TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Speech Acts...........................................................................................................................3

II. Speech act classification.......................................................................................................6

III. Direct and indirect speech acts......................................................................................8

IV. Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices (IFIDs)..........................................................10

V. Felicity conditions...............................................................................................................12

VI. The performative hypothesis........................................................................................14

VII. Speech events..................................................................................................................18

REFERENCES...........................................................................................................................20

1
 I. Speech Acts
In attempting to express themselves, people do not only produce utterances containing
grammatical structures and words, but they also perform actions via those utterances. If you
work in a situation where a boss has a great deal of power, then the boss's utterance of the
expression in [1] is more than just a statement.
[1] You're fired.
The utterance in [1] can be used to perform the act of ending your employment.
However, the actions performed by utterances do not have to be as dramatic or as unpleasant
as in [1]. The action can be quite pleasant, as in the complement performed by [2a.], the
acknowledgment of thanks in [2b.], or the expression of surprise in [2c.].
[2] a. You're so delicious.
b. You're welcome.
c. You're crazy!
Actions performed via utterances are generally called speech acts and, in English, are
commonly given more specific labels, such as apology, complaint, compliment, invitation,
promise, or request.
Speech acts have been central to the works of many other philosophers and linguists
like Grice (1957, 1975), Hymes (1964), Searle (1969, 1975, 1979), Levinson (1983), Yule
(1983,1996), Mey (1993, 2001), and Thomas (1995). Their common assumption is that when
conversing people use grammatical and lexical units not only to produce utterances but also to
perform actions. Just like how Austin states that In saying something the speaker (S) does
something (1962). This is a type of speech in which a person's words are causing something to
happen and not just making a statement.
Three dimensions of speech acts:
Locutionary speech act is roughly equivalent to uttering certain utterance with a certain
sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to meaning in the traditional sense.
(Austin, 1962: 108)

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 On any occasion, the action performed by producing an utterance will consist of 3
related acts. There is first a Locutionary act, which is the basic act of utterance, or producing a
meaningful linguistic expression. If you have difficulty with actually forming the sounds and
words to create a meaningful utterance in a language (for example, because it’s foreign or
you’re tongue-tied), then you might fail to produce a locutionary act.
Producing ‘Aha mokofa’ in English will not normally count as a locutionary act,
whereas [3] will.
[3] “I’ve just made some coffee”.
Mostly we don’t just produce well-formed utterances with no purpose. We form an
utterance with some kind of function in mind. This is the second dimension or the illocutionary
act. This can also be interpreted as the intention/purpose of the speaker when making an
utterance. The illocutionary act is performed via the communicative force of an utterance. We
might utter [3] to make a statement, an offer, an explanation, or for some other communicative
purpose. This is also generally known as the illocutionary force of the utterance.
We do not, of course, simply create an utterance with a function without intending it to
have an effect. This is the third dimension, the perlocutionary act. Hufford and Heasley
(1983:250) state that a perlocutionary act is an act that is carried out by a speaker when making
an utterance causes a certain effect on the hearer and others.
Depending on the circumstances, you utter [3] on the assumption that the hearer will
recognize the effect you intended (for example, to account for a wonderful smell or to get the
hearer to drink some coffee). This is also generally known as the perlocutionary effect. These
ultimate effects, according to Mey (1993: 112), are dependent on the context of the utterance
and are unpredictable. The H may correctly understand the S's intention and does what his/her
interlocutor wants, or he/she may deliberately ignore the S's want or desire
Of these three dimensions, the most discussed is illocutionary force. Indeed, the term
'speech act' is generally interpreted quite narrowly to mean only the illocutionary force of an
utterance. The illocutionary force of an utterance is what it 'counts as'. Even the term 'speech
act' is used to mean the same illocutionary act (Thomas 1995: 51), and illocutionary act is 'the
basic unit of human linguistic communication' (Searle 1976: 1).

3
 The same locutionary act, as shown in [4a.], can count as a prediction [4b], a promise
[4c], or a warning [4d]. These different analyses of the utterance in [4a.] represent different
illocutionary forces.
[4] a. I'll see you later. (= A)
b. [I predict that] A.
c. [I promise you that] A.
d. [I warn you that] A.
One problem with the examples in [4] is that the same utterance can potentially have
quite different illocutionary forces (for example, promise versus warning). How can speakers
assume that the intended illocutionary force will be recognized by the hearer? That question
has been addressed by considering two things: Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices and
Felicity conditions.

4
 II. Speech act classification
We can classify speech acts based on their functions. There are 5 types of general
functions performed by speech acts:
- Declarations
- Directives
- Commissives
- Representatives
- Expressives
Declarations are those kinds of speech acts that change the world via their utterance,
the utterer has to have a special institutional role in order for the declaration to have an effect.
(Yule, 1996: 53)
e.g.
a. Priest: I now pronounce you husband and wife.
b. Jury Foreman: We find the defendant guilty.
In using a declaration, the speaker changes the world via words.
Directives are those kinds of speech acts that speakers use to get someone else to do
something. They express what the speaker wants. They are commands, orders, requests, and
suggestions, and they can be positive or negative. (Yule, 1996: 54)
e.g.
a. Could you lend me a pen, please?
b. Don't touch that.
In using a directive, the speaker attempts to make the world fit the words (via the
hearer).
Commissives are those kinds of speech acts that speakers use to commit themselves to
some future action. They express what the speaker intends. They are promises, threats, refusals,
and pledges, and they can be performed by the speaker alone, or by the speaker as a member
of a group. (Yule, 1996: 54)
e.g.
a. I’ll be back.
b. We will not do that.
In using a commissive, the speaker undertakes to make the world fit the words (via the
speaker).

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 Representatives are those kinds of speech acts that state what the speaker believes to
be the case or not. Statements of fact, assertions, conclusions, and descriptions, are all examples
of the speaker representing the world as he or she believes it is. (Yule, 1996: 53)
e.g.
a. The earth is flat.
b. It was a warm sunny day.
In using a representative, the speaker makes words fit the world (of belief).
Expressives are those kinds of speech acts that state what the speaker feels. They
express psychological states and can be statements of pleasure, pain, likes, dislikes, joy, or
sorrow. They can be caused by something the speaker does or the hearer does, but they are
about the speaker's experience. (Yule, 1996: 53)
e.g.
a. I'm really sorry!
b. Congratulations!
In using an expressive, the speaker makes words fit the world (of feeling).

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III. Direct and indirect speech acts
Another way we can distinguish the types of speech acts is by separating them based
on their structure. In English, a structural distinction between three general types of speech acts
is provided by the three basic sentence types.
e.g.
(Yule, 1996: 54)
a. You wear a seat belt. (declarative)
b. Do you wear a seat belt? (interrogative)
c. Wear a seatbelt! (imperative)

Through the examples, we can see the relationship between the three structural forms
(declarative, interrogative, imperative) and the three general communicative functions
(statement, question, command/request).
To identify whether it’s an indirect or direct speech act, we need to look at the
relationship between the two. If there is a direct relationship between a structure and a function,
we have a direct speech act. Whenever there is an indirect relationship between a structure and
a function, we have an indirect speech act.
To put into perspective, a declarative used to make a statement is a direct speech act,
but a declarative used to make a request is an indirect speech act.
e.g.
(Yule, 1996: 55)
a. It's cold outside.
b. I hereby tell you about the weather.
c. I hereby request of you that you close the door.

(a) is a declarative, when it is used to make a statement, as paraphrased in (b), it is

functioning as a direct speech act. When it is used to make a command/request, as paraphrased
in (c), it is functioning as an indirect speech act.
The same can be said on other structures. For example, all of the utterances below have
the basic function of commanding/requesting:
a. Move out of the way!
b. Do you have to stand in front of the TV?
c. You're standing in front of the TV.
d. You'd make a better door than a window.
(Yule, 1996: 55)

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 However, only (a) follows the imperative structure thus being the only direct speech
act. The others function the same but are of interrogative and declarative structures
respectively.
One of the most common types of indirect speech act in English has the form of an
interrogative, but is not typically used to ask a question but rather as request.
e.g.
(Yule, 1996: 57)
a. Could you pass the salt?
b. Would you open this?

Indirect speech acts are generally associated with greater politeness in English than
direct speech acts.

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IV. Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices (IFIDs)
As you can see from the examples of [4], the problem could happen in every utterance:
They might have a different meaning for the same utterance which can make the hearer can not
recognize the real illocutionary force. How to solve this problem? According to Yule, there are
two ways to answer this: Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices (IFIDs) and felicity conditions.
The most obvious device to indicate illocutionary force is the Illocutionary Force
Indicating Devices or IFIDs- an expression where there is a slot for a verb that explicitly names
the illocutionary act being performed. That verb is called a performative verb (Vp) (động từ
ngữ vi) (Vp). It often appears with the structure:
I (Vp) you that…
Example:
[5] a. I’ll see you later (=A)
b. [I predict that] A
c. [I promise you that] A
d. [I warn you that] A
In example 5 [c,d], the words “promise” and “warn” would be the performative verbs
which are very clear IFIDs. Speakers do not always “performed” their speech acts so explicitly
through performative verbs. However, sometimes, they use it to distinct their speech act. You
can look at this example of a telephone conversation between a man trying to contact Mary and
Mary’s friends.
[6] Him: Can I talk to Mary?
Her: No, she’s not here.
Him: I’m asking you- can i talk to her.
Her: And I'm telling you- SHE’S NOT HERE.
They explicitly describe the illocutionary force of their utterances ( ask and tell) by
using ‘ask’ and ‘tell’ as a performative verb.
There are also other types of IFIDs: word order, stress and intonation.
Example:

9
[7] a. You’re going! [I tell you Y-G]
b. You’re going? [I request confirmation about Y-G]
c. Are you going? [I ask you if Y-G]

10
 V. Felicity conditions
For the performance of a speech act to be recognized as intended, the circumstances
surrounding the speaker must be appropriate with the conditions. Many utterances can’t
successfully perform their intended act unless certain conditions are met. In other words, a
sentence must not only be grammatical to be correctly performed, it must also be felicitous.
Such a condition is called felicity condition.
For example: I sentence you to six months in prison.
In this case, the performance will be inappropriate if the speaker is not a specific person
in a special context- a judge in a courtroom.
Yule proposed further classification of felicity conditions into 5 classes:
- General conditions: the speaker and hearer can understand the language being used
and that they are not play-acting or being nonsensical.
- Content conditions: concern the appropriate content of the utterance. For example, for
both a promise and a warning, the content of the utterance must be about a future event.
And that utterance should belong to the speaker.
- Preparatory conditions: deal with the differences of various illocutionary acts. For
example: When I promise to do something, there are two preparatory conditions: first,
the event will not happen by itself, and second, the event will have a beneficial effect.
When I utter a warning, there are the following preparatory conditions: it isn't clear that
the hearer knows the event will occur, the speaker does think the event will occur, and
the event will not have a beneficial effect.
- Sincerity conditions: count with the speaker's intention to carry out a certain act. For
a promise, the speaker genuinely intends to carry out the future action, and, for a
warning, the speaker genuinely believes that the future event will not have a beneficial
effect.

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- Essential conditions: combined with a specification of what must be in the utterance
content, the context, and the speaker's intentions, in order for a specific speech act to
be appropriately (felicitously) performed. By the act of uttering a promise, I thereby
intend to create an obligation to carry out the action as promised. In other words, the
utterance changes my state from non-obligation to obligation. Similarly, with a
warning, under the essential condition, the utterance changes my state from non-
informing of a bad future event to informing.

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VI. The performative hypothesis
The performative hypothesis is the hypothesis that every sentence is associated with an
explicit illocutionary act, i.e. is derived from a deep structure containing a performative verb
(John R. Ross, 1970).
It is assumed that this transformation, like others within a generative semantics
framework, does not change meaning. The hypothesis therefore requires acceptance of the
simplistic view that there is a precise correspondence between the meanings of performatives
and their non-performative analogues.
Another consequence of the hypothesis is that illocutionary force is defined in
grammatical terms: illocutionary force is that part of the meaning of a sentence that corresponds
to the highest clause in its semantic representation (Sadock, 1974:19).
One way to think about the speech acts being performed via utterances is to assume that
underlying every utterance there is a clause, containing a performative verb which makes the
illocutionary force explicit (George Yule, 1995). This is known as the performative hypothesis
and the basic format of the underlying clause is shown in this example:
[8] I (hereby) Vp you (that) U
In this clause, the subject must be first person singular (T), followed by the adverb
'hereby', indicating that the utterance 'counts as' an action by being uttered. There is also a
performative verb (Vp) in the present tense and an indirect object in the second person singular
('you'). This underlying clause will always be made explicit, as in [9b.] and [10b.], what, in
utterances such as [9a.] and [10a.], is implicit.
[9] a. Clean up this mess!
b. I hereby order you that you clean up this mess.
[10] a. The work was done by Elaine and myself.
b. I hereby tell you that the work was done by Elaine and myself.

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 Examples like [9b.] and [10b.] (normally without 'hereby'), are used by speakers as
explicit performatives. Examples like [9a.] and [10a.] are implicit performatives, sometimes
called primary performatives.
[11] Be careful.
I [IMPERE] you [that you be careful].
(Here IMPERE is meant to be a generalized imperative verb: the actual identity of the
performative verb, or even whether it has an overt surface-structure form at all, is not essential
to the hypothesis.)
The equivalence between the performative and its non-performative analog is here
achieved by the straightforward device of syntactic transformation: an optional
PERFORMATIVE-DELETION transformation which converts a sentence like into a sentence
like (You) be careful. Hence, according to this hypothesis, all sentences are 'deep down'
performatives.
The advantage of this type of analysis is that it makes clear just what elements are
involved in the production and interpretation of utterances. In syntax, a reflexive pronoun (like
'myself' in [10]) requires the occurrence of an antecedent (in this case T) within the same
sentence structure. The explicit performative in [10b.] provides the T element. Similarly, when
you say to someone, 'Do it yourself!', the reflexive in 'yourself is made possible by the
antecedent 'you' in the explicit version (T order you that you do it yourself). Another advantage
is to show that some adverbs such as 'honestly', or adverbial clauses such as 'because I may be
late', as shown in [11], naturally attach to the explicit performative clause rather than the
implicit version.
[12] a. Honestly, he's a scoundrel.
b. What time is it, because I may be late?
In [12a.], it is the telling part (the performative verb) that is being done 'honestly' and,
in [12b.], it is the act of asking (the performative again) that is being justified by the 'because I
may be late' clause.

14
 There are some technical disadvantages to the performative hypothesis. For example,
uttering the explicit performative version of a command [9b.] has a much more serious impact
than uttering the implicit version [9a.]. The two versions are consequently not equivalent. It is
also difficult to know exactly what the performative verb (or verbs) might be for some
utterances. Although the speaker and hearer might recognize the utterance in [13a.] as an insult,
it would be very strange to have [13b.] as an explicit version.
[13] a. You're dumber than a rock.
b. I hereby insult you that you're dumber than a rock.
The really practical problem with any analysis based on identifying explicit
performatives is that, in principle, we simply do not know how many performative verbs there
are in any language. Instead of trying to list all the possible explicit performatives, and then
distinguish among them, some more general classifications of types of speech acts are usually
used.
The performative hypothesis's most extreme manifestation is a variant developed in
most detail by Sadock, which may be called the “Extended performative hypothesis”. This is
the hypothesis that the illocutionary force not only of a direct speech act but also of an indirect
speech act, can be appropriately formalized in a performative deep structure (Sadock, 1974).
For example, an indirect request such as [14a] would be derived from a deep structure roughly
like [14b]:
[14] a. Can you close the window?
b. I request that you close the window.
Although Sadock does not claim that all indirect illocutions can be explained in this
way, he does claim that some can and that it is possible to provide a set of criteria for deciding
whether the underlying performative represents the indirect illocutionary force or not. The
criteria in question are 'syntactic". For example, the fact that [14a] can contain a mid-
occurrence of please is treated as a sign of its underlying status as a request:
[14] c. Can you please close the window?

15
 But such criteria as are offered are difficult to apply. If, for instance, [14a] is changed
into a slightly different example with roughly the same force, may the word please still be
inserted?
In this area, acceptability judgments about sentences are particularly uncertain, which
is itself a sign that we are dealing with questions of pragmatics rather than grammar. But
Sadock is on less shaky ground when he points out that the extent to which indirect illocutions
can be dealt with in grammar constitutes a gradient of 'idiomatization', rather like the scale of
'idiomatization' in the lexicon reflecting the way metaphors become institutionalized by
historical evolution. This process accounts for the occurrence of hybrid sentences which appear
to combine the grammatical characteristics associated with different kinds of utterance. “Shut
the window, can you?” combines the features of a command and a question. “Let's have a look
at the hand, may I?” combines the features of a suggestion and a request. “I'd like to know,
please, what are you going to say?” combines features of a statement and a question. Such
hybrids do occur quite frequently, but although they are supposed to provide grammatical
motivation for the extended performative hypothesis, such sentences do not lend themselves to
generalization in any kind of grammatical framework, being essentially exceptions to general
rules.
In all significant respects, the present account is completely at odds with the extended
performative hypothesis. First, the hypothesis implies that indirect force can be adequately
represented by a performative verb - an approach that fails to deal with the subtlety of
indirectness in human communication. Secondly, it treats the distinction between direct and
indirect force as simply an all-or-nothing matter. Thirdly, no attempt is made to give a
functional motivation for the relation between sense and force: for the extended performative
hypothesis, it is just an arbitrary fact of grammar that a request can be rendered using a “Can
you?” question, but not using a “Shall?” question. Fourthly, the relation between the direct and
indirect force of an utterance is seen as a grammatical ambiguity, rather than as a matter of two
coexisting meanings, one being conveyed by the other.

16
VII. Speech events
As we have learned in the previous part of this lesson, questioning a hearer-based
condition for making a request results in an indirect request. We can treat an indirect request
as being a matter of asking whether the necessary conditions for a request are in place:
- A preparatory condition is that the speaker assumes the hearer is able to, or CAN,
perform the action.
- A content condition concerns future action, that the hearer WILL perform the action.
We have learned that an indirect request is made when one person tries to get another
person to do something without risking refusal or causing offense. Because a request is an
imposition by the speaker on the hearer, it is better, in some social circumstances, for the
speaker to avoid a direct imposition via a direct request. We can look at the set of utterances
produced in this kind of situation as a speech event.
A speech event is an activity in which participants interact via language in some
conventional way to arrive at some outcome (Yule, 1996: 57). It is a social situation involving
participants who necessarily have a social relationship of some kind and who may have
particular goals on a specific occasion.
There is a difference between asking someone to do X and asking someone if the
preconditions for doing X are in place. Asking about preconditions technically doesn't count
as making a request, but does allow the hearer to react as if the request had been made. When
the speaker asks about preconditions, no direct request is made. In most cases, a 'request' is not
made using a single speech act suddenly uttered. Requesting is typically a speech event, as
illustrated in this example:

17
Him: Oh, Mary, I'm glad you're here.
Her: What's up?
Him: I can't get my computer to work.
Her: Is it broken?
Him: I don't think so.
Her: What's it doing?
Him: I don't know. I'm useless with computers.
Her: What kind is it?
Him: It's a Mac. Do you use them?
Her: Yeah.
Him: Do you have a minute?
Her: Sure.
Him: Oh, great.
Notice that there is no actual request from 'him' to 'her' to do anything. We might
characterize the question 'Do you have a minute?' as a 'pre-request', allowing the receiver to
say that she's busy or that she has to be somewhere else. In this context, the response 'Sure' is
taken to be an acknowledgment not only of having time available but also a willingness to
perform the unstated action.
Speech acts and speech events are said to be hierarchical components (thành phần có
thức bậc) of speech situations (Hymes, 1972), and for an utterance to have been made and to
be successful as an act of communication, the process of intention and inference must be done
on the basis of due consideration of the speech event.
The usefulness of speech act analysis is in illustrating the kinds of things we can do
with words and identifying some of the conventional utterance forms we use to perform specific
actions. However, we do need to look at more extended interactions to understand how those
actions are carried out and interpreted within speech events. The analysis of speech events is
another way of studying how more gets communicated than is said.

18
 CONTENTS
I. Notion of politeness 3
1. Definition of politeness 3
2. Face 8
3. Face-threatening acts 9
II. Indirectness 10
1. Intentional indirectness (Tính gián tiếp có chủ ý) 11
2. Cost and risk of indirectness 12
3. Factors governing indirectness 13
III. Theories of politeness 19
1. Grice’s principles 19
2. Lakoff’s rules 23
3. Leech’s maxisms 25
IV. Brown and Levinson's politeness strategies: 32
1. Bald-on record strategies 35
2. On-record strategies (Performing FTA with redress) 37
2.1. Positive politeness.................................................................................37
2.2. Negative politeness................................................................................47
3. Off-record strategies (Nói vòng) 52
4. No FTA - Không thực hiện hành động đe dọa thể diện 60
REFERENCE 63

2
I. Notion of politeness:
1. Definition of politeness
Politeness, a concept proposed by Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson, is
a theory that refers to attempts to restore a person's self-esteem through the assertion
of good social values in social interactions (Brown & Levinson, 1978).
Politeness is a system of interpersonal relations created to facilitate interaction
by minimising the potential for disagreement and confrontation inherent in all human
conversations. The purpose of "polite" is to reduce the possibility of conflict while
being able to satisfy each other's needs and interests. However, in any conversation, it
is obvious that each person always has a personal thought or opinion in the
subconscious with the hope that his or her point of view will be supported. Then, the
participants in the conversation can absorb each other's ideas and both get their
wishes. But in some cases, one has to lose for the other to win, one has to tell the other
what they don't want to hear; one person must refuse another's request; one person
must stop the discussion before the other wants to end. In the cases mentioned above,
there is a risk of individuals insulting each other and disrupting communication. Thus,
politeness strategies are a means of maintaining harmony and cohesion in social
relationships (Yule, 1996). “Politeness, in an interaction, can then be defined as the
means employed to show awareness of another person's face” (Yule, 1996). Showing
respect to those we feel socially distanced from is aware of another person's face.
[1a] Excuse me, would you mind bring me the menu, please?
Besides, showing an equivalent awareness when the other person has a social
closeness with a sense of friendliness, is a close friendship, and has a certain
connection.
[1b] Hey, can you give me the pen?

3
A. Concept of politeness
We find a lot of ambiguity in the enormous literature on politeness that has
accumulated since the late 1970s. The misunderstanding starts with the term
politeness, which, like collaboration, has been the source of much misunderstanding.
People have discussed five distinct, but related, phenomena under the heading of
politeness:

· Politeness as a real-world goal

· Deference
· Register
· Politeness as a surface level phenomenon
· Politeness as an illocutionary phenomenon.
A.1. Politeness as a real-world goal
According to Thomas (1983a:150), pragmatics has no place for politeness as a
real-world objective (i.e. politeness understood as a sincere desire to be nice to others,
or as the underlying motivation for an individual's linguistic behavior). We have no
way of knowing what motivates speakers to speak the way they do, and determining
whether one group of people is 'politer' than another (in the sense of genuinely
behaving better toward others than other groups) is ultimately pointless.

Only what speakers say and how their listeners respond are available to linguists. We
can see that the Chinese place a higher value on education in their talk on the needs of
the group rather than those of the individual, but we cannot conclude on the basis of
these observations alone that they are genuinely more altruistic than members of other
communities.

A.2. Deference versus politeness (Sự tôn trọng và phép lịch sự)

4
 Deference considered as politeness. Deference is connected with politeness but
is a distinct phenomenon; it is the opposite of familiarity. It refers to the respect we
show to other people by virtue of their higher status, greater age, etc. Both deference
and politeness can be manifested through general social behaviour (we can show
deference by standing up when a person of superior status enters a room, or show
politeness by holding a door open to allow someone else to pass through) as well as
by linguistic means.

Thomas says that deference has little to do with pragmatics is that generally,
unless the speaker deliberately wishes to flout the behavioural norms of a given
society (and is prepared to accept the consequences' of so doing), the speaker has no
choice as to whether to use the different form or not - usage is dictated by
sociolinguistic norms.

Example 1
An agricultural student, Ruth Archer, is referring to the estate fore- man, whom she
dislikes and mistrusts:"

What does old Gaffer Knowles want?

The use of the colloquial (thông tục) form Gaffer (meaning the boss) as a term
of reference (the form used when talking about someone) or of address (the form used
when talking to someone) indicates that the speaker is in a subordinate position, but
conveys no politeness whatever (its use in this context conveys contempt).

A.3. Register (Phạm vi từ vựng)

Certain situations (e.g. very formal meetings) or types of language use (e.g.
report-writing versus writing a note to a close friend), as well as certain social
relationships, require more formal language use. This 'formality' may manifest itself in
English by the choice of formal lexis and forms of address, the avoidance of
interruption.

5
 Because we have no real choice about whether or not to use formal language in
formal contexts, register, like deference, has little to do with politeness and has little
to do with pragmatics (unless we are prepared to risk sanctions, such as social
censure). Register, like deference, is largely a sociolinguistic phenomenon: a
description of the linguistic forms which generally occur in a particular situation.
Examples of the former might be if you decided to disrupt a stuffy meeting by using
language not normally associated with that particular type of event, such as cracking
jokes or making fun of the person chairing the meeting.

A.4. Politeness as an utterance level phenomenon (Lịch sự như một hiện tượng ở
mức độ bày tỏ/phát biểu)

Much early work in the area of politeness focused on utterance level

realizations (e.g. the early work of Rintell, Walters, Fraser on cross-cultural
pragmatics). We might find that one language has ten forms available for performing
a particular speech act, and that these correspond to just six in another language.
English, for example, has an unusually large number of ways of expressing obligation:
You must, you have to, you are to, you've got to, you should, etc. These studies also
found that members of a particular community showed a very high level of agreement
as to which linguistic forms were (when taken out of context) most polite, and in
general it was found that the more grammatically complex or elaborate the strategy,
the more highly it was rated for polite- ness. Thus (the equivalent in each language
of):

I wonder if I might ask you to X?

would be counted (all things being equal) as 'more polite' than:

Please X!

which in turn was ranked as more polite than the unmodified imperative form:

Do X!

6
 Two issues arise from studies of this nature. The first again relates to the
pragmatics/sociolinguistics divide: listing the linguistic forms which can be used to
perform a speech act in a given language is not pragmatics, any more than, say, listing
all the words for 'adult human female' in a given language falls within the realm of
pragmatics. These are sociolinguistic phenomena. It only becomes pragmatics when
we look at how a particular form in a particular language is used strategically in order
to achieve the speaker's goal. 'Doing' pragmatics crucially requires context. This leads
to the second issue: as soon as we put a speech act in context, we can see that there is
no necessary connection between the linguistic form and the perceived politeness of a
speech act. Consider the following example:

Example:
A married couple are trying to decide on a restaurant. The husband

says: You choose.

In this case we have a direct imperative, but it would normally be seen as

perfectly polite. This is because the speech act is what Leech (1983a: 107-8) terms
'costly to the speaker' or (better in this case) 'beneficial to the hearer'. The second
reason is well illustrated by the following examples (taken, like the previous one,
from a short story by James Thurber). The wife says to her husband:

Therefore, we cannot assess politeness reliably out of context; it is not the

linguistic form alone which renders the speech act polite or impolite, but the linguistic
form + the context of utterance + the relationship between the speaker and the hearer.

A.5. Politeness as a pragmatic phenomenon

According to Leech and Brown and Levinson, politeness is interpreted as a
strategy (or series of strategies) employed by a speaker to achieve a variety of goals,
such as promoting or maintaining harmonious relations. Following Fraser (1990),
Thomas have grouped the pragmatic approaches to politeness under three headings:
the 'conversational-maxim' view (exemplified by Leech) the 'face-management' view

7
(exemplified by Brown and Levinson) and Fraser's own 'conversational-contract'
view. He also added a fourth approach, which he termed the 'pragmatic scales' view,
proposed by Spencer Oatey (1992), which brings together many of the strengths and
avoids some of the weaknesses of the three previous approaches.
2. Face
Moving to the concept of face, it is related to the term “politeness” in which it
circulates social interaction behavior and consequence. Brown and Levinson’s works
(1987 and revived in 1987) were the two most influential and comprehensible on the
concept of “face”, as first proposed by Goffman (1967)
Goffman (1967) defined face as “the positive social value a person effectively
claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact
(p. 213).” This definition makes more sense when we take it apart a bit. Underlying
“positive social value” is the assumption that people want to be seen as having value
to others. People lay “claim” to that value by presenting themselves in certain ways to
others; for example, a doctor might claim an image of a professional healer and high
social standing.
Brown and Levinson (1987) conceptualize “face” as something that we want or
desire from others. They define face as “the want to be unimpeded and the want to be
approved of in a certain respect (p. 63).” They argue that when people interact they
recognize each other’s desire to have their faces supported and generally provide such
confirmation. Approval is reflected in the way that other people respond to us-
showing respect and honor. Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory uses face
concerns to explain communication outside of that necessary for efficient and clear
accomplishment of message goals.

8
Some more perspicuous definitions of “face” are presented by Craig, Tracy, and
Spisak (1986): “the self-image they present to others (p. 440)” and Cupach and Metts
(1994): The conception of self that each person displays in particular interactions with
others (p.3).” Both meanings represent a communication scholarly application that
emphasizes the interaction of faces and people’s effort to assist each other keep their
faces.
Drawing from the abovementioned literature, the general idea of “face” in
politeness theory is best seen as a personal sense of self-worth or self-image through
how society views him/her. It refers to the emotional and social sense of self that
everyone has and expects everyone else to recognize (Yule, 1996: p60).
3. Face-threatening acts
Generally, in English-speaking contexts, people expect their public self-image, or
their face wants to be respected in interactions. If Ss say something that potentially
threats another's self-image, they are said to perform a face threatening act (FTA). An
act of uttering something to lessen the potential threat is called a face saving act
(FSA).

Brown and Levinson’s (1987) politeness theory deals extensively with

face-threatening acts, which they define as “those acts that by their very nature run
contrary to the face wants of the addressee and/or speaker (p. 65).” Face-threatening
acts can be toward our positive face and/or negative face and caused by acts we
engage in ourselves or the acts of others toward us. Brown and Levinson created an
extensive list of various communication acts that can cause such face threat. For
example, if a friend asks you to help her move to a new apartment next Saturday, she
is threatening your negative face because you will have to give up whatever you might
have planned. If you say, “No, I’m sorry. I’m busy Saturday,” you have threatened her
negative face (interfered with the actions she wanted to take-moving), and you might
have threatened your own positive face if she sees you as not being a very good friend
(if you had a face of being a good friend).

9
 According to Brown and Levinson, certain illocutionary acts are liable to damage
or threaten another person's face; such acts are known as 'face-threatening acts'
(FTAs).

Goffman (1955) recognized that in our interactions with others there are times
when we fail in our attempts to take a particular “line” or present a particular face.
Goffman used such phrases as “in the wrong face,” “to be out of face,” “shamefaced,”
and “threats to face” to describe situations where the face a person is attempting to
maintain is challenged or undermined in some way. Suppose one aspect of the face
you enact with friends is someone who is funny. However, after telling a funny story,
one of your friends says, “You’re not really funny, you know.” Your friend’s
comment challenges your image (face) as a funny person; one for which you expected
support. How hurt would you be by the friend’s comment?

An illocutionary act has the potential to damage the hearer's positive face (by, for
example, insulting H or expressing disapproval of something which H holds dear), or
H's negative face (an order, for example, will impinge upon H's freedom of action); or
the illocutionary act may potentially damage the speaker's own positive face (if S has
to admit to having botched a job, for example) or S's negative face (if S is cornered
into making an offer of help). In order to reduce the possibility of damage to H's face
or to the speaker's own face, he or she may adopt certain strategies. The choice of
strategy will be made on the basis of the speaker's assessment of the size of the FTA.
The speaker can calculate the size of the FTA on the basis of the parameters of power
(P), distance (D) and rating of imposition (R). These combined values determine the
overall 'weightiness' of the FTA which in turn influences the strategy used.

Imagine a late night scene, where a young neighbor is playing his music very loud
and an older couple are trying to sleep. One of them, in [2], proposes a face
threatening act and the other suggests a face saving act.

[2] Him: I’m going to tell him to stop that awful noise right now!

10
 Her: Perhaps you could just ask him if he is going to stop soon because it’s getting
a bit late and people need to get to sleep.

Because it is generally expected that each person will attempt to respect the face
wants of others, there are many different ways of performing face saving acts.
II. Indirectness
● Indirectness
- Indirectness, or indirect speech acts, refers to cases when '... one
illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another'
(Searle 1979: 31),
and the speaker means more than, other than or even different from what
he/she actually says. (Kieu, 2006: 95)
− According to Thomas (1995: 119), indirectness occurs when there is a
mismatch between the expressed meaning and the implied meaning.
Indirectness is a universal phenomenon: as far as we know it occurs in all
natural languages.
● Indirectness vs politeness
- Indirectness is, according to Searle (1979: 36), '...the chief motivation
for politeness'.
- Although indirectness is seen to operate as one of the indicators of polite
requests in communication in Vietnamese language and culture (Vu T. T.
H. 1997, 2000) it does not always correlate with politeness. (Kieu: 2006,
100)
1. Intentional indirectness (Tính gián tiếp có chủ ý)
- Not all indirectness is intentional, some is caused by linguistic
inadequacy, when you do not know the correct word for some object in
your own or a foreign language. (Thomas, 1995: 120)
− We may have to use indirectness because of some performance error -
for example, if you temporarily forget a word, or through fear,
nervousness, excitement, etc, cannot get it out. The use of indirectness in
these
circumstances may lead the hearer to infer all sorts of things about you, but
11
you cannot be said to have generated any implicatures. (Thomas, 1995: 120)

12
 - In pragmatics, we are interested only in intentionally indirectness (although, as
we noted in chap 4, section 4.2.1, it is not always possible to say with certainty
whether indirectness is intended or not (Thomas, 1995: 120)
- Pragmatically, we focus only on intentional indirectness that generates
some sort of implicature. We know that one word, one speech act can be
used to accomplish different functions and vice visa, and different
structures can perform one function. (Kieu, 2006; 96)
2. Cost and risk of indirectness
- Dascal (1983) makes the point that indirectness is costly and risky. ‘Costly’
in the sense that an indirect utterance takes longer for the speaker to produce
and longer for the hearer to process. ‘Risky’ in the sense that the hearer may
not understand what the speaker is getting at. (Thomas, 1995: 120)
E.g 1: (Thomas, 1995: 120)
B (a non-native speaker of English) has been staying with A for several weeks. He has
a passion for West Side Story and has just played the film’s sound track right through
for the second time in one evening?
A: Would you like to listen to something else now?
B: No.
=> In order to avoid making a direct complaint to his guest, which could hurt his
feeling, A suggests indirectly that he had enough of West Side Story. However, his
strategy fails; B interprets A’s utterance as a genuine question and prepares to play the
record for a third time!
E.g 2: (Thomas, 1995: 120)
American woman was visiting Israel; one evening she went to the flat of some friends
and her host asked her what she would like to drink. She replied:
“Well, I’ve been on whisky all day”
=> The American woman intended to indicate indirectly that, having been drinking
whisky previously, she would prefer to stick with whisky. Unfortunately, the host
misinterpreted her indirectness and thought she was saying that, as she had been on
whisky all day, she didn’t want any more drink.

13
 3. Factors governing indirectness
Brown & Levinson, is calculated on the basis of the three parameters:
+ Power differential between S and interlocutor (P) (Quyền lực tương đối
giữa người nói và người đối thoại)
+ Social distance between S and interlocutor (D) (Khoảng cách xã hội giữa
người nói và người đối thoại)
+ The rating/ranking of imposition represented by the face threatening act
(R) (Mức độ áp đặt của một hành động đe dọa thể diện)
(Kieu T.T.H, 2006: 97)
Kieu T.T.H (2006: 98)
There are some other factors that are believed to affect Ss’ choice of indirectness, viz
(namely).:
(i) Religion: people may be more or less indirect because of their religious beliefs.
(ii) Second/Foreign language acquisition: Those who acquire more than one
language seem affected by values and norms of the culture/language other than those
of their first culture/language in their choice of indirectness.
(iii) Personal relation: Ss may be more or less direct in talk depending on
their interpersonal relations.
(iv) Education: those who are well-educated normally act differently in terms
of indirectness.
(v) Intellectual abilities (năng lực trí tuệ): people may be more or less direct
in speaking as regards their intellectual abilities
Thomas (1995: 124)
- Note that I am emphatically not saying that all languages/ cultures will
employ indirectness in the same circumstance. There are main factors are
listed below:
+ The relative power of the speaker over the hearer
+ The social distance between the speaker and the hearer
+ The degree to which X is rated an imposition in culture Y
+ Relative rights and obligations between the speaker and the hearer

14
=> Focus on Thomas’s analyst
3.1. Power
- The general point is that we tend to use a greater degree of indirectness
with people who have some power or authority over us than to those who
do not. (Thomas, 1995; 124)
- You would probably be more indirect about conveying to your employer that
you are annoyed by the fact that he or she always arrives late, than in
conveying the same to your brother. This is partly because your employer can
influence your career in a positive way (reward power) - quyền khen thưởng
or a negative way (coercive power) - quyền cưỡng chế (Thomas, 1995; 125)
- These types of power are most apparent in obviously hierarchical settings,
such as courts, the military, the workplace. (Thomas, 1995; 125)
Example 5: taken from the interrogation of a naval rating by the S.I.B (the Special
Investigation Bureau of the Royal Navy, (Cục Điều tra Đặc biệt của Hải quân Hoàng
gia) (Thomas, 1995; 125)
A is a senior N.C.O (Non-commissioned officer) - Hạ sĩ quan
1. A: You know what I’m going to do? I’m going to make sure you get locked away.
=> illustrate coercive power
Example 7 (Thomas, 1995; 126)
… In return you can expect an attractive salary and benefits package, including 28
days’ holiday, pension scheme, free life assurance and an interest-free season ticket
loan.
=> illustrate reward power
- Power is present to a degree in all relationships, at least some of the time.
Spencer-Oatey (1992) discusses different types and components of power at some
length. (Thomas summarise her account briefly here on page 127) (Thomas,
1995; 127))
3.1.1. Legitimate power (Quyền lực chính đáng)
- One person has the right to prescribe or request certain things by virtue of
role, age, or status (Thomas, 1995; 127)

15
 - It like reward power and coercive power remains fairly constant within a
relationship; it is the type of power most subject to cross-cultural
variation (Thomas, 1995; 127)
E.g: Teachers in some cultures can expect, by virtue of their role and status,
that students will routinely perform certain tasks for them (carry their book)
while in another culture this would be unthinkable.
- As so often happens in pragmatics, we often encounter explicit reference to
such power (e.g: ‘I’m your mother, I have a right to know) (Thomas, 1995;
127)
3.1.2. Referent power (Quyền lực giới thiệu/ ảnh hưởng)
- One person has power over another because the other admires and wants to
be like him/her in some respect
- It is rather different from the other types of power, in that it is often not
exerted consciously (you may be unaware that someone admires you from afar
and emulates you!) (Thomas, 1995; 127)
- In some societies, people in the public eye or with responsibilities for young
people are assumed (right or wrongly) to have referent power and are
placed under an obligation to act as a suitable role model. (Thomas, 1995;
127)
- For example: teacher, may be required to behave, or oven to dress, in
a particular (invariably conservative) manner. (Thomas, 1995; 127)
3.1.3. Expert power (Quyền uy do)
- In this case, one person has some special knowledge or expertise which
the other needs.
- It is more transient than the other types of power. (Thomas, 1995: 128)
E.g: if an individual has great expertise in computing, he or she may have
considerable (if temporary) power over someone who desperately needs to draw on
that knowledge. But the computer expert may, in turn, have to defer to the person he
or she was instructing earlier when it comes to finding out how to prepare a lemon
souffle. (Thomas, 1995: 128)

16
3.2. Social distance (Khoảng cách xã hội)
- The term ‘social distance’ (Leech, 1983a: 126) is the opposite of Brown and
Gilman’s (1960) 'solidarity factor’. It is best seen as a composite of
psychologically real factors (status, age, sex, degree of intimacy, etc.) which
‘together determine the overall degree of respectfulness’ within a given
speech situation. In other words, if you feel close to someone, because that
person is related to you or you know him or her well or are similar in terms of
age, social, class, occupation, sex, ethnicity, etc. you feel less need to employ
indirectness in, say, making a request than you would if you were making the
same request of a complete stranger. (Thomas, 1995: 128)
- It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between Power and Social Distance and
in fact some studies conflate the two. The reason they are so often confused is
that power and social distance very frequently co-occur - we tend to be
socially distant from those power over us (e.g: in the workplace). But this is by
no means always the case; Aegnitou (1995) clearly shows how in the language
classroom students are often close to their teachers, even though there is a
marked inequality of power. (Thomas, 1995; 129)
Example 11: (Thomas, 1995; 129)
This is an extract from an (authentic) interview between a detective superintendent
and a detective constable of the Thames Valley police:
DS (detective superintendent): … that’s the way. Come back bloody fighting. Let’s
have, let’s have some grit about it
DC (detective constable): I know governor, now I’ve done that …
=> In this situation, the interactants are in an unequal power relationship, but are
nevertheless quite close to one another. Just before this extract begins, the detective
constable has started to cry, and the DS changes his tone somewhat, speaking to him
‘man to man’, swearing (‘bloody’) and using informal terms (‘grit’). The DC
responded by addressing him as ‘governor’ which marks a close but still subordinate
relationship.

17
3.3. Size of imposition (Quy mô áp đạt)
- When we talk about ‘size of imposition’ we mean how great is the request
you are making? For example, you would probably use a greater degree of
indirectness in requesting someone to translate an article for you than in
requesting someone to pass you the newspaper, you would probably use a
greater degree of indirectness in asking to borrow £10 than you would in
requesting to borrow ten pence (Thomas, 1995: 130)
- Goffman’s (1967) notion of ‘free’ and ‘non-free’ goods provides a useful
framework within which to discuss the concept of ‘size of imposition’. ‘Free
goods’ are those which, in a given situation, anyone can use without seeking
permission (e.g: salt in a restaurant, peanuts at a bar). Requesting free goods
(or ‘free services’, such as asking someone the time) requires a minimal degree
of indirectness. Generally speaking, what an individual regards as free goods/
services varies according to the relationship in the situation within which the
interaction occurs. In one’s own family or home, most things (food, drink,
book, baths) are ‘free goods’. In a stranger’s house they are not. (Thomas,
1995: 130)
- Lakoff (1974: 27) has pointed out that free and non-free goods are not
necessarily material - the concept can be extended to information. Clearly
there are some topics that one may ask about freely and others that are ‘none
of your business’ - that is, non-free goods. Again, what is considered ‘freely
available’ varies according to the situation.
- In Laos, it is not unusual to ask strangers about their weight; in most
western cultures it would be considered very impolite to do so (except in
special circumstances, such as some medical consultations). (Thomas, 1995:
131)
- Vietnamese Ss might be considered rude, impolite or too practical if they
mention the purpose of their talk at the very beginning of the conversation.
Conversely, Americans are likely to put the purpose of their conversations
at the initial stage. (Kieu, 2006: 97)

18
 - Closely related to the concept of ‘free’ and ‘non-free’ information are taboo
topics. Taboos relate typically (but not exclusively) to sexual or religious
topics or to bodily functions such as excreting, but they are by no means
universal. As we saw in example 26, 27 in chapter 3, for the Navajo, it is taboo
to mention the name of a person who has died a violent death, in Britain it is
not.
(Thomas, 1995: 131)
3.4. Right and obligations (Quyền và nghĩa vụ)
- This dimension is needed in order to explain a situation in which a speech
act involving a major imposition is performed with a minimal degree of
indirectness. (Thomas, 1995: 131)
- What is important is whether or not the speaker has the right to make a
particular demand and whether the hearer has the obligation to comply.
(Thomas, 1995: 131) => Quyền và nghĩa vụ phụ thuộc vào cách đánh giá
của người nói và người nghe về những yếu tố ngôn cảnh có liên quan
(relevant contextual factor) về chính cuộc thoại đang diễn ra.
E.g. (Thomas, 1995: 131)
The first time I observed this was in an interaction involving two elderly
women traveling on a country bus service. On country routes the driver stops only
when requested to do so. The first woman wanted to get off at a scheduled stopping
place, and as the bus approached it she simply called out: ‘Next, stop, driver!’ Her
companion wanted to get off where there was no official stop, and asked the driver,
“Do you think you could possibly let me out just beyond the traffic lights, please?’
=> In this case, the parameter of power, social distance and size of imposition are
all held constant. It costs the driver no more effort to stop at the traffic lights than at
the bus stop. What changed was that in the first case the driver had an obligation to
stop, in the second case he had no such obligation.
III. Theories of politeness:
1. GRICE’S PRINCIPLES
Grice’s cooperative principle and four maxims

19
 It was defined by Mey (1993, 80) that cooperation is the cornerstone to
communication and without the former, the latter would cease to exist. A conversation
is presumed to possess the feature of cooperation if the interacting parties in the
conversation itself do not make any attempt to “confuse, trick, or withhold relevant
information from each other” (Yule, 1996, 36).
The cooperative principle describes how people achieve effective conversational
communication in everyday social situations—that is, how listeners and speakers
work together and mutually accept each other's understanding in a specific way.
The cooperative principle is divided into Grice's four conversational maxims,
which are known as the Gricean maxims—quantity, quality, relation, and manner.
These four maxims describe specific rational principles observed by people who
pursue effective communication using the cooperative principle. The Gricean maxims
can be used to explain the relationship between utterances and what is unspoken.
(Grice, 1989). There are four maxims, governing the use of language which is
considered as suitable. They are maxims of quantity, quality, relation and manner.
1.1 The maxim of quantity
According to Yule (1996, p. 37) the basics of this maxim are: (1) Make your
contribution as informative as required and (2) Do not make your contribution more
informative than required.
Example 10, Thomas, 1995, p64:
Husband: Where are the car keys?
Wife: They're on the table in the hall.

20
 In this example, the wife refers to a place that could contain the husband’s car
keys – to which the wife gives a sufficient answer indicating the exact location of
where the car keys might be.
Hang: Do you want to go with me?
Giang: Yes, I do.
Another example exemplifies the quantity maxim when Hang asks her friend
Giang if he wants to follow her. As a result, a yes/no answer is suitable for this
question. Giang replies with sufficient response to indicate that she wants to go
with Hang.
Nam: Do you know where Mr. Smith is?
Lan: Yes. I've seen him in the supervisor's room.
In this conversation example, Lan is wireless to the maxim of Quantity because
so much more information in her response. To ensure the maxim of Quantity,
Lan just needs to provide a yes or no answer.
1.2. The maxim of quality
According to Yule (1996, p. 37), The basics of this maxim are: (1) Do not say
what you believe to be false; and (2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate
evidence.
Nam: What did he tell you?
Lan: He said he wanted to give you this book.
Lan gives a truthful answer to Nam's query, or at least there is no evidence of
dishonesty in her response.
1.3. The maxim of relation

21
 The basic principle of this maxim is to make your contribution relevant.
Hung: Where’s Mr. Smith?
Ha: He’s in the supervisor room.
Ha's response is relevant since she answered the question explicitly, suggesting
the location where Mr. Smith may be, which is the supervisor's room. In contrast,
participation in does not guarantee the maxim of Relation.
Nam: Where’s Mr. Smith?
Lan: I’m looking for him too.
1.4. The maxim of manner
The idea of this maxim is to be perspicuous, and the basics are: (1) avoid
obscurity, (2) avoid ambiguity, (3) be brief, and (4) be orderly. According to Yule
(1996), in conversation, speakers or language users must adhere to the maxim of
manner, which implies being perspicuous, especially avoiding obscurity and
ambiguity, and being brief and orderly. In other words, utterances must be easily
understood based on the clarity and accuracy with which they are conveyed. The
essential points here are clarity and precision, and the full explanation is provided
following those fundamental principles. We can suppose that obscurity and ambiguity
refer to clarity, whereas the other two relate to concerns regarding accuracy. We can
examine the maxim of Manner in the following example.
Interviewer: Which position do you apply for?
Candidate: I apply for the position of Marketing Assistant.
We can see that the candidate's response is simple and to-the-point, with no
complicated grammatical construction.

22
 In the example below, the candidate delivers a more complex and less brief
version of his message.
Interviewer: Which position do you apply for?
Candidate: I’m glad to say that I spent my whole time in my university gaining
knowledge to apply for the Marketing Assistant position.
1.5. Flouting maxims:
According to Grice, flouting “occurs when a speaker blatantly fails to observe a
maxim at the level of what is said, with the deliberate intention of generating an
implicature” (Thomas, 1995). From this definition, we can see that flouting, first and
foremost, is an act of deliberation and rationality. Or in other words, the speakers have
full intention of failing to observe the maxims in order to prompt the listener, or
interactant to find an underlying meaning, or implicature on the whole. This act of
flouting can be grouped into two ways: flouting due to a clash of maxims and flouting
from exploiting maxims.
2. LAKOFF’S RULES
Robin Lakoff is one of the first linguists who invented a theory of politeness
(1973), which developed with a semantic based model of generative grammar known
as “generative semantics” and with the possible integration of speech act theory into
generative models of language (Fauziati, n.d). Her roots in generative semantics affect
her conceptualization in theory of politeness. Lakoff defines politeness as a tool that
has been developed in societies through time in order to lessen friction between
people in personal interaction. A central component of Lakoff’s theory of politeness is
Grice’s Cooperative Principle, which sees verbal communication as a cooperative
activity between interlocutors.
Grice proclaims that in a conversation, a speaker should follow four maxims:
Maxim of Quality (Be true), Maxim of Quantity (Be brief), Maxim of relation (Be

23
relevant) and Maxim of Manner (Be clear). In Lakoff’s theory of politeness, she
adopted and expanded on Grice’s view in two basic rules: 1) be clear and 2) be polite.
Accepting that the Rules of Conversation form the basis for the cooperative
venture of conversation, Robin Lakoff nevertheless observes that “interesting
conversation violates these rules at every turn: it is the insipid or stiffly formal
conversation that hews to them” (Lakoff, 1973, p297). The rule “be clear” can be
straightforward for the hearer but unavoidably rude.
For example:
(a) Linh, I’m asking you where you’ve put my phone.
(b) I’m telling you there will be no video game tomorrow.
Furthermore, Lakoff introduces three sub-rules under Politeness as follows:
“don’t impose”, “give options”, and “make A feel good and be friendly” (Lakoff,
1973).
The first sub-rule (don’t impose) is used in formal politeness by producing the effect
of distance and establishes a condition of formality between speaker and addressee.
“Don’t impose” here means that the speaker will be able to avoid or to reduce the
imposition on the hearer when forcing them to do something by asking for permission
or apologizing for the inconvenience.
For instance:
a. Open the window.
b. Can you open the window?
c. I’m so sorry to bother you, but can you open the window for me please?
Example (a) has a strong impose on hearers, forcing them to open the window
for you, meanwhile, example (b) is lessened by using the auxiliary verb “can”.
Example © is considered to be the sentence showing the highest level of politeness
among the three examples above.

24
 The second sub-rule (give options) is used in informal politeness by producing
the effect of deference, giving options for the addressee to help or to do something for
the speaker. Speakers can use hedges and mitigate expressions that allow learners to
form and hold their own opinions. For example, “I guess it’s time to leave” or
“It’s time to leave, isn’t it?” (Fauziati, n.d).
The third sub-rule (make the addressee feel good – be friendly) produces the
effect of intimacy, encouraging a feeling of camaraderie (Ivarsson, 2011). This rule is
used when people have close relationships; it creates a feeling of familiarity and
implying friendship. Such friendship may correspond to actual feelings, however, it
could be completely false. Only the sense of closeness in terms of status and
sentiment that the third rule produces matters.
Compliments also fall under the jurisdiction of rule number three (Ivarsson,
2011), for instance, someone asks his/her friend about his/her new outfit:
A: Do I look big in this?
B: No, it pretty suits you
B says that the outfit suits A though actually he/she thinks A looks fatter in it.
However, in order to be polite, B says something nice and gives a compliment (in an
informal way), so A could feel good. However, Lakoff’s theory of politeness was
denied by Brown, he said that it was not suitable as a universal theory because the
terms used to express politeness are confusing and not integrating each other
(Al-Duleimi, 2016). Lakoff’s rules are limited and not universal enough to apply to all
cultures.

25
 3. LEECH’S MAXIMS (Các phương châm hội thoại của Leech)
In chapter 4 of his Principles of pragmatics, Leech introduces the Politeness
Principle (PP) which runs as follows:

Minimize (all things being equal) the expression of impolite beliefs; Maximize
(all things being equal) the expression of polite beliefs.

Leech sees the PP as being of the same status as Grice's Cooperative Principle
(CP), which it 'rescues' by explaining why speakers do not always observe the Gricean
maxims. There is a good deal of evidence that people do respond consciously to
considerations of politeness, for instance, people will often explicitly 'mark' the fact
that they cannot or do not intend to observe politeness norms, as in the following
example:

Example 11 (Thomas, 1995:161)

Look, there's no polite way of putting this. Your husband and I are lovers and
he's leaving you for me.

