
Furthermore, it has a relation to the good considered as the object of the will, inasmuch as it
is formed by charity.

Reply to Objection 2: The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is based on human reasoning
in a conclusion which does not follow, of necessity, from its premisses; and which is subject
to be false: hence such like faith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are
speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and consequently its object cannot
be anything false; so that faith of this kind can be a virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically, as though they
belonged to different species. But they differ as perfect and imperfect within the same species.
Hence lifeless faith, being imperfect, does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect virtue, for
“virtue is a kind of perfection” (Phys. vii, text. 18).

Reply to Objection 4: Some say that faith which is numbered among the gratuitous graces is
lifeless faith. But this is said without reason, since the gratuitous graces, which are mentioned
47
in that passage, are not common to all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle says:
“There are diversities of graces,” and again, “To one is given” this grace and “to another” that.
Now lifeless faith is common to all members of the Church, because its lifelessness is not part
of its substance, if we consider it as a gratuitous gift. We must, therefore, say that in that
passage, faith denotes a certain excellency of faith, for instance, “constancy in faith,”
according to a gloss, or the “word of faith.”

Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain pleasure in its act by reason
of its certainty, wherefore the gloss on the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are
enumerated, explains faith as being “certainty about the unseen.”

Whether faith is one virtue?

Article 6

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith is a gift of God according to
Eph. 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge are numbered among God’s gifts according to Is.
11:2. Now wisdom and knowledge differ in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and
knowledge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 14,15). Since, then, faith
is about eternal things, and also about some temporal things, it seems that faith is not one
virtue, but divided into several parts.

Objection 2: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above (Q[3], A[1]). Now
confession of faith is not one and the same for all: since what we confess as past, the fathers
of old confessed as yet to come, as appears from Is. 7:14: “Behold a virgin shall conceive.”
Therefore faith is not one.

Objection 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But one accident cannot be in
many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one faith.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): “One Lord, one faith.”

I answer that, If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in two ways. First on the part of
the object, and thus there is one faith. Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by
adhering to which we believe whatever is contained in the faith. Secondly, on the part of the
subject, and thus faith is differentiated according as it is in various subjects. Now it is evident
that faith, just as any other habit, takes its species from the formal aspect of its object, but is
individualized by its subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit whereby we believe, it is one
specifically, but differs numerically according to its various subjects.

If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed, then, again, there is one faith,
since what is believed by all is one same thing: for though the things believed, which all agree
in believing, be diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to one.

Reply to Objection 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be believed, do not belong to
the object of faith, except in relation to something eternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above
(Q[1], A[1]). Hence there is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is different with
wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and eternal matters under their respective
aspects.

48
Reply to Objection 2: This difference of past and future arises, not from any difference in the
thing believed, but from the different relationships of believers to the one thing believed, as
also we have mentioned above (FS, Q[103], A[4]; FS, Q[107], A[1], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of faith.

Whether faith is the first of the virtues?

Article 7

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues. For a gloss on Lk. 12:4, “I
say to you My friends,” says that fortitude is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation
precedes that which is founded thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, “Be not emulous,” says that hope “leads on to faith.”
Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state further on (Q[17], A[1]). Therefore faith is not the first
of the virtues.

Objection 3: Further, it was stated above (A[2]) that the intellect of the believer is moved, out
of obedience to God, to assent to matters of faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore
faith is not the first virtue.

Objection 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation, as a gloss remarks on 1 Cor.
3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.]. Now faith is formed by charity, as stated above
(A[3]). Therefore it is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is the
foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the first part of a building) and
consequently it seems to precede faith.

Objection 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of acts. Now, in the act of
faith, the act of the will which is perfected by charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which
is perfected by faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity precedes faith.
Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that “faith is the substance of things to be hoped
for.” Now the substance of a thing is that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the
virtues.

I answer that, One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by its very nature; secondly,
by accident. Faith, by its very nature, precedes all other virtues. For since the end is the
principle in matters of action, as stated above (FS, Q[13], A[3]; FS, Q[34], A[4], ad 1), the
theological virtues, the object of which is the last end, must needs precede all the others. Again,
the last end must of necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to the will, since
the will has no inclination for anything except in so far as it is apprehended by the intellect.
Hence, as the last end is present in the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by faith,
the first of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith, because natural knowledge cannot reach
God as the object of heavenly bliss, which is the aspect under which hope and charity tend
towards Him.

On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For an accidental cause
precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which removes an obstacle is a kind of accidental
cause, according to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be
49
said to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove obstacles to belief. Thus fortitude
removes the inordinate fear that hinders faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses
to submit himself to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some other virtues, although
there are no real virtues, unless faith be presupposed, as Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv,
3).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one cannot hope to obtain
eternal happiness, unless one believes this possible, since hope does not tend to the impossible,
as stated above (FS, Q[40], A[1]). It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to
persevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this sense that hope is said to lead to
faith.

Reply to Objection 3: Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes the inclination of the
will to fulfil God’s commandments. In this way it is not a special virtue, but is a general
condition of every virtue; since all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine law,
as stated above (FS, Q[100], A[2]); and thus it is requisite for faith. In another way, obedience
denotes an inclination to fulfil the commandments considered as a duty. In this way it is a
special virtue, and a part of justice: for a man does his duty by his superior when he obeys
him: and thus obedience follows faith, whereby man knows that God is his superior, Whom
he must obey.

Reply to Objection 4: To be a foundation a thing requires not only to come first, but also
to be connected with the other parts of the building: since the building would not be
founded on it unless the other parts adhered to it. Now the connecting bond of the spiritual
edifice is charity, according to Col. 3:14: “Above all . . . things have charity which is the bond
of perfection.” Consequently faith without charity cannot be the foundation: and yet it does
not follow that charity precedes faith.

Reply to Objection 5: Some act of the will is required before faith, but not an act of the will
quickened by charity. This latter act presupposes faith, because the will cannot tend to God
with perfect love, unless the intellect possesses right faith about Him.

Article 8

Whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than science and the other intellectual
virtues. For doubt is opposed to certitude, wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain,
through being less doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less it has of an admixture of
black. Now understanding, science and also wisdom are free of any doubt about their objects;
whereas the believer may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about matters of
faith. Therefore faith is no more certain than the intellectual virtues.

Objection 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But “faith is through hearing”
according to Rom. 10:17; whereas understanding, science and wisdom imply some kind of
intellectual sight. Therefore science and understanding are more certain than faith.

Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more perfect is the more certain. Now
understanding is more perfect than faith, since faith is the way to understanding, according to
50
 another version [*The Septuagint] of Is. 7:9: “If you will not believe, you shall not understand
[Vulg.: ‘continue’]”: and Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that “faith is strengthened by
science.” Therefore it seems that science or understanding is more certain than faith.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): “When you had received of us the word of
the hearing,” i.e. by faith . . . “you received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the
word of God.” Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore science is not
more certain than faith; nor is anything else.

I answer that, As stated above (FS, Q[57], A[4], ad 2) two of the intellectual virtues are
about contingent matter, viz. prudence and art; to which faith is preferable in point of certitude,
by reason of its matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change, whereas the other
three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science [*In English the corresponding ‘gift’ is called
knowledge] and understanding, are about necessary things, as stated above (FS, Q[57], A[5],
ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and understanding may be taken in two
ways: first, as intellectual virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3); secondly, for
the gifts of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first way, we must note that certitude
can be looked at in two ways. First, on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more
certain cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain than those three virtues,
because it is founded on the Divine truth, whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on
human reason. Secondly, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and thus the
more a man’s intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is. In this way, faith is less
certain, because matters of faith are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the
aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged simply with regard to its
cause, but relatively, with respect to a disposition on the part of the subject, it follows that
faith is more certain simply, while the others are more certain relatively, i.e. for us. Likewise
if these three be taken as gifts received in this present life, they are related to faith as to their
principle which they presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith is more certain.

Reply to Objection 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith, but on our side, in
so far as we do not fully grasp matters of faith with our intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain than hearing; but if (the
authority of) the person from whom we hear greatly surpasses that of the seer’s sight, hearing
is more certain than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about what he hears on
the authority of an expert in science, than about what is apparent to him according to his own
reason: and much more is a man certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be
deceived, than about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.

Reply to Objection 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more perfect than the
knowledge of faith in the point of their greater clearness, but not in regard to more certain
adhesion: because the whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises from
the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge of conclusions arises from the
certitude of premisses. But in so far as science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual
virtues, they are based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the certitude of
God’s word, on which faith is founded.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 67, art. 3. (tr. Laurence Shapcote, O.P.):

Whether faith remains after this life?

51
 Objection 1: It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because faith is more excellent
than science. Now science remains after this life, as stated above (Article [2]). Therefore faith
remains also.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 3: 11): “Other foundation no man can lay, but that
which is laid; which is Christ Jesus,” i.e. faith in Jesus Christ. Now if the foundation is
removed, that which is built upon it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this
life, no other virtue remains.

Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differ as perfect
from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is compatible with perfect knowledge: thus in an
angel there can be “evening” and “morning” knowledge [*Cf. FP, Question [58], Article [6]];
and a man can have science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through
a probable syllogism, about one same conclusion. Therefore after this life faith also is
compatible with the knowledge of glory.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 5: 6,7): “While we are in the body, we are absent
from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by sight.” But those who are in glory are not
absent from the Lord, but present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the
life of glory.

I answer that, Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing being excluded from
another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two things are opposite to one another, we find
opposition of affirmation and negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect of
contrary forms; thus in colors we find white and black. In others we find opposition in respect
of perfection and imperfection: wherefore in alterations, more and less are considered to be
contraries, as when a thing from being less hot is made more hot (Phys. v, text. 19). And since
perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another, it is impossible for perfection and imper-
fection to affect the same thing at the same time.

Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a thing’s very nature, and
belongs to its species: even as lack of reason belongs to the very specific nature of a horse and
an ox. And since a thing, so long as it remains the same identically, cannot pass from one
species to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be removed, the species of that thing
is changed: even as it would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be rational. Sometimes,
however, the imperfection does not belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the
individual by reason of something else; even as sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a
man, because he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like reason; and it is evident,
that if such an imperfection be removed, the thing remains substantially.

Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is included
in its definition; faith being defined as “the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence
of things that appear not” (Heb. 11: 1). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.): “Where
is faith? Believing without seeing.” But it is an imperfect knowledge that is of things
unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith:
therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the
same.

But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect knowledge: for there is
nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect knowledge from being sometimes with perfect
knowledge. Accordingly we must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three ways:
first, on the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium; thirdly, on the
52
part of the subject. The difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the
knowable object is seen in the “morning” and “evening” knowledge of the angels: for the
“morning” knowledge is about things according to the being which they have in the Word,
while the “evening” knowledge is about things according as they have being in their own
natures, which being is imperfect in comparison with the First Being. On the part of the
medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge are exemplified in the knowledge of a conclusion
through a demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium.

On the part of the subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to opinion,
faith, and science. For it is essential to opinion that we assent to one of two opposite assertions
with fear of the other, so that our adhesion is not firm: to science it is essential to have firm
adhesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude which results from the
understanding of principles: while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion in so far
as its adhesion is firm, but falls short of science in so far as it lacks vision.

Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the same respect; yet the
things which differ as perfect and imperfect can be together in the same respect in one and the
same other thing. Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect on the part of the object is quite
incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; but they are compatible with
one another in respect of the same medium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a man
from having at one and the same time, through one and the same medium, perfect and
imperfect knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect, e.g. about health and
sickness, good and evil. In like manner knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is
incompatible with imperfect knowledge through one and the same medium: but nothing
hinders them being about the same subject or in the same subject: for one man can know the
same conclusions through a probable and through a demonstrative medium. Again, knowledge
that is perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect knowledge in the same
subject. Now faith, of its very nature, contains an imperfection on the part of the subject, viz.
that the believer sees not what he believes: whereas bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection
on the part of the subject, viz. that the Blessed see that which makes them happy, as stated
above (Question [3], Article [8]). Hence it is manifest that faith and bliss are incompatible in
one and the same subject.

Reply to Objection 1: Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of the object, because
its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a more perfect mode of knowing its object, which
is not incompatible with vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the mode of faith is
incompatible.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: consequently

when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will be perfected also.

The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.

53
DicendumQuod: Introduction to Theology1

Introduction to Theology Si non philosophandum, philosophandum est

The present anthology serves as an introduction to the science of Sacra Doctrina, in this way
bridging and continuing the method and knowledge already obtained in the study of philo-
sophy with that of theology. Both disciplines are not only compatible but necessary as faith
and reason. Popes, Councils, and even Founders of Religious Institutes have often extolled the
importance and perennial value of St Thomas’ writings; most recently the Encyclical Fides et
Ratio (n.43) pinpoints Divus Thomas as a perennial teacher, having a very particular and rele-
vant role to play in doctrine and method. To ensure a greater audience the texts are in English,
with all the technical drawbacks which that may imply.

Societas pro doctrinae divulgatione Sancti Thomae TM

Index

1. Faith is not demonstrative knowledge: S.Th., I, 46, 2.

2. Why should one believe: Sermon on the Creed, Prologue.
3. Why Faith is necessary for mankind: In Boethii de Trin., III, 1.
4. Theology goes beyond philosophy: Compedium of Theology, I, c.36.
5. Procedural distinction between philosophy and theology: In Boethii de Trin., Prologue.
6. On the use of philosophy by the theologian: In Boethii de Trin., II, 3.
7. All things are created by God: Disputed Questions on the Power of God, III, 5.
8. On Sacred Doctrine: S.Th., I, 1. [Latin only]

Faith is not demonstrative knowledge

S.Th.,I, 46,2,c.

By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not
always exist, as was said above of the mystery of the Trinity (Q32, A1). The reason of this is
that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the
principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species
is abstracted from “here” and “now”; whence it is said that universals are everywhere and al-
ways. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always. Like-
wise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For
the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God
must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above
(Q19, A3). But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence
that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science. And it
is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring
forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking
that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith.

Why one should believe

Sermon on the Creed, Prologue.

1
DicendumQuod: Introduction to Theology (Retrieved 10/15/24)
54
“The Evidence of Things that Appear Not.”-But someone will say that it is foolish to believe
what is not seen, and that one should not believe in things that he cannot see. I answer by
saying that the imperfect nature of our intellect takes away the basis of this difficulty. For if
man of himself could in a perfect manner know all things visible and invisible, it would indeed
be foolish to believe what he does not see. But our manner of knowing is so weak that no
philosopher could perfectly investigate the nature of even one little fly. We even read that a
certain philosopher spent thirty years in solitude in order to know the nature of the bee. If,
therefore, our intellect is so weak, it is foolish to be willing to believe concerning God only
that which man can know by himself alone. And against this is the word of Job: “Behold, God
is great, exceeding our knowledge.” One can also answer this question by supposing that a
certain master had said something concerning his own special branch of knowledge, and some
uneducated person would contradict him for no other reason than that he could not understand
what the master said! Such a person would be considered very foolish. So, the intellect of the
Angels as greatly exceeds the intellect of the greatest philos-opher as much as that of the
greatest philosopher exceeds the intellect of the uneducated man. Therefore, the philosopher
is foolish if he refuses to believe what an Angel says, and far greater fool to refuse to believe
what God says. Against such are these words: “For many things are shown to thee above the
understanding of men.”

Then, again, if one were willing to believe only those things which one knows with certitude,
one could not live in this world. How could one live unless one believed others? How could
one know that this man is one’s own father? Therefore, it is necessary that one believe others
in matters which one cannot know perfectly of oneself. But no one is so worthy of belief as is
God, and hence they who do not believe the words of faith are not wise, but foolish and proud.
As the Apostle says: “He is proud, knowing nothing.” And also: “I know whom I have
believed; and I am certain.” And it is written: “Ye who fear the Lord, believe Him and your
reward shall not be made void.” Finally, one can say also that God proves the truth of the
things which faith teaches. Thus, if a king sends letters signed with his seal, no one would dare
to say that those letters did not represent the will of the king. In like manner, everything that
the Saints believed and handed down to us concerning the faith of Christ is signed with
the seal of God. This seal consists of those works which no mere creature could accomp-
lish; they are the miracles by which Christ confirmed the sayings of the Apostles and of
the Saints.

If, however, you would say that no one has witnessed these miracles, I would reply in this
manner. It is a fact that the entire world worshipped idols and that the faith of Christ was
persecuted, as the histories of the pagans also testify. But now all are turned to Christ—wise
men and noble and rich—converted by the words of the poor and simple preachers of Christ.
Now, this fact was either a miracle or it was not. If it is miraculous, you have what you asked
for, a visible fact; if it is not, then there could not be a greater miracle than that the whole
world should have been converted without miracles. And we need go no further. We are more
certain, therefore, in believing the things of faith than those things which can be seen, because
God’s knowledge never deceives us, but the visible sense of man is often in error.

Faith behooves mankind

In Boethii de Trin., III, 1.

Faith has something in common with opinion and also with science and understanding; so
Hugh of St. Victor places it between science and opinion. With science and understanding it
has in common unerring and firm assent. In this respect it differs from opinion, which accepts
one of two contraries but fears the other might be correct, and also from doubt, which hesitates
between two contraries. With opinion it shares the fact that it has to do with matters that are
55
not clear to the mind, in which respect it differs from science and understanding. Now, as the
Metaphysics says there can be two reasons why something is not evident to human knowledge:
because of something wanting on the part of the knowable objects themselves, and because of
some deficiency on the part of our mind. Examples of something wanting on the part of objects
are individual and contingent things that are remote from our senses, for example, our actions,
words and thoughts, which are such that they can be known to one person and unknown to
another. And because in human society one person must make use of another just as he does
himself in matters in which he is not self-sufficient, he must take his stand on what another
knows and is unknown to himself, just as he does on what he himself knows. As a conse-
quence, faith is necessary in human society, one person believing what another says. As Cicero
remarks, this is the basis of justice. That is why there is no lie without moral fault, for every
lie does some harm to this so essential faith.

Owing to a deficiency on our part, divine and necessary realities, which are most knowable by
nature, are not apparent to us. We are not adapted to examine them from the outset, because
we have to arrive at what is more knowable and prior by nature beginning with what is less
knowable and posterior by nature. But what we first know is known on the strength of what
we eventually come to know; so from the very beginning we must have some knowledge of
those things which are more knowable in themselves, and this is possible only by faith. The
sequence of the sciences makes this clear, for the science that concerns the highest causes,
namely metaphysics, comes last in human knowledge, and yet the sciences that precede it must
presuppose certain truths that are more fully elucidated in that science. As a result, every
science has presuppositions which the learner must believe. Consequently, since the goal of
human life is perfect happiness, which consists in the full knowledge of divine realities, the
direction of human life toward perfect happiness from the very beginning requires faith in the
divine, the complete knowledge of which we look forward to in our final state of perfection.

Even in the present life it is possible for us to arrive by reasoning at a full knowledge of some
divine things. But even though we can have knowledge of them, and some persons actually
achieve it, faith is still necessary, and this for five reasons given by Rabbi Moses.
First, owing to the depth and subtlety of the subject matter, which conceals the divine from
human minds. Consequently, lest the human race be without any knowledge of things divine,
provision was made that it might know them at least by faith. As Ecclesiastes says (7:25). “It
is a great depth, and who shall find it out?”

The second reason is the initial weakness of the human mind, which reaches its perfection
only at the end. So, in order that it should at no time lack a knowledge of God, it needs faith,
through which it may accept divine things from the very beginning.

Third, because of the many preliminary items of knowledge that are needed to reach a
knowledge of God by human reasoning. Indeed a knowledge of almost all the sciences is
required for this, since the purpose of all of them is the knowledge of God. And yet, very
few persons reach these preliminaries. So, in order that a large portion of the human race will
not be left without a knowledge of God, he has provided the way of faith for them.

Fourth, because many persons by their physical dispositions are unsuited to reach perfection
of mind by the use of reason, the way of faith has been provided so that these also may not be
wanting in divine knowledge.

Fifth, because of the many occupations in which we must be engaged. This makes it impossible
for everyone to acquire the necessary knowledge about God by way of reasoning. For this

56
reason the way of faith has been provided, and here we are concerned with those matters which
are known by some people but are proposed to others for belief.

There are, however, some aspects of the divinity that human reason is utterly incapable
of knowing fully; we await their clear knowledge in the life to come, where our happiness
will be complete. An example is the unity and trinity of the one God. We shall be advanced
to this knowledge not by anything due to our nature but only by divine grace. So, even for this
perfect knowledge certain presuppositions must be offered at the beginning for our belief, and
from these we are led to the full knowledge of the things we believe from the beginning. As
has been said, the same thing happens in the other sciences. Thus it is said in Isaiah (7:9),
according to another version: “Unless you shall have believed you will not understand”. Pre-
suppositions of this sort are objects of belief for everyone; in this life no one knows or
understands them.

Theology goes beyond philosophy

Compedium of Theology, I, c.36.

The truths about God thus far proposed have been subtly discussed by a number of pagan
philosophers, although some of them erred concerning these matters. And those who pro-
pounded true doctrine in this respect were scarcely able to arrive at such truths even after long
and painstaking investigation. But there are other truths about God revealed to us in the teach-
ing of the Christian religion, which were beyond the reach of the philosophers. These are truths
about which we are instructed, in accord with the norm of Christian faith, in a way that tran-
scends human perception. The teaching is this: although God is one and simple, as has been
explained, God is Father, God is Son, and God is Holy Ghost. And these three are not three
gods, but are one God. We now turn to a consideration of this truth, so far as is possible to us.

Procedural distinction between philosophy and theology

In Boethii de Trin., Prologue.

Consequently, just as our natural knowledge begins with the knowledge of creatures ob-
tained by the senses, so the knowledge imparted from above begins with the cognition of
the first Truth bestowed on us by faith. As a result the order of procedure is different in the
two cases. Philosophers, who follow the order of natural knowledge, place the science of
creatures before the science of God, that is to say, natural philosophy before metaphysics, but
theologians follow the opposite path, placing the consideration of the creator before that of
creatures.

On the use of philosophy by the theologian

In Boethii de Trin., II, 3.

Now just as sacred doctrine is based on the light of faith, so philosophy is based on the natural
light of reason. So it is impossible that the contents of philosophy should be contrary to the
contents of faith, but they fall short of them. The former, however, bear certain likenesses to
the latter and also contain certain preambles to them, just as nature itself is a preamble to grace.
If anything, however, is found in the sayings of the philosophers contrary to faith, this is not
philosophy but rather an abuse of philosophy arising from faulty reasoning. Therefore it is
possible to refute an error of this sort by philosophical principles, either by showing that it is
entirely impossible or that it is not necessary. For, as matters of faith cannot be demonstratively
proved, so some assertions contrary to them cannot be demonstratively shown to be false; it
can, however, be shown that they lack necessity.

