The Change of Judicial Power in China in The Era of Artificial Intelligence
The Change of Judicial Power in China in The Era of Artificial Intelligence
515–530
doi:10.1017/als.2020.37
© The Author(s), 2021. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited.
Weidong JI*
China Institute for Socio-Legal Studies, KoGuan School of Law, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Abstract
The singularity of artificial intelligence (AI), which transcends human intelligence to play the
role of God, is imminent. In this context, the Chinese judicial system has gained some latecomer
advantage, with the help of information technology, the Internet, big data, cloud computing, and
AI to improve the efficiency and transparency of case handling. The trial process has undergone
extensive and profound qualitative mutations. This represents a challenge to the institutional
arrangements of the modern rule of law. At this stage, we should adopt a cautious and prudent
attitude towards the design and application of legal-expert systems as well as machine learning.
Especially from the aspect of computer sentencing, it is even more necessary to avoid a rush for
quick results, and there is no need to completely exclude the judge’s discretion and free evalu-
ation of the evidence through inner conviction. The finality of the judicial power is destined to
choose a correct final solution through a debate on the survival of the fittest mechanism. In the
face of such a modern rule-of-law system, big data, cloud computing, information technology,
and AI are just auxiliary means to achieve legal justice. It is impossible to put the cart before the
horses. This is a basic principle that we should always bear in mind.
* University Professor at Shanghai Jiao Tong University and President of the China Institute of Socio-Legal
Studies. Correspondence to Weidong Ji,. E-mail address: [email protected]
1. E.g. Robinson, Fernald, & Clayton (2008), pp. 896–900; Donaldson & Young (2008), pp. 900–4; see Harari &
Lin (2014), chapter 20.
intelligence (AI) system has the flexibility of human cognition. The probabilistic program
can distinguish between the essential and non-essential features of characters and can extract
new concepts from a small number of cases.2 On 15 March 2016, the AI program
“AlphaGo” defeated the world champion Lee Sedol with a 4:1 record, causing a global sen-
sation. On 19 October 2017, the major media reported that the “AlphaGo Zero” program had
been developed by the company DeepMind, a subsidiary under the Google umbrella master-
ing self-learning and creativity. These facts have occurred one after another, which means
that, as singularity is close, AI will surpass human intelligence to play the role of God.
From Alba to AlphaGo to AlphaGo Zero, only 17 years have passed. The digitalization
and Internet-based social restructuring that started in the 1990s have achieved great
improvements in only 30 years. During this period, the Chinese judicial system has gained
some sort of latecomer advantage, using information technology, the Internet, big data,
cloud computing, and AI to improve the efficiency and transparency of case handling, result-
ing in extensive and profound qualitative changes and mutations in the trial process. As a
result, it must be acknowledged that the subject, standards, and procedures of ruling have
presented an unprecedented scene: courtrooms seem like factories; the significance of the
judge as a skilled judge operating on the line of operations is being strengthened by the
weakening of the synergy and unity of the different roles of the public-prosecutor division.
All these trends pose a serious challenge to the institutional arrangement of the modern rule
of law and it is worthy of our careful research, analysis, and consideration. This article
attempts to present some cold thinking about the social craze which exclaims that “robot
judges are coming” and traces the initial intention and essence of judicial-system reform.
technology created the global “Cyberspace,” the large-scale “Netizen,” and “the e-People.”
“International crimes on the Information Highway are increasingly active, and hacker-like
anarchism continues to spread.”17 In 1999, the Ministry of Public Security of China set up
a computer-management and supervision department and deployed a large number of
“cyberpolice”18 patrolling electronic space, using electronic-information-detection systems
to detect criminal acts and collect evidence. “E-Detective” is also quite effective.19 The con-
cepts of “network society” and “network law” also entered the field of mass media.
by the end of 2000, the Supreme People’s Court will complete the reform of the judicial stat-
istical indicator system for various cases. As well, explore the establishment of modern judicial
statistics work and management that meets the needs of the People’s Court for Trial
Management and has rapid response and macro analysis capabilities systems.21
In 2002, the Supreme People’s Court enacted the “Regulations on the Construction of the
Computer Information Network System of the People’s Court” and the “Plan for the
Construction of the Computer Information Network System of the People’s Court,” con-
vened at the National Conference on Information Construction of Courts, and launched
the “National Judicial Trial Information System Project.” These reforms laid the foundation
for the large-scale use of big data, cloud computing, the Internet, information technology,
and AI in the trial process.