In each case the speaker minimizes the expression of impolite beliefs:

Example 12: I don't like her boyfriend!
Example 15: You're not coming with us!
Example 18: I couldn't care less about the role of women in the church!
Notice that Leech is only talking about the expression of impolite beliefs –what a
person is thinking or implying is a very different matter and it is perfectly clear in
each of these examples that the speaker has impolite thoughts or feelings, which she
has not hesitated to convey indirectly.

Leech (1983: chapter 6) introduces a number of maxims which, he claims, stand

in the same relationship to the PP as Grice's maxims (Quality, Quantity, Relation and
Manner) stand to the CP. These maxims are necessary. The main maxims are: Tact,

26
Generosity, Approbaion, Modesty, Agreement and Sympathy (to which are added an
assortment of 'sub-maxims'). In particular, some care needs to be taken with the
interpretation of the term 'other' in each of the maxims. Clearly the maxims will be
invoked with more or less strength depending upon whether the 'other' in question is a
relative stranger or someone with whom you are on intimate terms. I discuss each of
the main maxims briefly below.

3.1. The Tact maxim (Phương châm tế nhị)

The Tact maxim states: 'Minimize the expression of beliefs which imply cost to
others; maximize the expression of beliefs which imply benefit to others'. We can use
'minimizers' to reduce the implied cost to the hearer: .

Hang on a second!
I've got a bit of a problem.
Whether or not the strategy of minimizing the 'expression of cost to others' is
perceived as polite or not may be highly culture-specific. One Japanese student whose
M.A. thesis Thomas was supervising would regularly send me drafts of her work with
a note, such as the following, attached:

Example 9
This is a draft of chapter 4. Please read it and comment on it.
Other students would simply write: This is a draft of Chapter 4' or Please
could you look at this draft'. The fact that she spelt out what she wanted done
used to infuriate me. (What else did she imagine he was going to do with her
work? Make paper aeroplanes? Line the parrot's cage?!) he mentioned to a
Japanese doctoral student how much it irritated me, and she pointed out that the
M.A. student was simply acknowledging how much work she had let me in for
and was going on record with the degree of her indebtedness - clearly an
eminently reasonable point of view. It would seem that even in the case of

27
'impositions' minimizing the expression of cost to others is by no means
universally polite.

A second aspect of the Tact maxim is that of mitigating the effect of a request
by offering optionality. This closely resembles the second of Lakoff's (1973)
'rules of politeness': 'Give options!'

A third component of the Tact maxim is the cost/benefit scale: if something is

perceived as being to the hearer's benefit, X can be expressed politely without
employing indirectness: Have a chocolate! However, if X is seen as being
'costly' to the hearer, greater indirectness may be required: Could I have one of
your sandwiches? Here again there is an obvious connection with the 'size of
imposition' dimension.

3.2. The Generosity maxim (Phương châm về sự hào phóng)

Leech's Generosity maxim states: 'Minimize the expression of benefit to self;
maximize the expression of cost to self.' Thomas said: 'Minimize the expression
of cost to others; maximize the expression of benefit to others.'

The Generosity maxim explains why it is fine to say: You must come and
have dinner with us, while the proposition that we will come and have dinner
with you requires (generally speaking) to be expressed indirectly; Help yourself!
(a direct, unmodified imperative) is (generally speaking) perfectly polite while
the proposition that you will help yourself may require a degree of indirectness.

As Leech indicates, languages/cultures vary in the degree to which you are

expected to apply this maxim - under applying it will make the speaker appear
mean (Have a peanut!), over applying it will seem sarcastic, as the following
examples" illustrate:

Example 10
Basil Fawlty to his wife:"

28
 Have another vat of wine, dear.
Example 11
Basil's wife is in hospital:
You just lie there with your feet up and I'll go and carry you up another
hundredweight of lime creams...

Leech also points out that some cultures attach much more importance to the
Generosity maxim than do others (he suggests that it is particularly important in
Mediterranean cultures), but remember that we are only dealing with the
importance attached to the linguistic expression of generosity there is no
suggestion that members of one culture really are more generous than members
of another.

3.3 The Approbation maxim (Phương châm phê duyệt)

The Approbation maxim states: 'Minimize the expression of beliefs which
express disapproval of others; maximize the expression of beliefs which express
approval of others.' Once again, societies (and subcultures, such as universities,
within those societies) will vary greatly in the degree to which criticism is
acceptable. And in any society there will be times when adverse criticism is
expressed very strongly, and some activity types (e.g. in the British House of
Commons) when gratuitously vicious and destructive criticism is the norm. Thus
it is normal to say: I enjoyed your lecture, while if you did not enjoy it, you
would either keep quiet about it or convey the fact more indirectly.

As Leech points out, the 'other' may not be the person directly addressed, but
someone or something dear to him or her. Also, in most societies it is as
unacceptable to say: Did you do these ghastly daubings? as it would be to ask:
Are these talentless children yours?

29
 Often in pragmatics (and in linguistics in general) we only become aware of
the fact that a norm or regularity exists when someone (often an immature
member of, or an outsider to, a particular group) fails to observe the norm.

3.4 The Modesty maxim (Phương châm khiêm tốn)

The Modesty maxim states: 'Minimize the expression of praise of self;
maximize the expression of dispraise of self. This is another maxim which varies
enormously in its application from culture to culture. Leech (1983a: 137) notes
that in Japan the operation of the Modesty maxim may, for example, lead
someone to reject a compliment which had been paid to them:

[In Japan] the Modesty Maxim is more powerful than it is as a rule in

English-speaking societies, where it would be customarily more polite to accept
a compliment 'graciously' (e.g. by thanking the speaker for it) rather than to go
on denying it. Here English-speakers would be inclined to find some
compromise between violating the Modesty Maxim and violating the Agreement
Maxim.

The following example is a fairly typical example of the way in which the
Modesty maxim operates in British English." It is worth noting that speaker B
consistently invokes the Approbation maxim, while speaker A is invoking the
Modesty maxim:

Example 12
A and B were giving a series of lectures in a foreign country where decent
coffee was an uncertain commodity. At the airport A had bought a good supply
of ground coffee and a gadget for percolating it. She makes a first attempt at
using it:

A: This isn't bad is it?

B: The coffee? It's very good.

30
 A few hours later she makes some more:
B: This coffee's very good.

A: Not bad, is it?

There are individuals within any culture who are genuinely modest or (as in
the following example) immodest:

Example 13
The person referred to is Jeanette Winterson, author of a highly acclaimed
semi-autobiographical first novel. She has since written four more novels, each
achieving ever-diminishing popular success. She was interviewed after her most
recent book" had been panned by the critics

When asked to nominate her favorite book of the year, she nominated her
own.

3.5. The Agreement maxim (Phương châm thoả thuận)

The Agreement maxim runs as follows: 'Minimize the expression of
disagreement between self and other; maximize the expression of agreement
between self and other.' As with all the other maxims, the usual caveats (sự báo
trước) apply concerning the need to take account of the relationship between
speaker and hearer and of the nature of the interaction in which they are
involved.

Example 14
A: ... I don't want my daughter to do CSE, I want her to do 'O' level.

B: Yes, but Mr Sharma, I thought we resolved this on your last

visit. Example 15

31
 A: Nehemulla is ideally suited to the class she's in and this class will do CSE
in two years' time.

B: No, my dear, no, no, it's wrong!

These two examples are both taken from the film Cross Talk. Speaker B is
Mrs Green, the deputy headteacher of a school (a British woman), speaker A is
Mr Sharma, the Indian-born father of one of the pupils attending her school.
They are involved in a major disagreement concerning the courses Mr Sharma's
daughter will take the following year. Although Mrs Green disagrees strongly
with Mr Sharma, she nevertheless observes the 'Agreement maxim' to a high
degree (remember, we are here considering only what occurs at utterance level).
Mr Sharma speaks excellent English, but many of his contributions are
characterized by an absence of indirectness and, more specifically, a failure
(refusal?) to observe the Agreement maxim.

3.6 The Pollyanna Principle

'Pollyanna Principle' put the best possible gloss on what we have to say.
In its least contentious form, this may refer only to the use of 'minimizers'
such as a bit (This essay's a bit short', when in fact it is much too short), but
this is a strategy which is already adequately dealt with under the heading
of 'reducing the size of imposition'.
Other aspects of it simply relate to relexicalization replacing an
unpleasant term (e.g. body-snatcher) with a supposedly less unpleasant one
(resurrectionist). However, we can find instances of the 'Pollyanna
Principle' in operation which do not seem to be explained by other maxims
or principles.
Shen Jiaxuan (1994) notes that in Chinese (as in English) there is a bias
towards the positive in assigning utterance meaning. Thus, in English we
find that 'Good luck!' means 'I wish you good luck', whereas 'Bad luck!' is
an expression of commiseration (it does not wish the hearer bad luck!). In
interpersonal pragmatics, too, we can find examples of the Pollyanna
Principle in operation:

32
 Example 16
The speaker had just lost' two hours' work on the word-processor:
*Ah well, i'll probably write it better the second time around.'
Example 17
The two speakers were discussing the bad impression which visitors
would gain because of the appalling weather on a University Open Day:"
A: They're not exactly seeing the place at its best!
B: Well, at least it's not snowing.
Example 18
The famous Curate's Egg' joke, first published in the humorous
magazine, Punch, in 1895. A young curate is having breakfast with his
Bishop. Bishop to curate: I'm afraid you've got a bad egg, Mr Jones! Oh
no, my Lord, I assure you! Parts of it are excellent!

IV. Brown and Levinson's politeness strategies:

● Definition
On-record (Nói thẳng/Nói trắng)

33
 An actor goes on record in doing an act A if it is clear to participants what
communicative intention led the actor to do A. (Brown and Levinson, 1987:69)

You can directly address the other as a means of expressing your needs. These
direct address forms are technically described as being on record. The most direct
approach, using imperative forms such as those in examples, is known as bald on
record. ‘The other person is directly asked for something.

a. Give me a pen.
b. Lend me your pen.
These bald on record forms may be followed by expressions like ‘please’ and
‘would you?” which serve to soften the demand and are called mitigating devices.

In everyday interaction between social equals, such bald-on record behavior

would potentially represent a threat to the other's face and would generally be
avoided. (Yule, 1996:63)

Redressive action (Hành động đền bù/hành vi bù đắp)

By redressive action we mean action that ‘gives face’ to the addressee, that is,
that attempts to counteract the potential face damage of the FTA by doing it in such a
way, or with such modifications or additions, that indicate clearly that no such face
threat is intended or desired, and that'S in general recognizes H’s face wants and
Himself wants them to he achieved. Such redressive action takes one of two forms,
depending on which aspect of face (negative or positive) is being stressed.

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:70)

Positive Politeness (Lịch sự dương tính)
Positive politeness is oriented toward the positive face of H, the positive
self-image that he claims for himself. Positive politeness is approach-based; it
‘anoints’ the face of the addressee by indicating that in some respects, S wants H’s
wants (e.g. by treating him as a member of an ingroup, a friend, a person whose wants

34
and personality traits are known and liked). The potential face threat of an act is
minimized in this case by the assurance that in general S wants at least some of H’s
wants; for example, that S considers H to be in important respects ‘the same’ as he,
with in-group rights and duties and expectations of reciprocity, or by the implication
that S likes H so that the FTA doesn’t mean a negative evaluation in general of H’s
face.

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:70)

A positive politeness strategy leads the requester to appeal to a common goal, and
even friendship, via expressions such as those in (a).

a. How about letting me use your pen?

b. Hey, buddy, I’d appreciate it if you’d let me use your pen.
Negative politeness (Lịch sự âm tính)
Negative politeness, on the other hand, is oriented mainly toward partially
satisfying (redressing) H’s negative face, his basic want to maintain claims of territory
and self-determination. Negative politeness, thus, is essentially avoidance-based, and
realizations of negative-politeness strategies consist in assurance that the speaker
recognizes and respects the addressee’s negative-face wants and will not (or will only
minimally) interfere with the addressee’s freedom of action. Hence negative
politeness is characterized by self-effacement, formality and restraint, with attention
to very restricted aspects of H’s self-image, centring on His want to be unimpeded.

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:70)

However, in most English-speaking contexts, a face-saving act is more commonly
performed via a negative politeness strategy. The most typical form used is a question
containing a modal verb such as (a)

a. Could you lend me a pen?

b. I’m sorry to bother you, but can I ask you for a pen or something?

35
 c. I know you’re busy, but might I ask if you happen to have an extra pen that I
maybe borrow?

Using this strategy also results in forms which contain expressions of apology
for the imposition, of the type shown in (b). More elaborate negative politeness work
can sometimes be heard in extended talk, often with hesitations, similar to that shown
in (c.).

● Brown & Levinson’s Model of Strategies

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:60)

1. Bald-on record strategies
Where maximum efficiency is very important, and this is mutually known to
both S and H, no face redress is necessary. In cases of great urgency or desperation,
redress would actually decrease the communicated urgency. For example:

1. Help! (compare the non-urgent ‘Please help me, if you would be so kind’)
2. Watch out!
3. Your pants are on fire!
4. Give me just one more week! (to pay the rent)
(Brown and Levinson, 1987:95-96)

36
 Another motivation for bald-on-record (non-redressed) FTAs is found in cases
of channel noise, or where communication difficulties exert pressure to speak with
maximum efficiency. This can be seen, for example, when S is calling across a
distance (5) or talking on the telephone with a bad connection (6):

5. Come home right now!

6. I need another £1000.
Another set of cases where non-redress occurs is where S’s want to satisfy H’s
face is small, either because S is powerful and does not fear retaliation or
non-cooperation from H:

7. Bring me wine, Jeeves.

8. In future, you must add the soda after the whisky.
(Brown and Levinson, 1987:95-96)
Other situations in which no attempt is made to mitigate the FTA, are to be
found where the power differential is great. Or because S wants to be rude or doesn’t
care about maintaining face.

Example: The speaker is a senior rating at a naval detention centre. He is

addressing a prisoner of lower rank:

You are to stand for attention in the centre of your room every time the door is
opened. You are to obey all orders given to you by any member of the remand wing
staff at times. You are not to engage any member of the remand wing staff in casual
conversation.'

A third set of cases where non-minimization is likely occurs where doing the
FTA is primarily in H’s interest. Then in doing the FTA, S conveys that he does care
about H (and therefore about H’s positive face), so that no redress is required. Thus,
sympathetic advice or warnings may be baldly on record:

37
 9. Careful! He’s a dangerous man. (warning H against someone who could
threaten him)
10. Your slip is showing.
11. Your wig is askew; let me fix it for you.
12. Your headlights are on!
Comforting advice may similarly be non-redressed:
13. Don’t be sad.
And granting permission for something that H has requested may likewise be
baldly on record, as in English:

14. Yes, you may go.

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:96-98)
But many of the most striking examples of bald-on-record utterances fall into
none of the categories mentioned by Brown and Levinson. In each of the examples
which follow, the speaker takes no redressive action because he has chosen to be
maximally offensive:

Bob Champion, champion jockey, referring to women jockeys: 'I'm dead

against them! They're a mistake and get in the way. Women are not strong enough or
big enough.

Mr. Tam Dalyell, M.P., in the British House of Commons (refer- ring to the
then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher): I say that she is a bounder, a liar, a
deceiver, a crook.'

(Thomas, 1995:171)

38
 2. On-record strategies (Performing FTA with redress)
2.1. Positive politeness
Within Brown and Levinson's theory, when you speak to someone, you may
orient yourself towards that individual's positive face, and employ positive politeness.
Brown and Levinson (1987: 102) list fifteen positive politeness strategies:

Strategy 1: Notice, attend to H (his interests, wants, needs, goods) – Làm cho
người nghe nhận thấy sự chú ý của người nói đối với người nghe

In general, this output suggests that speaker should take notice of aspects of
hearer’s condition (noticeable changes, remarkable possessions, anything which looks
as though hearer would want speaker to notice and approve of it).

Goodness, you cut your hair! (...) By the way, I came to borrow some flour.
In the utterance above, the speaker shows that S notices H’s change by saying
“Goodness, you cut your hair” Actually, the intention of the speaker is to ask the H to
lend him some flour. However, the speaker, at first, chooses to say to satisfy the H’s
positive face wants and to minimize the FTA.

39
 (Brown and Levinson, 1987:103)
Strategy 2: Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with hearer) – Sử dụng lối
nói cường điệu

This is often done with exaggerated intonation, stress, and other aspects of
prosodies, as well as with intensifying modifiers, as in the English:

a. What a fantastic garden you have!

b. How absolutely (marvellous, extraordinary, devastating, incredible)!
The exaggeration or emphatic use of words or particles (for sure, really,
exactly, absolutely…) is another feature of this positive-politeness output.

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:104)

Strategy 3: Intensify interest to hearer – Tăng cường sự quan tâm đối với người
nghe

Another way for S to communicate to H that he shares some of his wants is to

intensify the interest of his own (S’s) contributions to the conversation, by making a
good story’. This may be done by using the ‘vivid present’ for example, this is a
common feature of positive-politeness conversations, as it of the events being
discussed, metaphorically at any rate, thereby increasing their intrinsic interest to him.

I come down the stairs, and what do you think I see? — a huge mess all over the
place, the phones off the hook and clothes are scattered all over . . .

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:106)

Strategy 4: Use in-group identity markers - Sử dụng các biểu thức chỉ ra rằng
người nói và người nghe thuộc cùng nhóm xã hội (Brown and Levinson,
1987:107-112)

By using any of the innumerable ways to convey in-group membership,

speaker can implicitly claim the common ground with hearer that is carried by that

40
definition of the group. These include in-group usages of address forms, language or
dialect, jargon or slang, and ellipses (tỉnh lược).

Address forms: In many languages the second-person plural pronoun of

address doubles as an honorific form to singular respected or distant alters. The use of
a singular non-honorific pronoun to a non-familiar alter can claim solidarity. Other
address forms used to convey such in-group membership include generic names and
terms of address like Mac, mate, buddy, pal, honey, dear, duckie, luv, babe, mom,
blondie, brother, sister, cutie, sweetheart, guys, fellas. Such forms may be used to
soften face-threatening acts:

a. Here mate, I was keeping that seat for a friend of mine ...
b. Help me with this bag here, will you, luv/son/pal?
Use of in-group language or dialect. The phenomenon of code-switching
involves any switch from one language or dialect to another in communities where the
linguistic repertoire includes two or more such codes. For example, the switch within
English, from nickname to full name:

a. First call: Come here, Johnny.

b. Second call: John Henry Smith, you come here right away.
Use of jargon or slang. By referring to an object with a slang term, speaker
may evoke all the shared associations and attitudes that he and hearer both have
toward that object; this then may be used as face-threatening act redress. For example,
use of brand names in a request may stress that speaker and hearer share an (in-group)
reliance on the required object:

a. Got any Winstons?

b. I came to borrow some Allinsons if you’ve got any.
Contraction and ellipsis. Because of the reliance on shared mutual knowledge
to make ellipsis comprehensible, there is an inevitable association between the use of
ellipsis and the existence in-group shared knowledge. Speaker and hearer must share

41
some knowledge about the context that makes the utterance. It is perhaps for this
reason that the use of ellipsis and contraction is associated with positive politeness,
and therefore the presence of ellipsis may mark an utterance as being positively polite.
Even the use of indirect requests normally a feature of negative politeness, if marked
by ellipsis crosses over into positive politeness:

a. Mind if I smoke?
b. Got any spare cash?
c. How about a drink?
(Brown and Levinson, 1987:107-112)
Strategy 5: Seek agreement - Tìm kiếm những đề tài mà cả hai bên (người nói,
người nghe) cùng quan tâm/tán đồng

Safe topics. Another characteristic way of claiming common ground with H is

to seek ways in which it is possible to agree with him. The raising of ‘safe topics’
allows S to stress his agreement with hearer and therefore to satisfy H’s desire to be
‘right’, or to be corroborated in his opinions (the weather, the beauty...) The more S
knows about hearer, the closer to home will be the safe topics he can pursue with H.

Another aspect of seeking agreement involves looking for those aspects of

topics on which it is possible to agree and sticking to them. So, for example, if your
neighbor comes home with a new car and you think it is hideously huge and
pollution-producing, you might still be able to say sincerely: “Isn’t your new car a
beautiful color!”

Repetition. Agreement may also be stressed by repeating part or all of what the
preceding speaker has said, in a conversation. In addition to demonstrating that one
has heard correctly what was said, repeating is used to stress emotional agreement
with the utterance (or to stress interest and surprise). For example:

I agree. Right. Manchester United played really badly last night, didn’t they?
D’you reckon you could give me a cigarette?

42
 (Brown and Levinson, 1987:112-113)
Strategy 6: Avoid disagreement - Tránh sự bất đồng
Token agreement: the desire to agree or appear to agree with H leads also to
mechanisms for pretending to agree, instances of ‘token’ agreement.

A: That’s where you live, Florida?

B: That’s where I was born.

A: Can you hear me?

B: Barely.

A: You hate your Mom and

Dad. B: Oh, sometimes.

Pseudo-agreement: the use of then and so as a conclusory marker, an indication

that the speaker is drawing a conclusion to a line of reasoning carried out
cooperatively with the addressee. This may refer to a genuine prior agreement, for
example:

I’ll meet you in front of the theatre just before 8.0, then.
where then points to a conclusion of an actual agreement between speaker and hearer.
So when are you coming to see us?
But then and so are often used where there is in fact no prior agreement by
pointing to a fake prior agreement, they call upon the cooperative agreement
associations.

White lies: a further output of the positive politeness desire to avoid

disagreement is the social ‘white lie’, where S, when confronted with the necessity to

43
state an opinion, wants to lie (‘Yes I do like your new hat!’) rather than damage H’s
positive face.

Hedging opinions: alternatively, speakers may choose to be vague about his

own opinions, so as not to be seen to disagree. Normally hedges are a feature of
negative politeness, but some hedges can have this positive-politeness function as
well, most notably: sort of, kind of like, in a way.

a. It’s really beautiful, in a way.

b. I kind of want Florin to win the race, since I’ve bet on him.
(Brown and Levinson, 1987:113-117)
Strategy 7: Presuppose/raise/assert common ground – Đề cập đến những lẽ
thường trong cộng đồng của người nói và người nghe

There are several ways to show this strategy such as by using gossip, deixis,
and presupposition. For example:

People like me and you, Bill, do not like being pushed around like that, do we? Why
don’t you go and complain? (Watts, 2003: 89)

The speaker tries to minimize the face threatening act by making a small talk
about him/her and the hearer. The speaker also uses the personal deixis ‘we’ to reduce
the distance between him/her and the hearer. Thus, by minimizing the face threatening
act, the hearer will do the speaker’s request.

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:117)

Strategy 8: Joke - Hãy biết nói đùa, nói vui
Since jokes are based on mutual shared background knowledge and values,
jokes may be used to stress that shared background or those shared values. Joking is a
basic positive-politeness technique, for putting H ‘at ease’ — for example in response
to a faux pas of H’s, S may joke. Or a joke may minimize a face-threatening act of
requesting, as in:

44
 a. OK if I tackle those cookies now?
b. How about lending me this old heap of junk? (hearer’s new Cadillac)
(Brown and Levinson, 1987:124)
Strategy 9: Assert or presuppose speaker’s knowledge of and concern for
hearer’s wants - Quan tâm tới sở thích của người nghe

One way of indicating that speaker and hearer are cooperators, and thus
potentially to put pressure on hearer to cooperate with speaker, is to assert or imply
knowledge hearer’s wants and willingness to fit one’s own wants in with them. The
negative questions discussed above may sometimes function in this way, as may
utterances like the following:

a. Look, I know you want the car back by 5.0, so should(n’t) I go to town now?
b. I know you can’t bear parties, but this one will really be good — do come!
(request/offer)
c. I know you love roses, but the florist didn’t have any more, so I brought you
geraniums instead. (offer + apology)

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:125)

Strategy 10: Offer, promise - Mời, hứa hẹn p125
In order to redress the potential threat of some face-threatening acts, S may
choose to stress his cooperation with H in another way. He may, that is, claim that
(within a certain sphere of relevance) whatever H wants, speaker wants for him and
will help to obtain. Offers and promises are the natural outcome of choosing this
strategy; even if they are false (‘I’ll drop by sometime next week’) they demonstrate
the speaker's good intentions in satisfying the hearer's positive-face wants.

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:125)

Strategy 11: Be optimistic - Hãy tỏ ra lạc quan

45
 The other side of the coin, the point-of-view flip that is associated with the
cooperative strategy, is for S to assume that H wants S’s wants for S (or for speaker
and hearer) and will help him to obtain them. That is, for S to be so presumptuous as
to assume H will cooperate with him may carry a tacit commitment for S to cooperate
with H as well, or at least a tacit claim that H will cooperate with S because it will be
in their mutual shared interest.

Wait a minute, you haven’t brushed your hair! (as husband goes out of the door)
The wife wants the husband to brush his hair before appearing in public; by
expressing this want in terms that assume he (hearer) wants it too (even though he
may well not care), she puts pressure on him to cooperate with her wants.

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:126)

Strategy 12: Include both speaker and hearer in the activity - Lôi kéo người nghe
làm chung một việc

By using an inclusive ‘we’ form, when S really means ‘you’ or ‘me’, he can
call upon the cooperative assumptions and thereby redress face-threatening acts.
Noting that “let’s” in English is an inclusive ‘we’ form, common examples are:

a. Let’s have a cookie, then. (i.e. me)

b. Let’s get on with dinner, eh? (i.e. you)
c. Let’s stop for a bite. (i.e. want a bite, so let’s stop)
d. Give us a break. (i.e. me)
(Brown and Levinson, 1987:127)
Strategy 13: Give (or ask for) reasons - Đưa ra lí do của hành động
Another aspect of including H in the activity is for S to give reasons as to why
he wants what he wants. By including H thus in his practical reasoning, and assuming
reflexivity (H wants S’s wants), H is thereby led to see the reasonableness of S’s FTA
(or so S hopes). In other words, giving reasons is a way of implying ‘I can help you’

46
or ‘you can help me’, and, assuming cooperation, a way of showing what help is
needed —as example below.

We (inclusive) will shut the door, ma’am. The wind’s coming in.
(Brown and Levinson, 1987:128)
Strategy 14: Assume or assert reciprocity - Đòi hỏi sự có đi có lại
The existence of cooperation between speaker and hearer may also be claimed
or urged by giving evidence of reciprocal rights or obligations obtained between
speaker and hearer. Thus S may say, in effect, ‘I’ll do X for you if you do Y for me’, or
‘I did X for you last week, so you do Y for me this week’ (or vice versa). By pointing
to the reciprocal right (or habit) of doing face-threatening acts to each other, S may
soften his FTA by negating the debt aspect and/or the face-threatening aspect of
speech acts such as criticisms and complaints.

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:129)

Strategy 15: Give gifts to hearer (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation) -
Trao tặng cho người nghe cái gì đó (vật phẩm, sự thông cảm, sự cộng tác của mình
với người nghe)

Finally, S may satisfy H’s positive-face want (that S want H’s wants, to some
degree) by actually satisfying some of hearer’s wants. Hence we have the classic
positive-politeness action of gift-giving, not only tangible gifts (which demonstrate
that speaker knows some of hearer’s wants and wants them to be fulfilled), but
human-relations wants such as those illustrated in many of the outputs considered
above — the wants to be liked, admired, cared about, understood, listened to, and so
on.

Examples in English are readily observable in almost any informal setting:

Male first-year student calling to female-first year student (whom he didn't know) in
their college bar during Freshers' Week':

47
Hey, blondie, what are you studying, then? French and Italian? Join the club!
The young man employed no fewer than three of Brown and Levinson positive
politeness strategies: 'use in-group identity markers' (blondie), 'express interest in H'
(asking her what she is studying), 'claim common ground' (Join the club!).

(Thomas, 1995:172)
2.2. Negative politeness
Negative politeness is oriented towards a hearer's negative face, which appeals
to the hearer's desire not to be impeded or put upon, to be left free to act as they
choose. Negative politeness is shown in the use of conventional politeness markers,
deference markers, minimizing imposition, etc. Brown and Levinson list ten negative
politeness strategies (Brown and Levinson, 1987:131)

Strategy 1: Be conventionally indirect - Dùng cách nói gián tiếp theo thông lệ
In this strategy a speaker is faced with opposing tensions: the desire to give H
an ‘out’ by being indirect, and the desire to go on record. In this case it is solved by

48
the compromise of conventional indirectness, the use of phrases and sentences that
have contextually unambiguous meanings (by virtue of conventionalization) which
are different from their literal meanings. In this way the utterance goes on record, and
the speaker indicates his desire to have gone off record (to have conveyed the same
thing indirectly). Conventional indirectness encodes the clash of wants, and so
partially achieves them both. Note that there are degrees of conventionalization, and
so degrees of compromise in one direction (off-recordness) or the other (on-
recordness).

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:132)

Strategy 2: Question, hedge - Dùng các yếu tố rào đón (hedges) hay tình thái hóa
Its performative hedges are ‘the most important linguistic means of satisfying
the speaker's want (Brown & Levinson, 1987: 146). Here are some common hedges: I
suppose/ believe/ assume/ guess/ think/ wonder/, I'm afraid/ sorry, I myself, a little bit,
merely, kind of, only, well, actually, maybe, perhaps, sort of, rather, pretty, quiet,
technically, roughly, really, certainly, totally, completely, just, etc.

(Kieu, 2006:88)
a. Give me your pen.
b. I think you could lend me your pen.
c. I don’t suppose you could lend me your pen.
Cách thứ hai là dùng yếu tố đền bù lịch sự dương tính, làm cho hành động bớt
nguy cơ FTA hơn bằng cách dùng các LRĐ báo hiệu sự “tỏ ra lạc quan”, “tin
tưởng” rằng người nghe sẽ cho mình mượn. Cách thứ ba, dùng yếu tố đền bù lịch sự
âm tính bằng cấu trúc phủ định, để chứng tỏ không muốn can thiệp vào quyền tự do
hành động và quyền “không bị áp đặt” của người nghe

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:145)

Strategy 3: Be pessimistic – Thể hiện sự bi quan

49
 This strategy gives redress to H’s negative face by explicitly expressing doubt
that the conditions for the appropriateness of S’s speech act obtain. In some of the
ways in which this want may be realized: namely, doing indirect requests with
assertions of felicity conditions which have had a negated probability operator
inserted (as in ‘You couldn’t possibly/by any chance lend me your lawnmower?’).

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:173)

Strategy 4: Minimize the imposition, rating of imposition - Giảm thiểu sự áp đặt
The speaker can apply this strategy by making the intrinsic seriousness of the
imposition look smaller. This kind of strategy is often signalized by the use of the
words ‘only’, ‘a little’, and ‘a few’, etc. For example:

I just want to ask you if I can borrow tiny bit of

you could lend me a little of paper.

single sheet

The example shows that the speaker minimizes the imposition by saying “just
… a tiny bit”
(Brown and Levinson, 1987:176-177)
Strategy 5: Indicating deference – Thể hiện sự kính trọng
Deferential markers (sir, madam...) are used to convey social hierarchy and
rank. In a formal setting one may express one's disagreement, saying:

There's a lot of truth in what you say, Sir, but …

The use of deference markers, address terms and other particles also helps to
lessen the threat to the H's face want.

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:178)

50
Strategy 6: Apologize – Nói lời xin lỗi
By apologizing for doing an FTA, the speaker can indicate his reluctance to
impinge on H’s negative face and thereby partially redress that impingement.

a. I’m sure you must be very busy, but…

b. I normally wouldn’t ask you this, but…
c. I can think of nobody else who could . . .
(Brown and Levinson, 1987:187)
Strategy 7: Impersonate speaker and hearer - Dùng phát ngôn phiếm chỉ
One way of indicating that S doesn’t want to impinge on H is to phrase the
FTA as if the agent were other than S, or at least possibly not S or not S alone, and the
addressee were other than H, or only inclusive of H.

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:178)

This results in a variety of ways of avoiding the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’.
A: The shirt you're wearing is short.

B: Everyone wears shirts like this.

(Kieu, 2006:88)
Strategy 8: State the face-threatening act as a general rule - Thể hiện FTA như
một quy tắc chung

One way of dissociating speaker and hearer from the particular imposition in
the FTA, and hence a way of communicating that S doesn’t want to impinge but is
merely forced to by circumstance, is to state the face-threatening act as an instance of
some general social rule, regulation, or obligation. So we get pronoun avoidance by
means of the first items rather than the second in pairs of sentences like the following:

a. Passengers will please refrain from flushing toilets on the train.

51
 b. You will please refrain from flushing toilets on the train.
(Brown and Levinson, 1987:206)
Strategy 9: Nominalize – Sử dụng thủ pháp danh hóa
Nominalization is the process of turning an adjective, a verb, or an adverb into
a noun. In this strategy, the speaker nominalizes the subject to make the utterance
sounds more formal which leads the speaker to satisfy the hearer’s negative-face
wants. The example of this strategy can be seen in the following expression:

a. You performed well on the examinations and we were favourably impressed.

b. Your performing well on the examinations impressed us favourably.
c. Your good performance on the examinations impressed us favourably.
Here (c) seems more formal, more like a business letter than (b), and (b) more
than (a). So as we nominalize the subject, so the sentence gets more ‘formal’. the
more nouny an expression, the more removed an actor is from doing or feeling or
being something; instead of the predicate being something attributed to an actor, the
actor becomes an attribute (e.g. adjective) of the action. with the progressive removal
of the active ‘doing’ part of an expression, the less dangerous it seems to be.

(Brown and Levinson, 1987:207)

Strategy 10: Go on record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting hearer – Sử
dụng lối nói thẳng để bày tỏ sự biết ơn đối với người nghe (rằng người nghe không
phải chịu ơn người nói về việc người nói đã giúp)

Speaker can redress a face-threatening by explicitly claiming his indebtedness

to hearer, or by disclaiming any indebtedness of hearer, by means of expressions such
as the following, for requests:

a. I’d be eternally grateful if you would ...

b. I’ll never be able to repay you if you ...
and for offers:

52
 c. I could easily do it for you.
d. It wouldn’t be any trouble; I have to go right by there anyway.
(Brown and Levinson, 1987:210)
Examples in English are readily observable in almost any informal setting:
She was visiting Lancaster for a conference and we had arranged to meet on
Friday, but unfortunately I forgot our appointment:

“Dear Jenny Thomas,

I'm sorry I missed you today. I wanted to discuss with you ...
I know it is a terrible imposition, but if you had any time, Sat. p.m. we could perhaps
meet in Lancaster for a coffee? I'd be very grateful.

Best wishes,

[Name

deleted]”

We could ... meet is an example of strategy 1 ('be convention- ally indirect');

perhaps is an example of strategy 2 (hedge'); if you had any time is an example of
strategy 4 ('minimize imposition'); I know it's a terrible imposition and I'm sorry I
missed you are examples of strategy 6 ('admit the impingement' and 'beg
forgiveness'). And, finally, I'd be very grateful for an example of strategy 10 ('go on
record as incurring a debt').

(Thomas, 1995:172-173)
3. Off-record strategies (Nói vòng)
A communicative act is done off record if it is done in such a way that it
is not possible to attribute only one clear communicative intention to the act. In
other words, the actor leaves himself an ‘out’ by providing himself with a

53
number of defensible interpretations; he cannot be held to have committed
himself to just one particular interpretation of his act. Thus if a speaker wants to
do an FTA, but wants to avoid the responsibility for doing it, he can do it off
record and leave it up to the addressee to decide how to interpret it. Brown and
Levinson (1978:211)

For instance, if I say ‘Damn, I’m out of cash, I forgot to go to the bank
today’, I may be intending to get you to lend me some cash, but I cannot be held
to have committed myself to that intent (as you would discover were you to
challenge me with “This is the seventeenth time you’ve asked me to lend you
money”). Brown and Levinson (1978:69)

Here is the chart of off-record strategies by Brown and Levinson

consisting of 15 politeness strategies. They are categorized into 4 groups based
on which Gricean maxim the strategy violates, and these groups belong to a

54
broader categorization of inviting conversational implicatures and being vague
or ambiguous. In this presentation, however, we will discuss 12 of the
abovementioned politeness strategies.

Now let’s take a closer look at these few methods for achieving
contextually ambiguous indirection, starting with:

3.1. Inviting conversational implicatures. (Mời gọi hàm ý hội thoại)

If a speaker wants to do an FTA, and chooses to do it indirectly, he must
give H some hints and hope that H picks up on them and thereby interprets what
S really means (intends) to say. The basic way to do this is to invite
conversational implicatures hy violating, in some way, the Gricean Maxims of
efficient communication. Brown and Levinson (1978:213)

3.1.1. Violating Relevance Maxim

Violating the Maxim Relevance S invites H to look for a suitable
interpretation of the utterance by making explicitly irrelevant utterances and
giving hints:

Strategy 1: Giving hints - Dùng lối nói gợi ý

If S says something that is not explicitly relevant, he invites H to search
for an interpretation of the possible relevance. The basic mechanism here is a
violation of the Maxim of Relevance. Brown and Levinson (1978:213)

Many cases of truly indirect (off-record) speech acts are accomplished by

hints that consist in ‘raising the issue of’ some desired act A, for instance, by
stating motives or reasons for doing A:

(1) It’s cold in here. (c.i. Shut the window)

(3) This soup’s a bit bland (c.i. Pass the salt) Brown and Levinson (1978:215)

55
Strategy 2: Giving association clues - Đưa ra các chỉ dẫn
In a sense, association clues for indirect requests are nothing but more
remote hints of practical-reasoning premises. What is special about them is that
specific knowledge extrinsic to H’s desired act is required to decode them.

(10) Are you going to market tomorrow? . . . There’s a market tomorrow, I

suppose, (c.i. Give me a ride there) Brown and Levinson (1978:216)

Such hints leave it up to H to offer, taking the responsibility for the FTA away
from S.

Strategy 3: Presuppose - Tiền giả định

An utterance can be almost wholly relevant in context, and yet violate the
Relevance Maxim just at the level of its presuppositions

For instance, if S says:

(13) I washed the car again today.
he presupposes that he has done it before (e.g. last week) and therefore may
implicate, a criticism. The use of “again” forces H to search for the relevance of
the presupposed prior event.

Brown and Levinson (1978:217)

Next, we will move on to the next 3 strategies that violate quantity maxim
3.1.2. Violating Quantity Maxim
Strategy 4: Understating - Nói giảm

56
 The violation of the Quantity Maxim makes Ss inevitably say something
less than or different from what they intend to convey. The disagreeing token
thus seems to be soft and weak, as in an example by Pomerantz (1978: 97):

(15) E: That Pat. Isn’t she a doll::

→ M: Yeh isn’t she pretty, (Meaning: not very beautiful)
Kieu (2006: 90)
Strategy 5: Overstating - Nói quá
If S says more than is necessary, thus violating the quantity maxim in
another way, he may also convey implicatures … Here, however, the
implicatures often lie far beyond what is said.

(36) I tried to call a hundred times, but there was never any answer
could convey an apology for not getting in touch: Brown and Levinson (1978:219)
(37) You never do the washing up.
(38) Why are you always smoking?
could convey the relevant criticisms. Brown and Levinson (1978:220)
Strategy 6: Using tautologies - Dùng lối nói trùng ngôn
A third method of generating inferences by violations of the Quantity
Maxim is to utter patent and necessary truths. By uttering a tautology, S
encourages H to look for an informative interpretation of the non-informative
utterance. Brown and Levinson (1978:220)

Tautology may be understood as an act of disagreeing as in:

(17) A. Boys are getting too naughty these days.

57
→ B. Boys are boys. Kieu (2006:90)
3.1.3. Violating Quality Maxim
Violation of the Quality Maxim is made through giving contradictions,
ironies, metaphors and rhetorical questions.

Strategy 7: Using contradictions - Dùng lối nói trái ngược

Ss express their intended meaning indirectly by saying the opposite of what
they want to convey. By giving two contradictory statements Ss show that they
cannot be telling the truth. It is Hs that have to look for a suitable interpretation
which implies disagreement:

(18) A. The government is to blame

→ B. Yes and no. /It is and it is not.
Kieu (2006:91)
Strategy 8: Being ironic - Nói vui, châm biếm

By saying the opposite of what he means, again a violation of Quality, S

can indirectly convey his intended meaning, if there are clues that his intended
meaning is being conveyed indirectly. Such clues may be prosodic (e.g.
nasality), kinesic (e.g. a smirk), or simply contextual: Brown and Levinson
(1978:221)

(51) John’s a real genius. (after John has just done twenty stupid things in a
row)

(53) Beautiful weather, isn’t it! (to postman drenched in rainstorm) Brown and
Levinson (1978:222)

58
Strategy 9: Using metaphors - Dùng ẩn dụ
Metaphors are a further category of Quality violations, for metaphors are
literally false. The use of metaphor is perhaps usually on record, but there is a
possibility that exactly which of the connotations of the metaphor S intends may
be off record. For example:

(61) Harry’s a real fish. (c.i. He drinks/ swims/ is slimy/ is cold-blooded like a
fish) Brown and Levinson (1978:222)

Strategy 10: Use rhetorical questions - Dùng các câu hỏi tu từ

To ask a question with no intention of obtaining an answer is to break a
sincerity condition on queststions — namely, that S wants H to provide him
with the indicated information. This sincerity condition straightforwardly
follows from the injunction ‘Be sincere’, i.e. the Quality Maxim. Questions that
leave their answers hanging in the air, implicated, may be used to do FTAs —
for example, excuses:

(64) How was I to know . . . ? (c.i. I

wasn’t) or criticisms:

(65) How many times I have to tell you . . . ? (c.i. Too many)
(66) What can I say? (c.i. Nothing, it’s so bad) Brown and Levinson (1978:223)
3.2. Being vague or ambiguous - Violating Manner Maxim
Rather than inviting a particular implicature S may choose to go off
record by being vague or ambiguous (that is, violating the Manner Maxim) in
such a way that his communicated intent remains ill-defined. Brown and Levinson
(1978:225)

59
In this part, 4 particular strategies will be discussed, starting with strategy

11 Strategy 11: Be ambiguous

Purposeful ambiguity may be achieved through metaphor, since (as

mentioned above) it is not always clear exactly which of the connotations of a
metaphor are intended to be invoked

(80) John’s a pretty sharp/ smooth cookie

This could be either a compliment or an insult, depending on which of
the connotations of sharp or smooth are latched on to.

Brown and Levinson (1978:225)

Strategy 12: Being vague - Hãy dùng lối nói mơ hồ
S may go off record with an FTA by being vague about who the object of
the FTA is, or what the offence is — e.g., in criticisms:

(81) Looks like someone may have had too much to drink.
(vague understatement)

(82) Perhaps someone did something naughty. Brown and Levinson (1978:226)
Strategy 13: Overgeneralizing - Hãy dùng lối khái quát hóa

The use of proverbs can be considered one way of over-generalization.

Ss’ overgeneralization makes Hs decide if the general rule applies to them:

(22) A. That party both you and I went to was very boring.
→B. Boring people get bored. Kieu (2006:91)
Strategy 14: Displacing H - Thay đổi người nhận

60
 S may go off record as to who the target for his FTA is, or he may
pretend to address the FTA to someone whom it wouldn’t threaten, and hope
that the real target will see that the FTA is aimed at him. Ervin Tripp
(1972:247) cites an example of this, where one secretary in an office asks
another — but with negative politeness — to pass the stapler, in circumstances
where a professor is much nearer to the stapler than the other secretary. His face
is not threatened, and he can choose to do it himself as a bonus ‘free gift’. Brown
and Levinson (1978:226)

Strategy 15: Be incomplete. use ellipsis - Dùng lối nói tinh lược

S may leave the implicature hanging in the air by leaving an FTA half
done. S can use one of the following structures to express his disagreement
(Blundell et al. 1996):

a) I see what you mean, but ..., b) To a certain extent, yes, but ..., c) Yes,
maybe/perhaps, but ..., d) I couldn't agree more, but ..., e) I see your point, but
…, f) Agreed, but ..., g) Yes, up to that point, but ..., h) That's one way of
looking at it, but ..., i) There's a lot in what you say, but ..., j) OK, but ..., k)
Yes, but ..., l) Mm, but ..., m) Granted, but ..., etc.

No longer can these structures retain the force of vagueness or ambiguity if they
are followed by argumentative utterances. Kieu (2006:91)
4. No FTA - Không thực hiện hành động đe dọa thể diện
The fifth strategic choice proposed by Brown and Levinson,‘Don’t do the
FTA’, “is simply that S avoids offending H at all with this particular FTA.”
Brown and Levinson (1978:72)

61
 This strategy often appears to be neglected, as it has ‘no interesting linguistic
reflexes”. Kieu (2006:94)

There are times when the speaker decides to say nothing and genuinely
wishes to let the matter drop; there are other occasions when an individual
decides to say nothing (decides not to complain, for example) but still wishes to
achieve the effect which the speech act would have achieved had it been
uttered. Tanaka (1993: 50-1) terms these two strategies OOC (opting
out choice)-genuine and OOC-strategic:
- OOC-genuine:
S does not perform a speech act, and genuinely intends to let the matter
remain closed.
S/he does not intend to achieve the perlocutionary effect.
- OOC-strategic: S does not perform a speech act, but ex- pects A to infer
her/his wish to achieve the perlocutionary effect. Thomas (1995:175)

Many people seem to prefer to have their needs recognized by others

without having to express those needs in language. Yule (1996:62)

For example, you arrive at an important lecture, pull out your notebook to
take notes, but discover that you don't have anything to write with. You think
that the person sitting next to you may provide the solution. In this scenario,
you are going to be 'Self', and the person next to you is going to be 'Other'.
Your first choice is whether to say something or not. You can, rummage in
your bag, search rather obviously through your pockets, go back into your bag,
without uttering a word, but with the vague intention that your problem will be
recognized. This 'say nothing' approach may or may not work (as Brown and
Levinson stated that S would fail to achieve his desired communication -

62
1978:72), but if it does, it's because the other offers and not because the self
asks, as in:
[3] Self: (looks in the bag)
Other: (offers pen) Here, use this. Yule (1996:62)
There is also situation - where there is such a strong expectation that
something will be said, that saying nothing is in itself a massive FTA (for
example, failing to express condolences to someone on the death of a loved
one).

For example: Aston was a senior research fellow at Corpus Christi. He

was subject to bouts of drinking and severe depression; he could be difficult to
work with and was something of an embarrassment to the College. At a meeting
between President and Fellow, Aston said to Dover: 'You're trying to push me
out o f the College!'

Dover commented: this was so obviously true that I didn't say

anything.' A few days later Aston killed himself. Thomas (1995:175)

63
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Politeness and interaction............................................................................4
1. The concept of face and face wants.........................................................4
2. Face-threatening acts & Face-saving acts................................................5
3. Negative and positive face.......................................................................8
4. Self and other: say nothing.......................................................................9
II. Politeness strategies..................................................................................13
1. Positive and negative politeness...............................................................13
1.1 Politeness..............................................................................................13
1.2. Positive politeness...............................................................................14
1.3. Negative politeness..............................................................................15
2. Politeness strategies...................................................................................16
2.1. Positive politeness strategies...............................................................17
2.2. Negative politeness strategies.............................................................19
3. Pre-sequences (tiền dẫn nhập)..................................................................20
III. Deixis and Distance.................................................................................23
1. Introduction............................................................................................23
2. Person deixis (Phạm trù/chỉ xuất nhân xưng/ngôi)................................24
3. Spatial deixis..........................................................................................28
4. Temporal deixis......................................................................................29
5. Deixis and Grammar..............................................................................30

1
I. Politeness and interaction
1. The concept of face and face wants
1.1 Face (Thể diện)
The term “face” may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively
claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular
contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social
attributes-albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a good
showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself.
Erving Goffman (1967:5)
Our notion of ‘face’ is derived from that of Goffman (1967) and from the
English folk term, which ties face up with notions of being embarrassed or
humiliated, or ‘losing face’. Thus face is something that is emotionally invested,
and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended
to in interaction. In general, people cooperate (and assume each other’s
cooperation) in maintaining face in interaction, such cooperation being based on
the mutual vulnerability of face (Brown & Levison, 1987:61)
Looking at “face” from the perspective of 'self', but focusing less on the
'process' of communication and more on the 'rights' of individuals Brown and
Levinson (1987: 61) argue that face is 'the image of self that every member
wants to present to others'. This perspective is criticized as being Western
individualistic, only emphasizing the desires and psychological needs of
individuals. The concept of 'face' needs to be understood in a broader sense,
with social and moral implications, and must consider both individual and
group aspects.
We believe that, based on the arguments about 'self' and 'other' in
communication as well as considering the dynamic nature of situational context
and cultural context, "Face in communication is the positive image that we
(desire to) construct for ourselves in accordance with the positive impression
others have of us. Each individual's face is constructed by that individual and
affirmed, reinforced by others in the process of interaction in specific situational
and cultural contexts."
1.2 Face want (mong muốn giữ thể diện)

2
Within their everyday social interactions, people generally behave as if their
expectations concerning their public self-image, or their face wants, will be
respected (Yule, 1993:61)
2. Face-threatening acts & Face-saving acts
2.1 Face-threatening acts
Face Threatening Acts (FTAs) are the people's way of getting their wants
through giving a threat to others. When FTAs happen, the people will do some
strategies to face it. Therefore, before doing the strategies. The people should
understand the FTAs that have happened first.
In an interaction, people's deeds always reflect their purpose of communication.
They behave like what they expect, and it is concerned with their public
self-image or their face wants, and every person always wants to be respected
(Yule, 1967)
In getting their purpose, people usually say something that represents a threat to
another individual, and it is called FTAs. FTAs mean the people's deed which
represents a threat to another person's self-image (Yule, 2010).
For example, someone uses a direct speech act to ask his friend to do something
by saying "give me that paper!" (Yule, 2010).
In this term, the person has given a threat to his friend. He does not have social
power with his friend anymore, but he uses a direct speech act in which a
command structure is used in its real function.
He orders his friend directly. Here, what the person said adds the possible threat
to his friend.
FTAs happen based on three aspects. Those three aspects depend on the cultural
situation between the speaker and the hearer. Brown and Levinson (1987)
divide those three aspects such as social distance (D), relative power (P), and
absolute ranking (R). Social distance is the social range between the speaker
and the hearer. For example, the degree of familiarity and solidarity appear
between the hearer and the speaker.

3
Relative power is the strength of the speaker to be respected by the hearer. For
example, the speaker's ability to impose his will on the hearer. In other words,
relative power can create a distance between the speaker and the hearer. The
absolute ranking is absolute position to impose the hearer to perform an act and
the degree to create an imposition of the hearer. (Septa Prifanti, 2016:17,18)
If a speaker says something that represents a threat to another individual’s
expectations regarding self - image, it is described as a face-threatening act.
Acts that threaten the listener's positive face and self-image include expressions
of disapproval, accusations, criticism, and disagreements. Face-threatening acts
can also be expressions that show that the speaker does not care about the
listener's positive face, for example mentioning taboo or emotional topics,
interruptions, and expressions of violent emotions.
Let's take a look at some face-threatening acts (positive face):
"I don't like that outfit at all."
"You ate all my cheese, didn't you?!"
"I'm definitely better at maths than
you."
"Didn't your last partner cheat on you all the time?"
2.2 Face-saving acts
Alternatively, given the possibility that some action might be interpreted as a
threat to another's face, the speaker can say something to lessen the possible
threat. This is called a face-saving act.
In getting the purpose of communication, people possibly give a threat to another
person. If FTAs happen, the person will get an embarrassing moment which is called
losing face. Alternatively, people can say something to lessen the possible threat
appearing, and it is called as Face Saving Acts (FSAs) (Yule, 1967). For example,
someone asks his friend to do something by saying an indirect speech act "Could you
pass me the paper?" (Yule, 2010).
The indirect speech in which a question sentence functions as a request can lessen the
possible threat to his friends. Thus, politeness strategies are developed by the panelists
and the moderator in order to cover FSAs

4
According to Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987), politeness strategies are used to keep
the hearer's face. Keeping the hearer's face means the speaker should respect another
speaker when the conversation is going on through maintaining self-esteem. In other
words, politeness strategies support the people to keep their face in an interaction.
Thus, Brown and Levinson (1978) present five FSAs strategies such as say nothing,
bald on record, off record, positive politeness, and negative politeness. (Septa Prifanti,
2016:17,18)
Imagine a late-night scene, where a young neighbor is playing his music very
loud and an older couple is trying to sleep.
One of them, in [2], proposes a face-threatening act and the other suggests a
face-saving act.
[2] Him: I'm going to tell him to stop that awful noise right now!
Her: Perhaps you could just ask him if he is going to stop soon
because it's getting a bit late and people need to get to sleep.
Because it is generally expected that each person will attempt to respect the face
wants of others, there are many different ways of performing face-saving acts.
(Yule, 1993:61)
2.3 Criticism of Brown&Levinson works
Brown and Levinson's work has been extraordinarily influential and very
widely discussed. It is not surprising, therefore, that several criticisms have
been made of their model of politeness. The description of the FTA implies that
an act is threatening to the face of either the speaker or the hearer; in fact, many
acts can be seen to threaten the face of both S and H simultaneously. An
apology, for example, threatens the speaker's face in an obvious way, but it can
also be the source of considerable embarrassment to the hearer. Brown and
Levinson claim that positive and negative politeness is mutually exclusive. In
practice, a single utterance can be oriented to both positive and negative faces
simultaneously: (Septa Prifanti, 2016:17,18)
Example 38
Woman addressing important
man: Do me a favor — piss off!

