Does India Need A Caste-Based Quota in Cricket?: Shubhamjain@nls - Ac.in
Does India Need A Caste-Based Quota in Cricket?: Shubhamjain@nls - Ac.in
In India’s 85-year-long Test history, only four of the 289 male Test cricketers have
reportedly been Dalits. While concrete steps have been taken to address a similar under-
representation of non-white players in South Africa, Dalit under-representation in Indian
cricket has received scant attention. There is a need to understand this as a function of
systemic barriers arising from corporate patronage post-independence and the urban
stranglehold of the game, instead of attributing it to choice, inherent inability or upper caste
“tastes.” The grass-roots development approach of Cricket South Africa can serve as an
example to address this anomaly.
Over the past two seasons, talent drain in South African cricket has been dominating the
headlines of cricket tabloids (Moonda 2017a). This drain occurred due to two coincidental,
but unrelated phenomena. The first of these is that Cricket South Africa (CSA) began
imposing “transformation targets,” that is, racial quotas, due to pressure from the South
African Department of Sports and Recreation. While this was long believed to be the unsaid
policy of the board (Moonda 2015),1 it has now been formalised across playing levels. These
transformation targets mandate that on an average, the national playing 11 must include six
players of colour, of which two must be black. The targets are slightly higher at the lower
levels of the game. The second factor was announcement of Britain’s exit from the European
Union (Brexit), which has left a limited window for Kolpak entries to the county game.2 This
limited window due to Brexit tempted those who were uncertain of a stable future in
international cricket to opt for the Kolpak route due to higher salaries in the county game in
England (Holme 2017).
Apart from being a factor in the departure of promising players such as Kyle Abbott, Riley
Russouw and David Wiese from the international game, the quota system also came under
the scanner for preventing CSA from bidding to host any major international event. A report
by an eminent persons group (EPG) commissioned by the sports ministry found that CSA,
among other sporting bodies, had failed to meet its transformation targets. Consequently,
the ministry barred all the errant sporting bodies, including CSA, from bidding to host any
international events such as the World Cup and Champions Trophy (Moonda 2016). That the
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
ban was effective in incentivising CSA to meet its targets is evident from the fact that CSA
exceeded transformation targets in less than a year, resulting in the ban being lifted
(Moonda 2017b). However, the transformation quota system comes under the scanner every
time the national team underperforms. For instance, after the South African team lost to
England by a large margin, former South African cricketer, Graeme Pollock argued that the
quotas resulted in poor selections and were also weakening the domestic circuit (SA Cricket
2017).
At a time when quotas in South Africa are coming under scrutiny, and Indian cricket is
witnessing judiciary-administered reforms, it is perhaps the most opportune moment to
examine the desirability of introducing such a structure in Indian cricket. Ramdas Athawale,
a union minister, has repeatedly raised the demand for reservations in the Indian cricket
team (Hindu 2017).3 Unfortunately, we are yet to see the initiation of a conversation on this
issue. Given the significant role cricket plays in popular culture in India alongside
Bollywood, perceptions of community and role models in cricket can be extremely
important.
We begin this paper by showing that, in fact, only a handful of Dalits have represented India
at the international level.4 Subsequently, we review literature and media to examine the
reasons that have been put forward for this under-representation. We then argue that the
absence of Dalits in Indian cricket is caused by systemic barriers and not reasons such as
choice or inherent inability. However, due to the invisible but pervasive nature of these
systemic barriers, it is often impossible to isolate and address them. Consequently, we
argue that it is necessary to introduce reservations, similar to South Africa, to the Indian
cricket team. Finally, the paper examines the possibility of judicial intervention to introduce
such a system.
Under-representation of Dalits
Since India was granted Test cricket status in 1932, 289 men have played Tests for India. In
its 85-year Test history,5 only four Dalits have reportedly played for India. The only names
that have been put forward by Dalit forums are Eknath Solkar, Vinod Kambli, Karsan Ghavri
and Bhuvneshwar Kumar (Indpaedia 2017; Chand 2017).6 Given the regional disparities in
surnames as well as changes in surnames to mask caste identities, it is difficult to ascertain,
beyond doubt, the caste backgrounds of most players. Nonetheless, this is a dismal figure
considering the fact that approximately 17% of the population of India belong to the Dalit
community (Economist 2017). At the other end of the spectrum, a disproportionately large
number of Brahmins have represented India since independence (Stevenson 2008,
TamilFunda 2017). Several reasons for these disparities have been put forth, ranging from
bias in selection, to the slow nature of cricket being more suited to the Brahminical way of
life.
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
Ramachandra Guha (2014) has discussed in passing, a possible reason for the lack of Dalit
cricketers in his book A Corner of a Foreign Field: The Indian History of a British Sport. A
large segment of the book chronicles the life of Palwankar Baloo, India’s first professional
Dalit cricketer. Baloo, and his three brothers, played for the Hindu Gymkhana Club team in
the annual Quadrangular Tournament7 in Bombay in the early 20th century, though they all
retired (or died) before India started playing Test cricket in 1932. Given that all four
brothers were extremely successful and popular cricketers, Guha (2014) wonders why they
failed to serve as role models for other Dalits, in the manner Jackie Robinson and Jessie
Owens did for black children. He believes that the reason such a small number of Dalits
have played cricket professionally is because they “have preferred to be doctors, lawyers,
bureaucrats or professors rather than sportsmen.” In support of his argument, he points out
that Baloo himself encouraged his children to aspire to higher education, to the exclusion of
cricket.
