PPR202 Essay 1 33692602

Explain how one evaluates actions using

the universal law formulation (UL) of the
categorical imperative, then assess the
ethical usefulness of the UL.
“Act only in accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time will it
become a universal” is Immanuel Kant’s universal law formulation (UL) 1. It is claimed to be
an “a priori synthetic practical proposition,” it is proven true by reason whilst action
guiding2. In this essay we shall explain and illustrate Kant’s argument for the UL and how the
UL is used form both perfect and imperfect duties. We shall then assess its ‘ethical
usefulness’ by examining Kant’s problematic illustration of the duty of benevolence, and
how it can be interpreted to prevent contradiction.

In section of the ‘Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals’ (hereafter referred to as the
Groundwork), Kant’s aim is to clarify our commonly held ideas about morality. His method is
Socratic, and illustrated by various examples. He unearths three key premises (each of
which I will explain his argument for): an action only has moral worth it is done from duty;
the moral worth of an action is based upon our volition and the good will; and that our
moral laws must be necessary and apply to all rational agents. These three premises are
required to understand why Kant argues the categorical imperative is morally binding.

Kant uses the example of a beneficent man to show why duty, as opposed to self-serving
aims are central to the concept of morality. A man who readily enjoys being generous and
giving to charity may do so purely for pleasure. Compare this to a man who is miserly by

1
KANT, IMMANUEL et al. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Edited by Allen W. Wood and Allen W. Wood, Yale University Press,
2002, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1njjwt.7. (AK4:421)

2
Kant. 4:420

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PPR202 Essay 1 33692602

nature, yet despite this still gives to charity as he knows it is his moral duty. Kant takes it as
obvious that the miserly man who gives from duty is more moral commendable.

Kant provides two negative arguments and two positive for the claim that morality lies
“merely on the principle of the volition3.”

The first positive argument for necessity of the good will is that there is nothing “that can be
held to be good without limitation, excepting only a good will4.” All other seemingly positive
features of a person can be “evil and harmful,” for example a person can be intelligent yet
arrogant, or witty yet cruel, however (Kant claims) this could not be possible for a person
that uses reason to choose the right thing to do.

Kant’s second argument is teleological in nature. He argues that in ‘organised beings’ we

shall find “only instruments for ends that are most appropriate and best adapted 5.” If our
true end was purely preservation, or happiness, natural inclinations or instinct, would be
best served to achieve this. Kant argues that having reason for this purpose would be a
“very bad arrangement6.” As reason is badly suited to serving our natural needs and desires,
yet as we still have reason, “it’s true vocation must therefore be not to produce volition as
a means to some other aim, but rather to produce a will good in itself7.”

Kant’s argument against the moral value of consequences is simple. The moral worth of an
action cannot reside in ends, as such ends “could be brought about through other causes 8.”

3
Kant (2002). 4:400

4
Kant (2002). 4:393

5
Kant (2002). 4:395

6
Kant (2002). 4:395

7
Kant (2002). 4:396

8
Kant (2002). 4:401

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PPR202 Essay 1 33692602

Our happiness can be affected by things that have no bearing on the actions of individuals,
thus to claim that such ends are the purpose of morality is false.

Kant’s second argument against the moral value of empirical facts is integral to the
formation of the categorical imperative. Kant claims that any grounding principle of morality
must apply with “absolute necessity”, in all occasions to every rational being 9. However,
aims toward any sort of end cannot grant the necessity that is required. This is because such
empirical aims are contingent, they could be otherwise. Thus Kant makes the claim “is clear
that all moral concepts have their seat and origin fully a priori in reason 10.” The problem
with contingent aims are made clear by Kant’s introduction of categorical and hypothetical
imperatives.