5
Brown and Levinson's model appears to predict that the greater the degree of
face-threat, the greater will be the degree of indirectness. However many
counter-examples are readily available. In addition to the examples of the type
of bald-on-record utterances I offered in examples 27, 28, and 29, we find very
different norms of directness in operation within long-term relationships and
within different sub-groups. Brown and Levinson argue that some speech acts
are inherently face-threatening (cf. Leech, who claims that some speech acts are
inherently polite). From these two observations, it might be concluded that
some utterances pose no face-threat at all. Dascal (1977: 315) argues, rightly in
my view, that merely speaking to someone sets up what he terms a
'conversational demand' (cf. also Nofsinger (1975)): simply by speaking we
trespass on another person's space. Saying anything at all (or even saying
nothing!) is potentially face-threatening. (Thomas, 1995:176)
3. Negative and positive face
Brown & Levinson (1987) assert that within each of us exists what is called "face,"
and because of face, we always have a need to maintain face-wants. Face comprises
two main types: Negative face and Positive face. Negative face is understood as: ...the
desire for one's actions not to be hindered. Brown & Levinson (1987: 13)
or: ...the right to territory, freedom of action, and not being imposed upon. Fasold
(1990: 160)
That, according to us, is 'the presentation of personal dignity with the
desire/expectation to be oneself: to be free to do what one likes, to be respected, not to
be disturbed, not to be intruded upon in private life...'.
Positive face is interpreted as: ...the desire (in some aspects) to be approved. Brown &
Levinson (1987: 13) or: ...the most consistent and positive self-image that one has and
wants at least some others to accept and value. Fasold (1990: 160)
That, according to us, is 'the presentation of individual dignity with the
desire/expectation to be accepted and approved: what one does is responded to by
others, accepted as part of the whole, cared for, shared...' Nguyen Quang (2019:3)

6
When we attempt to save another's face, we can pay attention to their negative
face wants or their positive face wants. A person's negative face is the need to
be independent, to have freedom of action, and not to be imposed on by others.
The word 'negative' here doesn't mean 'bad', it's just the opposite pole from
'positive'.
A person's positive face is the need to be accepted, even liked, by others, to be
treated as a member of the same group, and to know that his or her wants are
shared by others. In simple terms, negative face is the need to be independent,
and positive face is the need to be connected.
So, a face-saving act which is oriented to the person's negative face will tend to
show deference, emphasize the importance of the other's time or concerns, and
even include an apology for the imposition or interruption.
This is also called negative politeness. A face saving act which is concerned
with the person's positive face will tend to show solidarity, emphasize that both
speakers want the same thing, and that they have a common goal. This is also
called positive politeness. (Yule, 1993:62)
4. Self and other: say nothing
One way to see the relevance of the relationship between these politeness
concepts and language use is to take a single speech event and map out the
different interpretations associated with different possible expressions used
within that event. For example, you arrive at an important lecture, pull out your
notebook to take notes, but discover that you don't have anything to write with.
You think that the person sitting next to you may provide the solution. In this
scenario, you are going to be 'Self’, and the person next to you is going to be
'Other'.
Your first choice is whether to say something or not. You can, of course,
rummage in your bag, search rather obviously through your pockets, go back
into your bag, without uttering a word, but with the vague intention that your
problem will be recognized. This 'say nothing' approach may or may not work,
but if it does, it's because the other offers and not because the self asks, as in
[3].
[3] Self: (looks in bag)

7
 Other: (offers pen) Here, use this.
Many people seem to prefer to have their needs recognized by others without
having to express those needs in language. When those needs are recognized, as
in [3], then clearly more has been communicated than was said. ( Yule,
1993:62)
Researchers from non-Western cultures believe that politeness in language
communication is adherence to societal language norms. The concept of "self"
as a social entity is perceived differently by Eastern and Western individuals.
Western culture acknowledges and values an independent "self," not bound by
the relationships surrounding the individual. All forms of language and other
behaviors aim to assert this independent "self." Eastern culture perceives the
"self" as tied to the community, defined, and influenced by the relational
network within the community. The notion of the "self" as described forms the
basis for explaining concepts of representation and politeness in Eastern
countries
In Brown & Levinson’s model of politeness strategies, the fifth strategic choice
‘Don’t do the FTA’ appears to be neglected, as it has ‘no interesting linguistic
reflexes’ (1978:77). It might be as such in other speech acts like requesting,
ordering, offering or complaining when the S is the initiator or trigger of the act.
He/she may choose not to perform the act at all because of the seriousness of
the act.
Nevertheless, there are acts when the prior S’s utterance makes it relevant and
necessary for the present S to voice a reply, i.e. to perform the act. It is the case
of disagreeing. By proffering assessments or evaluations, first Ss invite their
interlocutors to respond. Second Ss have to verbally utilize socially determined
norms and/or certain individual strategies to give their own assessments which
may be the same or different from the priors’. In such non-Anglophone cultures
as Vietnamese, second Ss would be alleged to be inexplicably impolite if they
chose to abide by Brown & Levinson’s fifth strategy by being quiet (one way
not to do the FTA).
Silence in conversation (mentioned earlier in 1.1.2.3.) might imply unsaid
disagreements, inability to hear, or even scorn, and sometimes it may result in
costly consequences of misunderstanding or relationship breakup. Realizing the

8
possible implication of silence in communicative interaction, a number of
researchers take it into consideration: Schegloff et al. (1977), Pomerantz (1978,
1984ab), Schegloff (1979b, 1984, 1992), Levinson (1983), Nofsinger (1991),
Yule (1996), Mey (2001), to name just a few. Mey (Ibid. 158) even calls it ‘the
painful silence’ to underline its significance in talk-in-interaction.
Cultures and languages, however, perceive and interpret interactive silence in
their own ways. While 70% of 95 the English informants would rather be silent
than proffer evaluations opposite to the prior, only 24% of the Vietnamese
decide to cancel performing the act altogether. It can be inferred that in
comparison to the English, the Vietnamese on the whole, find it more important
to voice something in return to first evaluative tokens. Possibly, saying
something in reply in interactive communication is considered one way of
keeping solidarity and rapport, and thus, expressing politeness in Vietnamese
culture and society. Kieu Thi Thu Huong (2006:94)
5. Say something: on and off record
Even if you decide to say something, you don't actually have to ask for
anything. You can (perhaps after your search through your bag) simply produce
a statement of the type in [4a.] or [4b.].
[4] a. Uh, I forgot my pen.
b. Hmm, I wonder where I put my pen.
These, and other similar types of statements, are not directly addressed to the
other. The other can act as if the statements have not even been heard. They are
technically described as being off record. In casual descriptions, they might be
referred to as 'hints'. Once again, an off-record statement may or may not
succeed (as a means of getting a pen), but if it does, it will be because more has
been communicated than was said. In contrast to such off-record statements,
you can directly address the other as a means of expressing your needs. These
direct address forms are technically described as being on record. The most
direct approach, using imperative forms such as those in [5], is known as bald
on record. The other person is directly asked for something.

9
In many cases, people from Quang region often use a blunt form of speech, also
known as a straightforward style without redressive action. They prefer to
address issues directly and use direct verbal actions. Even when talking about
love and family marriage, people from Quang region also choose to express
themselves in such a straightforward manner. For example:
The folk songs of Quang Nam do not have such imagery in their speech. The
inherent straightforwardness and dislike for complexity of Quang people are
clearly demonstrated through their sincere and honest expression of emotions.
For instance
“- Cô kia má đỏ hồng hồng
Cho tui hỏi thử có chồng hay chưa?
- Có chồng năm ngoái, năm xưa
Năm nay chồng để như chưa có chồng.”
Because of their straightforwardness, sometimes they may come across as
rough and lacking in refinement, appearing somewhat uncouth and lacking in
decorum.
“Gặp đây anh nắm cổ tay
Anh hỏi câu này: có lấy anh không?”
These bald on-record forms may be followed by expressions like 'please' and
'would you?' which serve to soften the demand and are called mitigating
devices. It is tempting to equate the bald-on-record approach with all direct
command forms (i.e. imperatives). This would be misleading because
imperative forms are often used by close familiars without being interpreted as
commands.
Examples would be a friend offering something to eat, as in [6a.], or trying to
help you, as in [6b.].
[6] a. Have some more cake.
b. Gimme that wet umbrella.

10
Emergency situations also occasion the use of direct commands, regardless of
who is being addressed, as when danger prompts use of the expressions in [7].
[7] a. Don't touch that!
b. Get out of here!
There are, consequently, some social circumstances where using a direct
command as a bald on-record expression is considered appropriate among
social equals.
However, generally speaking, bald-on-record expressions are associated with
speech events where the speaker assumes that he or she has power over the
other (for example, in military contexts) and can control the other's behavior
with words. In everyday interaction between social equals, such bald-on-record
behavior would potentially represent a threat to the other's face and would
generally be avoided. Avoiding a face-threatening act is accomplished by
face-saving acts that use positive or negative politeness strategies. (Yule,
1993:64)
II. Politeness strategies
1. Positive and negative politeness
1.1 Politeness
As mentioned in the previous lesson, politeness, a concept proposed by
Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson, is a theory that refers to attempts to
restore a person's self-esteem through the assertion of good social values in
social interactions (Brown & Levinson, 1978). There were other explanations
for the concept of linguistic politeness by other researchers, such as Lakoff in
1975, Leech in 1983, and Holmes in 1995; however, Brown and Levinson’s
theory in 1987 is considered to be the most consistent, influential, and effective
for further study in the future. (Do, 2007)
Being linguistically polite means a speaker can select linguistic forms that
express the appropriate degree of social distance or recognize relevant status or
power differences (Holmes, 2001, as cited in Yulia, 2016). By doing so, the
speaker will put his/her conversation partners at ease because his/her feelings
are taken into account. (Yulia, 2016).

11
1.2. Positive politeness
In the purpose of addressing the two kinds of face that have previously been
mentioned, politeness is categorized into two kinds: positive politeness and
negative politeness.
According to Bentahila and Davies (1989: 101), positive politeness is “an
attempt to convey concern to others’ interests and a desire to fulfill their needs”.
Brown and Levinson (1990: 101) define positive politeness as: Positive
politeness is redress directed to the addressee’s positive face, his perennial
desire that his wants (or the actions/acquisitions/values resulting from them)
should be thought of as desirable. Redress consists in partially satisfying that
desire by communicating that one’s own wants (or some of them) are in some
respects similar to the addressee’s wants.
Positive politeness is characterized by attempts to attain solidarity through
statements of friendship, using language informally, employing compliments,
and using hedging and attempts to avoid conflict.“It emphasizes shared attitudes
and values” (Holmes, 2001: 268), which means that it expresses solidarity and
minimize status difference. Positive politeness deals with a positive face, i.e.
one’s self-esteem. Positive politeness strategy recognizes the addressee’s desire
to be respected, accepted, or liked by others, and treated as a member of the
group. Besides, it recognizes the addressee’s need to know that his/her wants
are shared by others. It also verifies that the relationship is friendly and
expresses group reciprocity. Such strategies seek to minimize the threat to the
hearer’s positive face (Yulia, 2016)
George Yule (1997: 62) added more shape to the notion of “positive politeness”
by associating it with the concept of “solidarity” or intimacy, camaraderie, an
indirect indication of the integration of power, and the vicinity, or close distance
between the interlocutors. According to him, a face-saving act relating to
positive politeness shows a tendency towards intimacy, emphasizing that both
the speaker and the hearer want the same thing and that they share the same
goal.
Positive politeness is any communicative act (verbal and/or nonverbal) which is
intentionally and appropriately meant to show the speaker’s concern to the

12
addressee, thus, enhancing the sense of solidarity between them in particular
contexts of situation and culture (Yule, 1997).
1.3. Negative politeness
Moving on to negative politeness, Bentahila and Davies define it as paying
attention to not imposing on others or limiting their freedom, keeping their
distance.
Negative politeness, on the other hand, is shown by paying people respect and
avoiding intruding on them. It involves “expressing oneself appropriately in
terms of social distance and respecting status differences” (Holmes, 2001: 268).
Negative politeness focuses more on expressing oneself appropriately in terms
of social distance and respecting status differences. Such politeness is
characterized by deference, apology, indirectness, and using language formally
(Yulia, 2016).
According to Brown and Levinson’s definition, Negative politeness is
redressive action addressed to the addressee’s negative face: his want to have
his freedom of action unhindered and his attention unimpeded.
However, Yule associates “negative politeness” with “deference”, an indirect
indication of discord and distance between the interlocutors.
According to him, a face-saving act that is oriented to the person's negative face
will tend to show deference, emphasize the importance of the other's time or
concerns, and even include an apology for the imposition or interruption.
[Negative politeness is any communicative act (verbal and/or nonverbal) which
is intentionally and appropriately meant to show that the speaker does not want
to impinge on the addressee’s privacy, thus, maintaining the sense of distance
between them in particular contexts of situation and culture].
2. Politeness strategies
According to Yule (1996: 160), Politeness strategies are the means to preserve a
least the semblance of harmony and cohesion in social relationships. Brown and
Levinson took a step further and categorized politeness strategy into positive
politeness strategy (which indicates closeness, intimacy, harmonious
relationship, and sympathy between the speaker and the hearer) and negative
politeness strategy (which indicates social distance between the speaker and the

13
hearer, respects and values the hearer’s self-esteem, avoiding imposition) (Ngo,
2014).
2.1. Positive politeness strategies
A positive politeness strategy leads the requester to appeal to a common goal,
and even friendship, via expressions such as those in [8].
[8] a. How about letting me use your pen?
b. Hey, buddy, I'd appreciate it if you'd let me use your pen.
These on-record expressions do represent a greater risk for the speaker of
suffering a refusal and may be preceded by some 'getting to know you' talk, of
the kind presented in [9], designed to establish the necessary common ground
for this strategy.
[9] Hi. How's it going? Okay if I sit here? We must be interested in the
same crazy stuff. You take a lot of notes too, huh? Say, do me a big favor,
and let me use one of your pens.
The tendency to use positive politeness forms, emphasizing closeness between
speaker and hearer can be seen as a solidarity strategy (chiến lược đoàn kết).
This may be the principal operating strategy among a whole group or it may be
an option used by an individual speaker on a particular occasion. Linguistically,
such a strategy will include personal information, the use of nicknames,
sometimes even abusive terms (particularly among males), and shared dialect or
slang expressions. Frequently, a solidarity strategy will be marked via inclusive
terms such as 'we' and 'let's', as in the party invitation in [11].
[11] Come on, let's go to the party. Everyone will be there. We'll have fun.
Comparing Yule’s concept of positive politeness strategy to that of Brown and
Levinson, which was mentioned in the previous lesson by Group 3, we found a
correlation between the two. To be specific, Yule’s notion of solidarity strategy
includes strategies 4 and 12 in Brown and Levinson’s positive politeness
strategy.
Strategy 8: Joke
Since jokes are based on mutual shared background knowledge and values,
jokes may be used to stress that shared background or shared values. Joking is a

14
basic positive-politeness technique, for putting H at ease’. By using any of the
innumerable ways to convey in-group membership, S can implicitly claim the
common ground with H that is carried by that definition of the group. These
include in-group usages of address forms, of language or dialect, of jargon or
slang, and of ellipsis.
Strategy 4: Use in-group identity markers
Address forms (Từ xưng hô). In many languages (for reasons discussed below)
the second-person plural pronoun of address doubles as an honorific form to
singular respected or distant alters. Such usages are called T/V systems, after
the French tu and vous (see Brown and Gilman 1960). In such languages, Using
a singular non-honorific pronoun to a non-familiar alter can claim solidarity.
Other address forms used to convey such in-group membership include generic
names and terms of address like Mac, mate, buddy, pal, honey, dear, duckie,
luv, babe, Mom, blondie, brother, sister, cutie, sweetheart, guys, fellas.
Diminutives and endearments (as in some of the above examples, or in English
by adding -ie to the addressee’s name) have a similar function of claiming
ingroup solidarity.
Use of in-group language or dialect. The phenomenon of code-switching
involves any switch from one language dialect to another in communities where
the linguistic repertoire includes two or more such codes. A type of
code-switching phenomenon is the switch in English into a spurious dialect, or
a dialect not normally used by S or H, to soften an FTA or turn it into a joke.
On the other hand, switches into a code associated with external relations may,
amongst other things, signal an FTA accompanied by negative politeness
(nicely paralleled by a switch from a T to a V pronoun). Or it may simply signal
a withdrawal of positive politeness and its associated emotional support
Use of jargon or slang. Related to the use of an in-group language or dialect is
the use of in-group terminology. By referring to an object with a slang term, S
may evoke all of the shared associations and attitudes that he and H both have
toward that object; this then may be used as FTA redress.
Strategy 12: Include both S and H in the activity
By using an inclusive ‘we’ form, when S really means ‘you’ or ‘me’, he can call
upon the cooperative assumptions and thereby redress FTAs. Noting that let’s m
English is an inclusive ‘we’ form, common examples are:
(129) Let’s have a cookie, then. (i.e. me)
(130) Let’s get on with dinner, eh? (i.e. you)
(131) Let’s stop for a bite. (i.e. / want a bite, so let’s stop)

15
 (132) Give us a break, (i.e. me)
(Brown&Levinson, 1990:127)
2.2. Negative politeness strategies
However, in most English-speaking contexts, a face-saving act is more
commonly performed via a negative politeness strategy. The most typical form
used is a question containing a modal verb such as [10a.].
[10] a. Could you lend me a pen?
b. I'm sorry to bother you, but can I ask you for a pen or something?
c. I know you're busy, but might I ask you if—em—if you happen to have
an extra pen that I could, you know—eh—maybe borrow?
Using this strategy also results in forms that contain expressions of apology for
the imposition, of the type shown in [10b.]. More elaborate negative politeness
work can sometimes be heard in extended talk, often with hesitations, similar to
that shown in [10C.].
It is worth noting that negative politeness is typically expressed via questions,
even questions that seem to ask for permission to ask a question (for example,
'Might I ask ...?') as in [10c.]. On the surface, such questions present an
opportunity for the other to answer in the negative to the question without the
same refusal effect of responding with a negative to a direct, bald-on-record
imperative. (This distinction is an important motivation for the distinction
between direct and indirect speech acts, discussed already.)
Even more relevant for our concern with the pragmatics of language in use, the
availability of the bald on-record form, as well as off-record forms, means that
the use of a face-saving on-record form represents a significant choice. The
choice of a type of expression that is less direct, potentially less clear, generally
longer, and with a more complex structure means that the speaker is making a
greater effort, in terms of concern for face (i.e. politeness) than is needed simply
to get the basic message across efficiently. These observations are summarized
in Figure 7.1 overleaf.
The tendency to use negative politeness forms, emphasizing the hearer's right to
freedom, can be seen as a deference strategy (chiến lược tôn trọng). It can be

16
the typical strategy of a whole group or just an option used on a particular
occasion. A deference strategy is involved in what is called 'formal politeness'.
It is impersonal, as if nothing is shared, and can include expressions that refer to
neither the speaker nor the hearer (for example, 'Customers may not smoke
here, sir'). The language associated with a deference strategy emphasizes the
speaker's and the hearer's independence, marked via an absence of personal
claims, as in [12.], an alternative version of the party invitation in [11].
[12] There's going to be a party, if you can make it. It will be fun.
Similarly, Yule’s deference strategy correlates with strategies 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 of
the negative politeness strategies that Brown and Levinson introduced. These
general types of strategies are illustrated here via utterances that are actually
central to the speech event (for example, invitation). Face-saving behavior,
however, is often at work well before such utterances are produced, in the form
of pre-sequences.
3. Pre-sequences (tiền dẫn nhập)
Mey defined pre-sequences as follows: Pre-sequences mean certain utterances
come before the other utterances which are at the beginning of a conversation or
certain utterances belong to the opening sequence of a conversation (Mey,
1983, p.221, as cited in Pham, 2011: 11)
1. Pre-apology
Apology exists in civilized society. However, not all the apologies that we make
are always accepted for many reasons. Therefore, when making apologies, most
speakers, especially Vietnamese people and English people may often use
pre-sequences, particularly pre-apology as a polite strategy as well as a safe
strategy to survey if their apologies can be accepted.
Fran: Can I say something? (Pre-apology )
Steve: Sure. What do you mean? (Go ahead)
Fran: I’m sorry. (Apologize)[200]
(Mey, 1987, as cited in Pham, 2011: 12)
Hải: Thu, có Ba Má ở nhà không? (Ướm thử)
Thu: Kiếm tui hay kiếm Ba Má? (Tiến triển)
Hải: Tôi qua đây để xin lỗi Thu. (Xin lỗi) [240]

17
 (Nguyen, 2011: 12)
2. Pre-requests
As already suggested, the concept of face-saving may be helpful in
understanding how participants in an interaction inevitably understand more
than is said. The basic assumption, from the perspective of politeness, is that
face is typically at risk when the self needs to accomplish something involving
others. The greatest risk appears to be when the other is put in a difficult
position. One way of avoiding risk is to provide an opportunity for the other to
halt the potentially risky act. For example, rather than simply make a request,
speakers will often first produce what can be described as a pre-request. We
already noted one example in discussing speech events earlier, at the end of
Chapter 6. Another is presented as [13], along with one analysis of the structure
of this interaction.
[13] Her: Are you busy? (= pre-
request) Him: Not really. (= go ahead)
Her: Check over this memo. (= request)
Him: Okay. (= accept)
The advantage of the pre-request element is that it can be answered either with
a 'go-ahead' response, as in the ẽample below, or with a 'stop' response, as in
[14].
[14] Him: Are you
busy? Her: Oh, sorry.

(Nguyen, 2008:400)
The response in [14] allows the speaker to avoid making a request that cannot
be granted at the time. Understanding that it is a response to a pre-request also

18
allows us to interpret the expression 'sorry', not only as an apology about being
busy but also as an apology about being unable to respond to the anticipated
request. There is, however, a general pattern of pre-requests being treated as
requests and being responded to, as in [15], with the (unstated, hoped-for)
action being performed.
[15] Her: Do you have a spare
pen? Him: Here, (hands over a
pen)
This 'short-cut' process of going from pre-request to granting of request helps
explain the literal oddness of the common pattern in
[16]. Her: Do you mind if I use your phone?
Him: Yeah, sure.
As a literal response, 'Yeah' or 'Yeah, sure' would be the equivalent of 'I do
mind' and wouldn't count as allowing use of the phone. However, these forms
are normally interpreted as a positive response, not to the pre-request, but to the
unstated request.
3. Pre-invitations
Pre-sequences are also commonly used in making invitations. As illustrated in
[17], with a 'go ahead', and [18], with a 'stop', inviters tend to ask a
pre-invitation question and receivers tend to recognize their function.
[17] Him: What are you doing this
Friday? Her: Hmm, nothing so far.
Him: Come over for
dinner. Her: Oh, I'd like
that.
[18] Him: Are you doing anything
later? Her: Oh, yeah. Busy, busy, busy.
Him: Oh, okay.
4. Pre-announcements
Children often use pre-announcements to check if their parents are willing to
pay attention, as in the example [19].
[19] Child: Mom, guess what
happened? Mother: (Silence)

19
 Child: Mom, you know what?
Mother: Not right now, Jacy, I'm
busy.
In example [19], there are two pre-announcements, neither of which receives a
'go-ahead'. The initial pre-announcement is met with silence, which is generally
interpreted as a 'stop'. The child's second attempt must be based on an
interpretation that the parent did not hear the first attempt. The final response
has to be interpreted as a 'stop', but noticeably it is expressed, in face-saving
terms, as a postponement.
Throughout this discussion of politeness in interaction, we have been assuming
a well-known and easily recognizable structure for the interaction. That
structure must now be analyzed because it is our comfortable familiarity with its
regularity that allows a great deal to be communicated that is never said.
III. Deixis and Distance
1. Introduction
Deixis (Chỉ xuất) is a technical term (from Greek) for one of the most
basic things we do with utterances. It means 'pointing' via language. Any
linguistic form used to accomplish this 'pointing' is called a deictic expression
(biểu thức chỉ định) (Yule;1996).
Every language carries an implicit division of space around the current
speaker, a division of time relative to the act of speaking, and a shorthand
naming system for the participants involved in the talk. (Saeed;1997:182)
Mỗi ngôn ngữ đều mang một sự phân chia không gian ngầm xung quanh
người đang nói , sự phân chia thời gian liên quan đến hành động nói và hệ
thống đặt tên tốc ký cho những người tham gia cuộc nói chuyện.
=> Is the use of general words and phrases to refer to a specific person, place,
or time in context.
Là việc sử dụng các từ và cụm từ chung để chỉ một người, địa điểm hoặc thời
gian cụ thể trong ngữ cảnh.
Trong đời sống thực tế có khi chúng ta dùng tay để chỉ sự vật ta muốn lấy, muốn

20
nói tới, tức là chúng ta dùng động tác chỉ trỏ để thực hiện hành vi chiếu vật. Chỉ
xuất là phương thức chiếu vật bằng ngôn ngữ dựa trên hành động chỉ trỏ. Quy
tắc điều khiển chỉ trỏ là :
- Sự vật được chỉ trỏ phải ở gần (trong tầm với của người chỉ và trong tầm
nhìn của cả người chỉ lẫn người được chỉ) đối với một vị trí được lấy làm
mốc. Điểm lấy làm mốc để chỉ trỏ thường là cơ thể của người chỉ tính
theo hướng nhìn thẳng của người này. Quy tắc này sẽ giải thích sự
chiếu.vật bằng chỉ xuất trong ngôn ngữ.
(Đỗ Hữu Châu;2007)
e.g.: they, there, tomorrow….
When you notice a strange object and ask;
'What's/ that?',
You are using a deictic expression ('that') to indicate something in the immediate
context.
Deictic expressions are also sometimes called indexicals (chỉ mục).
- It can be used to indicate people via person deixis ('me', 'you'), location
via spatial deixis ('here', 'there'), or time via temporal deixis ('now',
'then').
=> All these expressions depend, for their interpretation, on the speaker
and hearer sharing the same context.
E.g: [I’ll put this here]
Deixis is clearly a form of referring that is tied to the speaker's context, with the
most basic distinction between deictic expressions being 'near speaker' versus
'away from speaker'.
In English, the 'near speaker', or proximal terms, are 'this', 'here', 'now'. The
'away from speaker', or distal terms, are 'that', 'there', 'then'.
Proximal terms are typically interpreted in terms of the speaker's location, or
the deictic center, so that 'now' is generally understood as referring to some
point or

21
period in time that has the time of the speaker's utterance at its center.
Distal terms can simply indicate 'away from speaker', but, in some languages,
can be used to distinguish between 'near addressee' and 'away from both speaker
and addressee'.
2. Person deixis (Phạm trù/chỉ xuất nhân xưng/ngôi)
Person deixis is a deictic reference to the participant role of a referent,
such as the speaker, the addressee, and referents which are neither the speaker
nor the addressee.
“Person deixis concerns the encoding of the role of participants in the
speech event in which the utterance in question is delivered” (Levinson 1983,
62). The roles that individuals play in the speech event are those of the speaker
(first person pronouns), the addressee (second person pronouns), and bystanders
(third person pronouns).
Chỉ xuất nhân xưng/về ngôi là những dấu hiệu ngôn ngữ để chỉ các vai
tham gia vào một sự kiện lời nói gồm có ngôi thứ nhất - vai người nói, ngôi thứ
hai - vai người nghe và ngôi thứ ba - không phải người nói mà cũng chẳng phải
người nghe.
Person deixis operates on a basic three-part division, exemplified by the
pronouns for first person, second person, and third person.
a, First person (Chỉ xuất ngôi thứ nhất): deictic reference that refers to the
speaker, or both the speaker and referents grouped with the speaker, which is
expressed in singular pronouns (I, me, myself, my, mine) and plural pronouns
(we, us, ourselves, our, ours).
Chỉ xuất ngôi thứ nhất - hay chỉ xuất vai người nói, có thể là bản thân
người nói được biểu thị qua các đại từ nhân xưng ngôi thứ nhất số ít (I, me,
myself,...) hoặc là người nói và một hoặc một số đối tượng hiện hữu hoặc không
hiện hữu tại sự kiện lời nói được biểu thị qua các đại từ nhân xưng ngôi thứ
nhất số nhiều (we, us, ourselves,...)
Yule (1996: 11-12) mentions a potential ambiguity in English in some
uses of “we” which allows two different interpretations. There is an exclusive
we (speaker plus other(s), excluding addressee) and an inclusive we (speaker
and addressee included).”
Yule đề cập đến sự một sự mơ hồ trong tiếng Anh trong một số cách sử
dụng “we”, điều này cho phép từ we có hai cách hiểu khác nhau. Theo Yule,
we

22
có thể ngoại trừ người nghe (exclusive) hoặc bao gộp cả người nghe (inclusive)
=> There are 2 types of first-person deixis:
- Exclusive person deixis (chỉ xuất nhân xưng ngoại trừ): deixis that refers
to a group where the addressee(s) are not included with the speaker.
- Inclusive person deixis (chỉ xuất nhân xưng bao hàm): deixis that refers
to a group where both the speaker and addressee(s) are included.
Eg: WHO began when our Constitution came into force on 7 April 1948 – a
date we now celebrate every year as World Health Day. We are now more than
7000 people from more than 150 countries working in 150 country offices.
World Health Organization (WHO)
We distinguish between two values of we in the above-mentioned
quotations: the inclusive-of-speaker and inclusive-of-addressee we (a date we
now celebrate every year as World Health Day) – we refers to all the people in
the world; and the inclusive-of-speaker and exclusive-of-addressee we (We are
now more than 7000 people) – we refers to the people who are employed by
WHO.
b, Second-person: deictic reference to a person or persons identified as
addressee (you, yourself, yourselves, your, yours)
Sometimes, the personal pronoun you is not used for deictic purpose, but
to convey a general meaning.
Đôi khi, đại từ nhân xưng you không được dùng để chỉ xuất mà mang
nghĩa chung chung.
Ex: You are now entering a gum-free zone.
This is a common slogan on the streets of Singapore to remind people not
to spit gum indiscriminately to keep the environment clean. Therefore, the
pronoun you does not target a specific addressee.
Regarding the addressee, Bell (1984: 158-161) coined the phrase
audience design, defined as the extent to which the speakers accommodate to
their addressees, making a distinction between addressees (ratified participants
directly addressed), auditors (ratified participants, not directly addressed),
overhearers (not ratified participants, not directly addressed) and
eavesdroppers (the speaker is not aware of the presence of these participants).
Về phạm trù người nghe, ông Bell đặt ra thuật ngữ Audience design (kiểu
người nghe), được định nghĩa là mức độ mà người nói “thích ứng” với người

23
nghe của họ, trong đó phân biệt giữa người nghe chính (được người nói công
nhận và trực tiếp tham gia vào sự kiện lời nói), người nghe phụ (được người nói
công nhận nhưng không trực tiếp tham gia vào sự kiện lời nói), người nghe lỏm
(không được người nói công nhận và không trực tiếp tham gia vào sự kiện lời
nói) và người nghe lén (Người nói không nhận thấy sự hiện diện của những
người này.
c, Third person : deictic reference to a referent(s) not identified as the speaker
or addressee ('he', 'she', it, they, them, their)
“In deictic terms, third person is not a direct participant in basic (I-you)
interaction and, being an outsider, is necessarily more distant.” (Yule 1996, 11)
=> Third person is quite unlike first or second person, in that it does not
correspond to any specific participant-role in the speech event
Chỉ xuất ngôi thứ ba không chỉ đến người nói hay người hay người nghe,
mà là đối tượng nào đó liên quan đến sự kiện lời nói, biểu thị qua các đại từ số
ít (he, she, it,...) và ngôi thứ ba số nhiều (they, them, their)
The pronouns of the third person also give information about the gender
of the referent(s). In informal language, the pronoun he is used to refer to
animals whose gender is unidentified. For pets and other species that are
identified as female, the pronoun she will be used.
Ex: “The bird went higher in the air and circled again, his wings
motionless. Then he dove suddenly and the old man saw flying fish spurt out of
the water and sail desperately over the surface” (Hemingway 1994, 8)
The bird’s gender is unidentified, so the author use he to refer to it.
Third person pronouns are consequently distal forms in terms of person
deixis. Using a third person form, where a second person form would be
possible, is one way of communicating distance (and non-familiarity). This can
be done for an ironic or humorous purpose (Yule 1996, 11). For example, one
person, who is very busy in the kitchen, may address another, who’s being very
lazy like this:
Ex: Would his highness like some coffee?
In many languages, these deictic categories of speaker, addressee, and
other(s) are elaborated with markers of relative social status (for example,
addressee with higher status versus addressee with lower status).
Expressions that indicate higher status are described as honorifics (kính

24
ngữ). In the English language, an honorific is a form of address conveying
esteem, courtesy or respect. These can be titles prefixing a person's name, e.g.:
Mr, Mrs, Miss, Ms, Sir, Lady, or Lord (In Vietnamese we have: Ông, Bà, Cô,
Cậu, Ngài), or other titles or positions that can appear as a form of address
without the person's name, as in Mr President, General, Captain, Father, Doctor,
or Earl (Similarly in Vietnamese we have: Thủ trưởng, chủ tịch, giáo sư, bác sĩ,
thầy giáo,...)
Many forms of honorifics are for members of the nobility, military, or
royalty, these are found mainly in countries that are monarchies, these include:
Your Majesty, Your Royal Highness, Your Highness,...
The discussion of the circumstances that lead to the choice of one of
these forms rather than another is sometimes described as social deixis.
2. Spatial deixis
The concept of distance already mentioned is clearly relevant to spatial
deixis, where the relative location of people and things is being indicated.
Contemporary English makes use of only two adverbs, 'here' and 'there'.
E.g: I’m glad that we moved here, I was melting over there (Yule;2010)
-> “here” and “there” designate specific locations depending on their
closeness or distance from the speaker’s current whereabouts. This is based on
the context of the speaker and addressee.
->Spatial deixis is concerned with the idea of distance (Yule;2010) ->
describes how close and far away objects and people are from one another.
=> The placement of some gaps between the speaker and
listener/addressee is indicated by spatial deixis
In considering spatial deixis, however, it is important to remember that location
from the speaker's perspective can be fixed mentally as well as physically.
- Speakers temporarily away from their home location will often continue
to use 'here' to mean the (physically distant) home location as if they
were still in that location.
- Speakers also seem to be able to project themselves into other locations
prior to actually being in those locations, as when they say 'I'll come later'

25
 (= movement to addressee's location).
This is sometimes described as deictic projection and we make more use of its
possibilities as more technology allows us to manipulate location. If 'here'
means the place of the speaker's utterance (and 'now' means the time of the
speaker's utterance), then an utterance such as [5] should be nonsense.
[5] I am not here now.
Deictic projection: speaker being able to project themselves into other
locations, time, or shift person reference => using direct speech to represent the
person, location, and feelings of someone else.
It may be that the truly pragmatic basis of spatial deixis is actually
psychological distance.
- Physically close objects will tend to be treated by the speaker as
psychologically close.
- Something that is physically distant will generally be treated
as psycho-logically distant (for example, 'that man over
there').
=> Similar psychological processes seem to be at work in our distinctions
between proximal and distal expressions used to mark temporal deixis.
3. Temporal deixis
Temporal deixis refers to an event of utterance that takes place any time
relative to the speaking time and is, therefore, represented by tenses, time (now,
then, today, yesterday,...) and sometimes by spatial prepositions such as in the
evening, at midnight, on time. The location of an event referred to and
represented by time and tense constitutes the deictic centre in the utterance of a
speaker.
The psychological basis of temporal deixis seems to be similar to that of
spatial deixis. We can treat temporal events as objects that move toward us (into
view) or away from us (out of view).

26
 Example:
- Events coming towards speaker from the future: the coming week, the
approaching year
- Events moving away from speaker to the past: the previous month, the
past week.
We also treat the near and immediate future as being close to the
utterance time by using the proximal deictic “this” alone as in: this (coming
weekend) or this evening (said earlier in the day).
Previously, we have already noted the use of the proximal form 'now' as
indicating both the time coinciding with the speaker's utterance and the time of
the speaker's voice being heard (the hearer's 'now').
In contrast to 'now', the distal expression 'then' applies to both past and
future time relative to the speaker's present time.
[7] a. November 22nd, 1963? I was in Scotland then.
b. Dinner at 8:30 on Saturday? Okay, I'll see you then.
One basic type of temporal deixis in English is in the choice of verb
tense, which has only 2 basic forms: the present and the past (the proximal and
the distal).
[10] a. I live here now. (proximal) -> near speaker
b. I lived there then. (distal) -> far from speaker
Perhaps less obviously, something that is treated as extremely unlikely
(or impossible) from the speaker's current situation is also marked via the distal
(past tense) form.
[11] a. I could swim (when I was a child).
b. I could be in Hawaii (if I had a lot of money).
The past tense is always used in English in those //-clauses that mark
events presented by the speaker as not being close to present reality
[12] If I had a yacht,...

27
 The idea expressed in [12] is to be treated as having happened in the past
time. It is presented as deictically distant from the speaker's current situation.
=> In temporal deixis, the remote or distal form can be used to
communicate not only distance from current time but also distance from
current reality or facts.
5. Deixis and Grammar
The basic distinctions presented so far for person, spatial, and temporal
deixis can all be seen in the structural distinctions between direct and indirect
(or reported) speech.
[13] a. Are you planning to be here this evening?
b. I asked her if she was planning to be there that evening.
The deictic expressions for person ('you'), place ('here'), and time ('this
evening') can all be interpreted within the same context as the speaker who
utters [13a.]. When the context shifts to one that reports the previous utterance,
as in [13 b.], then the previous utterance is marked deictically as relative to the
circumstances of asking. The proximal forms presented in [13a.] have shifted to
the corresponding distal forms in [13b.] The proximal deictic form of a direct
speech gives the sense of being in the same context as the utterance, while the
distal deictic forms of an indirect speech give the sense of being remote as of
the original event.

28
Table of Content:
1. Reference: 3
1.1 Direct and indirect references 3
1.2. Reference and indexical expression (Biểu thức chỉ mục) 4
2. Inference 5
3. Referential and attributive uses 5
4. Names and referents 6
5. The role of co-text 10
6. Anaphoric reference 12
6.1 Anaphoric devices 13
6.1.1. Pronouns 13
6.1.2. Determiners 13
6.1.3. Lexical relationship 14
6.1.4. Substitution 14
6.1.5. Apposition 14
6. 2. Cataphora and zero anaphora (ellipsis) 15
1. Presupposition 18
2. Types of presupposition 19
2.1 Existential Presuppositions (Tiền giả định tồn tại): 19
2.2 Factive presupposition (Tiền giả định hiện thực): 20
2.3 Lexical Presupposition (Tiền giả định ngôn ngữ) : 20
2.4 Structural Presuppositions (Tiền giả định cấu trúc): 21
2.5 Non – factive presuppositions (Tiền giả định phi hiện thực): 21
2.6 Counterfactual presuppositions (Tiền giả định trái hiện thực) 22
3. Defeasibility and the projection problem (Tính khử bỏ và vấn đề chiếu) 22
3.1. Defeasibility 22
3.2. Projection Problem 25
4. Pragmatic theories of presupposition 28
4.1. Karttunen & Peters (1975, 1979) Theory 29
4.2. Gazdar (19798, 1979b) Theory: 30
5. Entailments (kéo theo) 31
5.1. Definition: 31
5.2. Ordered Entailments: 31
5.3. Semantic types of Entailment: 32
5.4. Entailment and Presupposition 33

2
A, Reference and inference (Tham chiếu và suy diễn)
In our previous discussion on deixis, we assumed that referring to people
and objects with words was straightforward. While it's something we all
do naturally, explaining precisely how we manage it is quite complex.
To clarify what they actually mean, speakers use references. It’s
important to note that references are made by speakers, not sentences.
Reference refers to "an act in which a speaker, or writer, uses linguistic
forms to enable a listener, or reader, to identify something”(Yule 1996:
17). This involves the use of referring expressions such as proper nouns
(danh từ riêng) (e.g., "Shakespeare"), definite noun phrases (cụm danh từ
xác định) (e.g., "the author"), indefinite noun phrases (cụm danh từ
không xác định) (e.g., "a man"), and pronouns (đại từ) (e.g., "he").
Successful reference depends on the speaker's intention to identify
something and the listener's ability to recognize that intention .
Inreference, on the other hand, involves the process of deriving meaning
that goes beyond the literal interpretation of the words used. It requires
the listener to make connections, draw conclusions, and fill in gaps based
on contextual information, shared knowledge, and pragmatic principles.
Eg: [i] Mister Aftershave is late today. (Yule 1996: 18)
“The example in [i] may serve to illustrate that reference is not based on
an objectively correct (versus incorrect) naming, but on some locally
successful (versus unsuccessful) choice of expression.”(Yule, 1996: 18)
1. Reference:
1.1 Direct and indirect references

3
 “We use language to refer to persons and things, directly or
indirectly. In the case of direct reference, we have names
available that will lead us to persons and things: we know who
'John' is, we understand the meaning of 'tax return', and so on. But
when reference is made indirectly, as in the case of the person
talking through my hotel door, we need to have recourse to other
strategies, linguistic as well as non-linguistic, in order to establish
the correct reference.” (Mey 2001: 52)
To put it simply, direct reference is a linguistic phenomenon where
a word or phrase refers directly to a specific individual, object, or
concept without the need for additional context or interpretation. In
other words, the meaning of the word or phrase is tied directly to
the entity it represents. This contrasts with indirect reference,
where the meaning is dependent on context or inference. Direct
reference is often associated with proper nouns, definite
descriptions, and demonstratives, as they typically point to specific
entities in the world without ambiguity.
1.2. Reference and indexical expression (Biểu thức chỉ mục)
“Indexical expressions are a particular kind of referential expression which, in
addition to the semantics of their 'naming', their sense, include a reference to the
particular context in which that sense is put to work.”(Mey 2001: 54)
“An indexical is, roughly speaking, a linguistic expression whose reference can
shift from context to context. For example, the indexical ‘you’ may refer to one
person in one context and to another person in another context. Other
paradigmatic examples of indexicals are ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘today’, ‘yesterday’, ‘he’,
‘she’, and ‘that’.” (Braun, David, 2017)
“Deictic expressions are also sometimes called indexicals.” (Yule, 1996: 9)
The function of indexical is presented in Lecture 4. We will skip over this and
move on to Inference.

4
 2. Inference
As mentioned before, Inference is “The listener's use of additional
knowledge to make sense of what is not explicit in an utterance.” (Yule
1996: 17).
To fully and thoroughly understand Inference, we must dive into
Implication, Presupposition, Speech Acts, Conversation Analysis,
Politeness and Social Dynamics. In this lecture, we can only give you the
definition of this term, further analysis will be presented in the following
lectures.
3. Referential and attributive uses
Referential and attributive uses are two ways in which definite
descriptions can be employed in language.
Referential Use: When a speaker uses a definite description referentially,
they use the description to help the listener identify the specific person
or thing being talked about. The focus is on enabling the audience to
pick out the intended referent and make a statement about that particular
entity. In this case, the definite description serves as a tool for reference,
directing attention to a specific individual or object. Other linguistic
devices, such as alternative descriptions or names, could also serve the
same purpose of identifying the referent. The referential use is about
pointing out a particular entity for discussion or consideration.
[2] a. There's a man waiting for you. (Yule. 18)
Attributive Use: In contrast, the attributive use of descriptions involves
the speaker making a statement about any entity that fits the description
provided. Here, the emphasis is on the attribute or characteristic
associated with the description rather than on uniquely identifying a
specific referent. The speaker uses the definite description attributively to
assert something about any entity that possesses the described attribute.
In this context, the focus is on the attribute itself rather than on singling
out a particular individual or object. The attributive use is more about
making a general statement based on a shared characteristic.

5
[2] b. He wants to marry a woman with lots of money.
Another example to distinguish this two uses is
[3] There was no sign of the killer.
If the reporter of this news did not know whether the killer exist or not,
this would be an attributive use (i.e. 'whoever did the killing').
If a particular individual had been identified as having done the killing
and had been chased into a building, but escaped, then uttering the
sentence would be a referential use, based on the speaker's knowledge
that a referent does exist.
4. Names and referents
Names: Names are specific linguistic expressions used to identify and
refer to individuals, entities, or objects. They can be proper nouns (e.g.,
"Shakespeare") or common nouns used as specific labels (e.g., "the Eiffel
Tower"). Names serve as convenient linguistic tools for pinpointing and
referring to particular referents in communication. Names can be
personal names, place names, object names, or any other label that
uniquely identifies a specific entity.
Referents: Referents are the entities or objects in the world to which
names or other referring expressions refer. They are the real-world
entities that names point to or denote. When a speaker uses a name or a
referring expression, they intend for the listener to identify and
understand the specific referent being referred to. Referents can be
people, places, things, concepts, or any entity that can be identified and
distinguished from others.
Speakers use names as linguistic tools to refer to specific referents, while
listeners rely on their understanding and knowledge of the world to
identify and interpret these referents based on the names used. This
process of naming and reference allows for effective communication and
the sharing of information and ideas among individuals.

6
Definition:
“The version of reference being presented here is one in which there is a
basic “intention-to-identify” and a “recognition-of-intention”
collaboration at work" ". (Yule)
Common belief:
There is a convention that makes us regularly identify certain things
when we talk about them. Because we often see this rule working well in
our daily lives, we might mistakenly believe that words or names can
only point to very particular things. This could make us think that a
name like 'Shakespeare' can only refer to one specific person, and a
phrase like 'the cheese sandwich' can only be about one particular thing.
Reasons:
As Yule (1996:20) stated “The version of reference (names and
referents) being presented here is one in which there is a basic
“intention-to-identify” and a “recognition-of-intention” collaboration at
work. This process needs not only work between one speaker and one
listener; it appears to work, in terms of convention, between all members
of a community who share a common language and culture. That is there
is a convention that certain referring expressions will be used to identify
certain entities on a regular basis. It is our daily experience of the
successful operation of this convention that may cause us to assume
that referring expressions can only designate very specific entities”
In another words:
● Communication involves a collaboration between speakers
intending to identify something and listeners recognizing
this intention.
● This collaboration isn't limited to one speaker and one listener
but extends to all members of a community sharing a common
language and culture.
● There's a convention where specific referring expressions
are regularly used to identify certain entities.

7
 ● Our daily experience of this convention working successfully
may lead us to assume that referring expressions can only
designate very specific entities.
However, this belief is mistaken.
A truly pragmatic view of reference allows us to see how we can
identify a person using the phrase "the cheese sandwich" and a thing
using the name "Shakespeare."
For example:
[4] a: Can I borrow your
Shakespeare? b: Yeah, it’s over
there on the table.
➔ Given the context just created, the intended referent and the
inferred referent (tiền tham chiếu) would not be a person, but
probably a book (notice the pronoun “it').
In a restaurant, one waiter brings out an order of food for another waiter
and asks him [5a.] and hears [5b.] in reply.
[5] a: Where's the cheese sandwich
sitting? b: He's over there by the
window.
➔ Given the context, the referent being identified is not a thing, but
a person (notice the pronoun 'he').
The examples in [4] and [5] may allow us to see more clearly how
reference actually works.
The Shakespeare example in [4] suggests that there is a conventional
(and potentially culture-specific) set of entities that can be identified by
the use of a writer's name. Let us call them 'things the writer produced'.
This would allow us to make sense of the sentences in [6].
[6] a. Shakespeare takes up the whole bottom shelf.
-> Shakespeare’s books
b. We're going to see Shakespeare in London.

8
 -> Shakespeare’s artworks
c. I hated Shakespeare at school.
Obviously, this convention does not only apply to writers, but also to
artists [7a.], composers [7b.], musicians [7c.], and many other producers
of objects:
[17] a. Picasso's on the far wall.
b. The new Mozart is better value than the Bach.
c. My Rolling Stones is missing.
There appears to be a pragmatic connection between proper names and
objects that will be conventionally associated, within a socio-culturally
defined community, with those names. Using a proper name referentially
to identify any such object invites the listener to make the expected
interence (for example, from name of writer to book by writer) and
thereby show himself or herself to be a member of the same community
as the speaker. In such cases, it is rather obvious that more is being
communicated than is said.
The nature of reference interpretation just described is also what allows
readers to make sense of newspaper headlines using names of countries,
as exemplified in [8a.] where the referent is to be understood as a
soccer team, not as a government, and in [8b.] where it is to be
understood as a government, not as a soccer team.
[8] a. Brazil wins World Cup.
b. Japan wins first round of trade talks.
5. The role of co-text
Our ability to identify intended referents depends on more than our
understanding of the referring expression (biểu thức sở chỉ) and it is
aided by co – text (Văn cảnh).
Co-text refers to the linguistic material that surrounds a specific word or
phrase in a text or discourse. Co-text is just a linguistic part of the
environment in which a referring expression is used. [Yule, 1996: 21]

9
“Văn cảnh là những hình thức ngôn ngữ cùng xuất hiện trên văn bản có
hiện tượng ngôn ngữ dc khảo sát. Nếu đối tượng khảo sát là một từ thì
văn cảnh là những từ bao quanh hay đi kèm tạo cho nó tính xác định về
nghĩa; nếu là câu thì là những câu đặt phía trước hoặc sau nó” [Giáp,
2008, 371]
E.g: Brazil wins World Cup [Yule, 1996: 21]
'Brazil' was a referring expression and 'wins World Cup' was part of
the co-text.
-> The co-text clearly limits the range of possible interpretations we
might have for a word like 'Brazil'. [Yule, 1996: 21]
It is consequently misleading to think of reference (sự quy chiếu) being
understood solely in terms of our ability to identify referents (đối tượng
quy chiếu) via the referring expression. The referring expression actually
provides a range of reference (phạm vi quy chiếu), that is, a number of
possible referents. [Yule, 1996: 21]
E.g: 9a. The cheese sandwich is made with white
bread, 9b. The cheese sandwich left without
paying.
While the phrase 'the cheese sandwich' stays the same, the
different co-texts in [9a] and [9b] lead to a different type of
interpretation.
The physical environment, or context (Ngôn cảnh), is more easily
recognized as having a powerful impact on how referring expressions are
to be interpreted. [Yule, 1996: 21]
The context of situation or the physical context of a restaurant, and
perhaps even the speech conventions (Quy ước ngôn ngữ) of those who
work there, may be crucial to the interpretation of [9b]. It may crucially
depend on familiarity with the local socio-cultural conventions (Quy ước
văn hóa xã hội) as the basis for inference (nền tảng suy luận) (For
example, if a person is in a hospital with an illness, then he or she can be
identified by nurses via the name of the illness). These conventions may
differ substantially from one social group to another and from one
language to another. [Yule, 1996: 22]

10
 Reference (tham chiếu), then, is not simply a relationship between
the meaning of a word or phrase and an object or person in the world. It
is a social act, in which the speaker assumes that the word or phrase
chosen to identify an object or person will be interpreted as the speaker
intended. [Yule, 1996: 22]
6. Anaphoric reference
In most of our talk and writing, we have to keep track of who or what we
are talking about for more than one sentence at a time. After the initial
introduction of some entity, speakers will use various expressions to
maintain reference, for example:
[11] In the film, a man and a woman were trying to wash a cat. The
man was holding the cat while the woman poured water on it. He said
something to her and they started laughing.
In English, initial reference, or introductory mention, is often
indefinite (a man, a woman, a cat). In [11] the definite noun phrases
(the man, the woman, the cat) and the pronouns (it, he, her, they) are
examples of subsequent reference to already introduced referents,
generally known as anaphoric reference, or anaphora.
=> In technical terms, the second or subsequent expression is the
anaphor and the initial expression is the antecedent.
In many cases, anaphoric reference is assumed to be a process of
continuing to identify exactly the same entity as denoted by the
antecedent. But in cases where some change or effect is described, the
anaphoric reference must be interpreted differently, like in example [12]
[12] Peel and slice six potatoes. Put them in cold salted water.

11
In this case, the initial referring expression ‘six potatoes’ identifies
something different from the anaphoric pronoun ‘them’, which must be
interpreted as ‘the six peeled and sliced potatoes’

6.1 Anaphoric devices

In order to identify when anaphoric expressions are used, we must have a
way to categorize anaphoric devices. This is a relatively new issue for
linguists, but according to the British linguist Richard Hudson in
“Coherence: Anaphora and Reference”, there are 5 anaphoric devices:
6.1.1. Pronouns
This is the most common way to create a reference sequence about an
entity even within the same sentence or the previous sentence, using
relative pronouns or possessive adjectives (like she-her,
they-them-their,..)
For example:
Once upon a time there was an old woman who had a lazy son. She was
forever scolding him, but it made no difference - he spent all his time
lying in the sunshine, ignoring her. His main job was to look after her
goats, but he preferred to sleep in the sun.
6.1.2. Determiners
Determiners such as this, that, these, those also have similar anaphoric
functions.
For example:
People are beginning to realize the true scale of the problem facing them.
Some of these are Germany’s alone, though with powerful
European side-effects.
Deixis such as here and there also can be used as an anaphoric reference.
For example:
My father expects to land at Portsmouth within the fortnight. It would
mean so much to me to be there on the dock, waiting for him.

