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Module 5-1

Module 5-1

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
13 views

Module 5-1

Module 5-1

Uploaded by

papadam6801
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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MODULE 5

Water Based Fire Extinguisher

• Water is the primary liquid used in these extinguishers, although sometimes other additives are also
included.
• A drawback for pure water f ire extinguishers is that it is not suitable for use in freezing conditions
since the water inside will freeze and render the extinguisher unusable. Certain types of water f ire
extinguishers contain antifreeze which will allow the extinguisher to be used in freezing conditions.
• Water type f ire extinguishers can also sometimes contain wetting agents which are designed to help
increase its effectiveness against fire.
• These extinguishers are intended primarily for use on Class A fires.
• Water mist extinguishers are a type of water fire extinguisher that uses distilled water and discharges
it as a f ine spray instead of a solid stream. Water mist extinguishers are used where contaminants in
unregulated water sources can cause excessive damage to personnel or equipment.
• Typical applications include operating rooms, museums, and book collections.
Carbon Dioxide type
Fire Extinguisher
• The principal advantage of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) f ire extinguishers is that the agent does not leave a
residue after use.
• This can be a signif icant factor where protection is needed for delicate and costly electronic
equipment.
• Other typical applications are food preparation areas, laboratories, and printing or duplicating areas.
• Carbon dioxide extinguishers are listed for use on Class B and Class C fires.
• This type of f ire extinguisher is not recommended for outdoor use where windy conditions prevail or
for indoor use in locations that are subject to strong air currents, because the agent can rapidly
dissipate and prevent extinguishment.
• The concentration needed for f ire extinguishment reduces the amount of oxygen in the vicinity of the
fire and should be used with caution when discharged in confined spaces.
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

Summary

■ Originated due to poor loss (accident)


record in 1966
■ One of the first “chemical plant” hazard
analysis systems
■ Unique Features
– Maximum Probable Property Damage
– Maximum Probable Days Outage
■ Continues to be upgraded in use and
application
■ Fill out like a “Tax Form”
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

F & EI
■ Uses material factors that relate to reactivity
and flammability
■ Identifies equipment that can present a
flammable or explosive hazard
■ Suggests approaches to control a hazard
■ Useful in determining plant layout and
separation between vessels
■ Requires engineering judgement
■ Is not a perfect tool
■ Is a useful tool
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

The expected damage of


QUANTIFY
potential fire &
explosion incidents in
realistic terms

Equipment that would


IDENTIFY likely contribute to the
creation or escalation
of an incident

The fire & explosion


COMMUNICAT potential to design
E teams and plant
personnel
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
■ Material Factor
– Measure of Reactivity and
Flammability
■ General Process Hazards
– Play a primary role in
determining the magnitude of
a loss incident
■ Special Process Hazards
– Contribute to the probability of
a loss incident
■ Fire & Explosion Index
– A measure of the relative
hazard and relates to an
exposure radius
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
LOSS CONTROL CREDITS

Are features that have proved


beneficial in preventing
serious incidents and
reducing the magnitude of a
particular incident

* Process Control
* Material Isolation
* Fire Protection
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

Actual Maximum Probable


Property Damage
Represents the property damage that
could result from an incident of
reasonable magnitude with adequate
functioning of protective equipment

Maximum Probable Days Outage


Time required to rebuild the plant to
its original capacity

Business Interruption
The lost profit to the company due to an
incident
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

Items Required to Develop an F & EI


1. Accurate Plot Plan for an existing plant
2. Preliminary Plot Plan for a new plant
3. Process Flow Sheet
4. F & EI Hazard classification guide
5. F & EI form
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
IDENTIFY PERTINENT PROCESS UNIT

(An item of equipment that could impact the process


from a safety & loss prevention standpoint)

* Chemical Energy Potential (Material


Factor)
* Quantity of hazardous materials in
the process unit
* Capital density
* Process pressure and temperature
* Past history of problems

Not all unit operation need to be analyzed.


Knowledge of the process is essential
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
MATERIAL FACTOR

* Measure of the flammability


(NF) and reactivity (NR) of a
material

* Material factor adjusted for


process conditions
- Flash Point
- Boiling Point
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
CONTRIBUTING HAZARD
FACTORS

Evaluate the process unit to


eliminate over estimating
penalties

* General Process Hazards (F1)

* Special Process Hazards (F2)


DOW Fire & Explosion Index
GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS
F1

Penalties for:

Exothermic/Endothermic
Material Handling & Transfer
Enclosed processes
Access
Drainage and spill control

F & EI workbook has various penalties


DOW Fire & Explosion Index

SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS


F2
Penalties for:
Toxic materials (0.2 x NH)
Sub-atmospheric pressure
(P<500mHg, 0.5)
Dust explosions
Operating in flammable range
Low temperature operation
Corrosion & Erosion
Leakage
Rotating equipment