Kant claims imperatives are “formulas of the determination of action” and can be either
hypothetical or categorical11. Hypothetical imperatives are imperatives towards a particular
end, for example ‘drink a glass of water if you are thirsty.’ To give up the binding-ness of this
imperative all we must do is give up the end of quenching our first. It is for this reason Kant
believes that theories that grant happiness as an ultimate end cannot be the basis of
morality. Any imperative with happiness as it’s root cause cannot be universally binding (as
moral laws must be) because the binding-ness of such an imperative is contingent. In Kant’s
words:

material ends are all only relative; for only their relation to a particular kind of
faculty of desire of the subject gives them their worth, which therefore can provide
no necessary principles valid universally for all rational beings12

9
Kant (2002). 4:408

10
Kant (2002). 4:411

11
Kant (2002). 4:415

12
Kant (2002). 4:427

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PPR202 Essay 1 33692602

Therefore, the underlying principle of morality, the categorical imperative, cannot consist of
any end, it must be based upon it’s form. Kant posits that “perhaps the mere concept of a
categorical imperative” can provide us with its formula. We know the categorical imperative
must be in the form of a law; universal, containing “no condition to what it is limited,” and
necessary. Thus it must be “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can
at the same time will that it become a universal law13.” This formula meet’s all the
requirements Kant claims are necessary for the categorical imperative. The concept of
universality avoids the contingent nature of material ends, yet it is still able to guide our
actions.

A potential critique of the Kant’s argument for the categorical imperative can be made at
this theoretical level. The categorical imperative is preferred to hypothetical imperatives
because hypothetical imperatives are unable to provide the universality necessary for the
basis of morality. For Kant this universality is needed for morality, as universality is the only
way by which moral laws can apply to all rational beings. Kant appears “just to help himself
to the idea that there are moral laws,” in the first place14. Our intuitive concept of morality
requires laws that apply to everyone equally, however this does not mean that such laws
actually exist.

However, if we accept that there actually are moral duties to which we are bound to (which
is the purpose of Kant’s Socratic illustrations in groundwork section one), then these duties
must be the same for all agents who can partake in the moral community. We must accept
that moral laws are binding for all involved. Then the universality, so integral to the
formation of the UL, is warranted. If there is such a thing as morality, it is based on the
moral laws formed by the UL.

Using the UL to evaluate actions is a four step process. It is able to generate perfect and
imperfect duties. The first step is to express the maxim that is guiding your action. The term
maxim is central to the explanation of the UL. Kant defines a maxim as a “subjective

13
Kant (2002). 4:420

14
Kitcher, Patricia. "Kant's Argument For The Categorical Imperative". Nous 38.4 (2004): 560.

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PPR202 Essay 1 33692602

principle for action15.” Maxims are the principles behind every action of imperfect rational
agents, for example: ‘if I am thirsty, I shall drink a glass of water.’ Throughout his examples
in the Groundwork and other ethical works, Kant uses a fairly specific form for his maxims.
In Acting on Principle, Onora O’Neill attempts to analyse these examples and produce a
schematic expression of a maxim. Maxims contain an act description A, an agent description
B, and a purposive component C and are schematically expressed like so: ‘To A if B in order
to C16.’ An expression of my earlier example would look like this: “To ‘drink a glass of water’
if ‘I am thirsty’ in order to ‘feel satisfied.’”

The next step is to universalise the maxim: To universally adopt a maxim, imagine a world in
which everyone would perform the specified action given their agent description. The third
step is to check whether it is still logically possible to adapt such maxim. It is rational (non-
contradictory) to adopt the maxim to ‘drink a glass of water’ if ‘I am thirsty’ in order to ‘feel
satisfied,’ even if all other rational agents would do the same. Therefore, such a maxim is
morally permissible. This is the case for the majority of maxims. In cases where there are
logical contradictions such maxims are impermissible. Kant illustrates this with the example
of lying.