However, as Boria Majumdar (2006: 943) rightly points out, Guha’s argument falsely
assumes that other Dalit children had such opportunities. Furthermore, they did in fact act
as role models at that time. B R Ambedkar called Baloo a role model to him in his youth
(Guha 2014). However, the Palwankars have been erased from the consciousness of cricket
fans, with very few having even heard of them. Guha himself states that one of the reasons
he wrote the book was to bring Baloo’s story back into the mainstream. Unfortunately, there
have been no Dalit role models in recent times. None of the four post-Test status cricketers
mentioned above have been recognised for their Dalit identity. Perhaps, the only one who
has publicly been called out to speak about his Dalit identity is Vinod Kambli, a batsman
who was much vilified and who has also refused to let his Dalit identity be spoken of in
politics (Indian Express 2016). While Karsan Ghavri has contested parliamentary elections
from a constituency reserved for Dalits, there are no significant speeches reported in which
he addresses his identity.
On the contrary, Majumdar (2006) argues that the reason for the decline in representation
after independence was a shift in patronage. The game that thrived on the patronage of the
princes and the colonial administrators was now taken over by corporate patrons. The
princes and the British had multiple motives to encourage diversity. This included the belief
that cricket would “civilise the natives” and that it could be a unifying factor. Corporate
patronage, however, resulted in the sport being concentrated in urban areas. It also did not
increase financial stability as players outside the top flight could not always find
employment. Corporate patrons preferred educated cricketers who would be employable
post their retirement from cricket. For instance, the Tatas insisted on hiring cricketers with
graduate degrees and the players’ qualifications would also influence their rank and salary.
The norms laid down by the Tatas also served as a model for other corporate patrons of
cricket. This resulted in players from affluent, educated backgrounds having an advantage
over those who did not have access to higher education, quite often those from the lower
castes.
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
Recently, the Tamil movie Jeeva portrayed caste as a barrier in selection to the Tamil Nadu
state Ranji Trophy team. This led to the disclosure of a number of allegations of casteism in
selection, and an equal number of rebuttals (Ramesh 2015). Some players stated that after a
good performance, selectors would surreptitiously check for the thread worn by Brahmins
while patting them on the back. Expectedly, all such allegations were promptly denied by
the board and the selectors.
Perhaps, one of the stranger reasons for the under-representation of Dalits in Indian cricket
has been put forth by Siriyavan Anand (2002, 2003). He argued that cricket, as opposed to
other sports, was dominated by Brahmins because it was conducive to their indolent
lifestyle. In support of his argument, he states that, on an average, the Indian team between
the 1960s and the 1990s had six Brahmins, and sometimes as many as nine. He drew a
contrast with the composition of the national hockey team, which was mostly comprised of
non-Brahmins. He argued that the non-sweaty, non-contact and slow nature of the sport was
perfectly suited to Brahminical tastes.
Other explanations put forth include the fact that cricket is a time-consuming sport, and is
thereby limited to people who could afford to spare the time; or the fact that cricket has
typically been the preserve of the elite (Stevenson 2008). Thus, a number of reasons ranging
from corporate patronage to Brahminical tastes have been put forth to explain the under-
representation of Dalits in Indian cricket. In the following section, we argue that the
barriers to Dalit representation are, in fact, systemic in nature.
The fact that the lack of Dalits in Indian cricket is due to the presence of systemic barriers
can be seen from the decline in Dalit representation in professional cricket in India since
independence; the more representational Indian women’s cricket team; the absence of
batsmen from minority communities; and the difference in fortunes of the Dalits and
Muslims.
Majumdar (2006) has argued that Indian cricket was more representative before
independence than it has been since then. In the latter half of the 19th century, the only
major cricketing fixture was an annual match between the Parsees and the Europeans in
Bombay. This gradually expanded to become the Quadrangular Tournament. After the early
phase, where the Parsees and upper class Hindus initially picked up cricket from the British,
the game gradually became more representative.
teams that were run under the patronage of the princes had diverse compositions, across
class and caste barriers.
Thus, a relatively large number of Dalits played in the upper echelons of Indian cricket at
that time. In spite of conditions for Dalits in cricket improving over time, from Baloo to
Vithal,8 there appears to have been a huge decline in their representation subsequently.
This shows that subsequent changes in the structure of the game, rather than tastes or
choices, must be a large factor. Thus, we believe that the change in patronage and the
subsequent concentration of the game in urban centres, along with other systemic factors
are the reasons for the under-representation of Dalits in Indian cricket.
The exclusionary impact of the urban concentration of the game can be seen from a study of
Muslims, another minority community in India that is under-represented in cricket
(Ramakrishnan 2017). As many as 48% of the total Indian Test cricketers in the
1970s–1980s hailed from merely six cities, namely Mumbai, Chennai, Delhi, Bengaluru,
Hyderabad and Kolkata. However, the share of these six cities has steadily declined to 39%
in recent years, and indications are that it shall continue to decrease. This shift to smaller
towns has coincided with a significant increase in the number of Muslims playing for India.
