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 THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
ACCOUNTING INFORMATION SYSTEMS

The Routledge Handbook of Accounting Information Systems is a prestige reference work offering
a comprehensive overview of the state of current knowledge and emerging scholarship in
the discipline of AIS.
The pace of technological-​­driven change is rapid, and this revised edition provides a
deeper focus on the technical underpinnings and organisational consequences of accounting
information systems. It has been updated to capture the changes in technology since the
previous edition. It now includes chapters and scholarly thought on artificial intelligence,
predictive analytics and data visualisation, among others. Contributions from an interna-
tional cast of authors provide a balanced overview of established and developing themes,
identifying issues and discussing relevant debates. The chapters are analytical and engaging.
Many chapters include cases or examples, and some provide additional resources for readers.
The chapters also provide a reflection on where the research agenda is likely to advance in
the future.
This is a complete and indispensable guide for students and researchers in accounting and
accounting information systems, academics and students seeking convenient access to an
unfamiliar area, as well as established researchers seeking a single repository on the current
debates and literature in the field.

Erik Strauss is Professor of Accounting and Control at Witten/­Herdecke University, Wit-

ten, Germany.

Martin Quinn is Professor of Management Accounting and Accounting History at Queen’s

Management School, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland.
‘Brings together some key insights on the interface between accounting and information
systems.’
— Al Bhimani, London School of Economics, UK

‘This book provides a good introduction to AIS and the contemporary research that is being
done on it. Given the growth and influence of AIS on our daily lives, as touched on within
the chapters, it is timely that such a book be produced.’
— Stephen Jollands, University of Exeter, UK

‘Finally a text that addresses the organizational aspects of AIS! Covering the most recent
insights from multiple knowledge domains – change, integration, implementation, it is all
there!’
— Hanno Roberts, Norwegian Business School, Norway
THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF ACCOUNTING
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Second Edition

Edited by Erik Strauss ­and Martin Quinn

 Cover image: monsitj/­Getty Images
Second edition published 2023
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2023 selection and editorial matter, Erik Strauss and Martin Quinn;
individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Erik Strauss and Martin Quinn to be identified as the
authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual
chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other
means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and
recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
First edition published by Routledge 2017
British Library ­Cataloguing-­​­­in-​­Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress ­Cataloging-­​­­in-​­Publication Data
Names: Quinn, Martin, 1973– editor. | Strauss, Erik, 1982– editor.
Title: The Routledge handbook of accounting information systems /
edited by Martin Quinn and Erik Strauss.
Other titles: Routledge companion to accounting information systems.
Description: 2nd edition. | Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge,
2023. | Series: Routledge international handbooks | Earlier edition
published as: The Routledge companion to accounting information
systems. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022022298 (print) | LCCN 2022022299 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780367678111 (hardback) | ISBN 9780367678135 (paperback) |
ISBN 9781003132943 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Accounting—Data processing. | Management
information systems.
Classification: LCC HF5679 .R68 2023 (print) | LCC HF5679 (ebook) |
DDC 657.0285—dc23/eng/20220623
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022022298
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022022299

ISBN: ­978-­​­­0 -­​­­367-­​­­67811-​­1 (­hbk)

ISBN: ­978-­​­­0 -­​­­367-­​­­67813-​­5 (­pbk)
ISBN: ­978-­​­­1-­​­­0 03-­​­­13294-​­3 (­ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/­9781003132943
Typeset in Bembo
by codeMantra
 CONTENTS

List of figures viii

List of tables x
Contributors xi

Introduction to Handbook of Accounting Information Systems 1

Erik Strauss and Martin Quinn

PART 1
The accounting information systems discipline 7

1 Introduction to accounting information systems 9

Peter Cleary

2 The evolution of accounting information systems 21

Pierangelo Rosati and Victoria Paulsson

3 Technologies underpinning accounting information systems 33

Gerhard Kristandl

4 Developing information systems for the contemporary accounting

profession: Challenges and recommendations 50
Andrea Crean and Noel Carroll

5 AIS as a catalyst for change 63

Krister Bredmar

v
 Contents

PART 2
Organisational effects of accounting information systems 75

6 Clarifying digitalisation: Strategy, transformation, and implementation 77

Daniel Schallmo and Christopher Williams

7 Accounting information systems and decision making 93

Markus Granlund and Henri Teittinen

8 Accounting information systems and continuous improvement 107

Winnie O’Grady and Sharlene Biswas

9 The dynamics of Artificial Intelligence in accounting organisations:

A structuration perspective 121
Othmar M. Lehner, Carina Knoll, Susanne ­L eitner-​­Hanetseder and
Christoph Eisl

10 Outsourcing of accounting information systems 140

Benoit A. Aubert and ­Jean-​­Grégoire Bernard

11 Technological developments and new hybrid roles in accounting and

finance 156
João Oliveira and Paulo J. Ribeiro

12 Predictive analytics in accounting information systems 171

Esperanza Huerta and Scott Jensen

13 Coding skills for accountants 190

Bibek Bhatta and Martin R. W. Hiebl

14 Novel visualisation techniques to understand AIS data 210

Lisa Perkhofer, Peter Hofer, and Heimo Losbichler

PART 3
Controlling accounting information systems 239

15 Data security and quality 241

W. Alec Cram

16 Continuous auditing: Developments and challenges 254

Maria Céu Ribeiro and João Oliveira

17 The status of robotic process automation 269

Steven A. Harrast and David A. Wood

vi
 Contents

18 Accounting information systems: Supporting business strategy 285

Victoria Paulsson and Malcolm Brady

PART 4
Future directions of accounting information systems 301

19 Integrating AIS and contemporary technologies 303

Brenda Clerkin and Danielle McConville

20 Technology, the future, and us 318

Tadhg Nagle

21 Challenges to technology implementation 329

Pierangelo Rosati and Theo Lynn

22 New developments in information technology: A further call for action 349

Joan Ballantine and Robert D. Galliers

Index 363

vii
 FIGURES

3.1 ­Client-​­server architecture 36

3.2 Local area network 36
3.3 Wide area network 37
3.4 Network topologies 39
3.5 Blockchain concept (­adapted from Wu et al., 2019, p­ . 3) 45
4.1 Key stages of a systems development life cycle 51
4.2 Example of a university incorporating AIS and analytics into curriculum 57
6.1 Connection between digital and corporate strategy
(­Schallmo et al., 2019a, 2019b) 80
6.2 Classification in the context of digitisation (­Schallmo et al., 2019a) 82
6.3 Procedure model for digital strategy development 82
6.4 Matrix with four generic options for a digital strategy 84
6.5 Procedure model for digital transformation of business models (­Schallmo,
2016, ­p. 23) 85
6.6 Digital radar with enablers and applications (­Bouée & Schaible, 2015) 86
6.7 Procedure model for the digital implementation 87
6.8 ­TOSC-​­Model and influence 88
6.9 Combination of approaches 89
7.1 Data environment and d­ ecision-​­making environment framing decision making 94
7.2 Uncertainty, decision making, and the roles of accounting practice (­adapted
from Boland, 1979; Burchell et al., 1980) 98
7.3 Summary of AIS and decision making 105
8.1 Simplified template for weekly reporting 110
8.2 Cost breakdown for cost centre summary 116
8.3 Interdependence of AIS and continuous improvement initiatives 118
9.1 Three maturity levels of Artificial Intelligence in Accounting (­A IA) 126
9.2 The “­t wo sides of a coin” of the structure and system in Artificial
Intelligence in Accounting and the impact of knowledgeable actors 131
10.1 Outsourcing and offshoring decisions 142
12.1 Typical users of accounting information systems for predictive analytics 174