Kant takes the maxim “If I believe myself to be in pecuniary distress, then I will borrow
money and promise to pay it back, although I know this will never happen,” with the
purposive action of “self-love17” (This self-love can be translated as personal gain). The
maxim in O’Neill’s schematic form: ‘to make false promises if I am in pecuniary distress to
gain personally.’ If every rational agent followed this maxim, it would be widely known that
people would make false promises in order to gain, and therefore no one would lend their
money. This would make it impossible to gain through making false promises, resulting in a
contradiction. As It is impossible to universalise the prior maxim, it is therefore morally

15
Kant (2002). 4:421

16
O’Neill, Onora. Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. p. 101 (O’neil uses
dashes to express the form, I have chosen letters)

17
Kant (2002). 4:423

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PPR202 Essay 1 33692602

impermissible. Kant names duties formed in this way as perfect. We have a perfect duty to
not make false promises.

The next step derives imperfect duties. It is not enough for maxims to logically possible to
maximise, we must be able to will that they are. This is illustrated by the creation of the
‘duty of beneficence.’ Kant describes a man “for whom it is going well” who refuses to
contribute to others welfare, he adopts a maxim of non-beneficence. A universalisation of
this principle is possible without contradiction, “universal law of nature could well subsist in
accordance with that maxim,” we cannot, however, will that it would be universalised.
There may be many scenarios in “which one would need the love and sympathy of others”
but by universalising such a maxim “he would rob himself all hope of assistance he wishes
for himself18.” Thus we must adopt a duty of beneficence.

This application of the UL is problematic and contradictory. The argument Kant gives seems
“entirely prudential,19” universalising a maxim of indifference would potentially negatively
affect the happiness of any person adopting such a maxim, therefore such a maxim is not
permissible. Such an interpretation flies in the face of the point Kant stresses at multiple
times throughout the Groundwork: that material ends, such as happiness, are contingent
and cannot be the basis of morality. Kant stresses that moral actions derived “from duty”
are “entirely different” than acting on principles based on “anxiety about detrimental
results20.” In Kant’s own terms the UL should provide a contradiction in will. If the UL can be
determined a priori, yet it’s application requires placing value on a contingent end, the
agent’s welfare, it cannot be ethically useful.

Herman provides an interpretation that prevents such an issue. She argues first that the
majority of ends can rationally be given up, for example it is possible for a rational agent to

18
Kant (2002). 4:423

19
Sedgwick, Sally S. Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals : An Introduction. Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical
Texts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. p. 120

20
Kant (2002). 4:402

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PPR202 Essay 1 33692602

give up the end of increasing their personal fame. However, there are certain ends that “are
necessary to sustain oneself as a rational being” that cannot be given up21. Kant describes
these as “true needs,” they are necessary as they grant us the “power to set an end” which
is the “characteristic of humanity22.” By willing any end “one has already willed the
continued exercise of one's agency as a rational being23.” For Herman it is impossible to
guarantee that these ‘true needs,’ the ability to set an end, can be realised without the help
of other agents. Therefore, it would be irrational, a contradiction of will (not prudence), to
universalise a maxim of non-beneficence. Expressed formally the argument is as follows:

P1: It is contradiction in will (hence immoral) for an agent to universalise a maxim

that may contradict their ability to form ends (their ‘true needs’).

P2: We cannot guarantee the ability to form ends without the beneficence of others.

C: It is a contradiction in will (hence immoral) to adopt the maxim of non-

beneficence.

Premise two requires more explanation. Herman shows that it is a “a fact of our nature that
we need things and skills to pursue our ends” by asking us to imagine a life independent of
objects to be used as means. It would also be irrational to “freeze” our skills as we cannot
guarantee an “ease of life” in which all ends we possibly desire require skill to achieve. In
the same way we cannot guarantee that any end we choose to formulate will not require
the assistance of others. Thus universalising the maxim of non-beneficence “conflicts with
the practical consequences of the conditions of human rationality24.”