The study further states,
For five full decades (1950s through the 1990s), only seven Muslim players
made their debut. This represents just 4% of the total number of cricketers
who made their debut in the same period (172). However, coinciding with the
power shift from the major cities to smaller towns, there has been a revival of
sorts in Muslim fortunes since 2000; 8 out of 64 cricketers (12.5%) who have
made their debut since 2000 are Muslims. (Ramakrishnan 2017)
That this is not merely a correlation but involves an aspect of causation can be seen from
the fact that only two of the eight Muslim cricketers to have made their debuts in this
millennium hail from one of the six traditional powerhouses of cricket. Moreover, most of
them come from lower class families. Consequently, it is probable that the urban
stranglehold and corporate patronage have had a similar impact on Dalit cricket.
The Indian women’s team that recently made waves by making it to the finals of the World
Cup had several women from lower caste backgrounds and did not reflect the upper caste
homogeneity of its male counterpart (Shantha 2017). Along with the presence of Dalits in
other men’s national teams such as hockey, this debunks Guha’s argument that Dalits prefer
careers in professional fields to sport. However, what the women’s success also does is
rebut the argument put forth by Anand that Brahmins are especially attracted to or adept at
cricket, as opposed to any other sport.
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
The women team’s success also gives credence to Majumdar’s argument that the corporate
patronage of the sport has resulted in the creation of systemic barriers. Patronage
determines the nature of feeder tournaments. The men’s game is primarily dependent on
interprovincial tournaments such as the Ranji Trophy, inter-corporate tournaments and the
lucrative Indian Premier League (IPL). While several of the teams were run by public sector
undertakings like Air India and Brihanmumbai Electricity Supply and Transport (BEST)
Undertaking, they employed the same models of employment as the Tatas (Majumdar 2006:
944). On the other hand, women’s cricket in India thrives on the patronage of state bodies:
The Indian Railways employs 10 out of 15 members of the squad that represented India at
the 2017 World Cup (Times of India 2017a). In addition to the interprovincial tournament,
the women’s game is largely dependent on the Inter-Railways Tournament, conducted
between railway departments. The Indian Railways, being one of the largest employers in
the world, hires across qualifications for a variety of posts and also has reservations in
employment, thus ensuring a more diverse employee pool.
This is a commonly heard refrain in gully (street) cricket in India, where a petulant child
refuses to share his bat unless allowed to bat first (or upon being dismissed soon after
beginning his innings). This story of power imbalances, unfortunately, also plays out in
contexts of caste and class.
The history of class and cricket is well-documented. In England, this manifested itself in the
division between the “amateurs” and the “professionals.” Amateurs or the “gentlemen” were
those from the ruling classes who played without any financial remuneration (at least on
paper).9 On the other hand, professionals (or the “players”), as the name suggests, would be
paid by the clubs to represent them. A curious aspect of this division was that the upper-
class amateurs mostly played as batsmen. On the other hand, the professionals could both
bat and bowl, with batting being almost the exclusive preserve of the amateurs. Thus,
bowling, especially pace bowling, which involved toiling and was the most physically taxing
part of the game, was left to the professionals (Shindler 2012).
This peculiar division seems to have permeated into the modern game. The easiest example
in this regard is, perhaps, South Africa. Temba Bavuma became just the first black Test
batsman for South Africa when he debuted in 2014 (Guardian 2014). A number of black
bowlers have played for the country over the years, but just the one specialist batsman.
Even though transformation guidelines have been in place at lower levels of the game for
several years, the 2016–17 charts from South Africa’s domestic competition show that
despite being outnumbered 30–36, there are seven white players in the top 10 run-scorers,
while six of the top 10 wicket-takers were non-white (Holme 2017). This division is also
reflected in the roles of India’s international Dalit cricketers (Table 1).
Table 1 shows that three of India’s four Dalit cricketers have been bowling all-rounders.
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
That this division also existed in colonial India is evident from the following line in Guha’s
(2014) story of Baloo: “Baloo once told his son that although he had bowled for hundreds of
hours at the Poona Club, not once was he given a chance to bat.” The limited sample set
available makes it appear as though this division has carried forward into independent
India.
For a larger sample set, it is informative to turn to the other under-represented minority in
Indian cricket, Muslims. A list of Muslim cricketers who have played Tests for India shows
that, in the early years, there was an even spread with a large number of batsmen.
However, since the turn of the millennium and with the spread of cricket to rural centres,
five of the eight Muslim players to debut have been pace bowlers (Table 2).10
Thus, structural inequities already present in cricket continue to operate in the context of
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
minorities and particularly, Dalits. The few Dalit cricketers that have played for India seem
to have been bound by these oppressive structures, whether consciously or not. Unlike
England, where the amateurs were the exception rather than the rule, Dalits and blacks are
minorities both on and off the field. Thus, here it is a question of them being discriminated
against, as opposed to privileges being given to a select few. Consequently, while this may
not appear to be a barrier to entry but an inequity having entered the sport, it is important
to remember that it may result in minorities resenting the discriminatory practices and
choosing alternative sports or professions instead.