12
6.1.3. Lexical relationship
It is a way of selecting a word that has a relationship with other words
introduced previously in terms of semantics. The easiest way for
anaphora is by repeating a word unit.
For example:
Algy met a bear. The bear was bulgy.
But the repetition can become boring when the sequence is extended. So
an alternative is to replace the noun/noun phrase by a synonym.
For example:
Once upon a time an old king was very ill. The old man sent for his
councillors. When they came before him, their ruler told them he wanted
to divide his kingdom.
6.1.4. Substitution
In English, there are a number of words other than pronouns which can
also substitute other words, propositions or phrases. The most obvious
example can be seen in the yes/no question.
For example:
A: Do you love me?
B: Yes. (= I love you)
Or the use of proforms can also achieve similar effect by substituting for
given information.
For example:
Susan won a prize last year and will do so again this year. (will do so =
will win a prize)
6.1.5. Apposition
Apposition resembles coordination in linking units having grammatical
affinity, therefore can also have anaphoric effect.
For example:
A neighbor, Fred Brick, is on the telephone.

13
 (“a neighbor” and Fred Brick both refer to a same person)
6. 2. Cataphora and zero anaphora (ellipsis)
There is also a reversal of the antecedent-anaphor pattern sometimes
found at the beginning of stories, as in example [13]
[13] I turned the corner and almost stepped on it. There was a large
snake in the middle of the path.
In this case, the pronoun ‘it’ is used first and it is difficult to interpret
until the full noun phrase is presented in the next line. This pattern is
technically known as cataphora, and is much less common than
anaphora.
There is a range of expressions which are used for anaphoric reference in
English. The most typical forms are pronouns as ‘it’ in [14a], but the
definite noun phrases are also used, for example, ‘the slices’ in [14b]
[14] a. Peel an onion and slice it.
b. Drop the slices into hot oil.
c. Cook for three minutes.
In [14c], we can see that the interpretation requires us to identify an
entity, as in ‘Cook (?) for three minutes’ and no linguistic expression is
present; it is called zero anaphora, or ellipsis.
-Ellipsis is the absence of a word or words from a structural slot. (yule
1996: 129)
-Ellipsis is most commonly used to avoid repetition. For example, we can
avoid repetition of sing in:
She might sing, but I don’t think she will (sing).
or also by the use of a pro-form:
She might sing, but I don’t think she will do so.

14
another important reason for ellipsis is that by omitting shared items
attention is focused on new material:
A: Have you spoken to him?
B: (I have) Not yet (spoken to him)
- The use of zero anaphora as a means of maintaining reference clearly
creates an expectation that the listener will be able to infer who or what
the speaker intends to identify. It is also another obvious case of more
being communicated than said.
The listener is also expected to make more specific types of inference
when the anaphoric expressions don’t seem to be linguistically connected
to their antecedents. For example
[15] a. I just rented a house. The kitchen is really big.
b. We had Chardonnay with dinner. The wine was the best part.
c. The bus came on time, but he didn’t stop.
Making sense of [15a] requires an inference (if x is a house, then x has a
kitchen) to make the anaphoric connection.
Such inferences depend on assumed knowledge which, as in [15b], may
be much more specific (Chardonnay is a kind of wine).
In addition, the inference can be considered so automatic for some
speakers (a bus has a driver), that they can go straight to a pronoun for
anaphoric reference, as in [15c]. In this example, note that the antecedent
(the bus) and the anaphor (he) are not in grammatical agreement
(normally a bus would be ‘it’)
=> Successful reference does not depend on some strictly literal, or
grammatically ‘correct’, relationship between the properties of the
referent and the referring expression chosen.
=> The key to making sense of reference is that pragmatic process
whereby speakers select linguistic expressions with the intention of

15
 identifying certain entities and with the assumption that listeners will
collaborate and interpret those expressions as the speaker intended.
Successful reference means that an intention was recognized, via
inference, indicating a kind of shared knowledge and hence social
connection. The assumption of shared knowledge is also crucially
involved in the study of presupposition.
B, Presupposition and entailment (Tiền giả định và
kéo theo)

In the preceding discussion of reference, there was an appeal to the idea that
speakers assume certain information is already known by their listeners.
Because it is treated as known, such information will generally not be stated
and consequently will count as part of what is communicated but not said. The
technical terms presupposition and entailment are used to describe two different
aspects of this kind of information.
A presupposition is something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to
making an utterance. Speakers, not sentences, have presuppositions.
An entailment is something that logically follows from what is asserted in the
utterance. Sentences, not speakers, have entailments.
We can identify some of the potentially assumed information that would be
associated with the utterance of [1]
[1] Mary’s brother bought three horses.
In producing the utterance in [1], the speaker will normally be expected to have
the presuppositions that a person called Mary existed and that she has a brother.
The speaker may also hold the more specific presuppositions that Mary has
only one brother and that he has a lot of money. All of these presuppositions are
the speaker’s and all of them can be wrong, in fact.

16
The sentence in [1] will be treated as having the entailments that Mary’s brother
bought something, bought three animals, bought two horses, bought one horse,
and many other similar logical consequences. These entailments follow from
the sentence, regardless of whether the speaker’s beliefs are right or wrong, in
fact.
=> They are communicated without being said.
Because of its logical nature, however, entailment is not generally discussed as
much in contemporary pragmatics as the more speaker-dependent notion of
presupposition.
1. Presupposition
In many discussions of the concept, presupposition is treated as a relationship
between two propositions.
For example,
[2] a. Mary’s dog is cute. (p)
b. Mary has a dog. (q)
If we say that sentence in [2a] contains the proposition p and the sentence in
[2b] contains the proposition q, then, using the symbol >> to mean
“presupposes”, we can represent the relationship as p >> q.
Constancy under negation
Interestingly, when we produce the opposite of the sentence in [2a] by
negating it (NOT p), as in [3a], we find that the relationship of presupposition
doesn’t change. That is, the same proposition q, repeated as [3b], continues to
be presupposed by NOT p, as shown in [3c]
[3] a. Mary’s dog isn’t cute. (NOT p)
b. Mary has a dog. (q)
c. NOT p » q.
This property of presupposition is generally described as constancy under
negation. Basically, it means that the presupposition of a statement will remain
constant even when the statement is negated.

17
As a further example, consider a situation in which you disagree (via a negative,
as in [4b]) with someone who has already made the statement in [4a]
[4] a. Everyone knows that John is gay. (p)
b. Everyone doesn’t know that John is gay. (NOT p)
c. John is gay. (q)
d. p >> q & NOT p >> q.
Although both speakers disagree about the validity of p (as in [4a]), they both
assume the truth of q, in making their statements. The proposition q, as shown
in [4d], is presupposed by both p and NOT p, remaining constant under
negation.
2. Types of presupposition

In the analysis of how speakers' assumptions are typically expressed,

presupposition has been associated with the use of a large number of words,
phrases, and structures. We shall consider these linguistic forms here as
indicators of potential presuppositions (Những giả định có thể có), which
can only become actual presuppositions in contexts with speakers.

(Yule, 1996: 27)

2.1 Existential Presuppositions (Tiền giả định tồn tại):

The possessive construction in English is associated with a

presupposition of existence. The existential presupposition is not only assumed
to be present in possessive constructions (for example, “your car” » “you have a
car”), but more generally in any definite noun phrase.

Example: By using any of the expressions in [5], the speaker is assumed

to be committed to the existence of the entities named.

[5] the King of Sweden, the cat, the girl next door, the Counting

Crows (Yule, 1996: 27)

18
2.2 Factive presupposition (Tiền giả định hiện thực):
The presupposed information following a factive verb (từ hiện thực) like
'know' can be treated as a fact and is described as a factive presupposition. A
number of other verbs, such as 'realize' in [6a.] and 'regret' in [6b.], as well as
phrases involving 'be' with 'aware' [6c], 'odd' [6d.], and 'glad' [6e.] have factive
presuppositions.
(Yule, 1996: 28)

[6] a. She didn't realize he was ill. (» He was ill)

b. We regret telling him. (» We told him)

c. I wasn't aware that she was married. (» She was married)

d. It isn't odd that he left early. (» He left early)

e. I'm glad that it's over. (» It's

over) (Yule, 1996: 28)

2.3 Lexical Presupposition (Tiền giả định ngôn ngữ) :

In lexical presupposition, the use of one form with its asserted meaning
is conventionally interpreted with the presupposition that another (non-
asserted) meaning is understood.

Each time you say that someone 'managed' to do something, the asserted
meaning (nghĩa trên mặt chữ) is that the person succeeded in some way. When
you say that someone 'didn't manage', the asserted meaning is that the person
did not succeed. In both cases, however, there is a presupposition (non-asserted)
that the person 'tried' to do that something. 'Managed' is conventionally
interpreted as asserting 'succeeded' and presupposing 'tried’.

(Yule, 1996: 28)

[7] a. He stopped smoking. (» He used to smoke)

b. They started complaining. (» They weren't complaining before)
c. You're late again. (» You were late before)
-> In the case of lexical presupposition, the speaker's use of a particular
expression is taken to presuppose another (unstated) concept

19
 (Yule, 1996: 28)

2.4 Structural Presuppositions (Tiền giả định cấu trúc):

Certain sentence structures have been analyzed as conventionally and

regularly presupposing that part of the structure is already assumed to be true.
Speakers can use such structures to treat information as presupposed (i.e.
assumed to be true) and hence to be accepted as true by the listener.

[8] a. When did he leave? (» He left)

b. Where did you buy the bike? (» You bought the bike)

The type of presupposition illustrated in [8] can lead listeners to believe

that the information presented is necessarily true, rather than just the
presupposition of the person asking the question.

The Wh-question construction in English, as shown in [8a.] and [8b.], is

conventionally interpreted with the presupposition that the information after
the wh- is already known to be the case

(Yule, 1996: 29)

2.5 Non – factive presuppositions (Tiền giả định phi hiện thực):
A non-factive presupposition is one that is assumed not to be true. Verbs
(động từ phi hiện thực) like 'dream', 'imagine', and 'pretend', are used with the
presupposition that what follows is not true.

[10] a. I dreamed that I was rich. (»I was not rich)

b. We imagined we were in Hawaii. (» We were not in Hawaii)

c. He pretends to be ill. (» He is not

ill) (Yule, 1996: 29)

2.6 Counterfactual presuppositions (Tiền giả định trái hiện thực)

A structure interpreted with a non-factive presupposition creates a

counterfactual presupposition, meaning that what is presupposed is not only not
true, but is the opposite of what is true, or 'contrary to facts'.

20
 [11] If you were my friend, you would have helped
me. (» You are not my friend)

(Yule, 1996: 30)

3. Defeasibility and the projection problem

3.1. Defeasibility
One of the peculiar things about presuppositions is that they are liable to
evaporate in certain contexts, either immediate linguistic context or the
less immediate discourse context, or in circumstances where contrary
assumptions are made.
A simple example of this is provided by a certain asymmetry to do with
the factive verb “know”.
In sentences where “know” has second or third person subjects, the
complement is presupposed to be true, as in (a). But where the subject is
first person and the verb is negated, the presupposition clearly fails; thus
(b) does not presuppose (c):
(a) : John doesn’t know that Bill came
(b) : I don’t know that Bill came
(c) : Bill came
The reason of course is that the presupposition that the speaker knows (c)
is precisely what the sentence denies.
Another instance is when certain facts that are inconsistent with the
presupposition are mutually known, then the presupposition does not
arise thereby avoiding a contradiction. In other words, a presupposition
only arises when it is consistent with the common knowledge of the
participants, otherwise it vanishes.
Example:
(d) : At least John won’t have to regret doing a PhD.
If we assume in the context that John got a job out of graduate school,
then the example (d) has the presupposition that John did a PhD.

21
But if we assume in the context that the participants mutually know that
John failed or did not get into the doctoral program, then the example (d)
can not have the presupposition that John did a PhD.
Another example,
(e) : Sue cried before she finished her PhD.
In this case, we can easily presuppose that Sue finished her PhD. But if
we say that:
(f) : Sue died before she finished her PhD.
In this case, the presupposition that Sue finished her PhD did not go
through; since we generally hold that people do not do things after they
die. The deduction made from the entailment together with the
background assumptions about mortals, conflicts with the presupposition
that Sue finished her PhD.
Skeptics might say that (e), (f) highlight an interesting peculiarity
regarding before-clauses rather than a sensitivity to background
assumptions, but (g) shows otherwise.
(g) John died before he reached the hospital’s ER.
In this case, we can still have the presupposition that John did in fact
reach the hospital’s ER, as it is not something that John was able to do on
his own, as he was dead, but rather something that was done to him
(someone took him to the hospital).
Another example
(h) John didn’t manage to pass his exams
In this example, we have the presupposition that John tried to pass his
exams (but failed).
But when we use various sentential devices like overt denial, like:
(i) John didn’t manage to pass his exams, in fact he didn’t even try.
(j) John didn’t manage to pass his exams, if indeed he even tried.

22
(k) Either John never tried to pass his exams, or he tried but he
never managed to pass them.
(l) John didn’t manage to pass his exams, he got through without
even trying.
In these cases, the presupposition mentioned above in (h) is defeated.
Or when presuppositions are embedded under certain kinds of verbs, like
verbs of saying (say, mention, tell,..) or verbs of propositional attitude
(believe, think, imagine,..) they also disappear.
(m) John said that Mary managed to speak with a broad Irish accent.
(n) John imagined that he is the emperor of China.
These verbs, called world-building verbs, have the property of evaluating
the embedded proposition in worlds other than the actual world. It may
be here that the presupposition does not vanish but is, indeed, trapped
below the level of the verb embedding it.
3.2. Projection Problem

The projection problem in linguistics refers to the challenge of

determining how presuppositions behave when embedded within
complex sentences or linguistic structures. It arises from the expectation
that presuppositions associated with a simple sentence should continue
to hold true when that sentence becomes part of a more complex
structure. However, in some cases, the presuppositions of the individual
parts do not project or carry over to the entire complex sentence as
expected.
Projection problem is the meaning of some presupposition (as “parts”)
does not survive to become the meaning of some complex sentences (as
“wholes”).
Presupposition projection refers to the phenomenon where
presuppositions of a simple sentence are expected to be inherited by the

23
 larger structure in which the sentence is embedded. This projection is
crucial for maintaining coherence and consistency in meaning.
Example:
[12] a. Nobody realized that Kelly was ill (=p)
b. Kelly was ill (=q)
c. p >> q
(At this point, the speaker uttering [12a.] presupposes [12b.].)

However, taking the following example:

d. I imagined that Kelly was ill (=r)

e. Kelly was not ill (= NOT q)
f. r >> NOT q
(At this point, the speaker uttering [12d.] presupposes [12e.], the
opposite of [12b.].)
g. I imagined that Kelly was ill and nobody realized that she was ill.
(= r&q)
h. r & q >> NOT q
(At this point, after combining r & p the presupposition q can no longer
be assumed to be true. )
In an example like [12], the technical analysis may be straight-forward,
but it may be difficult to think of a context in which someone would talk
like that.
Perhaps example [13] will contextualize better. In an episode of a TV
soap opera, two characters have the dialog in [13]:
[13]. Shirley: It’s so sad. George regrets getting Mary pregnant.
Jean: But he didn’t get her pregnant. We know that now.

24
If we combine two of the utterances from [13], we have the sequence,
“George regrets getting Mary pregnant; but he didn’t get her pregnant”.
Identifying the different propositions involved, as in [14], we can see that
the presupposition q in [14b.] does not survive as a presupposition of the
combined utterances in [14e.].
[14] a. George regrets getting Mary pregnant. (=p)
b. George got Mary pregnant. (= q)
c. p >> q
d. He didn’t get her pregnant. (= r )
e. George regrets getting Mary pregnant, but he didn’t get her
pregnant. (=p & r)
f. p & r >> NOT q
One way to think about the whole sentence presented in [14e.] is as an
utterance by a person reporting what happened in the soap opera that day.
That person will not assume the presupposition q (i.e. George got Mary
pregnant) is true when uttering [14e.].
Failure of Projection:
In some cases, presuppositions do not “project” as expected. And
according to Yule: “a simple explanation for the fact that presuppositions
don’t “project” is that they are destroyed by entailments.”
For example:
[13] , Jean's utterance of “he didn’t get her pregnant” actually
entails “George didn’t get Mary pregnant” as a logical
consequence.
Thus, when the person who watched the soap opera tells you that
“George regrets getting Mary pregnant, but he didn’t get her pregnant”.
=> you have a presupposition q and an entailment NOT q.
This failure can occur due to various linguistic factors, including certain
operators, negations, or other linguistic elements that disrupt the
projection of presuppositions.
Examples of Projection Failure:
One common example of the projection problem is when a
presupposition in a subordinate clause does not project to the main
clause.

25
 For instance, in the sentence:
"John believed that Mary had quit smoking,"
-> the presupposition that Mary used to smoke does not project to the
main clause.
Another example is when presuppositions are canceled or blocked by
certain linguistic operators or contexts, leading to the non-projection of
the presupposed information.
Resolution Strategies:
Various strategies have been proposed to address the projection problem,
including the use of accommodation mechanisms, lexical triggers, and
pragmatic inferences to reconcile conflicting presuppositions within
complex sentences.
4. Pragmatic theories of presupposition
Pragmatic theories of presupposition were once semantic concerns,
advocated by Stalnaker (1974), Kempson (1975), Wilson (1975), and
Boër & Lycan (1976). These theories later on were largely abandoned.
Instead, pragmatic presupposition theories have gained prominence.
Early pragmatic theories were programmatic and offered basic
definitions of presupposition using pragmatic notions. These definitions
emphasized the concepts of appropriateness (or felicity) and mutual
knowledge (or common ground) as essential conditions for
presupposition.
“An utterance A pragmatically presupposes a proposition B if A is
appropriate only if B is mutually known by participants” [Levinson 1983:
205]
However, these programmatic theories need refinement. There are
objections to the utility of the notion of appropriateness. Additionally, the
mutual knowledge condition is considered too strong, as demonstrated by
examples where presuppositions are not mutually known but still valid.

26
Thus, we will review two models of pragmatics theories of
presupposition that accurately predict pre-suppositional behaviour and
capture in particular the problematic properties of defeasibility and
projection reviewed above. Both of them assume that presuppositions
are
part of the conventional meaning of expressions, even though they are
not semantic inferences.
4.1. Karttunen & Peters (1975, 1979) Theory
Karttunen & Peters propose a conventional theory of presupposition
within the framework of Montague grammar. In their theory,
presuppositions are represented as implicature expressions, distinct
from truth-conditional extension expressions. They introduce the
concept of heritage expressions to manage the projection of
presuppositions, addressing issues of defeasibility and projection.
However, Levinson identifies several challenges with Karttunen &
Peters' theory. Firstly, it struggles with handling contextual influences
and negation. The theory relies on the assumption that negation is
ambiguous between presupposition-preserving and presupposition-
negating senses, which raises objections and conflicts with established
linguistic theories.
For instance:
"John didn't manage to stop, he didn't even try" (181)
"John didn't regret losing the game, because in fact he won" (182)
[Levinson, 1983: 210]
Moreover, the theory encounters difficulties in cases where contextual
influences nullify presuppositions or affect the classification of linguistic
items. For example, sentences like:
"Perhaps John has children but perhaps John's children are away" (183)
"Perhaps John has no children, but perhaps John's children are away"
(184) [Levinson, 1983: 211]

27
behave differently under the filtering rule for conjunctions, indicating the
theory's inflexibility in accommodating contextual influences.
4.2. Gazdar (19798, 1979b) Theory:
Gazdar (1979a, 1979b) presents a sophisticated theory to address the
projection problem and contextual defeasibility in presupposition theory.
In Gazdar's theory, presuppositions are considered non-truth-conditional
aspects of linguistic expressions' meanings. Presuppositions are
associated with linguistic expressions in the lexicon rather than being
predicted solely based on truth-conditional characterization.
Unlike Karttunen & Peters' theory, Gazdar's theory involves the
cancellation of presuppositions. First, all potential presuppositions of a
sentence are generated as a complete set. Then, a mechanism is employed
to select which presuppositions will become actual presuppositions in a
given context. This mechanism operates based on the consistency
requirement within the context.
The cancellation mechanism works in a specific order: first, entailments
of the uttered sentence are added to the context, followed by clausal
conversational implicatures, scalar conversational implicatures, and
finally presuppositions. The addition of new propositions to the context
is constrained by consistency with existing propositions.
Thus, Gazdar's theory straightforwardly deals with overt presupposition
denial cases, such as
"John doesn't regret failing, because in fact he passed" (196) [Levinson,
1983: 214]
where the presupposition that John failed is cancelled due to the assertion
that he passed.
Moreover, Gazdar's theory can handle cases where presuppositions are
cancelled by background knowledge, such as

28
 "The King of France doesn't exist" (199). [Levinson, 1983: 215]
Overall, Gazdar's theory successfully predicts solutions to the projection
problem for sentences of arbitrary complexity while handling cases of
contextual defeasibility. Its effectiveness contrasts with the more
problematic aspects of Karttunen & Peters' theory, such as the imperfect
filtering conditions and the ad hoc existence of categories like plugs,
filters, and holes.
5. Entailments (kéo theo)

5.1. Definition:
"a term refers to a relation between a pair of sentences such that the truth
of the second sentence necessarily follows from the truth of the first, e.g.
I can see a dog entails 'I can see an animal'. One can not both assert the
first and deny the second". [Crystal (1998: 136)]
Entailment refers to the logical relationship between propositions, where
the truth of one proposition logically guarantees the truth of another. In
the context of presuppositions, entailments are used to capture the
semantic content of sentences and predict what is presupposed.
5.2. Ordered Entailments:
Wilson & Sperber suggest that not all entailments of a sentence
are equal; rather, they propose distinguishing between background
and foreground entailments based on their relevance in a given
context.
For example:
[17] Rover chased three squirrels.
[18] a. Something chased three squirrels.
b. Rover did something to three squirrels.
c. Rover chased three of something.

29
d. Something happened.” (Yule 1996:33)
In this example, when a speaker utters sentence [17], they are necessarily
committed to the truth of numerous background entailments, some of
which are represented in [18a-d].
Foreground entailments refer to the main assumptions or points
emphasized by the speaker in an utterance, while background entailments
are the additional implications or assumptions necessary for interpreting
the intended meaning, but are not the primary focus.
However, the speaker can indicate, typically through stress, which
entailment is in the foreground, or most important for interpreting the
intended meaning. For instance, in the sentence "Rover chased THREE
squirrels" (emphasis on "three"), the foreground entailment is that Rover
chased a specific number of squirrels, while in "ROVER chased three
squirrels" (emphasis on "Rover"), the focus shifts to the entity
performing the action, indicating that something (in this case, Rover)
chased three squirrels.
5.3. Semantic types of Entailment:
The entailments that were looked at so far are lexical in origin, that
is, they are derived from the lexical relationship between
individual
words. But entailment can also be syntactic in origin. Active and
passive versions of the same sentence will entail one another (Finch,
2000: 164), for example:
6.a. John killed Bill.
b. Bill was killed by John. (Areej, 2008: 6)

These sentences mutually entail each other.

Kempson (1977: 80) states that "a relation of entailment arises

between two assertions whenever an argument or predicate in one

30
assertion is hyponymous to an argument or predicate in the other". Thus,
there is a precise correspondence between entailment and hyponymy. "If
two assertions differ only in the substitution of a hyponym for a
superordinate term, then one of the assertions entails the other" (Allan,
1986: I 181)
Thus, hyponymy involves entailment. For instance, the utterance
‘This is a tulip’ entails ‘This is a Flower’ and ‘This is scarlet’ entails
‘This is red’. This is true since hyponymy is the relationship between
specific and general lexical items so that the former is included in
the latter (Zuber, 2002: 2). Another example is the following pair of
sentences:
7.a. Jack killed Ann.
b. Ann died.(Areej, 2008: 6)
The entailment here is a consequence of the semantic relationship
between 'kill' and 'die'. Since one of the possible ways in which one dies
can be through being killed (Lyons, 1977: 180).
There are actually more semantic types of entailments, which we will not
discuss here since they are not under pragmatics concern.
5.4. Entailment and Presupposition
Presupposition and Entailments each belongs to a different field of
linguistics. Preposition is Pragmatics, while Entailment is more of a
Semantic notion.
“Presuppositions are relations between a form of expression and an
implicit meaning which can be arrived at by a process of (pragmatic)
inference. In addition to 'pragmatic' inference, i.e. the process of inferring
meaning in a way that cannot be imagined without taking contextual
information into account, there are also inference types that are supposed
to lead logically to relations between forms and implicit meanings. These

31
are usually called (logical) implications or entailments, or sometimes
conventional implicatures.” (Jef Verschueren, 1999: 30)
Thus, Presupposition and Entailment's most prominent differences is the
effect of contextual information. Presuppositions heavily rely on
contextual information for their interpretation, as they involve implicit
meanings that are inferred pragmatically. On the other hand, entailments,
as logical implications, may not always require contextual information
for their interpretation, although pragmatic factors can still influence their
understanding.
The two notions can also differ by truth-conditional. Entailments are
typically truth-conditional, meaning that if the premises are true, the
conclusion must also be true. They are logically derived relationships
between statements.
Presuppositions, while often closely related to truth conditions, are
not themselves truth-conditional. Instead, they are implicit
assumptions or background beliefs that are taken for granted in the
discourse.

32
I. COOPERATION.......................................................................................................4
1. Introduction.........................................................................................................4
2. H. P. Grice............................................................................................................5
3. Cooperation..........................................................................................................5
3.1. Definition of cooperation..............................................................................5
3.2. Cooperative principles (Nguyên tắc hội thoại).............................................6
4. The four conversational maxims (Bốn phương châm hội thoại).....................8
4.1. Observance and non-observance of the maxims...........................................8
4.1.1. Observing the maxims..........................................................................8
4.1.2. Non-observance of the maxims..........................................................12
5. Flouting the maxims (Coi thường phương châm)..........................................12
5.1. Flouts necessitated by a “clash between maxims” (Coi thường phương
châm do mâu thuẫn giữa các phương châm với nhau)
13
5.2. Flouts which exploit a maxim (Coi thường khai thác vào 1 phương
châm).. 14
5.2.1. Flouts exploiting maxim of Quality ( Khai thác phương châm về
Chất)
15
5.2.2. Flouts exploiting the maxim of Quantity (Khai thác phương châm về
Lượng)
17
5.2.3. Flouts exploiting the maxim of Relation (Khai thác phương châm
Quan hệ)
18
5.2.4. Flouts exploiting the maxim of Manner (Khai thác phương châm
Cách thức)....................................................................................................20
6. Other categories of non-observance of the conversational maxims..............21
6.1. Violating a maxim (Vi phạm phương châm)..............................................21
6.2. Infringing a maxim (Xâm phạm phương châm).........................................23
6.3. Opting out of a maxim (Từ bỏ phương châm)............................................24
6.4. Suspending a maxim (Hoãn phương châm)................................................25
7. Problems with Grice's theory..........................................................................27
7.1. When is non-observance intentional?.........................................................28
7.2. Distinguishing between types of non-observance.......................................29
7.3. Different nature of maxims.........................................................................29
7.4. Maxims may overlap...................................................................................29
7.5. Problems of calculability.............................................................................29
II. IMPLICATURE.....................................................................................................31
1. Hedges (Lời rào đón).........................................................................................31
1.1. Maxim of quality.........................................................................................31
1.2. Maxim of quantity.......................................................................................32
1.3. Maxim of relation.......................................................................................33
 1.4. Maxim of manner........................................................................................33
2. Definitions of implicature.................................................................................34
3. Conversational implicature..............................................................................35
4. Generalized conversational implicatures........................................................36
5. Scalar implicatures............................................................................................37
6. Particularized conversational implicatures.....................................................39
7. Properties of conversational implicatures.......................................................40
8. Conventional implicatures................................................................................41
III. DIRECTNESS AND INDIRECTNESS..............................................................44
1. Indirectness and Culture..................................................................................44
2. Indirectness and Gender...................................................................................45
3. Measurement and use of indirectness..............................................................46
REFERENCE LIST....................................................................................................48
I. COOPERATION
1. Introduction
In this presentation, we will explore the relationship between sense and force,
between what speakers say and what their words mean.

Example 1
The following incident, which occurred at a seaside resort in Kent, was
reported in several national newspapers infuly 1994.

Kent Coastguard reports that a girl, drifting out to sea on an inflatable set of
false teeth, was rescued by a man on a giant inflatable lobster.

Example 2
“We must remember your telephone bill', she said, hinting that Louise
hadtalked long enough. 'Goodbye', said Louisa, ringing off. It takes the rich to remind
one of bills, she thought.

Example 3
Late on Christmas Eve 1993 an ambulance is sent to pick up a man who has
collapsed in Newcastle city centre. The man is drunk and vomits all over the
ambulanceman who goes to help him. The ambulanceman says:

“Great, that's really great! That's made my Christmas!”

In example 1 the reporter has written exactly what he means, neither more nor
less. The speaker in example 2 means more than her words say; in uttering the words:
We must remember your telephone bill, she is hinting that she wants to close the
telephone conversation. In example 3 the ambulanceman means exactly the opposite
of what his words say. None of these situations is linguistically unusual; the most
casual observation of people talking will produce similar examples.

There are times when people say (or write) exactly what they mean, but
generally, they are not totally explicit. Since, on other occasions, they manage to
convey far more than their words mean, or something quite different from the
meanings of their words, how on earth do we know, on a given occasion, what a
speaker means? In this presentation we are going to look at the work of Paul Grice,
who attempted to explain how, by means of shared rules or conventions, competent
language-users manage to understand one another.

2. H. P. Grice
Herbert Paul Grice (1913 - 1988) is a British philosopher and linguist. He had
worked with J. L. Austin at Oxford in the 1940s and 1950s and his work on the
Cooperative Principle and its related conversational maxims arises from the same
tradition of ordinary language philosophy. In 1967 he first outlined his theory of
implicature. In papers published in 1978 and 1981 Grice expanded upon this earlier
work, but he never fully developed his theory — there are many gaps and several
inconsistencies in his writings. Nevertheless it is this work — sketchy, in many ways
problematical, and frequently misunderstood — which has proved to be one of the
most influential theories in the development of pragmatics.

Grice's theory is an attempt at explaining how a hearer gets from what is said to
what is meant, from the level of expressed meaning to the level of implied meaning.

3. Cooperation
3.1. Definition of cooperation
According to Oxford Dictionary, cooperation is the fact of doing something
together or of working together towards a shared aim.

According to Mey (1993:71), “cooperative behaviour is a kind of rationality

(‘without cooperation, communication wouldn’t be possible, hence we had better
cooperate’)”.

The cooperation functions upon the assumption that within a conversation, the
interactants do not attempt to “confuse, trick, or withhold relevant information from
each other” (Yule, 1996: 35).
 → In general: Cooperation is the assumption that all acts within the
conversation is for the sake of communication and whether they observe or not the
maxims/principles is intentional and for a particular purpose.

3.2. Cooperative principles (Nguyên tắc hội thoại)

In 'Logic and conversation' Grice introduced four conversational maxims and
the Cooperative Principle (CP). The CP runs as follows:

Make your contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by

the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

Already we have a problem. The fact that Grice expressed the CP in the
imperative mood has led some casual readers of his work to believe that Grice was
telling speakers how they ought to behave. What he was actually doing was
suggesting that in conversational interaction people work on the assumption that a
certain set of rules is in operation, unless they receive indications to the contrary.

In all spheres of life we make similar assumptions all the time.

In “Meeting in Interaction” (1995), Thomas attempted to illustrate the concept
of cooperation, he used an illuminating analogy of driving a car and a conversation, or
a flow of conversation, is understood as a kind of traffic. When we drive, we assume
that other drivers will operate according to the same set of regulations as we do (or, at
the very least, that they know what those regulations are). If we could not make such
assumptions, the traffic system would rapidly grind to a halt. Of course, there are
times when we do have indications that another driver may not obey the rules (a
learner, a drunk, a person whose car is out of control, an ambulance or fire tender with
its lights flashing and siren blaring) or that they may be following a different set of
rules (a car with foreign number plates) and on these occasions we re-examine our
assumptions or suspend them altogether. And, of course, there are times when our
assumption that others are operating according to the same set of rules is misplaced,
and then an accident may occur.
 The same is true of conversation. When we talk we operate according to a set
of assumptions and, on the whole, we get by. There will be times when we may
suspend our assumption that if our interlocutor is operating according to the same
conversational norms as we are: we may be talking to a young child who has yet to
acquire our community's conversational norms, to a drunk, to someone in pain or
distress. Or we may be talking to a person whom we have reason to think may have
different conversational norms from our own (a member of a different cultural or
linguistic community). And there will be times when our assumptions are wrong and
then mistakes and misunderstandings occur, or when we are deliberately misled by
our interlocutor.

Returning to the car analogy, unless there is a signal of a driver wanting to

change lane, the drivers participating in the same road of traffic, would assume there
is no divergence from the straightforward road.

For, in setting out his Cooperative Principle, Grice was not suggesting that
people are always good and kind or cooperative in any everyday sense of that word.
He was simply noting that, on the whole, people observe certain regularities in
interaction and his aim was to explain one particular set of regularities - those
governing the generation and interpretation of conversational implicature. Consider
the following example:

Example 9
The speaker has accidentally locked herself out of her house. It is winter, the
middle of the night and she is stark naked:

A: Do you want a coat?

B: No, I really want to stand out here in the freezing cold with no clothes on.
On the face of it, B's reply is untrue and uncooperative, but in fact this is the
sort of sarcastic reply we encounter every day and have no problem at all in
interpreting. How do we interpret it? According to Grice, if A assumes that, in spite of
appearances, B is observing the Cooperative Principle and has made an appropriate
response to his question, he will look for an alternative interpretation. Grice argues
that without the assumption that the speaker is operating according to the CP, there is
no mechanism to prompt someone to seek for another level of interpretation. The
observation that the speaker has said something which is manifestly untrue, combined
with the assumption that the CP is in operation sets in motion the search for an
implicature. The four Conversational Maxims help us establish what that implicature
might be.

4. The four conversational maxims (Bốn phương châm hội thoại)

4.1. Observance and non-observance of the maxims
4.1.1. Observing the maxims
In 'Logic and conversation' Grice proposed four maxims:
● The maxim of Quantity (Phương châm về Lượng)
● The maxim of Quality (Phương châm về Chất)
● The maxim of Relation (Phương châm Quan hệ)
● The maxim of Manner (Phương châm Cách

thức) The four maxims were formulated as follows:

Quantity:
Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose
of the exchange).

Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

The detailed explanation is quite clear and concise and we can understand from
the naming of the maxim that an utterance should provide just enough information
when they are contributed to a conversation.

If you are assisting me to mend a car, I expect your contribution to be neither

more nor less than is required; if, for example, at a particular stage I need four screws,
I expect you to hand me four, rather than two or six.
 Here I have an extract of a conversation between a husband a wife taken from
Thomas (1995):

Example 9:
Husband: Where are the car keys?

Wife: They're on the table in the

hall.

From this example, we can see that in the question of the husband, he wanted
to know the places that the care keys might be at. So the appropriate answer would
supposedly be a reference to a place. In response, the wife gives out a sufficient
account of the place they were, which were on the table located in the hall.

Quality:
Do not say what you believe to be false.
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
This maxim, as the name suggests, tells us that each utterance has to carry a
truth and has back-up evidence that provides the grounds for it to be true.

I expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious. If I need sugar as an

ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not expect you to hand me
salt; if I need a spoon, I do not expect a trick spoon made of rubber.

Returning to the previous conversation between the husband and the wife, we
can see that the wife provided a truthful answer to the question, or at least we did not
find any marker of deception in her answer.

Relation:
Be relevant.
Make your contribution relevant.
I expect a partner's contribution to be appropriate to immediate needs at each
stage of the transaction; if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be
handed a good book, or an oven cloth (even though this might be an appropriate
contribution at a later stage).

With the conversation above, the response of the wife can be considered
relevant on the grounds that she addressed the question directly, indicating the place
that the car keys might be, which was the table in the hall, not telling him to go to ask
their daughter, supposedly they have one.

Manner:
Avoid obscurity of

expression. Avoid ambiguity.

Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

Be orderly.

Your words have to be clarified: avoid obscurity of expression; avoid

ambiguity; And precised: be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity), be orderly.

I expect a partner to make it clear what contribution he is making, and to

execute his performance with reasonable dispatch.

A final look at the example above, we can see that in her reply, the wife gave
out a clear and to-the-point answer without any complex grammatical structure.

→ In conclusion, the wife has answered clearly (Manner) truthfully (Quality),

has given just the right amount of information (Quantity) and has directly addressed
her husband's goal in asking the question (Relation). She has said precisely what she
meant, no more and no less, and has generated no implicature (i.e. there is no
distinction to be made here between what she says and what she means, there is no
additional level of meaning).

Despite the somewhat boring example I have repeatedly revisited above, I

wanted to point out that such an answer is an exemplar of an utterance observing the
maxims of cooperative principle, or on how to be considered as cooperative in a
conversation. Moreover, the maxims are more intertwined and interdependent than
they are separated and isolated. One aspect of the answer the wife contributed can be
regarded as signs for observing many maxims at the same time.

The maxims can be perceived as useful tools to help construct and produce
intelligible utterances that undoubtedly make way for a productive conversation,
easily reaching the goals of communication. Nevertheless, this is not always the case.
Just as explained above, what distinguished pragmatics from other more long-standing
and traditional linguistic fields is its dependence on context, or it is context-bound and
its unpredictability, or spontaneity; therefore, attempting to draw the line on a more
rigorous guiding principles can often turn into a more robotic/automatic and rigid
interaction and expect people to follow a strict sets of principles and maxims is more
of a utopian opinion (Mey, 1993) for in the complex patterns of daily lives, people
more than often do not observe the maxims and often intentionally do so. Therefore,
in the following parts, I will discuss a more frequently observed phenomena related to
the Gricean cooperative principle, which are the acts of non-observance of principles
and maxims.

The failure to observe, or non-observance of maxims are classified into 5

categories, which are: flouting, violating, infringing, opting out and suspending
maxims. In this part, I am going to more in-depth into the act of flouting maxims for
its prevalence and pervasiveness in daily conversations.

In this part, the act of flouting will be examined in the flouting of each maxim,
once again namely of quantity, quality, relation and manner.

Despite the somewhat boring example I have repeatedly revisited above, I

wanted to point out that such an answer is an exemplar of an utterance observing the
maxims of cooperative principle, or on how to be considered as cooperative in a
conversation. Moreover, the maxims are more intertwined and interdependent than
they are separated and isolated. One aspect of the answer the wife contributed can be
regarded as signs for observing many maxims at the same time.
 The maxims can be perceived as useful tools to help construct and produce
intelligible utterances that undoubtedly make way for a productive conversation,
easily reaching the goals of communication. Nevertheless, this is not always the case.
What distinguishes pragmatics from other more long-standing and traditional
linguistic fields is its dependence on context, or it is context-bound and its
unpredictability, or spontaneity; therefore, attempting to draw the line on a more
rigorous guiding principle can often turn into a more robotic/automatic and rigid
interaction and expect people to follow a strict set of principles and maxims is more of
a utopian opinion (Mey, 1993) for in the complex patterns of daily lives, people more
than often do not observe the maxims and often intentionally do so. Therefore, in the
following parts, I will discuss a more frequently observed phenomenon related to the
Gricean cooperative principle, which are the acts of non-observance of principles and
maxims.

4.1.2. Non-observance of the maxims

The failure to observe, or non-observance of maxims are classified into 5
categories, which are: Flouting a maxim, Violating a maxim, Infringing a maxim,
Opting out of a maxim, Suspending a maxim

5. Flouting the maxims (Coi thường phương châm)

According to Jenny Thomas, the situations which chiefly interested Grice were
those in which a speaker blatantly fails to observe a maxim, not with any intention of
deceiving or misleading, but because the speaker wishes to prompt the hearer to look
for a meaning which is different from, or in addition to, the expressed meaning
(1995:65). This additional meaning Grice called 'conversational implicature' and he
termed the process by which it is generated 'flouting a maxim'.

A flout occurs when a speaker blatantly fails to observe a maxim at the level of
what is uttered with the explicit goal of eliciting an implicature (Thomas, 1995:65).
Also, according to Mey, we can make a blatant show of breaking one of the
maxims… in order to lead the addressee to look for a covert, implied meaning
(1993:70). In
thism part, I would like to provide examples of violations of each maxim in turn,
while also reviewing Grice's comments of the reasons for violating a maxim.

5.1. Flouts necessitated by a “clash between maxims” (Coi thường phương

châm do mâu thuẫn giữa các phương châm với nhau)

A speaker flouts the maxim of Quantity by blatantly giving either more or less
information than the situation demands. This will be further indicated by example
number 11 and 12 by Thomas (1995:65-66).

Example 11
The speaker is Rupert Allason (author, M.P. and expert on the British
intelligence services). He is discussing the identity of the so-called 'Fifth Man'

It was either Graham Mitchell or Roger Hollis and I don't believe it was Roger
Hollis.
According to Grice, such a response would set in motion a process of informal
reasoning which would lead the listeners to derive an additional piece of information.
This might work in the following way:

(i) Rupert Allason has blatantly given more information than required (he
could simply have said The Fifth Man was Graham Mitchell'). Allason appears to
have breached the maxim of Quantity.

(ii) However, we have no reason to believe that Allason is being deliberately

uncooperative (i.e. that he is failing to observe the Cooperative Principle (CP)).

(iii) We must conclude that his failure to observe the maxim of Quantity is due
to his wish to observe the CP in some other way. We must work out why the CP
should lead Allason to give more information than was requested.

(iv) The failure to observe the maxim of Quantity can be explained if we

assume that Allason also wished to observe the maxim of Quality. We conclude that
for some reason he is confronted with a clash between these two maxims (either he
tells the truth or he gives just the right amount of information).

(v) His reply is a compromise, which leads us to deduce that whilst he strongly
believes that Mitchell was the spy, he doesn't have sufficient evidence to assert this as
a fact. He has signalled that his belief may not be accurate.

As previously stated, Grice's argument for the speaker's failure to observe the
Quality maxim in this case is because he was confronted with a conflict of maxims. In
this case, the speaker was unable to observe both the maxims of quality and quantity
at the same time, signaling his problem by flagrantly failing to provide the appropriate
amount of information, prompting his interlocutor to seek an implicature.

A similar explanation might be offered for the following instance of

non-observance of the maxim of Quantity. In this case, the second speaker gives less
information than the situation demands:

Example 12
A is asking B about a mutual friend's new boyfriend:
A : Is he nice?
B: She seems to like him.
B could simply have replied: 'No' — this would give the maximum amount of
information possible in the situation. Instead, B gives a much weaker and less
informative response. It would be possible to argue that his failure to do so stems from
a clash between the maxims of Quantity and Quality (B cannot say for certain whether
the new boyfriend is nice or not, and speaks only on the basis of the evidence he has).
But this explanation is rather implausible. It is better explained by what Grice terms
'exploiting' the maxims.
 5.2. Flouts which exploit a maxim (Coi thường khai thác vào 1 phương
châm)

According to Grice's theory, interlocutors operate on the assumption that, as a

rule, the maxims will be observed. When this expectation is confounded and the
listener is confronted with the blatant non-observance of a maxim (i.e. the listener has
discounted the possibility that the speaker may be trying to deceive, or is incapable of
speaking more clearly, succinctly, etc.), he or she is again prompted to look for an
implicature. Most of Grice's own examples of flouts involve this sort of
“exploitation”.

5.2.1. Flouts exploiting maxim of Quality ( Khai thác phương châm về Chất)
Flouts which exploit the maxim of Quality occur when the speaker says
something which is blatantly untrue or for which he or she lacks adequate evidence
(Thomas, 1995:67). In the “ambulance man” example that Thomas gave (example 3),
an implicature is generated by the speaker's saying something which is patently false.
Since the speaker does not appear to be trying to deceive the listener in any way, the
listener was forced to look for another plausible interpretation.

Example 3:
Late on Christmas Eve 1993 an ambulance is sent to pick up a man who has
collapsed in Newcastle city centre. The man is drunk and vomits all over the
ambulanceman who goes to help him. The ambulanceman says:

- 'Great, that's really great! That's made my Christmas!

According to Grice, the deductive process might work like this:
(i) The ambulance man has expressed pleasure at having someone vomit over
him.
(ii) There is no example in recorded history of people being delighted at having
someone vomit over them.
 (iii) I have no reason to believe that the ambulance man is trying to deceive us
in any way.

(iv) Unless the ambulance man's utterance is entirely pointless, he must be

trying to put across some other proposition.

(v) This must be some obviously related proposition.

(vi) The most obviously related proposition is the exact opposite of the one he
has expressed.

(vii) The ambulance man is extremely annoyed at having the drunk vomit over
him.
The following example works in much the same way, but this time involves
what Grice terms 'generating a conversational implicature by means of something like
a figure of speech'.

Example 13
The speaker was Lady Lucinda Lambton and she was talking about John
Patten, who at the time was Secretary of State for Education

'I lived in the same house as that man for three years and he's the man I hate
most in all the world. In all my greasy past, he is the biggest grease spot.'

(i) It is patently false that John Patten is a grease spot.

(ii) Lucinda Lambton does not appear to be trying to make us believe that John
Patten is a grease spot.

(iii) Unless her utterance is entirely pointless, she must be trying to put across
some other proposition.

(iv) This must be some obviously related proposition.

(vi) The most obviously related proposition is that, like grease spots, John
Patten is a bane.
 Here is one final example of a flout which exploits a maxim. Often an
individual will try to deflect unwelcome attention by giving an improbable or
obviously untrue response. For example, if someone asks you your name and you
don't want to tell them, you might say: “I’m the Queen of Sheba”.

Example 14
B was on a long train journey and wanted to read her book. A was a fellow
passenger who wanted to talk to her:

A : What do you do?

B: I'm a teacher.

A : Where do you teach?

B: Outer Mongolia.

A : Sorry I asked!
Outer Mongolia is seen as somewhere impossibly remote, so that B's
improbable response prompted the hearer to look for an implicature (in this case that
his attentions were unwelcome). The funny thing about this example was that B really
did teach in Outer Mongolia, but A was nevertheless correct in assuming that B was
trying to give him the brush off!

5.2.2. Flouts exploiting the maxim of Quantity (Khai thác phương châm về
Lượng)

A flout of the maxim of Quantity occurs when a speaker blatantly gives more
or less information than the situation requires (Thomas, 1995:67). Thomas has already
provided one instance (example 12) of a person giving less information than required
by the situation, and the following examples operate in the same way:

- Giving less information:

Example 15
 A: How are we getting there?
B: Well we're getting there in Dave's car.
B blatantly gives less information than A needs, thereby generating the
implicature that, while she and her friends have a lift arranged, A will not be
travelling with them.

Example 16
Petruchio has come to ask Baptista for his daughter's hand in marriage
Pet: And you, good sir! Pray, have you not a daughter Call'd Katherina, fair
and virtuous?

Bap: I have a daughter, sir, call'd Katherina.

By confirming that he has a daughter called Katherina, but omitting any
mention of her fairness or virtue, Baptista implies that she does not possess these
qualities to any marked degree.

- Giving more information: are also common, as the following example

illustrates:

Example 17
The speaker was a BBC continuity announcer
At the time of recording, all the cast were members of the BBC Drama Group.
The apparently superfluous information in the first clause generates the
implicature that by the time the play was broadcast, one or more of the cast had left
the BBC Drama Group.

5.2.3. Flouts exploiting the maxim of Relation (Khai thác phương châm
Quan hệ)

The maxim of Relation ('Be relevant') is exploited by making a response or

observation which is very obviously irrelevant to the topic in hand (e.g. by abruptly
changing the subject, or by overtly failing to address the other person's goal in asking
a question) (Thomas, 1995:70). Examples of flouting the maxim of Relation by
changing the subject (example 18) or by failing to address the topic directly are
encountered very frequently, and the examples are mentioned by Thomas as
following:

Example 18 - Changing the subject (Thay đổi chủ đề)

Geoffrey is a vicar, trying hard to curry favour with his bishop. The speaker is
Susan, his wife, who couldn't care less about the church, religion (or, for that matter,
for Geoffrey). The emphasis is mine.

We were discussing the ordination of women. The bishop asked me what I

thought. Should women take the services? So long as it doesn't have to be me, I
wanted to say, they can be taken by a trained gorilla. 'Oh yes,' Geoffrey chips in,
'Susan's all in favour. She's keener than I am, aren't you, darling?' 'More sprouts
anybody?' I said.

The bishop is likely to come to the conclusion that Susan is not interested in the
subject of women's ordination and wishes to change the subject. And once again,
Grice's theory fails to address a very important issue: “Why does Susan choose to
indicate only indirectly that she is bored or uninterested?” After all, if the bishop was
a particularly insensitive person, there is the risk that he might ignore Susan's hint and
pose the question again. Susan could have avoided that possibility by saying: “I
couldn't care less!”. In the 1970s and 1980s much effort in the field of pragmatics has
been put into developing theories of politeness (for example, Brown and Levinson
1978 [1987] and Leech 1983a) which, proponents argue, “rescue” Grice's theory by
explaining the social constraints governing utterance production and interpretation.

Example 19
I finished working on my face. I grabbed my bag and a coat.
I told Mother I was going out ... She asked me where I was going. I repeated
myself. 'Out.'
 In this example the speaker, Olivia, makes a response which is truthful, clear,
etc., and which does answer her mother's question (unlike Susan's response in
example 18). What it does not do is address her mother's goal in asking the question:
her mother can see that Olivia is going out, what she wants to know is where she is
going. Example 19 could also be analysed as a flout of the maxim of Quantity, in that
Olivia has given less information that the situation requires.

5.2.4. Flouts exploiting the maxim of Manner (Khai thác phương châm
Cách thức)

Thomas included the following as an example of a flout of the maxim of

Manner (1995:71).

Example 20
This interaction occurred during a radio interview with an unnamed official
from the United States Embassy in Port-au-Prince, Haiti:

Interviewer: Did the United States Government play any part in Duvalier's
departure? Did they, for example, actively encourage him to leave?

Official: I would not try to steer you away from that conclusion.
The official could simply have replied: 'Yes'. Her actual response is extremely
long-winded and convoluted and it is obviously no accident, nor through any inability
to speak clearly, that she has failed to observe the maxim of Manner. There is,
however, no reason to believe that the official is being deliberately unhelpful (she
could, after all, have simply refused to answer at all, or said: 'No comment').

The hearer must therefore look for another explanation and, however, there is
nothing in Grice's theory to help us explain her flouting of the maxim of Manner. In
this case, Thomas stated that it was not a clash of maxims which had caused her to
flout the maxim of Manner in this way (Thomas, 1995:71). Rather it is occasioned by
a clash of goals: the desire to claim credit for what she sees as a desirable outcome,
while at the same time avoiding putting on record the fact that her government has
intervened in the affairs of another country.

The important thing to note in each of the foregoing cases is that it is the very
blatancy of the non-observance which triggers the search for an implicature.

6. Other categories of non-observance of the conversational maxims

In his first paper (1975:49) Grice listed three ways in which a participant in a
talk exchange may fail to fulfill a maxim: the speaker may: flout (coi thường) a
maxim, violate (vi phạm) a maxim or opt out (từ bỏ) of observing a maxim. He later
added a fourth category of nonobservance: infringing (xâm phạm) a maxim. Several
writers since Grice have argued the need for a fifth category — suspending (hoãn) a
maxim.

Having made all these distinctions, it is extremely irritating to note that Grice
himself does not always use the terms consistently and remarkably few commentators
seem to make any attempt to use the terms correctly. The distinctions Grice originally
made are important for a full understanding of his theory.

6.1. Violating a maxim (Vi phạm phương châm)

Many commentators incorrectly used the term “Violate” for all forms of
non-observance of the maxims. But in his first published paper on conversational
cooperation (1975), Grice defines “Violation”as the unostentatious non observance
of a maxim. If a speaker violates a maxim she “will be liable to mislead” (1975:49).

Let’s take an example of an extract from a fictional interaction between Martin

and his wife, Alice.

Example 21
Alice has been refusing to make love to her husband. Atfirst he attributes this
to post-natal depression, but then he starts to think she may be having an affair:

'Allice. I've got to ask you this.'

 He stopped.

'Ask me then—'

Will you give me a truthful answer? However much you think it'll hurt me?'

Alice's voice had a little quaver.

'I promise.'
Martin came back to his chair and put his hands on its back and looked at her.

'Is there another man?'

Alice raised her chin and looked at him squarely.

'No,' she said. 'There isn't another man.'

And then Martin gave a long, escaping sigh, and grinned at her and said he
thought they had better finish the champagne, didn't she?

It is later established that Alice's assertion that she is not having an affair with
another man is true, but not the whole truth (she is, in fact, having an affair with a
woman). But there is nothing in the formulation of Alice's response which would
allow Martin to deduce that she was withholding information. This unostentatious
violation of the maxim of Quantity generates the intentionally misleading implicature
that Alice is not having an affair with anyone.