It can be seen here that the Chinese Court Reform Program expects multimedia and digital
information technology to play the following three main functions: (1) as a “tool for trial
activities,” to help judges and lawyers to obtain litigation materials and record the results
of the inspection; (2) as a “device for court management,” to save and transfer trial data,
master the trial in a timely way, and produce court documents through audio and video
recordings, etc.; and (3) as the window of “real-time observation” of the process of case
handling, and judicial hearing being visualized and supervised by public opinion on live
broadcast. To ensure that these functions are fully utilized, relevant courts at all levels have
formulated relevant rules and regulations. For example, the Computer Network
Management Rules of the Haidian District People’s Court of Beijing (implemented in
April 1998) stipulate that all courts must conduct various records and case counts simulta-
neously with the trial. The trial data input shall be uniformly managed by the Computer Unit
of the technical room and quarterly surveys and spot checks of information quality shall be
carried out at any time. For this reason, the judges’ clerks and administrators are also tested
for their information-processing skills and penalties are set for negligence.22 In addition, the
research and development of the computer legal-expert system and the judicial
administrative-support system were also officially put on the agenda.23 By 2003, the
“China Trial Law Application Support System” had been promoted throughout the country.
In 2004, the Supreme People’s Court set up the first electronic and intelligent court. It is not
difficult to imagine that, from the end of the 1990s, what the French social thinker Michel
Foucault had thoroughly analyzed, the rational and precise power relations, the micro level
of regulation, organization, efficiency, mechanized landscapes, and how to use computer
systems and digital information technology as levers in China’s courts at various levels,
gradually unfolded and finally became a grand view.
24. For details, see Ji (2006); Ji (2007). The reason for the incident is that the “Beijing News” published a message
on 23 May 2004 that caused concern and controversy in China; see Beijing News (2004). The general situation at that
time can be found in the report in Legal Daily (2004). Computer sentencing is once again eye-catching because of the
report of Legal Daily (2006). The Suichuan court explores the standardization of criminal-trial sentencing. There are
many related introductions and discussions in China, such as Democracy and Legal Times (2006); Southern Metropolis
Daily (2006). For the reaction of international public opinion, see Haines (2006); Tech Republic (2006); IT Media
News (Japan) (2006); Amazing News (Japan) (2006).
25. Ji (1993), pp. 97–8.
26. For a typical example of the coexistence of true and false judgments, see Xinhua News (2006).
the articles. Here, it may also be concluded that a judicial-mirror principle of judgment
strictly corresponds to the same case of law. If you think at the level one more deeper layer,
there has also been a change in the understanding of the nature of a trial by trying to replace
the common language with a professional common language (to compare facts and conduct
rigorous arguments according to legal requirements), as much as possible to exclude the
effects of emotional factors and ambiguous connotations on inference. The promotion of
computer sentencing in Shandong courts has produced the intention and objective effect
of making legal jargon more standardized with the help of computer language. For example,
Zichuan District Court President Wang Jiandong said that the rural, mountainous region of a
judge’s professional quality is generally low, the discretion is often abused, and, under such
conditions, the use of sentencing software to handle cases (“In essence, people are con-
strained by institutions”27) will keep the trial more in line with the unified professional stan-
dards. In such a sense, the effort is certainly worthy of a full evaluation.
Nevertheless, we should adopt a cautious attitude towards the design and application of
legal-expert-system software, especially from the aspect of computer sentencing, and it is
also not necessary to completely exclude the judge’s mind and discretion. To ask why, the
answer is: first, any legal-expert-system software makes a pure legal-positivism presuppo-
sition. The computer deals with the syllogism reasoning in the content of the legal text and
the conditional reasoning of “requirement–effect.” It can also deal with the similarity
between the case characteristics and the basic case features retrieved by the database and
make propensity reasoning and judgment.28 However, it is impossible to properly represent
the meta-rules that determine the order of the pros and cons of effective specification.
