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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

Abstract

The study deals with the developmental approach in congruence to the cognitive developmental
processes and executive functioning of the age bracket 4,5 and 6. The study consists Stroop task
performance, digit span and vignettes hypothetical moral situations. The study is conducted on
cross sectional approach of the specified age groups and a convenience sampling data collection
was chosen. The result scores were analyzed from a statistical point of view taking out Anova (f-
ratio) of the lying behavior pattern of the children and the executive functioning. According to
the statistician outcome an interpretation was held of the retention or rejecting of the hypotheses
of the study which includes in two null hypothesis and two alternative hypotheses in relation to
the variables of the study (lying behavior and executive functioning) and a correlation was found
between the two.
Moral Development
According to the cognitive‐developmental perspective, cognitive maturity and social experience
lead to advances in moral understanding, from a superficial orientation to physical power and
external consequences toward a more profound appreciation of interpersonal relationships,
societal institutions, and law-making systems (Carpendale, 2009; Gibbs, 1995, 2010). As their
grasp of social cooperation expands, children’s ideas about what ought to be done when the
needs and desires of people conflict also change, toward increasingly just, fair, and balanced
solutions to moral problems.
Piaget’s Theory of Moral Development
Piaget’s (1932/1965) early work on children’s moral judgments originally inspired the
cognitive‐developmental perspective. Using clinical interviews, Piaget questioned 5‐ to 13‐ year‐
old Swiss children about their understanding of rules in the game of marbles. He also told
children stories in which characters’ intentions to engage in right or wrong action differed from
the consequences of their behavior. In the best known of these stories, children were asked which
of two boys is naughtier, and why—well‐intentioned John, who accidentally breaks 15 cups
while on his way to dinner, or ill‐intentioned Henry, who breaks a single cup while stealing some
jam. From children’s responses, Piaget identified two broad stages of moral understanding.
Heteronomous Morality (about 5 to 8 Years): - Heteronomous means under the authority of
another. As the term heteronomous morality suggests, children in this first stage view rules as
handed down by authorities (God, parents, and teachers), as having a permanent existence, as
unchangeable, and as requiring strict obedience. For example, younger children state that the
rules of the game of marbles cannot be changed, explaining that “God didn’t teach [the new
rules],” “you couldn’t play any other way,” or “it would be cheating. . .. According to Piaget, two
factors limit children’s moral understanding: (1) cognitive immaturity, especially a limited
capacity to imagine other perspectives and realism —the tendency to view mental phenomena,
including rules, as fixed external features of reality; and (2) the power of adults to insist that
children comply, which promotes unquestioning respect for rules and those who enforce them.
Together, egocentrism, realism, and adult power result in superficial moral understandings.
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

Younger children think that all people view rules in the same way and that rules are absolutes
rather than cooperative principles that can be modified at will. In judging an act’s wrongness,
they focus on impressive consequences rather than on intent to do harm. For example, in the
story about John and Henry mentioned earlier, they regard John as naughtier, despite his
innocent intentions, because he broke many more cups.
Morality of Cooperation (about 9 to 10 Years and Older): - Cognitive development, gradual
release from adult control, and peer interaction lead children to make the transition to the second
stage, morality of cooperation, in which they no longer view rules as fixed but see them as
flexible, socially agreed‐on principles that can be revised to suit the will of the majority. Piaget
regarded peer disagreements as especially facilitating. Through them, children realize that
people’s perspectives on moral action can differ and that intentions, not concrete consequences,
should serve as the basis for judging behavior.
Furthermore, as children interact as equals with peers, they learn to settle conflicts in mutually
beneficial ways. Gradually, they start to use a standard of fairness called reciprocity, in which
they express the same concern for the welfare of others as they do for themselves. Piaget found
that children start with a crude, tit‐for‐tat understanding of reciprocity: “You scratch my back,
and I’ll scratch yours.” This defines the beginning of the morality of cooperation. Older children
and adolescents move beyond this payback morality to a grasp of the importance of mutuality of
expectations, called ideal reciprocity —the idea expressed in the Golden Rule: “Do unto others
as you would have them do unto you.” Ideal reciprocity helps young people realize that rules can
be reinterpreted and revised to take individual motives and circumstances into account, thereby
ensuring just outcomes for all.
Evaluation of Piaget’s Theory
Follow‐up research indicates that Piaget’s theory accurately describes the general direction of
change in moral judgment. With age, outer features, such as physical damage or getting
punished, give way to subtler considerations, such as the actor’s intentions or the needs and
desires of others. Also, much evidence confirms Piaget’s conclusion that moral understanding is
supported by cognitive maturity, gradual release from adult control, and peer interaction—
findings we will consider when we turn to extensions of Piaget’s work by Lawrence Kohlberg
and his followers. Nevertheless, several aspects of Piaget’s theory have been questioned because
they underestimate the moral capacities of young children.
Intentions and Moral Judgments: - Because bad intentions are paired with little damage and
good intentions with a great deal of damage, Piaget’s method yields a conservative picture of
young children’s ability to appreciate intentions. When questioned about moral issues in a way
that makes a person’s intention as obvious as the harm done, preschool and early school‐age
children are capable of judging ill‐intentioned people as naughtier and more deserving of
punishment than well‐intentioned ones (Helwig, Zelazo, & Wilson, 2001; Jones & Thomson,
2001). As further evidence, by age 4, children clearly recognize the difference between two
morally relevant intentional behaviors: truthfulness and lying. They approve of telling the truth
and disapprove of lying, even when a lie remains undetected (Bussey, 1992). And by age 7 to
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

8—earlier than suggested by Piaget’s findings—children integrate their judgments of lying and
truth telling with prosocial and antisocial intentions. They evaluate very negatively certain types
of truthfulness—for example, blunt statements, particularly when made in public contexts where
they are especially likely to have negative social consequences (telling a friend that you don’t
like her drawing) (Bussey, 1999; Ma et al., 2011). Although both Chinese and Canadian
schoolchildren consider lying about antisocial acts “very naughty,” Chinese children—
influenced by collectivist values—more often rate lying favorably when the intention is modesty,
as when a student who has thoughtfully picked up litter from the playground says, “I didn’t do it”
(Lee et al., 1997, 2001). In contrast, Canadian children more often favor lying to support the
individual at the expense of the group (claiming that a friend who is a poor speller is actually a
good speller because he wants to represent the class in a spelling competition) (Fu et al., 2007).
Nevertheless, an advanced understanding of the morality of intentions does await the morality of
cooperation. Younger children are more likely to center, or focus on, salient features and
consequences in their judgments, while neglecting and hence failing to integrate other important
information. For example, preschoolers more often than older children evaluate lies as always
wrong (Peterson, Peterson, & Seeto, 1983). They also judge lies that lead to punishment more
negatively than lies that do not (Bussey, 1992). And preschoolers tend to focus on the here‐and‐
now, ignoring a guilt‐relevant prior event. Shown a series of pictures depicting one child pushing
another off a playground swing and then swinging on it himself, many young children simply
declare the perpetrator to be “happy, he’s swinging on the swing” (Arsenio, Gold, & Adams,
2006).
Furthermore, through the early school years, children generally interpret statements of intention
in a rigid, heteronomous fashion. They believe that once you say you will do something, you are
obligated to follow through, even if uncontrollable circumstances (such as an accident) make it
difficult or impossible to do so. By age 9 or 10, children realize that not keeping your word is
much worse in some situations than in others—namely, when you are able to do so and have
permitted another person to count on your actions (Mant & Perner, 1988). In sum, Piaget was
partly right and partly wrong about this aspect of moral reasoning.
Reasoning About Authority: - Research on young children’s understanding of authority reveals
that they do not regard adults with the unquestioning respect Piaget assumed. Even preschoolers
judge certain acts, such as hitting and stealing, to be wrong regardless of the opinions of
authorities. When asked to explain, 3‐ and 4‐year‐olds express concerns about harming other
people rather than obeying adult dictates (Smetana, 1981, 1985).
By age 4, children have differentiated notions about the legitimacy of authority figures, which
they refine during the school years. In several studies, children in kindergarten through sixth
grade were asked questions designed to assess their view of how broad an adult’s authority
should be. Almost all denied that adults have general authority (Laupa, 1995). For example, they
rejected a principal’s right to set rules and issue directives in settings other than his own school.
With respect to nonmoral concerns, such as the rules of a game, children usually base the
legitimacy of authority on a person’s knowledge, not on social position. And when a directive is
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