An important question that arises as a result of the foregoing analysis is on the difference in
the fortunes of Dalits and Muslims in Indian cricket, given that both communities remain
marginalised in India. Two answers readily present themselves in the preceding sections,
but we will elaborate them here. It must be noted that even Muslims have been under-
represented in Indian cricket since independence, though not quite to the extent of the
Dalits. First, the Muslims competed in several Quadrangular tournaments such as the one
held in Mumbai. The Quadrangular, or variations thereof, was a fixture in several Indian
cities such as Mumbai, Lahore, Karachi and Delhi. Further, colleges such as the
Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College—presently Aligarh Muslim University—prided
themselves on their cricket team (Guha 2014). This resulted in the development of Muslim
cricket across the country. A similar head start in playing cricket also resulted in a
disproportionate number of Parsis having played for India. While Dalits did play for Hindu
sides, this was often after great opposition, as was seen in the case of Baloo. Further, unlike
other Hindu castes and communities, there were no dedicated Dalit teams.11 The second
point of difference with the Dalits is with regard to the presence of role models. Players
such as Mansoor Ali Khan Pataudi and Syed Mushtaq Ali—after whom the Indian domestic
Twenty20 (T20) competition is named—captured the public imagination. In recent times,
Zaheer Khan, Mohammad Azharuddin and Irfan Pathan have been fan favourites; the latter
two have also spoken of their Muslim identity at political rallies. On the other hand, as
pointed out earlier, there is a complete dearth of Dalit role models in Indian cricket. The
only cricketer whose caste has been addressed in public, Vinod Kambli, has shied away from
his Dalit identity (Financial Express 2016).
Thus, structural issues that inhibited the growth of Dalit cricket in India at the very
beginning continue to affect their representation today.
The preceding sections have shown that the lack of Dalit representation is not due to
choices or Brahminical preferences. There is a need to address the issues rather than write
them off. Reservations can ensure that the issues of potential bias in selection and the lack
of role models are addressed. However, the preceding sections have also shown that there
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
are systemic issues that act as barriers against Dalit entry in the Indian cricket. Given the
fact that the barriers are often invisible and are not isolable, a quota is perhaps the best way
to address these simultaneously. Further, the example of South Africa shows that
reservations have indeed been effective. The first benefit has been an increased black
interest and participation in cricket. Equally important, it is significantly changing the
school cricket system on which South African cricket thrives. A few dozen schools provide
majority of the cricketers who play for South Africa. However, these schools are primarily
white and elite in their composition. The transformation guidelines have ensured a slowly
increasing intake of black children in these schools (Alfred 2017). Similarly, in India,
reservations across playing levels would ensure a larger pool of Dalit cricketers in the
domestic structure.
While Ramdas Athawale has proposed a reservation of 25% for Dalits in the international
team, our intention is not to lay down any such quota or percentage. Determination of a
specific number requires data on the available players at the first-class level, as well as a
clearly envisioned long-term plan. Unfortunately, at present, there is no publicly available
data about the number of Dalits playing in the domestic structure in India. Even at the
international level, most of the data is speculative. For instance, we are aware of Karsan
Ghavri’s Dalit identity only because he contested parliamentary elections from a Dalit
constituency (Times of India 2014). The only input on the model for a quota in Indian cricket
that we shall give would be to learn from the South Africans.
In South Africa, the quota for cricketers of colour was introduced at the lower levels of the
sport long before its introduction at the national level (Muller 2016). This ensured that there
was no sudden dip in the quality of cricket being played. While a few people still tend to
blame poor performances on the transformation guidelines, since the enforcement of the
quotas, South Africa has managed to work its way up from being the rank-seven Test team
to rank two at the time of writing. This is primarily because of the fact that there was a
ready supply line in place by the time the guidelines were imposed at the national level, with
players like Kagiso Rabada, who would probably have been in contention for selection even
in the absence of guidelines.
We can also learn from the failure of the reservation model at institutions of higher
education in India. The lack of support for students from disadvantaged classes in
institutions of primary education, specifically after the age of 14 means that even though
students are admitted into institutions of higher educations, they face structural barriers
which translate into high dropout rates and failures (Kumar 2015). Therefore, it is essential
that support structures are created at the grass roots in order to ensure that the structural
inequality can be tackled at its core. This would also ensure that the players who benefit
thereby, are not buried under an avalanche of comments about sport being the domain of
meritocracy, at every poor performance.
The question then turns to the means through which such a quota can be imposed upon
Indian cricket. There are two alternatives: First, the Board of Control for Cricket in India
(BCCI) itself can resolve to implement it; or second, the quota can be imposed by the
judiciary.12 Given the BCCI’s refusal to ever broach the subject, expecting it to enact such a
policy of its own accord is nothing short of a pipe dream. Consequently, we shall deal with
the latter alternative in the succeeding paragraphs.