Computer sentencing can largely exclude subjective arbitrariness in exercising discretion,
but it also excludes speculations including natural law, the protection of rights, natural
and human nature, and some critical factors such as teaching less and focusing more on
prevention; it also tends to exclude policy-adjustment mechanisms such as interest consid-
erations. Second, the standardization embodied in computer sentencing is bound to ignore
local knowledge, context, specific situations, and the “webs of significance” as key elements
for legal judgment. To some extent, it may be argued that tacit knowledge indicates the
boundaries or limitations of computer legal-expert-system and AI trials.
Moreover, Chinese statutes have always been marked by simple slogans and there is no
shortage of space for interpretation; the connotation and extension of each concept have
not yet been completely unified. For example, only the obligation clause has different expres-
sions such as “should” and “must.” The principle of fair liability with Chinese characteristics
and the often-used terms such as “reasonable” and “predictable” play an extremely important
role in legal reasoning, but the relevant matters are not given in the legal provisions and do not
have a clear definition. Administrative and local norms are extremely complex and there are
often contradictions between different levels and departmental regulations, making integration
work extremely difficult. All these realities are suitable for computer processing. Conversely,
if the dialogue and communication between the inside and outside of the court are formatted
and fixed through the machine in such a state, it is likely to hinder the development and
improvement of legal hermeneutics, reasoning techniques, professional education, and the
ethical attitude of the judge, making the justice flow a simple intellectual game of retrieval and
speculation. If such primary system software is only used to support trials and to reduce the
search burden and avoid omissions to a limited extent, it is not only unobjectionable, but also
strongly supported. But, once the judges are required to form a judgment based on this, and
even automatically generate judgments, it will inevitably lead to endless trouble.
It is also necessary to point out that the current database of legal knowledge in China is
incomplete.29 The core of computer sentencing is the legal-reasoning system and the accumu-
lation of research results on legal reasoning is extremely weak in China. Under such circum-
stances, if the simple method of formalizing the relevant provisions and adding several
explanatory rules is adopted, then, when the software is executed, it would be easy to appear
as if the knowledge itself does not circulate, but the program falls into a useless loop. It is also
difficult to properly handle negative performance. If the vocabulary reserves are not enough,
the combination of the legal-knowledge database and the inference engine can easily lead to
meaningless searches. If there are multiple legal-knowledge databases, how to make them
compatible with each other and to eliminate the integration of contradictions and conflicts
and effective consistent control is also a difficult and important topic, which requires signifi-
cant time and effort to achieve progress. Moreover, the law is constantly being revised, and
updating the knowledge database and adjustment of the interpretation rules also need to be
carried out. In the network structure, if the redefinition of a certain item is neglected, it is
possible to multiply the error and cause the automated processing to be abnormal. This will
also lead to high costs for the construction and maintenance of legal-expert systems.
It would be a mistake to try to use “the US Federal Sentencing Guide” as a defence for
mechanized trials. The nature of “the Federal Sentencing Guide” is closer to a technical
manual on how to exercise discretion. On the one hand, the informal “quote” of past sanc-
tions within the court and the ambiguous judgment were previously clearly defined as far as
possible. It is stipulated in the guide, on the other hand, that many standards of policy adjust-
ment have been established for the precision and flexibility of the judiciary (e.g. the principle
of giving priority to the relief of victims and the various elements of the aggravation or
mitigation of sanctions against corporate crimes).30 It is particularly worthy of attention that
this judicial technical-operation rule has obvious moral orientation, human rights philoso-
phy, and policy thinking, and is subject to constitutional review.31 In China, a more similar
phenomenon is the judicial interpretation of the Supreme Court’s specific criteria for deter-
mining the magnitude of sentencing and calculating the amount of compensation, as well as
the Guidelines of Sentences recently tried by some courts. There is not much substantive
connection with the computer automated-processing-software system. Since the purpose
of computer sentencing is to pursue precise trials, then the expert system software itself must
be able to withstand sophisticated trials and judges must have the quality to avoid human
29. This issue is also plagued by legally developed countries. For the weak foundations of similar expert systems,
the challenges of software development, and the various efforts and specific solutions to overcome barriers, see
Thomasset (1989); see also Natsui (1993), Part 3, chapter 3; Yoshino (2000), especially chapters V, VI.