fair and caring (for example, telling children to stop fighting or to share candy), children view it
as right, regardless of who states it—a principal, a teacher, a class president, or another child.
Even among Korean children, whose culture places a high value on respect for and deference to
adults, 7‐ to 11‐year‐olds evaluate negatively a teacher’s or principal’s order to keep fighting, to
steal, or to refuse to share—a response that strengthens with age (Kim, 1998; Kim & Turiel,
1996).
As these findings reveal, adult status is not required for preschool and school‐age children to
view someone as an authority. Knowledgeable peers or those who act to protect others’ rights are
regarded as just as legitimate. But in reasoning about authority, preschool and young elementary
school children do tend to place greater weight than older children on power, status, and
consequences for disobedience.
Stagewise Progression: - Many children display both heteronomous and cooperative moral
reasoning, raising doubts about whether each Piagetian stage represents a general, unifying
organization of moral judgment responses. But to be fair, Piaget (1932/1965) also observed this
mixture in children and, therefore, regarded the two moralities as fluid, overlapping phases rather
than tightly knit stages. Finally, moral development is currently viewed as a more extended
process than Piaget believed. Kohlberg’s six‐stage sequence, to which we turn next, identifies
three stages beyond the first appearance of the morality of cooperation. Nevertheless, Kohlberg’s
theory is a continuation of the research begun by Piaget.
Influences on Moral Reasoning
Many factors affect maturity of moral reasoning, including the young person’s personality and a
wide range of social experiences—child‐rearing practices, peer interaction, schooling, and
aspects of culture. Growing evidence suggests that, as Kohlberg believed, these experiences
work in two ways: They encourage young people to take the perspective of others, and they
present cognitive challenges, which stimulate young people to think about moral problems in
more complex ways.
Personality: - A flexible, open‐minded approach to new information and experiences is linked to
gains in moral reasoning, just as it is to identity development (Hart et al., 1998; Matsuba &
Walker, 1998). Because open‐minded young people are more socially skilled, they have more
opportunities for social participation. A richer social life enhances exposure to others’
perspectives, and open‐mindedness helps adolescents derive moral insights from that exposure.
In contrast, adolescents who have difficulty adapting to new experiences are less likely to be
interested in others’ moral ideas and justifications.
Child‐Rearing Practices: - Child‐rearing practices associated with mature moral reasoning
combine warmth, exchange of ideas, and appropriate demands for maturity. Children and
adolescents who gain most in moral understanding have parents who engage in moral
discussions, encourage prosocial behavior, insist that others be treated respectfully and fairly,
and create a supportive atmosphere by listening sensitively, asking clarifying questions, and
presenting higher‐level reasoning (Carlo et al., 2011; Pratt, Skoe, & Arnold, 2004; Wyatt &
Carlo, 2002). In one study, 11‐year‐olds were asked what they thought an adult would say to
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justify a moral rule, such as not lying, stealing, or breaking a promise. Those with warm,
demanding, communicative parents were far more likely than their agemates to point to the
importance of ideal reciprocity: “I trusted you,” “You wouldn’t like it if I did it to you” (Leman,
2005). In contrast, when parents lecture, use threats, or make sarcastic remarks, children show
little or no change in moral reasoning over time (Walker & Taylor, 1991a). In sum, parents who
facilitate moral understanding are affectionate, verbal, and rational and promote a cooperative
style of family life. Notice that these are the very characteristics, discussed earlier in this chapter,
that foster moral internalization in young children.
Schooling: - For the most part, moral reasoning advances in late adolescence and early adulthood
only as long as a person remains in school (Dawson et al., 2003; Gibbs et al., 2007). Higher
education introduces young people to social issues that extend beyond personal relationships to
entire political and cultural groups. Consistent with this idea, college students who report more
perspective‐taking opportunities (for example, classes that emphasize open discussion of
opinions, friendships with others of different cultural backgrounds) and who indicate that they
have become more aware of social diversity tend to be advanced in moral reasoning (Comunian
& Gielen, 2006; Mason & Gibbs, 1993a, 1993b).
Peer Interaction: - Research supports Piaget’s belief that interaction among peers who pre sent
differing viewpoints promotes moral understanding. When young people negotiate and
compromise, they realize that social life can be based on cooperation between equals rather than
on authority relations (Killen & Nucci, 1995). Adolescents who report more close friendships
and who more often participate in conversations with their friends are advanced in moral
reasoning (Schonert‐Reichl, 1999). The mutuality and intimacy of friendship, which foster
decisions based on consensual agreement, may be particularly important for moral development.
Peer discussions and role‐playing of moral problems have provided the basis for interventions
aimed at improving high school and college students’ moral understanding. For these
interventions to be effective, young people must be highly engaged—confronting, critiquing, and
attempting to clarify one another’s viewpoints (Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983; Comunian & Gielen,
2006). And because moral development occurs gradually, many peer interaction sessions over
weeks or months typically are needed to produce moral change.
Culture: - Individuals in industrialized nations move through Kohlberg’s stages more rapidly and
advance to a higher level than individuals in village societies, who rarely move beyond Stage 3.
One explanation of these cultural differences is that in village societies, moral cooperation is
based on direct relations between people and does not allow for the development of advanced
moral understanding (Stages 4 to 6), which depends on appreciating the role of larger social
structures, such as laws and government institutions, in resolving moral conflict (Gibbs et al.,
2007).
In support of this view, in cultures where young people participate in the institutions of their
society at early ages, moral reasoning is advanced. For example, on kibbutzim, small but
technologically complex agricultural settlements in Israel, children receive training in the
governance of their community in middle childhood. By third grade, they mention more
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

concerns about societal laws and rules when discussing moral conflicts than do Israeli city‐
reared or U.S. children (Fuchs et al., 1986). During adolescence and adulthood, a greater
percentage of kibbutz than American individuals reach Kohlberg’s Stages 4 and 5 (Snarey,
Reimer, & Kohlberg, 1985).
A second possible reason for cultural variation is that responses to moral dilemmas in
collectivist cultures (including village societies) are often more other‐directed than in Western
Europe and North America (Miller, 2007). In both village and industrialized societies that highly
value inter dependency, statements portraying the individual as vitally connected to the social
group are common. In one study, both male and female Japanese adolescents, who almost always
integrate care‐ and justice‐based reasoning, placed greater weight on caring, which they regarded
as a communal responsibility. As one boy remarked, yasashii (kindness/gentleness) and omoiyari
(empathy) are “something ‘normal’ that everyone shows” (Shimizu, 2001). Similarly, in research
conducted in India, even highly educated people (expected to have attained Kohlberg’s Stages 4
and 5) viewed solutions to moral dilemmas as the responsibility of the entire society, not of a
single person (Miller & Bersoff, 1995).
Further Challenges to Kohlberg’s Theory
Although much support exists for Kohlberg’s theory, it continues to face challenges. The most
important of these concern Kohlberg’s conception of moral maturity, the applicability of his
stage model to moral reasoning and behavior in everyday life, and the appropriateness of his
stages for characterizing children’s moral reasoning.
A key controversy has to do with Kohlberg’s belief that moral maturity is not achieved until the
postconventional level. Yet if people had to reach Stages 5 and 6 to be truly morally mature, few
individuals anywhere would measure up! John Gibbs (1991, 2010) argues that “postconventional
morality” should not be viewed as the standard of maturity against which other levels are judged.
Gibbs finds maturity in a revised understanding of Stages 3 and 4 that emphasizes ideal
reciprocity. These stages are not “conventional,” or based on social conformity, as Kohlberg
assumed. Instead, they require profound moral constructions—an understanding of ideal
reciprocity as the basis for relationships between people (Stage 3) and for widely accepted moral
standards, set forth in rules and laws (Stage 4).
According to Gibbs (2010), “postconventional” moral reasoning is part of a highly reflective,
metacognitive endeavor in which people grapple with existential issues: What is the meaning of
life? Why be moral? Most people who contemplate such questions have attained advanced
education, usually in philosophy—which sheds light on why Stages 5 and 6 are so rare.
Occasionally, however, as a result of soul‐searching life crises, life‐threatening events, or
spiritual awakenings, adolescents and adults without formal training in philosophy generate
ethical insights into the meaning of existence—transformations that may heighten their resolve to
lead a moral life. As a result, Gibbs notes, “postconventional” moral judgment is sometimes seen
as early as adolescence, when young people first become capable of the formal operational and
perspective‐taking capacities needed to engage in it.
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A more radical challenge comes from Dennis Krebs and Kathy Denton (2005), who claim that
Kohlberg’s theory inadequately accounts for morality in everyday life. Pointing to wide
variability in maturity of moral reasoning across situations, these researchers favor abandoning
Kohlberg’s stages for a pragmatic approach to morality. They assert that each person makes
moral judgments at varying levels of maturity, depending on the individual’s current context and
motivations: Conflict over a business deal is likely to evoke Stage 2 (instrumental purpose)
reasoning, a friendship or marital dispute Stage 3 (ideal reciprocity) reasoning, and a breach of
contract Stage 4 (social‐order‐maintaining) reasoning (Krebs et al., 1991). According to Krebs
and Denton, everyday moral judgments—rather than being efforts to arrive at just solutions—are
practical tools that people use to achieve their goals. To benefit personally, they often must
advocate cooperation with others. But many people act first and then invoke moral judgments to
rationalize their actions, regardless of whether the behavior is self‐centered or altruistic (Haidt,
2001; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). And sometimes people use moral judgments for immoral
purposes—for example, to excuse their transgressions, blame others, or attract unmerited
admiration. This pragmatism of moral reasoning, Krebs and Denton argue, is responsible for the
lack of a strong association between moral judgment maturity and behavior.
Finally, Kohlberg’s stages tell us much more about moral understanding in adolescence and
adulthood than in early and middle childhood. Nancy Eisenberg created dilemmas relevant to
children’s everyday lives that pit satisfying one’s own desires against acting prosocial—for
example, going to a birthday party versus taking time to help an injured peer and missing the
party as a result (Eisenberg, 1986; Eisenberg et al., 1991, 1995). She found that children’s
prosocial moral reasoning is more advanced than Kohlberg’s stages suggest. Furthermore,
empathic perspective taking strengthens prosocial moral thought and its realization in everyday
behavior (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006; Eisenberg, Zhoe, & Koller, 2001).
In sum, because Kohlberg focused on young children’s tendency to center on prominent external
features in their social world, he underestimated their potential for deeper moral understanding.
In the following sections, we consider additional evidence on both child and adolescent moral
reasoning.
Introduction
There is no universally accepted definition of lying to others. The dictionary definition of lying
is “to make a false statement with the intention to deceive” (OED 1989) but there are numerous
problems with this definition. It is both too narrow, since it requires falsity, and too broad, since
it allows for lying about something other than what is being stated, and lying to someone who is
believed to be listening in but who is not being addressed.
The most widely accepted definition of lying is the following: “A lie is a statement made by one
who does not believe it with the intention that someone else shall be led to believe it” (Isenberg
1973, 248).

A lie is an assertion that is believed to be false, typically used with the purpose of a lie is an
assertion that is believed to be false, typically used with the purpose of deceiving someone. The
practice of communicating lies is called lying. A person who communicates a lie may be termed
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a liar. Lies may serve a variety of instrumental, interpersonal, or psychological functions for the
individuals who use them.

Generally, the term "lie" carries a negative connotation, and depending on the context a person
who communicates a lie may be subject to social, legal, religious, or criminal sanctions.

Although people in many cultures believe that deception can be detected by observing nonverbal
behaviors (e.g., not making eye contact, fidgeting, stuttering) research indicates that people
overestimate both the significance of such cues and their ability to make accurate judgements
about deception. More generally, people's ability to make true judgments is affected by biases
towards accepting incoming information and interpreting feelings as evidence of truth. People
don't always check incoming assertions against their memory someone. The practice of
communicating lies is called lying. A person who communicates a lie may be termed a liar. Lies
may serve a variety of instrumental, interpersonal, or psychological functions for the individuals
who use them.
• Lying behavior
The psychology of lying can be a complicated concept because people lie for different reasons.
What induces a person to not tell the truth explains the causes for our lying behavior. While
some people lie in an attempt to avoid punishment or to avoid hurting someone else's feelings,
others lie out of impulse or because they want to present themselves as someone they are not.
Motive for lying varies throughout our lifespan period also. During childhood children usually
lies for pleasure and to escape from the punishments of parents or other authoritarian figures. As
we get older lying is found to have a survival value. That is, we lie to protect ourselves from the
perceived threat to our existence or wellbeing. In order to ensure our safety, we lie and hide the
truth.
Motives or the reasons for lying behavior can be explained based on various concepts and
theoretical foundations contributed by eminent theorists of psychology. There are many
explanations for why people lie. Lying can be explained based on the psychoanalytic explanation
of Sigmund Freud as the interplay of id, ego and super-ego. Ego is that level of mind which
works according to the reality principle. Sometimes we are forced by our id to stay away from
the reality since the reality evokes anxiety within us. We are afraid to face the reality and hence
we hide the truth and we lie. When the ego cannot cope with some distressing stimuli it finds an
alternative by making justifications through lying. Super-ego the moral arm of our personality
may also have role in this. Super-ego wants us to be perfect in any sense. So, in order to save us
from imperfection we lie to make ourselves perfect in the eyes of others and in our own eyes too.
That is, a kind of defense mechanism is working through, in deciding what to lie and how to lie.
Lying can hide or alleviate conflicts or stresses that give rise to anxiety. Sometimes we are
denying the truth from coming to our conscious mind or sometimes we are creating justifications
for our undesirable or unacceptable behavior by making use of untruth statements.
From a behavioristic point of view, it can be said that lying behavior patterns are acquired
through learning like learning other simple and complex behavioral responses. Once the lying
behavior of an individual is reinforced by favorable consequences, the behavior pattern gets
repeated and becomes a part of behavioral repertoire. They repeat the same when they are in
need of the same consequences.
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Lying can also be explained based on the Maslow’s hierarchy of need. According to his theory
we have an innate tendency to move towards achieving our needs one after the other. In order to
achieve these levels and to prevent the obstacles from coming way to our need satisfaction we
make statements which may be not true. When we feel that we need to tell a lie to get our food
we lie. When we are satisfied with our food, our need goes further for need for belongingness.
And if there arises any kind of hindrance of its satisfaction, we make statements which facilitate
our need satisfaction disregarding of whether it is true or false. Liars can also seem to possess
high narcissistic traits. That is, we all lies for our personal causes. So, because of our excessive
love for ourselves and to save ourselves from anxiety we lie.
• Measures of lies in children
Lying is a common social phenomenon. It occurs regularly in various social contexts for a
multitude of purposes. For children, there are two types of lies that are of great importance
during their socialization. One type is the lies that violate moral rules as they are typically told to
benefit oneself at the expense of others. Due to the anti-social nature of this type of lie, it is
universally discouraged by children's caregivers and teachers from a very early age. The other
type of lies are lies that are told with an intention to help, not harm, another individual (e.g.,
faking liking an undesirable gift in front of a gift-giver) and are thus prosocial in nature.
Although philosophers and theologians have long debated about whether prosocial lies should be
morally sanctioned (Bok, 1978), in everyday practice, such lies are told frequently (DePaulo &
Bell, 1996; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998), and often entail positive values (Nyberg, 1993). Some
theorists such as Sweetser (1987) have even suggested that in some situations prosocial lies are
not only socially acceptable but also are not lies at all.