Essentially, the judicial route would involve the Supreme Court or the high court exercising
writ jurisdiction over the BCCI. These two courts can issue writs against public bodies and
thereby enforce the Fundamental Rights against them: This includes the right to equality in
Articles 14 to 16 of the Constitution, which form the bedrock of reservations in India. While
the Supreme Court exercises writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution, high
courts do so under Article 226. While both courts have the power to issue writs, the kind of
cases in which this power can be exercised differs.
Under Article 32, the Supreme Court can exercise writ jurisdiction over any body that
constitutes the “state” as per the definition laid down in Article 12. Thus, it can exercise this
power only over bodies that form the government or are under the control of the
government. On the other hand, under Article 226, a high court’s writ jurisdiction is not
confined to bodies that constitute the state, but also extends to other “persons or
authorities.” What bodies do, in fact, fall under the ambits of the terms “state” and “persons
or authorities” has been a contentious issue. In considering the exercise of writ jurisdiction
over the BCCI, the first question that needed to be resolved is whether the BCCI constitutes
“state” and is thus amenable to Article 32. In the alternate, it needed to be seen whether
high courts could exercise writ jurisdiction over it nonetheless.
In Zee Telefilms Ltd v Union of India (2005), the Supreme Court concluded that the BCCI
did not constitute “state” under Article 12 of the Constitution, as the government does not
control it. The Court stated that any control exercised in terms of travel arrangements,
visas, permissions for foreign teams to visit, etc, are purely regulatory in nature. This
control is not so pervasive that it can be said the BCCI functions under the control of the
government. Consequently, it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under Article 32. As a result, the Supreme Court cannot enforce Part 3 of the Constitution,
that is, the Fundamental Rights against the BCCI.
However, the Supreme Court did state that as the BCCI performs “public duties” such as
controlling the activities of the team and others involved in the game and, importantly in our
case, team selection. Such bodies that perform public duties were held to be amenable to
the writ jurisdiction of high courts. The following remarks in the judgment summarise this
position succinctly:
Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the Board does discharge some
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
duties like the selection of an Indian cricket team, controlling the activities of
the players and others involved in the game of cricket. These activities can be
said to be akin to public duties or State functions and if there is any violation of
any constitutional or statutory obligation or rights of other citizens, the
aggrieved party may not have a relief by way of a petition under Article 32. But
that does not mean that the violator of such right would go scot-free merely
because it or he is not a State. Under the Indian jurisprudence there is always
a just remedy for violation of a right of a citizen. Though the remedy under
Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved party can always seek a remedy under
the ordinary course of law or by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution which is much wider than Article 32. (Zee Telefilms Ltd v Union of
India 2005)
However, following this case, the extent of power that the high court could exercise over the
BCCI and similar bodies, still remained unclear. It was argued that the Fundamental Rights,
qua Fundamental Rights, could not be enforced against them; though their substance could
(Bhatia 2014). However, it appears that following the judgment in the Board of Control for
Cricket in India v Cricket Association of Bihar (2015), this limitation has been done away
with. The Supreme Court13 directly applied the provisions of Part 3 of the Constitution to a
clause in the memorandum of the BCCI as though it were a statute. The Supreme Court
stated that
Article 14.14 On the basis of this, it can be argued that the absence of reservations, and
therefore the BCCI’s treatment of Dalits and upper castes as being alike, is violative of the
constitutional guarantee of equality. While this would amount to judicial legislation, this has
not stopped the court in the past as is best evidenced by the Lodha Commission case itself
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
(Board of Control for Cricket in India v Cricket Association of Bihar 2015). The judicial route
can be used in order to introduce a reservation in selection.
However, a question that may arise in adopting this route to introduce reservations is
whether this comprises governmental interference in the affairs of the board. Article 2.9 of
the Amended and Restated Memorandum of Articles of Association of the International
Cricket Council (ICC) requires the member boards to be independent. Article 2.9 (B)
specifically states that interference in selection matters may result in the suspension of a
member board. It reads:
Article 2.7 merely lays down the procedure by which the executive board of the ICC can
suspend the member board.
However, when the issue arose whether the guidelines issued upon CSA by the Department
of Sports and Rcreation amounted to interference, ICC spokesperson Claire Furlong stated,
“The issue of team selection is one for board members and the ICC does not get involved
with that” (SA Cricket 2016). While this is completely at odds with the wording of the article
cited above, Furlong introduced a condition that cannot be found in the articles, stating that
the ICC treats interference on a case-to-case basis and that action could be taken only if a
complaint was lodged with the ICC by CSA. However, it is doubtful that the BCCI would
consider lodging a complaint with the ICC against a policy imposed by the Supreme Court
ever again. Anurag Thakur, former president of the BCCI attempted to get Shashank
Manohar, the chairman of the ICC to attest to the fact that the Supreme Court’s
interference in the ongoing Lodha Committee case constituted government interference.
The fallout from this attempt resulted in him being removed from office by the Supreme
Court (Times of India 2017b). At the same time, the ICC also refused to intervene, calling
into question whether the ICC considers such judicial proceedings to be governmental
interference at all.