57
Accordingly we can use philosophy in sacred doctrine in three ways. First, in order to demon-
strate the preambles of faith, which we must necessarily know in [the act of] faith. Such are
the truths about God that are proved by natural reason, for example, that God exists, that he is
one, and other truths of this sort about God or creatures proved in philosophy and presup-
posed by faith.

Second, by throwing light on the contents of faith by analogies, as Augustine uses many
analogies drawn from philosophical doctrines in order to elucidate the Trinity.

Third, in order to refute assertions contrary to the faith, either by showing them to be false or
lacking in necessity.

Those, however, who use philosophy in sacred doctrine can err in two ways. In one way by
making use of teachings that are contrary to the faith, which consequently do not belong to
philosophy but are a corruption and abuse of it. Origen was guilty of this. In another way by
including the contents of faith within the bounds of philosophy, as would happen should
somebody decide to believe nothing but what could be established by philosophy.

All things are created by God

Disputed Questions on the Power of God, III, 5.

I answer that the ancients in their investigations of nature proceeded in accordance with the
order of human knowledge. Wherefore as human knowledge reaches the intellect by begin-
ning with the senses, the early philosophers were intent on the domain of the senses, and thence
by degrees reached the realm of the intellect. And seeing that accidental forms are in them-
selves objects of sense, whereas substantial forms are not, the early philosophers said
that all forms are accidental, and that matter alone is a substance. And because substance
suffices to cause accidents that result from the substantial elements, the early philosophers
held that there is no other cause besides matter, and that matter is the cause of whatever we
observe in the sensible world: and consequently they were forced to state that matter itself has
no cause, and to deny absolutely the existence of an efficient cause. The later philosophers,
however, began to take some notice of substantial forms: yet they did not attain to the
knowledge of universals, and they were wholly intent on the observation of special forms;
and so they posited indeed certain active causes, not such as give being to things in their
universality, but which transmute matter to this or that form: these causes they called
intelligence, attraction and repulsion, which they held responsible for adhesion and sep-
aration. Wherefore according to them not all beings came from an efficient cause, and matter
was in existence before any efficient cause came into action. Subsequent to these the philoso-
phers as Plato, Aristotle and their disciples, attained to the study of universal being: and
hence they alone posited a universal cause of things, from which all others came into
being, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 4). This is in agreement with the Catholic Faith;
and may be proved by the three arguments that follow.

First, if in a number of things we find something that is common to all, we must conclude
that this something was the effect of some one cause: for it is not possible that to each
one by reason of itself this common something belong, since each one by itself is different
from the others: and diversity of causes produces a diversity of effects. Seeing then that
being is found to be common to all things, which are by themselves distinct from one an-
other, it follows of necessity that they must come into being not by themselves, but by the
action of some cause. Seemingly this is Plato’s argument, since he required every multi-
tude to be preceded by unity not only as regards number but also in reality.

58
The second argument is that whenever something is found to be in several things by par-
ticipation in various degrees, it must be derived by those in which it exists imperfectly
from that one in which it exists most perfectly: because where there are positive degrees
of a thing so that we ascribe it to this one more and to that one less, this is in reference to
one thing to which they approach, one nearer than another: for if each one were of itself
competent to have it, there would be no reason why one should have it more than an-
other. Thus fire, which is the extreme of heat, is the cause of heat in all things hot. Now
there is one being most perfect and most true: which follows from the fact that there is a mover
altogether immovable and absolutely perfect, as philosophers have proved. Consequently all
other less perfect beings must needs derive being therefrom. This is the argument of the
Philosopher (Metaph. ii, 1).

The third argument is based on the principle that whatsoever is through another is to be
reduced to that which is of itself. Wherefore if there were a per se heat, it would be the cause
of all hot things, that have heat by way of participation. Now there is a being that is its own
being: and this follows from the fact that there must needs be a being that is pure act and
wherein there is no composition. Hence from that one being all other beings that are not their
own being, but have being by participation, must needs proceed. This is the argument of
Avicenna (in Metaph. viii, 6; ix, 8). Thus reason proves and faith holds that all things are
created by God.

On Sacred Doctrine
S.Th., Prologus et Q.1.

[omitted, since it is the Latin text only, which is readily available elsewhere, but cf. the
following from my file ON SACRED DOCTRINE:]

Because the doctor of Catholic truth ought not only to teach the proficient, but also to instruct
beginners (according to the Apostle: “As unto little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink,
not meat”—1 Cor. 3:1-2), we purpose in this book to treat of whatever belongs to the Christian
religion, in such a way as may tend to the instruction of beginners. We have considered that
students in this doctrine have not seldom been hampered by what they have found written by
other authors, partly on account of the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and argu-
ments, partly also because those things that are needful for them to know are not taught accord-
ing to the order of the subject matter, but according as the plan of the book might require, or
the occasion of the argument offer, partly, too, because frequent repetition brought weariness
and confusion to the minds of readers.

Endeavouring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by God’s help, to set forth
whatever is included in this sacred doctrine as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may
allow.

Question 1. The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine

To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to investigate the nature and
extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning this there are ten points of inquiry:

1. Whether it is necessary?
2. Whether it is a science?
3. Whether it is one or many?
4. Whether it is speculative or practical?
5. How it is compared with other sciences?
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6. Whether it is the same as wisdom?
7. Whether God is its subject-matter?
8. Whether it is a matter of argument?
9. Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes?
10. Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded in different senses?

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SUPPLEMENT: REASONS FOR BELIEF IN THE CATHOLIC FAITH.

MICHAEL A. AUGROS

EXCERPTS FROM SCRAPBOOK 1

1) To pave the way intellectually into belief in the Catholic faith, one may begin by
establishing all that is possible within reason itself, e.g. that there is a God, etc. Then one
may proceed to show certain things of the faith which reason cannot establish, but which
reason can be led to suspect through other things reason knows. Here are two examples.

[A] Aristotle and Plato say different things about the measure of human life, which
point the way into Christianity. Aristotle says that the good life should be judged by looking
to the good man, since he can be seen, and since a human life should be judged by a human
life, cf. Metaphysics X.1 1053a24. “The measure is always homogeneous with the thing
measured”.

But Plato, in the person of Socrates, says in the Republic that the perfect is the
measure of the imperfect: “Nay, my friends, said I, a measure of such things that in the least
degree falls short of reality proves no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is the
measure of anything” (504c). Hence, the good life should be judged by the best thing of all,
toward which man should move himself, namely God.

In light of this, see III Q1 A2, where St. Thomas quotes St. Augustine on the need
for the incarnation: “Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be
followed, who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that He Who might be
seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown to man.” This paves the way
in the mind to see the fittingness of the incarnation.

But was there any need for such a startling event, that God should take up human
nature?

[B] Again, Aristotle and Plato say different things about the soul of man, which
point the way to Christianity. Aristotle says that the soul is in its natural subject when it is
in the body, and so the body serves the soul, e.g. the senses, which are in the body, serve the
understanding, which is only in the soul. And yet Aristotle wonders why it is that man, being
the best of animals, fails for the most part to operate according to his natural reason, whereas
the beasts succeed for the most part in their natural operations.

But Plato says (e.g. in the Phaedo) that the soul is in a prison when it is in the body,
since the body and the soul often conflict--e.g. the imagination, which is in the body, often
deceives the understanding, which is only in the soul, and the passions, which are in the
body, often conflict with the rule of reason, which is only in the soul.

In light of this, see where Augustine argues, in the beginning of the Confessions, that
even children suffer from original sin. What Aristotle and Plato say points to original sin,
since the union of soul and body is natural, yet the two are not at peace. Hence, something
has gone wrong with the nature of man--he is born with some kind of punishment.
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 Finally, one may argue with those who believe in parts of the true faith from those
parts they believe to other parts of the true faith, as St. Thomas says in Summa Theologiae I
Q1 A8. E.g. if someone accepts Scripture, but not the assumption of Our Lady, one may
point out that Psalm 16:9-10 reads “Therefore my heart is glad and my soul rejoices, my
body, too abides in confidence; because you will not abandon my soul to the nether world,
nor will you suffer your faithful one to undergo corruption”. Both St. Peter (Acts 2:25-32)
and St Paul (Acts 13:35-37) take this to refer to Christ’s resurrection. It may also be referred
to Our Lady’s assumption into heaven. This paves the way (intellectually) for something in
the faith.

2) There are many reasons why “sola scriptura”, one of Luther’s two famous battle cries
(“sola fide” being the other), cannot be sustained. a) Scripture itself nowhere says or implies
that one must believe only in those supernatural matters revealed in scripture. b) Scripture
itself does not tell us what constitutes sacred scripture and what does not: it does not answer
the all-important question “what scripture?” c) The authors of scripture did not believe that
scripture alone held authority on supernatural matters--the authority of prophecy and oral
teaching must come first, or else there would be nothing about which and no one to write
sacred scripture. d) Scripture, like any other written teaching, does not interpret itself, and
so does not by itself protect against false interpretations. e) Christ himself never wrote a
word, so if one maintains that written teaching is superior to oral teaching, then one
maintains that Christ adopted an inferior mode of teaching. In fact, not even everything
Christ taught and did was written down (the gospel according to John 21:25). f) Scripture
does not give us Christ’s explicit teaching on many important questions of faith and morals,
e.g. on abortion, contraception, euthanasia, on the trinity, the incarnation, the means of
attaining grace, purgatory. g) The bible alone does not produce credentials for our belief in
it as the word of God (why should one believe what is written there rather than what is
written in the Koran or the Book of Mormon?): one cannot argue “what is in the word of
God is to be believed, that the word of God is to be believed is in the word of God, therefore
the word of God is to be believed”.

3) “Sola” in “sola fide” was simply interpolated by Luther, for which interpolation he gave
feeble reasons. He claims that it must be there to make sense in the German, which is simply
false. And he claims that it must be there to make sense simply, i.e. to make sound
theological sense. Whatever reason he might give would hardly be “sola scriptura”.

4) If the Church is the bride of Christ (as St Paul says in Ephesians 5.23: “For the husband
is head of his wife just as Christ is head of the Church”, and again in Ephesians 5.31-32),
then to put up a new Church is to give him a new bride (see p 12 in The Catholic Controversy
of St Francis De Sales). “Some accuse the Catholic Church of apostasy from Christ’s
teachings. It is his teachings that refute that charge. It is unbiblical to suggest that at some
point in the third or fourth century (opponents are vague) Christ the bridegroom divorced
his Church-bride on grounds of infidelity (from which he had promised to preserve her),
lived a bachelor for about 1200 years, and then married more than 22,000 denominations”
(Refuting the Attack on Mary, Father Mateo, p 8). But what God has joined, let no man put
asunder (Mark 10.9 “What God has joined together, no man must separate”). Therefore
whoever shall set up a Church must have divine credentials. Luther and Calvin had no such
divine mission, nor did they even claim to be sent by God or by those whom God sent (e.g.
the prophets and apostles).
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5) Samuel did not presume God and not a man spoke to him until Heli said it was so; Samuel
showed humility and submission to the ordinary and pre-established authority of Heli (p 31
of The Catholic Controversy). Moses and even Christ did not excuse themselves from the
obligation of carrying the credentials of miracles for belief in their words and the authority
and divine origin of their institutions (p 19). But Luther and Calvin showed neither humility,
nor their deference or relation to any pre-established authority, nor a single miracle.