viii
 Figures

12.2 Timeline of audit analytic milestones in the UK transparency reports for

each of the Big 4 firms (­­2012–​­2020) 177
12.3 Data layers and analysers in EY Helix 183
12.4 Screen capture of EY Helix Trade Receivables Analyzer (­w ith permission) 184
13.1 An illustration of ­three-​­way matching to automating payment processing 194
13.2 Programming languages used by respondents on a regular basis 197
13.3 Programming language recommended to learn first 198
13.4 Screenshots of Jupyter (­a) and Spyder (­b) to demonstrate frequently used
user interfaces while running commands in Python 200
13.5 Using Binder.org website to open Jupyter Notebooks from GitHub repository 201
13.6 Basic data visualisation and frequency table 202
13.7 Solving problems with multiple constraints using Python 202
13.8 Market research of a competitor examining the availability and price of books 203
13.9 Examining the use of emojis by customers 204
14.1 Sunburst visualisation (Link to original Visualisation:
https://observablehq.com/@d3/zoomable-sunburst) 215
14.2 Treemap visualisation (Link to original Visualisation:
https://observablehq.com/@d3/treemap) 216
14.3 Sankey visualisation (Link to original Visualisation:
https://observablehq.com/@d3/sankey-diagram) 216
14.4 Box plot visualisation (Link to original Visualisation:
https://observablehq.com/@d3/box-plot) 220
14.5 Heatmap visualisation (Link to original Visualisation:
https://observablehq.com/@mbostock/the-impact-of-vaccines) 221
14.6 Parallel coordinates plot (Link to original Visualisation:
https://observablehq.com/@d3/parallel-coordinates) 221
14.7 Scatterplot matrix (Link to original Visualisation:
https://observablehq.com/@d3/brushable-scatterplot-matrix) 222
14.8 Interactive line chart (Link to original Visualisation:
https://observablehq.com/@d3/line-with-missing-data) 227
14.9 Calendar visualisation (Link to original Visualisation:
https://observablehq.com/@d3/calendar-view) 228
14.10 Horizon graph (Link to original Visualisation:
https://observablehq.com/@d3/horizon-chart) 228
14.11 Choropleth visualisation (Link to original Visualisation:
https://observablehq.com/@d3/choropleth) 232
14.12 Map visualisation (Link to original Visualisation:
https://observablehq.com/@d3/bubble-map) 232
15.1 Data security and quality objectives, controls, and outcomes 243
17.1 RPA software revenue 270
18.1 Matrix for AIS strategy 290
18.2 Enhanced matrix for AIS strategy (­includes additional dimension referring
to extent of use of shared ledger technology) 297

ix
 TABLES

3.1 Examples of computer hardware 40

3.2 Programming language categories 44
4.1 Key challenges and recommendations for the accounting profession 58
10.1 Risk factors 149
14.1 Classification of visualisation activities 214
14.2 Sunburst visualisation, Dataset 1 217
14.3 Treemap visualisation, Dataset 1 218
14.4 Sankey visualisation, Dataset 1 219
14.5 Box plot visualisation, Dataset 2 223
14.6 Heatmap visualisation, Dataset 2 224
14.7 Parallel coordinates plot, Dataset 2 225
14.8 Scatterplot matrix, Dataset 2 226
14.9 Interactive line chart, Dataset 3 229
14.10 Calendar visualisation, Dataset 3 230
14.11 Horizon graph, Dataset 3 231
14.12 Choropleth visualisation, Dataset 4 233
14.13 Map visualisation, Dataset 4 234
15.1 Data security and quality objectives 243
17.1 Major RPA vendors, URLs, and resources 277
19.1 Example integration of types of analytics 304
20.1 Conflict of visions on Digital Natives 320
21.1 Categories and determinants of user resistance in information systems projects 333
21.2 ­Software-­​­­a s-­​­­a-​­Service security issues and challenges 338
21.3 ­High-​­level contractual Issues and challenges in cloud computing agreements 340

x
 CONTRIBUTORS

Benoit A. Aubert is a Professor at HEC Montreal (­Canada) and a Fellow of the CIRANO
(­Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organizations). His previous roles in-
clude Director of the Rowe School of Business at Dalhousie University and Head of the School
of Information Management at Victoria University of Wellington (­New ­Zealand). His main
research areas are risk management, innovation, outsourcing and business transformation.

Joan Ballantine is an accounting graduate and a Fellow of the Association of Chartered

Certified Accountant (­FCCA). After working in industry, she took up her first lecturing
position at Queen’s University Belfast and subsequently joined Warwick Business School,
Warwick University. During her ten years at Warwick, Joan gained her doctorate and was
actively engaged in delivering executive education/­consultancy to a range of p­ rivate-​­and
­public-​­sector organisations. She returned to Northern Ireland to take up the post of Senior
Lecturer at Queen’s University Belfast before being appointed to her current position as
Professor in Accounting at Ulster University in 2008. She is an active researcher, has been
published in IS and accounting journals (­EJIS, JIT, MAR, FAM, JOBE, SIHE, Accounting
Forum, Accounting Education), sits on a number of editorial board positions and has exam-
ined numerous doctorates. She has almost 3,500 citations to her name according to Google
Scholar: https://­scholar.google.com/­citations?hl=en&user=VnGdN7cAAAAJ.

­Jean- ​­Grégoire Bernard is a Senior Lecturer at the Victoria School of Business and Gov-
ernment at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand. His research focuses on
issues pertaining to digital innovation, online communities and online disinformation. His
work has been published in Social Media + Society, Information Technology for Development,
Communications of the Association for Information Systems and the International Conference on
Information Systems.

Dr. Bibek Bhatta is a Lecturer in the areas of accounting and finance at Queen’s University
Belfast. Bibek worked in commercial banks for more than five years before completing his
PhD in finance. His banking experience centres mainly around credit analysis and credit
control. He has delivered lectures in finance in both developed and developing countries.

xi
 Contributors

His research interests lie in international investments, corporate governance, corporate fi-
nance and fintech.

Sharlene Biswas is a Lecturer at the University of Auckland Business School. She teaches
courses on management control systems, cost accounting, and performance measurement
and evaluation and has research interests in innovation practices and family businesses.

Dr. Malcolm Brady is an Associate Professor at DCU Business School, Dublin City Uni-
versity, where he teaches business strategy to undergraduate, masters and executive students.
He researches in the areas of business strategy, business processes and business models draw-
ing on game and institutional theory. He has a particular interest in health and education
sectors.

Krister Bredmar holds a position as Professor in Business Administration, School of Busi-

ness and Economics at Linnaeus University in Sweden. He has, in over 30 years, interested
himself in how information systems affect managers in different ways. His research has been
published internationally both in articles and in books. His current research deals with dig-
ital transformation in SMEs.

Dr. Noel Carroll is a Lecturer in Business Information Systems at NUI Galway and Pro-
gramme Director for the MSc in Information Systems Management (­ISM). He is also a
researcher with L ­ ero – the
​­ Irish Software Research Centre. His research interests include
seeking ways to support organisations in developing transformation strategies, for example,
­large-​­scale agile transformations, digital innovation and health informatics for multination-
als, SMEs and ­start-​­ups. He enjoys exploring new (­interdisciplinary) theoretical perspectives
around managing and sustaining transformation processes. Noel has edited special issues,
published, chaired and reviewed for leading international journals and conferences in his
field.
Further details are available here: https://­w ww.nuigalway.ie/­­business-­​­­public-­​­­policy-​­law/
­cairnes/­ourstaff/­noelcarroll/.

Dr. Peter Cleary is a Senior Lecturer in Accounting. He has been lecturing at Univer-
sity College Cork (­UCC) in Ireland in the area of Management Accounting since 2002. A
graduate of UCC and a qualified Chartered Management Accountant (­ACMA), Dr. Cleary
has worked for organisations in both Ireland and the USA prior to becoming an academic.
Dr. Cleary completed his doctoral dissertation at the University of Limerick in 2007 which
focused on the role of management accounting in k­ nowledge-​­intensive firms. He regularly
presents his research at both national and international conferences. Dr. Cleary is currently
the Academic Programme Director for the BSc (­Accounting) degree at UCC.

Brenda Clerkin has over 14 years’ experience working in practice with a Big 4 professional
services firm before her career in academia. Her experience spanned from small and me-
dium enterprises, based in the UK and Ireland, to large multinational organisations across
a number of different industries. Her interests are in Accounting, Auditing, Data Analytics
and Ethics.

W. Alec Cram is an Assistant Professor in the School of Accounting & Finance at the
University of Waterloo, Canada. His research focuses on how information systems control

xii
 Contributors

initiatives can contribute to improving the performance of organisational processes, includ-

ing systems development and cybersecurity management. His work has been published in
outlets including Information Systems Journal, Information & Management, European Journal of
Information Systems, MIS Quarterly, Information Systems Research and Journal of the Association for
Information Systems.

Andrea Crean is an Accounting Lecturer, specialising in Financial Reporting and Auditing,

and also holds the position of Programme Director of the Master’s in International Account-
ing and Analytics at NUI Galway. She obtained an undergraduate degree in Accounting and
Finance and a first class Master’s in Accounting from Dublin City University. She is a Fellow
of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, Ireland, and prior to joining NUI Galway four
years ago, Andrea has seven years’ experience working in practice and industry roles. Andrea
is currently pursuing her PhD in the area of innovation in auditing through the use of big
data and data analytics.

Christoph Eisl is Professor for Controlling and Head of the Master’s degree programme
Accounting, Controlling and Financial Management. His teaching and research activities
focus on controlling and performance management, business planning, information visuali-
sation, digital accounting and accounting education.

Robert D. Galliers is the University Distinguished Professor Emeritus and former Provost
of Bentley University and Professor Emeritus and former Dean of Warwick Business School.
He was the founding E ­ ditor-­​­­in-​­Chief of The Journal of Strategic Information Systems up till the
end of 2018 and was the President of the Association for Information Systems (­A IS), of which
he is a Fellow, in 1999. He received the AIS LEO Award in 2012. His work has been cited
over 15,000 times according to Google Scholar.