Conclusions
It is beyond doubt that barely a handful of Dalits have played cricket for India. While a few
people have written about it, the mainstream media has largely dismissed the issue. The
only time that the issue has gained attention in mainstream media (Stevenson 2008) outside
of those papers that dedicate themselves to Dalit issues, it was dismissed without
engagement (Tripathi 2008). However, the issue is finally receiving some attention due to
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
the efforts of Ramdas Athawale. This paper is a step towards highlighting the issue and
arguing that the causes of the under-representation are systemic. We have tried to lay down
a road map for introducing reservations in Indian cricket.
However, the major issue facing any advocate of better Dalit representation in
cricket—whether through quotas or otherwise—is the lack of data. While it is simple enough
to rely on a list of Test cricketers from India to ascertain religious minorities such as
Muslims and Christians, it is not as simple in the case of caste, given the regional variations
in surnames as well as surnames contrived to erase caste identity. In order to truly assess
the status of Dalits in cricket, data collection needs to be strengthened, especially at lower
levels of the game. Lower levels are also where structural barriers most often crop up. The
South African sports ministry’s directive (DSRSA 2015) has led CSA to target these barriers
all the way down to school cricket, thereby proving that it is not impossible. The lack of
collected data is also a direct consequence of the fact that the issue has received hardly any
attention from the mainstream media. The absence of a players’ association, the
establishment of which has been recommended by the Lodha Commission, has also perhaps
stultified the process.
However, it must be noted that pure numbers are also not a reliable indicator of systemic
issues, there are also a number of other factors, such as regional development of the sport.
For instance, cricket is not as well developed in the North East and Kashmir, which have
larger than average non-Hindu populations. As discussed earlier, there has been a huge
increase in the number of Muslims representing India since the turn of the century as
cricket has reached newer centres. Consequently, it is not sufficient to look at caste alone,
as factors such as the concentration of cricket in urban and historically heavyweight centres
act simultaneously.
Any conversation about caste in Indian cricket is incomplete without a tale from the life of
Sunil Gavaskar. One of India’s greatest batsmen and a Brahmin, Gavaskar was exchanged
as a baby in the hospital with the son of a fisherman. His uncle noticed that a hole in the
baby’s ear—which he had observed earlier—was missing, and so the children were restored
to their respective families. In his autobiography (1976), Gavaskar admits that he would
probably have been an “obscure fisherman, toiling somewhere along the west coast.”
Perhaps contradictorily, when asked his opinion on the relation between cricket and caste,
he said, “no influence, at all” (Stevenson 2008).15 This belief perhaps stems from the notion
that the players do not even know each others’ castes and believe that caste today is only
the preserve of politics. This only goes to reinforce our argument that the structural barriers
are transparent and pervasive. These deterrents would have to be addressed through a
mechanism like reservations, rather than hoping to identify and isolate individual barriers.
Comments from cricketers and noted commentators like Harsha Bhogle stating that players
do not know each others’ caste, also shows how the notion of being a “post-caste” society in
fact makes caste oppression worse in some ways. It is more difficult to pinpoint the
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
discrimination, to talk about it and to address it, even though it is undeniable that such
discrimination continues to occur. Cricket is a great example for what is happening across
the country, especially in urban areas.
Before we conclude, we would like to note our own hesitation in authoring this piece. As
cricket fans, we worried that a quota would lead to a deterioration in the quality of the
Indian team. However, our own hesitation made us realise how ingrained the idea of merit
has become today. Without going into the value of the idea of merit—and there are several
arguments against it—objective merit has often been extremely flimsy in the context of
cricket. There have been as many as 41 players (Lynch 2017), Hardik Pandya being the
most recent example, who scored their maiden first class century in a Test match. While
first class statistics often form the primary basis of selection, these players show that quite
often quality cannot be measured “objectively” by numbers. Players such as Marcus
Trescothick were selected despite very ordinary domestic performances and went on to lead
great Test careers. Such players are picked for their “grit,” “potential,” “spark:” any
number of qualities which ensure that selections are not carried out solely on the basis of
statistics. If our argument results in the selection of a Dalit batsman with a slightly lower
batting average, he might, in fact, go on to become the next Trescothick. Even if he does
not, and merely scores a single century, that century may inspire millions, as Temba
Bavuma’s first, and only, century by a black South African did.
Notes
1 It used to be the official policy to field four players of colour in every match. This policy
was scrapped in 2007, but was believed to be enforced unofficially subsequently. The
inclusion of Vernon Philander in place of Kyle Abbott in the semi-final side during the 2015
World Cup after a match-winning performance was later admitted to have been due to this
reason (Moonda 2015).
2 The European Union (EU) allows the free movement of labour through member states,
which includes professional sportspeople. Kolpak is an additional window created through a
decision of the European Court of Justice that allows players from countries that have
signed European Union Association Agreements to exercise the same rights (Deutscher
Handballbund eV v Marcos Kolpak 2003). This is significant in the context of cricket
because each team in England’s domestic structure is allowed to field only two foreign
players; however, players from the EU and Kolpak players do not take up overseas slots but
count as domestic players. This acts as a drain on the home country because a player taking
up a Kolpak deal is not permitted to play for his home country for the period of the deal,
which is typically around four years. Further, the option of Kolpak deals is available only to
players who have played a certain number of international matches for their country and to
those who have four-year long work visas. As a result, most of the players who have taken
up such deals were on the fringes of the national team, thereby depleting their reserves. In
spite of having to relinquish their international futures, South African players sign Kolpak
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
deals due to the large difference in remuneration between the two countries. However, with
Brexit, the future of EU citizens working in Britain is uncertain. Moreover, given the English
and Wales Cricket Board’s disapproval for Kolpak (as it hurts domestic talent), it is unlikely
that the rule will be extended regardless. This has led to a rush to sign Kolpak deals among
the South African bench, giving up uncertain international futures for stability (Holme
2017).