The next example is authentic (naturally-occurring examples are quite difficult

to come by because, of course, you do not generally find out that you have been
misled):

Example 22
An English athlete, Dianne Modahl, the defending Commonwealth Games 800
metres champion, pulled out of her opening race and returned to England. Caroline
Searle, press officer for the England team, said:

'She has a family bereavement; her grandmother has died.'

 The next day it was announced that Ms Modahl had been sent home following
a positive test for drugs. What Ms Searle had said was true, but the implicature (that
the reason for Modahl's returning home was a bereavement) was false.

Pragmatically misleading (or potentially pragmatically misleading) utterances

of this sort are regularly encountered in certain activity types (see chapter 7), such as
trials, parliamentary speeches and arguments. So regularly do they occur, in fact, that
they could be seen as the norm for this type of interaction, and be interpreted in that
light by participants.

At first blush, it might appear that violating a maxim is the exact opposite of
flouting a maxim. In example 21, Alice says something which is 'true' (as far as it
goes) in order to imply an untruth. In the case of a flout (as in example 3), the speaker
blatantly fails to observe the maxim of Quality at the level of what is said, but
nevertheless implies something which is true. All the examples of flouts which Grice
himself gives are of this order. However, there is no principled reason to expect that
an implicature will be 'true' — speakers can imply a lie as easily as they can say one
(as in example 7).

6.2. Infringing a maxim (Xâm phạm phương châm)

A speaker who, with no intention of generating an implicature and with no
intention of deceiving, fails to observe a maxim is said to 'infringe' the maxim
(Thomas, 1995:74). She also stated that such non-observance stems from imperfect
linguistic performance rather than from any desire on the part of the speakers to
generate a conversational implicature.

This type of non-observance could occur mainly because the speaker has an
imperfect command of the language (a young child or a foreign learner), because the
speaker's performance is impaired in some way (nervousness, drunkenness,
excitement), because of some cognitive impairment, or simply because the speaker is
constitutionally incapable of speaking clearly, to the point, etc.
 6.3. Opting out of a maxim (Từ bỏ phương châm)
A speaker opts out of observing a maxim by indicating unwillingness to
cooperate in the way the maxim requires (Thomas, 1995:70). Here are some of the
examples of opting out occur frequently in public life:

(1) When the speaker cannot reply in the way normally expected, perhaps for
legal or ethical reasons.

(2) The speaker wishes to avoid generating a false implicature or appearing

uncooperative. Examples of such cases could include a priest, counsellor or even an
investigative journalist refusing to relay information given in confidence, or a police
officer refusing to release the name of an accident victim until the victim's relatives
have been informed. Here is a typical example from a British M.P.:

Example 23
The Conservative M.P., Teddy Taylor, had been asked a question about talks
he had had with Colonel Gadaffi:

'Well, honestly, I can't tell you a thing, because what was said to me was told
me in confidence'.

(3) Another reason frequently given for 'opting out' is that giving the requested
information might hurt a third party (example 24) or put them in danger (example 25):

Example 24
Ruth Rendell, a famous crime novelist, was being interviewed by an equally
famous psychiatrist, Professor Anthony Clare. Clare asked Rendell about her
husband'

AC : You married him twice. You've been interviewed many times, but I've
never seen a satisfactory explanation for that very interesting fact.
 RR: Well [pause] I don't think I can give you one. That is not to say that I don't
know it but I do know it but I cannot give it. I don't think that to give it would be a
very good idea, particularly for my husband.

Example 25
The first speaker is a caller to a radio chat show. The second speaker is the
host, Nick Ross:

Caller: ... um I lived in uh a country where people sometimes need to flee that
country.

Ross: Uh , where was that?

Caller: It's a country in Asia and I don't want to say any more.
When speakers expressly opt out of observing a maxim in this way, they make
explicit reference to the way in which speakers normally attend to the maxims, which
in turn offers support for Grice's contention that interactants have a strong expectation
that, ceteris paribus and unless indication is given to the contrary, the CP and the
maxims will be observed.

6.4. Suspending a maxim (Hoãn phương châm)

Several scholars have stated that there are times when there is no need to opt
out of observing the maxims since certain occurrences have no expectation on the part
of any participant that they would be met. As a result, non-fulfilment generates no
implicatures.

This category is necessary to respond to criticisms of the type made by Keenan

(1976) who proposed as a counter-example to Grice's theory of conversational
implicature the fact that in the Malagasy Republic participants in talk exchanges:

... regularly provide less information than is required by their conversational

partner, even though they have access to the necessary information. (Keenan 1976:
70)
 Keenan's example does not falsify Grice's theory if it is seen as a case where
the maxim of Quantity is suspended. There is no expectation at all on the part of
interactants that speakers will provide precise information about their relatives and
friends, in case they draw the attention of evil spirits to them. Although the Malagasy
speaker may appear to be underinformative at the level of what is said, the
uninformativeness is nevertheless systematic, motivated and generates no
conversational implicature for members of that community.

Here are two further examples, taken from a novel set on a Navajo reservation,
which make explicit reference to the suspension of a maxim:

Example 26
The speaker in this example and the next is the daughter of a murdered man.
She is talking to OfficerJim Ghee of the Navajo Tribal Police:
'Last time you were with that FBI man — asking about the one who got killed,'
she said, respecting the Navajo taboo of not speaking the name o f the dead. *You
find out who killed that man?'

Example 27
'... they told him he could not be cured,' Bistie's Daughter said in a shaky
voice. She cleared her throat, wiped the back o f her hand across her eyes. 'That man
was strong,' she continued. 'His spirit was strong. He didn't give up on things. He
didn't want to die. He didn't hardly say anything at all. I asked him. I said, "My
Father, why
— " ' She stopped.
Never speak the name o f the dead, Chee thought. Never summon the chindi to
you, even if the name o f the ghost is Father.

In examples 26 and 27 the speaker fails on three occasions to observe the

maxim of Quantity:

On the first occasion she refers vaguely to 'the FBI man', thereby generating
the (true) implicature that she does not know his name. Then she refers in a
similarly
vague fashion to 'the one who got killed' and 'that man'. Normally this would generate
exactly the same implicature (that she does not know the name of the man). However,
among the Navajo this implicature would not be generated in the case of a person who
had died a violent or premature death, because to mention his or her name in these
circumstances is taboo. Therefore, in this case the non-observance of the maxim of
Quantity generates no implicatures because all the participants know that it is
suspended.

Suspensions of the maxims may be culture-specific (as in Keenan's example

and in examples 26 and 27) or specific to particular events. For example, in the acting
community in Britain (but not among the population at large) people refrain from
uttering the name of Shakespeare's play Macbeth because to do so is supposed to
bring bad luck. They refer instead to 'The Scottish Play', thereby failing to observe the
maxim of Quantity.

7. Problems with Grice's theory

There are a number of problems associated with Grice's theory. However, a
detailed discussion of all the issues would take us beyond the scope of an introductory
book. In “Meaning in Interaction" (1995), Thomas have outlined them briefly. The
main problems are:

● Sometimes an utterance has a range of possible interpretations. How do

we know when the speaker is deliberately failing to observe a maxim
and hence that an implicature is intended?
● How can we distinguish between different types of non-observance (e.g.
distinguish a violation from an infringement)?
● Grice's four maxims seem to be rather different in nature. What are the
consequences of this?
● Sometimes the maxims seem to overlap or are difficult to distinguish
from one another.
● Grice argued that there should be a mechanism for calculating
implicature, but it is not always clear how this operates.
 7.1. When is non-observance intentional?
According to Grice, a flout is so blatant that the interlocutor is supposed to
know for certain that an implicature has been generated (even if we are not always
quite sure what that implicature is) but this is not always the case. There are times
when it is really very difficult to determine whether a non-observance is intentional
and hence to know whether any implicature is intended at all.

We have already noted that an utterance frequently has a range of possible

interpretations; Grice, however, did not discuss the possibility that more than one
implicature might be intended. If it were indeed the case that an utterance can have
only one implicature how do we know which is the intended implicature? Sometimes
although the hearer perceives (and is perhaps amused by) possible alternative
interpretations, the context of utterance is such that one interpretation is very much
more probable than another.

Given the nature of the event (official exchange of greetings between heads of
state), this was almost certainly not the case. In this instance, the context in which the
utterance was made allows us to determine which of the possible implicatures was
likely to have been intended, but this is not always so. There are times when it can be
very difficult to decide from a range of possible implicatures which was the one
intended.

7.2. Distinguishing between types of non-observance

Closely connected with the previous point is the problem that we do not always
know whether a non-observance is intentional and when this occurs it is not possible
to distinguish a flout from other types of non-observance. In those cases there could
really be no doubt at all that a maxim was being flouted. But many examples are less
clear-cut than these and the question then arises as to how we know which type of
non-observance is involved (flout, violation or infringement) which in turn raises once
again the issue of what the speaker has implied. Grice does not explain how an
interlocutor is supposed to distinguish between (say) a flout, a violation (possibly
intended to mislead) and an infringement, not intended to generate any implicature.
 7.3. Different nature of maxims
This point is closely connected with the previous one: not all Grice's maxims
are of the same order. The maxim of Quality is the most straightforward, its operation
is generally yes/no — someone is either telling the truth or is not, and (in the case of a
flout) it is usually pretty easy to tell which is which. The maxims of Quantity and
Manner, on the other hand, can be observed to a greater or lesser degree — it is rarely
possible to give precisely the right amount of information or to speak with perfect
clarity; usually it is a question of 'more or less the right amount', or 'more or less
clear'.

7.4. Maxims may overlap

It is not always possible to determine which maxim is being invoked — the
maxims of Quantity and Manner, in particular, seem to overlap and to co-occur.

7.5. Problems of calculability

Another important issue which Grice's theory (at least as originally formulated)
fails to address is why in some cases we are expected to seek a comparison, in others
we must look for a proposition which was the exact opposite of the one expressed,
while in others still the hearer has to look for an implicature which is in no way
related.

→ Conclusion: It is now more than 25 years since Grice first put forward his
ideas concerning the conversational maxims and his work continues to serve as the
basis for much (probably most) work in pragmatics. Grice can claim credit for asking
a lot of very exciting questions, which have led linguists to think about language in a
completely new way. But in the end, what we are left with is a set of very informal
procedures for calculating conversational implicature, which cannot really withstand
close scrutiny and, as we have seen, the theory is full of holes, some of which have yet
to be plugged.
II. IMPLICATURE
1. Hedges (Lời rào đón)
In a conversation, we can recognize these maxims as unstated assumptions. We
assume that people are normally going to provide an appropriate amount of
information, we assume that they are telling the truth, being relevant, and trying to be
as clear as they can. However, there are certain kinds of expressions speakers use to
mark that they may be in danger of not fully adhering to the cooperative principles.
And these kinds of expressions are called hedges.

The term hedges first proposed by Lakoff (1975) in the thesis Hedges: a study
in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts. According to Lakoff, “hedges are
words whose job it is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy”.

Professor Nguyễn Thiện Giáp has stated in his book in 2002: “Khi người nói
cảm thấy có thể vi phạm nguyên tắc nào đó thì nó dùng một số lời rào đón để chỉ ra sự
vi phạm có thể có ấy. Những lời rào đón này giống như những bằng chứng cho phép
nó vi phạm một nguyên tắc nào đó. Chúng cũng là những tín hiệu đối với người nghe
để người nghe có thể hạn chế các giải thích của mình [...] Khi một người nhận thấy
mối nguy hiểm của sự vi phạm nguyên tắc về chất, tức là thông tin đưa ra có thể chưa
chính xác, thiếu bằng chứng, anh ta luôn luôn hạn chế phán đoán của mình bằng cách
sử dụng những lời rào đón.”

In his book “Pragmatics”, Yule has mentioned some types of markers tied to
the expectation of the 4 maxims, including the maxim of quality, quantity, relation
and manner.

1.1. Maxim of quality

The importance of the maxim of quality for cooperative interaction in English
may be best measured by the number of expressions we use to indicate that what
we’re saying may not be totally accurate. For example, in the context of recent
rumors involving a couple known to the speakers as in [3]:
 [3] a. As far as I know, they’re married.
b. I may be mistaken, but I thought I saw a wedding ring on her finger.
c. I’m not sure if this is right, but I heard it was a secret ceremony in Hawaii.
d. He couldn’t live without her, I guess.
The initial phrases such as “As far as I know”, “I may be mistaken but”, “I’m
not sure if this is right”, and “I guess” are notes to the listener regarding the accuracy
of the main statement. Without the hedges being uttered, the hearer might assume that
the speaker has violated the maxim of quality, as the information given by the speaker
might be inaccurate or lack evidence. The use of hedges help the speaker to indicate
that what they say may not be totally accurate.

1.2. Maxim of quantity

The speaker’s attempt to provide information which is adequate and necessary
is commonly indicated by certain cautious notes. Cautious notes of this type can also
be used to show that the speaker is conscious of the quantity maxim, as in the phrases
like “As you probably know”, “To cut a long story short”, “I won’t bore you with all
the details” produced in the course of a speaker’s account of her recent vacation in [4].

[4] a. As you probably know, I am terrified of bugs.

b. So, to cut a long story short, we grabbed our stuff and ran.
c. I won’t bore you with all the details, but it was an exciting trip.
In the above examples, the hedges indicate the speaker’s awareness of their
being repetitive and excessive in speech. In other words, the speaker is aware of the
fact that they might be violating the quantity maxim. So they use hedges to avoid
providing more information than needed. When a speaker says more information than
required they also use the above phrases to demonstrate that the violation of the
quantity maxim is legitimate.
 1.3. Maxim of relation
Markers tied to the expectation of relevance can be found in the middle of
speakers’ talk when they say things like “Oh, by the way” and go on to mention some
potentially unconnected information during a conversation. Speakers also seem to use
expressions like “anyway”, or “well, anyway”, to indicate that they may have drifted
into a discussion of some possibly non-relevant material and want to stop. We can see
this type of hedges in the context of an office meeting.

[5] a. I don’t know if this is important, but some of the files are missing.
b. This may sound like a dumb question, but whose handwriting is this?
c. Not to change the subject, but is this related to the budget?
In these examples, the speaker has something to say but they found the topic
not entirely relevant, so they can use hedges like “I don’t know if this is important”,
“This may sound like a dumb question”, or “Not to change the subject” to move the
conversation in another direction without violating the principle of relation.

1.4. Maxim of manner

The awareness of the expectations of manner may also lead speakers to
produce hedges like 6a-6c, heard during an account of a crash.

[6] a. This may be a bit confused, but I remember being in a car.

b. I’m not sure if this makes sense, but the car had no lights.
c. I don’t know if this is clear at all, but I think the other car was reversing.
When a person intentionally violates the principle of manner, he can stop
mid-sentence and utter phrases like “This may be a bit confused”, I’m not sure if this
make sense”, and “I don’t know if this is clear at all”.

All these examples of hedges show that the speakers are not only aware of the
maxims, but they also want to show that they are trying to observe them.
 But there are some circumstances where speakers may not follow the
expectations of the cooperative principle. For example, in court rooms and
classrooms, witnesses and students are often called upon to tell people things which
are already well-known to those people (thereby violating the quantity maxim). These
circumstances are called specialized institutional talk, which are totally different from
conversation.

There are other circumstances in which the speakers uses expressions like “No
comment” or “My lips are sealed” to answer a question. What is special here is that
although these expressions are typically not “as informative as is required”, they are
naturally interpreted as communicating more than what is said (i.e. the speaker knows
the answer).

2. Definitions of implicature
Herbert Paul Grice (1913–1988) was the first to systematically study cases in
which what a speaker means differs from what the sentence used by the speaker
means.

Implicature is the central concept in Grice’s philosophy of language. In Logic

and Conversation, Grice introduces the concept of ‘implicature’, i.e. the action of
implying, the verb ‘implicate’ and the noun ‘implicatum’ (referring to what is
implied) (Grice 1989, p. 24).

The word “implicature” is derived from the verb “to imply”, as is its cognate
“implication”. “to imply” means “to fold something into something else”; hence,
what is implied, is “folded in”, and has to be “unfolded” in order to be understood.
(Mey, 2001:99)

Oxford Languages Online Dictionary defines implicature as “the action of

implying a meaning beyond the literal sense of what is explicitly stated” and “implied
meaning”. Implicature can also be defined as an additional conveyed meaning. That
something must be more than just what the words mean. (Yule, 1996:35)
 3. Conversational implicature
Grice distinguished two different sorts of implicature: conversational
implicature and conventional implicature. They have in common the property that
they both convey an additional level of meaning, beyond the semantic meaning of the
words uttered. They differ in that in the case of conventional implicature the same
implicature is always conveyed, regardless of context, whereas in the case of
conversational implicature, what is implied varies according to the context of
utterance (Thomas, 1995:57).

The basic assumption in conversation is that, the participants are adhering to

the cooperative principle and the maxims. In [7], Dexter may appear to be violating
the requirements of the quantity maxim.

[7] Charlene: I hope you brought the bread and the cheese.
Dexter: Ah, I brought the bread. (Yule, 1996:40)
After hearing Dexter’s response, Charlene has to assume that Dexter is
cooperating and may be aware of the quantity maxim. But he didn’t mention the
cheese. If he had brought the cheese, he would say so, because he would be adhering
to the quantity maxim. He must intend that she infer that what is not mentioned was
not brought. So, Dexter has conveyed more than he said via conversational
implicature.

We can represent the structure of what was said, with b (=bread) and c
(=cheese) as in [8]. Using the symbol +> for an implicature, we can also
represent the additional conveyed meaning.

[8] Charlene: b & c?

Dexter: b (+> NOT c)
 4. Generalized conversational implicatures
When talking about conversational implicatures, some linguists distinguish
between generalized conversational implicatures and conversational implicatures.

Yule stated that when no special knowledge is required in the context to calculate the
additional conveyed meaning, it is called a generalized conversational implicature.

Levinson (2000: 11–12, 16–22, 42–46) characterized generalized

conversational implicatures similarly as “default inferences”—implicatures we
normally and automatically infer in the absence of evidence.

In the case of example [7] and [9] on page 40, no special knowledge of the
context of utterance is required in order to make the necessary inferences. When
Doobie asks Mary about inviting her friends Bella (=b) and Cathy (=c) to a party. If
Mary had invited Cathy, she would mention Cathy in her answer. Once again, Doobie
must intend that Mary infer that who is not mentioned was not invited. The process of
calculating the implicature doesn’t require any background knowledge of the context
to be made.

[9] a. Doobie: Did you invite Bella and Cathy? (b & c?)
b. Mary: I invited Bella. (b +> NOT c)
One common example in English involves any phrase with an indefinite article
of the type “a/an X” such as “a garden” and “a child” in example [10]:

[10] I was sitting in a garden one day. A child looked over the fence.
These phrases are typically interpreted according to the generalized
conversational implicature that: an X +> not speaker’s X.

The implicature in [10] that the garden and the child mentioned are not the
speaker’s, are calculated on the principle that if the speaker was capable of being
more specific (following the quantity maxim), then he or she would have said “my
garden” and “my child”:
 -> I was sitting in my garden one day. My child looked over the fence.
A number of other generalized conversational implicatures are commonly
communicated on the basis of a scale of values and are consequently known as scalar
implicatures.

5. Scalar implicatures
In this part of the presentation, we will be discussing a specific type of
generalized conversational implicature, known as scalar implicatures. Scalar
implicatures are a common way of communicating meaning in a conversation, and
they arise from the use of a scale of values.

Yule stated that certain information is always communicated by choosing a

word which expresses one value from a scale of values. This is particularly obvious in
terms for expressing quantity, as shown in the scales in [11], where terms are listed
from the highest to the lowest value. The highest value occurs to the left and decreases
as one moves right.

[11] < all, most, many, some, few>

< always, often, sometimes>
When producing an utterance, a speaker selects the word from the scale which is the
most informative and truthful (quantity and quality) in the circumstances, as in [12].

[12] I'm studying linguistics and I've completed some of the required courses.
By choosing 'some' in [12], the speaker creates an implicature (+> not all).
This is one scalar implicature of uttering [12].
There is a clear opposition between ‘some’ and ‘all’. However, on a strictly
logical interpretation, ‘some’ does not exclude ‘all’: there is a sense in which ‘all’ can
be said to be a very special case of ‘some’. (Mey, 1993:102)

Then how do we interpret that some but not all of the required courses were
completed?
 Based on the principle of cooperation, there is a conversational implicature at
work here that tells us that if a speaker says ‘some’, he or she does not mean ‘all’,
because in that case, s/he would have said so. (Mey, 1993: 103)

The basis of scalar implicature is that, when any form in a scale is asserted, the
negative of all forms higher on the scale is implicated. The first scale in [11] had 'all',
'most', and 'many', higher than 'some'. Given the definition of scalar implicature, it
should follow that, in saying 'some of the required courses', the speaker also creates
other implicatures (for example, +> not most, +> not many).

There are many scalar implicatures produced by the use of expressions that we
may not immediately consider to be part of any scale. For example, the utterance of
[14a.] will be interpreted as implicating '+> not certain' as a higher value on the scale
of 'likelihood' and [14b.] '+> not must' on a scale of 'obligation' and '+> not frozen'
on a scale of 'coldness'.

[14] a. It's possible that they were delayed,

b. This should be stored in a cool place.
One noticeable feature of scalar implicatures is that when speakers correct
themselves on some detail, as in [15], they typically cancel one of the scalar
implicatures.

[15] I got some of this jewelry in Hong Kong—um actually I think I got
most of it there.
In [15], the speaker initially implicates '+> not most' by saying 'some', but then
corrects herself by actually asserting 'most'. That final assertion is still likely to be
interpreted, however, with a scalar implicature (+> not all).

(Yule, 1996: 41-42)

 6. Particularized conversational implicatures
In the preceding examples, the implicatures have been calculated without
special knowledge of any particular context. However, most of the time, our
conversations take place in very specific contexts in which locally recognized
inferences are assumed. Such inferences are required to work out the conveyed
meanings which result from particularized conversational implicatures. Because they
are by far the most common, particularized conversational implicatures are typically
just called implicatures.

Consider example [17], in which the speaker appears not to adhere to (i.e. to
'flout') the maxim of manner:

[17] Ann: Where are you going with the dog?

Sam: To the V-E-T.
In the local context of these speakers, the dog is known to recognize the word
'vet', and to hate being taken there, so Sam produces a more elaborate, spelled out (i.e.
less brief) version of his message, implicating that he doesn't want the dog to know
the answer to the question just asked.

In [18], Leila has just walked into Mary's office and noticed all the work on her
desk. Mary's response seems to flout the maxim of relevance.

[18] Leila: Whoa! Has your boss gone crazy?

Mary: Let's go get some coffee.
In order to preserve the assumption of cooperation, Leila will have to infer
some local reason (for example, the boss may be nearby) why Mary makes an
apparently non-relevant remark. The implicature here is essentially that Mary cannot
answer the question in that context.
 In addition to these fairly prosaic examples of implicatures, there are other
more entertaining examples, as in [19] and [20], where the responses initially appear
to flout relevance.

[19] Bert: Do you like ice-cream?

Ernie: Is the Pope Catholic?
[2o] Bert: Do vegetarians eat hamburgers?
Ernie: Do chickens have lips?
In [19], Ernie's response does not provide a 'yes' or 'no' answer. Bert must
assume that Ernie is being cooperative, so he considers Ernie's 'Pope' question and
clearly the answer is 'Yes'. So, the answer is known, but the nature of Ernie's response
also implicates that the answer to the question was 'Obviously, yes!'. An additional
conveyed meaning in such a case is that, because the answer was so obvious, the
question did not need to be asked. Example [20] provides the same type of
inferencing with an answer 'Of course not!' as part of the implicature.

(Yule, 1996: 42-44)

7. Properties of conversational implicatures
So far, all the implicatures we have considered have been situated within
conversation, with the inferences being made by people who hear the utterances and
attempt to maintain the assumption of cooperative interaction. Because these
implicatures are part of what is communicated and not said, speakers can always deny
that they intended to communicate such meanings. Conversational implicatures are
deniable. They can be explicitly denied (or alternatively, reinforced) in different ways.
To take a simple example, there is a standard implicature associated with stating a
number, that the speaker means only that number, as shown in [21].

[21] You have won five dollars! (+> ONLY five)

 As shown in [22], however, it is quite easy for a speaker to suspend the
implicature (+> only) using the expression 'at least' [22a.], or to cancel the
implicature by adding further information, often following the expression 'in fact'
[22b.], or to reinforce the implicature with additional information, as in [22c.].

[22] a. You've won at least five dollars!

b. You've won five dollars, in fact, you've won ten!
c. You've won five dollars, that's four more than one!
We have already noted with many of the previous examples that implicatures
can be calculated by the listeners via inference. In terms of their defining properties,
then, conversational implicatures can be calculated, suspended, cancelled, and
reinforced. None of these properties apply to conventional implicatures.

(Yule, 1996: 44-45)

8. Conventional implicatures
In contrast to all the conversational implicatures discussed so far, conventional
implicatures are not based on the cooperative principle or the maxims. They don't
have to occur in conversation, and they don't depend on special contexts for their
interpretation. Not unlike lexical presuppositions, conventional implicatures are
associated with specific words and result in additional conveyed meanings when those
words are used. The English conjunction 'but' is one of these words. The
interpretation of any utterance of the type p but q will be based on the conjunction p &
q plus an implicature of 'contrast' between the information in p and the information in
q. In [23], the fact that 'Mary suggested black' (= p) is contrasted, via the conventional
implicature of 'but', with my choosing white (= q).

[23] a. Mary suggested black, but I chose white,

b. p & q (+>p is in contrast to q)
 Other English words such as 'even' and 'yet' also have conventional
implicatures. When 'even' is included in any sentence describing an event, there is an
implicature of 'contrary to expectation'. Thus, in [24] there are two events reported
(i.e. John's coming and John's helping) with the conventional implicature of 'even'
adding a 'contrary to expectation' interpretation of those events.

[24] a. Even John came to the party.

b. He even helped tidy up afterwards.
The conventional implicature of 'yet' is that the present situation is expected to
be different, or perhaps the opposite, at a later time. In uttering the statement in [25a.],
the speaker produces an implicature that she expects the statement 'Dennis is here' (=
p) to be true later, as indicated in [25b.].

[25] a. Dennis isn't here yet. (=NOTp)

b. NOT p is true (+> p expected to be true later)
It may be possible to treat the so-called different 'meanings' of 'and' in English
(discussed in Chapter I) as instances of conventional implicature in different
structures. When two statements containing static information are joined by 'and', as
in [26a.], the implicature is simply 'in addition' or 'plus'. When the two statements
contain dynamic, action-related information, as in [26b.], the implicature of 'and' is
'and then' indicating sequence.

[26] a. Yesterday, Mary was happy and ready to

work. (p &t q,+> p plus q)

b. She put on her clothes and left the house.

(p &C q, +> q after p)

Because of the different implicatures, the two parts of [26a.] can be reversed
with little difference in meaning, but there is a big change in meaning if the two parts
of [26b.] are reversed. (Yule, 1996: 45-46)
III. DIRECTNESS AND INDIRECTNESS
1. Indirectness and Culture
Different cultures have distinct norms and conventions regarding politeness
and face-saving in communication. Brown and Levinson proposed a theory of
politeness that explores how individuals use linguistic strategies to mitigate face
threats and maintain social harmony in their work “Politeness: Some universals in
language usage” (1987, p91). Their work highlights cultural variations in politeness
strategies and their impact on directness/indirectness in speech.

Cross-cultural pragmatics examines how cultural factors influence pragmatic

competence and communication patterns. Blum-Kulka, House, and Kasper (1989)
conducted research on speech act realization patterns in requests and apologies across
different cultures, highlighting variations in directness and politeness strategies. They
analyzed data from naturalistic interactions and elicited speech acts to identify and
compare the strategies used by speakers from various cultural backgrounds when
making requests or offering apologies. They concluded that their research on
cross-cultural pragmatics, focusing on requests and apologies, revealed significant
differences in speech act realization patterns across cultures. They found that cultural
factors such as power distance, social hierarchy, and face-saving concerns influence
pragmatic behavior, leading to variations in the use of direct and indirect speech acts
and politeness strategies. Another study that supports this theory is when Hofstede
(1980) identified cultural dimensions, such as individualism-collectivism, power
distance, and uncertainty avoidance, that influence communication patterns. These
dimensions provide insights into cultural variations in directness/indirectness and the
underlying cultural values that shape communication styles.

Hall (1976, p. 105) introduced the concept of high-context and low-context

cultures, which refers to the degree to which contextual cues are relied upon in
communication. In high-context cultures, such as many Asian and Middle Eastern
cultures, indirect speech acts are more common as meaning is often conveyed
implicitly through context, shared knowledge, and nonverbal cues. In contrast,
low-context cultures, such as many Western cultures, tend to favor more direct and
explicit communication.

2. Indirectness and Gender

Studies have found that women and men may exhibit different linguistic styles
and preferences in communication. Some research suggests that women tend to use
more indirect speech acts and politeness strategies compared to men.

For example, Holmes (1997, p1) conducted research on gender and politeness,
observing that women often employ linguistic strategies to mitigate face threats and
maintain positive social relationships. Her work suggested that women tend to use
more indirect speech acts and politeness strategies compared to men. These
differences in communication styles were attributed to sociocultural factors such as
socialization, gender roles, and societal expectations. Holmes's research highlighted
the influence of gender on pragmatic behavior and contributed to the understanding of
gendered communication patterns in various contexts. Holmes argued that gender
differences in politeness behavior are influenced by sociocultural factors such as
socialization, gender roles, and societal expectations. Women are often socialized to
be more cooperative, empathetic, and relationship-oriented, leading to the adoption of
politeness strategies as a means of expressing empathy and maintaining social
harmony.

Holmes (1997, p56) also suggested that gender differences in communication

styles can be influenced by sociocultural factors such as socialization, gender roles,
and societal expectations. Cultural norms and stereotypes regarding femininity and
masculinity may shape individuals' communication behavior, leading to variations in
directness/indirectness in speech.

Gender differences in speech may also affect how language is perceived and
interpreted by others. Research has shown that listeners may attribute different
meanings or intentions to the same utterance based on the speaker's gender, leading to
potential misunderstandings or misinterpretations. In her seminal work, "Language
and Woman's Place," Robin Lakoff (1975, p49-53) explored how gender differences
in
 language use contribute to the construction of gender roles and stereotypes. She
identified linguistic features associated with women's speech, such as hedging, tag
questions, polite forms and empty adjectives, and discussed how these features can
shape perceptions of women's competence, assertiveness, and social status. Lakoff
identified several linguistic features that she associated with women's speech. These
features include:

- Hedging: Women tend to use hedges such as "sort of," "kind of," or "maybe"
more frequently than men. These linguistic devices soften the impact of
statements and convey uncertainty or tentativeness.

- Tag Questions: Women often use tag questions, such as "isn't it?" or "don't you
think?" to seek confirmation or agreement from their interlocutors.

- Polite Forms: Women are more likely to use polite forms and politeness
markers in speech, such as "please" and "thank you," which contribute to
maintaining positive social relationships and mitigating potential face threats.

- Empty Adjectives: Lakoff observed that women tend to use more "empty
adjectives" like "adorable," "nice," or "charming" in their speech, which may
reflect a focus on interpersonal relationships and emotional expression.

3. Measurement and use of indirectness

With all the aforementioned studies, a conclusion was reached that the use of
indirectness in communication serves various pragmatic functions, including:

- Politeness: Indirect speech acts are often used to maintain positive social
relationships, show respect, and mitigate potential face threats. Politeness
strategies such as hedging, indirect requests, and mitigating expressions help
speakers navigate social interactions and avoid imposing on others.

- Face-saving: Indirectness allows speakers to save face and preserve their own
and others' social identities. By conveying sensitive or potentially threatening
 messages indirectly, speakers can minimize embarrassment, conflict, or loss of
face for themselves and their interlocutors.

- Implicature: Indirect speech acts rely on implicature, where the intended

meaning is inferred from the context and conventionalized linguistic cues
rather than explicitly stated. Listeners use contextual information, shared
knowledge, and cultural norms to interpret indirect messages and infer the
speaker's intentions.

- Social Harmony: Indirectness contributes to social harmony by allowing

speakers to navigate complex social hierarchies, power dynamics, and cultural
norms. Indirect speech acts can facilitate cooperation, negotiation, and
compromise in interpersonal and intercultural interactions.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Discourse & Discourse analysis (Diễn ngôn và Phân tích Diễn ngôn)...................4
1. Introduction...........................................................................................................4
1.1. Discourse (Diễn ngôn)...................................................................................4
1.2. Discourse analysis (Phân tích diễn ngôn)......................................................4
2. Linguistics forms & functions (Hình thức và chức năng ngôn ngữ)................5
2.1. Functions of language (Chức năng ngôn ngữ)...............................................5
2.2. Spoken and written language ( Ngôn ngữ nói và ngôn ngữ viết)..................8
3. Discourse................................................................................................................9
3.1. Coherence (Mạch lạc)....................................................................................9
3.2. Cohesion (Liên kết)........................................................................................9
3.3. Reference (Quy chiếu).................................................................................12
3.4. Substitution (Phép thế).................................................................................16
3.5. Ellipsis (Phép tỉnh lược)...............................................................................19
3.6. Conjunction (Phép nối)................................................................................22
4. Pronouns in discourse.........................................................................................24
4.1. Pronouns and antecedent nominals (Đại từ và danh ngữ đứng trước).........24
4.2. Pronouns and antecedent predicates (Đại từ và vị ngữ đứng trước)............25
4.3. Pronouns and ‘new' predicates (Đại từ và vị ngữ mới)................................26
5. Background knowledge......................................................................................27
5.1. Schemata (Lược đồ).....................................................................................27
5.2. Frames (Khuân mẫu)....................................................................................28
5.3. Scripts (Kịch bản).........................................................................................29
II. Discourse and Culture............................................................................................31
1. Cultural Schema (Lược đồ văn hóa).................................................................31
2. Cross-cultural pragmatics (Ngữ dụng học xuyên văn hóa)............................37

2
I. Discourse & Discourse analysis (Diễn ngôn và Phân tích Diễn ngôn)
1. Introduction
1.1. Discourse (Diễn ngôn)
First of all, according to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, discourse
is defined as “the use of language in speech and writing to produce or convey
meaning”. However, discourse has no generally agreed-upon definition. The concept
of ‘discourse’ is further elucidated by many scholars. According to Van Dijk (2009:
67), discourse is regarded as a "multi-dimensional social phenomenon", so Oxford
Dictionary's definition is considered to be insufficient and inadequate. He suggested
that:
“It is at the same time a linguistic object, an action, a form of social
interaction, a social practice, a mental representation, an interactional or
communicative event or activity, a cultural product or even an economic
commodity that is being sold and bought .”
Van Dijk, 2009:
67 In other words, a more or less complete ‘definition’ of the notion of
discourse
would involve many dimensions and consists of many other fundamental notions that
need definition, that is, theory, such as meaning, interaction and cognition.
As for other scholars, the concept of ‘discourse’ is further elucidated.
Discourse, as the product of language use, can be seen as a stretch of conversation
(dialogue) or as a domain of communication (Jucker & Andreas H, 2017). The notion
of discourse can be understood as language in use – expectations, norms and
preferences that bound language to specific contexts (Brown & Yule, 1983). As for
Gee (1999), discourse can be defined as “socially accepted associations among ways
of using language, of thinking, valuing, acting, and interacting in the right place and
the right place and at the right times with the right objects”. Mumby & Stohl
(1991:315) stated that discourse is the ensemble of phenomena in and through which
social production of meaning takes place.
1.2. Discourse analysis (Phân tích diễn ngôn)
According to Yule (1996: 83) discourse analysis covers an extremely wide
range of activities, from the narrowly focussed investigation of how words such as 'oh'

3
and 'well' are used in casual talk to the study of the dominant ideology in a culture as
represented, for example, in its educational or political practices. As for Cambridge
Dictionary, discourse analysis is the analysis of spoken or written texts that contain
more than one sentence, including their social context. Moreover, discourse analysis is
"the study of language use with reference to the social and psychological factors that
influence communication" (Yule, 1996:129). And for (Stubbs, 1983:1), discourse
analysis is defined in three ways as: (a) concerned with language use beyond the
boundaries of a sentence/utterance; (b) concerned with the interrelationships between
language and society and; (c) as concerned with the interactive or dialogic properties
of everyday communication.
2. Linguistics forms & functions (Hình thức và chức năng ngôn ngữ học)
2.1. Functions of language (Chức năng ngôn ngữ)
According to Yule, the emphasis in the preceding chapter was particularly on
aspects of the turn-taking procedures for control of the floor, with less attention paid
to what speakers had to say once they got the floor. Consequently, they have to rely
on more explicit structural mechanisms for the organization of the texts.
In this expanded perspective, speakers and writers are viewed as using
language not only in its Interpersonal function, but also in its Textual function, and
Ideational function.
2.1.1. Interpersonal function (Chức năng liên nhân):
Interpersonal function: taking part in social interaction. (Yule, 1996:83).
Interpersonal function focuses on the interactivity of the language, and concerns the
ways in which we act upon one another through language. In either spoken texts or
written texts, an interlocutor expects to tell listeners/readers via text. This means that
each text has a relationship between providers of information and recipients of
information.
Example:
(1) (Declaratives - câu trần thuật) Mike arrived at school at nine o’clock.

4
(2) (Interrogatives - câu hỏi) Did Mike arrive at school at nine o’clock?.
or What time did Mike arrive at school?.
or Where did Mike arrive at nine
o’clock?.
(3) (Imperatives - câu mệnh lệnh) Tell me when Mike arrived at school.
Halliday (White,
2000:7) In the declaratives, the information is provided from the speaker to a
listener/reader; the former is a provider of information and the latter is a recipient of
information.
In the interrogatives, we can see the opposite movement of information; the
speaker expects to receive an answer (yes/no, at nine o’clock, or at school) from a
listener/reader. This shows that the former is a recipient of information, and the latter
is a (potential) provider of information.
In the imperatives, the speaker gives the information to a listener/reader; the
former is a recipient of information, and the latter is a provider of information/service,
as in the case of the interrogatives.
Halliday (White, 2000:7).
2.1.2. Textual function (Chức năng ngôn bản):
It is significant to consider the social roles and relationships, seen in the text, of
a speaker and a listener/reader: “their relative social status and power, their degree of
intimacy, the degree to which they share common knowledge, the degree to which
they are in agreement or share a sense of solidarity”.
(White, 2000:20).
Textual function (Chức năng văn bản): creating well-performed and appropriate
text
(Yule, 1996:83).
It is through this function that the speaker is able to communicate with his/her
audience. Textual function helps to provide texture to what is said, and quality of
coherence and cohesion to what is said. Without texture, text cannot be created.

5
(Halliday and Hassan, 1976). Language makes links with itself and with feature of the
situation in which it is used. This is what enables the speaker or writer to construct a
text, and enables the listener or reader to distinguish a text from a random set of
sentences. Textual functions deal with ‘the way in which a stretch of language is
organized in relation to its context’.
(Lock, 1996:10).
Example: (1): “Mike arrived at school at nine o’clock”.
(2) : “He arrived at school at nine o’clock”.
(3) : “It was Mike who arrived at school at nine o’clock”.
Although the core messages of the three sentences are the same, the speaker of
each sentence can express a different nuance to the listener/reader by using a different
form. Replacing the subject Mike with the pronoun he in (2), it can be seen that the
interlocutor expects that the listener/reader should already know who s/he is
mentioning. In the case of (3), the speaker puts a strong focus on the subject Mike as
an actor of the event.Hence, it is obvious that the way of expressing the interlocutor’s
experience decides the meanings of the three sentences.
Ideational function (Chức năng tư tưởng): representing thought and
experience in a coherent way.
(Yule, 1996:83).
Ideational function deals with the ways the language represents the
interlocutor’s experience: ‘how we talk about actions, happenings, feelings, beliefs,
situations, states, and so on, the people and things involved in them, and the relevant
circumstances of time, place, manner, and so on.
(Lock, 1996:9).
It focuses on how the text represents the external/internal reality: a certain
happening by a certain person at a certain situation in the reality.
Example: ‘Mike arrived at school at nine o’clock’
(Lock, 1996:9).
It can be analyzed that a man (Mike) represents his act (arrive) at the past tense

6
in a certain situation (place = school, time = nine o’clock). It can be supposed to be
between Mike’s friends, between Mike’s teacher and his classmate, or between Mike’s
teachers, etc. In this case, it can be said that the text was delivered in a casual
conversation between people who know Mike. Obviously, the speaker of the text
represents his event in the experiential world.
2.2. Spoken and written language (Ngôn ngữ nói và ngôn ngữ viết)
It seems reasonable to suggest that, whereas in daily life in a literate culture, we
use speech largely for the establishment and maintenance of human relationships
(primarily transactional use - mục đích sử dụng là tương tác chủ yếu), we use written
language largely for the working out of and transference of information (primarily
transactional use - mục đích sử dụng là truyền đạt thông tin chủ yếu).
From the point of view of production, it is clear that spoken and written
language make somewhat different demands on language-producers. The speaker has
available to him the full range of “voice quality” effects (as well as facial expression,
postural and gestural systems).
Gillian Brown & George
Yule The speaker can always override the effect of the words he speaks. For
example, the speaker who says “I'd really like to”, then leaning forward, smiling,
with a “warm, breath”' voice quality, is much more likely to be interpreted as meaning
what he says, than another speaker uttering the same words, leaning away, brow
puckered, with a “sneering, nasal” voice quality. Not only is the speaker controlling
the production of communicative systems which are different from those controlled by
the writer, he is also processing that production under circumstances which are
considerably more demanding.
The speak must monitor what it is that he has just said, and determine whether
it matches his intentions, while he is uttering his current phrase and monitoring that,
and simultaneously planning his next utterance and fitting that into the overall pattern
of what he wants to say and monitoring, moreover, not only his own performance but
its reception by his hearer. He has no permanent record of what he has and said earlier,

7
and only under unusual circumstances does he have notes which remind him what he
wants to say next.
The writer may look over what he has already written, pause between each
word with no fear of his speaker interrupting him, take his time in choosing a
particular word, even looking it up in the dictionary if necessary, check his progress
with his notes, reorder what he has written, and even change his mind about what he
wants to say.
Whereas the speaker is under considerable pressure to keep on talking during
the period allotted to him, the writer is characteristically under no such pressure.
Whereas the speaker knows that any words which pass his lips will be heard by the
speaker and, if they are not what he intends, he will have to undertake active, public
“repair”, the writer can cross out and rewrite in the privacy of his study. Goody goes
on to make even larger claims about the ways in which the acquisition of writing,
which permits man to reflect upon what he has thought, has permitted the development
of cognitive structures which are not available to the non-literate (cf. also the views of
Vygotsky, 1962).
There are occasions when speech is used for the detailed transmission of factual
information. It is noteworthy, then, that the recipient often writes down the details that
he is told. So a doctor writes down his patient's symptoms, an architect writes down
his client's requirements, Hansard records the proceedings of the British Parliament,
we write down friends' addresses, telephone numbers, recipes, knitting patterns, and so
on.
(Goody, 1977: 17)
3. Discourse
3.1. Coherence (Mạch lạc)
In the pragmatics of discourse, we inevitably explore what the speaker or writer
has in mind. And what language users have most in mind is an assumption of
coherence. Coherence A logical arrangement of parts (linguistic), simply that what is
said or written will make sense in terms of normal experiences. Generally, what

8
language users have most in mind is an assumption of coherence, that what is said or
written will make serise in terms of their normal experience of things. That “normal”
experience will be locally interpreted by each individual and hence will be tied to the
familiar and the expected.

(Yule,1996:84)
[ I] a. Plant Sale (Yule,1996:84)
b. Garage Sale
In the neighborhood where I live, the notice in [Ia] means that someone is
selling plants, but the notice in [Ib] does not mean that someone is selling garages.
Indeed, the interpretation of [Ib], that someone is selling household items from their
garage, is one that requires some familiarity with suburban life. They try to arrive at an
agreement that fits their experience of the world. Here is a good example, adopted
from Widdowson.
Her: That's the telephone
Him: I’m in the bath
Her: Ok
(Discourse Analysis, Widdowson, H.G,2007)
→ We can interpret the above dialogue with the help of conventional action and by our
background knowledge that someone in the bathroom cannot attend to the phone.
3.2. Cohesion (Liên kết)
According to Cambridge Dictionary, Cohesion means the situation when the
members of a group or a society are united. According to Halliday & Hasan (1976:2),
writers take the view that the primary determinant of whether a set of sentences do or
do not constitute a text depends on cohesive relationships within and between the
sentences, which create texture: “A text has texture and this is what distinguishes it
from something that is not a text ... The texture is provided by the cohesive relation.”

9
 According to Wang, Y & Guo, M (2014:462), Cohesion can hold segments of a
text together, making it a semantic edifice. The importance of cohesion lies in the
continuity it expresses between one part of the text and another.
Wang, Y & Guo, M (2014:462).
a. Text (Văn bản)
According to Halliday and Hasan (1976:1), Text is used in linguistics to refer
to any passage, spoken or written of whatever length, that does form a unified whole.
A text may be spoken or written, prose or verse, dialogue or monologue. It may
be anything (from a single proverb to a whole play, from a momentary cry for help to
an all-day discussion on a committee.)
b. Texture (Kết cấu):
According to Halliday and Hasan (1976:2), the concept of TEXTURE is
entirely appropriate to express the property of “being a text”. A text has texture, and
this is what distinguishes it from something that is not a text.
A paradigm example of such a cohesive relationship is given.
Example:
[1:1] Wash and core six cooking apples. Put them into a fireproof dish.
[1:1] Rửa sạch và bỏ lõi sáu quả táo nấu ăn. Đặt chúng vào một cái đĩa
chống cháy.
Halliday & Hasan (1976:2)
Of this text they say: “It is clear that the second sentence refers back to (is
ANAPHORIC - Phép tham chiếu to) the six cooking apples in the first sentence.
This ANAPHORIC function of them gives cohesion to the two sentences, so that we
interpret them as a whole; the two sentences together constitute a text”.
Halliday & Hasan (1976:2)
c. Ties (Gắn kết)
Ties refer to a single instance of cohesion, occurrence of a pair of cohesively
related items.
Halliday and Hasan (1976:3)

10
 Back to example [1:1] Wash and core six cooking apples. Put them into a
fireproof dish. Halliday and Hasan (1976:2), the relation between them and six
cooking apples constitutes a tie.
d. Comparison Coherence and Cohesion:

Coherence Cohesion

➤Very general principle of ➤ Formal linguistic elements

interpretation ex: repetition, reference.
of language in context. ➤ Semantic relationships between
➤ Fewer formal linguistic features. sentences and within sentences.
ex: vocabulary choice. ➤ Determined by lexically and
➤ Relationships deal with text as a grammatically overt relationships.
whole. ➤ More recognizable.
➤Based on primarily semantic Example:
Credit cards are convenient, but
relationships.
➤ Errors much more obvious. dangerous. People often get them in
Example: order to make large purchases easily
- My friend's on the phone. He without saving up lots of money in
says he needs the drill that he advance. This is especially helpful for
lent us. purchases like cars, kitchen appliances,
(Use of a pronoun to refer back to an etc., that you may need to get without
already-mentioned noun). delay. However, this convenience
- There was so much delicious comes at a high price: interest rates.
food on display, but I'm on a The more money you put on your credit
diet so I had to stick to the card, the more the bank or credit union
salad. will charge you for that convenience. If
(Substitution of an already mentioned you're not careful, credit card debt can
noun by a synonym or hyponym). quickly break the bank and leave you in
very dire economic circumstances!

11
3.3. Reference (Quy chiếu)
Words that make reference to something else for their interpretation.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 31)
Reference refers to an act in which a speaker, or writer, uses linguistic forms to
enable a listener, or reader, to identify something.
(Yule 1996: 17)
Reference is not simply a relationship between the meaning of a word or phrase
and an object or person in the world. It is a social act, in which the speaker assumes
that the word or phrase chosen to identify an object or person will be interpreted as the
speaker intended.
(Yule, 1996: 22)
Halliday and Hasan (1976: 33) call within text cohesive ties endophoric and
references, items outside the text exophoric.
There are three types of reference: Personal, Demonstrative and Comparative
How do we describe these words? Exophoric or Endophoric (Anaphoric,
Cataphoric)
3.3.1. Exophoric reference and endophoric reference
3.3.1.1. Exophoric reference
Exophora appears when the meaning is not explicit from the text itself, but it is
obvious to those in a particular situation. Exophoric reference is one form of
context-dependence since without the context, we cannot interpret what is said.
[2:2]
For he's a jolly good fellow
And so say all of us.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 32)
The text doesn’t make it explicit who he is, although his identity is not in doubt
to those who are present.

12
3.3.1.2. Endophoric reference
Endophora is considered a textual reference which connects main parts of the
text together.
[2:1] b.
Doctor Foster went to Gloucester in a shower of rain.
He stepped in a puddle right up to his middle and never went there again.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 31)
The text makes it explicit who he is. He refers to Doctor Foster.
Reference items may be exophoric or endophoric; and, if endophoric, they may
be anaphoric or cataphoric.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 33)
3.3.1.2.1. Anaphoric reference
Anaphoric references remind the reader of information previously read.
(Awward, 2017: 35)
[2:1] a.
Three blind mice, three blind mice.
See how they run! See how they run!
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 31)
Anaphoric reference they refers back to three blind mice previously mentioned.
3.3.1.2.2. Cataphoric reference
If an anaphora refers back to something previously mentioned, a cataphora
refers to something not yet mentioned.

(Awward, 2017: 35)

[13] I turned the corner and almost stepped on it. There was a large snake in the
middle of the path.

(Yule, 1996: 23)

The pronoun it is used first and is difficult to interpret until the full noun phrase
is presented in the next line.

13
3.3.2. Personal reference, Demonstrative reference, Comparative reference
3.3.2.1. Personal reference
Personal reference is reference by means of function in the speech situation,
through the category of PERSON. The term PERSON might seem a little misleading,
as the system includes not only “impersonal” meanings (which are actually still
personal, ie huma; they are merely or individualized) but also reference that is truly
non-personal, reference to objects. But most grammatical terms have fuzzy edges; they
express the central or typical meaning of the category in question, and are justified by
being in this way simple and easy to remember.

(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 37-45)

[2:1] a. (Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 31)
Three blind mice, three blind mice.
See how they run! See how they run!
They refers to three blind mice.
Some special kinds of personal reference:
- Extended reference it
The word it differs from all other personals in that it may refer not only to a
particular person or object, some entity that is encoded linguistically as a ‘participant’
- a noun or nominal expression - but also to any identifiable portion of text.
Of course it can be rude to call another person it but sometimes we use it in a phone
call. The person wouldn't get angry when you call them it in that situation.
“Who was that?” - “It was Alice”
But it is used more commonly when it refers to a longer section of the text, it
refers to process.
[2:18]
[The Queen said:] ‘Curtsey while you’re thinking what to say. It saves time.’ Alice
wondered a little at this, but she was too much in awe of the Queen to disbelieve it.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 52)

14
 It refers to Curtsey while you’re thinking what to say, the reference is still to a
‘thing’, but not in the narrow sense of a participant (person or object) - it is a whole
process or complex phenomenon which is in question.
- Generalized exophoric reference
a. Dave, you shouldn’t smoke.
b. 10 reasons you shouldn’t smoke.
The you in (a) refers to Dave
particularly
The you in (b) means ‘persons unspecified’. It doesn’t just mean you - the one
who is reading it right now. But it can also refer generally to anyone who reads the
text or might read the text. It's a generalized exophoric reference.
3.3.2.2. Demonstrative
Demonstrative is essentially a form of verbal pointing. The speaker identifies
the referent by locating it on a scale of PROXIMITY.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 57)
Proximity: the state of being near somebody/something in distance or time.
(Oxford Learner’s Dictionarie)
[2:30] Leave that there and come here!
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 58)
In general this, these and here imply proximity to the speaker; that, those and
there imply distance from the speaker, which may or may not involve proximity to the
addressee - the meaning is ‘near you, or not near either of us, but at any rate not near
me’.
Demonstratives can refer to extended bits of text.
[2:51] They broke a Chinese vase.
(i) That was valuable.
(ii) That was careless.
(Halliday and Hay, 1976: 66)
In (i) that refers to the object vase; we could have that vase instead. In (ii) that
refers to the total event (their breaking of the vase).

15
3.3.2.3. Comparative
- General comparison
General comparison expresses likeness between things. The likeness may take
the form of identity, where ‘two things’ are, in fact, the same thing, as in [2:71a]; or of
similarity where two things are like each other, as in [2:71b]. Each of these has its
negative; there is non-identity, and non-similarity. But these two concepts are
conflated, in the semantic system, into a single meaning, that of non-likeness, or
difference, as in [2:71c].
[2:71]
a. It's the same cat as the one we saw yesterday.
b. It’s a similar cat to the one we saw yesterday.
c. It's a different cat from the one we saw yesterday.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 78)
Likeness is a referential property. A thing can not just be “like”, it must be “like
something”. In each case of all examples [2:71], the referent was the one we saw
yesterday.
- Particular comparison means comparison that is in respect of quality or
quantity.
This tree is taller than that tree.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 81)
We know we compare this tree and that tree in terms of height.
3.4. Substitution (Phép thế)
Substitution is another kind of cohesive relation. A substitution is a counter that
is used in place of the particular item. Substitution can be thought of in simplest terms
as processes within the text: substitution as the replacement of one item by another.
(Halliday and Hay, 1976: 88)
[3:1]
a. My axe is too blunt. I must get a sharper one.
b. You think Joan already knows? - I think everybody does.
(Halliday and Hay, 1976: 89)
The substitute has the same structural function as the original.