There has been extensive research on the development of lying which dates back to the
beginning of developmental psychology (e.g., Binet, 1896; Darwin, 1877; Piaget, 1932). This
longstanding interest in this topic is due to the fact that lying can serve as a window into many
aspects of children's developing minds, for example, intelligence (Binet, 1896; Lewis, 1993),
theory of mind (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Leekam, 1993; Peskin,1992; Peterson,
1995; Peterson, Peterson, & Seeto, 1983; Polak & Harris, 1999; Sodian, 1991, Talwar, Gordon,
& Lee, 2007), moral understanding (Piaget, 1932), personality and character formation
(Hartshorne & May, 1928), and children's competence as witnesses in the courts of law
(Goodman et al., 2006; Lyon, 2000; Strichartz & Burton, 1990; Talwar, Lee, Bala & Lindsay,
2002, 2004; for a review, see Lee, 2000).

Research on Prosocial Lying

In contrast to the extensive literature on antisocial lying, there is very limited research on the
development of lie-telling for politeness purposes. Research on this issue should offer a unique
perspective for understanding social development in children due to the multi-faceted nature of
prosocial lie-telling. More specifically, to take an appropriate action in a politeness situation, one
must assess, and reason about, both moral and social conventional rules regarding interpersonal
interaction. Turiel and his colleagues (Helwig & Turiel, 2002; Nucci & Turiel, 2000; Smetana &
Turiel, 2003; Turiel, 2002) have found that moral and social conventional rules are distinctive
domains in the realm of social life and social thought. Moral rules are concerned with what is
right and what is wrong as well as regulating how individuals ought to behave toward each other
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based on the principles of welfare and justice. In contrast, social conventional rules are
concerned with uniformities that define social expectations regarding appropriate behaviors
within a specific society and serve functions of social coordination. Typically, these rules deal
with individuals' social thoughts and actions in their respective domains. For example, moral
rules prohibit killing of another human being, whereas social conventional rules may require one
to dress properly at a formal social gathering.

Politeness, however, cuts across both domains. In the politeness situation, one must assess, and
reason about, the applicability of various moral and social conventional rules in order to take a
morally and socially appropriate action. More significantly, the politeness situation brings to the
fore the inherent contradictions in the rule system in either the moral or social conventional
domains respectively. In the moral domain, the concern for others' wellbeing and the need to
avoid harm should motivate one to tell a prosocial lie (e.g., “I really like your gift” or “You look
great in that dress”) rather than telling the blunt truth (e.g., “I do not like your gift” or “you look
fat in that dress”). However, lying, or making a false statement with an intent to deceive, has
long been considered to be a serious moral transgression by philosophers and theologians such as
St. Augustine (1952), Kant (1949), and Bok (1978) because lying impinges on the lie-recipient's
right to information and freedom of choice (Grice, 1980; Krupfer, 1982). Children have also
been socialized to take this view of lying from very early on in life (Cameron et al.,
2001; Wilson et al., 2003).

The existing evidence suggests that many adults have little difficulty in resolving the conflicts
evoked by the politeness situation. Typically, they allow that the need to be polite and to avoid
hurting others overrides the need to be truthful. For this reason, adults not only endorse prosocial
lies (Lee & Ross, 1997) but tell them regularly (DePaulo & Bell, 1996; DePaulo & Kashy,
1998). In contrast, for children, the politeness situation poses a challenge to children who are still
in the process of acquiring moral and social-conventional rules of their society. Resolving
conflicts between these rules’ places additional demands on them. While the politeness situation
may be a challenge for developing children, it offers a naturalistic opportunity for developmental
researchers to understand whether children are capable of making strategic trade-offs when
facing social situations where rules are in conflict as well as how they select and apply rules
adaptively in different social situations.

To date, there are only three studies that have examined children's actual behavior in a
politeness situation. Talwar and Lee (2002b) used a Reverse Rouge task in which the
experimenter had a conspicuous mark of lipstick on the nose. The child was asked to take a
picture of the experimenter, but before the picture was taken, the experimenter asked, “Do I look
okay for the picture?” Results showed that 89% of children between 3 and 7 years of age stated
that the experimenter looked okay. However, when the experimenter left, children told another
adult that the experimenter actually did not look okay. Thus, the researchers concluded that
young children can tell prosocial lies in a politeness situation. However, because children were
not probed about why they told such a lie, it is unclear whether the children in the study
considered the contradictory rules evoked by the situation when deciding to lie. Further, among
the children who lied, it was unclear as to whether they told lies to spare the feelings of the
experimenter (a prosocial lie) or to avoid potential negative consequences if the truth was told (a
self-protective lie).
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

In another study (Fu & Lee, 2007), Chinese children between the ages of 3 and 6 years were
asked to rate pictures that were poorly drawn by confederates. Most children, except for the
youngest ones, gave the drawings more positive ratings in front of the confederates than when
the confederates were absent. Thus, like Western children, Chinese preschoolers appeared also to
refrain from telling the blunt truth to others (i.e., the pictures were poorly drawn). However,
because the children were not probed about their motivation for inflating their ratings, it is not
clear whether they did so for the benefit of the confederate (e.g., sparing the feelings of the
confederate) or for themselves (e.g., avoiding negative consequences if the truth was told).

In the third study, Talwar, Murphy, and Lee (2007) used a disappointing gift paradigm to
examine children's prosocial lie-telling. Children played a game where they were promised a gift
from a gift basket that contained a range of different toys and gifts. After the task, children
received an undesirable gift of soap instead of a toy and were questioned by the gift-giver about
whether they liked the gift. In this situation, children had to reconcile their desire for a better gift
with the competing social and moral requirement to be polite. When asked if they liked the gift,
the majority of children told the gift-giver untruthfully that they liked the disappointing gift,
despite having told their parents that they did not like the gift. School-aged children were more
likely to lie than were preschool children. However, this study also did not systematically probe
children's justifications for their lies. Thus, it is again not clear whether some children were more
motivated to lie for self-protection (e.g., avoiding negative responses from the gift-giver if the
truth was told) or to be polite and protect the gift-giver's feelings.

In contrast with the paucity of research on children's actual prosocial lie-telling behaviors, there
is some, albeit limited, research on children's conceptual understanding of prosocial lies. With
regard to children's concept of prosocial lies, Lee and Ross (1997) found that adolescents
between 12 and 14 years of age and college students were less inclined to classify untruthful
statements as lies when told with the intent to help another individual than when told to harm.
Their results confirmed Sweetser's (1987) theoretical contention that untruthful statements
deliberately told to help another individual and to be polite may not be considered lies. In
contrast, Bussey (1999) reported that most children between the ages of 4 and 11 years classify
all types of untruthful statements as lies regardless of their anti- or pro-social nature. This finding
suggests a possible developmental change in terms of the concept of prosocial lies during
adolescence.

With regard to moral judgments, Bussey (1999) found that children during preschool and
elementary school years tended to give negative ratings to prosocial lies. Nevertheless, beginning
from 4 years of age, their ratings of prosocial lies were not as negative as those given to trickery
or antisocial lies. Broomfield, Robinson, and Robinson (2002) further found that children
between 4 and 9 years of age would suggest that a story character should tell a lie about liking an
unwanted gift to make the giver believe the gift was liked. The children also judged that the gift-
giver would be happy when hearing the lie. The results of Broomfield et al. (2002) were
replicated in China (Zeng, 2004). However, Walper and Valtin (1992) found that children only
began to give prosocial lies positive evaluations at the end of the elementary school years. These
findings taken together suggest that children's conceptual understanding of prosocial lies begins
in preschool years and develops throughout the childhood. They appear to be able to consider the
contradictory rules evoked by the politeness situation when evaluating prosocial lies, but only in
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

late childhood do children appear to let the need to be polite and avoid hurting another's feelings
override the need to be truthful. It should be noted that this conclusion is tentative because the
above studies did not probe children about the underlying rationales for their evaluations.

No studies have examined the relationship between children's conceptions of prosocial lie-
telling and their actual lying behavior. Research on the general relationship between children's
social and moral conceptions and their actual behaviors is of significant importance because the
ultimate purpose of socialization is to ensure that children not only know morally what is right or
wrong and conventionally what is appropriate or inappropriate, but also that they act
accordingly. Existing studies with children and adults concerning Kohlbergian moral dilemmas
as well as antisocial lying have shown either weak or no linkages between individuals' moral
knowledge and moral action (Lying is a common social phenomenon. It occurs regularly in
various social contexts for a multitude of purposes. For children, there are two types of lies that
are of great importance during their socialization. One type is the lies that violate moral rules as
they are typically told to benefit oneself at the expense of others. Due to the anti-social nature of
this type of lie, it is universally discouraged by children's caregivers and teachers from a very
early age. The other type of lies are lies that are told with an intention to help, not harm, another
individual (e.g., faking liking an undesirable gift in front of a gift-giver) and are thus prosocial in
nature. Although philosophers and theologians have long debated about whether prosocial lies
should be morally sanctioned (Bok, 1978), in everyday practice, such lies are told frequently
(DePaulo & Bell, 1996; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998), and often entail positive values (Nyberg,
1993). Some theorists such as Sweetser (1987) have even suggested that in some situations
prosocial lies are not only socially acceptable but also are not lies at all.

