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NATO STANDARD
AJP-3.10
ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Edition A Version 1

DECEMBER 2015

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION

Published by the

NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)

© NATO/OTAN

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

7 Decernber 2015

1. The enclosed Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.10, Edition A, Version 1,

ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS, which has
been approved by the nations in the Military Committee Joint Standardization
Board, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this
publication is recorded in STANAG 2518.

2. AJP-3.10, Edition A, Version 1, is effective upon receipt and supersedes

AJP-3.10 which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local procedure for
the destruction of documents.

3. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval

system, used commercially, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without
the prior permission of the publisher. With the exception of commercial sales,
this does not apply to member or partner nations, or NATO commands and
bodies.

4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

\
Edvardas MAZEIKIS
Major General, LTUAF
Director, NATO Standardization Office

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RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at
time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization
Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations.

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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

[nation] [detail of reservation]

DEU Germany does not consider deception as a primary Info Ops
responsibility. However, deception operations are part of the
Info Ops task portfolio with regard to the coordination of
information activities. Deception operations particularly
create effects in the information environment and therefore
require careful coordination of information activities.
Deception operations have to be in line with the overall
information strategy and the StratCom Framework. In order
to avoid compromising credibility, Germany has strong
reservations against the usage of any of NATO’s information
capabilities for MILDEC. In today’s information environment
successful “deception” is almost impossible. An advantage
may only be gained on a very limited, local and short term
scale. It has been proven throughout all past and present
conflicts that the true information will come out and will cause
tremendous damage to the credibility of the source.
Consequently, deception has to be weighted up against the
risk of losing credibility and should not be considered as a
capability or technique for NATO StratCom functions, given
the fact that NATO StratCom aims at demonstrating
consistency of messaging and the maximum possible
transparency, in order to promote understanding and trust.

ITA ITA does not concur with Cyber Operations taxonomy detailed
in para 0128. In particular ITA does not consider Computer
Network Exploitation (CNE) as part of Offensive Cyber
Operations. Instead CNE is considered a foundation of Cyber
Operations per se.

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at
time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization
Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface XIII

Chapter 1 Information Operations

Section I - Background 1-1

Section II - Fundamentals of Information Operations 1-5

Definitions 1-5

Information operations activity areas 1-6

Focus of information operations 1-7

Section III - Information Operations Principles 1-9

Principles 1-9

Section IV - Capabilities and Techniques Integrated 1-11

Through Information Operations

Engagement 1-14

Physical destruction 1-16

Relationship to the military public affairs function 1-16

Section V - Roles of Information Operations at the 1-17

Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels

Section VI - Summary 1-20

Chapter 2 Information Operations Coordination Process and Staff

Requirements

Section I - Introduction 2-1

Section II - Headquarters Internal Coordination and 2-2

Staff Requirements

Section III - External Coordination 2-5

Section IV - The Information Activities Coordination 2-6

Board

Functional and special staff roles 2-8

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Chapter 3 Planning

Section I - Overall Planning Considerations for 3-1

Operations

Section II - Information Operations and the Operational- 3-1

level Planning Process

Operational-level planning process 3-2

Chapter 4 Competencies and Training

Section I - Information Operations Staff Skills and 4-1

Competencies

Section II - Individual and Collective Training for 4-1

Information Operations Staff

Section III - Training Activities for Key Leaders 4-2

Section IV - Headquarters Functional Area Internal 4-2

Training

Section V - Integrating Information Operations Within 4-2

Exercises

Annexes

Annex A – The Information Environment Study A-1

Annex B – Information Operations Plan Annex UU B-1

Format

Annex C – Example of an Information Operations C-1

Effects Matrix

Lexicon

Part I – Acronyms and Abbreviations LEX-1

Part II – Terms and Definitions LEX-3

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PREFACE

1. Doctrine consists of fundamental principles by which military forces

guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but
requires judgement in application. Planning, executing and supporting
military operations requires clearly understood and widely accepted
doctrine. This is especially important when combined, multinational or
coalition forces conduct operations. Joint doctrine applies when two or
more components operate together.

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Information Operations (Info

Ops) doctrine is intended primarily for use by NATO forces, and provides
a useful framework for operations conducted by a coalition of NATO
partners, non-NATO nations and other organizations. Interoperability
between NATO nations is based upon NATO standardization
agreements and publications. Many of the subjects covered in these
may have to be reconsidered when planning Info Ops with non-NATO
forces in accordance with North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed decisions
and procedures. This doctrine, therefore, provides a common baseline
for achieving Info Ops interoperability, rather than trying to encompass
each nation’s Info Ops approach.

3. The purpose of Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.10 (A), Allied Joint

Doctrine for Information Operations, is to provide guidance and direction
for integrating Info Ops into the planning, conduct and assessment of
operations. The provenance for AJP-3.10 (A) is MC 0422/5, NATO
Military Policy on Information Operations, which acknowledges
civil/political primacy on information issues and that the policy and
subordinate doctrine applies to the military instrument of power only.
While AJP-3.10 (A) focuses on the operational level, it recognises the
role of Alliance strategic communications (StratCom). This AJP defines
and discusses the principles of Info Ops, highlighting those particular
considerations relevant to conducting operations. These may include
the sensitivity to political factors, and the role of non-military entities and
emerging technological capabilities in the information environment, 1
both within and external to NATO.

4. StratCom’s development and Info Ops’ evolution is based on experience

from operations and centred on how Info Ops supports the Joint Force

1 The information environment is defined as: an environment comprised of the information

itself; the individuals, organizations and systems that receive, process and convey the
information; and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs. (This definition
will be proposed for inclusion in Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, based on MC
0422/5 NATO Military Policy on Information Operations).

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Commander’s (JFC’s) mission.2 In particular, it is cognizant of the role of

StratCom and the requirement to work closely with military public affairs
(PA)3 whilst recognising the specific relationship between the
commander and their spokesperson.

5. AJP-3.10 (A) mainly focuses on the operational level, but can be used as
a reference at all levels. It is intended principally for use by the JFC, the
Chief of Staff (COS) and those staff with Info Ops responsibilities. It
addresses the roles, links, responsibilities and required products from
the strategic, operational and tactical commands. It is deliberately broad
and is designed to guide all forces participating in NATO-led operations.

6. Within the overall NATO publication architecture, AJP-3.10 (A) is directly

subordinate to AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of
Operations, which is one of NATO’s keystone publications focused on
staff functions. AJP-3 describes the fundamental operational aspects of
joint operations and provides guidance on their conduct.

2 The term JFC is used throughout to indicate the operational-level commander of a joint
force, regardless of how it has been constructed (for example, joint task force/deployable joint
task force/combined joint task force).
3 NATO military PA is the function responsible to promote NATO’s military aims and

objectives to audiences in order to enhance awareness and understanding of military aspects

of the Alliance. This includes planning and conducting external and internal communications,
and community relations. (MC 0457/2 NATO Military Policy on Public Affairs).

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CHAPTER 1 – INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Section I – Background

0101. Information in the global security environment.4 Global trends

affecting the human environment and dynamics of global power could
lead to increased instability and growing opportunity for confrontation
and conflict. NATO’s operating environment, both now, and in the
future, will present threats that defy neat categorization and their
diffuse nature means that they can affect any area, even in home
nations. Actors (including adversaries) will increasingly blend a range
of asymmetric and conventional means to further their objectives.
Nations may seek to avoid state-on-state conflict, but instead use
proxies and non-state actors. Adversaries will capitalize on access to
technology, but continue to use and adapt proven ways of warfare.
They may assume different persona and may not be constrained by
accepted sociocultural norms (such as legal, ethical, pervasive public
opinion and media scrutiny) that apply to Alliance members.
Concurrently, an ‘information revolution’ (the Internet, social media
and mobile devices) has ushered in an age of decision-making
assisted by information technology (IT). To address both the
changing global security situation and the ever-growing importance
and complexity of the information environment, NATO must continue
developing its concepts, processes and doctrine, including information
operations (Info Ops), to meet these new challenges.

0102. The information environment. Today, information and news of

events from around the world circulate, uncensored, at the speed of
the Internet. This information revolution has allowed individuals or
groups to mobilize in a manner never seen before. Current
technology enables individuals and groups the ability to create, store,
manage, control, manipulate and transmit information quickly and
easily. In turn, this has created an increased dependency on
information and IT by nation states, non-state actors and individuals.
This has led to the concept of the information environment.
Information is subject to preconception, bias, agenda, manipulation,
cognitive and emotional interpretation, by both the transmitters and
receivers, and then possible retransmission. The information

4Information is defined in Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-06, NATO Glossary of

Terms and Definitions as: unprocessed data of every description, which may be used in the
production of intelligence.

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environment consists of two main facets – the domains5 and the

relationships between them (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 – The information environment

a. The first facet comprises the input into the three domains, the:

 cognitive/psychological domain – where decisions are

made;
 virtual domain – where intangible activity occurs and
technical tools facilitate communication; and
 physical domain – the space where physical activities
occur and individuals, nations, states, cultures and
societies interact.

5The three domains are the physical, virtual and cognitive/psychological. The
cognitive/psychological domain is the most important as it consists of cognition and emotions,
which affect an individual’s decision-making.

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b. The second facet is the interrelationships between six elements

or layers of the environment. These are:

 real world and its events;

 network connectivity that delivers information;
 information itself;
 persona that inhabit the environment and who develop
the messages in it; and
 layers five and six compose of people (individual actors
and social groups) that interpret and exploit the
environment.

0103. Strategic guidance. Military action alone cannot resolve crises, but it
can help set the conditions for resolution by other actors, including
using the full range of national power provided by NATO member
states. During planning, and throughout operations, the military
determines how it may best support, and be supported by, other
instruments of Alliance power.6 The North Atlantic Council (NAC) will
provide overall strategic guidance including directing NATO public
diplomacy efforts, as well as mission-specific strategic and political
guidance, for NATO military information activities. As NATO’s
political/military conditions evolve and mature for a given
situation/operation, Info Ops planners should expect strategic
guidance to be revised and updated to account for these changes.
This may require an adjustment when planning and conducting
information activities.

0104. Strategic communications. NATO strategic communications

(StratCom) is a political/military process to achieve coherence
between mutually reinforcing NATO communications and information
activities, closing the gap between Alliance actions and messages.
The conduct of military operations brings the potential use of force
into the communication equation. This adds a variable to military
communication considerations that is absent from the political level,
where communication is principally conducted through the use of
words and imagery. The message sent by potentially lethal
operations will have an immeasurable impact on people’s perceptions
and therefore requires proper coordination and integration with
NATO’s communication and information activities. At the operational
and tactical level, Info Ops staff have a key role in ensuring this
occurs, guided, along with the wider staff, by the StratCom adviser.

6 ‘Instruments of power’ are the national or organizational means of enforcing will or exerting
influence on others. NATO uses the diplomacy, information, military and economic
framework.

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Because information activities have potential strategic-level effects,

whether planned and conducted at the strategic, operational or
tactical levels, they should reinforce the NATO StratCom approach.
Info Ops staff at the operational and tactical level provide the
commander with the means to do so.

0105. Non-lethal and lethal activities.7 Coordinated lethal and non-lethal

activities create information effects.8 These activities are coordinated
at the earliest stages of planning, and assessed throughout all phases
of operations, achieving synchronization, sequencing and
de-confliction to generate desired effects. These coordinated
activities focus to create information effects within all three domains
as described in paragraph 102 to support the mission objectives and
commander’s intent. Info Ops will integrate lethal and non-lethal
activities with the intention of creating psychological and physical
effects in the information environment.

0106. The impact of the media. All crises occur under the scrutiny of the
international media (including social media). Maintaining public
understanding and support is crucial for democratically accountable
governments. This influences9 the options they can take (including
military action) and how they present these options to different
audiences. Some governments may seek to control media outputs to
regulate the information available to their population. To gain and
maintain public support, the actions of national governments and
international organizations/agencies should always be legal and as
transparent as possible. The ubiquity of global media complicates
NATO’s ability to influence and manage perceptions, and hence
people’s behaviours, both within and external to the immediate area of
operations. Today, anyone with a mobile device can record and
share information and events in real time with even minor events
creating significant interest. Events at the tactical level could result in
undesired effects at the strategic level and vice versa. This
underlines the importance of deployed personnel understanding the
significance of their actions. Consequently, NATO personnel at all
levels need to be agile, proactive and empowered to ensure NATO’s

7 Lethal activities are actions using capabilities whose primary purpose is to kill people or
destroy structures (for example, fires) creating physical effects. Non-lethal activities are
actions using capabilities whose primary purpose is to create psychological effects.
8 A desired condition created in the information environment as a result of information

activities. Information effects should be measurable to enable analysis, planning, execution

and assessment of related activities and the effects them self. (MC 0422/5 NATO Military
Policy on Information Operations)
9 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (COED) defines the term ‘influence’ as: the capacity

to have an effect on the character or behaviour of someone or something, or the effect itself.
This definition provides the meaning of ‘influence’ throughout this document.