F & EI workbook has various penalties


DOW Fire & Explosion Index
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS
F2
Pressure Penalty
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS
F2
Quantity of Flammable/Unstable
material

Separate figures for process, storage and solids


DOW Fire & Explosion Index
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS
F2
Use of fired equipment

Curve A-1 Release above flash point or combustible


dust
Curve A-2 Released above boiling point
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

UNIT HAZARD FACTOR (F3)

F3 = F1 X F2

F & EI = Material Factor X F3


DOW Fire & Explosion Index

F & EI USED TO DETERMINE

An area having a potential for impact from a flammable or over pressure


event
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

Degree of
F & EI Hazard

1 - 60 Light

61 - 96 Moderate

97 - 127 Intermediate

128* - 158 Heavy

159+ Severe

* Trigger for more detailed PHA


DOW Fire & Explosion Index
Area of Exposure

Exposure radius from empirical


relationship

Determined from spills of flammable materials 3 in. deep


as well as potential vapor air mixtures
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
Volume of Exposure

Calculate volume as a cylinder with


height equal to radius

Determine replacement value of


equipment in the area (volume)
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
Damage Factor

Determine damage factor from


empirical relationship of Unit
Hazard (F3) and Material Factor
(MF)
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

BASE MAXIMUM PROBABLE


PROPERTY DAMAGE

Base Maximum Probable Property


Damage (Base MPPD)

Value of the area of exposure

Damage Factor
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
LOSS CONTROL CREDIT
FACTORS

F & EI workbook has various credits


DOW Fire & Explosion Index
ACTUAL MAXIMUM
PROBABLE PROPERTY
DAMAGE

Actual Maximum Probable Property


Damage (Actual MPPD)

Base MPPD

Credit Factor
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
MAXIMUM PROBABLE DAYS
OUTAGE (MPDO)
Maximum Probable Days Outage
(MPDO) determined empirically
from actual MPPD
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION

Business Interruption (BI)

Maximum Probable Days Outage


(MPDO)

{Lost Profit before tax/day


+
Fixed Cost/day}
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
RISK ANALYSIS
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
WHAT CAN I DO TO LOWER
THE RISK?

* Reduce the Hazards (most impact)

* Add Loss Control Features (Least


impact)

* Increase spacing (plant layout)

It is more effective to reduce the hazards


early in the project than to add loss
control features late in the project

The system makes us quantify the risk


and suggests ways to reduce the risk
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

The DOW F & EI system


challenges you to
determine how much risk
you are willing to accept.
What Is Preliminary Hazard Analysis

■ Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) is usually the f ir st attempt in the system safety process to
identify and categorize hazards or potential hazards associated with the operation of a proposed
system, process, or procedure; it is used in the early stages of system design.
■ It is a semi-quantitative analysis that is performed to identify all potential hazards and accidental
events that may lead to an accident, rank the identif ie d accidental events according to their
severity and identify required hazard controls and follow-up actions.
■ Preliminary hazard analysis that can be used under different names, such as Rapid Risk Ranking
and Hazard Identification (HAZID).
Characteristics Of PHA

• It relies on brainstorming and expert judgment to assess the signif icance of hazards and assign a
ranking to each situation.
• It is typically performed by one or two people who are knowledgeable about the type of activity in
question.
• It is applicable to any activity or system
• It can be used as a high-level analysis early in the life of a process.
• It is used to generates qualitative descriptions of the hazards related to a process. Provides a
qualit at ive ranking of t he hazardous sit uat ions; t his ranking can be use d to priorit ize
recommendations for reducing or eliminating hazards in subsequent phases of the life cycle.
• Quality of the evaluation depends on the quality and availability of documentation, the training of the
review team leader with respect to the various analysis techniques employed, and the experience of
the review teams.
Advantages And Disadvantages Of PHA

■ Advantages
• Helps ensure that the system is safe
• Modifications are less expensive and easier to implement in
the earlier stages of design
• Decreases design time by reducing the number of surprises
■ Disadvantages
• Hazards must be foreseen by the analysts
• The effects of interactions between hazards are not easily
recognized
Steps To Carrying Out Preliminary Hazard Analysis
(PHA)

1. PHA prerequisites: This involves, establishing a PHA team, description of the system to

be analysed, and collection of risk information from previous system.

2. Hazard identif ication: This is where all hazards and possible accidental events must be

identif ied. All part of the system should be considered at this stage. All f indings should

be recorded.

■ Note: No hazards are too insignificant to be recorded.


3. Consequence and frequency estimation: To determine the risk level, we have to estimate the
frequency and the severity of each accidental event. At this stage, the consequence and frequency
of every hazard is considered.