Markus Granlund is the Dean and Professor of Accounting at the Turku School of Eco-
nomics, University of Turku. Markus’ key areas of expertise are strategic financial man-
agement, information system solutions and strategic management. His research has been
published in highly respected scientific journals, and he is also an ­award-​­winning manage-
ment educator. Markus has long been involved with various development projects in com-
panies and the public sector. He also holds a number of positions of trust in the university
sector, foundations and companies.

Steven A. Harrast, PhD, teaches accounting information systems and data analytics in the
School of Accounting at Central Michigan University. He received his PhD in 1999 from
the University of Memphis and is a frequent publisher and speaker on information technol-
ogy topics.

Martin R. W. Hiebl is Professor of Management Accounting and Control at the Uni-

versity of Siegen and a Visiting Professor at the Johannes Kepler University Linz. His re-
search concentrates on management accounting and control, risk management and digital
transformation, with a focus on family firms and small businesses. He is also interested
in contemporary business research methods and their further development. His work has
been published in the European Accounting Review, European Management Review, Journal of
Management Accounting Research, Management Accounting Research and Organizational Research
Methods, among others.

xiii
 Contributors

Peter Hofer is Professor of Managerial Accounting and BI at the University of Applied Sci-
ences Upper Austria in Steyr. His main research areas are information design, u
­ ser-​­centred
Big Data visualisation and managerial accounting. He is the author of several publications
in these research areas and also speaker on conferences for researchers and practitioners.
Peter Hofer is also a Lecturer at the Management Academy in Linz (­LIMAK) in the field of
Cost Accounting and Cost Management. Before his academic career, he has worked as an
accounting manager in the automotive industry.

Esperanza Huerta is a Professor in the Department of Accounting and Finance in the Lucas
College of Business at San José State University. She does research on data science, h
­ uman–​
­computer interaction, automated internal controls and blockchain. Her publications have
appeared in major journals and conferences in the Accounting Information Systems area.

Scott Jensen is an Associate Professor in the School of Information Systems & Technology
at San José State University focusing on big data and has published in international confer-
ences and journals such as the Journal of Information Systems. Prior to his PhD in Computer
Science, he worked for over 15 years in software development and professional services at
Big 4 accounting firms.

Carina Knoll is an aspiring researcher in the field of Digital Accounting at the University
of Applied Sciences Upper Austria. With a background in sociology and management, her
interests are the humanist implications of the digital transformation in accounting and audit-
ing. In this, she looks at new job roles, tasks, team compositions and educational avenues in
the larger financial service sectors.

Gerhard Kristandl is an Associate Professor of Accounting and ­Technology-​­enhanced

Learning at the University of Greenwich. He is the Faculty Business Learning Technologist
and the Head of the Greenwich SAP N ­ ext-​­Gen Lab. He has recently published in the area
of enabling technologies in higher education. He also runs a YouTube channel on enabling
learning technologies and regularly blogs in this area.

Prof. Dr. Othmar M. Lehner works in the fields of ­A I-​­based accounting and impact
investing. As Professor of Accounting and Finance in London at the Middlesex University,
and in Helsinki at the Hanken School of Economics, with an additional background in in-
formation sciences, he uses his knowledge to drive forward the field through h ­ igh-​­impact
publications, keynotes at global industry events and through consulting in the banking and
investment industry. He is also the Director of the Hanken Center of Accounting, Finance
and Governance in Helsinki.

Dr. Susanne ­L eitner-​­Hanetseder is Professor of Accounting at the University of Applied

Sciences Upper Austria in Steyr. Her research focuses on the digitalisation and automation
of financial processes. As part of her research, she supports companies in their digital trans-
formation. She has gained experience in the financial industry and accounting consulting.
She is a Lecturer at the Johannes Kepler University (­Linz/­Austria) and Hanken School of
Economics (­Helsinki/­Finland) in the field of International Accounting. Additionally, she is
a speaker at Accounting and Finance conferences. She is the author of several papers in the
field of national and international accounting and digitalisation and automation of account-
ing and finance.

xiv
Other documents randomly have
different content
 Whatsoever is not a living creature, is not a man,
Therefore, Every stone is not a man;

which conclusion is the converse of the direct conclusion, and

equipollent to the same.
The figures, therefore, of syllogisms, if they be numbered by the
diverse situation of the middle term only, are but three; in the first
whereof, the middle term has the middle place; in the second, the
last; and in the third, the first place. But if they be numbered
according to the situation of the terms simply, they are four; for the
first may be distinguished again into two, namely, into direct and
inverted. From whence it is evident, that the controversy among
logicians concerning the fourth figure, is a mere λογόμαχια, or
contention about the name thereof; for, as for the thing itself, it is
plain that the situation of the terms (not considering the quantity or
quality by which the moods are distinguished) makes four
differences of syllogisms, which may be called figures, or have any
other name at pleasure.
There are 12. In every one of these figures there are many
many moods moods, which are made by varying the premises
in every according to all the differences they are capable of,
figure, but
most of them by quantity and quality; as namely, in the direct
useless in figure there are six moods; in the first indirect
philosophy. figure, four; in the second, fourteen; and in the
third, eighteen. But because from the direct figure I
rejected as superfluous all moods besides that which consists of
universal propositions, and whose minor proposition is affirmative, I
do, together with it, reject the moods of the rest of the figures which
are made by conversion of the premises in the direct figure.
An 13. As it was showed before, that in necessary
hypothetical propositions a categorical and hypothetical
syllogism proposition are equipollent; so likewise it is manifest
when
equipollent to that a categorical and hypothetical syllogism are
a categorical. equivalent. For every categorical syllogism, as this,

Every man is a living creature,

 Every living creature is a body,
Therefore, Every man is a body,

is of equal force with this hypothetical syllogism:

If any thing be a man, the same is also a living creature,

If any thing be a living creature, the same is a body,
Therefore, If any thing be a man, the same is a body.

In like manner, this categorical syllogism in an indirect figure,

No stone is a living creature,

Every man is a living creature,
Therefore, No man is a stone,
Or, No stone is a man,

is equivalent to this hypothetical syllogism:

If any thing be a man, the same is a living creature,

If any thing be a stone, the same is not a living creature,
Therefore, If any thing be a stone, the same is not a man,
Or, If any thing be a man, the same is not a stone.

And thus much seems sufficient for the nature of syllogisms; (for
the doctrine of moods and figures is clearly delivered by others that
have written largely and profitably of the same). Nor are precepts so
necessary as practice for the attaining of true ratiocination; and they
that study the demonstrations of mathematicians, will sooner learn
true logic, than they that spend time in reading the rules of
syllogizing which logicians have made; no otherwise than little
children learn to go, not by precepts, but by exercising their feet.
This, therefore, may serve for the first pace in the way to
Philosophy.
In the next place I shall speak of the faults and errors into which
men that reason unwarily are apt to fall; and of their kinds and
causes.
 CHAPTER V.

OF ERRING, FALSITY, AND CAPTIONS.

1. Erring and falsity how they differ. Error of the mind by itself without the use of
words, how it happens.—2. A sevenfold incoherency of names, every one of
which makes always a false proposition.—3. Examples of the first manner of
incoherency.—4. Of the second.—5. Of the third.—6. Of the fourth.—7. Of the
fifth.—8. Of the sixth.—9. Of the seventh.—10. Falsity of propositions detected
by resolving the terms with definitions continued till they come to simple
names, or names that are the most general of their kind.—11. Of the fault of
a syllogism consisting in the implication of the terms with the copula.—12. Of
the fault which consists in equivocation.—13. Sophistical captions are oftener
faulty in the matter than in the form of syllogisms.