Research on Antisocial Lying

To date, most studies have focused on the development of antisocial lies and can be divided into
two major streams. One stream investigates children's conceptions and moral judgments of
antisocial lies. Extensive research has revealed that children from very early on are taught
explicitly or implicitly about the negative moral implications associated with antisocial lies.
They are also strongly discouraged from telling this type of lie (Cameron, Chen, & Lee,
2001; Wilson, Smith, & Ross, 2003). Perhaps for this reason, the conceptual understanding of
antisocial type of lies emerges as early as 3 years of age (Siegal & Peterson, 1998; Talwar et al.,
2002). With regard to children's moral judgments of lying, evidence shows that even
preschoolers understand that antisocial lies entail negative moral implications (Bussey,
1992, 1999; Talwar et al., 2002).

The other stream of research, pioneered by Binet (1896), Darwin (1877), and Hartshorne and
May (1928), examines children's lying behavior for trickery, personal protection, or benefit
(Chandler et al., 1989; Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989; Peskin, 1992; Polak & Harris,
1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002a). It has been found that even preschoolers tell lies with intent to
deceive (Chandler et al., 1989; Peskin, 1992). Young child lie-tellers are generally skilled in
masking their nonverbal behaviors (e.g., making eye contact while lying: Lewis et al.,
1989; Talwar & Lee, 2002a), but poor at concealing their deception in their verbal statements
(e.g., blurting out the name of a toy that they claimed not to have peaked at: Polak & Harris,
1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002a; Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007; Talwar & Lee, 2008).
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

Multiple theories have provided a variety of explanations as to why individuals fail to act
according to their conceptual knowledge about moral or social rules (Arsenio & Lemerise,
2004; Crick & Dodge, 1994; Huesmann, 1998; Rest, 1986; Walker, 2002), including situations
involving aggression (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Huesmann, 1998) or prosocial behaviors (e.g., Rest,
1986). A major factor contributing to this disconnection is the difference in the interpretation of
hypothetical situations used to assess moral and social knowledge and interpretations of actual
situations that call for morally and socially appropriate behavior. This is particularly true for
situations where contradictory moral and social rules may apply. For example, in a politeness
situation, individuals may interpret the need to be polite and to avoid hurting another to be the
primary concern and thus advocate hypothetically that one should tell a prosocial lie in such a
situation. However, when encountering the same situation in reality, they may interpret the
situation to require only for the fulfillment of the need to be truthful and thus tell the truth.
Alternatively, individuals could interpret the hypothetical situation to be concerned with the need
to the truthful but the real-life situation to be concerned with the need to be polite and to avoid
hurting another. In both cases, a disconnection between conceptual knowledge and action results.

Thus, to examine empirically the relation between children's conceptual knowledge about
prosocial lie-telling and their actual lying behavior, two methodological measures must be taken.
First, one must examine children's interpretations of hypothetical politeness stories that are used
to assess their understanding of prosocial lie-telling. Second, one must also obtain children's
interpretations of their own actions in the politeness situation. Such methodological measures
were not taken in the previous studies, which leaves gaps in our knowledge about: (a) the age at
which children begin to understand the politeness situation to be a situation where one needs to
consider the need to be truthful and the need to be polite and avoid hurting another, (b) the age at
which they begin to tell while lies for prosocial reasons, and most importantly, (c) whether
children's conceptual understanding of prosocial lie-telling is related to their actual behaviors in
the politeness situation. The present study was conducted to bridge the gap in the literature and
to address these three important questions.

• Lying and socio cognitive relation

Lying involves a speaker making a false statement with the intention to deceive the recipient
(Bok, 1978; Chrisholm & Feehan, 1977; Coleman & Kay, 1981; Lee, 2000). Lie-telling behavior
in children has received increased attention in recent years by developmental psychologists for
both its theoretical implications in understanding children’s social cognitive development (e.g.,
Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Leekam, 1993; Peskin, 1992; Polak & Harris, 1999; Sodian,
1991) as well as its practical applications in legal, clinical and educational settings (e.g.,
Chagoya & Schkolne, 1986; Goodman et al., 2006; Lyon, 2000; Strichartz & Burton, 1990;
Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986; Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2002, 2004). The majority of existing
research on children and lying has examined children’s understanding and moral evaluation of
lies (e.g., Bussey, 1992, 1999; Lee, Cameron, Xu, Fu, & Board, 1997; Lee, & Ross, 1997; Siegal
& Peterson, 1996, 1998; for a review, see Lee, 2000). These studies have shown that children
show rudimentary conceptual and moral understanding of lying around 3 years of age but take
more than a decade to reach maturity (e.g., being able to consider intention when categorizing a
statement as a lie and evaluate its moral values). Only a limited number of studies have
investigated children’s actual lie-telling behavior, most of which have involved preschool
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

children (e.g., Chandler et al., 1989; Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989; Peskin, 1992; Polak &
Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002a, 2002b; Talwar et al., 2002; 2004; Talwar, Murphy, & Lee,
2007). Overall, these studies have found that lie-telling behavior emerges in the pre-school years
and that young children are able to deceive others early in life.

Children’s Lie-Telling Behavior

The most frequently used method to study lying in children (e.g., Lewis, et al., 1989; Polak &
Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002a; Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007) is the temptation resistance
paradigm pioneered by Sears, Rau, & Alpert (1965). In this paradigm, children are typically told
explicitly by a researcher not to peek at or play with a toy when left alone. Due to children’s
curiosity and difficulty to resist temptation (hence the name of the paradigm), most children tend
to disobey the researcher’s instruction. Upon returning, the researcher asks children whether they
have peaked at or played with the toy. Thus, the temptation resistance paradigm creates a
situation where children who have transgressed by disobeying an adults’ instruction can make a
decision either to lie or to tell the truth about their transgression. The advantage of this paradigm
is that it elicits spontaneous lies from children (i.e., children are not instructed to lie) to conceal a
transgression. More importantly, it mimics the naturalistic conditions in which children tend to
lie (DePaulo & Jordan, 1982; Newton, Reddy & Bull, 2000; Wilson, Smith, & Ross, 2003).
Observational studies (e.g., Newton, et al. 2000; Wilson, et al. 2003) have found that the most
common and earliest lies children tell tend to conceal misdeeds where they have done something
they were not supposed to do. Interestingly, despite the early and common occurrence of these
types of lies, children of all ages and adults view them very negatively. For instance, Bussey
(1992, 1999) found that children as young as 4 years of age rated lies about misdeeds as being
very bad and that the liar would feel guilty for telling such a lie. Furthermore, they rated this type
of lie more negatively than other types of lies and even misdeeds themselves.

In a classic study, Lewis et al., (1989) experimentally investigated 3-year-olds’ deception to

conceal their transgression with the use of a temptation resistance paradigm. Lewis et al., (1989)
found of the 33 children tested, 29 peeked and 38% lied about peeking at the toy. Lewis et al.
(1989) concluded that children as young as 3 years of age are capable of verbally deceiving
others. This result was replicated by Talwar and Lee (2002a) who showed that 36% of 3-year-
olds lied about their peeking. They also found that unlike the 3-year-olds, the majority of the
children between 4 and 7 years of age lied. Polak and Harris (1999) further modified Lewis et
al.’s paradigm. They used a permissive condition where children were allowed to play with a toy
and a prohibition condition where children were instructed not to touch the toy. Similar results
were obtained with the majority of 3- and 5-year-olds lying in the prohibition condition, whereas
all children in the permissive condition admitted to their touching the toy. Thus, Polak and Harris
concluded that children’s denials about their transgression reflected their deliberate attempt to
mislead rather than forgetting. These results, along with the results of related research (Chandler
et al., 1989; Lewis et al., 1989; Peskin, 1992; Talwar & Lee, 2002a), suggest that young children
are able to engage in intentional verbal deceptive acts when given the opportunity.
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

Executive functioning

Some evidence exists that children’s lie-telling behavior also might be related to executive
functioning. Executive functioning has been defined as a set of higher-order psychological
processes involved in goal-oriented behavior under conscious control (Zelazo & Muller, 2002).
Executive functioning encompasses a collection of cognitive skills including self-regulation,
inhibitory control, planning, attentional flexibility, and strategy employment (Welsh, Pennington,
& Groisser, 1991; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997). Executive functioning skills have
been shown to emerge in late infancy and develop during the childhood years (Welsh &
Pennington, 1988; Zelazo & Muller, 2002), a time when researchers have noted increases in lie-
telling skill (e.g., Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002a). In particular, it has been
suggested that inhibitory control and working memory may be directly related to children’s
deception (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998). Inhibitory control is the
ability to suppress interfering thought processes or actions (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002),
and working memory is a system for temporarily holding and processing information in the mind
(Baddeley, 1986). When lying, children have to suppress the reporting of the transgression that
they wish to conceal and represent and utter the false information that differs from reality
(Carlson et al., 1998, 2002). Additionally, to maintain their lies, children must inhibit those
thoughts and statements that are contrary to their lie and that would reveal their transgression,
while maintaining in their memory the contents of their lie. Thus, to tell lies and to lie
successfully, children must be able to hold conflicting alternatives in their mind (i.e., what they
really did/thought and what they said they did/thought).

Only one study has examined the relation between children’s executive functioning and
deceptive behavior (Carlson et al., 1998). Carlson et al. (1998) found that preschool children who
experienced difficulty with executive functioning tasks, especially those that require a high level
of inhibitory control, demonstrated difficulties with physical deception (i.e., pointing). Although
Carlson et al. (1998) did not explicitly examine lie-telling behavior, their results seem to suggest
that children may also have difficulties with lying if they lack advanced executive functioning
skills, particularly in terms of inhibitory control and working memory. However, no study has
directly tested this hypothesis. The current study aims to address this gap in the literature by
examining the relationship between executive functioning and children’s lie-telling abilities.

Children’s conceptual and moral understanding of lying and truth-telling

Research has demonstrated that a child’s conceptual and moral understanding of lie- and truth-
telling emerges early in the preschool years and develops rapidly throughout the school years
(Bussey, 1992; 1999; Peterson, Peterson, & Seeto, 1983; Piaget, 1932; Siegal & Peterson, 1998;
Talwar et al., 2002; see Lee, 2000 for a review). As young as 3 years of age, children already
have a rudimentary concept of lies that are told for antisocial purposes and they evaluate such
lies negatively. With increased age, children begin to differentiate antisocial lies from honest
mistakes, guesses, exaggerations, and eventually sarcasm and irony. Children also gradually take
into consideration the social context in which lies are told and the intention of the lie-teller when
evaluating lies. Overall, by early adolescence, children’s conceptual and moral understanding of
lying and truth-telling becomes comparable to adults.
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

In summary, there have been few studies that have examined social and cognitive factors
contributing to the development of lying or truth-telling. Furthermore, the few studies that have
examined the relationship between social and cognitive factors (e.g., theory of mind, executive
functioning, children’s conceptual and moral judgement) and lying have only examined one
factor and none have examined the differential role of these factors on children’s lie-telling
behavior. The aim of the present research was thus to address these gaps in the literature and to
provide an integrated and comprehensive picture of the relationship between children’s lie-
telling behavior and various social and cognitive factors.