6) In scripture, the prophets and priests of any new or extraordinary mission never violated
the ordinary and already established authority before them, but rather sought its approval.
E.g. John the Baptist pointed to the old testament prophecy about himself to explain his
actions and his mission (how he was sent from God). Christ himself showed himself to be
directly sent by the Father in his baptism (when the voice of the father spoke and the Holy
Spirit descended upon him in truth and in the sign of the dove), and he showed himself to be
coming out of and in keeping with the older order by going to Simeon, a priest of the old
rite, as a child, by being baptized by John the Baptist, and by being a priest “in the order of
Melchizedek” (Hebrews 6.20 “Jesus has entered on our behalf as forerunner, becoming high
priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek”, where “according to the order of
Melchizedek” means “after the manner of Melchidezedek”, who offered not animals and
grains but bread and wine. See Genesis 14.18-19 “At vero Melchisedech rex Salem,
proferens panem et vinum, erat enim Sacerdos Dei altissimi, benedixit ei, et ait: Benedictus
Abram Deo excelso, qui creavit caelum et terram”). Luther and Calvin do not tie themselves
to any authority, directly or indirectly, whereby they may change the church and the word
of God. Not only do they alter these, but they destroy them and repudiate them; a thing which
Our Lord is never seen to have done regarding the old order. He does not abolish the old
law, but perfects it (Matthew 5.17 “Do not think that I have come to abolish the law or the
prophets. I have come not to abolish but to fulfill.” In Hebrews chapter 8 and following, St
Paul explains in what way the old covenant is obsolete and replaced, and how it was a figure
of the new covenant).

7) The Church mentioned in scripture, founded by Christ (as it is recorded there), must be a
visible Church, and not an invisible one only. The pastors and doctors of the Church (as
described in scripture) are visible, the head of that Church on earth--the vicar of Christ in
the absence of his visible presence--was visible (namely St. Peter), the sacraments
administered and the preaching of that Church were visible, the ancient synagogue of the
Jews whose office that Church had assumed into perfection was also visible, and the Jews
always began their course as a people of God with circumcision (a visible sign) as we begin
ours in His church with a visible sign in baptism. Therefore the true Church is a visible
Church. (pp 32-36 of The Catholic Controversy)

8) Just as Christ had a two part human nature, composed of body and soul, one of which is
outward and visible and the other of which is inward and invisible, so too does his bride, the
Church, have two parts. She has an inward and invisible part, a soul (which unites and gives
life--grace--to her members), namely the Holy Spirit, Who imparts faith, hope, love, and all
graces to each individual soul. She has an outward and visible part, her bodily aspect as it
were, which are the outward signs and instruments of the truth, grace, and actions of the
Holy Spirit (and the other Persons of the Trinity), namely such things as confessions of faith,
canticles, praises, holy gestures, preaching, sacraments, sacrifices, etc. All things done in the
Church have their exterior and their interior. The Church is thus not only an invisible Church,
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but a visible one as well. And this is in keeping with the nature of human persons, whose
well-being and salvation Christ’s Church is meant to effect, since human nature is not purely
spiritual, but bodily as well, and attains to the spiritual through the bodily. (p 37 of The
Catholic Controversy)

9) Some argue that the Church, being “holy and victorious” etc., must be holy in all its parts,
and so the true Church refers only to the predestinate, and since they are not known
outwardly, the true Church is invisible. But the Church is “holy and victorious” as an army
is “brave and victorious”--not in the sense that each of its soldiers is so, some of whom are
cowardly or some of whom are vanquished and destroyed in battle, but in that some of its
parts are so. We often call a whole by its parts, e.g. “the flower is white”, when only the
petals are white. Hence there is no argument here to the invisibility of the Church.

10) The true Church of Christ is indefectible and cannot fail or pass out of existence for some
time. For the Church was founded in a power for attaining graces from the Holy Spirit (lost
to man after original sin) purchased by Christ’s blood, not so that the Church could last for
a few years and then fizzle out among the whims of immoral or ignorant men. Christ did not
entrust his Church, the graces he bought for us with his own blood, and the deposit of truth
he revealed to men, in the hands of his apostles without the safeguard of the Holy Spirit.
Now it is written in Luke 11:21-23 “When a strong man fully armed guards his palace, his
possessions are safe. But when one stronger than he attacks and overcomes him, he takes
away the armor on which he relied and distributes the spoils. Whoever is not with me is
against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters.” But none is stronger than Christ.
Again, it is written in Psalm 48.9 (47.9) “God has founded it forever”, and in Isaiah 61.8 “a
lasting covenant I will make with them...and all who shall see them shall know them” (which
refers to the visible Church). And at the end of Matthew 28.20, it is written “behold I am
with you always, even unto the end of the earth”. If the Church is the work of God, how did
it come to nothing? No work or institution of God ever came to nothing, and none was
changed without His approval, nor was any changed by abolishing but by completing,
fulfilling, or perfecting. (p 57 of The Catholic Controversy)

11) If the Church failed and died, then who raised it to life again? Luther, or Calvin? But
the re-formation of a thing is a greater work or miracle than the formation of it, e.g. the
salvation of man is greater than the creation of man, or the reforming of a drunkard is more
difficult than the raising of a child to become a temperate man. Now Christ formed and
founded the Church, so that if Luther and Calvin have reformed it, they have done a work
greater than Christ. (p 58 of The Catholic Controversy)

12) If no one is appointed by God to hear people’s doubts and questions pertaining to the
faith and to answer them, to whom do we go with our doubts and questions? “To the
Scriptures”, say Calvin and Luther. But, my dear friends, it is precisely about the Scriptures
that I have questions, as the wise Ethiopian in Acts 8:26, who refused to think that he could
understand the scriptures unless someone instructed him. For there are many opposite
interpretations of scripture, and many opposite conclusions drawn from what is there.
Therefore, if Christ did not leave us trustworthy guides and shepherds, either he wished us
to perish, or else he was wanting in foresight. And Our Lord says in Matthew 18.17 “If he
refuses to listen, tell the Church”; he puts up the Church, and not Scripture, as the ultimate

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judge in resolving differences. And I Timothy iii.15 says that the “Church is the pillar and
ground of truth”, not scripture. (p 69 of The Catholic Controversy)

13) There was no continual church after Christ except the Catholic Church. Therefore it
alone is the true Church, or else the true Church failed and erred, and therefore Christ (the
founder of that Church) also failed and erred.

14) Calvin, Luther, and Beza teach that there is no freewill, that all the saved are equal in
glory (which is very democratic and very unbiblical; see Mark 9.35, where Our Lord says in
answer to “who shall be greatest in the kingdom?”, that “If anyone wishes to be first, he shall
be the last of all and the servant of all”; he does not say “none shall be first”), that virginity
is no better than marriage (which is contrary to St Paul), and that all sins are equal (again
very democratic and very unbiblical; see I John 5.16-17 “There is such a thing as deadly sin,
about which I do not say that you should pray. All wrongdoing is sin, but there is sin that is
not deadly”.). All these things and many more that they teach were condemned within the
first five hundred years of Christianity. (pp 74-81 of The Catholic Controversy)

15) There are at least eight rules or measures or criteria or standards of faith; things by which
to judge the credibility of someone claiming to have the supernatural Christian truth. 1)
Sacred scripture. 2) Apostolic tradition. 3) Authority of the Church. 4) Authority of the
councils. 5) Authority of the ancient fathers. 6) Authority of the Pope. 7) Miracles. 8)
Harmony of faith and reason. (pp 82-87 of The Catholic Controversy)

16) SACRED SCRIPTURE. Spoken tradition was before scripture, since much of scripture
is just spoken tradition reduced to writing. Christ himself never wrote, since oral teaching is
superior to written teaching (oral teaching is from a living and present teacher, who can
adjust his speech to the audience and answer questions). Because the supernatural truth
revealed to man does not change, but man does change, then the received and the receiver
are disproportional. And since the received is taken in to the receiver after the manner of the
receiver, man therefore needs a teacher who can change the thing to be received in the
manner of its expression or application without changing its substance, i.e. an oral teacher,
i.e. the Church.

17) SACRED SCRIPTURE. Let no man change what God has established (Mark 10.9
“What God has joined together, no man must separate”), and let no man add or subtract from
scripture (“I warn everyone who hears the prophetic words in this book: if anyone adds to
them, God will add to him the plagues described in this book, and if anyone takes away from
the words in this prophetic book, God will take away his share in the tree of life and in the
holy city described in this book.” Revelation 22.18-19). The reformers both added and
subtracted from scripture, e.g. Luther added “sola” to “fide” in St Paul, arguing that this was
necessary in German. This is hardly “sola scriptura”.

18) SACRED SCRIPTURE. According to the Council of Trent (the council called in answer
to the reformation), there are 45 books of the Old Testament, 27 books of the New
Testament, and so 72 books in all. The same were listed at the Council of Florence, and at
the third Council of Carthage about 1200 years before. (p 91 of The Catholic Controversy)

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19) SACRED SCRIPTURE. The reformers violated the integrity of sacred scripture by
removing parts of Esther, Baruch, Tobias, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Maccabees. P 96-
103 of The Catholic Controversy, St Francis de Sales gives ten reasons why they rejected
these books and refutes them. 1. We do not have them in the original languages in which
they were written, Hebrew or Chaldaic, so it would be difficult to restore them. 2. The Jews
do not accept them. 3. Nor does the whole Church accept them. 4. St Jerome says they are
not appropriate for supporting Church teaching. 5. Canon Law condemns them. 6. The Gloss
condemns them, saying they are not read everywhere. 7. They have been corrupted and
falsified, as Eusebius says. 8. Notably Maccabees. 9. Notably second Maccabees, which St
Jerome did not find in Hebrew, as Olivetanus says. 10. “There are in them many false
things”, says the new preface.

20) SACRED SCRIPTURE. Answers to the above. 1. Tobias and Judith were translated
from the Chaldaic into the Latin by St Jerome, so why not accept them? Likewise first
Maccabees and Ecclesiasticus were translated from the Hebrew into the Latin by St Jerome.
Rather, you do not accept these books because the Chaldaic and Hebrew versions are not
available to you, so you yourselves cannot translate them. Where is it written that what is
not available in Chaldaic or Hebrew is not to be received as holy scripture? 2. As St.
Augustine said, “It is the Catholic Church which holds the Books of Maccabees as canonical,
not the Jews” (De Civitate Dei, xviii.36). Are we to accept only what the Jews accept? Then
commit the entirety of the new testament to the flames. Thank God we are not Jews, we are
Catholics. 3. “But even the whole of your Church does not accept them”, you say. That is
simply false: the whole of the Catholic Church has accepted all these books and has listed
them canonical in council after council, e.g. St. Augustine includes them all in his list which
he takes from the Council of Carthage, they are accepted in the 6th General Council in Trullo,
and in the Council of Florence. St Jerome witnesses that the book of Judith was received in
the first Council of Nice. As for the more ancient members of the Catholic Church, they did
doubt and question the authenticity of some of these books, but never were they rejected:
they were held in question, and the question was answered in their favor. 4. In the time of St
Jerome, Judith had just been accepted as canonical, whereas there had been no decision yet
about the others, so indeed they were not to be used in defense of Church teaching, since the
Church had not yet decided upon their status as part of the canon. 5. The canon Sancta
Romana of Gelasius I rejects certain books, but none of those which are received on our
canon now, and in fact it witnesses that Tobias and Maccabees were publicly received in the
Church as canonical. 6. A Gloss is but a Gloss, to begin with. Besides, the Gloss says that
these books are read, though not “perhaps” generally accepted, where the “perhaps” keeps
it from saying what is false. 7. All the books of scripture have been corrupted and falsified
by the enemies of the Church, so if one is to remove a book from scripture because someone
has tried to tamper with it and so we cannot be sure what is authentic in it, we must remove
all of scripture. It is because of God’s providence that there have always remained enough
genuine copies to restore the incomplete or corrupted books that the sacred deposit of written
revelation is now available to us through the Church, untouched. 8. No argument is given
that Maccabees is especially corrupt, so neither will any argument be given in denial of this
assertion. 9. That second Maccabees is available to us only in Greek says nothing of its
authenticity one way or the other. 10. The books rejected by the reformers do not teach
“many false things”, but rather the intercession of the saints, prayer for the dead, freewill,
the honoring of relics, and many other things which the whole of antiquity held as articles
of faith: “Because you will not believe what the books teach, you condemn it;--why do you
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not rather condemn your presumption which is incredulous to their teaching?” (St Francis
de Sales, The Catholic Controversy, p 103)