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words, images and actions are timely, accurate and reflect NATO’s
StratCom framework. They must do this while countering an
adversary’s10 or detractor’s attempts to undermine public support.

0107. Challenges presented by information technology. Increased

reliance on IT introduces new opportunities for exploitation, and new
challenges to be considered. IT provides almost universal access to
information via the Internet, especially through social media. During
some terrorist incidents, participants have been able to communicate
in real or near real time. Such information is absorbed without
necessarily knowing its validity and source. In some cases,
considerable credence is placed on it – this is particularly so in
societies without a free press. The Internet offers opportunities to
spread or circulate information and opinion, including rumour, with a
speed inconceivable a few years ago. This unrestricted and
unregulated medium offers opportunities for NATO as well as its
adversaries. Info Ops, through its analysis of the information
environment, can allow a commander to understand how they might
exploit opportunities and manage risk.

Section II – Fundamentals of Information Operations

Definitions

0108. The definitions of Info Ops and information activities are listed
below.11

a. Info Ops: a staff function to analyze, plan, assess and integrate

information activities to create desired effects on the will,
understanding and capability of adversaries, potential
adversaries and NAC approved audiences12 in support of
Alliance mission objectives. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2.

b. Information activities: actions designed to affect information or

information systems.13 Information activities can be performed
by any actor and include protection measures.

10 AAP-6 defines an adversary as: A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly

party and against which the use of force may be envisaged.
11 Drawn from MC 0422/5. These definitions will be proposed for inclusion in AAP-06.
12 NAC approved audiences are those identified in top-level political guidance on Alliance

information activities. These may include adversaries, potential adversaries,

decision-makers, cultural groups, elements of the international community and others who
may be engaged by Alliance information activities.
13 Information systems are defined as: an assembly of equipment, methods and procedures,

and if necessary personnel, organized to accomplish information processing functions.

(AAP-06)

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Analyze

Plan
Information
activities
Assess

Integrate

Adversaries Will
Potential
Understanding Desired
adversaries
effects
North Atlantic
Council approved Capability
audiences

Alliance mission
objectives

Figure 1.2 – Information operations

Information operations activity areas

0109. Info Ops comprises three interrelated areas.

a. Information activities focusing on preserving and protecting

Alliance freedom of action in the information environment at all
times. This is achieved by defending the data, networks and
information that supports Alliance decision-makers and
decision-making processes.
b. Information activities focusing on behaviours, perceptions
and attitudes of NAC approved audiences as part of Alliance
military operations to induce, reinforce, convince or encourage
them in support of NATO objectives.
c. Information activities focusing on countering an adversary’s
propaganda as well as their command and control (C2)
functions and capabilities that support opinion forming and
decision-making processes.

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0110. While information activities focusing on preserving and protecting

Alliance freedom of action in the information environment take place
at all times, the latter two areas may only take place within the
framework of a military committee approved operations plan towards,
or against, NAC-approved audiences.

Focus of information operations

0111. An actor’s14 effectiveness is a function of will, understanding and

capability. They must have the will to act, an understanding of the
situation and possess the capability to act. If any one of these
elements is missing, decisions and actions will be affected.15 Activities
coordinated through Info Ops focus directly on influencing will, affecting
understanding and on those capabilities that promote understanding or
the application of will. Therefore, they have applicability across the full
spectrum of military operations. The following examples show how Info
Ops can affect will, capability and understanding.

0112. Will. Will is the faculty by which an actor decides upon, and initiates a
course of action (COA). It includes factors such as motivation, attitude,
beliefs and values and encompasses the intent to act or resist. Within
the direction and goals of wider military operations, and mission
specific NATO guidance, information activities are aimed at actors at
any level capable of influencing the situation.

a. Information activities aim to reinforce or deter specific types of

behaviour by affecting an approved audience’s will. For
adversaries, this could focus on undermining their cohesion by
questioning the legitimacy of leadership and cause. Information
activities may undermine an adversary’s moral power base,
separating leadership from its supporters (political, military and
public), thus weakening their desire to continue and affecting their
actions. Info Ops will also address attempts to influence NATO’s
will to maintain Alliance/coalition cohesion and enhance our
freedom of action. Such attempts may come from adversaries,
potential adversaries and other actors.

b. Information activities aim to protect those capabilities, such as

friendly command and control systems (C2S) and communication
and information systems (CIS) infrastructure, which allow a Joint
Force Commander (JFC) to exercise effective command, impose

14 Actor is used in its broadest sense throughout this document. They include political and
other leaders, military commanders, influential individuals, military personnel, armed factions
and specific population groups (for example, ethnic, cultural, religious and political). They
may be adversaries, potential adversaries or other NAC-approved audiences.
15 This publication uses the term ‘to affect’ in a generic sense meaning ‘to have an effect on’,

without any implied (positive or negative) connotations.

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their will as well as seize and maintain the initiative. NATO may
seek to protect approved parties’ capabilities proactively by
countering adversary information activities.

0113. Understanding. In the context of decision-making, understanding is

the perception and interpretation of a particular situation to provide the
context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making.
This situation is interpreted through the prism of an actor’s culture,
environment and perception.

a. Information activities seek to deny, degrade, disrupt or present

the information available to an audience to affect perception
and thereby understanding.

b. Information activities also aim to ensure the information

available to friendly decision-makers is safeguarded and
assured. In this way, shared understanding between allies and
other approved parties will be possible, thus improving NATO
decision-making and effectiveness.

0114. Capability. An actor’s capacity for action is dependent upon their

physical capabilities and their utility in a particular situation.
Information activities will seek to affect those capabilities, such as
C2S, CIS infrastructure and propaganda facilities that enable actors to
understand a situation and apply their will.

a. Information activities seek to: degrade, disrupt, deceive,

destroy or deny those capabilities that allow adversary
decision-makers to increase their understanding and; bolster,
impose, apply and sustain their will to act effectively and
(where appropriate) exercise C2.

b. Information activities also seek to attack the source of an

adversary’s power base, splitting internal and external
groupings and alliances. The aim is to influence their
decision-making processes, thereby preventing them from
taking the initiative.

c. Information activities also aim to protect those capabilities. For

example, friendly C2S and CIS infrastructure that allow the JFC
to exercise effective command, impose their will and seize and
maintain the initiative.

Section III – Information Operations Principles

0115. Planning and conducting information activities rely on understanding

the commander’s objectives, guidance and intent and the situation in

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the information environment. Info Ops is based on certain principles,

shaping its role within the planning and joint targeting processes, thus,
directing the way in which information activities support the
achievement of the commander’s objectives across the full range of
NATO military operations.

Principles

0116. Focussed and integrated. Info Ops must focus on the effects
required to achieve the commander’s objectives and then, through an
understanding of the information environment, select the correct
activity (lethal/non-lethal) to generate that effect. This is achieved by
integrating the full range of capabilities throughout the planning and
targeting processes.

0117. Coherent and consistent. Words, images and actions must be

coherent with one another and at all levels – strategic, operational and
tactical. This is challenging as message content can differ at each
level depending on the audience but the underlying substance in the
form of the narrative must show consistency.

0118. Comprehensive understanding. The successful outcome of an

operation is based on having a comprehensive understanding of the
operating environment, including the information environment and,
most particularly, the human terrain16 within it. Therefore, developing
a high degree of understanding of the sociocultural context of the
operational environment as early as possible is vital to facilitate
detailed planning. Understanding continues to develop and be refined
as engagement with a particular area increases.

0119. Centralized planning and decentralized execution. Due to the

need for fully integrating the Info Ops function, the principles of
centralized planning and decentralized execution apply at all levels of
command. Therefore, commanders should be prepared to accept risk
and delegate authority to the lowest practical level within political
constraints. There may be occasions where centralized execution is
necessary due either to the sensitivity of the activity or where strategic
assets are used.

0120. Continuous. Info Ops are applicable across the entire spectrum of
operations at all levels – tactical, operational and strategic.

16Human terrain is the social, political and economic organization, beliefs and values and
forms of interaction of a population.

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0121. Monitoring and assessment. A key part of Info Ops is effective

monitoring and assessment of the short and long-term effects of
integrated activities, directed towards objectives. A precondition of
accurate assessment is a defined baseline, measure of performance
(MOP)17 and clearly identified measure of effectiveness (MOE)18 An
accurate assessment provides a commander and staff with critical
information with which to make decisions and adjust planning. The
process depends on collecting multiple-source intelligence (INTEL)
and other feedback on information activities. MOE must be part of the
knowledge development (KD)19 process. Particular attention is
focussed on changes in the target’s behaviour and other indicators,
such as changes in the attitude of the civilian population, political
activity and expressions of unrest. Changes in a target’s capability,
such as reduced efficiency, disorganization and delayed reactions,
may also be used as a MOE. Monitoring is used to identify specific
actions in response to any deception plan.

0122. Agility. The Info Ops staff must be agile and responsive to constantly
changing conditions in the operational environment. To achieve this
they must constantly monitor, assess and evaluate information effects
and information activities to allow rapid adjustment when required.
This will include force structures and message content.

Section IV – Capabilities and Techniques Integrated Through

Information Operations
0123. Info Ops is an analyzing, planning, integrating and assessing function
focused on affecting the will, capability and understanding of a range
of actors. The following list of capabilities and techniques forms the
basis of most Info Ops activity. It is not exhaustive and is limited only
by the availability of the capabilities and techniques and the
constraints of policy and law.

0124. Psychological operations. The primary purpose of psychological

operations (PSYOPS) is to influence the behaviours, perceptions and
attitudes of NAC-approved audiences in support of Alliance
objectives. PSYOPS activities must conform to strategic direction and

17 See para 0311.d (1)

18 See para 0311.d (2)
19 The Allied Command Operations (ACO) Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

(COPD) describes KD as the meaning rendered from data and information, using the skills
acquired through experience or education that contributes to the theoretical or practical
understanding of a subject.

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the StratCom guidance in the operation plan (OPLAN). PSYOPS

provides the main capability to analyze, and counter, adversaries’
propaganda and, unlike military public affairs (PA), retains direct
control over the content and initial dissemination of its activities and
messages. Effective PSYOPS requires providing timely INTEL,
resources (such as linguistic support, graphics and print capability),
broadcasting capability and other delivery mechanisms. Additional
capacity can be generated by contracting local media services or
through reachback to troop contributing nations with organic PSYOPS
capability. Further detail on PSYOPS is contained in AJP-3.10.1,
Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations.

0125. Electronic warfare. Individuals and organizations, both civil and

military, use devices whose functionality depends on the
electromagnetic spectrum. Unimpeded military access to, and use of,
this spectrum is vital – sometimes becoming a focus for operations
themselves. Electronic warfare (EW) has wide application in
protecting friendly and denying adversary operations, within the
electromagnetic spectrum. Effects created by EW can be temporary
or permanent. They also have the potential to minimize the use of
force, hence avoiding unnecessary casualties and collateral damage.
Electronic attack enables the countering of command functions by
attacking adversary communication nodes and systems, such as
missiles and related support and guidance systems. It also supports
the conduct of friendly information activities, such as deception and
PSYOPS. Electronic protective measures protect personnel,
facilities, equipment, and, along with spectrum management, counter
hostile information capabilities and protect friendly use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic warfare support measures
(ESM) are an integral part of INTEL collection. They provide the
commander with a greater degree of situational awareness to aid
timely and informed decision-making. Further detail is contained in
AJP-3.6 (B), Allied Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare.