21
Herman, Barbara. "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons." Ethics 94, no. 4 (1984): 577-602.
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lancs.ac.uk/stable/2380319. p. 586

22
Kant, Immanuel. Doctrine of Virtue, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 53

23
Herman. "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons. (1984) p. 586

24
Herman. "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons. (1984) p. 587

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PPR202 Essay 1 33692602

This interpretation is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, why did Kant not makes this
interpretation clearer? This point in the Groundwork is Kant’s first introduction to the
action guiding ability of the UL, however the argument seems to be portrayed prudential.
This problem is not damning; it has been suggested that Kant’s main purpose at this point
was to distinguished between duties rather than fully explain their derivation. Furthermore,
Kant was writing under time constraints. It is possible that in this case he made a mistake,
especially as it this prudential explanation of the UL is in stark contrast to the purpose of the
UL. We can accept Herman’s case as it fits with Kantian aims in general, the contrast in
interpretation does not prevent the ethical usefulness of the categorical imperative.

Secondly, this interpretation can be accused of limiting the practical and pragmatic use of
the UL to guide our actions. For Kant examining the permissibility of our actions requires,
formulating a maxim, then imagining a world whereby the max is universalised, then the
spotting of any contradiction. This process is time consuming and unwieldy, especially as
certain moral decisions must be made quickly. Adding further abstraction, the requirement
to spot if furthering a maxim contradicts our ‘true needs,’ inhibits this process even further.

Once again this issue is easily cast aside. We could argue the morality isn’t supposed to be
easy, it takes effort and reasoning to understand. More pertinently the UL can be used to
generate general duties or laws. It might take a significant amount of reasoning and
cognition to generate such duties, but once they are made they can be acted upon with
relevant ease.

The third critique of this interpretation is more theoretical in nature. The Categorical
Imperative must apply to all rational beings, however, Herman’s interpretation relies on an
empirical fact about humans. It is a contingent fact that humans may need the assistance of
others in order to form ends, however we can conceive of rational being that is not
constrained in such a manner. There could be supremely rational beings, unencumbered by
the practical concerns of humanity (Herman uses the term angels) for whom the duty of
beneficence was not necessary. If the Categorical Imperatives purpose is to produce duties

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applicable to all rational beings, an inconsistency becomes apparent. The Categorical

Imperative produces one sort of duty for human’s and others for perfectly rational agents.

Herman’s response is acceptable. She claims that “All rational beings are subject to the
same fundamental practical principle-the Categorical Imperative.” However “Not all rational
beings will have the same duties25.” All rational beings are bound by the categorical
imperative, yet it is possible that the different duties will be derived different entities,
dependant on their nature. This does not mean that humans who would never require any
help are able to escape the duty of beneficence. The ability of humans to not require help in
achieving ends is contingent, it requires empirical things such as skills or wealth. However,
for supreme rational beings, it is not a contingent fact about them (there is no appeal to
strength, wealth, etc.) that leads them not to need help, it is a matter of their nature 26.

In this essay we have explained the argument Kant uses to produce the UL, the steps leading
to the ‘necessity of a universal law’ and how it’s mere concept produces the categorical
imperative. We have explained and illustrated how the UL can evaluate actions and
examined the difficulties surrounding a ‘prudential’ interpretation of the duty of
beneficence. A solution was found by Herman, showing that the adoption of a non-
beneficence maxim is impermissible as the duty of beneficence is necessary for our ability to
form rational ends.

25
Herman. "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons. (1984) p. 590

26
Herman. "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons. (1984) p. 591

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Bibliography
1. Herman, Barbara. "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons." Ethics 94, no. 4 (1984): 577-
602. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lancs.ac.uk/stable/2380319.
2. KANT, IMMANUEL et al. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Edited by Allen
W. Wood and Allen W. Wood, Yale University Press, 2002,
www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1njjwt.7
3. Kant, Immanuel. Doctrine of Virtue, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1964),
4. Kitcher, Patricia. "Kant's Argument For The Categorical Imperative". Nous 38.4
(2004): 555-584. Web.
5. O’Neill, Onora. Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics. 2nd ed. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013.
6. Sedgwick, Sally S. Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals : An Introduction.
Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008

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