Erring & 1. Men are subject to err not only in affirming and
falsity how denying, but also in perception, and in silent
they differ. cogitation. In affirming and denying, when they call
Error of the
mind by any thing by a name, which is not the name
itself, thereof; as if from seeing the sun first by reflection
without the in water, and afterwards again directly in the
use of words, firmament, we should to both those appearances
how it give the name of sun, and say there are two suns;
happens.
which none but men can do, for no other living
creatures have the use of names. This kind of error only deserves
the name of falsity, as arising, not from sense, nor from the things
themselves, but from pronouncing rashly; for names have their
constitution, not from the species of things, but from the will and
consent of men. And hence it comes to pass, that men pronounce
falsely, by their own negligence, in departing from such appellations
of things as are agreed upon, and are not deceived neither by the
things, nor by the sense; for they do not perceive that the thing they
see is called sun, but they give it that name from their own will and
agreement. Tacit errors, or the errors of sense and cogitation, are
made, by passing from one imagination to the imagination of
another different thing; or by feigning that to be past, or future,
which never was, nor ever shall be; as when, by seeing the image of
the sun in water, we imagine the sun itself to be there; or by seeing
swords, that there has been or shall be fighting, because it uses to
be so for the most part; or when from promises we feign the mind
of the promiser to be such and such; or lastly, when from any sign
we vainly imagine something to be signified, which is not. And errors
of this sort are common to all things that have sense; and yet the
deception proceeds neither from our senses, nor from the things we
perceive; but from ourselves while we feign such things as are but
mere images to be something more than images. But neither things,
nor imaginations of things, can be said to be false, seeing they are
truly what they are; nor do they, as signs, promise any thing which
they do not perform; for they indeed do not promise at all, but we
from them; nor do the clouds, but we, from seeing the clouds, say it
shall rain. The best way, therefore, to free ourselves from such
errors as arise from natural signs, is first of all, before we begin to
reason concerning such conjectural things, to suppose ourselves
ignorant, and then to make use of our ratiocination; for these errors
proceed from the want of ratiocination; whereas, errors which
consist in affirmation and negation, (that is, the falsity of
propositions) proceed only from reasoning amiss. Of these,
therefore, as repugnant to philosophy, I will speak principally.
A sevenfold 2. Errors which happen in reasoning, that is, in
incoherency syllogizing, consist either in the falsity of the
of names, all premises, or of the inference. In the first of these
of which
make always cases, a syllogism is said to be faulty in the matter
a false of it; and in the second case, in the form. I will first
proposition. consider the matter, namely, how many ways a
proposition may be false; and next the form, and
how it comes to pass, that when the premises are true, the
inference is, notwithstanding, false.
Seeing, therefore, that proposition only is true, (chap, III, art. 7) in
which are copulated two names of one and the same thing; and that
always false, in which names of different things are copulated, look
how many ways names of different things may be copulated, and so
many ways a false proposition may be made.
Now, all things to which we give names, may be reduced to these
four kinds, namely, bodies, accidents, phantasms, and names
themselves; and therefore, in every true proposition, it is necessary
that the names copulated, be both of them names of bodies, or both
names of accidents, or both names of phantasms, or both names of
names. For names otherwise copulated are incoherent, and
constitute a false proposition. It may happen, also, that the name of
a body, of an accident, or of a phantasm, may be copulated with the
name of a speech. So that copulated names may be incoherent
seven manner of ways.

1. If the name of a Body the name of an Accident.

2. If the name of a Body the name of a Phantasm.
3. If the name of a Body be the name of a Name.
4. If the name of an Accident copulated the name of a Phantasm.
5. If the name of an Accident with the name of a Name.
6. If the name of a Phantasm the name of a Name.
7. If the name of a Body, the name of a Speech.
Accident, or Phantasm

Of all which I will give some examples.

Examples of 3. After the first of these ways propositions are
the first false, when abstract names are copulated with
manner of concrete names; as (in Latin and Greek) esse est
incoherency.
ens, essentia est ens, τὸ τί ἦν ειναὶ (i.); quidditas
est ens, and many the like, which are found in Aristotle's
Metaphysics. Also, the understanding worketh, the understanding
understandeth, the sight seeth; a body is magnitude, a body is
quantity, a body is extension; to be a man is a man, whiteness is a
white thing, &c.; which is as if one should say, the runner is the
running, or the walk walketh. Moreover, essence is separated,
substance is abstracted: and others like these, or derived from
these, (with which common philosophy abounds.) For seeing no
subject of an accident (that is, no body) is an accident: no name of
an accident ought to be given to a body, nor of a body to an
accident.
The second. 4. False, in the second manner, are such
propositions as these; a ghost is a body, or a spirit,
that is, a thin body; sensible species fly up and down in the air, or
are moved hither and thither, which is proper to bodies; also, a
shadow is moved, or is a body; light is moved, or is a body; colour is
the object of sight, sound of hearing; space or place is extended;
and innumerable others of this kind. For seeing ghosts, sensible
species, a shadow, light, colour, sound, space, &c. appear to us no
less sleeping than waking, they cannot be things without us, but
only phantasms of the mind that imagines them; and therefore the
names of these, copulated with the names of bodies, cannot
constitute a true proposition.
The third. 5. False propositions of the third kind, are such as
these; genus est ens, universale est ens, ens de
ente prædicatur. For genus, and universale, and predicare, are
names of names, and not of things. Also, number is infinite, is a
false proposition; for no number can be infinite, but only the word
number is then called an indefinite name when there is no
determined number answering to it in the mind.
The fourth. 6. To the fourth kind belong such false
propositions as these, an object is of such
magnitude or figure as appears to the beholders; colour, light,
sound, are in the object; and the like. For the same object appears
sometimes greater, sometimes lesser, sometimes square, sometimes
round, according to the diversity of the distance and medium; but
the true magnitude and figure of the thing seen is always one and
the same; so that the magnitude and figure which appears, is not
the true magnitude and figure of the object, nor anything but
phantasm; and therefore, in such propositions as these, the names
of accidents are copulated with the names of phantasms.
The fifth. 7. Propositions are false in the fifth manner, when
it is said that the definition is the essence of a thing;
whiteness, or some other accident, is the genus, or universal. For
definition is not the essence of any thing, but a speech signifying
what we conceive of the essence thereof; and so also not whiteness
itself, but the word whiteness, is a genus, or an universal name.
The sixth. 8. In the sixth manner they err, that say the idea
of anything is universal; as if there could be in the
mind an image of a man, which were not the image of some one
man, but a man simply, which is impossible; for every idea is one,
and of one thing; but they are deceived in this, that they put the
name of the thing for the idea thereof.
The seventh. 9. They err in the seventh manner, that make this
distinction between things that have being, that
some of them exist by themselves, others by accident; namely,
because Socrates is a man is a necessary proposition, and Socrates
is a musician a contingent proposition, therefore they say some
things exist necessarily or by themselves, others contingently or by
accident; whereby, seeing necessary, contingent, by itself, by
accident, are not names of things, but of propositions, they that say
any thing that has being, exists by accident, copulate the name of a
proposition with the name of a thing. In the same manner also, they
err, which place some ideas in the understanding, others in the
fancy; as if from the understanding of this proposition, man is a
living creature, we had one idea or image of a man derived from
sense to the memory, and another to the understanding; wherein
that which deceives them is this, that they think one idea should be
answerable to a name, another to a proposition, which is false; for
proposition signifies only the order of those things one after another,
which we observe in the same idea of man; so that this proposition,
man is a living creature raises but one idea in us, though in that idea
we consider that first, for which he is called man, and next that, for
which he is called living creature. The falsities of propositions in all
these several manners, is to be discovered by the definitions of the
copulated names.
Falsity of 10. But when names of bodies are copulated with
propositions names of bodies, names of accidents with names of
detected by accidents, names of names with names of names,
resolving the
and names of phantasms, with names of
 terms with phantasms, if we, nevertheless, remain still doubtful
definitions. whether such propositions are true, we ought then
in the first place to find out the definition of both those names, and
again the definitions of such names as are in the former definition,
and so proceed by a continual resolution till we come to a simple
name, that is, to the most general or most universal name of that
kind; and if after all this, the truth or falsity thereof be not evident,
we must search it out by philosophy, and ratiocination, beginning
from definitions. For every proposition, universally true, is either a
definition, or part of a definition, or the evidence of it depends upon
definitions.
Of the fault 11. That fault of a syllogism which lies hid in the
of a syllogism form thereof, will always be found either in the
consisting in implication of the copula with one of the terms, or
implication of
the terms in the equivocation of some word; and in either of
with the these ways there will be four terms, which (as I
copula. have shewn) cannot stand in a true syllogism. Now
the implication of the copula with either term, is
easily detected by reducing the propositions to plain and clear
predication; as (for example) if any man should argue thus,

The hand toucheth the pen,

The pen toucheth the paper,
Therefore, The hand toucheth the paper;

the fallacy will easily appear by reducing it, thus:

The hand, is, touching the pen,

The pen, is, touching the paper,
Therefore, The hand, is, touching the paper;

where there are manifestly these four terms, the hand, touching the
pen, the pen, and touching the the paper. But the danger of being
deceived by sophisms of this kind, does not seem to be so great, as
that I need insist longer upon them.
 Of the fault 12. And though there may be fallacy in equivocal
which terms, yet in those that be manifestly such, there is
consists in none at all; nor in metaphors, for they profess the
equivocation.
transferring of names from one thing to another.
Nevertheless, sometimes equivocals (and those not very obscure)
may deceive; as in this argumentation:--It belongs to metaphysics to
treat of principles; but the first principle of all, is, that the same
thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time; and
therefore it belongs to metaphysics to treat whether the same thing
may both exist and not exist at the same time; where the fallacy lies
in the equivocation of the word principle; for whereas Aristotle in the
beginning of his Metaphysics, says, that the treating of principles
belongs to primary science, he understands by principles, causes of
things, and certain existences which he calls primary; but where he
says a primary proposition is a principle, by principle, there, he
means the beginning and cause of knowledge, that is, the
understanding of words, which, if any man want, he is incapable of
learning.
Sophistical 13. But the captions of sophists and sceptics, by
captions are which they were wont, of old, to deride and oppose
oftener faulty truth, were faulty for the most part, not in the form,
in the matter
than in the but in the matter of syllogism; and they deceived
form of not others oftener than they were themselves
syllogisms. deceived. For the force of that famous argument of
Zeno against motion, consisted in this proposition,
whatsoever may be divided into parts, infinite in number, the same is
infinite; which he, without doubt, thought to be true, yet
nevertheless is false. For to be divided into infinite parts, is nothing
else but to be divided into as many parts as any man will. But it is
not necessary that a line should have parts infinite in number, or be
infinite, because I can divide and subdivide it as often as I please;
for how many parts soever I make, yet their number is finite; but
because he that says parts, simply, without adding how many, does
not limit any number, but leaves it to the determination of the
hearer, therefore we say commonly, a line may be divided infinitely;
which cannot be true in any other sense.
 Conclusion. And thus much may suffice concerning syllogism,
which is, as it were, the first pace towards
philosophy; in which I have said as much as is necessary to teach
any man from whence all true argumentation has its force. And to
enlarge this treatise with all that may be heaped together, would be
as superfluous, as if one should (as I said before) give a young child
precepts for the teaching of him to go; for the art of reasoning is not
so well learned by precepts as by practice, and by the reading of
those books in which the conclusions are all made by severe
demonstration. And so I pass on to the way of philosophy, that is, to
the method of study.
 CHAPTER VI.

OF METHOD.
1. Method and science defined.—2. It is more easily known concerning singular,
than universal things, that they are; and contrarily, it is more easily known
concerning universal, than singular things, why they are, or what are their
causes.—3. What it is philosophers seek to know.—4. The first part, by which
principles are found out, is purely analytical.—5. The highest causes, and
most universal in every kind, are known by themselves.—6. Method from
principles found out, tending to science simply, what it is.—7. That method of
civil and natural science, which proceeds from sense to principles, is
analytical; and again, that, which begins at principles, is synthetical.—8. The
method of searching out, whether any thing propounded be matter or
accident.—9. The method of seeking whether any accident be in this, or in
that subject.—10. The method of searching after the cause of any effect
propounded.—11. Words serve to invention, as marks; to demonstration, as
signs.—12. The method of demonstration is synthetical.—13. Definitions only
are primary and universal propositions.—14. The nature and definition of a
definition.—15. The properties of a definition.—16. The nature of a
demonstration.—17. The properties of a demonstration, and order of things to
be demonstrated.—18. The faults of a demonstration.—19. Why the analytical
method of geometricians cannot be treated of in this place.