0126. Civil-military cooperation. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is

defined as: the coordination and cooperation, in support of the
mission, between the NATO commander and civil actors, including
national population and local authorities, as well as international,
national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.20
Therefore, it seeks to create a meaningful relationship between the
military, civilian agencies and the local population. CIMIC facilitates
cooperation and coordinates activities between a military force and all
parts of the civilian environment within the joint operations area by:

20 AAP-06.

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 liaising and coordinating with civil actors, for example,

international organizations (IO) and non-governmental
organizations (NGO);
 providing assessments and knowledge on political, economic,
environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and
conducting military operations; and
 building an effective relationship between the military and civilian
authorities, organizations, agencies and populations within the
joint operations area.

0127. In addition to civil-military liaison, providing an advisory service and

coordinating projects and other efforts in support of civilian actors,
CIMIC staff may also coordinate the military involvement in relief
operations. They will establish relationships with a variety of civilian
authorities and agencies and thereby establish a valuable source of
information to assist Info Ops planning and wider military operations.
This includes advising on prevention of interference or on
coordination with other actors. Due care must always be taken to
avoid CIMIC activities being perceived as military INTEL gathering or
activities aiming to influence partner agencies such as IO and NGO.
Further detail on CIMIC is contained in AJP-3.4.9, Allied Joint
Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation.

0128. Computer network attack. Software and hardware vulnerabilities

allow computers, storage devices and networked equipment to be
attacked through inserting malicious code (such as viruses) or through
more subtle manipulation of data that change the characteristics and
performance of the devices or how that information is displayed. This
capability is enhanced by the increasing use of commercial off-the-
shelf software in military systems.

0129. Computer network exploitation. Computer network exploitation

provides an ability to remotely access targeted computer networks to
exploit the information hosted on them and the computers/computer
networks themselves.21

0130. Presence, posture and profile. The mere presence of a force may
have a significant effect on perceptions. The force’s presence, posture

21Cyber operations are yet to be defined in AAP-06 and doctrine. Once defined they will be
reviewed from an Info Ops perspective. AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of
Operations (2011, under review) identifies cyberspace as an environment and as an element
of the information environment. AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning
(2013) includes cyberspace as one of the functional areas normally divided into components
and recognises the requirement to include defensive cyber operations in plans for joint
targeting and the employment of joint fires.

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and profile, and that of its leadership, conveys a message to local

audiences directly and global ones through modern communications
technology. Info Ops staff will advise on how aspects of presence,
posture and profile will impact on the information environment.

a. Presence. The presence or threat of deploying a force will have

an impact on perceptions. Deploying even limited capability to
the right place at the right time adds substantial credibility to
messages delivered through other channels and provides a
major contribution to deterrence.

b. Posture. The posture and conduct of force elements can be

scrutinised by global audiences and make a considerable
difference to the perceptions of all actors. Therefore, force
posture must be deliberately considered and feature in prevailing
cultural and threat factors.

c. Profile. The public profile of commanders at all levels will be of

significant interest to a large number of audiences. Their public
role must be carefully analyzed and opportunities used to
transmit key messages.

0131. Deception. Deception comprises measures designed to mislead the

enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to
induce them to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests. This
involves deliberate measures to manipulate adversary decision-
makers’ perceptions and condition their behaviour to persuade them
to adopt a particular COA. More specifically, deception seeks to
influence their cognitive processes to create a tangible physical effect
in terms of activity. Deception is a complex art and should only be
attempted if it can be fully planned and supported. In operations, it
can directly contribute to achieving surprise and, indirectly, to
achieving security and economy of effort. Normally deception is
planned and conducted through a compartmented deception
community of interest and is not, therefore, exclusively an Info Ops
responsibility. However, coordinated information activities (except PA
which has no role in planning or executing deception operations),22
contribute to deception operations at all levels – for example, by
influencing adversary audiences’ perceptions. Info Ops planners
must be involved in deception planning to ensure that deception
objectives and information activities are mutually supportive.23

22MC 457/2 NATO Military Policy for Public Affairs.

23Further detail on deception will be contained in AJP-3.10.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for OPSEC
and Deception.

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0132. Operations security. Operations security (OPSEC) is the process

which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security,
using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the
dispositions, capabilities or intentions of friendly forces.24 OPSEC
identifies and protects information that is critical to the success of the
operation, described as essential elements of friendly information
(EEFI). It aims to deny EEFI to the adversary or potential adversary
decision-maker, thereby affecting their understanding of the
operational environment. EEFI will need to be protected using a
variety of active and passive techniques for as long as necessary and
throughout the range of military operations.

0133. Special capabilities. Special capabilities refers to highly classified

compartmentalized national capabilities that can be generic or
mission specific. Where such capabilities exist, national
organizations will hold a nominated officer able to brief the
commander where appropriate.

Engagement

0134. Traditionally, engagement has focussed only on the key leader.

While this remains important, recent operations have emphasized
that engagement at all levels and all times can have an impact on
behaviours, attitudes and perceptions. Engagements should be
consistent, culturally sensitive, credible, adaptive, balanced and
pragmatic. Engagement can be broadly categorized as described
below.

0135. Key leader engagement. Key leader engagements are

engagements between NATO military leaders and the key
decision-makers of approved audiences that have defined goals
(such as a change in policy or supporting the JFC’s objectives).
These engagements can be used to shape and influence local
leaders within the operations area or may also be directed toward
specific groups such as religious leaders, academic leaders and tribal
leaders (for example, to solidify trust and confidence in NATO forces).
Info Ops supports these engagements by identifying and maintaining
a database of all key actors within the joint operations area and their
interrelationships. Detailed knowledge of key leaders’ personalities,
their leadership styles, ambitions, motivations, objectives (short and
long term), current stances, dependencies, psychological profiles and
personal histories, together with any previous target audience
analysis conducted on the leader or the leader’s primary home
audience is essential to providing the context to plan appropriate
information activities. A vital component in all plans will be to

24 Enemy can refer to any actual or potential adversary.

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recognize the complex, adaptive relationships and dependencies that

exist between actors. The Info Ops staff will coordinate the
commander’s key leader engagement plan. This contains information
on the situational context (planning milestones), critical events,
planned contacts of the command group and special staff (key
leaders) with relevant actors, objectives, main themes or issues to be
addressed, desired effects and MOE.

0136. Soldier-level engagement.25 In the contemporary operating

environment, we recognize that operations are conducted amongst
people. Soldiers interact with local populations on a daily basis.
Consequently, soldier engagement is likely to comprise the majority of
engagements. These can occur as an opportunity, a face-to-face
encounter on the street or a scheduled meeting and can bridge the
difference between the aims and ambitions of local audiences and the
NATO force. To best exploit this potential opportunity, all soldiers
should be trained on how to engage with the local population and
given a simple narrative that they can construct their engagement
around.

0137. Engagement categories. Key leader and soldier engagements fall

into two main categories and, as such, differ in their planning and
execution.

a. Deliberate. A deliberate engagement is a planned and

anticipated personal interaction designed to create a specific
outcome. These engagements may be face-to-face interactions
or interactions by other means, such as telephone or video
conference.

b. Dynamic. Dynamic engagements are unanticipated or

impromptu encounters for which neither soldiers nor leaders
have conducted specific planning; such encounters can occur
frequently and in many circumstances. Soldiers’ or leaders’
ability to exploit them will depend heavily on training, experience
and their understanding of the mission narrative.

0138. Cultural understanding and engagement. In some societies it may

not be possible to directly engage with specific groups (such as
females, specific castes or tribes) for cultural reasons or, it may be
desirable to engage with religious leaders due to their influential
position in society. In such societies, special provision should be
made to enable these types of engagement (which will generally be
deliberate) through appropriately training and preparing personnel to
conduct them (for example, female or religious). In particular,

25 ‘Soldier’ in this context includes sailors, marines and airmen, as well as NATO civilians.

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emphasis should be placed on language skills minimizing the

requirement to use interpreters.

Physical destruction

0139. There are two main aspects to using physical destruction for creating
effects in the information environment. First, by attacking C2
systems, physical destruction will play a large part in affecting an
adversary’s understanding and thus their ability to apply will. Second,
using force sends a strong message. Directly applying physical
destruction will have significant psychological impact. Carefully
applied force can play a major role in coercion, deterrence and in
reducing an adversary’s ability to exercise command. However, using
physical destruction to create psychological effects must be balanced
against the risk of collateral damage. These have a negative impact
on public support towards NATO. If physical destruction is planned to
create the desired effect, the JFC must consider and balance the
potential negative impact (for example, secondary effects, unintended
consequences and reconstruction/remediation requirements) against
the expected benefits. These activities are subject to the Law of
Armed Conflict (LOAC).

Relationship to the military public affairs function

0140. Military Public affairs. NATO military PA is the function responsible

to promote NATO’s military aims and objectives to audiences in order
to enhance awareness and understanding of military aspects of the
Alliance. This includes planning and conducting external and internal
communications, and community relations.26 It is a separate, but
related, function to Info Ops. They both directly support military
objectives, counter adversary disinformation and deter adversary
actions. However, military PA efforts and Info Ops may differ
regarding audience, scope and intent. Coordination and collaboration
between military PA and Info Ops is essential at all times and at all
levels and is enabled and assisted by the relevant coordination
boards and the advice of the StratCom staff. This ensures
consistency in the released message and promotes the operation’s
overall effectiveness and credibility. This is particularly important
when conducting consequence management.27 Further detail is
contained in MC 0422/5, NATO Military Committee Policy for
Information Operations.

26MC 0457/2 NATO Military Policy on Public Affairs.

27Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and to lessen the effects of natural
or man-made disasters. The latter could include civilian casualty or other events/incidents
which have a direct physical or psychological effect on people.

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Section V – Roles of Information Operations at the Strategic,

Operational and Tactical Levels

0141. General. Operations by NATO forces are directed, planned and

conducted at three levels of command. Direction and guidance are
obtained from NATO Headquarters (HQ) via the strategic commander,
while planning and execution are largely achieved at the operational
and tactical levels. The distinction between activities conducted by
forces at the different levels is clear, but the effects of political,
strategic, operational and tactical levels of joint operations will seldom
remain only at one level. This requires special consideration within
the StratCom framework for Info Ops, where interconnected
information systems and the psychology of decision-making mean
that actions at the tactical level can have strategic implications and
vice versa. Particular attention must be paid to local and regional
media to influence local and regional populations.

0142. Political and strategic level. At this level, armed forces are used
within an overarching political framework and in a synchronized
fashion. The Military Committee considers the contribution that Info
Ops, within an overall StratCom approach, can make to achieving
Alliance objectives and provides military advice to the NAC. The
International Military Staff (IMS), on behalf of the Military Committee,
would consult with the strategic commander when forming Info Ops
advice (as outlined in policy on Info Ops). The IMS carries out a
number of other roles.

a. The IMS recognizes any political or legal limitations for

conducting information activities (particularly international law,
custom and practice, host nation agreements/arrangements, support
by other nations or other sensitivities).
b. It considers the impact of NAC-approved rules of engagement
on the application of information activities.
c. The IMS contributes to the StratCom guidance (through the NAC
initiating directive) which informs the operational design and
ultimately the planning and execution of information activities; it may
also inform the strategic HQ of approved target audiences for Info
Ops activity.
d. It also ensures coordination of strategic-level targeting, including
information activities – especially to sensitive targeting, such as
against computer networks and IT, population groups or individuals.

0143. Info Ops guidance is outlined in the StratCom guidance and in Annex
UU to the strategic-level OPLAN (if developed). Strategic guidance,
under MC 133/4, will usually include available political guidance,

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strategic goals, directives and limitations. The main body of the

concept of operations (CONOPS) and OPLAN should reflect
StratCom guidance which may include reference to a narrative
together with themes and focus areas. This may be expanded in a
StratCom Annex (SS) or a NATO HQ/ACO authorized StratCom
framework. It is the responsibility of the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) StratCom staff to ensure that military
coordination with the higher-level political and media aspects of the
operation occurs regularly.

0144. After the initial coordination process has been established and
strategic planning guidance has been issued, the StratCom and Info
Ops staff further refine the OPLAN, contingency plan or Standing
Defence Plan. They need to take into account issues from
multinational and joint operational-level planning.