30. For the ins and outs of the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the basics, and recent controversies and amend-
ments, see US Sentencing Commission website (https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines (accessed 20 September 2006)).
31. Documents can be referred to, e.g. Gebler, and also the Ethics and Policy Integration Centre (2003), as well as
Democracy Now (2005).
mistakes such as misleading the mouse or the fat-finger problem. This is a conclusion that
can be inferred without a computer.
of the People’s Court of the province. In 2014, the Jiangsu Higher People’s Court established the
litigation-service network “Jiangsu Legal Cloud,” which not only provided information services
in litigation, trial, and judicial administration, but also visualized the judgment-execution proc-
ess. At the end of 2016, the Beijing High Court launched the “Intelligence Judge” system,
known as the “robot judge.”33 Affected by developments such as “AlphaGo” and “AlphaGo
Zero,” the speech bubble around “robot judges” and “robot lawyers” is also expanding.
Some local courts have begun to vigorously promote such decisions as the automatic generation
of sentences by AI. There are also innovative measures such as correcting the errors of judges
based on big data.
At the beginning of June 2017, the Central Political and Legal Committee organized more
than a dozen experts and scholars to visit Shanghai, Nanjing, and Guiyang to investigate the
results of the pilot reform of the judicial system. The focus of the experience of local and
various agencies has inadvertently shifted from judicial-system innovation to judicial-
technological innovation. Wisdom courts, data courts, litigation services with integrated
information systems, electronic cross-examination, cloud cabinet interconnection of case
files, intelligent voice court proceedings, discretion data cages, robot lawyers, buzzwords,
new concepts, and avant-garde phenomena have come out one after the other. These new
improvements have left people both excited and worried about the risks and hidden dangers.
In any case, courts at all levels are becoming like a judgment workshop and judges are work-
ing mechanically as if in an assembly line. On many occasions, the trial has become the
result of a joint decision between the judge and the computer engineer. The automatic gen-
eration mechanism of the judgment can easily lead to the data algorithm governing the judi-
cial realm. In short, the trial space is undergoing radical reforms, which are vigorous and will
inevitably affect the design of various legal mechanisms and the field of legal education in
the future. We cannot but carefully observe, analyze, and comprehensively evaluate the two
aspects. The various ripple effects of the “Internet” and “Artificial Intelligence” in the
trial space take precautionary measures from the system and from the mind.
construction of the “wisdom court” has an important value and it is promising. However, if we
go further and let AI exceed the scope of auxiliary means and apply it comprehensively to trial
cases, and even largely replace judges’ judgments, it is very likely that the judicial power will go
astray because, in cases where the facts are difficult, interpersonal relationships are complex, and
human and emotional factors are involved, judging according to legal principles, common sense,
and insights, and properly handling them are subtle arts. Even if AI is embedded into probabi-
listic procedures and has deep-learning ability, it is difficult to make a fair and reasonable, stable,
and convincing case judgment.35
More importantly, excessive expectation or misunderstanding of AI may lead to the collapse
of the system design of the modern rule of law, causing contradictions, confusion, and even a
social structure that is out of control. In the modern state-governance system, the court is the
calibrator of the relationship between government power and individual rights, and is key to
the formation and maintenance of order. To ensure the impartiality and authority of the judiciary,
judges are given the privilege of certain preferences in the system—obeying the law only to
prevent any external interference, ensuring accountability; the final power given to the applica-
tion of law and legal judgment; occupational security, including exemption, is provided on the
premise of procedural justice. The reason for the legitimacy of such identity privilege is that the
judge’s selection of criteria is strict enough to ensure the legitimacy of their knowledge and
character; the trial process is open, transparent, and fair, and can prevent unprincipled com-
promises and black-box operation; any decision must go through the baptism of confrontational
debates and proofs, often taking the third-instance final review, based on legal reasoning and full
consideration. It is for these reasons that the final judgment is also the best time to settle any
dispute. Obviously, after the trial space is reformed in an unrestrained “artificial intelligence”
way, such a judge’s position will inevitably be greatly shaken, and it may cause a comprehensive
deconstruction of the judicial system and even judicial power.