Method and 1. For the understanding of method, it will be

science necessary for me to repeat the definition of
defined. philosophy, delivered above (Chap. I, art. 2.) in this
manner, Philosophy is the knowledge we acquire, by true
ratiocination, of appearances, or apparent effects, from the
knowledge we have of some possible production or generation of the
same; and of such production, as has been or may be, from the
knowledge we have of the effects. Method, therefore, in the study of
philosophy, is the shortest way of finding out effects by their known
causes, or of causes by their known effects. But we are then said to
know any effect, when we know that there be causes of the same,
and in what subject those causes are, and in what subject they
produce that effect, and in what manner they work the same. And
this is the science of causes, or, as they call it, of the διότι. All other
science, which is called the ὄτι, is either perception by sense, or the
imagination, or memory remaining after such perception.
The first beginnings, therefore, of knowledge, are the phantasms
of sense and imagination; and that there be such phantasms we
know well enough by nature; but to know why they be, or from
what causes they proceed, is the work of ratiocination; which
consists (as is said above, in the 1st Chapter, Art. 2) in composition,
and division or resolution. There is therefore no method, by which
we find out the causes of things, but is either compositive or
resolutive, or partly compositive, and partly resolutive. And the
resolutive is commonly called analytical method, as the compositive
is called synthetical.
It is easier 2. It is common to all sorts of method, to proceed
known from known things to unknown; and this is manifest
concerning from the cited definition of philosophy. But in
singular than
universal knowledge by sense, the whole object is more
things, that known, than any part thereof; as when we see a
they are; and man, the conception or whole idea of that man is
contrarily it is first or more known, than the particular ideas of his
easier known being figurate, animate, and rational; that is, we
concerning
universal first see the whole man, and take notice of his
than singular being, before we observe in him those other
things, why particulars. And therefore in any knowledge of the
they are, or ὅτι, or that any thing is, the beginning of our search
what are is from the whole idea; and contrarily, in our
their causes.
knowledge of the διότι, or of the causes of any
thing, that is, in the sciences, we have more knowledge of the
causes of the parts than of the whole. For the cause of the whole is
compounded of the causes of the parts; but it is necessary that we
know the things that are to be compounded, before we can know
the whole compound. Now, by parts, I do not here mean parts of
the thing itself, but parts of its nature; as, by the parts of man, I do
not understand his head, his shoulders, his arms, &c. but his figure,
quantity, motion, sense, reason, and the like; which accidents being
compounded or put together, constitute the whole nature of man,
but not the man himself. And this is the meaning of that common
saying, namely, that some things are more known to us, others more
known to nature; for I do not think that they, which so distinguish,
mean that something is known to nature, which is known to no man;
and therefore, by those things, that are more known to us, we are to
understand things we take notice of by our senses, and, by more
known to nature, those we acquire the knowledge of by reason; for
in this sense it is, that the whole, that is, those things that have
universal names, (which, for brevity's sake, I call universal) are more
known to us than the parts, that is, such things as have names less
universal, (which I therefore call singular); and the causes of the
parts are more known to nature than the cause of the whole; that is,
universals than singulars.
What it is 3. In the study of philosophy, men search after
philosophers science either simply or indefinitely; that is, to know
seek to know. as much as they can, without propounding to
themselves any limited question; or they enquire into the cause of
some determined appearance, or endeavour to find out the certainty
of something in question, as what is the cause of light, of heat, of
gravity, of a figure propounded, and the like; or in what subject any
propounded accident is inherent; or what may conduce most to the
generation of some propounded effect from many accidents; or in
what manner particular causes ought to be compounded for the
production of some certain effect. Now, according to this variety of
things in question, sometimes the analytical method is to be used,
and sometimes the synthetical.
The first part, 4. But to those that search after science
by which indefinitely, which consists in the knowledge of the
principles are causes of all things, as far forth as it may be
discovered, is
purely attained, (and the causes of singular things are
analytical. compounded of the causes of universal or simple
things) it is necessary that they know the causes of
universal things, or of such accidents as are common to all bodies,
that is, to all matter, before they can know the causes of singular
things, that is, of those accidents by which one thing is distinguished
from another. And, again, they must know what those universal
things are, before they can know their causes. Moreover, seeing
universal things are contained in the nature of singular things, the
knowledge of them is to be acquired by reason, that is, by
resolution. For example, if there be propounded a conception or idea
of some singular thing, as of a square, this square is to be resolved
into a plain, terminated with a certain number of equal and straight
lines and right angles. For by this resolution we have these things
universal or agreeable to all matter, namely, line, plain, (which
contains superficies) terminated, angle, straightness, rectitude, and
equality; and if we can find out the causes of these, we may
compound them altogether into the cause of a square. Again, if any
man propound to himself the conception of gold, he may, by
resolving, come to the ideas of solid, visible, heavy, (that is, tending
to the centre of the earth, or downwards) and many other more
universal than gold itself; and these he may resolve again, till he
come to such things as are most universal. And in this manner, by
resolving continually, we may come to know what those things are,
whose causes being first known severally, and afterwards
compounded, bring us to the knowledge of singular things. I
conclude, therefore, that the method of attaining to the universal
knowledge of things, is purely analytical.
The highest 5. But the causes of universal things (of those, at
causes, and least, that have any cause) are manifest of
most themselves, or (as they say commonly) known to
universal in
every kind, nature; so that they need no method at all; for they
are known by have all but one universal cause, which is motion.
themselves. For the variety of all figures arises out of the variety
of those motions by which they are made; and
motion cannot be understood to have any other cause besides
motion; nor has the variety of those things we perceive by sense, as
of colours, sounds, savours, &c. any other cause than motion,
residing partly in the objects that work upon our senses, and partly
in ourselves, in such manner, as that it is manifestly some kind of
motion, though we cannot, without ratiocination, come to know
what kind. For though many cannot understand till it be in some sort
demonstrated to them, that all mutation consists in motion; yet this
happens not from any obscurity in the thing itself, (for it is not
intelligible that anything can depart either from rest, or from the
motion it has, except by motion), but either by having their natural
discourse corrupted with former opinions received from their
masters, or else for this, that they do not at all bend their mind to
the enquiring out of truth.
Method from 6. By the knowledge therefore of universals, and
principles of their causes (which are the first principles by
found out, which we know the διότι of things) we have in the
tending to
science first place their definitions, (which are nothing but
simply, what the explication of our simple conceptions.) For
it is. example, he that has a true conception of place,
cannot be ignorant of this definition, place is that
space which is possessed or filled adequately by some body; and so,
he that conceives motion aright, cannot but know that motion is the
privation of one place, and the acquisition of another. In the next
place, we have their generations or descriptions; as (for example)
that a line is made by the motion of a point, superficies by the
motion of a line, and one motion by another motion, &c. It remains,
that we enquire what motion begets such and such effects; as, what
motion makes a straight line, and what a circular; what motion
thrusts, what draws, and by what way; what makes a thing which is
seen or heard, to be seen or heard sometimes in one manner,
sometimes in another. Now the method of this kind of enquiry, is
compositive. For first we are to observe what effect a body moved
produceth, when we consider nothing in it besides its motion; and
we see presently that this makes a line, or length; next, what the
motion of a long body produces, which we find to be superficies;
and so forwards, till we see what the effects of simple motion are;
and then, in like manner, we are to observe what proceeds from the
addition, multiplication, subtraction, and division, of these motions,
and what effects, what figures, and what properties, they produce;
from which kind of contemplation sprung that part of philosophy
which is called geometry.
 From this consideration of what is produced by simple motion, we
are to pass to the consideration of what effects one body moved
worketh upon another; and because there may be motion in all the
several parts of a body, yet so as that the whole body remain still in
the same place, we must enquire first, what motion causeth such
and such motion in the whole, that is, when one body invades
another body which is either at rest or in motion, what way, and
with what swiftness, the invaded body shall move; and, again, what
motion this second body will generate in a third, and so forwards.
From which contemplation shall be drawn that part of philosophy
which treats of motion.
In the third place we must proceed to the enquiry of such effects
as are made by the motion of the parts of any body, as, how it
comes to pass, that things when they are the same, yet seem not to
be the same, but changed. And here the things we search after are
sensible qualities, such as light, colour, transparency, opacity, sound,
odour, savour, heat, cold, and the like; which because they cannot
be known till we know the causes of sense itself, therefore the
consideration of the causes of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and
touching, belongs to this third place; and all those qualities and
changes, above mentioned, are to be referred to the fourth place;
which two considerations comprehend that part of philosophy which
is called physics. And in these four parts is contained whatsoever in
natural philosophy may be explicated by demonstration, properly so
called. For if a cause were to be rendered of natural appearances in
special, as, what are the motions and influences of the heavenly
bodies, and of their parts, the reason hereof must either be drawn
from the parts of the sciences above mentioned, or no reason at all
will be given, but all left to uncertain conjecture.
After physics we must come to moral philosophy; in which we are
to consider the motions of the mind, namely, appetite, aversion,
love, benevolence, hope, fear, anger, emulation, envy, &c.; what
causes they have, and of what they be causes. And the reason why
these are to be considered after physics is, that they have their
causes in sense and imagination, which are the subject of physical
contemplation. Also the reason, why all these things are to be
searched after in the order above-said, is, that physics cannot be
understood, except we know first what motions are in the smallest
parts of bodies; nor such motion of parts, till we know what it is that
makes another body move; nor this, till we know what simple
motion will effect. And because all appearance of things to sense is
determined, and made to be of such and such quality and quantity
by compounded motions, every one of which has a certain degree of
velocity, and a certain and determined way; therefore, in the first
place, we are to search out the ways of motion simply (in which
geometry consists); next the ways of such generated motions as are
manifest; and, lastly, the ways of internal and invisible motions
(which is the enquiry of natural philosophers). And, therefore, they
that study natural philosophy, study in vain, except they begin at
geometry; and such writers or disputers thereof, as are ignorant of
geometry, do but make their readers and hearers lose their time.
That method 7. Civil and moral philosophy do not so adhere to
of civil and one another, but that they may be severed. For the
natural causes of the motions of the mind are known, not
science,
proceeding only by ratiocination, but also by the experience of
from sense to every man that takes the pains to observe those
principles, is motions within himself. And, therefore, not only they
analytical; that have attained the knowledge of the passions
and again, and perturbations of the mind, by the synthetical
that which
begins at method, and from the very first principles of
principles is philosophy, may by proceeding in the same way,
synthetical. come to the causes and necessity of constituting
commonwealths, and to get the knowledge of what
is natural right, and what are civil duties; and, in every kind of
government, what are the rights of the commonwealth, and all other