0145. Information operations at the operational level. At the operational

level, armed forces are deployed, sustained, employed, and
redeployed to achieve strategic objectives through conducting
operations. Using the StratCom guidance, the operational level Info
Ops staff will contribute to the following activities:

 analysis of the information environment to contribute to the JFC’s

overall understanding;
 identifying the effects necessary in the information environment to
achieve the JFC’s objectives and establish the priorities for
achieving them;
 providing guidance for allocating information activities forces and
resources (as necessary) for subordinate commanders to execute
their tasks;
 conducting Info Ops assessments to measure the effectiveness of
information activities, contribute to overall operation assessment
and provide military advice on Info Ops to the operational-level
commander; and
 providing guidance to tactical level commanders on conducting
information activities to enable them to create the desired effects
depicted in the operations plan.

0146. Information operations at the tactical level. At the tactical level,

armed forces conduct military activities to achieve military objectives
assigned to tactical forces. As well as those tasks outlined above, at
this level, Info Ops focuses on:

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 creating an effect on key local decision-makers and groups by

affecting their will, capabilities and understanding (including
decision-making processes);
 coordinating and integrating information activities to create these
effects; and
 conducting activities to protect own information and information
systems.

Section VI – Summary
0147. Figure 1.3 summarises this chapter’s primary theme. It shows how
Info Ops integrates the range of information activities within the
StratCom framework.

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Figure 1.3 – Integrating information activities within the

StratCom framework

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CHAPTER 2 – INFORMATION OPERATIONS

COORDINATION PROCESS AND STAFF
REQUIREMENTS
Section I – Introduction

0201. General. To successfully meet the commander’s objectives

information operations (Info Ops) must be fully integrated and
coordinated with all other joint force actions. To create the desired
effects, headquarters, adjacent and subordinate commands, and the
strategic-political level must achieve a coherent and synchronized
approach. This is achieved by thoroughly coordinating effects within
the information environment and related military actions from the
strategic to the tactical level within the overall strategic
communications (StratCom) framework. Commanders should ensure
that any information activity likely to affect other areas is implemented
with prior coordination and notification.

0202. Information operations process. Figure 1.2 summarized the Info

Ops military function of integrating and coordinating information
activities to meet mission-specific Alliance objectives. To achieve this,
Info Ops personnel undertake the following major staff activities:

 analyzing the information environment and, using this analysis,

inform the joint staff estimate, planning and targeting processes;

 planning and integrating information activities into the

operational-level planning process (OLPP) to create desired
effects; and

 coordinating the execution and assessment of activities in the

information environment and the resultant effects.

0203. The role of the Information Activities Coordination Board.28

Within the headquarters’ battle rhythm, the Information Activities
Coordination Board (IACB) serves as the mechanism to synchronize,
integrate and harmonize information activities with other military
capabilities.

0204. The IACB prepares inputs to relevant headquarters internal and

external processes including the joint targeting processes, the
knowledge development (KD) process and the joint coordination
process. A wide range of functional area participation in the IACB
(including liaison officers from subordinate or superior commands) is

28 Formerly the Info Ops Coordination Board; the change of title better reflects its role.

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essential if their input and subject matter expertise can be applied to

the Info Ops process. This structured Info Ops process, includes
supporting working groups and takes account of StratCom advice.
This allows Chief Info Ops, (acting on behalf of the Chief of Staff
(COS) as chairman), to outline current and future information
activities.29 The need for all activity to be consistent with mission-
specific strategic guidance and a view taken on the potential impact is
particularly important. The IACB is covered in greater detail in
Section IV.

0205. Planning. Info Ops staffs must be directly involved from the start of
any planning process including early discussions and mission
analysis.30 Throughout, they must remain mindful of and responsive
to the possibility of rapid changes in the information environment such
that they can seek to gain or retain the initiative. Further details are in
Chapter 3.

Section II – Headquarters Internal Coordination and Staff

Requirements

0206. The information operations staff. The Info Ops staff comprises a
Chief Info Ops and sufficient supporting staff relative to the
headquarters’ size and function (such as planners, targeteers and
analysts). Info Ops staff focus and responsibilities are determined by
the command level and assigned mission. An operational-level
headquarters requires a comprehensive staff to enable analysis,
planning, operations, intelligence (INTEL) support and specialists to
conduct targeting and operations assessment. At the tactical level,
the need will focus more on specialists to deliver capability to achieve
specific objectives. Within the headquarters, the Chief Info Ops is
responsible for the following functions:

 providing the lead on analyzing the information environment and

contributing to the comprehensive preparation of the operational
environment (CPOE);31

29 If available and appropriate the IACB may be chaired by Chief StratCom on behalf of the
COS.
30 Carried out in accordance with the established planning process in AJP-5, Allied Joint

Doctrine for Operational-level Planning with additional guidance in MC 133/4 NATO’s

Operations Planning and the COPD.
31 The comprehensive operations planning directive (COPD) describes CPOE as a crisis-

specific cross headquarters process, led by the intelligence/knowledge staff, to develop a

comprehensive understanding of the operational environment covering all aspects of political,
military, economic, social and infrastructures, including associated threats and risks.

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 providing specific Info Ops input to developing the commander’s

direction and guidance;

 preparing Info Ops contributions to the commander’s plans and

orders;

 helping determine the desired effects to support operations

objectives, the nodes or targets that could generate those effects
and appropriate activities for inclusion in the joint targeting
process;32

 recommending priorities for information activities;

 assessing information activities and contributing to the overall

operations synchronization and assessment;

 coordinating with all principal functional staff areas, special staff

and higher and subordinate headquarters on Info Ops matters;
and

 chairing the IACB within the Headquarters’ staff.

0207. Information operations staff structures. As part of the wider

StratCom effort information activities should be planned under J5 and
executed under J3. The Chief Info Ops must consider coordinating
activity with J2 and J5 (to inform and shape the planning process) and
J3 (to coordinate the creation of the effect) in order to influence
approved target audiences and targets. This ensures that Info Ops is
considered at the highest cross-functional level in analysis, planning,
execution and assessment.

0208. There are two considerations which will influence the level or structure
for Info Ops staff within a command.

a. Info Ops must be staffed by trained and experienced Info Ops

personnel. Such staff must have an understanding of the
information environment as well as being aware of available
capabilities (including non-NATO owned assets) to conduct
information activities. They should also be familiar with general
staff procedures (particularly the operational-level planning and
targeting processes).

b. The Info Ops staff should develop and/or improve Info Ops
awareness and procedures within their commands, ensuring

32This process, described as a ‘full spectrum approach to targeting’ is described in paragraph

0209 and outlined in Figure 2.1.

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adequacy to support the analysis, planning, integration, conduct

and assessment of information activities.

0209. Full spectrum approach to targeting. Joint targeting considers the

full spectrum of available military capabilities to create the effects that
support the objectives of the operation. Therefore, the Info Ops staff
plays an integral role in the Joint Targeting Coordination Board
(JTCB) and its subordinate working groups. The targeting process
covers both lethal and non-lethal activities creating physical and
psychological effects. So, it is vital that it considers all possible
secondary effects (intended and unintended) that may result in
psychological or physical damage. This means the full range of
targets affected by information activities, including adversary decision-
making processes, key decision-makers and technical components of
information systems must be coordinated. Info Ops provides a key
targeting function by helping ensure that effects created in the
information environment are those required to achieve the joint force
commander’s (JFC’s) objectives or to mitigate undesirable
consequences when they do not. When necessary, and when the
situation dictates, the IACB could be merged with the JTCB to
produce a single decision board.

0210. This full spectrum approach to targeting is pictorially represented in

Figure 2.1. It begins at the start of any planning process with a
detailed target systems analysis to ensure that efforts are focused on
intended effects that support the JFC’s objectives. These will all be
set within the overarching strategic direction which includes the
StratCom framework and narrative. The JFC commands the targeting
process at the operational level, which will have a substantial impact
on battle rhythm.

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Joint Task Force

Components
Headquarters
Ends Ways Means

E N A R
Effect Node Action Resources

• Determine what Who or what you need Which actions Which resources
objective(s) you want to to target to create the lethal or non-lethal can perform the
achieve and what effects desired effect? against the node desired action
will support achievement (the effected) will produce the (capabilities
of the objective(s) desired effect? and effectors)
• The end result of the
engagement

Figure 2.1 – The full spectrum approach

Section III – External Coordination

0211. General. As well as between strategic, operational and tactical-level

headquarters, coordination must also take place with international,
regional, political and civil organizations. Coordination up and down
the command levels takes the form of plans, direction, guidance,
doctrine, policy and training. Coordination with external organizations
normally occurs through engagement. All staff contribute to this
coordination; StratCom staff (through the public diplomacy branch at
the strategic level) and Info Ops staff (at the operational level and
below) through key leader engagement play a key role in this process.

0212. Component commanders/tactical level commanders. It is important

that activities conducted by component commanders and commanders
at lower tactical levels are synchronized with activity at higher levels.
Also, commanders at these levels will often be required to conduct
activity to support higher level objectives. To ensure synchronization,
proposed information activities should be forwarded to higher
headquarters Info Ops cells for de-confliction with other ongoing
activities. Liaison officers (LO) will normally be required during crisis or
deployed operations. All LO must maintain close contact with their
command Info Ops staff to ensure they are fully aware of changes
and/or requirements for discussion at the IACB.

0213. Information operations analysis and assessment. Any viable

analysis of the information environment and assessment of information
activities requires an inter-command effort that will involve all elements

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of the force, as well as external political and civilian organizations. This

could include using contracted capabilities.

Section IV – The Information Activities Coordination Board

0214. General. The IACB is the forum for the coordination of information
activities within an operational level headquarters. This board,
chaired by Chief Info Ops on behalf of the COS, meets as a subset of
the Joint Coordination Board (JCB).33 It will convene as stipulated in
the headquarters’ battle rhythm.34

0215. Membership. Figure 2.2 shows an example composition for a typical

IACB. While its composition is not fixed, and Chief Info Ops will invite
other parties as required, all members should attend whenever it
convenes. Representatives on the IACB must have the authority to
speak for, and make decisions on behalf of, their command functional
area. IACB members’ responsibilities are outlined at paragraph 0219.
If the posts for deception and operations security (OPSEC) officers
are not established, J3 and/or J5 should cover these areas.
StratCom adviser
Chief Info Ops
Civil-military cooperation CJ1

Special operations forces CJ2

CJ3
Electronic warfare forces

Deception officer CJ4

Operations security officer CJ5

Information Activities CJ6

PSYOPS
Coordination Board
CJ7
Legal adviser
CJ8
Political adviser
Operational analysis
Cultural adviser
Public affairs
Gender adviser
Cyber Military engineering officer

Targets officer Liaison officers

Figure 2.2 – Information Activities Coordination Board example

33
The JCB is the JFC’s principle meeting. It’s aim is to assist the macro aspects of joint force activity
and effects synchronization, specifically to issue commander’s priority guidance across the
components, and to resolve potential areas of conflict. (AJP-3(B)).

34
If available and appropriate the IACB may be chaired by Chief StratCom on behalf of the
COS.

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0216. Role. First and foremost, the IACB provides a forum for coordinating,
de-conflicting and monitoring Info Ops plans and activities. It ensures
information activities are coherent and synchronized with other
actions (potentially) affecting the information environment. The IACB
provides the forum for collective coordination of the JFC’s information
activities. Within the scope of its assigned functions, the IACB will
initially coordinate target nominations related to information and
information systems to facilitate subsequent harmonization at the
JTCB.35 It will also provide advice on possible effects in the
information environment created by other military actions. The Info
Ops representative at the JTCB will:

 present IACB recommendations;

 monitor the selection, harmonization, nomination and

prioritization process; and

 advise on overarching, cross-functional issues, as required.

0217. Representatives responsibilities. Representatives provide

information on their future intentions and advise on the employment of
their assets. Through the IACB, activities are de-conflicted and
intentions amended to ensure coherence before submitting inputs to
the JTCB, JCB and, ultimately, the commander for approval.
Representatives from the subordinate or component commands
(preferably trained Info Ops staff) will provide expertise and act as
liaison for Info Ops matters between the higher and subordinate
commands. (Where circumstances allow, component or formation
Info Ops staffs can participate in the IACB via technical means, such
as video teleconferencing.) Paragraph 0219 describes the role and
contribution of board members.