Letting AI automatically generate judgments to correct deviations in accordance with the
law of big-data correction will inevitably form a dual structure of the trial subject and even
lead to the pluralization of the decision-makers. In fact, there will be a situation in which the
data-processing company of the software and the judge jointly make decisions. Once the
judge and the software jointly function, the power boundary becomes blurred and the judi-
cial accountability system can easily lose its strength. There is at least the possibility of
shirking responsibility by the judge by the machine taking more influence in the decision
of the ruling. In addition, if the wisdom court’s idea flows to one-sided and extreme, and
popularizes the mechanism for computers to automatically generate judgments, it will inevi-
tably overthrow the ruling process inside the trial. Of course, the computer-generated sen-
tence is only a reference text that the judge also needs to review and correct but, under the
double pressure of the cases accepted and the rigid period of the statutory trial period, plus
35. On the evening of 15 October 2017, I was invited to give a speech and discussion at Shanghai Jiao Tong
University Alumni Association at Microsoft Headquarters in Seattle. I discussed AI and justice with digital-informa-
tion-technology experts, legal consultants, and lawyers of the company and other multinational corporations. The rela-
tionship in which everyone believes that the use of big data, search technology, and AI to develop a trial-assistance
system to reduce the burden of transactional work is promising, but the automatic generation of robot judges and judg-
ments is impossible in the foreseeable future, because the judiciary and the judgment must not only understand the laws
and facts of the requirements, but also understand people’s minds. It must have a profound and comprehensive under-
standing and insight into the context, and resolve the disputes and consider the corresponding relationship between the
ripped peripheral relations.
the inertia of the person, the judge may rely heavily on the reference judgment sooner or
later. Once such a situation is a commonplace, algorithmic dictatorship cannot be avoided.
Big data will also make mistakes, such as quality problems and deviations in existing judg-
ments unintentionally fixed, suppressing the dynamic mechanism of discovering legal
rights, innovation norms, and promoting institutional evolution through cases. More impor-
tantly, big data and AI will become the “guillotine” of the court debate, resulting in an
atmosphere that “all depends on established software, (and) face-to-face dialogue arguments
are nothing,” making China inherently weak. Legal reasoning, legal discussion, and legal
interpretation will become less important. This means a fundamental change in the structure
and function of the modern judicial process so that judges are losing the institutional and
technical guarantees of “doing at will without breaking rules” in free evaluation of the
evidence.
Legal data with diversified sources and expanding scales could not be perfect. Moreover,
there are still serious quality problems in the process of rapid development in China and
there are even problems of data fraud based on performance considerations.36 Under such
circumstances, computer algorithms constitute a black box. If there is one-sided overempha-
sis on the application of big data and AI in the judiciary, it is easy to make the algorithm and
inference inherit the drawbacks and prejudices of the original judicial practice, and some
defects will even be magnified. If the inadvertent judicial system is dominated by the algo-
rithmic theory, then legal justice will inevitably be kidnapped by the algorithm and kid-
napped by the data processor. To prevent such bleak prospects, it is necessary to use the
opportunity of the court’s organization law and the revision of the judges’ law to clearly
define the main body of the trial mechanism. Judging from the current draft revision of
the law and the content of the discussion, the changes in the era of “Internet” and “artificial
intelligence” have not been reflected in the legislative process in a timely and sufficient
manner. For example, the organization law of the court does not clearly stipulate the rights
and obligations of judicial assistants, which is incompatible with the current changes in the
trial; the data-processing department and computer engineers are having a profound impact
on the trial of the case, and the court’s information-processing outsourcing business is huge.
These new phenomena are subject to further clear definition by law. In addition, in the face
of laws and computer-program coding, and the control of big-data algorithms, the principle
of “consideration of thinking” should be emphasized and give sufficient space for judges to
comprehensively name and make decisions. Furthermore, how is the automatically gener-
ated technology compatible with legal interpretation and legal communication, and how will
AI be prevented from compressing the space for legal discussion? How can it be ensured that
the three elements of the procedure, debate, and consensus in the era of AI are not only
maintained, but also further strengthened? How can a new solid foundation for the legal
profession be provided? These issues must be seriously considered.