• Role of executive functioning

Many of the differences we see in young children’s behavior relate to their executive function.
Executive function is a set of skills that stems from the coordination of three cognitive processes:
cognitive flexibility, working memory and inhibitory control. These skills help us plan, focus,
remember instructions and complete tasks. Executive function is important throughout life and
starts to develop early. Cognitive flexibility is the ability to pay attention and switch attention
from one task to another. For example, children use cognitive flexibility when they focus on one
activity, such as building with blocks, but then switch to another activity, putting the blocks
away and joining their peers for a story. Working memory enables us to mentally hold and
process information. Young children use working memory when they have to remember and
follow one or more instructions, such as when working on an art project and then putting their
materials away. Inhibitory control allows us to stop an impulse and display a more appropriate
response. We see this often in young children when they have to take turns in sharing a desirable
toy (for example, asking ‘Can I have a turn?’ rather than grabbing the toy). In young children,
the three aspects of executive function work together and can be seen in many different ways,
such as when a child has to listen and follow directions, ignore distractions and wait in line.

How executive function develops

Executive function begins to develop early in life. Babies who experience warm and supportive
interactions with important adults in their lives are more likely to feel safe and secure. This helps
children develop positive relationships with parents and adults, giving children the confidence,
they need to explore their world and develop independence and problem-solving skills. Secure
relationships also lead to strong social emotional development and executive function skills in
young children. Children who develop executive function skills early in life are more likely to
show self-control, especially as they get older and make the transition to more structured
learning environments.

Studies relating to lying and executive functioning

1. The effects of denial on memory

Research on the effects of (false) denials on memory have shown that such a strategy has a
singular effect known as denial-induced forgetting (DIF; Otgaar et al., 2014). Denying an event
or specific details of an event impairs memory for the discussion (i.e., denials) rather than it
leads to an impairment for the original memory for the event (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2016; Otgaar et
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

al., 2018; Vieira & Lane, 2013). The work on false denials has mainly examined this mnemonic
effect by instructing participants to deny that an event really occurred (e.g., “I did not steal
anything”). In one of the first studies on this topic, Vieira and Lane (2013) showed pictures (e.g.,
apple) to participants. Then, participants were randomly instructed to truthfully describe or
falsely deny having seen the studied and unstudied pictures. After two days of delay, all
participants completed a source monitoring task where their memory performance was measured
for having studied a picture and for having talked (i.e., truthfully described or denied) about such
specific pictures. Interestingly, participants had more difficulty in remembering whether they
studied the pictures when they falsely denied them than when they truthfully discussed them.

Further evidence on the detrimental effect of false denials on memory was found by a recent line
of studies (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2014; Otgaar et al., 2016; Otgaar et al., 2018; Romeo et al., 2018;
Romeo et al., 2019). These studies have demonstrated that memory impairment is related to
memory for having denied details of the event and not for the memory for the event. The typical
procedure adopted by Otgaar and colleagues (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2014; Otgaar et al., 2016;
Romeo et al., 2018) requires participants to view an event (e.g., video of a theft) and after that, to
deny or tell the truth about all details of the event. Following a delay, both groups of participants
are involved in a source monitoring task during which they honestly answer some questions on
memory for the event and memory for having discussed (i.e., denied or honestly answered)
specific details of the event in the first session. These studies have found what is called the
denial-induced forgetting effect (Otgaar et al., 2014), meaning that deniers typically have more
forgetting for memory for the interview than truth-tellers.

Although the DIF effect has been replicated in several studies by using different stimuli (e.g.,
pictures, virtual reality scenes), tasks (e.g., recall memory task), and populations (e.g., children),
few studies have also demonstrated an undermining effect of denials on memory for the original
event (e.g., Romeo et al., 2018). In particular, Romeo et al. (2018) showed that denials may
affect memory for the event by adapting the classical procedure in a more ecological one (i.e.,
more realistic stimuli using virtual reality scenes of an airplane crash). Findings demonstrated
that deniers reported a memory impairment for the original experience than participants that had
never denied. The authors stated that forgetting for the initial event might be related to the
emotional and the active involvement required by such a more realistic procedure (Romeo et al.,
2018). Indeed, it could be the case that such an involvement required additional cognitive
resources during the lie than usual, thus impacting the individual's memory for the event.

2. The effects of fabrication on memory

Studies on the impact of fabrication on memory have demonstrated that such a deceptive
strategy affects memory for the event. This memory undermining effect has been typically
investigated through the forced confabulation paradigm (e.g., Ackil and Zaragoza, 1998, Ackil
and Zaragoza, 2011; Zaragoza et al., 2001). In this paradigm, participants watch a video and then
answer some questions on it. During this phase, a group of participants is instructed to answer
questions based on their actual memory and a second group is requested to fabricate both details
presented and not presented in the video. After a delay of one week, a source monitoring task is
administered to participants in order to test their memory for having discussed details in the first
session and memory for having seen details in the video. By using this paradigm, many studies
 18
ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

have demonstrated that fabrication makes people more likely to recognize their own fabrications
as actual details of the event. Hence, fabricators are more prone to report commission errors (i.e.,
distortions or details never seen) when they decide to come forward with the truth (Chrobak and
Zaragoza, 2008, Chrobak and Zaragoza, 2012; Gombos et al., 2012; Van Oorsouw & Giesbrecht,
2008; Zaragoza et al., 2001). Moreover, other studies have shown that the memory impairment
caused by fabrication occurs just for self-generated details and not for the entire memory for the
event (e.g., Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2008; Pickel, 2004). That is, when asked to genuinely recall
the event, fabricators report few correct details and more commissions for the details fabricated,
while no mnemonic effects occur for not fabricated details.

Recently, research carried out by Polage, 2004, Polage, 2012, Polage, 2018 has demonstrated
that the act of fabrication has additional effects besides memory distortions. In particular, those
studies shed light on the possible effects of fabrication on beliefs of having actually experienced
the self-fabricated event. Polage asked participants to assess the occurrence that two events
happened to them (i.e., one experimental and one control). Then, she invited participants who
reported a low rate for the experimental event to write a false description of it. A week (or five
weeks) later, participants completed a questionnaire where they again reported their beliefs
concerning the possibility that the experimental event had really happened. Polage found two
interesting findings: (i) 50% of fabricators decreased their beliefs while (ii) 10–16% of
fabricators increased their beliefs for the occurrence of self-fabricated events. To clarify such a
pattern of results, she carried out other studies (2012; 2018) demonstrating that fabricators
increased their beliefs in their lies, a phenomenon called fabrication inflation (but see also
Riesthuis et al., 2020).

3. Executive function resources and memory

Recent studies have demonstrated that individuals' cognitive resources predict the formation of
memory distortions when individuals try to genuinely recall an event (e.g., Battista et al., 2020;
Gerrie & Garry, 2007; Leding, 2012; Marsh et al., 2005; Peters et al., 2007). Specifically, these
studies have shown that people with a low availability of Executive Functions (EF) resources
have a higher impairment (i.e., forgetting and memory errors) of the memory for the event than
those who have a high availability of EF resources. For this reason, it might be plausible to
assume that having a high availability of EF resources can also protect from the memory
undermining effect (e.g., DIF, commissions) associated with each deceptive strategy (e.g., false
denials and fabrication).

In general, EFs have been described as a set of cognitive functions responsible for modulating
several cognitive subprocesses and the performance of complex executive tasks (Carpenter et al.,
2000; Carretti et al., 2010; Miyake et al., 2000). A large number of processes (i.e., problem-
solving, planning, selective attention, etc.) can be enumerated as EF abilities (e.g., Diamond,
2013). However, the most frequently theorized and the principal EFs involved in elaborate
cognitive performances (e.g., memory recall) are Shifting between tasks or mental sets,
Inhibition of prepotent responses and updating and monitoring of working memory
representations (e.g., Baddeley, 1996; Burgess & Simons, 2005; Diamond, 2013; Espy, 2004;
Logan, 1985; Lyon et al., 1996; Miyake et al., 2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999).
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

In particular, Updating pertains to the individuals' ability to detect the relevant information to
perform a task among different incoming information. Indeed, it enables changing the irrelevant
information in working memory with a relevant one (Morris & Jones, 1990). The recognition of
relevant information needs a “temporal tagging” (Miyake et al., 2000, p 57; Jonides & Smith,
1997). Beyond the passive maintenance of relevant information, this ability allows also the
active manipulation of relevant information in working memory (Lehto, 1996; Morris & Jones,
1990).

The executive function Shifting refers to individual's capacity to move back and forth among
different operations or tasks (Monsell, 1996). It is also called “attention switching” or “task
switching”. This operation requires that the irrelevant task set is disengaged in order to activate a
new relevant task set. This process encompasses a temporal cost (e.g., Jersild, 1927; Rogers &
Monsell, 1995) that becomes particularly demanding when the switching process is not driven by
external prompts (Spector & Biederman, 1976). Furthermore, the Shifting ability entails the
individual's ability to overtake proactive interference or negative priming (Allport & Wylie,
2000).

Finally, Inhibition concerns the ability to voluntarily suppress dominant, automatic and
prepotent responses whether necessary (Miyake et al., 2000). However, this function can also
refer to a process not necessarily intentional. In such a case, it is referred to “reactive inhibition”
and pertains to the situations where in activation level occurs following a negative activation
(Logan, 1994).

A study of Miyake et al. (2000) demonstrated the concurrently unitary and divergent identity of
those three EFs. More specifically, despite the fact that every function is delegated to respond in
specific situations, they seem to be strongly associated and depend on each other in the execution
of complex tasks (e.g., Dempster & Corkill, 1999; Duncan et al., 1996, Duncan et al., 1997;
Engle & Kane, 2000; Miyake et al., 2000). Based on this, some scholars have collapsed multiple
measures of EF into one unique score in their studies (Battista et al., 2020; Biederman et al.,
2004; Giancola, 2004; Kersten et al., 2018; Salthouse et al., 2004; Thorell, 2007; Unsworth et al.,
2009), an aggregate measure of EF. By contrast, other scholars have adopted a more specific
measure of EF by considering a multifaceted and composed of distinct EF scores (e.g., Barkley,
1997; Fleming et al., 2016; Friedman et al., 2011; Langberg et al., 2013; Miller & Hinshaw,
2010). That is, these studies used the scores of Shifting, Inhibition, and Updating separately (i.e.,
one-facet EF measures) rather than collapse the three EF scores into one aggregate score. Due to
the aim of our study, the use of one-facet EF measures seems to better explain how individual
EFs resources can interfere with the effects of lying on memory. Indeed, by considering the
separate EF scores, we might be able to understand whether a specific EF (i.e., Shifting,
Inhibition, or Updating) is more responsible than others for such effects. Thus, in the current
experiment, we followed a one-facet approach to assess individual Shifting, Inhibition, and
Updating differences.