0218. Responsibilities of the Information Activities Coordination

Board. The responsibilities of the IACB are:

 presenting the analysis of the information environment;

 developing, revising and assessing the plans and information
activities based on approved information effects;
 providing Info Ops guidance based on commander’s guidance
and direction;

35 More detail on the JTCB is contained in AJP-3.9, Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting.

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 considering activities affecting the information environment

within the StratCom approach;
 identifying necessary and available resources and requirements
to support information activities;
 recommending the tasking of capabilities, coordination and staff
action;
 reviewing Info Ops inputs to the main body and annexes to
various plans and fragmentary orders;
 developing target nominations for input at the JTCB;
 recommending approval of the Info Ops Annex UU to the
operations plan;
 coordinating with outside agencies and consulting with other
staff areas as required; and
 developing and monitoring of MOE.

Functional and Special Staff Roles

0219. Effective Info Ops requires a coordinated approach across the staff,
led by the command group. These roles are explained in Table 2.1
below.

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Staff Role

The commander provides direction and guidance to the headquarters on developing and implementing
information operations (Info Ops). They also provide advice on Info Ops to the higher levels of command,
including an assessment of information activities as part of the operation and for implementing mission-specific
Commander
political guidance. The commander is a key Info Ops contributor in their own right, given their ability to influence
local events through key leader engagement, presence and dialogue. They also contribute to the wider mission-
specific guidance through direction of all headquarters’ activity.

The Chief of Staff (COS) coordinates the work of all staff divisions across the headquarters, setting priorities and
Chief of Staff giving extra guidance to support the commander’s direction. The COS ensures unity of staff effort as well as
synchronizing and integrating Info Ops into the headquarters processes and staffing activities.

The StratCom adviser (supported by a small staff) ensures that Info Ops, military public affairs (PA) and public
StratCom diplomacy (through the political adviser) are coordinated in-line with the mission narrative and within the
adviser StratCom framework. When available and appropriate they may chair the information activities coordination
board (IACB) on behalf of the COS.

The Chief Info Ops at each level is the commander’s subject matter expert on Info Ops and advises the
Chief commander on issues relating to the information environment. They are responsible for the overall direction of
Information Info Ops through the headquarters coordination and synchronization process and chair the IACB on behalf of
Operations COS. Chief Info Ops leads the integration process, ensuring prioritization, de-confliction and unity of purpose for
all information activities undertaken within the command.

The political adviser (POLAD) advises on policy implications of proposed information activities and, when
Political required, coordinates the policy implications of information activities with higher headquarters counterparts. The
adviser POLAD should also coordinate public diplomacy activities with Info Ops staff as part of mission-specific political
guidance.

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Staff Role

The legal adviser advises on legal implications, including rules of engagement of proposed information activities,
Legal adviser
and provides a legal assessment of information activities proposed by the IACB.

The cultural adviser advises on cultural implications of proposed information activities, including ethnological,
Cultural
religious, gender and social aspects. They, in conjunction with J9 and the knowledge development section in J2,
adviser
also contribute to the assessment of information activities from the cultural perspective.

The gender adviser will ensure that gender perspectives, in particular the role of women in local societies and the
Gender
effects conflict has on them are considered in both the planning and execution phases of operations. This
adviser
gender perspective will have particular utility for planning Info Ops.

Using scientific methods, the operational analysis officer provides significant input to all operational and
Operational operation assessments. They are closely associated with Info Ops, advising on, and analyzing, MOE and
analyst informing operation assessments. Their advice and output will be applied throughout the iterative analysis,
planning, execution and review cycle, in particular in relation to the information environment.

PA is the commander’s interface with the media and the public. Their representative coordinates with Info Ops
Military public
staff to ensure that PA and other information activities are mutually coherent and consistent. This does not
affairs
prejudice Chief PA’s direct access to the commander.

CJ1 participates when personnel matters are included in the information activities. CJ1 also identifies personnel
CJ1
requirements and shortfalls including operations security considerations.

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Staff Role

CJ2 CJ2 coordinates intelligence (INTEL) collection requirements and analytical support for Info Ops. INTEL will
provide the initial systems analysis, to include a description of the political/military decision-making process and
decision-makers, a communications and information systems nodal analysis, human factors (in tandem with the
cultural advisor) and an analysis of other entities’ capabilities to affect the information environment. CJ2 assists
in the assessment of activities and the resulting effects and advises on the capability of all-source INTEL support
to Info Ops (including targeting). CJ2 provides subject matter expertise to support the intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance activities in coordination with CJ3.

CJ3 plans, advises on, and integrates, planning of effects and activities in the information environment into the
headquarters’ deliberate short and mid-term planning process. J3 operations provide subject matter expertise to
CJ3 support planning, executing and assessing information activities including intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance allocation. CJ3 provides subject matter expertise to support the intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance activities in coordination with CJ2.
CJ4 considers the effects of information activity and operations security on logistics and support, including its
CJ4 own contribution to creating information effects, particularly Info Ops requirements, and operations security
(OPSEC) considerations.
CJ5, supported by Info Ops staff, integrates Info Ops planning into the deliberate long-term planning process.
CJ5
Info Ops is driven by and supports CJ5 through the Joint Operations Planning Group process.
CJ6 identifies vulnerabilities to communication and information systems and develops procedures and
capabilities to protect friendly command and control communication systems and command and control
CJ6
information systems. J6 develops information security plans and in conjunction with chief Info Ops and J2
assesses the impact of adversary information activities and maintains a joint restricted frequency list.
Security force assistance, usually led by CJ7 offers opportunities that can be exploited for information effect.
CJ7
CJ7 also advise on best practice as custodians of the headquarters lessons learned process.

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Staff Role
Many information activities make use of contracts to provide resources (for example, interpreters and printing).
CJ8 The financial management staff can advise on placing contracts and provide scrutiny over expenditure and
resource management.
Civil-military They advise on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) capabilities and assessments that support information effects
cooperation and coordinate activities with Info Ops staff. They can also provide useful feedback on the progress of
representative information activities.
The psychological operations (PSYOPS) representative (who may be embedded staff) advises on PSYOPS
PSYOPS support and coordinates PSYOPS with other information activities during the OLPP. Through its target audience
representative analysis capability PSYOPS also contributes to human factors understanding, target systems analysis and
analysis of adversary propaganda.

Liaison officers (for example, from components) provide critical linkages between their parent organization and
Liaison officer
the joint force commander (JFC) headquarters, ensuring the activities of both are mutually supportive.

Special The Special Operations Forces (SOF) activities can have a significant impact on the information environment and
Operations this should be coordinated with wider information activities. The SOF representative (who may be embedded
Forces staff) provides advice on SOF capabilities and force use to achieve this.

The electronic warfare officer (who may be embedded staff) advises on electronic warfare support to Info Ops
Electronic
including actions to deny, deceive, exploit and degrade adversary information and information systems and
warfare
provides feedback on their effectiveness. They will coordinate electronic warfare protection measures with CJ6
officer
to assure friendly C2 networks.

Operations The J3/J5 OPSEC security officer is responsible for identifying essential elements of friendly information,
security identifying their vulnerabilities and implementing and evaluating the plan to protect them.
officer

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Staff Role

The deception officer, normally working within CJ5 is responsible for recommending deception targets,
Deception
formulating deception objectives, planning the deception effort, supervising its execution, developing MOE and
officer
controlling termination of the deception effort.

When the IACB is not merged with the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB), the JTCB representative
Targets
ensures that the IACB planning activities are synchronized within the joint targeting process. They also assist in
officer
targeting de-confliction and assist in assessing effects following the conduct of information activities.

Cyber The cyber representative, within CJ6 advises on cyber operations support to proposed information activities,
operations including assessments of effects.

Military The senior military engineer at each level advises on military engineering related activities that have an impact
engineering on Info Ops, such as environmental protection, hardening of facilities and hazardous areas.
officer

Table 2.1 - Functional and special staff roles

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CHAPTER 3 – PLANNING
Section I – Overall Planning Considerations for Operations

0301. Information operations (Info Ops) is an integral part of all military activity
and must be included from the beginning of the operational-level planning
process (OLPP). Planning and activities in the information environment
must directly support the commander’s intent, guidance and objectives.
Info Ops staff are core members of relevant staff planning subgroups at all
levels and work in collaboration with other information and specialist staff.
They provide inputs to planning for the joint targeting process. Info Ops
staff conduct an analysis of the information environment ensuring that all
potential information activities and their intended effects are properly
considered and then fed into the commander’s estimate process. A
summary of plans and outputs for Info Ops in relation to the 8 steps OLPP
is contained in Figure 3.1 and a comparator between this and and the
Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive is presented in Figure 3.2.
Both are found at the end of this Chapter.

0302. Planning for sensitive issues. Sometimes, information activities may be

considered sensitive due to their nature, the audiences or targets. This
type of planning may have to be conducted within a compartmentalized
planning subgroup. Briefing of sensitive plans, or those which are
classified above the level of the overall operation, will be conducted
separately on the basis of ‘need to know’ and marked with a limited
distribution caveat. Plans will require sensitivity marking if they address
deception, the use of special information technology, political sensitivities
or involve using special operations forces .

Section II – Information Operations and the Operational-level

Planning Process

0303. General situation awareness. Joint force commanders’ (JFC’s) will

continually monitor their areas of interest to anticipate potential crises and
allow them to assist the strategic level in understanding any situation.
During this period, Info Ops staff at the operational level should conduct as
much analysis of the information environment in potential crisis areas as
time and resources permit. This allows continuous Info Ops assessment
to take place involving coordination and information exchange with a
number of branches including J2, J3, strategic communications
(StratCom), military public affairs (PA), civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)
and targeting staff – all of which should be conducting their own

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assessments. Psychological operations (PSYOPS) will assist through

target audience analysis and adversary propaganda analysis.

Operational-level Planning Process

0304. Step 1 – Initiation. Step 1 begins on receipt of a warning order from

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The warning order allows
the operational-level commander (JFC) to understand the strategic
situation and offer SACEUR operational-level advice on military response
options. In concert with other branches, the Info Ops staff develop and
refine their analysis and assessment of the information environment
(including potential target audiences). This is done through the information
environment study36 – Annex A shows an example. The Info Ops staff
also does the following:

 alert subordinate and supporting commanders of potential tasking

with regard to Info Ops planning support;
 gauge the initial scope of Info Ops required for the operation;
 identify the location, standard operating procedures and battle rhythm
of other staff organizations that require integration and divide
coordination responsibilities among the Info Ops staff;
 begin to identify the information required for mission analysis and
courses of action development;
 identify Info Ops planning support requirements (including staff
augmentation, support products and services);
 propose and assist in developing priority intelligence requirements
(PIR) and requests for information (RFI), mindful of the long
lead-time often required to satisfy Info Ops requirements37; and
 establish the information activities coordination board (IACB) and, in
coordination with the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB),
submit potential targets to the JFC.

0305. Step 2 – Problem and mission analysis. Step 2 is initiated by the

strategic planning directive followed later by a strategic concept of
operations (CONOPS). During this step the JFC analyzes the crisis in

36 Formerly known as the Info Ops estimate.

37 This follows the understood process of PIR and RFI development from the commander’s critical
information requirement (CCIR) and is conducted collaboratively with the Intelligence and other
staffs.

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depth, determining the precise nature of the operational problem and the
conditions they need to create to resolve it. In turn, these conditions will
allow the JFC to identify the key operational factors that will lead to them
being achieved and any constraints or restraints that may apply to their
freedom of action. The output from this stage will be the JFC’s operations
design and an operational planning directive to initiate tactical planning.
Info Ops staff will complete a number of different tasks.

a. Info Ops staff will assist the joint operations planning group (JOPG) in
identifying friendly and adversarial centres of gravity and critical
factors (critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical
vulnerabilities).

b. In coordination with other branches and capabilities (for example,

PSYOPS), Info Ops staff identify relevant aspects of the physical,
virtual and cognitive/psychological domains (whether friendly,
adversarial, neutral or potentially adversarial) of the information
environment.

c. They will identify adversary and other actor’s activity in the

information environment and baseline capabilities.

d. Info Ops staff will analyze which information activities and related
capabilities are available to support Info Ops and the authorities
required for their use. The analysis must also consider the impact of
any constraints or restraints imposed by higher authority, such as the
following:

(1) Mission-specific guidance on information activities and

themes.