3 Throughout this paper, the terms Indian cricketer and Indian team, or any variants
thereof, are used to refer to male cricketers, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Though non-
male and differently abled cricketers, such as the blind cricket team, equally fall under the
ambit of these terms, this has been done solely for the sake of literary convenience.
4 We have limited our analysis to Dalits because there is no data available on players
belonging to Other Backward Classes, who have played for India. To truly ascertain the
same, the family of every Indian cricketer, past and present, would have to be interviewed.
The veracity of the only list available is unclear (TamilFunda 2017). Further, with respect to
religious minorities, a handful of Christians have represented India in test cricket, which is
in keeping with their proportion in the population. Parsees, given their early interest in
cricket, are overrepresented. Similarly, more Sikhs have represented India than their
proportion in the population would mandate. Muslims have been proportionally represented
since the turn of the millennium, with the spread of cricket to smaller towns and villages.
Since our argument stems from the need to correct systemic barriers that result in under-
representation, it would not be applicable to these communities. With respect to Jains and
Buddhists, arguing for the reservation of even one slot in the team would be to over-
represent them, given their proportion of the population. However, any other arguments
such as a more robust data collection put forth in this paper would apply to them.
5 Test cricket is widely considered the pinnacle of the game, because it involves the
greatest examination of a player’s skill and temperament. Most players, barring a few
notable exceptions, consider representing their country in test cricket the greatest
ambition. Consequently, we have used test cricket as the metric for this study.
6 The caste of most of these players is unverified, although the Dalit forums cited state that
they hail from the Dalit community. The only concrete reason given for putting forth any of
these names is that Karsan Ghavri contested elections from a seat reserved for Dalits (Times
of India 2014).
7 The Quadrangular Tournament in Bombay was played between the Europeans, Parsees,
Hindus and Muslims from 1912 to 1936. From 1892 to 1906, it was played between the
Parsees and Europeans before expanding to a triangular format to include the Hindus in
1907.
8 Apart from not being allowed to lead, Baloo’s initial inclusion in the Hindu team faced
severe opposition from the community. Among other things, he was served tea in different
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
utensils and would have to dine separately from the team (Guha 2014).
9 They would often take up positions in the management of the club and thus be paid,
though they would retain their amateur status and the accompanying prestige. The
hypocrisy of the system was one of the reasons it was abandoned (Ford 2012).
10 A similar analysis of Indian Muslim players to have played in the Indian Premier League
(IPL) since its inception threw up the following numbers: eight have been batsmen, another
eight all-rounders and as many as 27 bowlers. The presence of such a disparity in the IPL as
well shows that this hypothesis holds true with a larger sample set as well; and more
importantly, that this disparity extends to the lower levels of cricket and is not limited
merely to Test cricket.
11 The cause for this was probably the absence of resources and political power to set up
Dalit cricket teams. It is also doubtful whether any other Hindu team would agree to play
against them.
12 The legislature is not an alternative because the BCCI is a society incorporated under the
Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act. The only way a legislature can affect the way an
incorporated body functions is if the body was created by way of a statute. However, as the
BCCI was incorporated by the means provided by a general statute rather than the
enactment of a specific statute enacted solely to create it, the legislature cannot exercise
any power over it. Justice Katju (2016) has argued that the separation of powers dictates
that Parliament address the issue. He opines that a special resolution can be passed in
Parliament under the above act. With all due respect, this is not possible as per the terms of
the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act. Section 12 of the act deals with amending the
Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations of BCCI (the constitutional
document), but it states that a society under the act, that is, the BCCI, may amend its own
constitution by way of a special resolution of its board. Thus, the board itself makes its
constitution and can amend it. The only external body that has power over the BCCI as per
the act is the registrar of societies. The registrars, either of their own motion, or on the
direction of the district collector may initiate an inquiry into the affairs of the society.
However, the only remedy available on exercise of this power is to cancel the registration if
it is found that the provisions of the act were violated, the BCCI’s own constitution was
violated or if the BCCI becomes insolvent. While this power could have been exercised by
the registrar with respect to financial mismanagement in the
ongoing reforms in BCCI, it would find no application to the issue being discussed in this
paper.
13 The Supreme Court got jurisdiction to hear this case as an appeal from a decision of the
Bombay High Court, where the high court had exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226.
14 See Jalan Trading Co v Mill Mazdoor Union (1967); and Venkateshwara Theatre v State
of Andhra Pradesh (1993).
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
15 The only influence that Gavaskar does admit the event perhaps had on his career was
when he quipped humorously, “I keep thinking about [how] I was found in a crib next to a
fisherwoman so it definitely has had an effect on my cricketing career—look at the number
of times I’ve been out caught fishing outside the off stump” (Stevenson 2008).