• Role of culture

While parents from Western countries may be more familiar with the cultural notion that child-
rearing demands a hands-on approach from caregivers until the child is self-sufficient, other
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

cultures might leave children to explore freely as a form of self-education. They may be left to
“find their own way” from a much younger age than children from Western countries are
accustomed to.

Furthermore, a child’s personality may be acknowledged earlier or later on in the life-cycle in

some societies compared with others. This early exposure affects the way children attend to
themselves or to their relationships with others – forming their self-image and identity. For
example, in Western European and North American countries, children tend to describe
themselves around their unique characteristics – such as “I am smart” or “I am good at drawing”.
In Asian, African, Southern European and South American countries, however, children describe
themselves more often around their relationship with others and social roles. Examples of this
include “I am my parents’ child” or “I am a good student”.

Because children in different cultures differ in how they think about themselves and relate to
others, they also memorize events differently. For example, when preschoolers were asked to
describe a recent special personal experience, European-American children provided more
detailed descriptions, recalled more specific events and stressed their preferences, feelings and
opinions about it more than Chinese and Korean children. The Asian children instead focused
more on the people they had met and how they related to themselves.

Children growing up in different cultures receive specific inputs from their environment.

Cultural Effects of Parenting

Parents in different cultures also play an important role in molding children’s behavior and
thinking patterns. Typically, parents are the ones who prepare the children to interact with wider
society. Children’s interaction with their parents often acts as the archetype of how to behave
around others – learning a variety of socio-cultural rules, expectations and taboos. Cultural
differences in interactions between adults and children also influence how a child behaves
socially.

For instance, in Chinese culture, where parents assume much responsibility and authority over
children’s early development, parents interact with children in a more authoritative manner and
demand obedience from their children. Children growing up in such environments are more
likely to comply with their parents’ requests, even when they are reluctant to do so. In societies
where the division of labor is more rigid, however, we might alternatively note that children are
expected to do their full share of grown-up work as soon as it is possible for them to contribute.

Culture is really what kind of atmosphere the child grows up in.

Not too distant from familial culture is a culture that is derived from the religious beliefs and
practices of a specific family. If a child grows up seeing a lot of time and effort being devoted to
religion, prayer, ceremonies; that is the culture he or she might also adopt. Similarly,
communities and their peculiarities also form part of the cultural exposure and inheritance of a
child. If we were to generalize and use a cliché, a Bengali family where there is the
omnipresence of the arts and other intellectual pursuits, a child in that environment will be
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

obviously influenced by that kind of learning. Similarly, a different community that might
propagate a philosophy of austerity, is likely to be inculcated in the children of that family too.
Culture then, is really what kind of atmosphere the child grows up in.

Culture is a term that straddles and encapsulates a whole lot that can impact a child’s
development. Its influence is inevitable and should be taken into account when it comes to
parenting and educating.

Objective Of the Study:

• To study the developmental pattern across ages 4,5 and 6 in terms of variable under the
study that is executive functioning and lying behavior
• To investigate the relationship among understanding of lies (detecting lie and telling lie)
and executive functioning

Hypotheses Of the Study:

1. Null Hypothesis:

• there is no difference between the lying behavior across the age group 4,5 and 6
• there is no difference between the executive functioning across the age group 4,5 and 6

2. Alternative Hypothesis

• There is difference between the lying behavior among age group 4,5 and 6
• There is difference between the executive functioning among the age group 4,5 and 6

Method
1. Participants
The participants for the present study were taken from the age groups of 4,5 and 6 where we had
one male and female participator of our convenience age choice and availability. From the
specific age group, personal administration of the study was held on Rohan Kasana (male) and
Vaibhani (female) who were both from the age bracket of 6 years. The participants were easily
reached out from the community society where I live in PG. The male participant is well versed
with English language and goes to a private school named The Shri Ram School, Vasant Vihar.
The female participant on the other hand is more comfortable with Hindi Language
communication and is well versed with her mother tongue that is, Bhojpuri. She has little
communication skills in English medium and receives education and training from a government
school named Arya Public School, Sarojini Nagar.
2. Design of the study
The research design of the present study is cross sectional where we have different age groups
within 3 different brackets of age 4,5 and 6. There are two hypotheses framed in the study, one is
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

to study the developmental pattern across ages 4,5 and 6 in terms of variable under the study that
is executive functioning and lying behavior. So here the independent variable is executive
functioning and the dependent variable is the lying behavior. Second hypotheses entail to
investigate the relationship among understanding of lies (detecting lie and telling lie) and
executive functioning. This suggests a correlational design where the relationship of the two
variables (executive functioning and lying behavior) is investigated without controlling or
manipulating any of the extraneous variables.
The benefit of administrating a cross sectional study between the age group of 4,5 and 6 is
because it allows the researchers to compare the differences of the various variables at the same
time. For example, we could look at the age, gender, income status of the family, and educational
level.
3. Measures
The participants were first asked to be seated and were made comfortable before administrating
the test and a rapport formation was built. After a brief introduction of the tester and the testee,
the test administration was headed where first lie tasks were administered where the participants
were introduced into two hypothetical situation one was anti-social lie and another was pro-
social lying pattern scenario where they had to give their own personal judgements and opinion
to what the protagonist of the story should be saying or doing to justify their actions respectively.
The story held for anti-social lie was---
“Rahul's parents are going out for a movie and they tell Rahul to not eat the lollipop in the fridge.
But Rahul can't control himself and ate the lollipop. When his parents are back, they ask him
"Where is the lollipop, Rahul?" What would Rahul say?”
“राहुल के मम्मी- पापा एक फिल्म के फलए बाहर जा रहे हैं और वे राहुल को फिज में रखे लॉलीपॉप को खाने से मना करते हैं । लेफकन राहुल का बहुत
मन करता है और वो खदु पर कंट्रोल नही कर पाता। इसफलए वो लालीपॉप खा जाता है ।जब उसके मम्मी- पापा वापस आते हैं तो वे उससे पूछते हैं
"राहुल लॉलीपॉप कहााँ है?" राहुल क्या कहेगा?”

The story held for pro-social lie was---

“Jiya’s mother gets her a new dress for her birthday celebrations but the dress her mother chose
is not to her liking, so what would Jiya say?”
“फजया की मम्मी उसे उसके जन्मफदन के फलए एक नए कपडे फदलाती है लेफकन उसकी मम्मी ने जो कपडा चनु ा है वह उसे पसदं नहीं आता है। उसकी
मम्मी जब उस से पूछती है फक उसको कपडे कै से लगे?” तो फजया क्या कहेगी?”

For the easy convenience of the participant, we had our story framed in two different languages
(English and Hindi), depending on the ease of the participant’s choice of communication, the
administration of the test was administered.
The selection of the stories for lying behavior was taken with class advice, suggestions and as
well as expert rating. The best of all the stories was chosen for the final administration. The
expert rating helped us know the incongruency held in our story and also led to an unbiased
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

anonymous story suggestively which was standardized for the whole class. The scoring pattern
of the lying behavior was 0 for telling the truth; 1 for Telling a lie and 2 for lying with
fabrication
The next set of tasks held was in congruence to measuring executive functioning which included
Digit Span Test and Stroop Test.
In the digit span test, the participants were asked to repeat numbers after the administrator. With
every correct answer, the digits kept adding and chain of numbers were followed. The test design
was made with recalling one number and ending with 15 numbers at a go chain. If the participant
misses any digit in repeating or skips the order of the digit span consecutively for three
maximum times the test administration is stopped and the scoring is held till the last numerical
span where he/she recalled digit span correctly. With every correct repetition of the digit span
after the administrator, a score was given allotted to the participant successfully.
In the Stroop experiment, the task was held in two parts, one is the congruent condition and the
other is the incongruent condition. To make the experiment excited and colorful, animal Stroop
was selected which could be of easy recognition to the participants understanding level and
would hold their attention span of interest.
In the congruent condition, there were animals displayed of different sizes in front of the
participants and they were asked to respond them in terms of “small” or “big” irrespective of the
animal size displayed in front of them. For example, on the display of an elephant, the participant
had to respond “big”. The responses were noted along with time taken to complete the task.
Next, in the incongruent condition, the participant was instructed that another set of animals of
different sizes will be shown, their task is to tell the opposite size of the animal irrespective of
the size displayed. For instance, if the participant sees an elephant this time, he/she will respond
“small”. The responses will again be noted down along with the completion time period.
4. Procedure
The study of the qualitative data analysis started with the selection of the objective and the
design of the study. The objective for the present study is to study the developmental pattern
across ages 4,5 and 6 in terms of variable under the study that is executive functioning and lying
behavior as well as to investigate the relationship among understanding of lies (detecting lie and
telling lie) and executive functioning. Before going to the field of administration, the
administrators explored lying behavior patterns and its favorable measures in children
theoretically where we got into the understanding of lying and socio-cognitive relation and the
role of executive functioning. Along with the analysis of the purpose of the study, there were
several studies interpreted from the past research works in the domain of lying and effective
executive functioning. The impact of culture on understanding level of the children also played
an important role as inspected from review of literature.
There were 3 groups of age liability students could have their administration of the test held (age
4,5 and 6) out of which the preference for my personal availability and reach was for the age
group of 6 both male and female participant. The participants along with their parents were
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

briefed about the purpose of the study and with due consent of the primary caregiver the children
were taken for the administration enrollment. The participators were separately administrated on
two different days, first the male participant followed by the female participant. In the beginning
of the test administration, a rapport formation was built so as to make the participant feel
comfortable and have informal conversation with the normal day to day life activities and
sharing of personal experiences from both ends. After a few minutes of informality, the test
administration began stating “chalo ab ak mazedar game khelte hain (now let’s play an
interesting game), where I started with the digit span test administration. The sole purpose of
referring the word “game” was to make it sound interesting and grab the children attention to the
instructions and not to deceive them intentionally or unintentionally. With the conduction of the
digit span, we had a small break, where I gave each of my participant a chocolate to have and
then administrated the Stroop animal test which took a little longer at the time of administration
as compared to the digit span for both of the participants. A keen observation was made that
participants (both male and female) easily and quickly completed responding with the congruent
condition whereas in the incongruent instruction they had time taken to response each time in
relevance to the observation of the animal, increased attention span and more cognition efforts
before calling out “big” or “small” animal.
The entire administration of the tests was held face to face for both male and female participant.
The date for the male and female participants administration was 5th October, 2022 and 10th
October, 2022 respectively. The administration was held at my own place, where the participants
were invited to take part in a simple interesting test administration with due acknowledgment of
their parent(s). Both participants were welcomed for the administration in the evening time at
around 5p.m.
After having the completion of the tasks, the administration was concluded with gratitude to the
children giving them a packet of chips and frooti. Towards the end of the test administration, the
children were asked about their schooling information, personal interests, hobbies and favorite
subject. Apart from these, relationship status with parents and non-verbal cues, communication
approach, preferences in lifestyle and other minor personal information were noted. He/she was
provided the assurance of confidentiality of all the data being held during the whole test
administration process. It was made sure that the testee(s) do not feel uncomfortable or ridiculed
with the performance of them in the administration. They were made to believe that the test
results were a “secrecy” between us only and no one will invade in so as to approve a mental
relaxation in their consciousness and reduce stress of any variable.
The collection of the data is analyzed with qualitative method where we found out the F ratio for
executive functioning scores collected by the entire class and as well as the F ratio calculation of
the lying behavioral pattern and then trying to find a correlation between executive functioning
and the lying pattern of the children of the age bracket 4, 5 and 6. The scores for the digit span of
memory retention(executive functioning) was made on the basis of each correct response where
the participant could recall the digit span in correct sequence. And the other executive
functioning which was in relevance to attention span and higher cognitive thinking was the
Stroop Experiment where the administrator got to understand the participant’s executive maturity
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