16
 In the above example, one and axe are both Head in the nominal group; and
does and knows are both Head in the verbal group.
Substitution is a relation between linguistic items, such as words or phrases;
whereas reference is a relation between meanings. In terms of the linguistic system,
reference is a relation on the semantic level, whereas substitution is a relation on the
lexicogrammatical level, the level of grammar and vocabulary, or linguistic ‘form’.
In English, the substitute may function as a noun, as a verb, or as a clause. To
these correspond the three types of substitution: nominal, verbal, and causal.
3.4.1. Nominal substitution
Nominal substitution means the replacement of a noun or a noun phrase by a
nominal substitute (one/ones, same). Nominal substitution functions either as the head
of the nominal group or as to presuppose an entire nominal group.
3.4.1.1. One/ones
The substitutes one/ones always functions as Head of a nominal group, and
only substitutes only for an item which is itself Head of a nominal group.
[3:4]
I shoot the hippopotamus
With bullets made of
platinum Because if I use
leaden ones His hide is sure to
flatten ‘em.
(Halliday and Hay, 1976: 91)
Bullets is Head of the nominal group bullets made of platinum and ones is Head
of the Nominal group leaden ones.
Substitute may differ from the presupposed item in number, in the following the
presupposed item is the singular cherry, whereas the substitute is plural:
[3:6]
Cherry ripe, cherry ripe, ripe I
cry. Full and fair ones - come and
buy.
(Halliday and Hay, 1976: 91)

17
 But the noun that is presupposed is always a count noun; there is no substitute
form for mass nouns.
[3:7]
a. These biscuits are stale. - Get some fresh ones.
b. This bread’s stale. - Get some fresh.
(Halliday and Hay, 1976: 92)
3.4.1.2. Same
[3:38]
a. I’ll have two poached eggs on toast, please.
b. I’ll have the same.
The same presupposes the entire nominal group, including any modifying elements,
except such as are explicitly repudiated.
(Halliday and Hay, 1976: 105)
It means you can say “the same but fried’/ “the same (but) without the toast”
The same eggs would be comparative reference, not substitution.
3.4.2. Verbal substitution
The verbal substitute in English is do. This operates as Head of a verbal group,
in the place that is occupied by the lexical verb; and its position is always final in the
group.
[3:56]
a. …the words did not come the same as they used to do.
b. ‘I don’t know the meaning of half those long words, and, what’s more, I don’t
believe you do either!’
(Halliday and Hay, 1976: 112)
The first do, in (a), substitutes for come; that in (b) substitutes for know the
meaning of half those long words.

18
3.4.3. Clausal substitution
Clausal substitution is another type of substitution in which what is
presupposed is not an element within the clause but an entire clause. The words used
as substitutes are “so” and “not”.

(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 130)

[3:96] (Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 130)
Example:
Is there going to be an earthquake? - It says so.
Here the so presupposes the whole of the clause there’s going to be an earthquake.
3.5. Ellipsis (Phép tỉnh lược)
The starting point of the discussion of ellipsis can be the familiar notion that it
is ‘something left unsaid’. There is no implication here that what is unsaid is not
understood; on the contrary, ‘unsaid’ implies ‘but understood nevertheless’, and
another way of referring to ellipsis is in fact as SOMETHING UNDERSTOOD, where
understood is used in the special sense of ‘going without saying’.
Ellipsis is simply substitution by zero.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 142)
Ellipsis is the absence of a word or words from a structural slot.
(Yule, 1996: 129)
[14]
a. Peel an onion and slice it.
b. Drop the slices into hot oil.
c. Cook for three minutes.
(Yule, 1996: 23)
When the interpretation requires us to identify an entity, as in ‘Cook (?) for
three minutes’, in [14c], and no linguistic expression is present, it is called ellipsis.
[4:3]
Would you like to hear another verse? I know twelve more.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 143)

19
 There is no structural relationship between the two parts. The second sentence
contains a nominal group twelve more, consisting of a Numerative only, for which we
have to supply a Head noun verses presupposed from the first sentence to understand
the second sentence which could be interpreted as “I know twelve more verses”.
When a substitute is used, it signals that the actual item required, the particular
word or group or clause, is recoverable from the environment; and the substitute
preserves the class of the presupposed item, which may therefore be replaced in the
‘slot’ created by it. The difference between substitution and ellipsis is that in the
former a substitution counter occurs in the slot, and this must therefore be deleted if
the presupposed item is replaced, whereas in the latter the slot is empty - there has
been substitution by zero.
[4:5]
a. This is a fine hall you have here. I’m proud to be lecturing in it.
b. This is a fine hall you have here. I’ve never lectured in a finer one.
c. This is a fine hall you have here. I’ve never lectured in a finer.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976:
146) Example [4:5a] is reference. It would be possible to replace it by some
expression containing the word hall; but it would have to be altered from the original
(eg: in this fine hall).
Examples (b) and (c ) are substitution and ellipsis, and it would be quite natural
to add hall after finer (deleting one in (b)).
In what follows, we shall discuss ellipsis under three headings: nominal
ellipsis, verbal ellipsis and clausal ellipsis.
3.5.1. Nominal ellipsis
By nominal ellipsis we mean ellipsis within the nominal group.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976:
147) [4:7] Which last longer, the curved rods or the straight rods? - The straight are
less likely to break.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 148)
straight function as Modifier in the question but as Head in the answer.

20
 An elliptical nominal group clearly required that there should be available from
some source or other the information necessary for filling it out. Faced with the
straight, we need to know ‘The straight what?’. Normally, the source of information is
a preceding nominal group. A nominal group that is elliptical presupposes a previous
one that is not, and it is therefore cohesive.
3.5.2. Verbal ellipsis
By verbal ellipsis we mean ellipsis within the verbal group.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 167)
[4:54]
a. Have you been swimming? - Yes, I have.
b. What have you been doing? - Swimming.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 167)
The two verbal groups in the answers, have (in Yes, I have) in (a) and
swimming in (b), are both instances of verbal ellipsis. Both can be said to ‘stand for’
have been swimming, and there is no possibility of ‘filling out’ with any other items.
So, for example, swimming in (b) could not be interpreted as I will be swimming or
they are swimming. It could only be interpreted only as I have been swimming, since
as in all types of ellipsis, the full form and the elliptical one are both possible.
3.5.3. Clausal ellipsis
The clause in English, considered as the expression of the various speech
functions, such as statement, question, response and so on, has two-part structure
consisting of MODAL ELEMENT plus PROPOSITIONAL ELEMENT, for example:
[4:96]
(1) The Duke was | going to plant a row of poplars in the
park. (Modal element) (Propositional element)
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 197)
3.5.3.1. Modal ellipsis
[4:97] What was the Duke going to do? - Plant a row of poplars in the park.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 197)

21
 In the answer, the Modal element is omitted: the Subject and, within the verbal
group, the finite operator was. Hence there is operator ellipsis in the verbal group.
3.5.3.2. Propositional ellipsis
[4:98] Who was going to plant a row of poplars in the park? - The Duke was.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 197)
There is omission of the Complement and the Adjunct, and, within the verbal
group, of the lexical verb plant: so we have lexical ellipsis in the verbal group. The
answer could be interpreted as The Duke was going to plant a row of poplars in the
park.
3.6. Conjunction (Phép nối)
Conjunctive elements are cohesive not in themselves but indirectly, by virtue
of their specific meanings; they are not primary devices for reaching out into the
preceding (or following) text, but they express certain meanings which presuppose
the presence of other components in the discourse.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 226)
[5:1]
a. A snowstorm followed the battle. (The battle was followed by a snowstorm)
b. After the battle, there was a snowstorm.
c. After they had fought a battle, it snowed.
d. They fought a battle. Afterwards, it snowed.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976:
228) In [5:1a], the verb follow means ‘occur subsequently in time’.
The relation of succession in time can be expressed as a minor predication; that
is, it may be realized prepositionally, as in [5:1b].
Time sequence may be expressed as a relationship between predications, with
one clause being shown as dependent on another by means of a conjunction as in
[5:1c]
In [5:1d], we have two separate sentences. Here there is no structural
relationship at all; but the two parts are still linked by the same logical relations of
succession in time because of the conjunction Afterwards.

22
 There are 4 types of conjunction: additive, adversative, causal, and temporal.
Here is an example of each:
[5:13] For the whole day he climbed up the steep mountainside, almost without
stopping.
a. And in all this time he met no one. (Additive)
b. Yet he was hardly aware of being tired. (Adversative)
c. So by night time the valley was far below him. (Causal)
d. Then, as dusk fell, he sat down to rest. (Temporal)
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 238)
The words and, yet, so, and then can be taken as typifying these four very
general conjunctive relations, which they express in their simplest form.
3.6.1. Temporal
The relation between the theses of two successive sentences may be simply
one of sequence in time: the one is subsequent to the other. This temporal relation is
expressed by words such as ‘then’, ‘and then’, ‘next’, ‘afterwards’, ‘after that’,
‘sequentially’ and a number of other expressions.

(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 263)

[5:1] d. They fought a battle. Afterwards, it snowed. (Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 228)

3.6.2. Additive
[5:6]
‘I wonder if all the things move along with us?’, thought poor puzzled Alice.
And the Queen seemed to guess her thoughts, for she cried ‘Faster! Don’t try to talk!’
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 235)
In conjunctive relation, the relation is between sentences, and sentences follow
one another one at a time as the text unfolds; they cannot be rearranged, as a
coordinate structure can, in different sequences and different bracketings, eg: women
and men, or men and boys. If you reverse these two sentences, that would change the
meaning. Some additive conjunctions: and, or, nor, further, furthermore, moreover,
besides, additionally, in addition, etc.

23
3.6.3. Adversative
[5:30]
All the figures were correct; they’d been checked. Yet the total came out wrong.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 250)
An adversative conjunction tells you that the two clauses are linked but they're
linked in an adversative way.
Adversative: expressing something that is opposed to or the opposite of what
has been said.
(Oxford Learner’s Dictionarie)
The basic meaning of the adversative relation is “contrary to expectation”. The
expectation may be derived from the context of what is being said, or from the
communication process, the speaker-hearer situation.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 250)
Some adversative conjunctions: though, but, however, nevertheless, etc.
3.6.4. Causal
[5:43] a. … she felt that there was no time to be lost, as she was shrinking rapidly; so
she got to work at once to eat some of the other bit.
(Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 256)
Causal relation involves primarily reason, result and purpose relations between
the sentences. Some causal conjunctions: so, thus, hence, therefore, consequently,
accordingly, etc.
4. Pronouns in discourse
From a formal point of view, the paradigm examples of expressions used by
speakers to refer to 'given' entities. Pronouns are typically uttered with low pitch in
spoken discourse and, as such, are types of referring expressions which, in Chafe's
terms (1976), are phonologically and lexically 'attenuated' (Brown & Yule, 1983:214).

24
4.1. Pronouns and antecedent nominals (Đại từ và danh ngữ đứng trước)
Example: (36) I've just had my hair curled and it looks windblown all the
time. (36a) My hair looks windblown all the time.
(36b) My hair which I've just had curled looks windblown all the time.
In sentence (36), the interpretation of the pronoun is simply replacing it with
my hair. The pronominal it refers back to its antecedent nominal which is my hair.
However Brown & Yule argue that if a 'change of state' predicate is attached to a
nominal expression, then subsequent pronominals must be interpreted in terms of that
predicate. Then, they suggest that a better analysis of it in example (36) would involve
not only the antecedent nominal expression which is my hair, but also the
accompanying predicate which is curled.
So there are 2 interpretations of it in this situation. If the pronoun it just simply
substitutes my hair, we can understand that the speaker's hair naturally looks
windblown like example 36a but if the pronoun it substitutes my hair curled, it means
that the speaker's hair after getting curled looks windblown like example 36b.
Therefore, the nature of the entity to which looks windblown applies is different in
(36b) from that in (36a)
(Brown & Yule, 1983:214)
4.2. Pronouns and antecedent predicates (Đại từ và vị ngữ đứng trước)
According to Brown and Yule, the speakers' use of pronouns is indeed
influenced by the predicates attached to antecedent nominals
(Brown & Yule, 1983:216,217)
Examples (37) and (38) below can elaborate this view.
(37) There's two different ladies go up to the whist and both have a wig and
they're most natural.
(38) Even an apprentice can make over twenty pound a week and they don't get
much tax [taken] from that.
The correct interpretation of they in (37) depends on the hearer's understanding
that there are two wigs, not just one as implied by the nominal antecedent - a wig
alone. In (38), there is a similar problem, with a singular antecedent nominal and a

25
plural pronoun. Using a singular antecedent nominal - an apprentice may seem to
introduce a particular individual into the discourse but in the context of predicate - can
make over twenty pound a week, it refers to any individual which means any
apprentice from a set of individuals to whom the lexical expression - apprentice can be
applied. Therefore, examples (37) and (38) present a grammatical mismatch in terms
of number agreement between antecedent nominal and subsequent pronoun
(Brown & Yule, 1983:217)
Next, examples (39) and (40) will present a mismatch in terms of gender
agreement.
(39) There's a car going up the road and he comes to a crossroads.
(40) The second car hasn't got time to avoid the person who swerved away to
avoid the car that was pulling out and he hits it.
In example (39), the hearer is clearly required to infer that a car moving along a
road must have a driver and that this implied driver is referred to by a pronoun he.
However, when it comes to example (40), it is more complex. Despite the presence of
both a human antecedent - the person and a non-human antecedent - the second car,
the most natural interpretation of what happened requires us to match the 'human'
pronoun - he with the 'non-human' antecedent - the second car, and the 'non-human'
pronoun - it with the 'human' antecedent - the person who swerved away to avoid the
car.
(Brown & Yule, 1983:217)
4.3. Pronouns and ‘new' predicates (Đại từ và vị ngữ mới)
When a pronoun occurs in a discourse with no antecedent nominal, the
inadequacy of the substitution approach is even more apparent. That is, the speaker
may structure his message in such a way that some 'new' information is attached to a
'given' element like using a pronoun, intending to provide the hearer with a 'given or
new' interpretive procedure. However, the hearer may have to reverse that procedure
and use the 'new' information to decide what the 'given' referent must have been.
(Brown & Yule, 1983:218)
Here is an example:

26
 (41) (Talking about the First World War) I used to go about with a chap - I
don't know whether he's still alive now or not - but - there was nine - ten - eleven in
the family altogether - two girls - and nine boys - and she lost eight sons one after the
other.
In this example, there is no direct antecedent for she. However, we can still
propose that if the speaker is talking about a family and there is a female referent (she)
who lost eight sons, then we can infer that it is 'the mother' the speaker is referring to.
Notice that, if the hearer does follow this procedure, then he is using 'new' information
to determine a 'given' referent.
Moreover, we have an example from conversational discourse where pronouns
are used to realise 'given' information should 'serve as an address directing the listener
to where "new" information should be stored'.
(42) one of our main jobs in the Botanics is writing on the flora of Turkey +
they . . .
(42a) one of our main jobs in the Botanics is writing on the flora of Turkey +
they don't have the scientists to do it.
In this example, the speaker has assumed that, if he is talking about a country,
he can refer to a group of people in that country without stating explicitly that 'Turkey
has people in it'. This assumption requires the hearer to infer this connection only after
hearing the new predicate associated with the pronoun they.
To sum up, these given examples have been presented as illustration of the fact
that we need to take 'new' predicates into account when assigning an interpretation to
some 'given' elements, such as pronouns in discourse. The interpretation of the
reference of pronouns depends on what is predicated of it, and is not only determined
by information in the preceding discourse
(Brown & Yule, 1983:219,220)
5. Background knowledge
According to Brown and Yule, this general knowledge about the world
underpins our interpretation not only of discourse, but of virtually every aspect of our
experience.
(Brown & Yule, 1983:236)

27
5.1. Schemata (Lược đồ)
According to Yule in 1996, our ability to arrive automatically at interpretations
of the unwritten and the unsaid must be based on pre-existing knowledge structures.
This means that we use previous experience to interpret new experiences. The most
general term for a pattern of this type is a schema. A schema or in the plural form is
schemata is a pre-existing knowledge structure in memory.
(Yule, 1996:85)
For example, racial prejudice: can be seen as a fixed way of thinking about
newly meeting individuals who are assigned undesirable traits based on existing
schema for members of the race.
Schemata can be seen as the organized background knowledge which leads us
to expect or predict aspects in our interpretation of discourse.
(Brown & Yule, 1983:248)
Example: A: There's a party political broadcast coming on - do you want to
watch it?
B: No - switch it off - I know what they're going to say already.
In this situation, when talking about the “political broadcast”, the hearer
immediately expects to hear political discussions or debates among politicians that
he/she doesn't like to hear. Therefore, the hearer refuses to turn the broadcast on.
(Brown & Yule, 1983:247)
5.2. Frames (Khuân mẫu)
According to Yule, if there is a fixed, static pattern to the schema, it is
sometimes called a frame. A frame is shared by everyone within a social group which
would be something like a prototypical version.
(Yule, 1996:86)
In Minsky's frame theory, he proposes that our knowledge is stored in memory
in the form of data structures which he calls frames and which represent stereotyped
situations. Moreover, frames can be adapted to fit reality by changing details as
necessary.
(Minsky, 1975 as cited Brown & Yule, 1983:247)

28
 Example: We have this below advertisement: Apartment for rent. $500.
763-6683.
In this discourse, the interpretation will be based on 2 frames which are
apartment frame and for rent advertiser frame as the basis of inference. In a frame
representing apartment, when seeing/hearing apartment, people will immediately think
of an apartment which is a place to live having a kitchen, bathroom, bedroom even
though these elements aren't explicitly mentioned in the text. Therefore, a particular
apartment existing in the world or mentioned in a text can be treated as an instance of
the apartment frame. A frame for apartment for rent advertiser: only on the basis of
advertiser frame, the hearer is expected to fill per month after $500 rather than per
week or per year. However, in this frame, the discourse is likely to be misunderstood
because for rent frame can differ among individuals based on different experiences of
the cost of apartment rental that people may have. Although there are different ways of
thinking rental price in this situation, the pragmatic point will be the same: the reader
uses a pre-existing knowledge structure to create an interpretation of what is not stated
in the text.
(Yule, 1996:86)
5.3. Scripts (Kịch bản)
When more dynamic types of schemata are considered, they are more often
described as scripts. Scripts is a pre-existing knowledge structure involving event
sequences. We use scripts as a way of recognizing some expected sequence of actions
in an event because most of the details of a script are assumed to be known, they are
unlikely to be said.
(Yule, 1996:86)
Example: I stopped to get some groceries but there weren't any baskets left so
by the time I arrived at the check-out counter I must have looked like a juggler having
a bad day.
This speaker's script for 'getting groceries' obviously involves having a basket
and going to the check-out counter. Everything else that happened in this event
sequence is not explicitly mentioned in the text as they are assumed to be shared

29
background knowledge (for example, she went through a door to get inside the store
and she walked around picking up items from shelves).
For members of the same culture, the assumption of shared scripts allows much
to be communicated that is not said. However, for members of different cultures, such
an assumption can lead to a great deal of miscommunication
(Yule, 1996:86,87)
The comparison table of 3 representations of background knowledge:

They are means of representing that background knowledge which we use and
assume others can use too, when we produce and interpret discourse

Schemata A pre-existing knowledge structure in memory involving the normal

expected patterns of things which people rely on to interpret or predict
their new experiences.

Frames A fixed or stable pre-existing knowledge structure in memory which

people rely on to represent stereotyped situations and can be adapted
to change one's view of the present problem.

Scripts A pre-existing knowledge structure involves a sequence of events.

30
II. Discourse and Culture
1. Cultural Schema (Lược đồ văn hóa)
The last part of our presentation is about Cultural Schema and Cross-cultural
Pragmatics. First of all, I’d like to introduce you to an example:
A: Hôm nay rét quá.
B: Mai ông Táo về trời rồi còn gì!
A: Thế à! Mua cá chép chưa?
(Ngô Hữu Hoàng, 2012:26)
To us, especially those who live in the northern region, this example must be
very normal. With the above dialogue, A and B don’t have to say who the Kitchen
God is, when is the time of the Kitchen God's day, and why it is carp and not any other
fish. Because this is a cultural knowledge, like the background knowledge that two
people share. So if one of the two communicating members has no cultural
background to the issue they are talking about, they cannot understand each other, or
at least, cannot have complete and fluent native communication between them like the
given dialogue.
And that is why we need the so-called “culture knowledge” to comprehend the
given information and to produce our own discourse. Before moving on to Cultural
Schema, we need to figure out what schema is.
1.1. Schema
According to Cambridge Dictionary, schema is defined as a drawing that
represents an idea or theory and makes it easier to understand. And for Yule (1996: 85,
150), schema (plural, schemata) is a conventional knowledge structure that exists in
our memory.
Frederic Bartlett, a British psychologist at Cambridge University defines a
schema as “an active organization of past experiences, which must always be
supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organic response.” (1932: 201). And he
postulates that schemata are regularly used in the reconstruction of past experiences.
This reconstruction being the basis of what we call “remembering.” (1932: 202). He
also stated that a schema can be viewed as a (hypothetical) mental pattern for
representing generic concepts which are kept in memory. It can be defined as
the organised

31
background knowledge which can help us make predictions or expectations within our
interpretation (1932:202).
For example:
When a student is asked to tell his day in his school, s/he does not need to tell
every single details, like taking a vehicle to school, attending the lessons,
taking a seat, greeting his/her friends or the teacher, studying that day’s topics,
and so on; however, we can still fill in these missing details perfectly as our
schemata for a lesson experience are already stored in our minds.
(Bilokcuoğlu, 2014: 78-
79) Nearly agreeing with Bartlett’s opinion, other scholars also define
schema:
Cook (1989:69) states, “The mind stimulated by key words or phrases in the text or by
the context activities activates a knowledge schema”; Brown and Yule (1983: 249)
explain schema as an organized background knowledge which leads the readers to
expect or predict aspects in their interpretation of discourse. They also believe that
"our background knowledge is organized and stored in some fixed schemata, together
with some other, more flexible schematic structures".
1.2. Cultural schema
a. Definition
Cultural Schemata are pre-existing knowledge structures based on experience in
a particular culture. (Yule, 1996:87). According to Nishida (1999:756), cultural
schema explains the familiar and pre-acquainted knowledge one uses when entering a
familiar situation in his/her own culture. It proposes that cultural schemata are created
and stored in our brain when we interact with members of the same culture in certain
situations many times, or talk about certain information with them many times. When
one’s cultural environment provides experiences to which every member of that
culture is exposed, his/her experiences allow every member to acquire cultural
schemas. Cultural schemas are conceptual structures which enable individuals to store
perceptual and conceptual information about his/her culture and interpret cultural
experiences and expressions. If a person is not equipped with the appropriate cultural
schema, s/he may not be able to make sense of culturally unfamiliar situations
(Malcolm & Sharafian, 2002)

32
 Yule (1996:87) also states that: “It is almost inevitable that our background
knowledge structures, our schemata for making sense of the world, will be culturally
determined. We can readily modify the details of a cultural schema for some obvious
differences a cultural schema for some obvious differences.” For many other subtle
differences, we often don't recognize that there may be a misinterpretation based on
different schemata. Yule (1996: .87) gave an example:
An Australian factory supervisor clearly assumed that other factory workers
would know that Easter was close and hence they would all have a holiday. He
asked another worker, originally from Vietnam, about her plans:
“You have five days off. What are you going to do?”
The Vietnamese worker immediately interpreted the utterance in terms of being
laid off (rather than having a holiday).
Yule (1996: .87)
In this example, we can understand that, since Vietnam does not celebrate
Easter, the Vietnamese worker does not understand that she has a holiday, so she
mistakenly thinks she is being fired. From this, we can conclude that something good
in one person's schema can sound like something bad in another's.
b. How do we develop cultural schemata?
We develop our cultural schemata in the contexts of our basic experiences.
(Yule, 1996:86). Take this as an example:
We often see Dutch Lady Milk commercials on TV. But most people do not
understand this as the milk from Dutch lady (like cow's milk, goat's milk, etc.) but
Dutch Lady Milk as a brand name. This is due to the common experience that no one
sells human milk.
Nguyễn Thiện Giáp (2008:
447) Nishida is a Japanese communicologist and social psychologist in her book
“Theorizing about Intercultural Communication”. She (1999:756) simply explains that
experience is the force which creates cultural schemas. As people have more
experiences their developing cultural schemas become more tightly organized. The
information not only becomes more complex, but more useful among members of a
culture, alike or different.

33
 Yule (1996: 86) gave us an example of one of his experiences:
“I remember my first visit to a Moroccan restaurant and the absence of one of
my 'restaurant script' requirements-there were no chairs!
(The large comfortable cushions were an excellent replacement.)”
Yule (1996: 86)
Yule has added a piece of new information in his cultural schemata which is
that the Moroccan restaurant uses cushions instead of chairs. To be more specific,
Yule had already had a schema in his mind and being exposed to a new culture, a
scenario that was not like what he had expected, which helped him develop his cultural
schemata.
Another example is from (Paltridge, 2012: 6) when companies decide to set up
branches of their business overseas.
A number of years ago the Japanese department store Daimaru opened a
branch in Melbourne. Each year the store had a spring sale and sent out
circulars to its customers to let them know about it. It was interesting to see
how differently the company wrote their promotional materials for their
Japanese-speaking and their English-speaking customers.
- The Japanese texts commenced with “seasonal greetings” referring to
the warm spring weather and the sight of fresh flowers in the gardens
- Whereas the English texts went straight to the point of the message, the
sale would be starting shortly.
(Paltridge, 2012:
6) In the Japanese texts it would have been impolite not to do this whereas in the
English texts it would have been unnecessary and, indeed, may have hidden the point
of the text for the English readers if they had done this.
c. Types of Cultural Schemata for Social Interactions (Các loại lược đồ văn
hóa tương tác xã hội)
Nishida (1991: 407-410) defines cultural schemas for social interactions as
cognitive structures that contain knowledge for face-to-face interactions in one’s
cultural environment. She also points out the eight primary types for generating human

34
behavior for social interactions. These eight schemas are also referred to as Primary
Social Interaction schemas (Lược đồ tương tác xã hội chính/chủ yếu) or PSI schemas.
1. Fact-and-concept schemata (Lược đồ về sự thật và khái niệm)
These are pieces of general information about facts. For example:
- Tokyo is the capital of Japan.
- Bicycles are those vehicles that have two wheels, a seat, and handlebars
2. Person schemata (Lược đồ về con người)
These contain knowledge about different types of people, specifically
personality traits. For example:
- John is neurotic.
- Taro is shy.
- Mary is easy-going.
In some instances person schemas are linked to stereotypes or prejudice.
3. Self-schemata (Lược đồ về bản thân)
These contain people’s knowledge about themselves (i.e., how they see
themselves and how others see them). These are cognitive generalizations about the
self, derived from past experience, that organize and guide the processing of
self-related information contained in the individual's social experiences (Markus,
1977:64).
Nishida (1999: 758) categories these into three levels of self schemas in the self
concept:
(1) The superordinate level of the self as a human being, the common features
shared with other members of the human species in contrast to other forms of
life
(2) The intermediate level of ingroup–outgroup categorizations that define one as a
member of certain social groups and not others. For example: ‘‘American,’’
and ‘‘female’’

35
 (3) The subordinate level of personal categorizations that define one as a specific
individual person. Example: in terms of one’s personality or other kinds of
individual differences
4. Role schemata (Lược đồ về vai trò)
These are knowledge about social roles that denote expected sets of behaviors
of people in particular social positions such as:
- Women work hard
- Men cook well
- Poor people have good manners
These refer to achieved and ascribed roles.
5. Context schemata (Lược đồ về ngữ cảnh)
These contain information about the situation and appropriate setting of
behavioral parameters. According to Turner (1994: 37-39), the information contained
in context schemas includes predictions about appropriate actions to take in order to
achieve goals in the context (i.e., to activate procedure schemas), and suggestions for
reasonable problem-solving strategies (i.e., to activate strategy schemas). For example:
It is usually appropriate to sit on a chair or A chair on a theatre stage is
usually only for actors to sit on, not spectators.
6. Procedure schemata (Lược đồ về quy trình)
These are knowledge about the appropriate sequence of events in common
situations. They include specific steps to take and behavioral rules for the events. The
application of the procedure schemas causes people to take some actions. For example:
After paying for my ticket, I enter the cinema room, I can buy popcorn in
between.
7. Strategy schemata (Lược đồ về ngữ cảnh)
These are knowledge about problem-solving strategies. (Chi, 1981; Taylor &
Crocker, 1981; Turner, 1994). For example:

36
 If I think that I might be late, then I will hurry or if a person is tense, they get a
massage, if I want to get better at playing the piano, I must practise.
There is some evidence that in humans, one factor impacting the choice of
strategy is the person's expertise. There are factors affecting strategy schemas:
(1) The experience level of the person with respect to the kind of problem
under consideration. For example, doctors who are experts in a given type of
problem tend to use a strategy called predictive reasoning, which is basically
the same as hypothetico-deductive reasoning,but less-experienced clinicians, or
those solving a problem outside their area of expertise, tend to use another
strategy.
(2) The problem-solving constraints that are context-independent. For example,
a constraint on time may be seen in many different contexts, including an
emergency situation in a hospital or a situation of being late for an appointment.
So rather than redundantly storing strategy schemas about these constraints
with each context schema they affect, the information is instead recorded with
strategies useful for coping with them.”
8. Emotion schemata (Lược đồ về cảm xúc)
These contain information about affect and evaluation stored in long-term
memory which is accessed when other schemas are activated. For example, fear and
anxiety in the presence of a “dentist”: when our schema of a dentist is activated, the
emotion schema of fear and anxiety is accessed. Another example is when the death of
a friend makes you sad. Note: Emotion schemas are constructed in social interactions
throughout one’s life.
2. Cross-cultural pragmatics (Ngữ dụng học xuyên văn hóa)
2.1. Definition
Firstly, as we have learned in the first lesson, pragmatics is concerned with the
study of meaning as communicated by a speaker and interpreted by a listener. It has,
consequently, more to do with the analysis of what people mean by their utterances
than what the words or phrases in those utterances might mean by themselves. Or we
can understand pragmatics as the study of the speaker 's meaning (Yule, 1996:3).

37
 And House & Kádár (2021: 2) note that the expression “cross-cultural”
conventionally describes the comparison of behavioral patterns in two or more
cultures. Therefore, according to Yule (1996:87), cross-cultural pragmatics is the study
of differences in expectations based on cultural schemata. Cross-cultural pragmatics is
the study of linguistic acts by language users from different cultural backgrounds
(Kasper & Blum-Kulka, 1993). As for Taguchi and Roever (2017: 3), “the main
premise of cross-cultural pragmatics is that language use reflects the underlying
values, beliefs and assumptions shared by members of the given speech community”.
House and Kádár (2021: 1) note that “cross-cultural pragmatics encompasses the
comparative study of the use of language by human beings in different languages and
cultures”. Take this as an example:
Can you open the window?
(English) Bāng wǒ dǎkāi chuānghù.
(Chinese)
帮我打开窗户。
Help me open the window.
House & Kádár, 2021:
1 Here we can see that English prefers the modal verb can, while in Chinese the
comparable request tends to be formulated as an imperative expression mitigated by
the expression ‘help me’. This is already a striking pragmalinguistic difference.
2.2. Reassessed aspects in cross-cultural pragmatics
In Pragmatics, Yule (1996:88) said: “To look at the ways in which meaning is
constructed by speakers from different cultures will actually require a complete
reassessment of virtually everything we have considered so far.”
a. Cooperative principles (Nguyên tắc hợp tác)
A cultural preference for NOT saying what you believe to be the case, which is
reported in many cultures, would clearly require a different approach to the
relationship between the maxims of quality and quantity in a more comprehensive
pragmatics (Yule, 1996:88). Maxim of Quantity demands the speaker’s contribution
informative as is required and no more informative than is required. Maxim of Quality

38
requires the speaker not to say what is believed to be false and for which the speaker
lacks adequate evidence.
b. Turn-taking mechanisms (Cơ chế luân phiên)
When we considered turn-taking mechanisms, we did not explore the powerful
role of silence within the normal conversational practices of many cultures. (Yule,
1996:88)
c. Types of speech acts (Các loại hành vi ngôn từ)
When we explored types of speech acts, we did not include any observations on
the substantial differences that can exist cross-culturally in interpreting concepts like
“complementing”, “thanking” or “apologizing”. For example:
“The typical American English style of complimenting creates great
embarrassment for some Native American Indian receivers (it’s perceived as
excessive), and can elicit a reaction similar to apologizing from some Japanese
receivers (it’s perceived as impossible to accept). Indeed, it is unlikely that the
division one cultural group makes between any two social actions such as
“thanking” or “apologizing” will be matched precisely within another
culture.”
Yule, 1996:88
2.3. Three main points
a. Contrastive Pragmatics (Ngữ dụng tương phản)
According to Yule (1996:87), contrastive pragmatics is the study of different
cultural ways of speaking. Within this macro-category, contrastive pragmatics has
been a useful descriptive term for research on specific speech acts (e.g. requests,
refusals, compliments) across, typically, English and one other language and culture.
The goal of such contrastive studies tends to target one feature or groups of features of
one speech act.
b. Interlanguage Pragmatics (Ngữ dụng học liên ngôn ngữ)

39
 Interlanguage pragmatics is the investigation that focuses more specifically on
the communicative behavior of non-native speakers attempting to communicate in
their second language. (Yule, 1996: 88)
c. Pragmatic accent (Giọng ngữ dụng)
Such studies increasingly expose that we all speak with what might be called
pragmatics accent, that is, aspects of talk that indicate what is assumed to be
communicated without being said. (Yule, 1996: 88)
2.4. Cross-cultural pragmatics failures (Lỗi ngữ dụng học xuyên văn hoá)
a. Definition
Pragmatic failure, a term introduced by Thomas (1983:99), “is an area of
cross-cultural communication breakdown”. It addresses misunderstandings arising
from the inability on the part of the hearer to recognise the force of the speaker‟s
utterance. Pragmatic failure refers to mistakes in producing and understanding
situationally appropriate language behavior. According to Thomas (1983:99), the
inability to interpret intended meaning may be due to regional, ethnic, gender, and
class differences within a community and across cultural boundaries. In other words,
there are intracultural and intercultural differences. Culturally influenced patterns of
behavior not only result in production difficulties, but also incomprehension problems,
as listeners tend to interpret others’ language use through the lens of their own
worldviews.
According to Charlebois (2003:36), cross-cultural pragmatic failure is used to
describe the case of pragmatic failure between people from different speech
communities. For example:
An American speaker of Japanese interprets the answer “that will be a little
difficult” as an acceptance for his/ her request whereas this answer refers to a
refusal in Japanese culture.
Charlebois, 2003: 36
b. Classification

40
 Thomas (1983:99) categorizes cross-cultural pragmatic failure into two types,
pragma-linguistic failure (Lỗi ngữ dụng học ngôn ngữ) and socio-pragmatic failure
(Lỗi ngữ dụng học xã hội).
Pragma-linguistic failure is a linguistic failure occurred due to dissimilarities in
expressing a pragmatic force. That is, it is the failure to choose the appropriate
linguistic means to express pragmatic objectives. He affirms that pragma-linguistic
failure occurs when speech act strategies are transferred from the first language and
applied in the second language resulting in inappropriate effects in the target language.
So that “the pragmatic force mapped by speakers onto a given utterance is
systematically different from the force most frequently assigned to by native speakers
of the target language” (Thomas, 1983, 99). We can understand pragma-linguistic
failure refers to people’s failure to choose and use the correct form of language
expression according to the specific context in which they are communicating with
others in contrast to the principles of linguistic usage and eventually leads to
communication errors. This is mainly caused by the differences between languages or
their interactions.
As for socio-pragmatic failure, leech (1983:10) states that it is “the sociological
interface of pragmatics”. Riley (1989: 234) asserts that socio-pragmatic failure is the
outcome of applying the social rules of one culture in a communicative situation where
the social rules of another culture should be applied. Socio-pragmatics refers to the
inappropriate choice of language forms in cross-cultural communication due to the
lack of understanding of cultural differences in social rules, etiquette, and customs of
both parties (related to the status, position, and topic of both parties). This can be
caused by the cultural differences or social and cultural habits underlying different
languages
Pragma-linguistic failure is easier to overcome than socio-pragmatic failure
because the former can be systematically learned to reduce them by mastering usage
while the latter involves all aspects of social culture.

41
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Overview 4
1. Background 4
1.1. Discourse (Diễn ngôn) 4
1.2. Discourse Analysis - DA (Phân tích diễn ngôn) 4
1.3. Critical Discourse Analysis - CDA (Phân tích diễn ngôn phê phán) 4
2. Power and Ideology (Quyền lực và Hệ tư tưởng) 5
2.1. Power (Quyền lực) 5
2.1.1. Power in discourse (Quyền lực trong diễn ngôn) 5
2.1.2. Power behind discourse (Quyền lực sau diễn ngôn) 6
2.1.3. Hidden power (Quyền lực ẩn) 6
2.2. Ideology (Hệ tư tưởng) 6
3. Rhetoric: ethos, pathos, logos (Thuật hùng biện: đạo đức, cảm xúc, lý lẽ) 7
3.1. Ethos (Đạo đức) 8
3.2. Pathos (Cảm xúc) 8
3.3. Logos (Lý lẽ) 9
3.4. Examples 9
3.4.1. Rhetoric in Donald Trump’s Relevant Tweets 9
3.4.2. Rhetoric in Hillary Clinton’s “Women’s Rights are Human Rights”
Speech (1995)
11
4. Metaphor (Ẩn dụ) 12
4.1. Definition 12
4.2. Example 12
5. Modality and Hedging (Tình thái và Rào đón) 13
5.1. Modality (Tình thái) 13
5.1.1. Epistemic modality (Tình thái tri nhận/ chân nguỵ) 13
5.1.2. Deontic modality (Tình thái chức phận/ đạo nghĩa) 14
5.1.3. Dynamic modality (Tình thái năng động) 14
1. Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional Framework 16
1.1. About Fairclough and his framework 16
1.2. Description (Mô tả) 17
1.2.1. Vocabulary 17
1.2.2. Grammar 18
1.2.3. Text structure 20
1.3. Interpretation (Hiểu) 21
Situational context ( bối cảnh tình huống) 21

1
 1.4. Explanation (Giải thích) 22
1.5. Conclusion 23
2. Van Dijk's Socio-cognitive approach 23
2.1. Overview 23
2.2. The Discourse–Cognition–Society triangle 23
3. Wodak's Discourse - Historical Approach (DHA) (Khanh Nhi) 28
3.1. Introduction 28
3.1.1. Who is Ruth Wodak? 28
3.1.2. What is CDA according to Wodak? 29
3.2. Ruth Wodak’s "The Discourse-Historical Approach" 29
3.3. Key Concepts in the Discourse-Historical Approach 30
3.3.1. Triangulation of Ideology, Power and Critique 30
3.3.2. Levels of discourse in DHA 31
3.3.3. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity 32
3.4. Fundamental Principles of the Discourse-Historical Approach 32
3.4.1. DHA approach 32
3.4.2. Discursive strategies 33
3.5. Salient features of the DHA 33
3.6. Application of the DHA: Case study and Example 34
3.6.1. Eight-stage programs 34
3.6.2. Case studies and Examples 36
3.7. Conclusion 37
3.7.1. Strengths and Challenges of the DHA 37
3.7.2. Limitation of the DHA 37
III. Applications - Political discourse, discourse and gender, discourse and media
38
1. Political discourse (Diễn ngôn chính trị) 38
1.1. Defining political discourse 38
1.2. The domain of politics 40
1.3. Political discourse as political action 41
1.3.1. Written and Spoken Discourse as Forms of Action 41
1.3.2. Conditions for political discourse 42
2. Discourse and gender (Diễn ngôn và giới) 43
2.1. Discourse and gender (Gendered Discourse) 43
2.1.1. The relationship between language and gender, as well as how language
reflects and perpetuates gender inequalities as described by Lakoff
43
2.1.2. Features of Women's Language 44
2.1.3. Complex Relationship between Gender and Discourse 44
2.1.4. The Personal as Political 45
2
 2.2. Analyzing Gender and Discourse 45
2.2.1. The social construction of gender 45
2.2.2. The indirect relationship between gender and discourse 46
2.2.3 Gendered discourse as a resource (Diễn ngôn giới tính như một tài
nguyên)

47
2.2.4. Gendered discourse as a constraint (diễn ngôn giới tính như một ràng
buộc)

47
3. Discourse and Media 48
3.1. Introduction 48
3.2. The Development of Media Discourse Analysis 49
3.3. Approaches to Media Discourse 49
3.4. Key Components of Media Discourse (Các thành phần chính của diễn ngôn
truyền thông)
50
3.4.1. Text dynamics 51
3.4.2. Audience considerations 51
REFERENCES 52

3
I. Overview
1. Background
1.1. Discourse (Diễn ngôn)
First of all, according to the Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries, discourse is defined as
“the use of language in speech and writing to produce or convey meaning”. According
to van Dijk (2009:67), discourse is regarded as a “multi-dimensional social
phenomenon”.
1.2. Discourse Analysis - DA (Phân tích diễn ngôn)
According to Cambridge Dictionary, discourse analysis is the analysis of spoken or
written texts that contain more than one sentence, including their social context.
Discourse analysis focuses on pragmatics on what is unsaid or unwritten, yet
communicated, within discourse (Yule, 1996:84). Moreover, discourse analysis is “the
study of language use with reference to the social and psychological factors that
influence communication” (Yule, 1996:129).
1.3. Critical Discourse Analysis - CDA (Phân tích diễn ngôn phê phán)
CDA is conceptualized explicitly by van Dijk (2008:85): “Critical Discourse Analysis
(CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social
power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text
and talk in the social and political context.”
According to Lu (2022:68), CDA originates from Critical Linguistics, a term first
adopted by a group of scholars working at the University of East Anglia (Fowler,
Hodge, Kress, & Trew, 1979) in the late 1970s. Their approach was based on
Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics, which viewed language in use as
simultaneously performing three macro-functions of language: ideational function,
interpersonal function, and textual function (Bell & Garrett, 1998, as cited in Phung,
2021:8).
Compared with traditional discourse analysis, CDA is distinguished by the close
relationship between discourse and power. CDA, unlike other linguistic branches, is
not based on fixed research methods. Instead, CDA accepts a wide range of
approaches. CDA is “more problem-oriented than discipline-oriented, and requires a
multidisciplinary approach” (van Dijk, 2009:63). Its nature requires researchers to
touch upon many other fields of science including social psychology, anthropology,

4
cognitive psychology, cultural studies, international relations, and so on (Phung,
2021:9).
2. Power and Ideology (Quyền lực và Hệ tư tưởng)
2.1. Power (Quyền lực)
The question of power has been at the core of the CDA project. It is defined as “the
ability of people and institutions to control the behaviors and material lives of others”
(Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew, 1979:61). Here language is not simply a vehicle of
communication, or for persuasion, but a means of social construction and domination.
Therefore, discourse does not merely reflect social processes and structures but is
itself seen to contribute to the production and reproduction of these processes and
structures (Machin & Mayr, 2012:24).
The power/language relation is an interactive two-way concept. It shows that no one
agent in discourse is entirely more powerful than the others. Power shifts from one
participant to another. It may be unlikely that powerful people possess unconditional
dominance. Thus, power does not always belong to a certain group of people (van
Dijk, 1998, as cited in Tran, 2020:9).
Typically, CDA researchers are interested in the way discourse (re)produces social
domination, that is, the power abuse of one group over others, and how dominated
groups may discursively resist such abuse (Wodak & Meyer, 2008:9).
The notion of power is further elaborated by (Fairclough, 1989) who explores various
dimensions of the relations of power and language focusing on two major aspects of
the power/ language relation: power in discourse and power behind discourse. Power
in discourse is concerned with discourse as a place where relations of power are
actually exercised and enacted; power behind discourse focuses on how certain types
of discourse are shaped and constituted by relations of power. The former is said to
appear in lexical and syntactical structures such as speech acts. The latter focuses on
how orders of discourse are created and constituted by relations of power (Negm,
2015:285). In other words, power behind discourse means that “the whole social order
of discourse is put together and held together as a hidden effect of power to
influence/change” (Fairclough, 2001:47). He also mentions “hidden power” appeared
in mass media’s discourse such as radio, film, television, newspaper, etc. Since the
nature of power relations in mass media is not clear, analyzing discourse of such is
intriguing (Tran, 2020:10).

5
2.1.1. Power in discourse (Quyền lực trong diễn ngôn)
We can say that power in discourse is to do with powerful participants controlling and
constraining the contributions of non-powerful participants. It is useful to distinguish
broadly between three types of such constraints - constraints on:
● contents, on what is said or done;
● relations, the social relations people enter into in discourse;
● subjects, or the 'subject positions' people can occupy.
2.1.2. Power behind discourse (Quyền lực sau diễn ngôn)
'Power behind discourse' is also a hidden power, in that the shaping of orders of
discourse by relations of power is not generally apparent to people.
2.1.3. Hidden power (Quyền lực ẩn)
Power is also sometimes hidden in face-to-face discourse. For instance, there is
obviously a close connection between requests and power, in that the right to request
someone to do something often derives from having power. But there are many
grammatically different forms available for making requests. Some are direct and
mark the power relationship explicitly, while others are indirect and leave it more or
less implicit. Direct requests are typically expressed grammatically in imperative
sentences: Type this letter for me by 5 o'clock, for instance. Indirect requests can be
more or less indirect, and they are typically expressed grammatically in questions of
various degrees of elaborateness and corresponding indirectness: Can you type this
letter for me by 5 o'clock?, Do you think you could type this letter for me by 5 o'clock?
Could I possibly ask you to type this letter for me by 5 o'clock? There are also other
ways of indirectly requesting - through hints, for instance: I would like to have the
letter in the 5 o'clock post. (Fairclough, 2001:46).
2.2. Ideology (Hệ tư tưởng)
Another key principle of critical discourse analysis is ideology. According to
Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, ideology is defined as “a set of beliefs or
principles, especially one on which a political system, party, or organization is based”.
In the same vein, Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries adds that it "influences the way
people behave”.

6
van Dijk holds the belief that ideologies are the mutual knowledge, attitudes and
beliefs that members of groups, organizations and others have in a specific event
happening in a particular social and cultural context (Tran, 2020:8). He also argues
that “besides their social function of sustaining the interests of groups, ideologies have
the cognitive function of organizing the social representations (attitude, knowledge) of
the group, and thus indirectly monitor the group-related social practice” (van Dijk,
1993:256)

Ideologies are, according to van Dijk, made up of the social norms and values that
exist within the culture the group belongs to, and selected to optimize the realization
of the group’s goals. An example of this is feminist ideology that does not recognize
women as being any weaker than men and therefore considers the notion of equality
between the genders a key value of the ideology (van Dijk, 1995, as cited in Lauritzen
& Fisker, 2009:39).
3. Rhetoric: ethos, pathos, logos (Thuật hùng biện: đạo đức, cảm xúc, lý lẽ)
According to Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, rhetoric is “speech or
writing intended to be effective and influence people”. The term rhetoric itself was
derived from the Greek word “rhetor”, which means “speech”. Rhetoric is used to
display communication in a persuasive sense, and is also a tool for one to study such a
communication (Pham, 2022:13).
In addition to producing text and enhancing its effects, rhetoric can also promote
social behaviors – it creates a discourse which could reflect and affect reality through
a combination of ideas and actions (Eyman, 2015, as cited in Pham, 2022:16).
The original method was coined by Aristotle in 350 B.C with three pillars of
expressions – logos, pathos, and ethos, which is rhetorical triangle, as visualized
below (Pham, 2022:13-14):

7
Note. From “Digital Rhetoric: Theory, Method, Practice” by D. Eyman, 2015,
(https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv65swm2).
The first depends upon the moral character of the speaker, the second upon putting the
hearer into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the speech itself, in so far as it
proves or seems to prove (Aristotle, translated by Freese, 2020:17).
3.1. Ethos (Đạo đức)
The word ethos comes straight from Greek. In Greek, ethos literally translates to
“habit,” “custom,” or “character.”. In rhetoric, the word ethos is used to refer to the
character or reputation of the speaker. As a rhetorical appeal, ethos is known as “the
appeal to authority” or “the appeal to credibility.” When it comes to ethos, one
important consideration is how the speaker carries themself and how they present
themselves to the audience. Ethos is important in rhetoric because it often influences
the opinion or mood of the audience. If a speaker seems unenthusiastic, unprepared, or
inexperienced, the audience is more likely to discount the speaker’s argument
regardless of what it even is. On the other hand, a knowledgeable, authoritative,
confident speaker is much more likely to win an audience over” (Donahue & Prosser,
1997:154).
Concerning ethos, Finlayson theorizes that it can be understood as arguments that
depend on the recipient’s respect for the figure of authority. Upon producing
discourse, the speaker attempts to benefit from the audience’s sense of admiration.
Every political ideology has their distinctive application of ethos, but they all share the
same goal: to generate an impression that the speaker is both the expert and the
credible figure to represent the ideologies in question (Pham, 2022:12).
3.2. Pathos (Cảm xúc)
The orator persuades by means of his hearers, when they are roused to emotion by his
speech, because our judgements are influenced by “joy or sorrow, love or hate”. It is
identified when the hearers are “moved to action or decision” by “various emotions”
caused by the speaker (Aristotle, translated by Freese, 2020:17).
Pathos is directly linked with an audience. In Aristotle’s book “Rhetoric”, pathos is
the power with which the writer’s (speaker’s) message moves the audience to his or
her desirable emotional action. Thus a good orator should know for sure which
emotion would effectively impact on audience considering their social status, age and
other features. It is important to know not only how the orator can express but how he
or she

8
can by help of discourse cause favorable emotions, like anger, insult, empathy, fear,
confusion, etc. (Amossy, 2000:178).
With regard to pathos, Finlayson (2013) notes that emotional appeals are rather
understudied, due to the fact that they possess simple, yet straightforward and possibly
brutal nature. Though a core element of political rhetoric, emotions do not comply
with certain ideologies – as they can vary from the essence the intensity of any
intended emotion. But it is undeniable that emotional aspects constitute to an
ideology, and political thoughts can be defined by their according emotions in certain
discursive circumstances (Pham, 2022:11).
3.3. Logos (Lý lẽ)
Lastly, persuasion is produced by the speech itself, when we establish the true or
apparently true from the means of persuasion applicable to each individual subject
(Aristotle, translated by Freese, 2020:17). It is identified when the speaker uses
“logical reasoning” to persuade the hearers to act (Herrick, 2016:78-79). Logos is a
very important for argumentative judgment as one of the dimensions of persuasion
(Tamar, 2013:1939).
3.4. Examples
3.4.1. Rhetoric in Donald Trump’s Relevant Tweets
The first rhetorical device used by Trump that is involved in this deed is logos. There
are three main elements that should be intertwined to generate persuasion, one of
which is logos, or a person’s use of logic and reasoning (Pham, 2022:23).
“Exclusive: Eyewitness Says as Many as 20,000 Unverified Absentee Ballots
Counted in Detroit Primary https://t.co/za6Yr37RUu via @BreitbartNews”
(Trump, 2020, as cited in Trump Twitter Archive, 2022)
“Exclusive: Nearly 700 U.S. Veterans Issue Open Letter in Support of Trump
https://t.co/IoKXU2a9EU via @BreitbartNews Thank you! As we get closer
and closer to the November 3rd Election, and as my poll numbers rocket up,
the attacks get more and more vicious. I love our HEROES!” (Trump, 2020, as
cited in Trump Twitter Archive, 2022)
In these particular Tweets, the very first word that readers can easily notice is the
word “exclusive”. Such a word is cited repeatedly in the same position – at the
beginning of the sentence, as this could serve as evidence for Trump to validate and
legitimize any

9
attack towards political opponents. It is notable that numbers were mentioned in such
Tweets, which is once again the employment of logos - and these figures are married
with undermining terms, for example “as many as” in order to highlight the credibility
established by Trump to the American public. The context of the first Tweet should be
mentioned to understand the idea of bringing numbers into play: during the Primary
Rounds of the 2020 US Presidential Election, the number of absentee ballots, or votes
delivered by mail, did not match the total number of ballots cast (Mauger, 2020). This
was an attempt by Trump to further solidify that the election was “stolen” from him
(Wolfe, 2022).
The second rhetoric device utilized by Trump to degrade his opponents, and
statistically the most popular theme, is pathos. Emotions are subjective – they can be
swayed by a simple everyday anecdote or something as sizable as a series of
heart-rending narration. This emotional aspect is powerful in a sense that it could
discard any possible opposition arguments, however logical – as it makes the targeted
audience sympathize with the situation in real-time contexts. Trump’s provocation
could be seen firsthand with the use of nicknames towards his political opponents
(Pham, 2022:24-25):

One of the most prominent aspects echoed throughout Donald Trump’s campaign
election and presidency is fear appeal – he is notorious for voicing controversial
concerns regarding immigration (Pham, 2022:26).