References
Anand, Siriyavan (2002): “Eating with Our Fingers, Watching Hindi Cinema and Consuming
Cricket,” Ambedkar.org, 4 March, http://www.ambedkar.org/research/Eatingwith.htm.
Bhatia, Gautam (2014): “What Is the State–V: Zee Telefilms, the Death of the Functional
Approach, and an Alternative,” Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 19 August,
https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2014/08/19/what-is-the-state-v-zee-t....
Board of Control for Cricket in India v Cricket Association of Bihar (2015): SCC, SC, 3, p
251.
Deutscher Handballbund eV v Marcos Kolpak (2003): Case C-438/00, ECR, I-4135, European
Court of Human Rights.
Chand, Dular (2017): “Dalit in Cricket,” Chamaar Tab Aur Ab, 3 February, accessed on 20
October 2017, http://chamaar-today.blogspot.in/2017/
02/dalit-in-cricket.html.
DSRSA (2013): “Pilot Evaluation: A Transformation Status Report 2013,” Eminent Persons
Group on Transformation in Sport and Department of Sports and Recreation, South Africa.
Economist (2017): “In the Race with its Tricky Neighbour, India Has Recently Been
Winning,” 22 July,
https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21725104-india-becoming-more-nationalist-
and-more-authoritarian-race-its-tricky.
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
Financial Express (2016): “Vinod Kambli Shying Away as His Dalit Status Might Oust Him
from Page 3, Says Udit Raj,” 29 December,
http://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/vinod-kambli-shying-away-as-h....
Ford, Christopher (2012): “From the Archive, 27 November 1962: Cricket Ends
Distinction between Gents and Players,” Guardian, 27 November,
https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2012/nov/27/cricket-gentleman-pl....
Guardian (2014): “Temba Bavuma Set to Make History as South Africa’s First Black
Batsman,” 24 December,
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2014/dec/24/temba-bavuma-south-africa-....
Guha, Ramachandra (2014): A Corner of a Foreign Field: The Indian History of a British
Sport, Ebook, Gurgaon: Penguin Books.
Holme, Tristan (2017): “Kolpak Beyond the Headlines,” Cricket Monthly, 10 July,
http://www.thecricketmonthly.com/story/1104863/kolpak-beyond-the-headlines.
Indian Express (2016): “Vinod Kambli Rejects BJP MP’s Claim of Discrimination in Cricket
Owing to Dalit Background,” 28 December,
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/i-request-you-to-refrain
-from-using-my-name-vinod-kambli-hits-back-at-bjp-mps-claims-regarding-discrimination-in-
cricket-4448292/.
Katju, Markandey (2016): “First Report of the Justice Katju Commission to the BCCI,” Board
of Control for Cricket in India.
Kumar, Pramod G (2015): “90% IIT-Roorkee Dropouts Are Backward Caste: A Case against
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
Moonda, Firdose (2015): “SA Motivator Horn Hints at Politics in Team Selection,” ESPN
Cricinfo, 16 April, http://www.espncricinfo.com/southafrica/content/story/862155.html.
— (2017a): “Who Could Be Next in South Africa’s Talent Drain?” ESPN Cricinfo, 6 January,
http: //www.espncricinfo.com/story/_/id/ 18418824/next-south-africa-talent-drain.
— (2017b): “Ministerial Ban on Cricket South Africa Lifted,” ESPN Cricinfo, 9 May,
http://www.espncricinfo.com/story/_/id/19341651/ministerial-ban-cricket-....
Muller, Antoinette (2016): “Beyond the Boundary: Transformation in South African Cricket,”
Daily Maverick, http://features.dailymaverick.co.za/beyond-the-boundary/.
Ramesh, Akshay (2015): “Is Caste an Indispensable Member of Tamil Nadu Cricket
Association’s Squad?” Medium, 15 April,
https://medium.com/@iamnotakshayr/is-caste-an-indispensable-member-of-ta....
Shindler, Colin (2012): “The Slow Death of Cricket’s Class Divide,” ESPN Cricinfo, Wisden
ISSN (Online) - 2349-8846
Stevenson, Andrew (2008): “A Class Act? Opinions Differ,” Sydney Morning Herald,
http://www.smh.com.au/news/cricket/a-class-act-opinions-differ/2008/01/0....
TamilFunda (2017): “Indian Cricket Team Players Caste and Region List,” accessed on 20
October 2017, http://tamilfunda.com/indian-cricket-players-caste-religion-list/.
Times of India (2014): “Ghavri from Patan to Add Shine to BJP’s Poll Plan,” 3 March,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/Ghavri-from-Patan-to-....
— (2017a): “Railways Award Rs 1.30 Crore to Ten Indian Women Cricketers,” 27 July,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/cricket/icc-womens-world-cup-....
— (2017b): “BCCI v Lodha: Events that Led to Anurag Thakur’s Removal as President,” 2
January, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/cricket/news/bcci-v-lodha-eve....
Tripathi, Salil (2008): “What’s Caste Got to Do With It?” ESPN Cricinfo, 6 January,
http://www.espncricinfo.com/magazine/content/story/329291.html.