in relevance to their age with the number of correct and wrong responses. Another variable
aspect which the present study assessed was the lying behavior under 2 different situations which
the administrators portrayed with the help of vignettes---one for prosocial lying and other for
antisocial lie. To analyses the executive function of the lying behavior scores were set for 0,1 and
2 which denotes telling truth, telling a lie and telling a lie with justification respectively.
However, with the selection of the vignettes at personal classroom suggestion and interpersonal
brain storming sessions for improvising for the betterment of the vignette outcome with
professor in charge, we sought expert rating and had our selection out of the several vignettes
being made to the last 2 ones which seemed standardized to the whole class students for
administration.
There were several limitations in the administration of the study which includes limited pooling
of data collection. There was a reduced sample size and statistical limitations are bounded along
with vignette selection limitation prevalence. The socio-economic strata were taken into
consideration and a biased pooling of pooling participants could be regarded as another withdraw
where there is inclusion/exclusion factor of selection. Participants who could only speak and
understand Hindi and English language were taken into consideration. The educational
qualification was limited to age 4,5 and 6 standard children and authenticity of the data matters
as in the administrator’s loyalty to administer the test veritably.
Results
1. Anova (F ratio) for Lying Behavior among age groups 4,5 and 6 years

2. Anova (F ratio) for Executive Functioning among age groups 4,5 and 6years
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

3. Correlation found between Lying Behavior and Executive Functioning of the collected
data sample

Discussion
The current study has a cross-sectional research design, with diverse age groups divided into
three distinct age groups (ages 4, 5, and 6). The study has two hypotheses; the first is to examine
the developmental pattern between ages 4,5 and 6 in terms of the variables being executive
functioning and lying conduct. Therefore, executive functioning is the independent variable here,
while lying conduct is the dependent variable. The purpose of the second hypothesis is to look at
the connection between executive functioning and the ability to tell and detect lies. This provides
a correlational approach in which the link between the two variables (executive functioning and
lying behaviour) is examined without adjusting or modifying any of the auxiliary variables.
Before administering the test and establishing a rapport, the participants were requested to take a
seat and become comfortable. After a brief introduction of the tester and the testee, the test
administration began with the first lie task, which required the participants to make their own
judgments and opinions about what the protagonist of the story should say or do to justify their
respective actions in two hypothetical situations: one involved an anti-social lie and the other a
pro-social lying pattern.
With the use of student recommendations, expert ratings, and class feedback, the stories for
prosocial and anti-social behaviour were chosen. The expert rating assisted us in identifying the
inconsistencies in our story and also produced an objective, anonymous account that served as a
standard for the entire class. Giving the truth resulted in a score of 0, stating a falsehood resulted
in a score of 1, and fabricating a lie resulted in a score of 2. The following collection of tasks
includes the Digit Span Test and the Stroop Test, which were relevant to testing executive
functioning. The participants in the digit span test were instructed to repeat numbers after the
examiner. The digits kept increasing and a series of numbers was followed after each accurate
response. The test design started with one number recall and went all the way up to 15 numbers
in a go chain. The test administration is stopped and the score is retained until the last numerical
span where the participant properly remembered the digit span if the participant misses any digit
while repeating or skips the order of the digit span consecutively for a maximum of three times.
A score was awarded to the participant after each successful repetition of the digit span by the
administrator. The task in the Stroop experiment was divided into two sections: the congruent
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

condition and the incongruent condition. the reason to select animal Stroop test, was to let
animal(s) be easily recognized by participants of any knowledge level and would maintain their
interest for the duration of the trial, was chosen to add excitement and color.
The participants and their parents received an explanation of the study's objectives, and with the
primary caregivers' informed agreement, the children were enrolled in the study. On two distinct
days, the participants underwent separate administrations—first the male participant, then the
female participant. In order to make the participant feel comfortable and have casual talk about
everyday activities and sharing of personal experiences from both sides, a rapport was
established prior to the test administration. When given congruent instructions, participants (both
male and female) responded quickly and easily, whereas when given incongruent instructions,
they took longer to respond each time in relation to the observation of the animal, paid more
attention, and required more cognitive effort before calling out "big" or "small" animal.
A lie is a claim that is thought to be false and is usually made with the intention of deceiving
another person. The act of telling lies is referred to as lying. Liar is a phrase used to describe
someone who tells a lie. Lies can be used by those who employ them for a range of instrumental,
interpersonal, or psychological purposes. During the socialization process for children, there are
two types of lies that are quite significant. One category includes falsehoods that go against
moral principles since they are frequently told to one's own advantage at the expense of others.
This kind of lying is universally prohibited by children's caretakers and teachers from a very
young age due to its anti-social nature. The other kind of lies are prosocial in character and are
those that are told with the goal to benefit, not hurt, another person (such as pretending to like an
unwanted present in front of the donor). Prosocial lies are regularly told in daily life (DePaulo &
Bell, 1996; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998) and typically involve positive values, despite the fact that
philosophers and theologians have long argued about whether they should be morally sanctioned
(Bok, 1978). (Nyberg, 1993). According to some theorists, such as Sweetser (1987), prosocial
lies may occasionally not only be socially acceptable but might not even be lies at all.
There is some evidence suggesting a connection between children's lying conduct and executive
function. Executive functioning has been defined as a set of higher-order psychological
processes engaged in goal-oriented behaviour under conscious control (Zelazo & Muller, 2002).
Executive functioning covers a variety of cognitive skills including self-regulation, inhibitory
control, planning, attentional flexibility, and strategy employment (Welsh, Pennington, &
Groisser, 1991; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997). Researchers have seen gains in the
ability to tell lies throughout this period, when executive functioning skills have been
demonstrated to arise in late infancy and develop throughout childhood. Children must be able to
keep competing ideas in their minds, such as what they actually did or thought versus what they
claimed to have done or thought, in order to successfully tell lies.
The association between children's executive functioning and dishonest behaviour has only been
studied in one study (Carlson et al., 1998). Carlson et al. (1998) discovered that preschoolers
with executive functioning issues, particularly those that call for a high level of inhibitory
control, also have issues with physical deception (i.e., pointing). Carlson et al. (1998) did not
specifically address the conduct of lying, but their findings appear to indicate that children may
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

struggle with lying if they lack highly developed executive functioning abilities, particularly in
terms of inhibitory control and working memory. But this theory hasn't been directly tested in
any research. By exploring the connection between executive functioning and children's ability
to tell lies, the current study seeks to fill this vacuum in the literature.
Denial-induced forgetfulness is one result of this tactic, according to studies on the impact of
(false) denials on memory (DIF; Otgaar et al., 2014). Denying an event or certain specifics of an
event damages memory for the conversation rather than the initial memory for the event (i.e.,
denials) (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2016; Otgaar et al., 2018; Vieira & Lane, 2013). The majority of the
research on false denials has looked at this mnemonic effect by having participants say they
didn't do anything, such as "I didn't steal anything." In one of the earliest research projects on
this subject, Vieira and Lane (2013) offered participants images (such as an apple). Then,
participants were given a chance to either accurately describe or untruthfully deny having seen
the examined and control images. After a two-day delay, each participant finished a source
monitoring task in which their memory was tested for having looked at and discussed certain
photos (i.e., if they had been accurately described or denied). It's interesting to note that when
individuals fraudulently denied discussing the photographs, they had a harder time remembering
whether they had actually studied them.
Recent studies by Polage, 2004, Polage, 2012, and Polage, 2018 have shown that fabrication
also has impacts other than memory distortions. These investigations give light on the potential
impacts of fabrication on the belief that the self-fabricated event was truly experienced.
Participants were tasked by Polage with rating the likelihood that two occurrences had occurred
to them (i.e., one experimental and one control). She then asked those who gave the experimental
event a negative rating to write a fictitious account of it. Participants responded to a
questionnaire a week (or five weeks) later, in which they again expressed their opinions on the
likelihood that the experimental event had actually taken place. Polage discovered two intriguing
results: 50% of fabricators dropped their beliefs, whereas (ii) 10%–16% of fabricators raised
their beliefs regarding the likelihood of self-fabricated occurrences. She conducted additional
studies (2012; 2018) indicating that fabricators expanded their trust in their lies, a phenomenon
known as fabrication inflation, to explain such a pattern of outcomes.
Children are concrete thinkers. There are many gray areas on the spectrum of lying, including
white-lies to avoid hurting someone’s feelings and lies of omission. Of course, there are the
“caught with your hand in the cookie jar but still trying to blame it on your brother” type of lies
that are obvious, but most lies are less so. Some lies are simply accepted, even encouraged (i.e.,
inviting the imaginary friend to dinner) and some lies get a big reaction. For children who are
concrete thinkers, these nuances make it hard to learn what’s okay and what’s not okay when it
comes to lying. Children receive mixed messages. Beyond the fact that children are just learning
social norms which are incredibly complicated, the world (including parents) often models a
little bending of the truth (i.e., “This is a great gift; one can never have too many socks!”). In
fact, many times children get shushed for being too honest (i.e., “My mom said she hates your
lasagna.”). And television shows and movies very often depict the main characters plotting and
scheming and not having many consequences. In fact, a laugh track usually makes the dishonest
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