36. According to the results of the 2015 survey conducted by Shanghai First Intermediate People’s Court, 43% of
the judges believed that the information collection of the case was not targeted and the degree of adaptation to new law
was not enough; 50% of the judges believed that the information points were set too much. For some, there is no post-
application for information-point entry. More importantly, there is a lack of uniform standards for the collection and
configuration of various pieces of information. The phenomenon of “information islanding” is serious and restricts the
intelligent application of judicial big data. In addition, 61.59% of the judges believed that “the accuracy of case infor-
mation entry is not enough, and the key information lacks the automatic verification function.” For details, please refer
to the research report of the research group RR (2017).
In the new social context, in judging judicial responsibility and judicial democracy, the two
major problems that the system design must face are how to prevent the burden of judges from
being too heavy and how to prevent judges from trying to shirk their responsibility. China’s
solution to the problem of the heavy burden of responsibility is mainly to develop the means
of dispute settlement outside the court or the direct democratization of the judicial system and to
improve the efficiency and decentralization of responsibility by means of information technol-
ogy. It is easy to form a channel for shirking responsibility and transferring responsibility under
the condition that the subject of the trial is diversified and the trial standards are diversified. The
computer software system can ensure the whole process being left in the mark and it may be able
to alleviate similar problems to some extent. However, the practice of data cages and the auto-
matic generation of judgments can easily lead to the situation of algorithms governing the trial,
making the judges incapable of being responsible, and it is difficult to carry out real and effective
accountability for the results of the judges handling the case. Once the situation of algorithmic
autocracy is formed, the meaning of court debate, appeal review, and expert discretion will be
relative. The result will lead to the objectification of judges, the weakening of judicial authority,
the deconstruction of the trial system, and even complete legal nihilism.
In general, the main functions of the legal system are to form order, resolve disputes,
provide clear expectations, and justify the value. The key to the modernization of the so-
called national governance system and governance capacity lies in the concept of legality,
the regulation of the operation of public power, and the cultivation of the behaviour and
mode of thinking of the government and all people in observing legal rules. To this end,
the legal system, especially the trial system, must have sufficient rationality and neutrality
to improve the efficiency and fairness of the entire society. Law enforcers and judicial peo-
ple have always faced various conflicts of interest and value. To effectively resolve conflicts,
legal reasoning and legal arguments must abandon the attitude of self-respect, must be good
at listening to different opinions and arguments, and must make decisions that are univer-
sally convincing, so as both sides accept and agree. Such fundamental characteristics deter-
mine the position of legal research and the purpose of legal education. For the legal-decision
process, no matter which viewpoint can be raised in an equal and open program arena, it is
necessary to experience the baptism of persuasive competition. In other words, the essence
of the rule of law is to convince people, not to force people. The neutrality of judicial power
is bound to adopt an inclusive attitude towards different interests and value judgments. The
finality of judicial power is destined to choose a correct final solution through debate on the
survival of the fittest mechanism. These programs must meet at least two criteria: first, they
must be completely self-consistent in logic and should never contradict each other; second,
they must reflect the maximum common divisor of society in value judgment and have the
maximum general persuasion. In the face of such a modern legal system, AI, big data, cloud
computing, and information technology are just auxiliary means to achieve legal justice.
REFERENCES
Amazing News (Japan) (2006) “China Introduces Computer Sentencing Software to Trial,” 15
September.
Beijing Haidian District People’s Court (1998) Regulations and Institutions, Beijing: Haidian District
People’s Court Research Office.
Beijing News (2004) “Entering A Criminal Plot Computer to Make A Sentence,” 23 May.
Buchanan, Bruce G., & Thomas E. Headrick (1970) “Some Speculation about Artificial Intelligence
and Legal Reasoning.” 23 Stanford Law Review 40–62.
Cui, Yadong (2017) “Exploration of the Judge’s Annual Maximum Case Handling Calculation and the
Solution of the Contradiction of ‘Thousands of People with Less Cases’.” 1 Judicial Decision-
Making and Reference 1–9.
D’Amato, Anthony (1977) “Can/Should Computers Replace Judges?” 11 Georgia Law Review 1277–
301.