(2) Political, legal and rules of engagement issues, with particular

regard to international law, custom and practice, host nation
agreements/arrangements, support by other nations and other
sensitivities.

(3) Those arising from social and cultural attitudes which will limit
information activity options and lead to development of rules of
behaviour (for example, Alliance or coalition sensitivities or
ethnic, cultural and religious issues; and constraints imposed
on the activities of the force to deny information to an
adversary).

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e. They will develop and refine proposed PIR, RFI and commander’s
critical information requirements (CCIR).

f. Identifying specified, implied and essential tasks together with facts,

assumptions, constraints and restraints affecting information
activities’ employment is a task Info Ops staff will complete.

g. Info Ops staff will conduct an initial Info Ops risk assessment
including reviewing operations security (OPSEC) considerations and
potential essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).

h. Developing the Info Ops mission to contribute to the commander’s

mission statement, and the Info Ops element of the staff estimate,
falls under the remit of the Info Ops staff. This element of the overall
estimate forms the basis for the Chief Info Ops’ recommendation to
the JFC on how Info Ops contributes to each course of action (COA).

i. In coordination with the Target Support Cell and J2, Info Ops staff
identifies and develops potential targets including compiling target
folders in the integrated database in accordance with the Law of
Armed Conflict.

j. Info Ops staff assist in developing the mission success criteria

(decisive conditions and effects). Therefore, identify (tentative)
desired and undesired effects in the information environment.

k. Info Ops staff need to be prepared to brief and/or join the Operational
Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) if established and
determine any specific RFI for the OLRT.

l. Info Ops staff also provide further subject matter expert input to
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe’s operational advice
and to the operational planning directive.

0306. Step 3 – Courses of action development. Step 3 takes the outputs from
mission analysis, such as initial estimates, missions, tasks and planning
guidance from the JFC to develop and subsequently test a number of
tentative COA. During Step 3, Info Ops refines the Info Ops contribution to
the staff estimate, as well as:

 refining desired and undesired effects in the information environment

that support or degrade the JFC’s objectives and decisive conditions;

 developing MOE and their indicators for approved COA;

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 developing information activities tasks and related capabilities for

recommending to J5/J3 to include in the overall plan;

 recommending which information activities may be used to

accomplish those recommended tasks for each COA;

 developing the operational-level narrative from the StratCom

framework along with the StratCom adviser;

 synchronizing information activities within each COA; and

 continuing to develop the Info Ops element of the staff estimate,

inputs for the COA brief and inputs for target folders.

0307. Step 4 – Courses of action analysis. During this step the tentative COA
are refined and analyzed to develop a series of options that are derived
from a logical cross functional process. The step will deliver an outline
CONOPS including missions and tasks, task organization and outline
timelines. These are analyzed against a number of criteria including troops
to task and logistic feasibility. This process could involve using wargaming.
Info Ops will:

 analyze each course of action (COA) from a functional Info Ops

perspective;

 identify decision points for employing information activities;

 recommend adjustments in the tasks of information activities as

appropriate;

 provide Info Ops input into synchronization matrices or other

decision-making tools;

 identify the Info Ops contribution to any branch or sequel plans;

 identify any high pay off targets in the information environment; and

 submit PIR and recommend CCIR for Info Ops.

0308. Step 5 – Courses of action validation and comparison. Step 5

validates and compares those COA analyzed in Step 4. Evaluated criteria,
wargaming results and general assessment will allow the staff to generate
a list of evaluated COA, recommend a COA and give their reasoning
behind the recommendation. Info Ops will:

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 compare each COA based on missions and tasks;

 compare each COA in relation to the Info Ops requirements against

available information activities;

 prioritize COA from an Info Ops perspective; and

 revise the Info Ops input to the staff estimate.

0309. Step 6 – Commander’s courses of action decision. During Step 6, the

commander will select a COA based on the information and
recommendations derived from Steps 1 to 5. The Info Ops staff must
provide the commander with a recommendation of how information
activities can best contribute to mission success in each of the COA
briefed. These recommendations must be clear and concise. They can
then be grasped quickly by the commander and easily understood by peer,
subordinate and higher headquarters command and staff elements. Once
a COA is selected, the staff refine the COA leading to a refined intent
including:

 an agreed purpose;
 a main effort; and
 how the entire operation or major operation will achieve the
operational-level objectives and contribute to accomplishing military
strategic objectives and acceptance of risk.

0310. Step 7 – Operational-level concept and plan development. Step 7

produces a coherent operational-level CONOPS. Info Ops staff will
contribute as subject matter experts to the main body and other functional
area requirements (including StratCom, OPSEC, military PA, CIMIC and
PSYOPS) as well as produce the Annex UU to the commander’s
operational plan . Annex UU will develop the information effects
articulated in the main body and the StratCom guidance. It links them to
themes that can be developed by PSYOPS and military PA. Because
information activities are covered elsewhere in the OPLAN, the Info Ops
staff will have to continuously coordinate within the JOPG during this
development process. The Info Ops staff will be responsible for providing
the following elements as part of the OPLAN (an outline Info Ops Annex
UU is at Annex B).

a. The Info Ops staff is responsible for providing proposals for the
commander’s intent concerning desired effects in the information
environment.

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b. They will provide the desired effects within the information

environment derived from mission-specific StratCom framework and
strategic and political guidance on information activities.

c. They produce the headquarters’ internal and external coordinating

instructions for implementing the Info Ops function within their own
and subordinate commands.

d. Info Ops considerations concerning intelligence, targeting (lethal and

non-lethal) and assessment of effects in the information environment,
including (as cross-references to the appropriate functional annexes)
the coordination and support to the primary contributors of
information activities are provided by Info Ops staff – these cross-
references are not fixed but will be situation and mission dependent.

e. Info Ops staff provide supplementary orders of military

functions/capabilities will focus on creating the desired effects, taking
into account information effects listed in the OPLAN Annex UU –
these supplementary orders will describe the overall sequencing and
execution of various information activities, each designed to create
specific effects and formulate requirements for determining the
measurement of success.

f. Info Ops staff will also provide other key functions during planning
including:

 refining of tasks from the approved COA;

 identifying any shortfalls in information activity capabilities and

recommending solutions to rectify them;

 remaining engaged with the refinement of force deployment

data to ensure that Info Ops supports the OPLAN; and

 continuing to advise the commander on Info Ops issues

throughout the planning process.

g. Within the JCB process, Info Ops will also contribute to developing
fragmentary orders (FRAGO)38 that contain coordinating instructions
for conducting current operations – these FRAGO should address

38A FRAGO is an abbreviated form of an operation order. It is issued as required to eliminate the
need for restating information contained in a basic operations plan or operation order. It serves to
adjust ongoing operations to situation developments and/or to changed/updated superior direction
and guidance.

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necessary updates to coordinated information activities and formulate

requirements for the measurements of effectiveness.

0311. Step 8 – Campaign assessment and plan review/revision. Throughout

the planning process, the Info Ops staff will continue to conduct theatre
assessment focused on the information environment, and contribute to the
refinement/adjustment of the estimate and the family of plans. This will
require constant synchronization of the planning of information activities
with StratCom advice and feedback to mission-specific strategic guidance.

a. Plan refinement and FRAGO. The information environment

changes and evolves continuously. Info Ops planners must remain in
constant interaction with the JOPG to provide updates to the OPLAN
and contingency plans and issue FRAGO as appropriate. Within the
joint coordination board (JCB) process, Info Ops contributes aspects
concerning the information environment that affect the conduct of
information activities and require additional coordination effort.

b. Information operations contribution to target nomination. Info

Ops plays an essential role in the joint targeting process by
identifying where information activities could be applied to create
specific effects in support of the JFC’s mission objectives. During
planning, and continuously as part of execution, target nominations
are required to implement information activities. These will be
initiated through the joint targeting process into the IACB for
development and then fed into the JTCB for inclusion on the joint
prioritized target list. Such targets can include a diverse array of
subjects including decision-making systems, information systems and
other linked activities. The cyclic target development process during
planning must include Info Ops input, from the strategic to tactical
levels.

c. Analysis of adversary information activities. Using the baseline

information identified in Step 2, the Info Ops staff will review
adversaries’ capabilities and actions in the information environment
to identify those that will require countering or exploitation. This
systems-of-systems analysis of the adversary provides fundamental
information on their abilities and own exposed areas. This review is
conducted through the IACB in conjunction with other staff branches
as appropriate and covers all of the areas of analysis that were
undertaken in Step 2.

d. Assessing and monitoring. Assessment is integrated into all

phases of the planning and execution processes. A well crafted plan

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is useless unless its progress can be measured in a relevant way to

allow a commander to understand if their actions are generating the
effects required to achieve the objective. Assessment seeks to
analyze and inform on the performance and effectiveness of activities
to provide feedback to decision-makers so that activities can be
modified where necessary to achieve the desired results. The most
critical element is measuring how effective activities have been, so it
is important to understand the distinctions of terminology.

(1) Measurement of performance. This is a criterion to evaluate

the accomplishment of own force actions. The measure of
performance (MOP) allows the measurement of progress,
intending to answer the question – are the actions being
executed as planned and is a criterion used to assess task
accomplishment? For example, ‘we produced and
disseminated 500/500 leaflets aimed at an approved audience’.
The intended target audience picked up and read the leaflets;
this can be summed up as what did we do and did we do things
right?

(2) Measurement of effectiveness. This is a criterion used to

assess changes in system behaviour, capability or operational
environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end-
state, achieving an objective or creating an effect. Measure of
effectiveness (MOE) can be used to assess the realization of
specified effects. It considers what effects, both intended and
unintended, have been created through the performance and
activities of the force and the target audience. MOE is used to
monitor progress, highlight negative consequences and to
support current and future planning. The key question that
MOE endeavours to answer is whether or not the action
achieved its stated purpose. Did the target audience
understand the message and subsequently adopt the desired
behaviour; did we do the right things?

MOE (and MOP) are crafted and refined throughout the planning
process and should be specific, measurable and observable. It is
absolutely vital to establish a baseline measurement before
execution, against which to measure system changes.

e. An Info Ops assessment framework. Assessment is a continuous

process integrated into all aspects of planning and operations. The
Info Ops element offers particular challenges, as many of the desired
effects are in the cognitive domain and changes in behaviour and

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attitudes take time to become apparent. Therefore, it is useful to

consider specific advice for Info Ops assessment that feeds into the
overall assessment process. Table 3.1 offers a possible Info Ops
assessment framework nested within the planning process.

Info Ops assessment activity Operational-level planning process step

• Conduct the information • Steps 1 and 2

environment study

• Integrate Info Ops assessment • Step 2

into planning process
• Develop information requirements • Steps 2 and 3
and collection plans
• Build Info Ops assessment baseline • Steps 1 to 7
• The baseline represents understanding
the behaviours and attitudes of
audiences within the operations area. It
begins with the start of the information
environment study and continues to the
point of execution

• Execute information activities and • Step 8

supporting intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance
• Monitor execution and collect
Info Ops assessment data
• Analyze Info Ops assessment data
• Through the Information Activity
Coordination Board, incorporate
Info Ops assessment results and
recommendations into overall
operations assessment

Table 3.1 – Info Ops assessment framework

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Input Operational-level planning Info Ops cell

process step functions and outputs

Strategic warning order OLP P 1 - Initiation PIR, RFI, potential targets, Info Ops advice

OLP P 2 - Problem and COG analysis, information environment analysis

Strategic Planning Directive including baseline data, identified Info Ops tasks,
mission analysis
refined PIR/CCIR. Information activities analysis
(own, neutral and adversarial), identify EEFI and
produce Info Ops proposals regarding Operations
design, mission statement and intent

Outputs from mission analysis OLP P 3 - CO A development Identified information e ffects, MOP and MOE,
tasks for J5/3 and operational narrative

Developed COA OLP P 4 - CO A analysis Identified key decision points, HVT and contribute to
sychronization matrices, branch and sequel plans

Evaluated CO A criteria and OLP P 5 - CO A validation Compare COA based on Info Ops requirements
wargame results and comparison and available information activities

CO A recommendations OLP P 6 - CO A decision Info Ops contribution to each CO A and CO A

recommendation from Info Ops point of view

Commanders direction and OLP P 7 - Operational-level Info Ops Annex UU and contribute to main body
strategic CONOPS concept and plan development and other functional area annexes

OLP P 8 - Campaign operation

MOP, MOE, J2 Analysis of MOE, FRAGO, target nominations
assessment and plan
assessment
review/revision

Legend
CCIR Commander’s critical information requirements Info Ops Information operations
COA Course of action MOE Measurement of e ffectiveness
COG Centre of gravity MOP Measure of performance
CONOPS Concept of operations OLPP Operational-level planning process
EEFI Essential elements of friendly information PIR Priority intelligence requirements
FRAGO Fragmentary orders RFI Requests for information
HVT High value targets

Figure 3.1 – Info Ops planning activity and outputs

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Figure 3.2 – Info Ops planning activity and outputs shown in relation to both the 6 Phase Comprehensive
Operations Planning Directive and the AJP-5 doctrinal 8 Steps Planning Process

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CHAPTER 4 – COMPETENCIES AND TRAINING

Section I – Information Operations Staff Skills and Competencies
0401. The information operations (Info Ops) function requires dedicated and
appropriately trained personnel, who can effectively plan, analyze and
assess the integration of information activities. The formal training
requirement prior to deploying or being assigned to a NATO Info Ops post
is qualification through a NATO certified course and/or through a national
training programme. These provide an understanding of the differences
between national and NATO policy and doctrine for coordinating NATO
information activities.39

0402. Info Ops should be integrated into NATO military training exercises to
ensure that commanders and staffs understand its value to operations and
the negative consequences of not using it.