“Refugees from Syria are now pouring into our great country. Who knows who
they are - some could be ISIS. Is our president insane?” (Trump, 2015, as cited
in Trump Twitter Archive, 2022)

Using implication, Donald Trump displays his belief through the Tweet that
then-President of the United States, Barack Obama, was failing his duty as the Head
of State – by letting Syrian refugees to pour into his country in an unprecedented
manner. Another implication that followed was the presumption that some of these
Syrian nationals could actually be Muslim extremists – suggesting that the influx of
refugees fleeing a civil war could taint the overall security landscape of the United
States. This is accompanied by lexicalization: the word “great” is used to highlight
Trump’s patriotism, implying the idea that America is a land of the elites and the
civilized where Muslim refugees should think twice before consider being sheltered
from the horrors of conflicts; and by describing Obama as an insane person, Trump
discloses his own point of view that Obama himself was an incapable President.

The third element of rhetoric, known as ethos, stands out rather noticeably in Trump’s
discourse. This theme refers to the credibility and/or the professionalism of the

10
speaker on a digital context (Eyman, 2015), and is exemplified in the Tweets below
(Pham, 2022:34):

“Get out and vote! I am your voice and I will fight for you! We will make
America great again! https://t.co/XXvLRlhSaz” (Trump, 2016, as cited in
Trump Twitter Archive, 2022)

The usage of the pronoun “I” should be highlighted in this Tweet – Trump implies that
only he could do the deed of representing the American people to the fullest extent,
instead of other political candidates. The metaphor of the “voice” is also considerable
in this context, as the leader will serve as a delivery man of the public’s message, or
the speaker of the people. But this deed can be done only by Trump himself – and if
his voters allow him to succeed in this task, the benefits will be collective: Trump
shall stand up for the rights of American citizens, and America as a whole will return
to its previous greatness.
3.4.2. Rhetoric in Hillary Clinton’s “Women’s Rights are Human Rights” Speech
(1995)

We can see an example of how these three types of appeal interact in a speech by
former First Lady and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to the fourth World
Conference of the United Nations. Clinton speaks about the rights of women around
the world. Look at these excerpts:

a) Logos:

● “Women comprise more than half the world’s population, 70% of the world’s
poor, and two-thirds of those who are not taught to read and write.”
● “What we are learning around the world is that if women are healthy and
educated, their families will flourish. If women are free from violence, their
families will flourish. If women have a chance to work and earn as full and
equal partners in society, their families will flourish.”

Clinton appeals to logos with statistics (“more than half”, “70%”, “two-thirds”) to
persuade her audience of the importance of her cause: worldwide human rights for
women. She also poses a logical cause-and-effect argument (“If women …, then …”).

b) Ethos:
● “Over the past 25 years, I have worked persistently on issues relating to
women, children, and families.”
● “Earlier today, I participated in a World Health Organization forum.”

11
Clinton establishes her ethos, or credibility, when she cites her 25 years of experience
working on “issues relating to women”, and her participation in the World Health
Organization forum.
c) Pathos:
● “Women also are dying from diseases that should have been prevented or
treated. They are watching their children succumb to malnutrition caused by
poverty. They are being denied the right to go to school by their own fathers
and brothers. They are being forced into prostitution, and … banned from the
ballot box.”
Clinton taps into the audience’s sympathy by listing hardships women face around the
world (poverty, malnutrition). She also cites examples of rights that women are denied
in some parts of the world (education, voting).
4. Metaphor (Ẩn dụ)
4.1. Definition
Metaphor has been viewed as one of the most important rhetorical devices (Pham,
2022:12). According to Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, metaphor is “an
expression that describes a person or object by referring to something that is
considered to possess similar characteristics”. The phenomenon of metaphor occurs
when humans take conceptual characteristics of the source domain to clarify the target
domain to provide a link between the source domain and the target domain. Source
domains are usually concrete or familiar objects in the physical world, while target
domains are abstract or unknown concepts. The phenomenon of metaphor occurs
when humans take conceptual characteristics of the source domain to clarify the target
domain (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, as cited in Tran, 2019:14).

However, the interpretation of metaphors varies individually. There is a gap between

the source domain and the target domain. These gaps determine whether a metaphor is
correctly understood, which depends largely on the role of ideology. Shared
metaphors represent shared ideologies of a particular social group. The more members
of a community have in common, the more they are likely to communicate through
metaphors (Tran, 2019:15)

4.2. Example

The speech by Hillary Clinton investigated here was delivered when she suspended
her presidential campaign, in June 2008. The following statement is today one of the

12
most famous and most cited among Hillary Clinton's utterances (Giordano,
2010:159-160):

Although we weren't able to shatter that highest, hardest glass ceiling this time,
thanks to you, it's got about 18 million cracks in it and the light is shining
through like never before, filling us all with the hope and the sure knowledge
that the path will be a little easier next time. (HC2, par.55-56)

The metaphor of the "glass ceiling" in this example and the image of the transparent
barrier stopping women's achievements in the American political arena is
representative of women's conflicts and struggles to see their own capabilities and
skills recognized in the world of work. Hillary Clinton uses the metaphor of the glass
ceiling as the barrier impeding women's upward advancement in the world of politics
and decision-making as a means to explain her election defeat. Her personal defeat
represents the defeat of all women: the use of the inclusive pronoun we invites the
audience to participate in her struggle and to overcome the setback.

The image of the White House, symbol of the highest and unachievable position an
American woman could aspire to or could dream of, lies beyond that "highest, hardest
glass ceiling". The eighteen million cracks in the glass, symbol of the numerous votes
received by the Senator during the Democratic primaries, pull together the women and
the people of the United States and the woman leader who strongly believed they
could win, and fiercely fought to break the last obstacle into pieces. This time they
“weren't able to shatter it" but, thanks to Hillary Clinton's supporters, the transparent,
yet impenetrable and impassable ceiling has eighteen million cracks allowing the light
to shine through it like never before. The negative connotation of BARRIER, seen as
one of the "entities that hinder the achievement of social good", similar to a barricade,
is juxtaposed to the positive connotation of LIGHT, that light which now shines
through the thick and solid glass, that light which gives not only hope or expectation,
but the "sure knowledge" and awareness of women's determination and willpower. For
the first time in American history, a woman has been tantalisingly close to the
achievement of the highest position in the power hierarchy.

5. Modality and Hedging (Tình thái và Rào đón)

5.1. Modality (Tình thái)
Modality is about commitment to levels of truth in language and images. In language,
modality can also tell us something about people's own sense of perceived status and
can be used to convey deliberate ambiguity about this. In cases of visual
communication, modality can tell us precisely in what ways aspects of images are
more or less than real and what different kinds of truth claims this allows them to

13
make, whether naturalistic truth, scientific or sensory truth (Machin & Mayr,
2012:13).
Modality plays an important role in expressing the meaning of the utterance. If
modality is absent, the propositional content will lose its vitality because modality
often expresses many different meanings of the speaker about the propositional value
(Ho, 2023:231).
5.1.1. Epistemic modality (Tình thái tri nhận/ chân nguỵ)
Epistemic modality is described as the speaker's judgment, assessing the degree of the
factual proposition, or the speaker's confidence or non-confidence in the truth value of
the proposition (Ho, 2023:231).
Ayer (1956) considered epistemic modality in the relationship between knowledge
and belief. He argued that when something is considered true belief, it constitutes
knowledge. He defined knowledge as the necessary and sufficient conditions for
knowing that something is said first to be true, then it is true, and finally it is
recognized true (Ho, 2023:233).
We can see how modals communicate our levels of certainty in the following example
(Machin & Mayr, 2012:187):
I will have a beer tonight.

I may have a beer tonight.

In the first sentence, the speaker indicates much more commitment than in the second
sentence. This is only a trivial example. But it shows the way that modals are used in
everyday language to express levels of commitment to what we do or do not do.
So if I say ‘I may have a beer tonight’, I am expressing uncertainty about the
proposition ‘I will probably have a beer tonight’. In other words, epistemic modals
show how certain you are something will happen, or is the case.
5.1.2. Deontic modality (Tình thái chức phận/ đạo nghĩa)
Deontic modality: This is to do with influencing people and events. So if I say
'Students must do the essay', I am expressing greater influence than if I say 'Students
may do the essay'. Deontic modals are therefore about how we compel and instruct
others.

14
Deontic modality also implies an authority, or ‘deontic source’ – which may be a
person, a set of rules, or something as vague as a social norm – responsible for
imposing the necessity (obligation) or granting the possibility (permission). Thus John
must go home means, on a deontic (obligation) reading, something like ‘it is necessary
for John to go home’ plus, for example, ‘I oblige John to go home’, and John can go
home means, on a deontic (permission) reading, ‘it is possible for John to go home’
and, for example, ‘the rules permit John to go home’(Depraetere & Reed, 2023:5).
5.1.3. Dynamic modality (Tình thái năng động)
Dynamic modality: This is related to possibility and ability, but is not subjective in the
manner of the first two modalities. For example, if we say 'I can do this essay' or
'Tomorrow I will go to the dentist' or 'You can eat your lunch in this room', I am not
so much expressing my judgement nor attempting to influence others, but indicating
an ability to complete an action or the likelihood of events.
Modality can also be associated with hedging terms, such as 'I think', 'kind of/sort of',
'seems' or 'often'. This becomes clear in the difference between:
This is the correct procedure.
I think this might be the correct procedure.
This seems to be the correct procedure.
The second sentence is an example of epistemic modality, where we find evidence of
the speaker's judgement of the level of truth of the proposition 'This is the correct
procedure'. The third sentence is an example of dynamic modality, where the speaker
offers a sense of possibility. An example of deontic modality here would be:
You have to carry out this procedure.
5.2. Hedging (Rào đón)
Hedges as originally defined are “words whose meaning involves fuzziness - words
whose job is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy”. This concept has been used and
subsequently extended to such an extent that hedges are now commonly used, as
realizations of a communicative strategy called ‘hedging’ (Lakoff, 1973:471).
Hedging is the use of language features that allow a speaker or writer to avoid coming
cleanly and quickly to the point to avoid being specific and therefore possibly
providing 'padding' to the consequences of what they do say. It is a term used to

15
describe the way that in language we often use terms or grammar to soften the impact
of what we have to say, or to mitigate something (Machin & Mayr, 186-187).
Hedging means that a speaker avoids directness or commitment to something,
although, as we will see, this can often be used to give the impression of being
detailed and precise. Hedging can be used to distance ourselves from what we say and
to attempt to dilute the force of our statements and therefore reduce chances of any
unwelcome responses.

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II. Methodology
1. Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional Framework
1.1. About Fairclough and his framework
Norman Fairclough is a British linguist and critical discourse analyst. He was born
June 25, 1941, in England.
Fairclough is best known for his contributions to the field of critical discourse
analysis, which is a method of analyzing language that emphasizes the ways in which
language is used to construct and maintain social power relations.
Norman Fairclough‘s three-dimensional model of critical discourse analysis (CDA)
involves the analysis of text, discursive practice, and social practice, with a focus on
the ways in which language, power, hegemony and ideology intersect in these three
dimensions. Let's take a closer look at each dimension and its sub-dimensions:

He distinguishes three dimensions (description, interpretation and explanation)

corresponding to the three dimensions of discourse (text, interaction and context)
respectively.

17
1.2. Description (Mô tả)
This is the first step, description
According to Fairclough (1989: 26), "Description is the stage which is concerned with
formal properties of text". In other words, linguistic features of the text are to be
explored in the descriptive stage.
In particular, Fairclough (2001, p. 110-1) has raised 10 questions displayed in the
following table to guide text analysis on three linguistic features mentioned above:

1.2.1. Vocabulary
The first aspect of description is vocabulary, including 4 questions and some
sub-questions) which can be asked of a text; this will hopefully make it relatively easy
to assimilate and use the framework.
What experimental values do words have?
What classification schemes are drawn upon?
Are there words which are ideologically contested?
Is there rewording or overwording?
What ideologically significant meaning relations (synonymy, hyponymy,
antonymy) are there between words?

18
What relational values do words have?
Are there euphemistic expressions?
Are there markedly formal or informal words?
What expressive values do words
have? What metaphors are used?
So to help you have a better understanding about the use of vocabulary, I will use
Hilary Clinton’s speech in 1995 as an example here. As we may know, Hillary Clinton
is an American politician and a feminist icon and this speech is about woman’s right.
E.g:
Experiential values: Ideologically contested words
- Hillary Clinton knows that there are some people who doubt the contribution of
women to society’s progress:
“There are some who wonder whether the lives of women and girls matter to
economic and political progress around the globe.”
However, she then stresses the importance of women’s contribution to the
development of families and then society:
“At this very moment, as we sit here, women around the world are giving birth,
raising children, cooking meals, washing clothes, cleaning houses, planting crops,
working on assembly lines, running companies, and running countries.”
Relational value and expressive value
- She calls for joint effort and action of women throughout the world.
“There is no formula for how women should lead their lives. That is why
we must respect the choices that each woman makes for herself and her family.
Every woman deserves the chance to realize her God-given potential. We also must
recognize that women will never gain full dignity until their human rights are
respected and protected.” (make listeners empathize and be inspirational.)
1.2.2. Grammar
Next aspect of description is grammar, focusing on sentence structure, word order,
pronouns usage and how clauses are connected:
What experiential values do grammatical features have?
What types of process and participant predominate?
Are sentences active or passive/ positive or negative
What relational values do grammatical features have?
What modes (declarative/grammatical question/imperative)?
Are there important features of relational modality?
Are the pronouns we and you used, and if so, how?

19
What expressive values do grammatical features have?
Are there important features of expressive modality?
Are the pronouns we and you used, and if so, how?
What expressive values do grammatical features have?
Are there important features of expressive modality?
How are (simple) sentences linked together?
What logical connectors are used?
E.g: Relational value
In the speech, pronouns like “I”, “we” are both used to serve different purposes of the
speaker.
When sharing her personal experience or expressing her own ideas, Clinton uses the
pronoun “I”, which makes the speech more convincing. The pronoun “we” is used
when the speaker wants to attract the attention of the audience and to call for joint
effort and the responsibility to cooperate in fighting for women’s rights:

“I have worked persistently on issues relating

to women, children and families.” “We come together in fields and in factories”

“I have met new mothers in Indonesia” “We share a common future”

“I have met working parents in Denmark” “We are here to find common ground so that we
may help bring new dignity and respect to
“I have met with the leading women of the women and girls all over the world”
Western Hemisphere”

E.g: Usage of modality

The use of “must” reveals the power and the authoritative position of the speaker. The
power is exerted on the audience – the addressee, and the addressee is required to
perform the action she asks them to do:
- “The voices of this conference must be heard loud and clear…”
-“Women must enjoy the right to participate fully in the social and political
lives of their countries if we want freedom and democracy to thrive and endure.”

20
- “We must move beyond rhetoric. We must move beyond recognition of problems to
working together to have the common efforts to build that common ground we hope to
see.”
E.g: Connectors
In the speech, logical connectors “can cue the ideology assumption”. We will discover
Hillary Clinton's ideology through the connectors used in the text.
The speaker also points out the reality that it was not too difficult to avoid another
world war but to solve discrimination against women is really difficult.
“We have seen peace prevail in most places for a half century. We have avoided
another world war. But we have not solved older, deeply-rooted problems that
continue to diminish the potential of half the world's population.”
“And” is used after the speaker has mentioned the benefits that women can bring to
their families to emphasize the close relationship between families and society or
nations.
- “What we are learning around the world is that if women are healthy and educated,
their families will flourish. If women are free from violence, their families will
flourish. If women have a chance to work and earn as full and equal partners in
society, their families will flourish. And when families flourish, communities and
nations will flourish.
1.2.3. Text structure
Text structure aspect look at the macro- structure of the text to understand the
communicative purpose of speaker
The Speaker's ideology hidden behind words from the microstructure perspective by
breaking the speech into small units like vocabulary, grammar, cohesive devices and
grammatical features.
E.g: In the speech’s context, women’s rights have only been paid attention to in
recent years. Realizing that something must be done to help women around the
world gain their legitimate rights. First, the speaker tries to raise the awareness of
people about women’s roles in families and societies. She then makes herself
convinced by giving her personal experience working with women in many parts of
the world. She emphasizes that it is her responsibility to protect women’s rights and
ask for joint efforts from other women to create a bright world without unfairness.

21
1.3. Interpretation (Hiểu)
According to Fairclough N., 2001:118), "Interpretation is concerned with the
relationship between text and interaction with seeing the text as the product of a
process of production, and as a resource in the process of interpretation".
Situational context ( bối cảnh tình huống)
In terms of situational context, the following questions are taken into consideration:
“What’s going on?”, “Who’s involved?”, “What relationships are at issue?” and
“What’s the role of language in what’s going on?”

22
E.g: This is a speech so the subject positions are the speaker, Hillary Clinton and
the audience including Mrs. Gertrude Mongella - the founding president of the
Pan-African Parliament, UN Assistant Secretary General and Secretary General of 4th
World Conference on Women in Beijing, China (1995).The speech is aimed at
calling for actions to struggle for women’s rights, and for a better world, which
needs joint efforts of women themselves and people of all ages around the world.
Language has been used in an instrumental way to give information, to persuade
people and to call for cooperation. It is informative, directive, expressive and
commissive. Hillary Clinton is the main speaker of the conference, in which gather
leaders of many countries in the world. Therefore, there seems to be no social distance
and the position of the speaker and others are the same.
1.4. Explanation (Giải thích)
The third dimension of Fairclough’s model is social practice, which involves
analyzing the broader social and cultural structures that shape discourse, including
economic, political, and historical factors. These processes can be summarized in the
following figure:

According to Fairclough, the objective of this stage is to portray a discourse

as part of a social process, as a social practice. It tries to show how
discourses are determined by social structures, and what reproductive
effects discourses can have on those structures, sustaining them or changing
them. These social determinations and effects are mediated by MR: that is social
structures shape MR while MR in turn shape discourses, and discourses
sustain or change MR, which in turn sustain or change structures.
(Mục tiêu của giai đoạn này là miêu tả diễn ngôn như một phần của quá trình xã hội,
như một thực tiễn xã hội. Nó cố gắng chỉ ra cách các diễn ngôn được xác định bởi các
cấu trúc xã hội và những tác động sản sinh mà các diễn ngôn có thể có đối với các
cấu trúc đó, duy trì hoặc thay đổi chúng. Những quyết định và tác động xã hội này
được trung gian bởi MR: nghĩa là các cấu trúc xã hội định hình MR trong khi MR lần

23
lượt định hình các diễn ngôn, và các diễn ngôn duy trì hoặc thay đổi MR, từ đó duy trì
hoặc thay đổi các cấu trúc.)
1.5. Conclusion
Overall, Fairclough's three-dimensional model of CDA provides a framework for
analyzing language in context and highlights the complex ways in which language use
is shaped by and shapes social structures, power relations, and ideologies. The model
allows for an analysis of the ways in which language is used to construct and maintain
social power relations, as well as for identifying opportunities for social change and
transformation through critical analysis of language use in society. By examining
texts, discursive practice, and social practice, we can gain a deeper understanding of
the ways in which language use.
2. Van Dijk's Socio-cognitive approach
2.1. Overview
Teun A. van Dijk is a prominent figure in the field of Critical Discourse Studies
(CDA), known for his significant contributions to the discipline.
Van Dijk's Sociocognitive Approach highlights the interconnection between
cognition, discourse, and society. His investigations primarily focus on the prejudice
and inequality encountered by minority groups and ethnic communities. Aligned with
other scholars in critical discourse studies, he emphasizes the importance of
acknowledging that power dynamics are established through discourse manipulation.
Based on the idea that the interactivity between discourse and society is not direct but
depends on the mediating role of cognition, he presented The
Discourse-Cognition-Society triangle.
2.2. The Discourse–Cognition–Society triangle
This framework emphasizes that the relations between discourse and society are
cognitively mediated, suggesting that discourse structures and social structures are of
different natures and can only be related through the mental representations of
language users both as individuals and as social members.
Social interaction, social situations, and social structures can only influence text and
talk through people's interpretations of such social environments. Conversely,
discourse can only influence social interaction and social structures through the

24
cognitive interface of mental models, knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies. This
underlines the importance of cognitive processes in understanding how discourse is
produced and interpreted within social contexts.
Van Djik points out that language users not only act (communicate, talk, write, listen,
read, etc.) but also think when they do so. This highlights the cognitive nature of
discourse, suggesting that understanding discourse requires considering the cognitive
processes involved in its production, comprehension, and interpretation.
Example 3.1. Racist propaganda in the European Parliament elections of 2014
Van Djik (2015:65)

Figure 3.1 Election billboard used by UKIP in the 2014 European Parliament elections

Discourse Component: This involves examining the linguistic and semiotic structures
of the propaganda. For instance, the use of numbers (e.g., "26 million people"),
rhetorical questions (e.g., "whose jobs are they after?"), commands or
recommendations (e.g., "take back, vote"), and possessive pronouns (e.g., "our
country") are all elements of the discourse. The image of a finger pointing at the
readers and the use of different colors are also part of the discursive strategies
employed by UKIP. These elements are designed to appeal to specific emotions and
prejudices, such as fear and resentment towards immigrants

Cognition Component: This focuses on the cognitive processes involved in

interpreting the discourse. The interpretation requires shared sociocultural knowledge
about unemployment, immigration, and the ongoing debate on these issues. The
propaganda appeals to xenophobic attitudes and a racist ideology that polarizes
ingroups and outgroups

Society Component: This component looks at the social and political context in
which the discourse is produced and consumed. The propaganda by UKIP is part of a
broader political strategy aiming to exploit fear and prejudice to gain votes,
contributing to white-dominant racism in the UK and Europe. The context includes the

25
setting (time and space of the elections), participants (UKIP and British citizens),
actions (election advertising), and aims (getting votes for UKIP)

After this very brief analysis (summarizing a How to do sociocognitive critical

discourse analysis) let us now examine these three different dimensions of a
sociocognitive analysis of discourse in more detail.

The cognitive component

A component deals with the mind, memory and especially with the cognitive
processes and representations involved in the production and comprehension of
discourse. (Van Djik 2015:66)
Cognitive structure
Memory: Memory is divided into Working Memory (WM), also known as Short
Term Memory (STM), and Long Term Memory (LTM). LTM includes Episodic
Memory (EM) for personal experiences and Semantic Memory (SM) for socially
shared knowledge, attitudes, and ideologies.
Mental Models: Personal experiences processed in WM are represented as unique
mental models in EM, with a structure including Setting, Participants, Actions/Events,
and Goals. These models are multimodal, incorporating various sensory and emotional
information.
Social Cognition: Beyond personal mental models, humans share generic knowledge
and ideologies with their community and social groups, influencing the interpretation
of personal experiences. This shared cognition facilitates cooperation and
communication, enabling discourse.
The relation of these three cognitive elements is explained by van Dijk (2009) as
follows: humans’ individual experiences are interpreted from the events, which
become mental models under the influence of social cognition. As a result, the mental
models of each person are not very different from those belonging to the same
community. In this way, discourse can successfully influence members of a group
(Tran Hanh Linh, BA thesis:13)
● Discourse processing
Discourse is strategically produced and understood on the basis of these cognitive
structures. Its words, phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs or turns are sequentially
processed in WM and represented and controlled by the mental models, knowledge
(and sometimes ideologies) in LTM. (Van Djik, 2015:67)

26
We distinguish between two types of mental model in discourse processing:
Situation models represent the context or scenario that a discourse is discussing,
referring to, and can also be referred to as semantic models. These models account
for the personal meaning or interpretation of discourse and define its meaningfulness
and (local and global) coherence. Mental models are more complex and complete than
the meaning explicitly expressed in discourse, because language users are able to infer
relevant aspects of a situation model by applying their shared knowledge
Context models depict the ever-changing communication environment in which
language users continuously participate. They establish the suitability of discourse in
relation to the communicative setting, thus also referred to as pragmatic models.
Like all mental models, context models are subjective, reflecting each participant's
understanding and perception of the communication setting. They not only regulate
which information from the situation model (such as personal experience) can or
should be discussed appropriately but also dictate how this should be accomplished.
● Knowledge
The basis of all cognition, and hence of all thought, perception, understanding, action,
interaction and discourse, is the system of knowledge accumulated during our lifetime,
and as shared by the members of epistemic communities. (Van Djik, 2015:69)

Knowledge is defined as beliefs that meet the (historically developing) epistemic

criteria of each community, such as reliable perception, discourse or inference. (Van
Dijk, 2015:69)

● Attitudes and ideologies

Whereas social knowledge is defined as beliefs shared by all or most members of

epistemic communities or cultures, there are forms of social (often evaluative) beliefs
that are only shared by specific groups: attitudes and ideologies. (Van Dijk, 2015:69)
Attitudes are evaluations of objects or people, expressing favor or disfavor, while
ideologies are more comprehensive systems of beliefs that influence attitudes and
behaviors
Understanding attitudes and ideologies is crucial for social cognition, as these beliefs
influence how individuals perceive and interact with their social world. They play a
role in shaping social identities, influencing judgments, and affecting social
interactions and discourse.
● The relevance of the cognitive component
Cognitive component is crucial for a theory of discourse in general, and for critical
studies in particular. Power and power abuse, domination and manipulation, as well as

27
all other illegitimate forms of discourse, interaction and communication are rooted in
social structure and relations between social groups.
The social component
The critical study of discourse needs an important social component. We are dealing
with power abuse of dominant groups or the resistance of dominated groups, as well
as with organizations, institutions, enterprises and nation states, among other societal
macrostructures (Van Dijk, 2015:70)
A more sociological approach focuses on the micro-level of everyday interaction of
social members on the one hand, and on the macro-level of the overall structures and
relations of groups and organizations on the other
(Van Dijk, 2015:70)
Van Djik explains the overall structure of the sociocognitive account of the relations
between discourse, cognition and society in Table 3.1 The organization of the
sociocognitive approach of discourse. (Van Dijk, 2015:71)

● Power and domination

Power and domination are here defined as a specific relationship of control between
social groups or organizations – and not as a property of interpersonal relations. (Van
Dijk, 2015:71)
Such control has a social and a cognitive dimension: control of the actions (and hence
discourses) of dominated groups and their members, on the one hand, and control of
their personal and socially shared cognitions – mental models, knowledge, attitudes
and ideologies – on the other. (Van Dijk, 2015:71)
Whereas power in general may well be legitimate, for instance in democratic societies
or between parents and children in families, CDS is more specifically interested in
power abuse or domination. (Van Dijk, 2015:71)
The discourse component
The primary focus of critical discourse analysts is the discourse component, which
involves analyzing how discourse contributes to the reproduction or resistance of
power abuse or domination in society.

28
 ● Ideological structures of discourse
More specific for research in CDS is the analysis of those structures of discourse that
are specifically involved in the (re)production of power abuse. Since power and power
abuse are defined in terms of the relations between social groups or organizations,
such discourse generally will be ideologically based. (Van Dijk, 2015:73)
Discourse structures exhibiting the attitudes and ideologies of dominant social groups
are of interest. These ideologies are schematically organized into fundamental
categories as below.
Polarization: Ideological discourses often polarize between a positive representation
of the ingroup and a negative representation of the outgroup, affecting all levels of
discourse.
Pronouns: The use of pronouns like 'We' and 'They' to refer to ingroup and outgroup
members is a common feature, reflecting the polarization and the distinction between
'Us' and 'Them'.
Identification: Members of ideological groups continuously identify with their group,
expressing this identification in various ways, such as through specific terms (e.g.,
feminist, pacifist).
Emphasis of positive self-descriptions and negative other-descriptions: Ideologies
often emphasize positive self-descriptions (e.g., glorification of 'Our' country) and
negative descriptions of 'Others', a rhetorical strategy known as the Ideological
Square.
Activities: Ideological discourse often focuses on what 'We' do and must do, such as
defending or protecting the group, or attacking the outgroup.
Norms and Values: Ideologies are built on norms of conduct or values, which are
explicitly or implicitly expressed in discourse, especially in evaluative statements
about groups of people.
Interests: Ideological discourse typically features references to interests, including
basic and symbolic resources, as part of the struggle for power and interests.

29
3. Wodak's Discourse - Historical Approach (DHA) (Khanh Nhi)
3.1. Introduction
3.1.1. Who is Ruth Wodak?
● Ruth Wodak is distinguished professor and chair of discourse studies at
Lancaster University, UK.
● She is member of the Academia Europea and fellow of the British Academy of
Social Sciences(FAcSS).
● Her research interests focus on national and European identity politics and
politics of the past: racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia; and organizational
discourse.
3.1.2. What is CDA according to Wodak?
Ruth Wodak, sees CDA as a way to understand how power works in society through
language.
● Power in language: People use language to influence each other and sometimes
those in power use language in certain ways to maintain their position. CDA
helps us see these tactics.
● Many approaches: There's no single CDA method. It's more like a toolbox with
different tools ( and by tools, i mean various approaches and methods)
depending on the situation you're analyzing. For example, different scholars
have different ways of studying discourse and power. Ruth Wodak emphasizes
the linguistic and discursive nature of power in contemporary societies, while
Norman Fairclough explores the relationship between power and discourse
from multiple dimensions.
Basically, CDA helps us understand how language reflects and reinforces power
structures.
3.2. Ruth Wodak’s "The Discourse-Historical Approach"
● The DHA is also known as discourse sociolinguistics direction to CDA.
● It was introduced by Wodak and her colleagues at Vienna school of discourse
analysis.
● The third point leads us to the History of the DHA. The discourse historical
approach (DHA) was initially developed to analyze the formation of
anti-Semitic stereotypes in public discourses during the 1986 Austrian

30
 presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim. Waldheim, who had concealed his
involvement in national socialism, was the former UN General Secretary. This
study played a significant role in the development of the DHA methodology
(Wodak et al., 1990).
● In Ruth Wodak's "The Discourse-Historical Approach," the term "historical"
means that the approach seeks to carefully consider and include all relevant
background information when analyzing and interpreting a written or spoken
text. This includes looking at different layers and aspects of the text and taking
into account its historical context. The goal is to gain a comprehensive
understanding of the text by considering its historical background and the
information available.
3.3. Key Concepts in the Discourse-Historical Approach
3.3.1. Triangulation of Ideology, Power and Critique
a) Ideology
● Ideology refers to a particular way of thinking or seeing the world, shaped by
our beliefs, opinions, attitudes, and evaluations. It is a perspective that
influences how we understand and interpret things.
● Ideologies are not individual beliefs; they are shared by members of specific
social groups. These groups may have common values, interests, or identities
that shape their ideologies.
● Ideologies play a crucial role in establishing and maintaining unequal power
relations through language and communication. They can be used to justify and
perpetuate inequalities in society. For example, certain ideologies may support
the idea that one group is superior to others, leading to discrimination and
marginalization.
b) Power
● For the DHA, language is not powerful on its own; it is a mean to gain and
maintain power through the use that powerful people make of it.
● Power imbalance: Power isn't always equal. Imagine a teacher and a student.
The teacher has more authority in the classroom. The DHA looks at how
language reflects these imbalances in power between different social groups or
positions.
● Struggle for control in language: Discourse can be a battleground. People
and groups use language to try to gain dominance or control over how things

31
 are understood. The DHA helps us see the traces of these "fights" within texts,
where some ideas are presented as more powerful or important than others.
● In conclusion, the DHA sees power as an ongoing struggle reflected in how
language is used.
c) Critique
● Text or discourse-immanent critique: This type of critique focuses on finding
inconsistencies, contradictions, paradoxes, and dilemmas within the text itself.
Researchers examine the internal structures of the text to uncover these issues.
● Socio-diagnostic critique: This critique aims to demystify the persuasive or
manipulative nature of discursive practices. Researchers draw on their
contextual knowledge, social theories, and theories from other disciplines to
interpret the discursive events and identify the explicit or hidden intentions
behind them.
● Future-related prospective critique: This critique aims to contribute to
improving communication. For example, it can involve developing guidelines
to address sexist language use or reducing language barriers in places like
hospitals and schools. The goal is to use the analysis to provide insights and
suggestions for better communication practices in the future.
● Overall, these forms of critique help researchers analyze texts, uncover the
underlying ideologies and power dynamics, and provide insights for enhancing
communication and addressing social issues.
3.3.2. Levels of discourse in DHA
a) Immediate context (within the text): This refers to the words and sentences
around a specific part of the text you're analyzing. Imagine a news article where a
strong statement is followed by an explanation. The explanation provides the
immediate context for the strong statement.
b) Connections between texts: This level looks at how the text you're analyzing
relates to other texts or genres. For example, a political speech might reference a
famous historical quote. The DHA would consider how the meaning of the speech is
shaped by this connection.
● Social and institutional factors: This level considers the social situation and
institutions where the text was produced. Imagine a social media post by a

32
 company. The DHA would look at the company culture and social media
trends to understand the context of the post.
● Broader historical and political context: This level examines the larger
historical and political forces that influence the text. For example, a wartime
newspaper article would be analyzed considering the social and political
climate of the war.
By looking at all these levels, the DHA helps understand the full story behind how
language is used.
3.3.3. Intertextuality and interdiscursivity
In this part, we will explore three key concepts that help us understand the
relationships between texts and how meaning is constructed. These concepts are
intertextuality, recontextualization, and interdiscursivity. By examining these
relationships, we gain a richer understanding of how texts are shaped by other texts,
how elements are adapted for new contexts, and how discourses interact with each
other.
a) Intertextuality
Intertextuality refers to the idea that no text exists in isolation. Every text is shaped by
and refers to other texts, both consciously and unconsciously. These connections can
be explicit, such as a direct quote or paraphrase. Or they can be more implicit, such as
an allusion to a well-known story or theme. By understanding the intertextual
relationships within a text, we can gain a deeper understanding of its meaning and
purpose.
b) Recontextualization
Recontextualization describes how elements of a text, such as quotes, ideas, or
images, are taken out of one context and placed in a new one. Decontextualization
refers to the removal of the element from its original context. Recontextualization
refers to the placement of the element in a new context. This process can significantly
alter the meaning of the element. For instance, a political speech can be
decontextualized by a journalist who selects specific quotes to fit a particular narrative
in their news article. We will dive deeper into this in the last part.
c) Interdiscursivity
Interdiscursivity refers to the interconnectedness of different discourses. A discourse
is a way of talking about a particular topic, and it includes the language, concepts, and
assumptions that are used. Discourses are not isolated entities; they interact and
influence each other. For example, the discourse on climate change may refer to topics

33
from the discourse on finance or health. Through interdiscursivity, new sub-topics can
emerge, creating a more complex and nuanced understanding of the issue at hand.
3.4. Fundamental Principles of the Discourse-Historical Approach
3.4.1. DHA approach
The DHA is three-dimensional: after (1) having identified the specific contents or
topics of a specific discourse, (2) discursive strategies are investigated.Then (3),
linguistic means (as types) and the specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations
(as tokens) are examined. There are several strategies which deserve special attention
when analysing a specific discourse and related texts.
3.4.2. Discursive strategies
Nomination: This strategy focuses on how social actors and things are constructed
within discourse. It involves analyzing the vocabulary choices used to describe people,
groups, events, or concepts. By examining these choices, we can see how language
frames the issue and shapes our understanding.
Predication: This strategy delves into the relationship between social actors and
things. It involves examining verbs and clauses to see how they connect concepts and
ideas. For instance, the choice of active or passive voice can influence how we
perceive power dynamics within a text.
Argumentation: This strategy focuses on how arguments are constructed and
presented in discourse. It involves analyzing the use of evidence, reasoning, and
persuasion techniques. By examining these elements, we can see how a text attempts
to convince the audience of a particular viewpoint.
Perspectivation: This strategy examines the perspective from which a text is written
or spoken. It helps us understand who is being positioned as the voice of authority or
legitimacy within the discourse. This can reveal whose viewpoint is being privileged
and whose is being marginalized.
Intensification/Mitigation: This strategy focuses on how the importance or severity
of an issue is presented. It involves analyzing the use of adjectives, adverbs, and
metaphors. For instance, the use of strong adjectives can intensify an issue, while
mitigating language can downplay its significance.

34
3.5. Salient features of the DHA
Various principles characterizing the approach have evolved over time since the study
on Austrian post-war antisemitism. Here, we summarize ten of the most important
principles:
● Interdisciplinary: The approach draws on theories, methods, and practices
from various disciplines to provide a comprehensive understanding of the
research topic.
● Problem-oriented: The focus of the approach is on addressing specific issues
or problems within the research area.
● Integration of theories and methods: Different theories and methods are
combined to ensure a comprehensive understanding and explanation of the
research subject.
● Incorporation of fieldwork and ethnography: Fieldwork and ethnographic
research methods may be used to gain a deeper understanding of the subject
being studied.
● Recursion between theory and data: The research process involves a
continual back-and-forth movement between theoretical concepts and empirical
data.
● Study of various genres and public spaces: The approach analyzes different
types of texts and explores how they are connected within specific social
contexts.
● Flexible categories and tools: Categories and analytical tools are not fixed but
are developed and tailored for each analysis based on the specific research
problem.
● Use of foundational and middle-range theories: Foundational theories
provide a basis for analysis, while middle-range theories offer more specific
and contextually relevant explanations.
● Application of results: The aim is to make the research findings accessible and
applicable to experts and the general public, promoting their practical use.
● In summary, the DHA is an interdisciplinary and problem-oriented approach
that combines theories and methods, incorporates fieldwork, and emphasizes

35
 the application of research findings. It involves analyzing various types of texts
and adapting analytical tools to specific research problems.
3.6. Application of the DHA: Case study and Example
3.6.1. Eight-stage programs

a) Activating Prior Knowledge

● Begin by refreshing your knowledge on the topic.

● Read and discuss previous research related to your chosen theme.

b) Data and Context Collection

● Gather relevant texts (speeches, news articles, etc.) based on your research
question.
● Consider various discourses, social fields, actors involved, media formats, and
genres.

c) Data Selection and Preparation

● Apply relevant criteria to select and potentially downsize your data collection.
● Transcribe recordings if necessary and prepare the data for analysis.

d) Research Question and Assumptions

● Based on your literature review and initial data exploration, refine your
research question.
● Formulate initial assumptions about the discourse you're analyzing.

e) Pilot Analysis

● Conduct a preliminary analysis to test your categories, assumptions, and refine

them as needed.

f) Detailed Case Studies

● Conduct in-depth analysis of a wide range of data, primarily qualitative but

potentially including quantitative aspects.

g) Formulating Critique

● Interpret your results, considering the relevant context and applying the three
dimensions of critique:

36
 ○ Text-immanent critique: Analyze inconsistencies within the discourse
itself.
○ Sociodiagnostic critique: Unmask underlying power dynamics and
ideologies.
○ Future-oriented critique: Propose ways to improve communication
and social change.

h) Application of Results

● Explore potential applications of your findings. Can your analysis inform future
research or social action?

By following these steps, you can effectively utilize the DHA program to gain deeper
insights into the interplay between discourse, power, and social change.
3.6.2. Case studies and Examples
The DHA involves a detailed texts analysis, examining their linguistic features,
structure, and framing. In this case, three news reports will be analyzed to identify the
specific language choices, descriptions, and framing used to present the incident.
On June 2nd, 1975, in Salisbury, Rhodesia (now Harare, Zimbabwe), a protest
resulted in the deaths and injuries of African citizens by Rhodesian police.
In this case study, the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) can be applied to
analyze the different narratives and underlying ideologies presented in the three news
reports. Here's how the DHA can be applied:
Text analysis: The DHA involves a detailed analysis of the texts, examining their
linguistic features, structure, and framing. In this case, the three news reports are
analyzed to identify the specific language choices, descriptions, and framing used to
present the incident.
Recontextualization: The DHA emphasizes the importance of recontextualization,
which involves understanding how the texts are situated within broader social,
cultural, and historical contexts. In this case, the reports are examined in relation to the
political and social climate of the time, including the racial tensions and power
dynamics in Rhodesia.
Ideological analysis: The DHA aims to uncover the underlying ideologies and power
relations reflected in the texts. By comparing the three news reports, the different
ideologies can be identified. For example, the Times report frames the African

37
 individuals as "rioting Blacks," potentially portraying them as a source of chaos and
justifying the police shooting. The Guardian report, on the other hand, portrays the
individuals as "demonstrators" and emphasizes the actions of the "riot police,"
potentially highlighting police aggression. The Tanzanian Daily News report
explicitly labels the police as "racists" and "supremacists," positioning them as
perpetrators and the Africans as innocent victims.
Critical analysis: The DHA encourages a critical examination of how power relations
are constructed and maintained through discourse. In this case, the different narratives
and frames used in the news reports reflect underlying power dynamics and
ideological perspectives. The DHA enables a critical understanding of how language
and discourse shape public perceptions and influence the representation of events.
Overall, the application of the DHA in this case study involves analyzing the linguistic
features, recontextualizing the texts, identifying underlying ideologies, and critically
examining the power relations reflected in the news reports. It helps uncover the
different narratives and perspectives surrounding the incident.

 In her BA Thesis, Ms Phung Tra My used CDA to examine Putinism in President

Vladimir Putin’s speech on the Crimea annexation delivered on March 18th, 2014.
Her study was aimed to reveal linguistic devices and forms of realisations, which
contributed to the discursive strategies Putin utilises to convey his ideology and
political intentions.
(Phung Tra My BA Thesis, 2021, Abstract).

1. By implementing nomination strategies, it is apparent that Putin prefers to use word

with the prefix re- , which generally mean “return, back to the original place or
again” (TheSaurus, 2011, “Definition” section), to coin the Crimea event such as
reunification, rehabilitation, reuniting, return and restore.
 Crimean Tatars returned to their homeland. I believe we should make all the
necessary political and legislative decisions to finalise the rehabilitation of Crimean
Tatars, restore them in their rights and clear their good name. (para. 9)
 [...] almost 92 percent of our people support Crimea’s reunification with Russia.
(para.61)
 [...] the overwhelming majority of people in Crimea and the absolute majority of the
Russian Federation’s people support the reunification of the Republic of Crimea and
the city of Sevastopol with Russia. (para. 62)

(Phung Tra My BA Thesis, 2021, p25,26)

2. Through DHA’s predication strategies, how Putin discursively portrays social actors
such as the Crimean Peninsula, the city of Sevastopol, Russia and Russia’s decades-
long opponent is explicitly revealed.
While praising Crimea and Sevastopol, Putin skillfully incorporates Russia and its

38
 national adjectives as well as the possessive determiner “our” into the sentences, such
as:
 our historic territory (para. 52)
 our country’s lands (para. 61)
Putin expresses strong Russian representation by painting a picture of a mighty, glory,
liberated and generous Russia through some predicate nouns, such as:
 an independent, active participant in international affairs (para. 44)
 a strong and stable sovereignty (para. 50)
Through explicit predicates, Russia is not only depicted as a good neighbor to Ukraine
but also a corporative partner to the Western countries:
 [...] we expected Ukraine to remain our good neighbour [...]. (para. 18)
 [...] we will never seek confrontation with our partners, whether in the East or the
West, but on the contrary, will do everything we can to build civilised and good
neighbourly relations as one is supposed to in the modern world. (para. 58)

(Phung Tra My BA Thesis, 2021, p26, 27, 28)

3.7. Conclusion
3.7.1. Strengths and Challenges of the DHA
● Interdisciplinary orientation: DHA transcends disciplinary boundaries,
allowing researchers to draw on insights from various fields to provide a more
comprehensive understanding of discourse.
● Triangulation: DHA utilizes triangulation, a strategy that involves examining
the research object from multiple angles. This approach helps to ensure a more
comprehensive and nuanced understanding of discourse.
● Historical analysis: DHA emphasizes the importance of historical context. By
analyzing how discourse has changed over time, researchers can gain a deeper
understanding of the forces that shape it.
● Practical applications: DHA findings can be used to promote social change
and improve democratic processes. By understanding how discourse shapes
power relations, researchers can develop strategies to challenge inequality and
promote justice.
3.7.2. Limitation of the DHA

39
 ● Theoretical integration: One of the main challenges of DHA is integrating
theoretical concepts from various disciplines. Researchers need to be careful to
avoid combining incompatible theoretical frameworks.
● New phenomena: There is a need to continuously develop DHA to address
new forms of discourse and social phenomena. As communication practices
evolve, DHA needs to adapt to effectively analyze these emerging trends.
III. Applications - Political discourse, discourse and gender, discourse and media
1. Political discourse (Diễn ngôn chính trị)
1.1. Defining political discourse
- Political discourse is identified by its actors or authors, viz., politicians. Indeed, the
vast bulk of studies of political discourse is about the text and talk of professional
politicians or political institutions, such as presidenta and prime ministers and other
members of government, parliament or political parties, both at the local, national
and international levels.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.12)
- Politicians in this sense are the group of people who are being paid for their
(political) activities, and who are being elected or appointed (or self-designated) as the
central players in the polity.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.13)
- Although crucial in political science and PDA as actors and authors of political
discourse and other political practices, politicians are not the only participants in the
domain of politics. From the interactional point of view of discourse analysis, we
therefore should also include the various recipients in political communicative events,
such as the public, the people, citizens, the `masses', and other groups or categories.
In the sense that their members are participants of & political discourse only when
acting as political actors, and hence as participating in political actions, such as
governing, ruling, legislating, protesting, dissenting, or voting.
=> That is, once we locate politics and its discourses in the public sphere, many more
participants in political communication appear on the stage.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.14)

40
- The same is true for the definition of the field of media discourse, which also needs
to focus on its audiences. And also in medical, legal or educational discourse, we not
only think of participants such as doctors, lawyers or teachers, but also of patients,
defendants and students.
=> The delimitation of political discourse by its principal authors is insufficient and
needs to be extended to a more complex picture of all its relevant participants, whether
or not these are actively involved in political discourse, or merely as recipients in
one-way modes of communication.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.14)
- Delimiting the object of study in political discourse involves focusing on the nature
of activities or practices being accomplished by political text and talk, rather than
solely on the participants involved.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.13-14)
- Participants and actions are the core of such contexts, but we may further analyze
such contexts broadly in terms of political and communicative events and encounters,
with their own settings (time, place, circumstances), occasions, intentions,
functions, goals, and legal or political implications.
=> That is, politicians talk politically also (or only) if they and their talk are
contextualized in such communicative events such as cabinet meetings,
parliamentary sessions, election campaigns, rallies, interviews with the media,
bureaucratic practices, protest demonstrations, and so on.
- Example: A session of parliament is precisely such only when elected politicians
are debating (talking, arguing, etc.) in parliament buildings ín an official capacity (as
MPs), and during the official (officially opened) session of parliament.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p. 14)
- However, in order to avoid the extension of politics and political discourse to a
domain that is so large that it would coincide with the study of public discourse in
general we shall not treat such forms of discourse-with-possible-political-effects as
political discourse.
=> corporate, medical or educational discourse, even when public and even when
affecting the life of (many) citizens, will here not be included as forms of political
discourse. And although we may readily subscribe to the well-known feminist slogan
that the personal is political, we shall similarly not take all interpersonal talk (not even
of gender) as political discourse.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p. 15)

41
- Political discourse, are essentially defined contextually, viz., in terms of special
events or practices of which the aims, goals or functions are maybe not exclusively but
at least primarily political. (This excludes the talk of politicians outside of political
contexts, and includes the discourse of all other groups, institutions or citizens as soon
as they participate in political events.)
(Van Dijk, 1997, p. 15)
=> The study of political discourse should not be limited to the structural
properties of text or talk itself, but also include a systematic account of the
context and its relations to discursive structures.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p. 15)
1.2. The domain of politics
- Societal Domain or Field: Politics encompasses various aspects such as Education,
Health, and Law, which define and influence political actions and discourse. It is often
used to critique practices in other fields, such as when activities move from being
considered scientific to political.
- Political Systems: These are the structural frameworks like communism, democracy,
or fascism that organize power and decision-making within societies.
- Political Values: Core values such as freedom, solidarity, equality, and tolerance
underpin political ideologies and shape the attitudes and goals of different groups.
- Political Ideologies: These are belief systems, like communism or democracy, that
provide a socio-cognitive framework for understanding and organizing the social
representations of groups and their members.
- Political Institutions: These include formal structures like the state, governments,
parliaments, and city councils that top-down organize the political field.
- Political Organizations: Less formal entities such as political parties, clubs, and
NGOs also structure political action.
- Political Groups: Independent of formal organizations, groups like dissidents,
demonstrators, and socio-political movements also form and act within the political
domain.

42
- Political Actors: This group includes all individuals engaged in political actions,
from politicians to demonstrators and lobbyists.
- Political Relations: The interactions among political entities are characterized by
dynamics of power, oppression, and freedom, among others.
- Political Process: This term captures the dynamic and ongoing sequences of
political actions like governing, legislation, and policy-setting.
- Political Actions: These are the tangible activities within the political domain, such
as meetings, laws, voting, and demonstrations, which directly engage individuals in
politics.
- Political Discourse: Political actions often involve discourse through various
mediums like debates, speeches, and media, which are crucial for executing political
actions.
- Political Cognition: This involves the individual and collective understanding and
interpretation of political information, influencing attitudes and behaviors like public
opinion.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.16-18)
For a parliamentary (or House) debate, such a characterization may be the
following:
- Domain: Politics.
- System: Democracy.
- Institution: Parliament.
- Values and ideologies: Democracy, group and party ideologies.
- Organizations: Political parties, lobbyists.
- Political actors: Members of parliament, cabinet ministers.
- Political relations: Legislative power.
- Political process: Legislation.
- Political action: Political decision making.
- Political cognitions: Attitudes about the relevant issue (e.g. about abortion,
affirmative action or nuclear energy).
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.19)
1.3. Political discourse as political action
- Political discourse is primarily viewed as a form of political action and is integral to
the political process.

43
 (Van Dijk, 1997, p.20)
- This perspective aligns with the dominant paradigm in most social approaches to
discourse, which regard discourse as a form of social action and interaction.
(Atkinson & Heritage 1984; Boden & Zimmennan 1991; van Dijk 1985).
1.3.1. Written and Spoken Discourse as Forms of Action
- Textual (written, printed, computer) communication and spoken interaction or
dialouge are considered forms of social and political action.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.20)
(because they can influence opinions, shape policies, and mobilize people to take
concrete actions in society)
1.3.2. Conditions for political discourse
- A conversational side-sequence or non-topical talk (on a personal or otherwise
non-political topic) of parliamentarians in parliament need not be political discourse
at all, although all other contextual conditions are satisfied, and similar examples may
be mentioned for most political contexts.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.20)
=> Discourse is only political when it is part of the parliamentary debate, recorded
for the record, and contributes to the parliamentary business at hand.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.20)
- Indeed, as is typically the case in classrooms, courtrooms and other institutional
settings, such `irrelevant' side-sequences may be prohibited by the Speaker, chair or
others controlling discourse in such a setting.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.20)
- Besides speaking publicly and for the record, the speakers are thus expected to speak
as members of parliament, and as members or representatives of their party.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.20)
- They are required to speak out loud, sometimes only when they have been allocated
a speaking turn (except in special cases, as interruptions), as addressing the assembly,
and when speaking relevantly, i.e., on topic.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.20)
- Political talk and text become truly political only when they are integral to activities
like governing, legislating, and campaigning. However, off-the-record
conversations

44
among politicians, though not public or attributed, play critical roles by enabling
unofficial critiques and influencing political decisions once disclosed. Therefore, such
private exchanges, despite their informal nature, should still be considered impactful
political discourse due to their significant effects on political and media environments.
- Political talk and text have institutional (legal, political or constitutional
consequences, such as being recorded, corrected, printed and possibly published, and
will `count as' the intervention and position of a member of parliament or of a party
on' the issue or topic at hand.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.21)
- However, off-the-record talk may not be considered public political discourse
because of problems of attribution, identification, privacy, and the lack of
accountability.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.21)
- Categorizing political discourse is not just a definitional problem but is crucial for
understanding the political process itself. Politics involves not only official
administrations but also activities like propaganda, campaigning, media interviews,
and interactions with citizens.
(Van Dijk, 1997, p.21)
2. Discourse and gender (Diễn ngôn và giới)
2.1. Discourse and gender (Gendered Discourse)
- The year 1975 was key in launching the field of language and gender. The
publication of three books that proved pivotal: Robin Lakoff’s Language and
Woman’s Place (the first part appeared in Language and Society in 1973), Mary
Ritchie Key’s Male/Female Language, and Barrie Thorne and Nancy Henley’s edited
volume Language and Sex: Difference and Dominance emerged during the feminist
movement of the 1970s, as scholars began to question both the identification of male
norms as human norms, and the biological determination of women’s and men’s
behavior.
(Kendall&Tannen, 2005, p. 548)
- A conceptual split was posited between biological “sex” and sociocultural
constructs of “gender.” Early language and gender research tended to focus
on
(1) documenting empirical differences between women’s and men’s speech,
especially in cross-sex interaction
(2) describing women’s speech in particular; and, for many
(3) identifying the role of language in creating and maintaining social
inequality between women and men.
(Kendall & Tannen, 2005, p. 548-549)

45
2.1.1. The relationship between language and gender, as well as how language
reflects and perpetuates gender inequalities as described by Lakoff
- Lakoff's seminal work, "Language and Woman's Place," examines language as
evidence of gender inequality in society. She posits a cycle that begins with the
unequal role of women and men in society, resulting in differential gender
socialization by which girls learn to use a “nonforceful style” because unassertiveness
is a social norm of womanhood, given men’s role in establishing norms. The use of
“women’s language,” in turn, denies women access to power, and reinforces social
inequality.
(Kendall & Tannen, 2005, p. 549)
2.1.2. Features of Women's Language
Lakoff identifies linguistic forms such as by which “women’s language” weakens or
mitigates the force of an utterance:
+ “weaker” expletives (những lời “ít” tục tĩu hơn): (oh, dear versus damn)
+ “trivializing” adjectives (tính từ “tầm thường hóa”) (divine versus great)
+ tag questions used to express speakers’ opinions (Câu hỏi đuôi dùng để bày
tỏ ý kiến của người nói) (The way prices are rising is horrendous, isn’t it?)
+ rising intonation in declaratives (ngữ điệu lên cao trong câu tường thuật) (as
seen in the second part of the sequence, “What’s for dinner?” “Roast beef?”)
+ mitigated requests (lời yêu cầu nhẹ nhàng) (Would you please close the door?
versus Close the door) (1975: 10–18)
These features are seen as reinforcing the social norms of womanhood and denying
women access to power.
(Kendall&Tannen, 2005, p. 549)
2.1.3. Complex Relationship between Gender and Discourse
- O’Barr and Atkins (1980) examined features of “women’s language” in courtroom
discourse and found that the features Lakoff identified were related to the status
(social class, occupation, and experience as a witness) rather than the sex of the
speaker. They suggested that women use this style (mentioned above) more than men
in everyday interaction because they are more likely to be in lower-status positions.
(Kendall & Tannen, 2005, p. 549)
- Cameron et al. (1989), finding that speakers who took up the role of conversational
facilitator tended to use more tag questions, posited that women were more likely to
do so because they were more likely to assume this role.