knowledge appertaining to civil philosophy; for this reason, that the
principles of the politics consist in the knowledge of the motions of
the mind, and the knowledge of these motions from the knowledge
of sense and imagination; but even they also that have not learned
the first part of philosophy, namely, geometry and physics, may,
notwithstanding, attain the principles of civil philosophy, by the
analytical method. For if a question be propounded, as, whether
such an action be just or unjust; if that unjust be resolved into fact
against law, and that notion law into the command of him or them
that have coercive power; and that power be derived from the wills
of men that constitute such power, to the end they may live in
peace, they may at last come to this, that the appetites of men and
the passions of their minds are such, that, unless they be restrained
by some power, they will always be making war upon one another;
which may be known to be so by any man's experience, that will but
examine his own mind. And, therefore, from hence he may proceed,
by compounding, to the determination of the justice or injustice of
any propounded action. So that it is manifest, by what has been
said, that the method of philosophy, to such as seek science simply,
without propounding to themselves the solution of any particular
question, is partly analytical, and partly synthetical; namely, that
which proceeds from sense to the invention of principles, analytical;
and the rest synthetical.
The method 8. To those that seek the cause of some certain
of searching and propounded appearance or effect, it happens,
out, whether sometimes, that they know not whether the thing,
anything
propounded whose cause is sought after, be matter or body, or
be matter or some accident of a body. For though in geometry,
accident. when the cause is sought of magnitude, or
proportion, or figure, it be certainly known that
these things, namely magnitude, proportion, and figure, are
accidents; yet in natural philosophy, where all questions are
concerning the causes of the phantasms of sensible things, it is not
so easy to discern between the things themselves, from which those
phantasms proceed, and the appearances of those things to the
sense; which have deceived many, especially when the phantasms
have been made by light. For example, a man that looks upon the
sun, has a certain shining idea of the magnitude of about a foot
over, and this he calls the sun, though he know the sun to be truly a
great deal bigger; and, in like manner, the phantasm of the same
thing appears sometimes round, by being seen afar off, and
sometimes square, by being nearer. Whereupon it may well be
doubted, whether that phantasm be matter, or some body natural,
or only some accident of a body; in the examination of which doubt
we may use this method. The properties of matter and accidents
already found out by us, by the synthetical method, from their
definitions, are to be compared with the idea we have before us;
and if it agree with the properties of matter or body, then it is a
body; otherwise it is an accident. Seeing, therefore, matter cannot
by any endeavour of ours be either made or destroyed, or increased,
or diminished, or moved out of its place, whereas that idea appears,
vanishes, is increased and diminished, and moved hither and thither
at pleasure; we may certainly conclude that it is not a body, but an
accident only. And this method is synthetical.
The method 9. But if there be a doubt made concerning the
of seeking subject of any known accident (for this may be
whether any doubted sometimes, as in the precedent example,
accident be in
this or in that doubt may be made in what subject that splendour
subject. and apparent magnitude of the sun is), then our
enquiry must proceed in this manner. First, matter in
general must be divided into parts, as, into object, medium, and the
sentient itself, or such other parts as seem most conformable to the
thing propounded. Next, these parts are severally to be examined
how they agree with the definition of the subject; and such of them
as are not capable of that accident are to be rejected. For example,
if by any true ratiocination the sun be found to be greater than its
apparent magnitude, then that magnitude is not in the sun; if the
sun be in one determined straight line, and one determined
distance, and the magnitude and splendour be seen in more lines
and distances than one, as it is in reflection or refraction, then
neither that splendour nor apparent magnitude are in the sun itself,
and, therefore, the body of the sun cannot be the subject of that
splendour and magnitude. And for the same reasons the air and
other parts will be rejected, till at last nothing remain which can be
the subject of that splendour and magnitude but the sentient itself.
And this method, in regard the subject is divided into parts, is
analytical; and in regard the properties, both of the subject and
accident, are compared with the accident concerning whose subject
the enquiry is made, it is synthetical.
 Method of 10. But when we seek after the cause of any
searching for propounded effect, we must in the first place get
the cause of into our mind an exact notion or idea of that which
any effect,
propounded. we call cause, namely, that a cause is the sum or
aggregate of all such accidents, both in the agents
and the patient, as concur to the producing of the effect
propounded; all which existing together, it cannot be understood but
that the effect existeth with them; or that it can possibly exist if any
one of them be absent. This being known, in the next place we must
examine singly every accident that accompanies or precedes the
effect, as far forth as it seems to conduce in any manner to the
production of the same, and see whether the propounded effect may
be conceived to exist, without the existence of any of those
accidents; and by this means separate such accidents, as do not
concur, from such as concur to produce the said effect; which being
done, we are to put together the concurring accidents, and consider
whether we can possibly conceive, that when these are all present,
the effect propounded will not follow; and if it be evident that the
effect will follow, then that aggregate of accidents is the entire
cause, otherwise not; but we must still search out and put together
other accidents. For example, if the cause of light be propounded to
be sought out; first, we examine things without us, and find that
whensoever light appears, there is some principal object, as it were
the fountain of light, without which we cannot have any perception
of light; and, therefore, the concurrence of that object is necessary
to the generation of light. Next we consider the medium, and find,
that unless it be disposed in a certain manner, namely, that it be
transparent, though the object remain the same, yet the effect will
not follow; and, therefore, the concurrence of transparency is also
necessary to the generation of light. Thirdly, we observe our own
body, and find that by the indisposition of the eyes, the brain, the
nerves, and the heart, that is, by obstructions, stupidity, and debility,
we are deprived of light, so that a fitting disposition of the organs to
receive impressions from without is likewise a necessary part of the
cause of light. Again, of all the accidents inherent in the object,
there is none that can conduce to the effecting of light, but only
action (or a certain motion), which cannot be conceived to be
wanting, whensoever the effect is present; for, that anything may
shine, it is not requisite that it be of such or such magnitude or
figure, or that the whole body of it be moved out of the place it is in
(unless it may perhaps be said, that in the sun, or other body, that
which causes light is the light it hath in itself; which yet is but a
trifling exception, seeing nothing is meant thereby but the cause of
light; as if any man should say that the cause of light is that in the
sun which produceth it); it remains, therefore, that the action, by
which light is generated, is motion only in the parts of the object.
Which being understood, we may easily conceive what it is the
medium contributes, namely, the continuation of that motion to the
eye; and, lastly, what the eye and the rest of the organs of the
sentient contribute, namely, the continuation of the same motion to
the last organ of sense, the heart. And in this manner the cause of
light may be made up of motion continued from the original of the
same motion, to the original of vital motion, light being nothing but
the alteration of vital motion, made by the impression upon it of
motion continued from the object. But I give this only for an
example, for I shall speak more at large of light, and the generation
of it, in its proper place. In the mean time it is manifest, that in the
searching out of causes, there is need partly of the analytical, and
partly of the synthetical method; of the analytical, to conceive how
circumstances conduce severally to the production of effects; and of
the synthetical, for the adding together and compounding of what
they can effect singly by themselves. And thus much may serve for
the method of invention. It remains that I speak of the method of
teaching, that is, of demonstration, and of the means by which we
demonstrate.
Words serve 11. In the method of invention, the use of words
to invention consists in this, that they may serve for marks, by
as marks; to which, whatsoever we have found out may be
demonstratio
n as signs. recalled to memory; for without this all our
inventions perish, nor will it be possible for us to go
on from principles beyond a syllogism or two, by reason of the
weakness of memory. For example, if any man, by considering a
triangle set before him, should find that all its angles together taken
are equal to two right angles, and that by thinking of the same
tacitly, without any use of words either understood or expressed;
and it should happen afterwards that another triangle, unlike the
former, or the same in different situation, should be offered to his
consideration, he would not know readily whether the same property
were in this last or no, but would be forced, as often as a different
triangle were brought before him (and the difference of triangles is
infinite) to begin his contemplation anew; which he would have no
need to do if he had the use of names, for every universal name
denotes the conceptions we have of infinite singular things.
Nevertheless, as I said above, they serve as marks for the help of
our memory, whereby we register to ourselves our own inventions;
but not as signs by which we declare the same to others; so that a
man may be a philosopher alone by himself, without any master;
Adam had this capacity. But to teach, that is, to demonstrate,
supposes two at the least, and syllogistical speech.
The method 12. And seeing teaching is nothing but leading the
of mind of him we teach, to the knowledge of our
demonstratio inventions, in that track by which we attained the
n is
synthetical. same with our own mind; therefore, the same
method that served for our invention, will serve also
for demonstration to others, saving that we omit the first part of
method which proceeded from the sense of things to universal
principles, which, because they are principles, cannot be
demonstrated; and seeing they are known by nature, (as was said
above in the 5th article) they need no demonstration, though they
need explication. The whole method, therefore, of demonstration, is
synthetical, consisting of that order of speech which begins from
primary or most universal propositions, which are manifest of
themselves, and proceeds by a perpetual composition of
propositions into syllogisms, till at last the learner understand the
truth of the conclusion sought after.
Definitions 13. Now, such principles are nothing but
only are definitions, whereof there are two sorts; one of
primary, & names, that signify such things as have some
 universal conceivable cause, and another of such names as
propositions. signify things of which we can conceive no cause at
all. Names of the former kind are, body, or matter, quantity, or
extension, motion, and whatsoever is common to all matter. Of the
second kind, are such a body, such and so great motion, so great
magnitude, such figure, and whatsoever we can distinguish one
body from another by. And names of the former kind are well
enough defined, when, by speech as short as may be, we raise in
the mind of the hearer perfect and clear ideas or conceptions of the
things named, as when we define motion to be the leaving of one
place, and the acquiring of another continually; for though no thing
moved, nor any cause of motion be in that definition, yet, at the
hearing of that speech, there will come into the mind of the hearer
an idea of motion clear enough. But definitions of things, which may
be understood to have some cause, must consist of such names as
express the cause or manner of their generation, as when we define
a circle to be a figure made by the circumduction of a straight line in
a plane, &c. Besides definitions, there is no other proposition that
ought to be called primary, or (according to severe truth) be
received into the number of principles. For those axioms of Euclid,
seeing they may be demonstrated, are no principles of
demonstration, though they have by the consent of all men gotten
the authority of principles, because they need not be demonstrated.
Also, those petitions, or postulata, (as they call them) though they
be principles, yet they are not principles of demonstration, but of
construction only; that is, not of science, but of power; or (which is
all one) not of theorems, which are speculations, but of problems,
which belong to practice, or the doing of something. But as for those
common received opinions, Nature abhors vacuity, Nature doth
nothing in vain, and the like, which are neither evident in