Dearing, Mark C. (1999) “Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Can the Traditional Principles and
Landmark Cases Guide the Legal System into the 21st Century?” 4 Journal of Technology Law &
Policy 4–5.
deBessonnet, Cary G. (1991) A Many-Valued Approach to Deduction and Reasoning for Artificial
Intelligence, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Democracy and Legal Times (2006) “Computer Sentencing Challenges Discretion,” 9 September.
Democracy Now (2005) “Supreme Court Overturns Federal Sentencing Guidelines,” 14 January.
Donaldson, Zoe R., & Larry J. Young (2008) “Oxytocin, Vasopressin, and the Neurogenetics of
Sociality.” 322 Science 900–4.
Ethics and Policy Integration Centre (2003) “The Relationship between Law and Ethics, the
Significance of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations,” 2 May.
Gao, Yifei (2010) “On the New Development of American Trial Disclosure in the Digital Age and Its
Enlightenment to China.” 10 Academic Forum 50–6.
Gebler, David (2004) “How Changes to Federal Sentencing Guidelines Will Affect Ethics and
Compliance Programs,” http://accounting.smartpros.com/x44059.xml (accessed 16 October 2019).
Gong, Xiangrui, & Keqiang Li (1983) “Computerization of Legal Work.” 3 Journal of Law 16–20.
Haines, Lester (2006) “Chinese Court Deploys Sentencing Software: Computer Says 10 Years,
comrade,” The Register, 13 September.
Harari, Y. Noah, & Junhong Lin (2014) Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (Chinese Edition),
Beijing: CITIC Publishing House.
Hou, Zhaoxiao (2007) “The Dream of Computerized Sentencing: Prof. Zhao Tingguang and His
Computer System of Sentencing.” 23 Democracy and Legal System 4–8.
IT Media News (Japan) (2006) “Computer Courts Are Active in China,” 14 September.
Ji, Weidong (1993) “The Significance of Legal Procedures.” 1 Chinese Social Sciences 83–103.
Ji, Weidong (2001) “The Digital Age and Re-Construction of the Legal Network: The Role of
Information Technology in China’s Judicial Reform.” 54 Sociology of Law (Professional
Journal of the Japanese Association of Sociological of Law) 222–35.
Ji, Weidong (2006) “Computer Sentencing Is Right and Wrong,” Southern Weekly, 25 September.
Ji, Weidong (2007) “Computer Disciplinary Dialectical View.” 1 Political and Legal Forum 124–8.
Ju, Xuewu (2000) “Criminal Crime on the Internet and Its Containment.” 4 Legal Studies 83–100.
Kumar, K. Ashwin, Yashwardhan Singh, & Sudip Sanyal (2009) “Hybrid Approach Using Case-
Based Reasoning and Rule-Based Reasoning for Domain Independent Clinical Decision
Support in ICU.” 36 Expert Systems with Applications 65–71.
Lake, M. Brenden, Ruslan Salakhutdinov, & Joshua B. Tenenbaum (2015) “Human-Level Concept
Learning through Probabilistic Program Induction.” 350 Science 1332–8.
Legal Daily (2004) “Computer Sentencing Controversy in Advance,” 13 September.
Legal Daily (2006) “Can Computer Sentencing Avoid Different Criminal Cases?” 2 August.
Lessig, Lawrence (1999) Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, New York: Basic Books.
Liu, Guojun, & Hongqing Shen (2000) “Strengthening the Construction and Development of the
Court’s Computer Information Network,” People’s Court Newspaper, 27 December.
Liu, M., & K. Platt (2000) “China’s e-Rebels,” Newsweek, 1 October.
Liu, Ziyang (2016) “Robot Judge ‘Xiao Rui’ Background Automatically Filed,” Legal Daily, 14
December.
Maggs, Peter B., & Cary G. deBessonet (1972) “Automated Logical Analysis of Systems of Legal
Rules.” 12 JURIMETRICS Journal 158–69.
Matsumura, Yoshiyuki (1986) “Introduction,” in H. Yoshino, ed., The Foundation of the Legal Expert
System, Tokyo: Gyosei Publishing House, 24–35.