behavior seem funny rather than inappropriate. Children don’t understand reality is fixed. Have
you ever hoped you could change something just by wishing it so? Children not only hope for
this, but they believe it’s a possibility. Until about age seven or eight, children often see a blurry
line between reality and fantasy and don’t know that reality is permanently fixed. They think
wishful thinking really works. They believe in super-heroes, unicorns, and their ability to change
the facts. So, when they say they didn’t do it, what they mean is that they wish they didn’t do it,
and are trying to make that true. It’s all part of imagination and experimentation. Young children
with active imaginations are actually developing their cognitive abilities. But imaginative or
pretend play requires some suspending of the truth. One reason for children lying is because they
are engaging in imaginative play when they say or do something less than honest. To make it
more complex, one of the important tasks of childhood is to push boundaries, to test the waters,
to see what can and can’t be done (i.e., “Why can’t I fly if I jump from the top of the tree?” and
“What will happen if I blame it on the cat?”). Although this can be very frustrating, it helps
children learn about the world and themselves, as well as develop important social skills.
Neither pathological nor compulsive lying are mental health diagnoses. Their existence remains
controversial among many mental health clinicians. Some clinicians argue there is no such thing
as pathological or compulsive lying. Others assert that these behaviors only arise as part of
another diagnosis or as the product of fear, trauma, and other motivations. Those who do
distinguish pathological and compulsive lying from one another argue that the difference is one
of intent. Pathological liars may lie for no clear reason, seemingly without planning or motive.
For example, a child might claim something happened when it clearly did not, even when there is
no reason—such as fear or wishful thinking—for them to do so. Compulsive liars may use lying
to get things they want or need or to escape punishment. This type of lying is much more
common among children and is developmentally typical at many ages. For instance, a child
might say they didn’t eat a slice of cake, even as their mouth is covered with crumbs. Or they
might tell a story about a present they never received because they wish someone had given them
that present. Parents should know that children almost always lie for a reason. Identifying the
reason is more important than stigmatizing or punishing the lie. Punishing lies may even
encourage children to lie more, in the hopes that they will not be caught next time.
In order to find a relationship between executive functioning and the lying pattern of the
children in the age range of 4, 5, and 6, we first calculated the Anova (F-ratio) for the executive
functioning scores gathered by the entire class as well as the F ratio calculation of the lying
behavioral pattern. The participant's ability to recall the digit span in the proper order was taken
into account for each correct response when calculating the participant's score for the digit span
of memory retention (executive functioning). The Stroop Experiment allowed the administrator
to determine the participant's executive maturity in relation to their age by counting the number
of correct and incorrect responses. This executive functioning was relevant to attention span and
higher cognitive thinking. The administrators used vignettes to depict two separate situations—
one for prosocial lying and the other for antisocial lying—in which participants were asked to
engage in lying behaviour. To analyze the executive function of the lying behaviour, scores of 0,
1, and 2 were used, which, respectively, represent telling the truth, telling a lie, and telling a lie
with good reason.
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

The resultant outcome clearly denotes the descriptive statistics of the data collection. The total
number of participants (N) found for age group 4 is 26; age group 5 is 32 and age group 6 is 43.
In totality, the number of participants were 101. Talking in detail of the results found in lying
behavior; sum of the squares in between groups of the age group 4,5 and 6 seemed to be 1.873
and degree of freedom (df) 2. At the same time, sum of the squares for within group data
collected in the age bracket of 4,5 and 6 is 64.998 and degree of freedom is 98. The sum of
squares held for between and within group in altogether is (1.873+64.998) 66.871 and the sum of
the two distinct df is (98+2) 100. The f ratio outcome is insignificant at 0.05 level of
significance. This means that the resultant f ratio (1.412) is greater than 0.05 significant level
having a p-value of 0.0248 which denotes that the null hypothesis is accepted meaning that there
is no difference between the lying behavior of children in the age group 4,5 and 6.
For the executive functioning variable to be examined within different age groups, it is seen that
the sum of the squares between age groups is 69.114 and within age groups is 350.311. The total
of the two sums of the squares scores (69.114+350.311) seemed to come out 419.426. The
degree of freedom held between groups of age scores for executive functioning is 2 and that for
within group is 98 (98+2) which sums up to 100. The F ratio seemed to be high as 9.667 and is
significant with a p value less than 0.001 at the significant level of 0.05. the null hypothesis is
hence rejected suggesting that there is significant difference between the executive functioning
development in different age groups of 4,5 and 6.
The correlation between the two variables i.e., the lying behavior and the executive functioning
was also calculated with the help of SPSS, where the descriptive statistics denotes that the mean
score for lying behavior was 0.6535 and for executive functioning is 26.8119. with the mean
scores the standard deviation for both lying behavior and executive functioning was 0.81775 and
2.04799 respectively for both variables having total number of participants 101 (inclusion of the
different age grouped children). The correlation is two-tailed and the correlation coefficient is
0.253 which denotes that there is a weak positive correlation relationship between lying behavior
and executive functioning in the sample drawn from the population of age 4,5 and 6.
Implications, Limitations and Future Direction
Research on the development of children’s lie-telling has implications for our understanding of
children’s social-cognitive development. To date, it remains an open question whether the
development of lie-telling reflects a singular skill or whether the various types of lies children
tell, for ostensibly different motivations, differ in their development and foundations. Children
here had the opportunity to spontaneously choose to tell two lies for different scenarios. overall,
a larger proportion of children told self-oriented lies than lies for others, which is congruent with
the idea that self-serving lies may appear earlier than prosocial-motivated lies and have different
developmental trajectories. However, a number of children told only other-oriented lies – and
this behavior, along with telling both types of lies, was associated with higher cognitive
flexibility scores. This suggests that lie-telling may be a unitary construct, not necessarily
sequential, with the decision to lie dependent on social factors not measured in the current study.
In addition, both Executive Functioning and lying behavior predicted children’s lies for self,
further supporting the view that lie-telling behavior in children may be a unitary construct. On
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the other hand, their lies for self and others were predicted by somewhat different cognitive
factors, which could indicate that they follow different developmental trajectories. However,
these were small effect sizes and further research is needed to tease out potential differences in
the cognitive skills needed to tell different types of lies. Nevertheless, the current findings
highlight the importance of examining children’s lie-telling behavior across motivational
contexts to examine the developmental trajectories of this behavior and how different factors
may influence that trajectory.
The current findings also raise questions about children’s developing executive functioning
justifications. Children who did not lie at all appeared to have the lowest scores on the vignettes.
However, children with the highest executive functioning tendency scores; told lies in both
contexts (prosocial and antisocial situation), suggesting that early false-belief understanding
supports using lie-telling as a social strategy in general. Children who learn how to manipulate
others’ beliefs are more likely to tell lies in general. However, more research is needed to see
how this develops with age. The current study examined preschool and kindergarten children’s
lies. Research with a broader age range and that assesses second-order cognitive functioning is
needed. It may be that children who have greater mental state understanding and initially tell lies
indiscriminately in the preschool years, develop into older children who tell more prosocial lies
(Lavoie et al, 2016). Furthermore, it may be that more advanced mental state understanding in
older children is differentially related to children’s lie-telling for different motivational contexts.
For instance, Lavoie and colleagues (2016) found that children over 9 years of age with better
manipulation of words and telling lie scores on first and second-order false belief tasks were
most likely to tell lies in a politeness context.
The current findings have implications for educators, clinicians and parents who wish to
understand and foster children’s honesty and moral behavior as well. For example, parenting
strategies that consider children’s developing Executive Functioning and communication skills
can successfully teach children to use lying sparingly and in more socially-acceptable situations.
Younger children with limited EF and manipulation skills may not yet know how to use lying as
an appropriate social strategy, and thus, they may engage in impulsive, frequent and maladaptive
lying behaviors. Failing to consider a child’s cognitive and social capabilities, parents might
instead focus on punishments for lying, and inadvertently increase the frequency of children’s
self-serving lies, especially lies to avoid negative consequences (Talwar & Lee, 2011). In
contrast, parents and others can teach children strategies that promote self-control to help them
avoid transgressions that elicit the initial motivation to lie. Parents can model honesty, even in
situations where the truth is difficult. They can also reinforce for children the positive
consequences of truth-telling in practice (see Talwar & Crossman, 2011 for a review).
There are several considerations in the current study that should be noted. First, children’s lie-
telling behavior was measured using vignettes formed one for prosocial and antisocial situation,
but their-lie-telling decisions may not be as systematic or static in their daily lives as they seem
based on extraneous variables. Future research is needed to examine children’s lie-telling
behavior in their daily environments to complement the experimental studies on children’s lie-
telling. Second, for some of the cognitive measures (e.g., Stroop, digit span) there were
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

restricted ranges of scores with some children reaching ceiling. Future studies, should consider
using multiple measures of different cognitive abilities and include a larger age range. It also
may be that other cognitive measures or other variables (e.g., moral understanding) may be
associated with children’s lie-telling behavior. The cognitive measures used in this study were
chosen because they had been used in previous research on children’s self-oriented lies, and
discussions of lie-telling behavior in the literature often refer to these cognitive abilities as being
crucial for children’s lie-telling behavior in general (e.g., Talwar & Crossman, 2012; Lee, 2013).
However, it is possible that other cognitive tasks would have captured greater variability than
those chosen, or that other tasks (e.g., higher-order cognitive tasks, empathy-related tasks) that
tapped abilities not measured here would have revealed differences between the types of lies.
For instance, even though a number of studies have found that children’s moral understanding of
lies does not predict their actual lie-telling behavior in early childhood (e.g., Lyon, Malloy, Quas,
& Talwar, 2008; Talwar et al., 2002; 2004), with age and across motivational contexts, it may be
that moral understanding of lies and the intentions behind those lies are related to children’s lie-
telling.
Another important consideration is our conceptualization of lies motivations. Although children
and adults generally perceive self-serving lies to be more antisocial in nature and other-oriented
lies to be more socially acceptable (e.g., Lavoie, Leduc, Crossman, & Talwar, 2015), there is still
a “gray area” when evaluating the moral acceptability of different lies. For instance, some self-
serving lies can be considered socially acceptable, such as when individuals refrain from
honestly answering personal or uncomfortable questions to avoid possible mistreatment by
others. Similarly, other-oriented lies can have antisocial consequences, such as when children
falsely deny the wrongdoing of another to protect that person from punishment (e.g., Lyon et al.,
2008). Also, children’s perceptions of the potential consequences of a lie can influence their
truth/lie decision-making (Talwar et al., 2004). Furthermore, socio-cultural factors (e.g.,
religious and cultural values), parenting style (e.g., authoritarian vs. authoritative parenting) and
family emotional expressivity can influence children’s understanding of honesty and dishonesty
in different social contexts (Fu, Xu, Cameron, Heyman, & Lee, 2007; Popliger et al., 2011).
More research is needed to understand how the social context and intent of a lie, as well as
children’s socialization environments, moral understanding and cognitive development, all
interact to influence their lie-telling behavior in everyday situations.
Conclusions
Overall, the current findings suggest several conclusions. They indicate that Executive
Functioning skills are consistently associated with children’s decisions to lie, across different
types of lies (Lee, 2013), and may be related to a unitary construct of lying in general. They also
provide a more nuanced picture of the relation between children’s lie-telling behavior for
different motivations and their developing cognitive abilities. Consistent with prior research, we
found that EF abilities are related to lie-telling, yet we found that different cognitive measures
predicted self-oriented lies versus other-oriented lies. It may be that lies told in different social-
motivational circumstances tax different aspects of children’s cognitive abilities. In addition,
different motivational situations elicit lies from the same child and their willingness to tell lies in
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ROLE OF EF IN DEVELOPMENT OF LYING BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN

different contexts varies as a function of cognitive skill development. Although the current study
provides some modest support for the possibility that children’s self-serving lies appear earlier
than lies told for others (Talwar & Crossman, 2011), additional research conducted over time,
beginning at a younger age, would provide a more robust test of this hypothesis. Although
children’s deception is often considered to be problematic, the current study’s results suggest that
lying is associated positively with children’s cognitive development in terms of their
understanding of others’ minds and executive functioning. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the
predictors and trajectories of children’s lie-telling behavior for self and others diverge further as
children’s cognitive skills develop with age.
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