21) SACRED SCRIPTURE. The reformers in France gave their real reason for rejecting
certain parts of scripture in the protestation of faith which they presented to the king of
France. In the third article they list the books they accept. In the fourth article, they write
“We know these books to be canonical and a most safe rule of our faith, not so much by the
common accord and consent of the Church, as by the testimony and interior persuasion of
the Holy Spirit.” (p 104 The Catholic Controversy) 1. Show us clearly, French reformers,
that you are not lying about this interior persuasion of the Holy Spirit. 2. Show us that these
are the persuasions of the Holy Spirit, and not of some other spirit. 3. Does this spirit grant
his persuasions equally to everyone, or only to some? If to everyone, how is it I am not
persuaded the same way? If to only some, why to them and not to others? And by what
mark shall we recognize them whom the spirit has inspired? 4. If interior persuasion is
certain enough to discard parts of Scripture, then how is it that Luther rejects the letter of St
James, but Calvin accepts it? “You will say, perhaps, that Luther is mistaken. He will say
as much of you. Which is to be believed? Luther ridicules Ecclesiastes, he considers Job a
fable. Will you oppose him your persuasion? he will oppose you his. So this spirit, divided
against himself, will leave you no other conclusion except to grow thoroughly obstinate,
each in his own opinion.” (p 107) 5. And why should the Holy Spirit give inspiration to
those whom everyone must believe to be nobodies, without any credentials, e.g. Luther and
Calvin?

22) SACRED SCRIPTURE. Calvin removes Baruch, Tobias, Judith, Wisdom,

Ecclesiasticus, Maccabees, the canticle of the three children and the history of Susanna and
that of the dragon Bel from Daniel, and also a great part of Esther. Luther removes the Epistle
of St James, of St Jude, the Second of St. Peter, the Second and Third of St John, the Epistle
to the Hebrews, he ridicules Ecclesiastes, and holds Job a fable. (p 108 The Catholic
Controversy)

23) SACRED SCRIPTURE. If we gave in to “interior persuasion” or “personal inspiration”,

our faith would not be catholic, but private. Even Heraclitus, a pagan, could see that one
must become strong in what is common to all (DK2 and DK114). The orthodox way is a
common way, not a private way. Truth is common, error is one’s own.

How likely is it that the Holy Spirit hid for 1500 years, and then privately revealed
the exact canon after it had been approximated by others? We hold to the list in the ancient
council of Laodicea, with the additions made known as canonical (not made canonical) in
the councils of Carthage and Florence. Try to find an older canon, and you will fail.

24) SACRED SCRIPTURE. If Scripture is so easy to understand that one needs nothing but
himself and his bible to understand the word of God, why have Luther, Calvin, et alia written
huge commentaries on Scripture? And how does one fit this with II Peter 3.16, where St.
Peter says, speaking of some of the writings of St Paul, “in them are some things hard to
understand that the ignorant and unstable distort to their own destruction, just as they do the
other scriptures”?

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25) APOSTOLIC TRADITION. The word of God cannot err, but only if he who proposes
it also cannot err is all safe and assured (p 157 The Catholic Controversy).

26) THE CHURCH. The true Church of Christ must have four marks. 1. It must be one. 2.
It must be holy. 3. It must be universal. 4. It must be apostolic.

27) THE CHURCH. The true Church must be one. Matthew 12.25 “No city or house divided
against itself will stand”. The Catholic Church is one because it stands under one visible
vicar of Christ who is over all men on earth. And again, since nothing can rule itself (as even
the pagan Anaxagoras could see, in DK12) except if one part rule another (since the ruler
must be separate from the ruled), then in one Church, which is under one rule, one part must
rule another. Since Christ left earth in his visible presence, he left behind him not a new head
(since Christ is always the head, and he is not dead), but his vicar. Hence the Church is one
in its rule.

And the Church is one in its doctrine, unlike the many reformed churches, which
vary in their doctrine with age. E.g. the Anglican Church used to reject, but then accepted
the use of artificial means of birth control as moral. The Catholic Church under Christ’s vicar
who is the bishop in Rome has never changed its teaching from one thing to another,
although it has made certain parts of its teaching more explicit or clearer.

28) THE CHURCH. The true Church must be holy. She must therefore wear the ornaments
of a holy one of God, and among them, since some may be imitated by impostors, must be
ornaments of sanctity which cannot be imitated, e.g. miracles. Miracles are from God alone,
so whatever is graced by miracles has the divine approval. The Roman Catholic Church
alone is resplendent with miracles, which is in keeping with Mark 16.17 “These signs will
accompany those who believe”.

And prophecy, which is a great miracle, is abundant among Catholic saints, almost
every one of which has prophesied. See Apocalypse 19.10 “The testimony of Jesus is the
Spirit of prophecy”.

And a holy Church must practice, at least in some of its parts, the perfection of the
Christian life, i.e. in poverty, virginity, and missionary preaching (and often martyrdom).
The holy Catholic Church has a myriad of religious orders devoted to these very perfections,
all three of which are found in Our Lord.

29) THE CHURCH. The true Church must be universal, or “catholic” (the Greek word for
“universal”, from KATA + HOLOS, “according to the whole”). “Roman” does not
particularize the Church in a certain place and time, since that name only adds that there is
found the see (or seat) of the Bishop who is the general and visible pastor of the Church.

The true Church must be always and everywhere, and so it must be ancient. St John
says of heretics “They went out from us”, I Letter of St John 2.19. Therefore the Church
precedes heresy. To be “in” and a “part” is fidelity, to be “out” and “apart” is heresy. And
hence St Jerome says that “to have reduced heresy to its origin is to have refuted it” (p 207
The Catholic Controversy). Hence to trace back any church to its beginning, which
beginning is neither ancient nor from God, is to discredit that church. The Roman Catholic
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Church takes its beginning in Christ who founded it, who himself came from the church of
the Jews, which in turn grew out of the covenants of the Old Testament made with God from
the very beginning and even with our first parents.

The true Church must be perpetual, since no man can destroy what is promised and
safeguarded by God. Hence no church is true and from God which claims it has been restored
to life from death, and that it had no living members for a span of time. Hence the true
Church must be universal in persons and places.

The true Church must be fruitful, i.e. always growing, and especially so in the face
of persecution, since God is wont to show His strength by causing growth in what has more
human persecution than human support (as in the Old Testament, when the Jews, so few,
one battles against many, or as the Church itself was founded by 12 uneducated and poor
men without political power, headed by a poor carpenter). And it must be fruitful, therefore,
not by means of persecution, but by means of preaching. Hence, any church which is spread
by the sword is a purely human institution.

30) THE CHURCH. The true Church must be apostolic. I.e. it must take its mission from
the apostles (APOSTOLE, “a sending off” in Greek), who are “those sent” by God Himself,
or else the church is one giving itself its own authority, and hence is a purely human
institution.

31) THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCILS AND OF THE ANCIENT FATHERS. The
early councils of the true Church, then, are to command our judgment in discerning which
Church visible today is descended from Her, and likewise the teachings of the ancient fathers
in that Church.

32) THE AUTHORITY OF THE POPE. The Holy Father in Rome, the bishop of Rome, is
the vicar of Christ on earth, and the deposit of divine truth is his to guard by the help of the
Holy Spirit. St Francis de Sales offers many proofs of this.

[A] Whenever God gives a man a new name, he also gives him a special grace
according to the name (the name is not insignificant). E.g. Abraham, in Genesis 17.5,
receives a new name and a special grace: “No longer shall you be called Abram; your name
shall be Abraham, for I am making you the father of a host of nations.” And at Genesis
17.15-16 God says “As for your wife Sarai, do not call her Sarai; her name shall be Sarah. I
will bless her, and I will give you a son by her.” Now in Isaiah 51.1-2, God calls Abraham
“rock”: “Look to the rock from which you were hewn...Look to Abraham, your father, and
to Sarah, who gave you birth”. And Christ is called “rock” by antonomasia (see I Peter 2.4-
8; Christ is the stone rejected by the builders, but who has become the cornerstone, and who
is a stumbling block, a scandal), since he is not only the foundation, but the founder. Hence,
when Christ says to Peter “you are Rock and on this Rock I build my Church” (Matthew
16.18), he bestows upon Peter a special authority over the entire Church.

[B] And when Christ says “and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it” (Matthew
16.18), he confirms that the Church which he founds upon Peter is everlasting. Also, Our
Lord says to Peter “Simon, Simon...I have prayed that your faith may not fail; and once you

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have turned back, you must confirm your brethren.” (Luke 22.32) Hence Peter is put in a
position of highest authority among the apostles.

[C] And Christ gives the keys of the Church to Peter at Matthew 16.19 “I will give
you the keys to the kingdom of heaven”.

[D] And Christ entrusts the whole care of the Church to Peter at John 21.15-19,
where Christ tells Peter to feed his lambs, tend his sheep, and feed his sheep.

[E] In naming the apostles, the evangelists almost always put Peter first (Catholicism
and Fundamentalism, Karl Keating, p 205). Why? If it is simply because Christ loved Peter
most of all, then why is John called “the disciple whom Jesus loved”? (See John 21.20
“Peter turned and saw the disciple following whom Jesus loved”).

[F] In any scriptural metaphor for the Church, St. Peter always stands in the first
place. E.g. if the Church is a building, then Peter is its second rock (second only to Christ)
and foundation (Matthew 16.18).

If the Church is a family, Our Lord is the head of the household, and Peter is his
lieutenant (Matthew 17.24-27, Christ pays the temple tax or pays tribute as the head of a
household, and St. Peter carries out the payment as Christ’s vicar).

If the Church is a ship, St. Peter is its captain, and in it Our Lord teaches (Luke 5.1-
11, Christ calls Simon the fisherman).

If the Church is a fisher of men, St. Peter is the first within it, and the true disciples
of Our Lord fish only with him (John 21.11).

If the Church draws men with nets (Matthew 13.47), St. Peter casts them into the sea
and draws them back, and it is St. Peter who draws them to the land and presents them to
Our Lord (Luke 5.1-11, John 21.11).

If the Church is an embassy, St. Peter is its first ambassador (in Matthew 10.5-15,
Christ sends the twelve as a kind of embassy, in Matthew 10.2, the twelve are listed and
“first, Simon called Peter”).

If the Church is a brotherhood, St. Peter is first, the governor and confirmer of the
rest (Luke 22.32 Christ prays that Peter’s faith will not fail, and commands him to confirm
his brethren).

If the Church is a kingdom, St. Peter receives its keys (Matthew 16.19).

If the Church is a flock or fold of sheep and lambs, St. Peter is its pastor and shepherd-
general (John 21.15-17).

[G] And in Acts 15.6-12, in a general council of the Church (the Council of
Jerusalem), Peter’s private revelation becomes a law, and not only as it was revealed to him,
but as he understood it and as he drew conclusions from it (men, not just animals, were no
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longer to be called “unclean”, although the revelation was only of animals). “My brothers,
you are well aware that from early days God made his choice among you that through my
mouth the Gentiles would hear the word of the gospel and believe.”