Matsuo, Hiroshi (1986) “Logical Programming of the British Nationality Law,” in Hajime Yoshino,
ed., The Foundation of the Legal Expert System, Tokyo: Gyosei Publishing House, 51–8.
McCarty, L. Thorne (1977) “Reflections on TAXMAN: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and
Legal Reasoning.” 90 Harvard Law Review 837–93.
McCarty, L. Thorne (1980) “The TAXMAN Project: Towards a Cognitive Theory of Legal
Argument,” in B. Niblett, ed., Computer Science and Law: An Advanced Course, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 23–43.
McCarty, L. Thorne (1983) “Intelligent Legal Information Systems: Problems and Prospects.” 9
Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 265–94.
Natsui, Takato (1993) Trial Practice and Electronic Computer-Coordination of Law and Technology,
Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron Sha Press.
Niida, Katsumi (1987) “Patent Law Consultation System.” 5 Law and Electronic Computer 115–24.
Popp, Walter G., & Bernhard Schlink (1975) “Judith: A Computer Program to Advise Lawyers in
Reasoning a Case.” 15 JURIMETRICS Journal 303–14.
Prentzas, Jim, & Ioannis Hatzilygeroudis (2007) “Categorizing Approaches Combining Rule-Based
and Case-Based Reasoning.” 24 Expert Systems 97–122.
Research Office of the Supreme People’s Court (2000) The Five-Year Reform Outline of the People’s
Court, Beijing: People’s Court Press.
Roberts, John (2014) “Chief Justice’s 2014 Year-End Reports on the Federal Judiciary,” https://www.
supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx (accessed 10 October 2019).
Robinson, Gene E., Russell D. Fernald, & David F. Clayton (2008) “Genes and Social Behavior.” 322
Science 896–900.
RR (2017) “Strengthening the Development of Case Information Resources and Promoting the
Intelligent Application of Judicial Data.” 8 Judicial Decision-making and Reference 1ff.
Sergot, M. J., F. Sadri, R. A. Kowalski et al. (1986) “The British Nationality Act as a Logic Program.”
29 Communications of the ACM 370–86.
SHPC (2017) “Exploration and Practice of the Reform of the Judicial System of the Shanghai Court
(2014–17),” Report, Shanghai Higher People’s Court.
Simitis, Spiros (1967) Automation in der Rechtsordnung—Möglichkeiten und Grenzen, Karlsruhe:
Verlag Müller.
Southern Metropolis Daily (2006) “Shandong Promotes Computer Sentencing in Disputes Is Expected
to Be Accurate to the Day,” 12 September.
Tech Republic (2006) “Order in the Database! The Software Says, ‘Go to Jail!’,” 13 September.
Thomasset, Claude (1989) “Expert Systems in Law and the Presentation of Legal Knowledge: Can We
Isolate It from the Why and the Who?” in A. A. Martino, ed., Proceedings of the 3rd International
Congress on Logica, Informatica, Dritto, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 1–20.
Waterman, Donald A., & Mark A. Peterson (1981) Models of Legal Decision Making, Santa Monica,
CA: Rand Corporation.
Waterman, Donald A., & Mark A. Peterson (1984) “Evaluating Civil Claims: An Expert Systems
Approach.” 1 Expert Systems 65–76.
Waterman, Donald A., Jody Paul, & Mark Peterson (1986) “Expert Systems for Legal Decision
Making.” 3 Expert Systems 212–26.
Xinhua News (2006) “Yin and Yang Verdict,” 14 September.
Xu, Chenggang (2017) “Why AI Can Never Completely Replace Human Beings,” Pengpai News, 23
September.
Yang, Weibo (2011) “On the US E-Filing Online and Its Enlightenment.” 1 Cyber Law Commentary
137–47.
Yoshino, Hajime, ed. (2000) Legal Artificial Intelligence—Analysis and Law of Legal Knowledge the
Realization of Legal Reasoning, Tokyo: Nihon Sousei Sha Press.
Zernik, Joseph (2010) “Data Mining of Online Judicial Records of the Networked US Federal Courts.”
1 International Journal on Social Media: Monitoring, Measurement 69–83.
Zhang, Lixing (1986) “The Impact of the Computer Revolution on the Legal Circle.” 3 Journal of
Peking University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 81–5.