themselves, nor at all to be demonstrated, and which are oftener
false than true, they are much less to be acknowledged for
principles.
To return, therefore, to definitions; the reason why I say that the
cause and generation of such things, as have any cause or
generation, ought to enter into their definitions, is this. The end of
science is the demonstration of the causes and generations of
things; which if they be not in the definitions, they cannot be found
in the conclusion of the first syllogism, that is made from those
definitions; and if they be not in the first conclusion, they will not be
found in any further conclusion deduced from that; and, therefore,
by proceeding in this manner, we shall never come to science; which
is against the scope and intention of demonstration.
The nature & 14. Now, seeing definitions (as I have said) are
definition of principles, or primary propositions, they are
a definition. therefore speeches; and seeing they are used for
the raising of an idea of some thing in the mind of the learner,
whensoever that thing has a name, the definition of it can be
nothing but the explication of that name by speech; and if that
name be given it for some compounded conception, the definition is
nothing but a resolution of that name into its most universal parts.
As when we define man, saying man is a body animated, sentient,
rational, those names, body animated, &c. are parts of that whole
name man; so that definitions of this kind always consist of genus
and difference; the former names being all, till the last, general; and
the last of all, difference. But if any name be the most universal in
its kind, then the definition of it cannot consist of genus and
difference, but is to be made by such circumlocution, as best
explicateth the force of that name. Again, it is possible, and happens
often, that the genus and difference are put together, and yet make
no definition; as these words, a straight line, contain both the genus
and difference; but are not a definition, unless we should think a
straight line may be thus defined, a straight line is a straight line:
and yet if there were added another name, consisting of different
words, but signifying the same thing which these signify, then these
might be the definition of that name. From what has been said, it
may be understood how a definition ought to be defined, namely,
that it is a proposition, whose predicate resolves the subject, when it
may; and when it may not, it exemplifies the same.
Properties of 15. The properties of a definition are:
a definition. First, that it takes away equivocation, as also all
that multitude of distinctions, which are used by such as think they
may learn philosophy by disputation. For the nature of a definition is
to define, that is, to determine the signification of the defined name,
and to pare from it all other signification besides what is contained
in the definition itself; and therefore one definition does as much, as
all the distinctions (how many soever) that can be used about the
name defined.
Secondly, that it gives an universal notion of the thing defined,
representing a certain universal picture thereof, not to the eye, but
to the mind. For as when one paints a man, he paints the image of
some man; so he, that defines the name man, makes a
representation of some man to the mind.
Thirdly, that it is not necessary to dispute whether definitions are
to be admitted or no. For when a master is instructing his scholar, if
the scholar understand all the parts of the thing defined, which are
resolved in the definition, and yet will not admit of the definition,
there needs no further controversy betwixt them, it being all one as
if he refused to be taught. But if he understand nothing, then
certainly the definition is faulty; for the nature of a definition
consists in this, that it exhibit a clear idea of the thing defined; and
principles are either known by themselves, or else they are not
principles.
Fourthly, that, in philosophy, definitions are before defined names.
For in teaching philosophy, the first beginning is from definitions;
and all progression in the same, till we come to the knowledge of
the thing compounded, is compositive. Seeing, therefore, definition
is the explication of a compounded name by resolution, and the
progression is from the parts to the compound, definitions must be
understood before compounded names; nay, when the names of the
parts of any speech be explicated, it is not necessary that the
definition should be a name compounded of them. For example,
when these names, equilateral, quadrilateral, right-angled, are
sufficiently understood, it is not necessary in geometry that there
should be at all such a name as square; for defined names are
received in philosophy for brevity's sake only.
Fifthly, that compounded names, which are defined one way in
some one part of philosophy, may in another part of the same be
otherwise defined; as a parabola and an hyperbole have one
definition in geometry, and another in rhetoric; for definitions are
instituted and serve for the understanding of the doctrine which is
treated of. And, therefore, as in one part of philosophy, a definition
may have in it some one fit name for the more brief explanation of
some proposition in geometry; so it may have the same liberty in
other parts of philosophy; for the use of names is particular (even
where many agree to the settling of them) and arbitrary.
Sixthly, that no name can be defined by any one word; because
no one word is sufficient for the resolving of one or more words.
Seventhly, that a defined name ought not to be repeated in the
definition. For a defined name is the whole compound, and a
definition is the resolution of that compound into parts; but no total
can be part of itself.
Nature of a 16. Any two definitions, that may be compounded
demonstratio into a syllogism, produce a conclusion; which,
n. because it is derived from principles, that is, from
definitions, is said to be demonstrated; and the derivation or
composition itself is called a demonstration. In like manner, if a
syllogism be made of two propositions, whereof one is a definition,
the other a demonstrated conclusion, or neither of them is a
definition, but both formerly demonstrated, that syllogism is also
called a demonstration, and so successively. The definition therefore
of a demonstration is this, a demonstration is a syllogism, or series
of syllogisms, derived and continued, from the definitions of names,
to the last conclusion. And from hence it may be understood, that all
true ratiocination, which taketh its beginning from true principles,
produceth science, and is true demonstration. For as for the original
of the name, although that, which the Greeks called ἀποδέιξις, and
the Latins demonstratio, was understood by them for that sort only
of ratiocination, in which, by the describing of certain lines and
figures, they placed the thing they were to prove, as it were before
men's eyes, which is properly ἀποδεικνύειν, or to shew by the figure;
yet they seem to have done it for this reason, that unless it were in
geometry, (in which only there is place for such figures) there was
no ratiocination certain, and ending in science, their doctrines
concerning all other things being nothing but controversy and
clamour; which, nevertheless, happened, not because the truth to
which they pretended could not be made evident without figures,
but because they wanted true principles, from which they might
derive their ratiocination; and, therefore, there is no reason but that
if true definitions were premised in all sorts of doctrines, the
demonstrations also would be true.
Properties of 17. It. is proper to methodical demonstration,
a First, that there be a true succession of one
demonstratio reason to another, according to the rules of
n, and order
of things to syllogizing delivered above.
be Secondly, that the premises of all syllogisms be
demonstrate demonstrated from the first definitions.
d. Thirdly, that after definitions, he that teaches or
demonstrates any thing, proceed in the same method by which he
found it out; namely, that in the first place those things be
demonstrated, which immediately succeed to universal definitions (in
which is contained that part of philosophy which is called philosophia
prima). Next, those things which may be demonstrated by simple
motion (in which geometry consists). After geometry, such things as
may be taught or shewed by manifest action, that is, by thrusting
from, or pulling towards. And after these, the motion or mutation of
the invisible parts of things, and the doctrine of sense and
imaginations, and of the internal passions, especially those of men,
in which are comprehended the grounds of civil duties, or civil
philosophy; which takes up the last place. And that this method
ought to be kept in all sorts of philosophy, is evident from hence,
that such things as I have said are to be taught last, cannot be
demonstrated, till such as are propounded to be first treated of, be
fully understood. Of which method no other example can be given,
but that treatise of the elements of philosophy, which I shall begin in
the next chapter, and continue to the end of the work.
Faults of a 18. Besides those paralogisms, whose fault lies
demonstratio either in the falsity of the premises, or the want of
n. true composition, of which I have spoken in the
precedent chapter, there are two more, which are frequent in
demonstration; one whereof is commonly called petitio principii; the
other is the supposing of a false cause; and these do not only
deceive unskilful learners, but sometimes masters themselves, by
making them take that for well demonstrated, which is not
demonstrated at all. Petitio principii is, when the conclusion to be
proved is disguised in other words, and put for the definition or
principle from whence it is to be demonstrated; and thus, by putting
for the cause of the thing sought, either the thing itself or some
effect of it, they make a circle in their demonstration. As for
example, he that would demonstrate that the earth stands still in the
centre of the world, and should suppose the earth's gravity to be the
cause thereof, and define gravity to be a quality by which every
heavy body tends towards the centre of the world, would lose his
labour; for the question is, what is the cause of that quality in the
earth? and, therefore, he that supposes gravity to be the cause, puts
the thing itself for its own cause.
Of a false cause I find this example in a certain treatise where the
thing to be demonstrated is the motion of the earth. He begins,
therefore, with this, that seeing the earth and the sun are not
always in the same situation, it must needs be that one of them be
locally moved, which is true; next, he affirms that the vapours,
which the sun raises from the earth and sea, are, by reason of this
motion, necessarily moved, which also is true; from whence he
infers the winds are made, and this may pass for granted; and by
these winds he says, the waters of the sea are moved, and by their
motion the bottom of the sea, as if it were beaten forwards, moves
round; and let this also be granted; wherefore, he concludes, the
earth is moved; which is, nevertheless, a paralogism. For, if that
wind were the cause why the earth was, from the beginning, moved
round, and the motion either of the sun or the earth were the cause
of that wind, then the motion of the sun or the earth was before the
wind itself; and if the earth were moved, before the wind was made,
then the wind could not be the cause of the earth's revolution; but,
if the sun were moved, and the earth stand still, then it is manifest
the earth might remain unmoved, notwithstanding that wind; and
therefore that motion was not made by the cause which he allegeth.
But paralogisms of this kind are very frequent among the writers of
physics, though none can be more elaborate than this in the
example given.
Why the 19. It may to some men seem pertinent to treat
analytical in this place of that art of the geometricians, which
method of they call logistica, that is, the art, by which, from
geometrician
s cannot be supposing the thing in question to be true, they
treated of in proceed by ratiocination, till either they come to
this place. something known, by which they may demonstrate
the truth of the thing sought for; or to something
which is impossible, from whence they collect that to be false, which
they supposed true. But this art cannot be explicated here, for this
reason, that the method of it can neither be practised, nor
understood, unless by such as are well versed in geometry; and
among geometricians themselves, they, that have most theorems in
readiness, are the most ready in the use of this logistica; so that,
indeed, it is not a distinct thing from geometry itself; for there are,
in the method of it, three parts; the first whereof consists in the
finding out of equality betwixt known and unknown things, which
they call equation; and this equation cannot be found out, but by
such as know perfectly the nature, properties, and transpositions of
proportion, as also the addition, subtraction, multiplication, and
division of lines and superficies, and the extraction of roots; which
are the parts of no mean geometrician. The second is, when an
equation is found, to be able to judge whether the truth or falsity of
the question may be deduced from it, or no; which yet requires
greater knowledge. And the third is, when such an equation is
found, as is fit for the solution of the question, to know how to
resolve the same in such manner, that the truth or falsity may
thereby manifestly appear; which, in hard questions, cannot be done
without the knowledge of the nature of crooked-lined figures; but he
that understands readily the nature and properties of these, is a
complete geometrician. It happens besides, that for the finding out
of equations, there is no certain method, but he is best able to do it,
that has the best natural wit.