[H] And in Acts 1.15, Peter stands up and decides that Judas must be replaced by
someone to stand among the twelve. No one ever chose an apostle other than Christ himself.
Clearly, Peter is acting in Christ’s place.

33) THE AUTHORITY OF THE POPE. But who has taken up the authority which Peter
was given, now that he is dead? Did he hand on his office to any man? There are many
ancient witnesses who wrote in books and letters the order of men who assumed the office
after Peter. In Chapters X and XI of Part II of The Catholic Controversy (pp 280-290), St
Francis de Sales gives abundant ancient testimony that Peter did indeed take his seat in Rome
as its bishop, and died there, and that he was succeeded by Linus, etc.

34) MIRACLES. St Francis de Sales says “Therefore a miracle is a sound proof of the faith,
and an important argument for persuading men to believe; for if it were not our God would
not have made use of it.” (p 313 The Catholic Controversy). Some miracles, e.g. the telling
of the Samaritan woman that the man she lived with was not her husband (John iv.18) and
the turning of water into wine (John ii), could be imitated by the work of men or of angels.
But others could never be imitated, e.g. the raising of the dead. Hence it is because of these
second kind of miracles that the first are known to be miracles and not the tricks of a human
or an angelic mind. The human mind knows only some of what nature can do, the angelic
mind knows much more of the inner workings of nature, and yet not all (e.g. an angel cannot
know the secret thoughts of another person, nor cause thoughts or move the will directly in
another person), whereas God knows all of what is in nature and can move it as He wills.

35) HARMONY OF FAITH AND REASON. Luther and Calvin teach that the law of God
is impossible (p 319, The Catholic Controversy). But it is against reason that a wise and
good God should command what is not possible. Luther teaches (in his Commentary on
Galatians) that man does not become holy intrinsically and within his soul, but rather his
sins are hidden from the Father when he puts on Christ. I.e. God the Father rewards the
blessed in heaven by turning to His son rather than by looking into their hearts (which is
why they are all rewarded equally, since none is truly holy), i.e. God lies to Himself about
the condition of those before Him. But that is impossible, according to reason and according
to Luther’s own principles. It is impossible for God to love something without making it
good, since His love is active and not passive--He does not love something because it is
good, but vice versa. Luther thought this forced the conclusion that man in no way merits
heaven, so that God predestines to Hell and to Heaven (double predestination), and there is
no human freewill. Hence there are many things repugnant to reason in the faith, according
to Luther and Calvin, and Luther admits this freely, as when he calls reason a whore (see his
Commentary on Galatians).

36) SACRAMENTS. The word “sacrament” is used explicitly by St Paul in reference to

marriage (Ephesians 5.31-32 “Propter hoc relinquet homo patrem, et matrem suam, et
adhaerebit uxori suae: et erunt duo in carne una. Sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem
dico in Christo et in Ecclesia”).

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 Baptism is found in Matthew 28.19: “Go, therefore, and make disciples of all nations,
baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit”, and in Acts
at the baptism of St Paul “He got up and was baptized” (Acts 9.18), and in John with
Nicodemus: “no one can enter the kingdom of God without being born of water and spirit”
(John 3.5), and in many other places in the epistles and in Acts.

The Eucharist is found at the last supper (Luke 22.19-20) “Then he took the bread,
said the blessing, broke it, and gave it to them, saying, this is my body, which will be given
for you; do this in memory of me”, and in John 6.55 “For my flesh is true food, and my blood
is true drink”, and in John 6.48-51 “I am the bread of life. Your ancestors ate the manna in
the desert, but they died; this is the bread that comes down from heaven so that one may eat
it and not die. I am the living bread that came down from heaven; whoever eats this bread
will live forever; and the bread that I will give is my flesh for the life of the world” (the
eating of Christ’s flesh is compared to the eating of manna--he must therefore mean physical
eating), and in St Paul I Corinthians 11.29 “For anyone who eats and drinks without
discerning the body of the Lord, eats and drinks judgment on himself”.

Confirmation is found in Acts 2.4 “And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit” and
again at Acts 8.14-17 “they sent them Peter and John...that they might receive the Holy
Spirit, for it had not yet fallen upon any of them; they had only been baptized in the name of
the Lord Jesus. Then they laid hands on them and they received the Holy Spirit”. See also
Acts 19.5-6.

Confession is found in its institution: “Whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in
heaven; and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven” (Matthew 16.19). And
in John 20.23 we find “quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis; et quorum retinueritis,
retenta sunt.” And it is also mentioned in the letter of James 5.16: “Therefore confess your
sins to one another”.

Holy orders is found in Acts 14.23 “They appointed presbyters for them in each
church”, and in Hebrews 7.12 “When there is a change of priesthood, there is necessarily a
change of law as well”, where St Paul is arguing that the old priesthood was not perfect, but
the new priesthood (in which Christ is the high priest), is perfect and everlasting, and again
in Acts 6.6 “They presented these men to the apostles who prayed and laid hands on them”.

Marriage is called a sacrament in Ephesians 5.32.

And last rites or anointing of the sick is mentioned in the letter of James 5.14: “Is
anyone among you sick? He should summon the presbyters of the Church, and they should
pray over him and anoint him with oil in the name of the Lord, and the prayer of faith will
save the sick person, and the Lord will raise him up. If he has committed any sins he will be
forgiven.”

37) PURGATORY. If there is nothing in the next life but Heaven and Hell, then there is no
use to pray for the dead. Hence, if there is use to pray for the dead, there is something in the
next life besides Heaven and Hell. Many texts in Scripture point to the existence of
Purgatory.

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 A) In Hebrews 5.1, St Paul speaks of “sacrificia pro peccatis”. One needs to be
cleansed and owes a debt although a sin is forgiven. This happens among men; although
someone forgives his friend for damaging his body or his property or his reputation, i.e. he
does not choose to end the friendship, he may still demand that his friend restore his body
or his property or his reputation. And although one may no longer be committing a serious
sin or have the guilt for it on his soul, the greater inclination toward committing that sin,
which he acquired in committing it, may very well remain as a dross or an impurity.

B) Psalm 66.9-12 (65.9-12) “He has given life to our souls...For you have tested us,
O God! You have tried us as silver is tried by fire...we have passed through fire and water,
but you have led us out to refreshment”.

C) Isaiah 4.4 “When the Lord washes away the filth of the daughters of Zion, and
purges Jerusalem’s blood from her midst with a blast of searing judgment”.

D) Micah 7:8-9 “Rejoice not over me, O my enemy! though I have fallen, I will
arise; though I sit in darkness, the Lord is my light. The wrath of the Lord I will endure
because I have sinned against Him, until He takes up my cause, and establishes my right. He
will bring me forth to the light.”

E) Zechariah 9.11 “As for you, by the blood of your covenant with me, I will bring
forth your prisoners from the dungeon.”

F) Malachi 3.3 “He will sit refining and purifying silver, and he will purify the sons
of Levi, refining them like gold or like silver that they may offer due sacrifice to the Lord.”

G) I Corinthians 3.13-15 “But if someone’s work is burned up, that one will suffer
loss; the person will be saved, but only as through fire.”

H) Matthew 12.36 “I tell you, on the day of judgment people will render an account
for every careless word they speak.”

I) Luke 12.57-59 and Matthew 5.25-26 “Settle with your opponent quickly while on
the way to court with him. Otherwise your opponent will hand you over to the judge, and
the judge will hand you over to the guard, and you will be thrown into prison. Amen, I say
to you, you will not be released until you have paid the last penny.” Our Lord speaks of a
debtors’ prison in the next life, but Heaven is not a prison, and Hell is not a debtors’ prison
from which souls may be released “after paying the last penny”.

J) Luke 16.3-8 “And the steward said to himself...I know what I shall do so that,
when I am removed from the stewardship, they may welcome me into their homes.” The
dishonest steward, before he was dismissed, diminished all the debts of his master’s debtors,
thus making friends for himself before he was fired and at his master’s expense. “And the
master commended that dishonest steward for acting prudently.” Likewise we should make
use of the excess in the merits of the saints and apply them to the debts of those in Purgatory,
so that upon our death, we shall have made friends who will be eager to welcome us into
Heaven, and relieve us of our debt by their prayers.

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 K) Philippians 2.10 “at the name of Jesus every knee should bend, of those in heaven
and on earth and under the earth”. Who is “under the earth”, bending their knees at the name
of Jesus? Not those living on earth, nor those in heaven. Perhaps those in Hell? But Psalm
6.6 says “who shall confess to Thee in Hell?” and Isaiah 38.18 “for neither shall Hell confess
to Thee”. But if those “under the earth” are neither those in Hell, nor in Heaven, nor on earth,
they must be the dead elsewhere.

L) Proverbs 24 “The just man falls seven times a day, and rises again”. If the man is
still called justified before God, he cannot be committing sins which sever his friendship
with God, and therefore deserve Hell. Therefore there is some sin which does not deserve
Hell, and yet no sin can enter Heaven. Again, in the first letter of John 5.17, it is written “All
wrongdoing is sin, but there is sin that is not deadly”.

M) II Samuel 12.13-14 “The Lord on his part has forgiven your sin: you shall not
die. But since you have utterly spurned the Lord by this deed, the child born to you must
surely die.” The debt of sin is not the same as the guilt of sin, since one is removed, but not
the other. Hence, although one be forgiven for sins in this life, some temporal debt for them
may remain to be paid.

N) II Maccabees 12.46 “Thus he made atonement for the dead that they might be
freed from this sin.”

O) Matthew 12.32 “But whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven,
either in this age or in the age to come”. Our Lord here speaks as if some sins are forgiven
in the age to come.

All these texts show that there is a time and a place for the purgation or cleansing of
souls after this mortal life. Therefore there is a Purgatory; since Hell has nothing that can be
purged, and Heaven has nothing that needs be purged.

38) THE EUCHARIST. Christ reacts the same way in response to disbelief in his words
when he claims to be divine as when he claims that man must eat his flesh and drink his
blood. When he claims to be a divine person (John 8.24, 8.28, 8.58-59, 10.30), the crowd
attempts to stone him, and he does not correct them as if they had misunderstood him, as he
would be obliged to do if they had. When he claims that man must eat his flesh and drink
his blood indeed (John 6.55), countless disciples leave him, and he does not correct them as
if they had misunderstood him, as he would be obliged to do if they had. Hence, if Christ
meant that he is food in a figurative sense, he must have meant the same about his divinity.

And Christ promises never to leave us: “I will not leave you orphans” (John 14.18),
and “Behold, I am with you always, until the end of the age.” (Matthew 28.20)

Furthermore, his claim to divinity is never as explicit as his claim that his body is
under the appearance of bread, and his blood under the appearance of wine in the cup
(Matthew 26.26), so that if his divinity is to be taken as clearly and explicitly claimed in
Scripture, a fortiori is his real presence under the appearances of bread and wine at the last
supper. Again, St Paul, right after admonishing some in Corinth who ate during the mass as

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if they were simply satisfying hunger and thirst or as if at a social gathering, is rather explicit
about the Eucharist in I Corinthians 11.23-31:

Ego enim accepti a Domino quod et tradidi vobis, quoniam Dominus Iesus in quo
nocte tradebatur, accepit panem, et gratias agens fregit, et dixit: Accipite, et manducate: hoc
est corpus meum, quod pro vobis tradetur: hoc facite in meam commemorationem. Similiter
et calicem, postquam coenavit, dicens: Hic calix novum testamentum est in meo sanguine.
Hoc facite quotiescumque bibetis, in meam commemorationem. Quotiescumque enim
manducabitis panem hunc, et calicem bibetis: mortem Domini annunciabitis donec veniat.