4. Risk ranking and follow-up actions: Risk is established as a combination of a given


event/consequence and a severity of the same event/consequence. This will enable a ranking of
the
events/consequences in a risk matrix. This ranking level will determine the follow up actions necessar
for the risk.
Hazard & Operability Analysis (HAZOP)

■ Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic


technique for system examination and risk management.
■ In particular, HAZOP is often used as a technique for identifying potential
hazards in a system and identifying operability problems likely to lead to
nonconforming products.
■ HAZOP is based on a theory that assumes risk events are caused by
deviations from design or operating intentions.
■ Identification of such deviations is facilitated by using sets of “guide
words” as a systematic list of deviation perspectives.
■ This approach is a unique feature of the HAZOP methodology that helps
stimulate the imagination of team members when exploring potential
deviations.
HAZOP Methodology

■ The HAZOP analysis


process is executed
in four phases as
illustrated below:
Definition Phase

■ The Def inition Phase typically begins with preliminary identif ic ation of
risk assessment team members.
■ HAZOP is intended to be a cross-functional team effort, and relies on
specialists (SMEs) from various disciplines with appropriate skills and
experience who display intuition and good judgment.
■ SMEs should be carefully chosen to include those with a broad and
current knowledge of system deviations.
■ HAZOP should always be carried out in a climate of positive thinking and
frank discussion.
■ During the Def inition Phase, the risk assessment team must identify the
assessment scope carefully in order to focus effort.
■ This includes def ining study boundaries and key interfaces as well as key
assumptions that the assessment will be performed under
Preparation Phase

■ The Preparation Phase typically includes the following activities:


Identifying and locating supporting data and information
 Identification of the audience and users of the study outputs
 Project management preparations (ex: scheduling meetings,
transcribing proceedings, etc.)
 Consensus on template format for recording study outputs
 Consensus on HAZOP guide words to be used during the study
■ Risk assessment teams are responsible for identifying the guide words
that will best suit the scope and problem statement for their analysis.
Some common HAZOP guide words include:
Examination Phase

■ The Examination Phase begins with identification of all elements (parts

or steps) of the system or process to be examined. For example:

 Physical systems may be broken down into smaller parts as necessary

 Processes may be broken down into discrete steps or phases

 Similar parts or steps may be grouped together to facilitate

assessment
■ The HAZOP guide words are then applied to each of the elements.
■ In this fashion a thorough search for deviations is carried out in a
systematic manner.
■ It must be noted that not all combinations of guide words and elements
are expected to yield sensible or credible deviation possibilities.
■ As a general rule, all reasonable use and misuse conditions which are
expected by the user should be identified and subsequently challenged to
determine if they are “credible” and whether they should be assessed any
further.
■ The re i s no ne e d t o e x pl i c i t l y d o c um e nt t he i nst a nc e s w he n
combinations of elements and guide words do not yield any credible
deviations
Documentation & Follow-up Phase

■ The documentation of HAZOP analyses is often facilitated by utilizing a


template recording form as detailed in IEC Standard 61882.
■ Risk assessment teams may modify the template as necessary based on
factors such as:
 Regulatory requirements
 Need for more explicit risk rating or prioritization (ex: rating deviation
probabilities, severities, and/or detection)
 Company documentation policies
 Needs for traceability or audit readiness
 Other factors
Risk Review

■ On a long-term basis, operational feedback should conf ir m that the


assessment and control steps are adequately addressing the risk
question.
■ It is also important to note that new risks may arise from risk control
practices.
■ Sometimes risks that were not originally identif ie d or may have been
f iltered out during the initial risk assessment can become aggravating
factors due to the implementation of risk control measures.
Risk Communication

■ HAZOP is a powerful communication tool.

■ The output of the tool should always be presented at a level of detail

appropriate for the various stakeholders.

■ This is important not just for presenting results, but also for obtaining

early buy-in on the approach.


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Controlling Chemical Hazards
■ Controlling exposures to chemical hazards and toxic substances is the fundamental method of
protecting workers.
■ A hierarchy of controls is used as a means of determining how to implement feasible and effective
controls.
■ Engineering and work practice controls must be the primary means used to reduce employee exposure
to toxic chemicals, as far as feasible, and that respiratory protection is required to be used when
engineering or work practice controls are infeasible or while they are being implemented.
■ Where possible, elimination or substitution is the most desirable followed by engineering controls.
■ Administrative or work practice controls may be appropriate in some cases where engineering controls
cannot be implemented or when different procedures are needed after implementation of the new
engineering controls.
■ Personal protection equipment is the least desirable but may still be effective.
Hazardous Properties of Chemicals
Sometimes they can explode and cause burns, vomiting, drowsiness, etc

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