Section II – Individual and Collective Training for Information

Operations Staff

0403. In addition to the formal training outlined in Section I, individual training can
be undertaken with personnel grouped for training depending on their role
and function in a headquarters staff. As well as those involved daily with
Info Ops, there is a general requirement to train all staff to have a basic
understanding of Info Ops and to train the command groups to understand
how to best employ the resources/capabilities at their disposal.

0404. Personnel augmenting a staff for exercises and operations need to be

properly qualified and should have some experience prior to filling the
posts. Sufficiently detailed job descriptions for each Info Ops billet should
be prepared and posted or distributed during the planning phase for
operations or exercises.

0405. Augmentees must receive the latest policy, doctrine and standing
operating procedures concerning Info Ops prior to filling an Info Ops post.
This enables them to prepare properly for their functions.

39 MC 0422/5 NATO Military Policy on Information Operations.

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Section III – Training Activities for Key Leaders

0406. It is crucial that the key commanders have an understanding of the Info
Ops function, information activities and the effects they can create.
Training commanders in Info Ops greatly improves their understanding of
how Info Ops contributes to the mission. NATO and nations conduct a
number of senior officer courses providing such training.

Section IV – Headquarters Functional Area Internal Training

0407. Functional and specialist staff also benefit from Info Ops training enabling
them to effectively work and integrate with Info Ops staff to maximise the
Info Ops contribution to the mission. Training could include lectures,
pre-exercise briefings and exercises.

Section V – Integrating Information Operations within Exercises

0408. Info Ops staff should be fully involved in preparing strategic, operational or
tactical exercises, integrating from the beginning of the exercise planning
process through exercise analysis and identifying lessons learned.
Command post exercises, study periods, and seminars are particularly
useful to develop the Info Ops knowledge and understanding of
commanders and their key staff.

0409. To ensure successful Info Ops training on exercises, Info Ops posts must
be adequately resourced across the training audience and higher and
lower controllers. These should be supported by appropriate role players
and scenario material. These factors must be considered early in the
exercise development stage.

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ANNEX A – THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT STUDY
A1. General. Information operations (Info Ops) contribute to the staff estimate
throughout the operations planning process and conduct of operations.
The following guidance addresses Info Ops considerations at the various
stages of the command estimate process. It can be conducted as a written
information environment study, or as a thought process that feeds into the
overall staff estimate, as required. It should be updated through an
iterative process that involves intelligence analysis as well as
functional/capability expertise and will contribute to overall situational
awareness and understanding. A properly resourced and conducted
information environment study will assist all staff branches of the
headquarters as they conduct the estimate.

A2. Strategic guidance analysis. The Info Ops staff will continuously review
mission-specific strategic guidance for information activities to reaffirm
relevancy of effects in the information environment and information
activities. The study should contain an updated comparison of strategic
guidance (objectives, themes and messages) and the joint force
commander’s Info Ops intent and plans. Related assessments should be
translated as feedback and advice to superior authorities.

Describing the Information Environment

A3. The study should focus on describing and assessing the information
environment in a systemic context including (as a minimum) relevant
actors, specific information systems and the media. This description and
assessment cannot be done in isolation by the Info Ops staff, but needs to
be coordinated with and draw from functional/capability expertise without
duplicating others’ analysis efforts. The resulting product should be
considered as a summary of collective situation analysis.

A4. Actors.

 Individuals (for example: decision-makers and leaders; opinion

leaders and opinion formers; journalists, editors and media
publishers).
 Groups (population as a whole or in parts. For example, by region,
ethnicity, religion, activity or groups of the above individuals).
 Organizations (government agencies and governmental
organizations; international organizations, non-governmental

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organizations, regional and international enterprises; or organizations
of the above individuals and groups).
 Actors need to be described by relevant characteristics. Some
examples follow.
 Personalities (comprising factors such as: psychological
profiles/traits and personal history; culture, motives, interests,
values, beliefs, attitudes, and stances; risk aversion, and
sensitivities).
 Diverse roles – official and unofficial.
 Perceptions, images, and opinions (How do actors see
themselves and other actors? How do actors want to be seen?
To what extent do actors trust the international community,
coalition, coalition partners, other actors?).
 Information flow and opinion-forming processes, main sources
of information and trust in those.
 Intent and capabilities for conducting information
activities/protecting the information environment against
adversary activities.
 Balance of power, including military, economic, sociocultural,
and religious aspects. In particular, control over media,
communication/information processes and/or related means and
infrastructure.
 Security situation and its stability, robustness and sustainability.
 Supporters, and followers, and their respective subsistence
levels; support-networks; relationships to other actors with
regard to politics, security, economy, and psychology.
 Possible political, strategic, operational, and tactical short-, mid-,
and long-term objectives, as well as their hierarchical schemes
and prioritization of objectives (What do the actors want to
achieve? How will they act in the information environment?).
 Interrelationships and interdependencies between and among
actors.
 Receptivity, addressing the psychological and technical/physical
ability/capability of an actor to perceive/receive messages in any
format (for example, literacy, availability of electronic
communication devices, use/penetration of social media); this
also includes aspects of external control such as censorship.

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 Susceptibility, addressing those issues that attract the actors’
attention, regardless of the possible resulting effects when
consuming information; also, ‘areas of interest’ for the actors
(for example, newspaper articles they would read, or radio
programmes they would listen to); these are often related to
attitudes and values.
 Vulnerability, addressing those issues that directly affect
cognition and emotion of the actors and can be exploited by
own actions to create desired effects; assessment is based on
results of present social research and refers to anxieties/fears
and needs rather than to attitudes.

A5. Specific information systems.

 Communication and information systems equipment. Methods

and procedures and, if necessary, personnel, organized to
accomplish information processing and transfer functions.
 Command and control systems. Equipment, methods and
procedures (including planning and decision-making tools) and
personnel that enable commanders and their staffs to exercise
command and control (C2).
 Relevant characteristics and components of communication and
information systems/C2 systems.
 Personnel (including actors in the above sense).

 Command and control philosophy, in terms of decision-making

processes, organization, and communication and information
flow patterns (including aspects such as censorship and
freedom of opinion).

 Technical equipment, techniques, platforms, and organizations

used, established, and required to receive, process, and
transmit data and information, including their functionality,
detailed features, capacity, and level of interoperability,
robustness, redundancy, and reliability. This includes system
elements and components from (human and technical) sensors
throughout the loop to shooters (for example, information
technology in weapons systems).

 Infrastructure (official and unofficial), including commercial

facilities and installations related to telecommunication
companies and networks, postal and courier services, broadcast

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or media dissemination facilities, such as fixed and mobile radio
stations, platforms.

 Support dependencies, such as energy, water, transportation

and maintenance.

A6. Media.

 Personnel (for example, management, owners, financiers,

stakeholders, publishers, editors, journalists and employees).
 Assets (official and unofficial, open and covert; used or employed by
actors for indirect communication, information, entertainment, and
other related purposes, including traditional communication, new and
emerging media).
 Contents (themes and messages).

 Reach/area of influence.

 Affiliation.

 Credibility.

 Availability.

 Infrastructure (including related industries and media production

facilities – for example, studios and printing shops).

A7. Status of own information activities. The study should include an

overview of available own capabilities and techniques for conducting
information activities, including their current state of readiness,
involvement in current operations and principle limitations. This part of the
study should be contributed to by the responsible capability
representatives, functional advisers or component liaison officer (LO).

A8. Status of adversary information activities. The study should also

include an overview of adversary capabilities and techniques for
conducting information activities, including their (assumed) intent and
objectives, current state of readiness, involvement in current operations,
principle limitations and vulnerabilities. This part of the study should be
contributed to by CJ2 with the responsible capability representatives,
functional advisers, or component LO.

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A9. Status of neutral information activities. The study should include an
overview of neutral actors capabilities and techniques for conducting
information activities, including their (assumed) intent and objectives,
current state of readiness, involvement in current operations, principle
limitations and vulnerabilities. This part of the study should be contributed
to by CJ2 with the responsible capability representatives, functional
advisers, or component LO.

A10. Possible effects in the information environment. The study should

conclude with a list of possible effects, considering information activities
focused on:

 preserving and protecting Alliance freedom of manoeuvre in the

information environment at all times;
 the behaviour, perceptions and attitudes of North Atlantic Council
(NAC) -approved audiences; and
 countering adversaries’ propaganda as well as their command
functions and capabilities.

Effects must be formulated in a way that describes the physical and/or

behavioural state of a part of the information environment (see Annex B
paragraph 3) that results from an action or set of actions. They should be
characterized as desired or undesired. The Info Ops staff should also
consider possible trends (developments, evolutions) that may occur over
time without own interference.

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ANNEX B – INFORMATION OPERATIONS PLAN ANNEX
UU FORMAT

ANNEX UU TO

OPLAN xxxx

TITLE xxxx

DATED dd mm yyyy

INFORMATION OPERATIONS
References:

1. (xx)40 SITUATION.

a. General. See main text.

b. Specific.

(1) Information environment. Summary of mission-relevant

aspects of the information environment, taken from the staff estimate,
which is supported by the information environment study.

(2) Strategic communications framework. Summary of

mission-specific strategic communications (StratCom) guidance on
information activities (narrative, core message, StratCom/information
effects, themes and messages, focus topics).

(3) Own information activities. Summary of the status of own

information activities, taken from the staff estimate, which is
supported by the information environment study.

(4) Adversary information activities. Summary of the status of

adversary information activities, taken from the staff estimate, which
is supported by the information environment study.

40 Abbreviated classification.

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(5) Other actors’ information activities. Summary of the status of
other actors’ information activities, taken from the staff estimate,
which is supported by the information environment study.

2. (xx) MISSION.

a. Strategic command. Statement of the superior commander's intent

towards the information environment, taken from the strategic operation
plan (OPLAN), Annex O (if available).

b. Joint Force Command. Statement of the commander's intent

towards the information environment, taken from the OPLAN, Paragraph 3a.

3. (xx) EXECUTION.

a. Information effects. List of information effects that are to be created

or contributed to by military means, derived from mission-specific strategic
and political guidance on information activities and the strategic OPLAN,
Annex O (if available). The list should also include any undesirable effects
which are to be avoided.

b. Themes and messages. Taken from mission-specific StratCom

guidance on information activities and the strategic OPLAN, Annex UU (if
available).

c. Primary contributors. Cross-reference to appropriate functional

annexes of capabilities conducting or contributing to information activities.

d. Engagement. Guidance on developing the engagement plan

including key leader, soldier and cultural considerations, expanded at
Appendix 2 if necessary.

e. Information activity integration. How information activities are

synchronized with other joint functions in the operational synchronization
matrix developed by J3. The Info Ops effects matrix provides the basis for
this.

4. (xx) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Information Activities Coordination Board. Guidance on the

Information Activities Coordination Board (IACB) composition and process
in support of the Joint Coordination Board (JCB), taken from the relevant
standard operating procedures (SOP) (if available).