Itaque quicumque manducaverit panem hunc, vel biberit calicem Domini

indigne: reus erit corporis, et sanguinis Domini. Probet autem seipsum homo: et sic de pane
illo edat, et de calice bibat. Qui enim manducat, et bibit indigne, iudicium sibi manducat, et
bibit: non diiudicans corpus Domini. Ideo inter vos multi infirmi et imbecilles, et dormiunt
multi.

Verse 29 is the explicit one: “Qui enim manducat...” “For he who eats and drinks unworthily,
not discerning the body of the Lord (non diiudicans corpus Domini), eats and drinks
judgment to himself.” What else is St Paul saying other than “Do not eat at the mass as if
you were eating bread; that is what the bread in your house is for. It is wrong to eat at the
mass non diiudicans corpus Domini; know that you are eating the body of the Lord, or do
not eat at all.”

39) MARY’S SPIRITUAL MOTHERHOOD. Everything that Christ did at his sacrifice on
calvary had redemptive significance. John 19:26-27 says “When Jesus saw his mother and
the disciple there whom he loved, he said to his mother, woman, behold your son. Then he
said to the disciple, behold, your mother. And from that hour the disciple took her into his
own.” This is to refer to all men.

40) There is internal evidence for the truth of scripture as well as external evidence. E.g. the
Old Testament points to the New (in the prophecies, etc.), although the Jews are responsible
for the Old Testament, and they do not accept the New, so that the New Testament is not
Jewish propaganda.

41) Against those who believe that God can change or improve, but believe in Scripture,
show them Malachi 3.6 “Surely I the Lord do not change”.

42) Against those who believe that “Catholic”, because it was not always used in reference
to Christians, must have been the name for something new, point out first the meaning of the
name, i.e. “universal” or “general”. Then point out the origin of the name: the title was first
used in A.D. 107 by St Ignatius of Antioch (Letter to the Smyrneans 8.2): “Where Jesus
Christ is, there is the Catholic Church” (see John A. Hardon, S.J., The Catholic Catechism,
p217). Then point out that even the word “Christian” had to have an origin--there were
Christians walking about before there was a name for them. See Acts 11.26 “and it was in
Antioch that the disciples were first called Christians”.

43) Against those who would argue that miracles never have occurred in history, or at least
none that have been so public as to have universal visibility and efficacy upon the belief of
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man, then let him hear this argument. The Roman Catholic Church, which is visible for all
to see, is a 2,000 year old institution which has never changed any of its teachings (which
teachings occupied some of the greatest minds in history), which institution was founded by
12 fisherman and a carpenter, all uneducated, none of whom benefited in a worldly way from
this institution, and most of whom died for it. The Roman Catholic Church is therefore itself
a visible miracle for all who care to behold it.

SUPPLEMENT: ON THE NATURE OF CERTAINTY.

Cf. Michael Augros, “Spring 1993 Scrapbook,” n. 9 (Scrapboo.1):

9) A Christian must say it is more certain that there are three persons in God than that three
is an odd number. Whence comes the certitude? “...it must be said that certitude is nothing else
than the determination of the intellect to one thing.” (In III Sent., d23 q2 a2 sol3) “...it must
be said that the firmness of the adherence of the cognitive power to its knowable object is
properly called certitude.” (In III Sent., d26 q2 a4) And opinion is when “reason leans
completely to one side of a contradiction, but with fear of the other side” (Proemium to the
Commentary on the Posterior Analytics), so that certitude would be the cleaving of reason to
one side of a contradiction without fear of the other side.

To be certain of the things of faith, then, is for human reason to be completely and firmly
determined to one side of a contradiction (i.e. to a revealed proposition) without fear of the
other side. Human reason is obviously not determined to these propositions by resolution to
principles which are certain to us in themselves, since then there would not be faith, but know-
ledge simply speaking. But there is no certitude where there is no truth, nor even when there
is truth but the cause for the assent to the truth is extrinsic to the truth, e.g. if I believe a true
geometrical proposition because my teacher claimed it is so (here there is only probability).
Notice these two requirements, namely that the thing adhered to be true, and that the cause of
adherence be intrinsic to the truth, are found in science and in faith, but in different ways.

First, in science, the conclusions follow from the principles, whose truth and necessity
directly move the intellect to assent. E.g. nothing causes me to assent to the truth of the state-
ment “every whole is greater than any of its parts” other than the truth of that statement itself—
and nothing is extrinsic to itself, so that in the case of science, the truth itself immediately
causes the intellect to cleave to it. Hence science is certain.

Second, in faith, it is because God has said it to be so that we believe what we believe. But
God is (as can be known by the natural power of reason) unable to err or to deceive, so that
what He says must be true. God Himself is the cause of our assent to His revelation, and He
is the truth itself (which can also be known by the natural power of reason). But do we believe
God directly or through another? If we believe God through what another says He said, then
since that other who is not God is able to err or to deceive, the cause of our adherence to the
truth is not simply the truth itself (as God is the Truth itself), and hence we lose our certitude.
That is why fides est ex auditu (Romans 10:17), and yet it is also true to say fides...est a Deo
interius movente per gratiam (II-II Q6 A1). I.e. faith requires that something believable (true
but not knowable by reason either simply or by the reason of most men) be proposed, and that
it be assented to interiorly. Now God alone can propose something believable (since such a
thing is above reason), and He can do so directly to some (such as the prophets), and indirectly
to others, who hear what God has said through others (such as those who hear the prophets).
In this regard, God must be the first cause of faith, but men can be secondary and sufficient
causes of faith. But on the side of assent, the witnessing of miracles or the hearing of persua-
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sive arguments can be external causes of faith, but neither is sufficient, since seeing these,
some men believe and some men do not. Hence there must be something else in addition which
causes faith in men. The Pelagians said “freewill”, but this cannot be so, since by assenting to
things of faith, man is lifted above his own nature, which freewill, being a natural power,
cannot do. Hence, there must be some supernatural power working inwardly in man moving
him to assent to the things of faith, i.e. God. That is, God Himself moves the intellect of man,
through grace, to believe Him. Hence nothing other than the Truth itself, namely God, causes
us to assent to the truth about Himself, so that in the case of faith, the Truth itself immediately
causes the intellect to cleave to it. Hence faith is certain.
One may be disposed to believe, i.e. disposed for God’s internal work, by outward things
such as miracles and arguments. This is perhaps something like dialectic, which disposes the
mind for resolution in science by tying the problems and finding the likelihood in things, but
which does not present the truth itself and coerce the intellect, or as the authority of an expert
might dispose someone previously ill disposed to hear your argument.

The difference between the cause of certitude in faith and science is that in the case of
science, the truth moves the intellect directly, whereas in the case of faith, God moves the
intellect by means of moving the will: “intellectus credentis determinatur ad unum non per
rationem, sed per voluntatem. Et ideo assensus hic accipitur pro actu intellectus secundum
quod a voluntate determinatur ad unum.” (II-II Q2 A1 Ad6) If God were to move the intellect
directly to see the truths above reason, He would be doing so by showing the truths above
reason to the human mind, which pertains to knowledge and vision, not faith.

Hence faith is like the habits of science and understanding insofar as “credere habet firmam
adhesionem ad unam partem” (II-II Q2 A1), but it is like doubting or suspecting or opining
insofar as “cognitio non est perfecta per manifestam visionem”. Faith is like the intellectual
virtues of necessary things with regard to its certitude, but like opinion with regard to its lack
of vision and clarity: “perfectio intellectus et scientiae excedit cognitionem fidei quantum ad
maiorem manifestationem: non tamen quantum ad certiorem inhaesionem.” (II-II Q4 A8
Ad3).

This last consideration brings us to the opening statement. We have seen how faith is certain,
but how can it be more certain than the sciences and things known by the natural power of
reason? In II-II Q4 A8 (whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual
virtues?), St Thomas distinguishes the habits of understanding, science, and wisdom which
are natural from those which are supernatural (the gifts of the Holy Spirit). We are concerned
with the natural virtues. Now knowledge is more certain either on the part of its object (or
cause), or on the part of its subject, i.e. something can be more certain in itself or to us. Hence
the cause of something is more certain in itself (since it is simpler than the effects), but the
effects are more certain to us (since they are closer to sense experience), and the demonstration
is more certain in itself, but the induction is more certain to most, and metaphysics (since it is
about unchangeable and immaterial things) is more certain than physics, but physics is more
certain to us.

On the part of the object, clearly faith is more certain than any of the natural intellectual vir-
tues, since its object is the First Truth as He reveals Himself, and it is impossible for Him to
err or to deceive, whereas the object of the intellectual virtues is the truth of things as known
by reason, which can fail and be deceived.

On the part of the subject, something is said to be more certain to the human mind which
follows more naturally the motion of reason, or fits its capacity more naturally, as natural
philosophy does because it most of all proceeds in the way natural to reason, i.e. from the more
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universal to the less universal. In this regard, faith is less certain than the natural intellectual
virtues, since it is about things above the mind of man, whereas even metaphysics, though not
nearly so well proportioned to the human mind as mathematics, is about things that can be
reasoned out by the natural power of the human mind.

Which way of being more certain deserves to be called more certain simply speaking? The
way of being more certain on the part of the object (or cause), since everything is judged
simply from its object (or cause). E.g. knowledge is better either on the part of its object or its
subject, but the knowledge having a better object is better simply speaking (see In De Anima
I, lectio 1, n 5). So faith is more certain than the intellectual virtues simply speaking. Faith,
then, is less certain to us, but more certain simply speaking, than all natural knowledge. Hence
it is more certain simply speaking that God is triune, than that three is an odd number (since
the trinity is the first cause of every truth), but it is less certain to us. Of course, that the faith
is less certain to us does not mean that it has a little bit of uncertainty or doubt, any more than
saying “virtue is better than health” means that health is a little bit bad.

Faith, then, is a little like a vocation to the religious life in its cause. One might be called to
that life exteriorly by the example and encouragement of others, yet this is not a sufficient
cause since some respond and many do not, so that there must be an interior calling as well;
God must move interiorly and directly the will of those whom He calls to that life.

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 SUPPLEMENT

St. Thomas Aquinas

Prologues and First Lectures of Commentaries

Translated by

P. H. Conway, O.P. and R. F. Larcher, O.P.

. (Columbus, Ohio: Alum Creek Press, St. Mary of the Springs, 1965)

[Excerpt from the Introduction]

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 INTRODUCTION

The end of man as the knowledge of God:

the role of philosophy as set against this perspective
(as drawn from various writings of St. Thomas Aquinas)

I. Relation of revelation and faith to theology

1. God is the object of faith, which assents to propositions concerning God under the formal aspect
of their being revealed by God.

…The object of any cognoscitive habit [in this case, that of faith] has two aspects, namely, that
which is materially known, which is, as it were, the material object, and that through which it is
known, which is the formal notion of the object. Thus, in the science of geometry, what are materially
known are the conclusions, while the formal notion under which they are known constitutes the
middles of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known. Hence, in the faith, if we
consider the formal notion of its object, it is nothing other than the first truth [i.e., God as the
guarantor of all truth]. For the faith of which we are speaking does not assent to anything except
insofar as it is revealed by God. Hence, it is founded upon the divine truth as a middle [of
demonstration, whence derives the certitude of its conclusions]. But if we consider materially the
things to which faith assents, not only is it God, but also many other things, which, however, do not
fall under the assent of faith except insofar as they have some order to God, namely, as through
certain effects of the Divinity, man is aided in his tending toward divine fruition [e.g., by faith in the
sacraments, in the divine foundation of the Church, etc.] (Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, c.).