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b. Analysis support. Guidance on intelligence/systems analysis
support to Info Ops, as well as contributions by capabilities conducting or
contributing to information activities, with cross-reference to appropriate
functional annexes.

c. Targeting. Guidance concerning the coordination of target

nominations in support of the Joint Targeting Coordination Board, taken
from the relevant SOP (if available).

d. Measurement of effectiveness. Reference to effects listed in

Paragraph 3.a: guidance on the coordinated/collective assessment of
measures of effectiveness.

e. Info Ops reporting. Guidance on contributions to reporting

concerning information activities and effects in the information environment,
with cross-reference to appropriate functional annexes.

f. OPSEC. Guidance on measures required to ensure operations

security, expanded at Appendix 3 if necessary.

g. Command and Control (C2) defence considerations. Guidance

on the aspects of C2 defence that require consideration, expanded at
Appendix 4 if necessary.

APPENDICES:
1 Info Ops effects matrix (Format: see Annex C).
2 Key Leader Engagement Plan.
3 OPSEC.
4 C2 defence Considerations.

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ANNEX C – EXAMPLE OF AN INFORMATION
OPERATIONS EFFECTS MATRIX

Strategic communications guidance (Note 2)

Commander’s Information Audiences Mean Measurements of effectiveness
objectives effects (Note 5) (Note 6) How to measure Who
(Note 3) (Note 4) them (Note 8)
Which indicators
(Note 7)

Explanatory notes

1. The aim of the effects matrix is to list the desired information effects, linking
them to the commander’s objectives in priority order. Identifying the activities,
themes and messages that will create the effects and how they can be measured
and any coordination requirements.

2. StratCom guidance taken from the StratCom framework will cover in outline the
key StratCom objectives, themes and messages.

3. Commander’s objectives taken from the operational design.

4. Information effects relate to effects created in the information environment by

information activities that contribute to the commander’s objectives (note: a single
information effect can contribute to several different objectives).

5. Those audiences against which some sort of activity or action must take place
to generate the desired information effect. Also note any prohibited audiences.

6. The selected capability or technique identified to generate the effect through

the specific audience.

7. The specific indicators that will show whether change has occurred in the
audience.

8. The capability or function directed to collect against those indicators.

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LEXICON
PART 1 – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AAP Allied administrative publication
ACO Allied Command Operations
AJP Allied joint publication

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement

CIMIC civil-military cooperation
CIS communication and information systems
COA course of action
COED Concise Oxford English Dictionary
CONOPS concept of operations
COPD Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
COS chief of staff
CPOE comprehensive preparation of the operational
environment
C2 command and control
C2S command and control systems

EEFI essential elements of friendly information

ESM electronic warfare support measures
EW electronic warfare

FRAGO fragmentary order

HQ headquarters

IACB information activities coordination board

IMS International Military Staff
Info Ops information operations
INTEL intelligence
IO international organization
IT information technology

JCB joint coordination board (within AJP-3.10 only)

JFC joint force commander
JOPG joint operations planning group
JTCB joint targeting coordination board

KD knowledge development (within AJP-3.10 only)

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LO liaison officer
LOAC Law of Armed Conflict

MC Military Committee (NATO)

MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance (within AJP-3.10 only, not
NATO agreed)

NAC North Atlantic Council

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO non-governmental organization
NTMS NATO Terminology Management System

OLPP operational-level planning process (within AJP-3.10

only)
OLRT operational liaison and reconnaissance team
OPLAN operation plan
OPSEC operations security

PA public affairs
PIR priority intelligence requirement
POLAD political adviser
PSYOPS psychological operations

RFI request for information

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SOF special operations forces
SOP standard operating procedures
STANAG NATO standardization agreement
StratCom NATO strategic communications (within AJP-3.10 only)

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LEXICON
PART 2 – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Guidelines. Terminology lexicon entries are annotated in parentheses as
appearing in AAP-06, or with one of the following notes: 1) (NATO Terminology
Management System (NTMS) – NATO Agreed); or 2) (This term is a new term and
definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed status); or 3) (This term and
definition modifies an existing NATO Agreed term and/or definition and will be
processed for NATO Agreed status); or 4) [Actual Source (Not NATO Agreed)]; or
5) (This term and definition are only applicable in this publication).

assess
To evaluate or estimate the nature, value, or quality of something. (COED)

centre of gravity
Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military
force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to
fight. (NTMS – NATO Agreed)

channel
Direct towards a particular end. (COED)

civil-military cooperation
The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO
Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as
well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.
(AAP-06)

coerce
Persuade (an unwilling person) to do something by using force or threats. (COED)

collect
Systematically seek and acquire (items of a particular kind). (COED)
In Info Ops this refers to the collection of information.

compel
Force or oblige to do something. (COED)

computer network attack

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Action taken to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information resident in a
computer and/or computer network, or the computer and/or computer network
itself. Note: A computer network attack is a type of cyber attack. (AAP-06)

computer network exploitation

Action taken to make use of a computer or computer network, as well as the
information hosted therein, in order to gain advantage. (AAP-06)

contain
To control or restrain. (COED)
In Info Ops this refers to restraining the spread of information, a message or an
effect in a media or audience or on an information system.

convince
Cause to believe firmly in the truth of something. Persuade to do something.
(COED)
In Info Ops this refers to overcoming by argument, bringing to belief, consent, or a
course of action.

corrupt
Make unreliable by errors or alterations. (COED)

course of action
In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the
accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed.
(AAP-06)

deceive
Deliberately cause (someone) to believe something that is not true. (COED)
In Info Ops, deception seeks to mislead adversary decision-makers by
manipulating their perception of reality and persuading them to adopt a particular
course of action.

degrade
To lower the character or quality of. (COED)
In Info Ops this refers to adversary command and control or communications
systems, and information collection efforts or means. Info Ops also aims to
degrade morale, reduce worth, or reduce the quality of adversary decisions and
actions. Damage is done to the entity which still continues to operate but at a
reduced effectiveness or efficiency.

deny

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Prevent enemy use of a specified thing. (STANAG 2287)
In Info Ops this means preventing someone from accessing and using critical
information, systems and services. Denial can be permanent or temporary.

destroy
Damage an object or an enemy force so that it is rendered useless to the enemy
until reconstituted. (STANAG 2287)
In Info Ops this means to undermine an actor’s trust, credibility and loyalty by
damaging reputation, or physically damaging an enemy system, or entity, so badly
that it cannot perform its function to create a psychological effect, or reduce
adversary command and control capability.

detect
To discover or identify the presence or existence of. (COED)
In Info Ops this includes adversary propaganda, entities on social media or
intrusions into information systems.

deter
Discourage (someone) from doing something by instilling fear of the
consequences. (COED)

diminish
Make or become less. (COED)
In Info Ops this includes the will, understanding, or capability of an actor.

discredit
Harm the good reputation of. Cause (an idea or account) to seem false or
unreliable. (COED)
In Info Ops this includes the reputation, credibility and/or authority of an actor or
argument.

disrupt
Disturb or interrupt. (COED)
In Info Ops this applies to using lethal and non-lethal capabilities to interrupt
information flow (denial of service attacks, electronic warfare, destruction of
broadcast facilities and/or command and control capability).

empower
Give authority or power to. (COED)

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In Info Ops this means using information to promote confidence, authority,
accountability and responsibility in an actor or group(s).

exploit
Make use and derive benefit from (a resource). (COED)
In Info Ops this means using information to take advantage of, or create a
favourable situation for, tactical, operational or strategic purposes.

expose
Make (something) visible by uncovering it. (COED)
In Info Ops this means revealing information that offers an advantage to the
Alliance.

host nation
A nation which by agreement:
a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from
or transiting through its territory;
b. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory;
c. provides support for these purposes. (AAP-06)

indicator
An item of information which reflects the intention or capability of a potential enemy
to adopt or reject a course of action. (AAP-06)

influence
The capacity to have an effect on the character or behaviour of someone or
something, or the effect itself. (COED)
In Info Ops, influence is an outcome and refers to the behaviour, attitudes and
perceptions of an actor following the conduct of information activities.

information
Unprocessed data of every description, which may be used in the production of
intelligence. (AAP-06)

information activities
Actions designed to affect information or information systems. Information
activities can be performed by any actor and include protection measures.
(This is a new term; the definition will be processed for NATO Agreed status)

information effect
A desired condition created in the information environment as a result of
information activities. Information effects should be measurable in order to enable

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analysis, planning, execution and assessment of related activities and the effects
them self. (This is a new term; the definition will be processed for NATO Agreed
status)

information environment
An environment comprised of the information itself; the individuals, organizations
and systems that receive, process and convey the information; and the cognitive,
virtual and physical space in which this occurs. (This is a new term; the definition
will be processed for NATO Agreed status)

information operations
A staff function to analyse, plan, assess and integrate information activities to
create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries,
potential adversaries and North Atlantic Council approved audiences in support of
Alliance mission objectives. (This is a new term; the definition will be processed
for NATO Agreed status)

information security
The protection of information (stored, processed, or transmitted), as well as the
host systems, against a loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability through a
variety of procedural, technical and administrative controls. (This is a new term;
the definition will be processed for NATO Agreed status)

information system
An assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and, if necessary, personnel,
organized to accomplish information processing functions. (AAP-06)

manipulate
To handle or control with dexterity. (COED)
In Info Ops this means managing an actor to create friendly advantage often
through persuasion, or deception.

mask
To conceal from view or disguise. (COED)
In Info Ops this means protecting information from individuals or groups until an
appropriate moment for its release. This applies particularly to operations security
and deception.

measure of effectiveness
Assessment of the realisation of specified effects. (NTMS - NATO Agreed)

military public affairs

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NATO military public affairs is the function responsible to promote NATO’s military
aims and objectives to audiences in order to enhance awareness and
understanding of military aspects of the Alliance. This includes planning and
conducting external and internal communications, and community relations. (MC
0457/2 NATO Military Policy on Public Affairs)

mislead
Cause to have a wrong impression about someone or something. (COED)

narrative
A spoken or written account of connected events; a story. (COED)

negate
Nullify or make ineffective. (COED)
In Info Ops this means countering the effects of adversary information activities or
the information itself. It is particularly applicable to counter propaganda and
operational security.

neutralize
Render an enemy element temporarily incapable of interfering with the operation
(AAP-06/STANAG 2287)
In Info Ops this means countering the source of information rather than the effect.
For example, by denial of service, EW or physical action.

operations security
The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security,
using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions,
capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. (AAP-06)

prevent
Keep from happening or arising. To make unable to do something. (COED)
In Info Ops terms this means persuading an actor not to undertake a particular
course of action by convincing them that it will be unsuccessful. Unlike coercion it
is less reliant on physical force.

probe
Enquire into closely. (COED)

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In Info Ops this means to examine closely, evaluate and test a system or entity
(human or technological) to gain an understanding of its general layout and/or
perception).

promote
Further the progress of; support or encourage. (COED)
In Info ops this means to advocate or advance positive awareness of an actor,
organization and/or courses of action.

protect
To keep safe from harm or injury. (COED)
In Info Ops this means protecting the joint force commander’s freedom to operate
in the information.

psychological operations
Planned activities using methods of communication and other means directed at
approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour,
affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. (NTMS - NATO
Agreed)

reassure
Allay the doubts and fears of. (COED)
In Info Ops this means restoring confidence and dispelling fear through
coordinated use of capabilities (such as psychological operations) and techniques
(such as key leader engagement and presence, posture and profile).

reinforce
Strengthen or support. Give added strength to. (COED)
In Info Ops this means using information to maintain and increase support for
specific ideas, actors, organizations or activities.

shape
Develop in a particular way. (COED)
In Info Ops this means preparatory work focussed on actor’s behaviours to cause
them to conform to a particular pattern, prior to subsequent activities conducted by
NATO forces.

usurp
Take (a position of power) illegally or by force. Supplant (someone) in power.
(COED)

LEX-9 Edition A Version 1

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Lexicon to
AJP-3.10
In Info Ops this means establishing a position of authority within the information
environment that means our ideas and arguments supplant those of our
adversaries.

LEX-10 Edition A Version 1

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Lexicon to
AJP-3.10

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

Edition A Version 1

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AJP-3.10(A)(1)

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