2. This revelation is contained in Scripture (and tradition), and appropriately summarized under
certain articles of faith:

Scripture
…The truth of the faith is contained diffusedly in Sacred Scripture, and in various manners, and
obscurely in some. Hence, in order to bring forth the truth of faith from Sacred Scripture there is
required long study and training. But all those for whom it is necessary to know the truth of faith
cannot arrive at this—a great number, being occupied with other concerns, cannot devote themselves
to study. Therefore it was necessary that, from what was set forward in Sacred Scripture, a certain
clear summary be gathered together, to be proposed for belief by all. This summary is not added to
Scripture, but is, rather, drawn from Sacred Scripture (ibid, a. 9, ad 1).

Tradition
[In the Mass, where the words of consecration of the bread and wine are proposed as Christ’s
words, mysterium fidei, do not appear in Sacred Scripture, whereas the remainder do, in the Gospels
of Saints Matthew, Mark and Luke, and I Corinthians. The following are the words of St. Thomas
on the opinion that solely the Scriptural words of consecration suffice for valid consecration.] Some
say therefore that whatever forms of these words are written down in canonical Scripture suffice for
conse- [i-ii] cration. But it is seen to be more probably that consecration takes place solely by these
words which the Church uses from the tradition of [i.e., as transmitted by] the Apostles. For the
Evangelists intended to set down the Lord’s words insofar as this pertained to the narrating of events,
but not as they were ordained to the consecrating of the sacraments, which consecrations were
maintained secret by the early Church because of unbelievers. [Later while expounding each of the
phrases in consecration of the wine, one has the following statement of St. Thomas on the words
mysterium fidei.] … He [Christ] says, “the mystery of faith,” i.e. the hidden object of faith, since,
namely, faith in the passion of Christ was hidden in all the sacrifices of the Old Testament as truth is

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in a sign. This [expression] the Church has from the tradition of the Apostles, since it is not found in
canonical Scripture (Expos. of I Corinthians, 11:25).

3. The defining of the faith in articles is the office of the Roman Pontiff:

…To the authority of him, therefore, pertains the issuing of a creed [composed of articles of faith],
to whose authority it pertains to settle in a final way those things which are of faith, that they may be
held by all with a faith that is unshaken. Now this pertains to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff,
to whom the more important and more difficult questions of the Church are referred, as stated in the
Decretals. Hence the Lord said to Peter, “I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and thou,
being once confirmed, confirm thy brethren” [Luke 22:32] (Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, c.).

4. Theology, as the science of which God is the subject, argues from the divine knowledge of God
contained in the Scriptures, whose main aspects are summarized under specific articles of faith:

…[Sacred doctrine, i.e., theology] uses the authority of canonical Scripture as being that proper to
it, and reasons from it with necessity… For our faith is based upon the revelation made to the
Apostles and Prophets, who wrote the canonical books (Summa Theologica, I, c. 1, art. 8, ad 2).

…God is the subject of this science. For as an object is related to a power or habit [thus, God is
related to the act and habit of faith as its object], so is a subject related to a science [thus, God is the
subject of the science of faith, whose principles are the articles of faith]. That is assigned as the
proper object of any power or habit, under whose notion all things are referred to that power or habit.
Thus man and stone are referred to sight insofar as they are both colored. Hence the “colored” is the
proper object of sight. But all things are treated in sacred doctrine [i.e. theology] under the notion of
God—i.e., either because they are God, or because they have an order to God [e.g., the Blessed
Trinity as to the former; the sacra-ments as to the latter]. Hence it follows that God is truly the subject
of this science. This is also clear from the principles of this science, which are the articles of the
faith which is of God. Now the same thing is the subject of the principles and of the whole science,
since the whole science is contained virtually in its principles (ibid, a. 7, c.).

…The things to be believed in the Christian faith are said to be distinguished into articles insofar
as they are divided into certain parts, having a certain relationship to one another. Now the object of
faith is something “not seen” concerning the divine… Hence, where there occurs [ii.-iii] something
which has a special notion of “not seen,” there is then a special article [e.g., those referring to the
Persons of the Blessed Trinity and to the Incarnation], but where many things are known, according
to the same notion, here articles should not be distinguished [e.g., in reference to the belief in the
passions, death and burial of Christ, which together have the same aspect, but which differ, in the
notion of what is to be believed, from the article on the resurrection of Christ] (Summa Theologica,
II-II, q. 1, a. 6, c.).

Reference:

St. Thomas Aquinas, Prologues and First Lectures of Commentaries, Pro Manuscripto,
trans. P. H. Conway, O.P. and R. F. Larcher, O.P. (Columbus, Ohio: Alum Creek Press, St.
Mary of the Springs, 1965) 36 pp.

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SUPPLEMENT: THAT SACRED TRADITION AND SACRED SCRIPTURE
CONSTITUTE THE ONE DEPOSIT OF FAITH.

DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION
ON DIVINE REVELATION
DEI VERBUM
SOLEMNLY PROMULGATED
BY HIS HOLINESS
POPE PAUL VI
ON NOVEMBER 18, 1965

CHAPTER II

HANDING ON DIVINE REVELATION

7. In His gracious goodness, God has seen to it that what He had revealed for the salvation of all
nations would abide perpetually in its full integrity and be handed on to all generations. Therefore
Christ the Lord in whom the full revelation of the supreme God is brought to completion (see 2 Cor.
1:20; 3:13; 4:6), commissioned the Apostles to preach to all men that Gospel which is the source of
all saving truth and moral teaching, (1) and to impart to them heavenly gifts. This Gospel had been
promised in former times through the prophets, and Christ Himself had fulfilled it and promulgated
it with His lips. This commission was faithfully fulfilled by the Apostles who, by their oral preaching,
by example, and by observances handed on what they had received from the lips of Christ, from
living with Him, and from what He did, or what they had learned through the prompting of the Holy
Spirit. The commission was fulfilled, too, by those Apostles and apostolic men who under the
inspiration of the same Holy Spirit committed the message of salvation to writing. (2)

But in order to keep the Gospel forever whole and alive within the Church, the Apostles left bishops
as their successors, “handing over” to them “the authority to teach in their own place.”(3) This sacred
tradition, therefore, and Sacred Scripture of both the Old and New Testaments are like a mirror in
which the pilgrim Church on earth looks at God, from whom she has received everything, until she
is brought finally to see Him as He is, face to face (see 1 John 3:2).

8. And so the apostolic preaching, which is expressed in a special way in the inspired books, was to
be preserved by an unending succession of preachers until the end of time. Therefore the Apostles,
handing on what they themselves had received, warn the faithful to hold fast to the traditions
which they have learned either by word of mouth or by letter (see 2 Thess. 2:15), and to fight
in defense of the faith handed on once and for all (see Jude 1:3) (4) Now what was handed on
by the Apostles includes everything which contributes toward the holiness of life and increase
in faith of the peoples of God; and so the Church, in her teaching, life and worship, perpetuates
and hands on to all generations all that she herself is, all that she believes.

This tradition which comes from the Apostles develop in the Church with the help of the Holy
Spirit. (5) For there is a growth in the understanding of the realities and the words which have been
handed down. This happens through the contemplation and study made by believers, who treasure
these things in their hearts (see Luke, 2:19, 51) through a penetrating understanding of the spiritual
realities which they experience, and through the preaching of those who have received through
Episcopal succession the sure gift of truth. For as the centuries succeed one another, the Church
constantly moves forward toward the fullness of divine truth until the words of God reach their
complete fulfillment in her.

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The words of the holy fathers witness to the presence of this living tradition, whose wealth is
poured into the practice and life of the believing and praying Church. Through the same tradition the
Church’s full canon of the sacred books is known, and the sacred writings themselves are more
profoundly understood and unceasingly made active in her; and thus God, who spoke of old,
uninterruptedly converses with the bride of His beloved Son; and the Holy Spirit, through whom the
living voice of the Gospel resounds in the Church, and through her, in the world, leads unto all truth
those who believe and makes the word of Christ dwell abundantly in them (see Col. 3:16).

9. Hence there exists a close connection and communication between sacred tradition and
Sacred Scripture. For both of them, flowing from the same divine wellspring, in a certain way
merge into a unity and tend toward the same end. For Sacred Scripture is the word of God inasmuch
as it is consigned to writing under the inspiration of the divine Spirit, while sacred tradition takes the
word of God entrusted by Christ the Lord and the Holy Spirit to the Apostles, and hands it on to their
successors in its full purity, so that led by the light of the Spirit of truth, they may in proclaiming it
preserve this word of God faithfully, explain it, and make it more widely known. Consequently it is
not from Sacred Scripture alone that the Church draws her certainty about everything which has been
revealed. Therefore both sacred tradition and Sacred Scripture are to be accepted and venerated with
the same sense of loyalty and reverence.(6)

10. Sacred tradition and Sacred Scripture form one sacred deposit of the word of God, commit-
ted to the Church. Holding fast to this deposit the entire holy people united with their shepherds
remain always steadfast in the teaching of the Apostles, in the common life, in the breaking of
the bread and in prayers (see Acts 2, 42, Greek text), so that holding to, practicing and pro-
fessing the heritage of the faith, it becomes on the part of the bishops and faithful a single
common effort. (7)

But the task of authentically interpreting the word of God, whether written or handed on, (8) has
been entrusted exclusively to the living teaching office of the Church, (9) whose authority is exer-
cised in the name of Jesus Christ. This teaching office is not above the word of God, but serves it,
teaching only what has been handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it scrupulously and ex-
plaining it faithfully in accord with a divine commission and with the help of the Holy Spirit, it draws
from this one deposit of faith everything which it presents for belief as divinely revealed.

It is clear, therefore, that sacred tradition, Sacred Scripture and the teaching authority of the Church,
in accord with God’s most wise design, are so linked and joined together that one cannot stand
without the others, and that all together and each in its own way under the action of the one Holy
Spirit contribute effectively to the salvation of souls.

NOTES

Chapter II

Article 7:

1. cf. Matt. 28:19-20, and Mark 16:15; Council of Trent, session IV, Decree on Scriptural Canons:
Denzinger 783 (1501).

2. cf. Council of Trent, loc. cit.; First Vatican Council, session III, Dogmatic Constitution on the
Catholic Faith, Chap. 2, “On revelation:” Denzinger 1787 (3005).

3. St. Irenaeus, “Against Heretics” III, 3, 1: PG 7, 848; Harvey, 2, p. 9.

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Article 8:

4. cf. Second Council of Nicea: Denzinger 303 (602); Fourth Council of Constance, session X, Canon
1: Denzinger 336 (650-652).

5. cf. First Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith, Chap. 4, “On Faith and
Reason:” Denzinger 1800 (3020).

Article 9:

6. cf. Council of Trent, session IV, loc. cit.: Denzinger 783 (1501).

Article 10:

7. cf. Pius XII, apostolic constitution, “Munificentissimus Deus,” Nov. 1, 1950: A.A.S. 42 (1950) p.
756; Collected Writings of St. Cyprian, Letter 66, 8: Hartel, III, B, p. 733: “The Church [is] people
united with the priest and the pastor together with his flock.”

8. cf. First Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith, Chap. 3 “On Faith:”
Denzinger 1792 (3011).

9. cf. Pius XII, encyclical “Humani Generis,” Aug. 12, 1950: A.A.S. 42 (1950) pp. 568-69: Denzinger
2314 (3886). (emphasis added)

(c) 2024; 2025 Bart A. Mazzetti

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