46
 (Kendall & Tannen, 2005, p. 549)
- Similarly, Preisler (1986) examined problem-solving situations in an industrial
community, and found that managers who contributed most actively to the
accomplishment of a task also used more linguistic “tentativeness features,” and
these managers were usually women.
(Kendall & Tannen, 2005, p. 549)
- Tannen (1994a) also found women managers using strategies, including
indirectness, to save face for subordinates when making requests and delivering
criticism. Neither conversational facilitator nor manager is a low-status position.
(Kendall & Tannen, 2005, p. 549)
=> women's language use could vary depending on factors such as conversational
roles and managerial positions.
2.1.4. The Personal as Political
- In another influential early study, Zimmerman and West (1975) found that men
interrupted women more than the reverse in thirty-one dyadic conversations
tape-recorded in private residences as well as in “coffee shops, drug stores and other
public places in a university community.”
=> The authors concluded that “just as male dominance is exhibited through male
control of macro-institutions in society, it is also exhibited through control of at
least a part of one micro-institution” (1975: 125). Their conclusion confirms the
1970s feminist slogan, “the personal is political,” by positing that asymmetries in
everyday conversational practices reflect and reproduce asymmetries found in the
wider social environment.
(Kendall & Tannen, 2005, p. 549-550)
- Fishman (1983) examined naturally occurring conversations tape-recorded by three
heterosexual couples in their homes, and found that the women performed more of the
conversational “support work” required to sustain conversational interaction with
their partners: they produced more listening cues (mhm, uhuh), asked more
questions, used you know and attention-getting beginnings (This is interesting) more
frequently (presumably to encourage a response), and actively pursued topics raised
by the men. On the other hand, men were more likely to not respond to turns and
topics initiated by the women, and to make more declarative statements. Fishman
argues that women’s supportive role in private conversations reflects and reproduces
sex-based hierarchies of power within the public sphere

47
=> Everyday conversational practices mirror and perpetuate wider social
symmetries.
(Kendall & Tannen, 2005, p. 550)
2.2. Analyzing Gender and Discourse
2.2.1. The social construction of gender
- The “meaning” of gender is culturally mediated, and gendered identities are
interactionally achieved.
(Kendall & Tannen, p. 556-557)
- Goffman (1976) demonstrated, with illustrations from print advertisements, that the
gendered self is accomplished through the display of postures that both ritualize
subordination and are conventionally associated with gender, such as the “bashful
knee bend,” receiving help and instruction, and smiling more frequently and more
expansively than men.
(Kendall & Tannen, p. 557)
- Butler’s (1993: 227) conception of performativity, local practices bring gender into
being “through the repetition or citation of a prior, authoritative set of practices.”
(Kendall & Tannen, p. 557)
2.2.2. The indirect relationship between gender and discourse
- Tannen (1994c) draws on Goffman (1977) to claim that discourse and gender are
“sex-class linked” rather than sex-linked.
=> discourse patterns are not directly linked to individual men or women but rather
are associated with the class of women or the class of men within a given society
(Kendall & Tannen, 2001, p. 557)
- Because the relationship between gender and discourse is indirect, individuals may
not be aware of the influence of gender on their speaking styles.
(Kendall & Tannen, 2001, p. 557)
- For example, in interviews with four prominent Texan women, Johnstone (1995)
found that the women proudly acknowledged the influence of being Texan but denied
that their behavior was related to gender. Yet, in discussing her success as a litigator,
one woman said (among other things): “I try to smile, and I try to just be myself.”

48
=> Tannen (1994c: 216) notes that, as Goffman (1976) demonstrated, this woman’s
way of being herself – smiling – is sex-class linked.
- McElhinny (1992: 399–400) notes that the indirect relationship between gender and
discourse enables women to assume typically male verbal behavior in institutional
settings
(Kendall & Tannen, 2001, p. 557)
- For example: “female police officers can interpret behaviors that are normatively
understood as masculine (like noninvolvement or emotional distance) as simply ‘the
way we need to act to do our job’ in a professional way.”
(Kendall & Tannen, 2001, p. 557)
2.2.3 Gendered discourse as a resource (Diễn ngôn giới tính như một tài nguyên)
- The constructivist approach entails a distinction between expectations or ideologies
and actual discursive practices.
=> “gendered speaking styles exist independently of the speaker” (Bucholtz and Hall
1995: 7)
=> gendered discourse provides a resource for women’s and men’s presentation of self
(expressing themselves).
(Kendall & Tannen, 2005, p. 557)
- As Tannen (1989b: 80) explains, cultural influences do not determine the form that a
speaker’s discourse will take; instead, they “provide a range from which individuals
choose strategies that they habitually use in expressing their individual styles.”
(Kendall & Tannen, 2005, p. 557)
- Hall (1995) demonstrates that phone-sex workers draw on gendered discourse as a
resource by using “women’s language” to construct the gendered identity required for
economic gain in their occupation.
(Kendall & Tannen, 2005, p. 557)
+ They use “feminine” words (lacy) and nonbasic color terms (charcoal rather
than black) (as described in Lakoff 1975);
+ They use “dynamic” intonation, characterized by a relatively wide pitch range
and pronounced and rapid shifts in pitch (McConnell-Ginet 1978)

49
 + They actively maintain the interaction through supportive questions and
comments (Fishman 1983). For instance, they may ask questions like, "Do you
like that?" or provide encouragement and validation such as, "You're so good at
this," to keep the conversation flowing smoothly and maintain the client's
interest.
2.2.4. Gendered discourse as a constraint (diễn ngôn giới tính như một ràng buộc)
- If gendered discourse strategies is a resource, it is simultaneously a constraint.
- Example of Workplace Communication: small talk between status unequals
+ Two men who are discussing a computer glitch negotiate status and connection
through challenges; bonding against women; and alternating displays of
helping, expertise, and independence (needing no help).
+ Four women negotiate status and connection through complimenting, a focus
on clothing and shopping, the balancing of display and gaze, and expressive
intonation.
(Kendall & Tannen, 2005, p. 558)
- Gendered discourse is a constraint, in the sense that negotiating status and
connection through challenges and mock insults was less available as a resource to the
women, and doing so through the exchange of compliments on clothing and
discussion of shopping and fashion was less available as a resource to the men.
(Kendall & Tannen, 2005, p. 558)
3. Discourse and Media
3.1. Introduction
- “Media” meant “the media”: broadcast and print institutions and outlets reporting,
interpreting, and conveying news about the world around us, whether
local or global, serious or fun, event or entertainment.
(Cotter, 2005, p.795)
- “Medium is the message” - words and image alone do not tell the story; how we
receive our news, and via which channels, is a key part of it
(Cotter, 2005, p.795)
- At the end of XX, the Internet and other digital technologies have profoundly
influenced various aspects of media (newspapers, television, and radio), including
+ deadlines (24/7 updates)

50
+ transmission modes (synchronous and asynchronous modes, online and traditional),
+ outside involvement (through citizen or participatory journalism at one end to
comments, online feedback, and user-generated content on the other)
+ story presentation (search-engine optimization, links, video and visual elements)
+ reporting (digital records and archives, blogs)
(Cotter, 2005, p.795)
- The concept of media now encompasses more than just traditional print and
broadcast outlets.
+ mobile media and new digital technologies (tablets, smartphones, copy-editing
software)
+ “social media” and information-sharing platforms (Facebook, YouTube, Twitter,
Reddit, Instagram, and the like),
+ news aggregation software (delivering the news to your desktop or mobile device)
+ a different business model for freelance writers online (often unpaid)
+ foreign reporting (bureau closures)
> creating new adaptations by the media and by university journalism departments,
eager to add “visualization and digital storytelling” to reporters’ and students’ skill
sets.
(Cotter, 2005, p.795-756)
- As the scope of “the media” is so far-reaching, so it is the subject of a great deal of
intellectual scrutiny across academic areas, highlighting the traditional domains of
news production and advertising as well as entertainment media and social media
and the changes underway.
(Cotter, 2005, p.796)
3.2. The Development of Media Discourse Analysis
- The United Kingdom has been a pioneer in various approaches to media language
research, including content analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis, multimodality,
social semiotics, and corpus linguistics.

(Cotter, 2005, p.796)

- Since its inception, a primary objective of most media discourse analysis (from the
linguistic to the sociological) is often the accounting of the presence of bias or
ideology in language, or the problematizing of power relations in society. As such,
social theory has often been more a basis for analysis than linguistic theory. (purpose)

51
 (Cotter, 2005, p.797)
3.3. Approaches to Media Discourse
- The main approaches to the study of media discourse can be characterized broadly as
(1) discourse analytic, (2) sociolinguistic, and (3) “non-linguistic.”
+ The “discourse analytic” paradigm addresses discourse-level matters related to
larger stretches of talk and text beyond the word or sentence level, including:
● questions of participant, topic, function
● discourse structure
● a range of genre- or speech-event-specific discourse phenomena that includes
interviews, quotation and reported speech, register issues, politeness,
positioning and framing, stance, graphic display, visual communication, and
so forth.
+ The term “sociolinguistic” refers to work that involves variation and style in the
media or a similar close analysis of language alongside socially motivated processes
of standardization and prescription. Researchers often rely on sociolinguistic insights
either to characterize some dimension of media language or to inform related
discourse-level work, such as genre and register
+ The “non-linguistic” research involves work in political science, media studies,
cultural studies, history, or communication studies paradigms.
3.4. Key Components of Media Discourse (Các thành phần chính của diễn
ngôn truyền thông)
- The discourse of the news media encapsulates 3 key components:
+ the news story (câu chuyện thời sư), or spoken or written text (văn bản nói hoặc
viết): newspapers, TV program, social media posts
- The first dimension (texual dimension) has been the primary focus of most media
researchers to date, particularly as the text encodes values and ideologies that impact
on and reflect the larger world.
+ the process involved in producing the texts (quá trình liên quan đến việc tạo ra
văn bản).
- The second dimension (process dimension) – including the norms and routines of
the community of news practitioners – has been on the research agenda for the past
several years, but to date no significant work has been completed. It is thus a ripe area

52
for further research, especially as factors in the process significantly influence – and
define – news discourse.
+ alignments to audience(s) (sự điều chỉnh, phối hợp hoặc thích nghi với đối tượng
người nghe hoặc khán giả)
(Cotter, 2005, p. 801)
- The third dimension (audience dimension) anchored by Bell’s audience design
framework (1991) and accommodation theory (Giles, Coupland, and Coupland 1991),
involves consideration of audience and the various social and linguistic meanings that
adhere as a result.
3.4.1. Text dynamics
- Most linguists consider the news text from one of two vantage points:
(1) that of discourse structure or linguistic function
(2) according to its impact as ideology-bearing discourse or representation of the
social world.
=> Either view assumes an emergent, dynamic mechanism that results in the unique
display of media discourse over time, culture, and context.
(Cotter, 2005, p.801-802)
3.4.2. Audience considerations
- Attention to audience is the first step away from text-only-focused analyses of
media, and many researchers actively support a theoretical position of media
discourse that includes the audience (or the consumer or participant/recipient or
discursive co-creator)
(Cotter, 2005, p.802)
- The audience is foregrounded as a key element in the production of discourse
meaning both through the researcher’s own emphasis on audience comprehension of
texts, and by the audience’s response to texts in the data-eliciting process itself (K.
Richardson, 1998).
(Cotter, 2005, p.803)
- Audience roles and embedded points of view and are conscious when there are
departures from a prescribed position.
(Cotter, 2005, p.804)
- Example: Fowler’s (1994) discussion of “hysterical style” in the media – which
identifies language in print and broadcast news stories that blames, provokes concern,

53
confusion, and emotional reaction, and animates the threat (e.g., “killer bug”) – shows
how discourse features we may not consciously consider can influence our reading of
the news.
=> This includes quantification and numbers: “inevitably the figures [and other style
factors] blur, becoming impressions rather than facts” (Fowler 1994: 98), whether
intentional or not.
(Cotter, 2005, p.804)

54
OPENING......................................................................................................................4
I. CONVERSATION....................................................................................................4
1. Conversation and conversation analysis...........................................................4
a. Conversation (Hội thoại)..................................................................................4
b. Conversation Analysis (Phân tích hội thoại)...................................................6
2. Turn taking (Thay phiên nhau/Nhận lượt lời).......................................................8
2.1. Turn (Lượt lời)..............................................................................................8
2.2. Turn-taking (Thay phiên nhau/Nhận lượt lời)..............................................9
2.3. Turn Constructional Units (TCU) - Đơn vị lượt lời/Đơn vị cấu tạo lượt lời 9
2.4. Transition Relevance Place (TRP) - Chỗ chuyển lời thích hợp/Điểm
chuyển tiếp quan yếu.........................................................................................11
2.5. Turn Allocation (Sự phân phối lượt lời).....................................................12
3. Pauses, overlaps and backchannels (Sự dừng lời, trùng lời và kênh phản hồi)...17
4. Adjacency pairs (Cặp cận kề)..............................................................................23
II. PREFERENCE STRUCTURE (BỐ CỤC ĐƯỢC ƯA DÙNG).........................28
3. Preferred and dispreferred second turns (Lời đáp được ưa dùng và lời đáp không
được ưa dùng)
35
3.1. Preferred and dispreferred responses..........................................................35
3.2. Dispreferred signals....................................................................................39
3.3. How to do a dispreferred.............................................................................40
4. Pre-sequences and repair (Tiền dẫn nhập và sửa)...............................................42
4.1. Pre-sequences (Tiền dẫn nhập)...................................................................42
4.1.1. Definition............................................................................................42
4.1.2. Category.............................................................................................43
4.2. Repair..........................................................................................................48
4.2.1. Types of repair....................................................................................48
4.2.2. Positions of repair...............................................................................48
4.2.3. Same-turn repair.................................................................................49
4.2.4. Transition space repair.......................................................................51
4.2.5. Second position repair........................................................................52
4.2.6. Third position repair...........................................................................55
4.2.7. Fourth position repair.........................................................................61
4.2.8. The multiple repair space...................................................................62
4.2.9. The preference for self-repair.............................................................63
5. Constraint Systems..............................................................................................63
5.1. Action chains..............................................................................................64
5.2. Solution types.............................................................................................69

2
OPENING
In the chapter of Politeness and Interaction, which focused on aspects of social
awareness that can have impacts on what gets communicated by what is said
during an interaction.
(Yule, 1996: 71)

The structure of the talk, also the basic pattern of “I speak - you speak - I speak -
you speak” will derive from that fundamental kind of interaction we acquire first and
use most often -> that is the structure of conversation.
(Yule, 1996: 71)

In this chapter of Conversation and Preference Structure, we will be looking more

closely at that structure as a crucial aspect of pragmatics.
(Yule, 1996: 71)
I. CONVERSATION
1. Conversation and conversation analysis
a. Conversation (Hội thoại)
Conversation is a way of using language socially, of “doing things with words”
together with other persons.
(Mey, 1993: 214)
Theo định nghĩa của Mey, hội thoại là một phương thức sử dụng ngôn ngữ mang tính
xã hội, hoặc là một phương thức “làm việc bằng lời nói” cùng với những người khác.
We can look at this use of language from two points of view. The first is that of
content, regarding what the conversation is about, the topic being discussed and so
on.
(Mey, 1993: 214)
Besides, we can also focus on the topical organization of conversation and how the
topics are managed, either by overt steering or by covert manipulation, often in the
form of indirect speech acting.
(Mey, 1993: 214)
Alternatively, one can focus on the formal aspects of conversation: how
conversation works, what rules are observed, how “sequencing” is achieved. These

4
aspects are often structured, and this further on we are going to discuss these contents
more closely.
(Mey, 1993: 214)
Besides, according to Liddicoat, conversation is the way in which people socialize and
develop and sustain their relationships with each other. For him, conversation is not
solely an elite activity, but rather an everyday one, and it is important to understand
how it is that people engage in this everyday activity as a structured social event.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 1)
b. Conversation Analysis (Phân tích hội thoại)
According to Mazeland, Conversation analysis (CA) studies practices and
structures of language use in talk in interaction as forms of human social action.
(Mazeland, 2006:
2) Theo Mazeland, Phân tích hội thoại đi nghiên cứu thực tiễn và cấu trúc của việc sử
dụng ngôn ngữ trong trò chuyện trong tương tác dưới dạng hình thức hoạt động xã hội
của con người.
There are many metaphors that can be used to describe conversation structure. For
some, conversation is like a dance, with the conversational partners coordinating their
movements smoothly. For others it's like traffic crossing an intersection involving
lots of alternating movement without any crashes.
(Yule, 1996: 71)
However, the most widely used analytic approach is based, not on dancing nor on
traffic flow, but on an analogy with the workings of a market economy.
(Yule, 1996: 71)
In this market, there is a scarce commodity called the floor which can be defined as
the right to speak.
(Yule, 1996: 72)
Trong thị trường này có một mặt hàng khan hiếm được gọi là quyền được phát
biểu/nói.
Talking about conversation analysis, Psathas in 1995 besides claimed that there are
three core assumptions of conversation analysis which are:
(Psathas, 1995)

5
Order is produced orderliness. That is, order does not occur of its own accord nor
does it pre-exist the interaction, but is rather the result of the coordinated practices of
the participants who achieve orderliness and then interact.
(Psathas, 1995)
Order is produced, situated and occasioned. That is, order is produced by the
participants themselves for the conversation in which it occurs. The participants
themselves orient to the order being produced and their behavior reflects and indexes
that order. This means that in analyzing conversation as an academic activity,
orderliness being documented is not externally imposed by the analyst, but internally
accomplished by the participants. This observed order is not the result of a preformed
conception of what should happen, nor is it a probabilistic generalization about
frequencies.
(Psathas, 1995)
Order is repeatable and recurrent. The patterns of orderliness found in conversation
are repeated, not only in the talk of an individual speaker, but across groups of
speakers. The achieved order is therefore the result of a shared understanding of the
methods by which order is achievable.
(Psathas, 1995)
These three formulations make it clear that conversation analysis assumes that there is
overwhelming order in conversation. Conversation is neither random nor
unstructured; however, the order observable in conversation does not imply an
overarching uniformity in conversational structure which is generalizable across
conversations. Instead, the participants themselves construct conversations in orderly
ways.
(Wooffitt, 2005)
2. Turn taking (Thay phiên nhau/Nhận lượt lời)
2.1. Turn (Lượt lời)
“Turn” is the basic unit of the conversation, according to Sacks, with being
described as a shift in the direction of the speaking “flow” which is characteristic of
normal conversation.
(Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974)

6
Theo Sacks, “lượt lời” là một đơn vị cơ bản của hội thoại, thường được mô tả là sự
thay đổi hướng của “dòng chảy” trong giao tiếp. Đây là một đặc trưng của một hội
thoại thông thường.
In normal, civilized, Western-type conversation, conversationalists do not speak
at all at the same time. They wait for their “turn”, also in this sense of the world.
(Mey, 1993: 217)
Yielding the right to speak, or the “floor”, as it is often called, to the next speaker
thus constitutes a turn.
(Mey, 1993: 217)
“Turn”, according to Yule, means having control of the scarce commodity in the
market economy, which is also the conversation at any time.
(Yule, 1996: 72)
2.2. Turn-taking (Thay phiên nhau/Nhận lượt lời)
In any situation where control is not fixed in advance, anyone can attempt to get
control. This is called turn-taking.
(Yule, 1996: 72)
Trong mọi tình huống mà quyền kiểm soát không được xác định trước, bất cứ ai cũng
có thể cố gắng tiếp cận và giành quyền kiểm soát. Đây được gọi là thay phiên nhau.
Because it is a form of social action, turn-taking operates in accordance with a
local management system that is conventionally known by members of a social
group.
(Yule, 1996: 72)
The local management system is essentially a set of conventions for getting turns,
keeping them, or giving them away. This system is needed most at those points
where there is a possible change in who has the turn.
(Yule, 1996: 72)
2.3. Turn Constructional Units (TCU) - Đơn vị lượt lời/Đơn vị xây dựng lượt lời

Sacks et al. (1974) once stated that turns are made up of units which they call turn
constructional units (TCU) and that the composition of TCUs is highly context
dependent. A variety of grammatical units may function as TCUs: words, phrases,

7
clauses and sentences. In fact, any linguistic constituent can potentially function as a
TCU.
(Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson,
1974) Sacks và cộng sự vào năm 1974 đã từng nói lượt lời được tạo thành từ các đơn
vị mà họ gọi là đơn vị lượt lời/đơn vị cấu tạo lượt lời và thành phần của các đơn vị
cấu tạo lượt lời phụ thuộc nhiều vào ngữ cảnh. Nhiều đơn vị ngữ pháp khác nhau có
thể đóng vai trò là một đơn vị lượt lời: từ, cụm từ, mệnh đề và câu. Trên thực tế, bất
cứ thành phần ngôn ngữ nào cũng có thể hoạt động như một đơn vị cấu tạo lượt lời.
According to Mazeland, the building stones of turns are turn constructional units
(TCUs). Each turn is built with at least one turn constructional unit.
(Mazeland, 2006: 6)
TCUs consist of various linguistic units which include sentential, clausal, phrasal and
lexical constructions. They may also contain, or, indeed, be uniquely made up of,
non-verbal elements such as silence, laughter, continuers, and bodily and facial
movements.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 55)
Eg: (4) [Lunch]
Joy: hh. so we decided tub go to that place th' s jus' opened
up. Harry: where' s that
-> Joy over near dee jays.
Harry: oh I haven' seen *t.
(Liddicoat, 2007:
55) Extract (4) contains TCUs which are also sentences: for example so we decided
tuh go to that place th's jus' opened up. and where's that and also a TCU, indicated
by the arrow, which is a prepositional phrase.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 55)
In context, even linguistic forms which are not usually considered to able to stand
alone can be found as TCUs, as in (5).
(Liddicoat, 2007: 55)
Eg: (5) [Jones and Beach (1995) -FAM:A2,
simplified] Ther: What kind of work do you do?
Mother: Foodservice
-> Ther: At?
Mother: (A) / (uh) post office cafeteria downtown main post office on
Redwood Ther: °0kay°

8
 (Liddicoat, 2007: 55)
In (5) the arrowed turn contains the word At?, and in this case it functions as a
complete TCU. That is, this single word in and of itself functions as a full unit in this
conversation at this point in the conversation.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 55)
2.4. Transition Relevance Place (TRP) - Điểm chuyển lượt lời phù hợp
Any possible change-of-turn point is called a Transition Relevance Place, or TRP.
Within any social group, there will be features of talk (or absence of talk) typically
associated with a TRP.
(Yule, 1996: 72)
Bất cứ một thời điểm nào có khả năng có sự thay đổi về lượt lời thì được gọi là thời
điểm thích hợp để chuyển giao giữa các lượt lời.
Bất cứ một thời điểm nào có thể chuyển lời cho người khác được gọi là chỗ chuyển
lời thích hợp.
(Nguyễn Thiện Giáp, 2000: 66)
Vị trí chuyển giao hai lượt lời, tức là chỗ mà người đang nói ngừng lời và nhường lời
cho người nói tiếp theo được gọi là điểm chuyển tiếp quan yếu. Điểm chuyển tiếp
quan yếu này có thể được xác định dựa vào một số nhân tố như: Kiểu hội thoại; Cấu
trúc của hội thoại; Cấu trúc của lượt lời; Cấu trúc ngữ pháp; Ánh mắt, vận động cơ
thể, cử chỉ...; Ngữ điệu, âm lượng, cường độ của giọng nói; Sự kéo dài một vài âm tiết
cuối lượt lời.
(Đỗ Hữu Châu, 2005: 549-550)
This type of analytic metaphor provides us with a basic perspective in which speakers
having a conversation are viewed as taking turns at holding the floor. They
accomplish change of turn smoothly because they are aware of the local management
system for taking those turns at an appropriate TRP.
(Yule, 1996: 72)
2.5. Turn Allocation (Sự phân phối lượt lời)

At any TRP, there are two basic ways in which a next speaker can come to have a turn
at talk: either the current speaker can select the next speaker or a next speaker may
self-select.

9
 (Liddicoat, 2007:
63) Tại bất cứ điểm chuyển tiếp quan yếu nào cũng có hai cách cơ bản để người nói
tiếp theo có quyền được phát biểu: một là người đang nói lựa chọn người nói kế tiếp
hoặc hai là người nói tiếp theo tự lựa chọn mình.
Current speaker can select the next speaker: If a current speaker is to select the next
speaker, the talk must be designed to achieve this. Only some forms of talk can select
the next speaker: for example, questions can, but answers do not. If a current speaker
produces a question, s/he produces some talk which makes a particular type of action
a relevant next action (i.e. an answer) and at the same time may make some recipient
the relevant participant to perform that action.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 63)
An address term, such as a name or the pronoun you, can be used to select a next
speaker. However, addressing by itself does not select a next speaker, rather it is the
combination of the type of talk in which the address term is embedded and the address
term which does this, as can be seen in extracts (13) and (14).
(Liddicoat, 2007: 64)
Eg: (13) [Lunch]
Joy: Have yuh got the papers for the meeting ye'
Carol,; Carol: Yeah=they came in th' s morning.
(14) [Lunch]
Joy: how' s
things Harry: not
ba:d Joy.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 64)
In (13), Joy selects Carol as the next speaker by a combination of both the question
form and the name. Essentially, the question makes speaker change a relevant next
action and the naming works to select Carol as the new speaker. If someone other than
Carol speaks in this position it would be accountable because the next turn has been
allocated to Carol and it is Carol, as the recipient of the question, who is required to
provide the answer. In (14), however, the naming does not work to select a next
speaker. Here, Harry's turn is an answer and does not require or constrain future talk.
If someone other than Joy talks next it would not be accountable and a silence would
not be heard specifically as Joy not doing something.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 64)
The use of you as an address term creates further complexities in multi-party talk
because of the potential vagueness of the reference, and indicates some other

10
techniques that can be used by current speakers to select next speakers, including
context, turn design and non-verbal cues such as gaze direction.
(Lerner, 1996b)
Eg: (15) [Chicken Dinner (Lerner, 1996b)]
Shane: I can' t get this thing mashed
Nancy: You do that too to your potatoes?
Shane: Yeah
(Liddicoat, 2007: 65)
In (15), Nancy's turn is explicitly tied to Shane's prior turn and the use of you and
your tie the two turns grammatically. At the same time, Nancy initiates an action, in
this case a question, which makes further talk relevant as a next action, that is, an
answer. In this context, the you can be seen as selecting Shane as the relevant next
speaker as the result of the sequential position of the turn containing the reference.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 65)
Eg: (16) [Chicken Dinner (Lerner, 1996b)]
(2.8 )
Vivian: C' n you pass the
butter, (3.1)
(Liddicoat, 2007: 65)
In (16), Vivian's talk cannot rely on sequential positioning to identify the addressee,
but rather relies on environmental cues such as the positioning of the butter in relation
to other participants. In Lerner's (1996b) analysis, the participants use their location in
relation to the butter as a resource for determining who the addressed recipient is, and
who should perform the required next action.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 65)
Next speaker self-select: Self-selection occurs when a participant becomes next
speaker, but nothing in the previous talk has selected this person to be next speaker, as
in extract (18).
(Liddicoat, 2007: 66)
Eg: (18) [SF:ST:4]
(0.2)
Sue : Ggo: d whadda Day.
Trish: hh whadda wee[: k.
Mary: [yeh than' g (h) od i' s
Fr(h)[iday

11
 Sue: [hh. Huh
(Liddicoat, 2007: 66)
Here, Sue self-selects as next speaker following a brief silence, but her talk does not
select any next speaker. Trish then self-selects immediately as next speaker providing
an upgraded version of Sue's prior turn and likewise does not select a next speaker.
Mary then self-selects, aligning with the prior talk.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 66)
Self-selection can also occur where the prior talk is designed to require that someone
speak next, but does not constrain who that person should be.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 66)
Eg: (19) [SF:ST:4]
Sue: Hi.
Trish: Hi[:
Sue
Mary: [Hello:,
(Liddicoat, 2007: 66)
In this extract, Sue's greeting requires a greeting response; however, it is addressed to
both Trish and Mary. As such, it cannot select either of them as next speaker even
though it does make it relevant for them to produce greetings. The turn type is
constrained by Sue's talk, but not the identity of the next speaker. Trish, therefore,
self-selects as next speaker, as does Mary.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 66)
In some cases where a next speaker self-selects, this speaker may be the person who
produced the immediately prior turn, as in (20):
(Liddicoat, 2007: 67)
Eg: (20) [Car conversation]
Sasha: reminds me of this guy I used to go out with
(when I was in school)
(2.2 )
Sasha: he was real nut case [ as well.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 67)
Here, Sasha's first turn is possibly complete and does not select a next speaker. No
other participant speaks after her turn and there is quite a long silence, which ends
when Sasha again becomes the speaker. In so doing, she self-selects as next speaker.

12
 (Liddicoat, 2007: 67)
3. Pauses, overlaps and backchannels (Sự dừng lời, trùng lời và kênh phản

hồi) Pause: to stop talking or doing something for a short time before continuing.

(Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries)

Overlap: if two events overlap or overlap each other, the second one starts
before the first one has finished

(Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries)

Overlap: More than one speaker talking at the same time in conversation.
( Yule 1993: 132)

Backchannel: a sound or sign that somebody makes to show that they are
listening to the person who is talking to them

(Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries)

Backchannels: Vocal indications of attention, e.g. “uh huh”, ‘hmm’, when someone
else is talking.

(Yule, 1996: 127)

Most of the time, conversation consists of two, or more, participants taking turns, and
only one participant speaking at any time. Smooth transitions from one speaker to the
next seem to be valued. Transitions with a long silence between turns or with
substantial overlap (i.e. both speakers trying to speak at the same time) are felt to be
awkward. When two people attempt to have a conversation and discover that there is
no 'flow', or smooth rhythm to their transitions, much more is being communicated
than is said. There is a sense of distance, an absence of familiarity or ease, as in the
interaction shown in [1] between a student and his friend's father during their first
meeting.

(Yule, 1996; 72, 73)

[1] Mr.Strait: What’s your major Dave ?

Dave: English—well I haven’t really decided yet.

(3 seconds)

Mr. Strait: So—you want to be a teacher ?

13
 Dave: No—not really—well not if I can help it.

(2.5 seconds)

Mr. Strait: Wha--// Where do you-- go

ahead Dave: I mean it’s a—oh sorry // I em—

(Yule, 1996; 73)

As shown in [1], very short pauses (marked with a dash) are simply hesitations, but
longer pauses become silences. The silences in [1] are not attributable to either
speaker because each has completed a turn. If one speaker actually turns over the floor
to another and the other does not speak, then the silence is attributed to the second
speaker and becomes significant. It's an attributable silence (Im lặng quy gán)..

As shown in [2], the non-response of Dave is treated, by his girlfriend, as possibly

communicating something.

[2] Jan: Dave I'm going to the

store. (2 seconds)
Jan: Dave?
(2
seconds)
Jan: Dave—is something wrong?
Dave: What? What's wrong?
Jan: Never mind.

(Yule, 1996; 73)

Silence at a TRP (Transition Relevance Place: Điểm chuyển lượt lời phù hợp)
is not as problematic for the local management system (hệ thống điều hành
cục bộ) as overlap. If the expectation is that only one person speaks at a time,
then overlap can be a serious problem. Returning to example [1], the final two
lines illustrate overlaps, conventionally marked by a double slash (//) at the
beginning of the overlapping talk. Typically, the first overlap occurs as both
speakers attempt to initiate talk. In accordance with the local management
system, one speaker will stop to allow the other to have the floor. However, for
two speakers who are having difficulty getting into a shared conversational
rhythm, the stop-start-overlap-stop pattern may be repeated.

(Yule, 1996; 73)

The type of overlap shown in [i] is simply part of a difficult first conversation
with an unfamiliar person. There are other kinds of overlap and they are
14
interpreted differently. For many (often younger) speakers, overlapped talk
appears to function like an expression of solidarity or closeness in expressing
similar opinions or values. As shown in [3], the effect of the overlapping talk
creates a feeling of two voices collaborating as one, in harmony.

[3] Min: Did you see him in the video?

Wendy: Yeah—the part on the
beach Min: Oh my god//he was so
sexy

Wendy: he was just being so cool

Min: And all the waves // crashing around him!

Wendy: yeah that was really wild!

(Yule, 1996; 74)

In example [3], overlap communicates closeness. In example [4], overlap

communicates competition.

[4] Joe: when they were in

//power las— wait CAN I FINISH?
Jerry: that's my point I said—

(Yule, 1996; 74)

In example [4], the speakers may appear to be having a discussion, but they are,
in fact, competing for the floor. The point at which overlap occurs is treated as
an interruption and the first speaker actually has to make a comment about
procedure (with a louder voice, shown by the capital letters in 'CAN I FINISH?')
rather than about the topic of conversation.

By drawing attention to an expectation that he should be allowed to finish, the

first speaker in [4] is appealing to some of the unstated 'rules' of conversation
structure. Each potential speaker is expected to wait until the current speaker
reaches a TRP. The most obvious markers of a TRP are the end of a structural
unit (a phrase or clause) and a pause. Notice that, in [4], the first speaker has
uttered 'when they were in—' at the point where the second speaker begins to
talk. There is no pause and it is not the end of a phrase or clause. This is a clear
interruption and breaks the 'rules'.

Normally, those who wish to get the floor will wait for a possible TRP before
jumping in. Of course, those holding the floor in a competitive environment will
avoid providing TRPs. To do so, they must avoid an open pause at the end of a
15
syntactic unit. As illustrated in [5], the speaker fills each of his pauses ('um' or
'uh'), which are placed inside, not at the end of, syntactic units. (Just prior to this
turn, another speaker had attempted to take the floor, so the speaker in [5] seems
concerned to protect his turn.)

(Yule, 1996; 74, 75)

[5] I wasn't talking about—um his first book that was—uh really just like a start
and so—uh isn't—doesn't count really.

Another type of floor-holding device is to indicate that there is a larger structure

to your turn by beginning with expressions of the type shown in [6]

[6] a. There are three points I'd like to make—first...

b. There's more than one way to do this—one
example would be ...
c. Didn't you know about Melvin?—oh it was
last October ...
d. Did you hear about Cindy's new car?—she got it in ...

(Yule, 1996; 75)

The expressions in [6a.] and [6b.] are associated with discussions of facts or
opinions whereas those in [6c] and [6d.] are preludes to storytelling. In all
cases, they are used to get the regular exchange of turn process suspended and
allow one speaker to have an extended turn. Within an extended turn, however,
speakers still expect their conversational partners to indicate that they are
listening. There are many different ways of doing this, including head nods,
smiles, and other facial expressions and gestures, but the most common vocal
indications are called backchannel signals, or simply backchannels. Some of
these are present in Mary's contributions to [7].

[7l Caller: if you use your long distance service a lot then
you'll Mary: uh-uh
Caller: be interested in the discount I'm talking about because
Mary: yeah
Caller: it can only save you money to switch to a cheaper service
Mary: mmm

(Yule, 1996; 75)

These types of signals ('uh-uh', 'yeah', 'mmm') provide feedback to the current speaker
that the message is being received. They normally indicate that the listener

16
is

17
following, and not objecting to, what the speaker is saying. Given this normal
expectation, the absence of backchannels is typically interpreted as significant. During
telephone conversations, the absence of backchannels may prompt the speaker to ask
if the listener is still there. During face-to face interaction, the absence of
backchannels may be interpreted as a way of withholding agreement, leading to an
inference of disagreement. In conversation, silence is significant and will be
interpreted as meaningful.
4. Adjacency pairs (Cặp cận kề)

Adjacency pairs are defined as two subsequent utterances continuing a conversational

exchange.

(Mey, 1993: 243)

Interactional exchanges, often composed of two subsequent utterances, are called

pairs or adjacency pairs.

(Kieu. T. T. Huong, 2006: 26)

They always consist of a first part and a second part, produced by different
speakers. The utterance of a first part immediately creates an expectation of the
utterance of a second part of the same pair. Failure to produce the second part in
response will be treated as a significant absence and hence meaningful.

(Các cặp cận kề luôn bao gồm phần đầu tiên và phần thứ hai, được tạo ra bởi
các người nói khác nhau. Việc phát ngôn phần đầu tiên ngay lập tức tạo ra sự
mong đợi về phát ngôn của phần thứ hai trong cùng một cặp.)

There is substantial variation in the forms which are used to fill the slots in
adjacency pairs, as shown in [11], but there must always be two parts.

(Yule, 1996; 77)

The production of the first-turn action provides the relevance for the appearance
of the second-turn action. And the second cannot exist without the first. They
recur in pairs.

(Kieu. T. T. Huong, 2006: 26)

[11] First Part Second Part

A: What’s up ? B: Nothin’ much.

18
 A: How’s it goin’? B: Jus’ hangin’ in

there. A: How are things ? B: The casual.

A: How ya doin’ ? B: Can’t complain.

(Yule, 1996; 77)

The examples in [11] are typically found in the opening sequences of a

conversation.

(Yule, 1996; 77)

Schegloff and Sacks (1973) offer us a characterization along the following lines:

(18) adjacency pairs are sequences of two utterances that are:

(i) adjacent (tính cận kề)

(ii) produced by different speakers (được thực hiện bởi những người nói khác
nhau)

(iii) ordered as a first part and second part (được sắp xếp như phần đầu tiên
và phần thứ hai)

(iv) typed (được phân loại), so that a particular first part requires a particular
second (or a range of second parts) – e.g offers require acceptances or rejections,
greetings require greetings, and so on.

And there is a rule governing the use of adjacency pairs, namely:

(19) Having produced a first part of some pair, current speaker must stop speaking,
and next speaker must produce at that point a second part to the same pair.

(Levinson 2008: 303)

(Schegloff và Sacks (1973) đưa ra cho chúng ta mô tả đặc điểm như sau:

Types of Adjacency pairs:

Pairs are characterized by their type. The type of a pair is given by a common
illocutionary intention (ý định ngôn trung thông thường) (or ‘force’, as
Austin called it); pairs can thus be, e.g., ‘greeting- greeting’, ‘order- (verbal)

19
compliance’, ‘request (e.g. for information) – providing the requested item (e.g.
information)’ and so on.

For instance, the first pair part maybe a summon; then what constitutes the
second pair part has to be an utterance which deals with compliance (either
positive or negative)

Could you please close that

window? Sure

And

Could you please close that

window? No way.

(Mey, 1993: 243)

Everyday casual conversations are full of such pairs as invitation-acceptance,

greeting-greeting, assessment-agreement and assessment-disagreement. Below is
one example of assessment-disagreement by (Pomerantz 1984a: 74):

(14) R: … well never mind. It’s not important.

D: Well, it is important.

(cited by Kieu. T. T. Huong, 2006: 26)

Other types of adjacency pairs are illustrated in [12], including a question-

answer sequence [12a.], a thanking-response [12b.], and a request-accept [12c.].

[12] First part Second Part

a A: What time is it? B: About eight-thirty.

b A: Thanks B: You’re welcome .

c A: Could you help me with this? B: Sure.

(Yule, 1996:77)

Not all first parts immediately receive their second parts, however. It often
happens that a question-answer sequence will be delayed while another
question-answer sequence intervenes. The sequence will then take the form of

20
Q1-Q2-A2-A1, with the middle pair (Q2-A2) being called an insertion
sequence (chuỗi chêm xen).

Although there appears to be a question (Q2) in response to a question (Q1), the

assumption is that once the second part (A2) of the insertion sequence is
provided, the second part (A1) of the initial question (Q1) will follow. This
pattern is illustrated in [13].

[13] Agent: Do you want the early flight? (=Q1)

Client: What time does it arrive? (=
Q2) Agent: Nine forty-five. (=
A2)
Client: Yeah—that's great. (=A1)

(Yule, 1996:78)

An insertion sequence is one adjacency pair within another. Although the

expressions used may be question-answer sequences, other forms of social action
are also accomplished within this pattern.

As shown in [14], there is a pair which consists of making a request-accepting

the request (Q1-A1), with an insertion sequence of a question-answer pair
(Q2-A2) which seems to function as a condition on the acceptance (A1) being
provided.

[14] Jean: Could you mail this letter for me? (Q1 = Request)
Fred: Does it have a stamp on it? (Q2 =
Question) Jean: Yeah. (A2 = Answer)
Fred: Okay (A1 = Accepting)

(Yule, 1996:78)

The delay in acceptance in example [14], created by the insertion sequence, is

one type of indication that not all first parts necessarily receive the kind of
second parts the speaker might anticipate. Delay in response symbolically marks
potential unavailability of the immediate (i.e. normally automatic) expected
answer. Delay represents distance between what is expected and what is
provided. Delay is always interpreted as meaningful. In order to see how delay is
locally interpreted, we need some analytic terms for what is expected within
certain types of adjacency pairs.

(Yule, 1996:78)

21
In general, the notion of ‘type’ is useful when it comes to predicting what the
answer could be, and how it is managed: in a way, it defines the ‘base line’ for
the second pair parts that are possible. But it also does more.

(Mey, 1993:244)

Paired utterances, viz., adjacency pairs are pervasive in natural language use. On
the basis of the adjacency pair assumption, a second pair part is relevant and
necessary, once the first pair part is produced. The delay or absence (in case of
silences) of a second part may lead to the repetition of the first part by the prior S
(Schegloff 1972a).

(cited by Kieu. T. T. Huong, 2006: 26)

VD: Refer to Mey’s example above

Could you please close that window?

Sure

And

Could you please close that window?

No way.

(Mey, 1993: 243)

The absence of a second pair part is noticeable, and has certain conversational
effects, as in the case of ‘pretending it didn’t happen’. Suppose somebody makes
a socially impossible request, such as asking the boss’s wife for a date at the
company outing. The painful silence which ensues makes the unfortunate
requester feel embarrassed; yet it is also a means of telling him (by not giving
any indication that anybody has heard what he said); ‘Listen, you did something
unfortunate, but we’re prepared to pretend it didn’t happen’.
Formally, one can express the same ‘denied reality’ using an explicit (and
strictly speaking, self-contradictory) second pair part such as ‘We didn’t hear
that, did we?’ And an even stronger second pair part such would contain an
indirect speech act of reprimanding: ‘I don’t believe what I’m hearing’. In such
cases, as noted earlier, the most effective way of stating is not stating (explicitly)
what is really being expressed: that the speaker is a socially incompetent oaf.

(Mey, 1993: 244)

22
A question raised here is that the so-called ‘painful silence’ would differently be
interpreted in intracultural and across-cultural interactions by different identities.
As a result, first Ss would have a variety of subtle nuances of feelings when
facing second Ss’ silences, not just embarrassment.

(Kieu. T. T. Huong, 2006: 27)

II. PREFERENCE STRUCTURE (BỐ CỤC ĐƯỢC ƯA DÙNG)
The concept of 'preference' was developed to characterize basic differences in the
ways that alternative 'second' actions (for example, accepting vs. rejecting an
invitation) are routinely accomplished. The term itself is potentially misleading in that
it does not refer to the personal desires or psychological dispositions of individual
speakers, but rather to recurrent and institutionalized features of the turn and sequence
structures in which the alternative actions are carried out. In this context, the term
gains its currency from the fact that these features tend to maximize the likelihood that
'preferred' actions will occur and, correspondingly, to minimize the occurrence of
'dispreferred' actions.
(J. Heritage, 1989:9)
1. Markedness (sự đánh dấu)
According to a lecture note published by the MIT Open Course Ware, Markedness [1]
a term and intuition that derives from the Prague School of Trubetzkoy (1939) and
Jakobson (1941)
In the contemporary context, markedness means that one sound or structure is
preferred to another in a given context: a ≻ b; the dispreferred one is said to be
“marked” with respect to the preferred or “unmarked” one… ( ≻ = “better than”)
(M.Kenstowicz, 2014)
The intuition behind the notion of markedness in linguistics is that, where we have an
opposition between two or more members…, it is often the case that one member is
felt to be more usual, more normal, less specific than the other (in markedness
terminology it is unmarked, the others marked).
Cited from Comrie (1976: 111)
Preferred/unmarked seconds, as interpreted on the basis of linguistic markedness,
have less material, and are structurally simpler compared to dispreferred/marked
(Levinson 1983, Mey 2001).

23
In linguistics and semiotics, the phenomenon, noted by Jakobson, in which one term
and/or concept is highlighted as (markedly) different from another, as in the words
male/female, where the former is literally unmarked and the latter is linguistically
marked by the addition of an initial fe-. The unmarked form is typically dominant (e.g.
statistically within a text or corpus) and is often used as a generic term while the
marked form is used in a more specific sense.
(Oxford Reference)
Ex: irregular/regular, men/women,
The unmarked form is typically dominant (e.g. statistically within a text or corpus)
and is often used as a generic term while the marked form is used in a more specific
sense.
(Oxford Reference)
Preferred alternatives tend to occur within simple sequential structures. On the
contrary, dispreferred are likely to be accompanied with different kinds of structural
complexity, as in the following examples by Pomerantz (1984a: 60- 71):
(1) J: It’s really a clear lake, isn’t it?
→ R: It’s wonderful.
(2) L: Maybe it’s just ez well you don’t
know (2.0)
→ W: Well uh-I say it’s suspicious it could be something good too.
(Kieu T. Thu Huong, 2006:118)
The preferred second in (1) is immediately produced after the first evaluative token,
whereas the delivery of the dispreferred second is deliberately delayed in (2).
After a two-second silence, W starts speaking, prefacing his disagreeing with ‘well’
and other delay components. Other kinds of dispreferred seconds like rejections of
requests, refusals of offers, denials of blames etc., are normally done in this marked
manner, as Levinson (1983: 308) puts it: …[I]n contrast to the simple and immediate
nature of preferreds, dispreferreds are delayed and contain additional complex
components; and certain kinds of seconds like request rejections, refusals of offers,
disagreements after evaluative assessments, etc., are systematically marked as
dispreferreds. By and large, the marked actions are likely to be avoided in
interpersonal conversations due to the complexity of their marked formats
(Kieu T. Thu Huong, 2006:118)

24
2. Structural organization (bố cục cấu trúc)
The initial and most fundamental assumption of conversation analysis is that all
aspects of social action and interaction can be examined in terms of
conventionalized or institutionalized structural organizations which analyzably
inform their production. These organizations are to be treated as structures in
their own right which, like other social institutions or conventions, stand
independently of the psychological or other characteristics of particular
participants. It is this 'structural' assumption which links conversation analysis
both to the linguistics of Harris (1951) and to the Durkheimian sociological
tradition (Durkheim 1982) and it is the successful application of this structural
assumption to the fine details of social interaction which has characterised
conversation analytic research from the outset.
(J. Heritage, 1989:2)
Conversation analysts working on the structural organization of
preferred/dispreferred seconds realize the salient and essential differences in
structural organization between preferreds and dispreferreds. The specific
characteristics of such complex-structured responses are examined and
generalized in the works by Atkinson and Drew (1979), Pomerantz (1975, 1978,
1984ab), Levinson (1983), Yule (1996), Mey (1993, 2001) among others.
(Kieu T. Thu Huong, 2006:119)
The main features include: (i) delay tokens: silences/ pauses, hesitations and
hedges (false starts ‘Er’, expletives ‘Yes’…), repairs, or insertion sequences, (ii)
prefaces: dispreferred markers like ‘Well’ and ‘Uh’, appreciations, apologies,
qualifiers and mitigations ‘I don’t know for sure, but…’, and (iii) accounts or
explanations for uttering dispreferreds.
(Kieu T. Thu Huong, 2006:120)
Some other prosodic features like speed of delivery, articulation, stress,
irregular breathing, as well as non-linguistic factors (head nods/shakes, smiles,
facial expressions, body movements etc.) may create certain impact on the
quality of dispreferred seconds. On the whole, the production of such wordy
and elaborate responses takes time and requires a great effort on the part of
conversationalists.
(Kieu T. Thu Huong, 2006:120)

25
Moreover, they may bring unpleasant feelings to whatever parties involved in
interchanges. Consequently, dispreferred seconds are likely to be avoided due to
their complex-structural format and communicative ineffectiveness.
Conversation analytic work also focuses on the correlation of the content and
the sequential structure of preference. Quite interestingly, there is an organic
relationship between the content and its format, to wit, some patterns seem
recurrently occur in fixed structures. For instance, agreements with evaluative
assessments tend to appear in unmarked/preferred format, whereas almost all of
disagreements are delivered in marked/dispreferred structures.
(Kieu T. Thu Huong, 2006:120)
The notion of preference may be applied to the actions that are produced in
either preferred or dispreferred constructions, i.e., preferred actions are
normally done in preferred format, and dispreferred actions in dispreferred
format. A consistency between the format and content is found in a substantial
number of adjacency pair second parts. This consistent match is illustrated in
the following table:
(Kieu T. Thu Huong, 2006:120)

(Kieu T. Thu Huong, 2006:121)

A close look at the sequential structure reveals that the concept of correlation
also involves the first pair parts. Let us take an example from Levinson’s work
(1983: 337) (cited from Kieu T. Thu Huong, 2006:121)
(3) C: …I wondered if you could phone the vicar so that we could ((in breath))
do the final on Saturday (0.8) morning o:r (.) afternoon or
(3.0)

26
R: Yeah you see I’ll I’ll phone him up and see if there’s any time free
(2.0)
C: Yeah.
R: Uh they’re normally booked Saturdays but I don’t- it might not be
Actually, C’s first turn is full of places potential for R to perform a preferred
second (breathing, pauses, silences, and latching), and this wordiness is resulted
from C’s delayed uptake. Had it not been for R’s delay of a compliance
response right after C’s request ‘I wondered if you could phone the vica’, C
would not have had to prolong and elaborate his first part. As clearly shown,
preferred and dispreferred seconds, by nature, may systematically influence the
structural design of their corresponding first parts
(Kieu T. Thu Huong, 2006:121)
3. Preferred and dispreferred second turns (Lời đáp được ưa dùng và lời đáp
không được ưa dùng)
3.1. Preferred and dispreferred responses
Typical adjacency pairs, as earlier mentioned, consist of two parts: a first pair
part and a second pair part. Once the first part is given, there is a set of potential
seconds to it. However, not all second parts are of equal structural complexity and
status. Some are very simple, made of one or two words (‘Yes’, ‘Fine, thanks’),
others are constructed of several long utterances (like long explanations, elaborate
accounts etc.). In general, all second alternatives can be distinguished as either
preferred or dispreferred responses
(K.T.T. Huong, 2006:118)
In spite of its original connotation, the concept of preference organization has
nothing to do with the psychological preference of the speakers or hearers. It is merely
a structural notion similar to the concept of markedness in linguistics, which was first
proposed and developed by the Prague School, and later, by Jakobson and others
(Levinson, 1983:333 as cited in K. T. T. Huong, 2006:118)
Preference structure divides second parts into preferred and dispreferred
social acts. The preferred is the structurally expected next act and the
dispreferred is the structurally unexpected next act. (The general patterns are
presented in Table 2.3.1 below)
(Yule, 1996: 79)

27
 First part Second part

Preferred Dispreferred

Assessment (Lời đánh giá) Agree Disagree

Invitation (Lời mời) Accept Refuse

Offer (Ngỏ ý) Accept Decline

Proposal (Đề xuất) Agree Disagree

Request (Yêu cầu) Accept Refuse

TABLE 8.1 The general patterns of preferred and dispreferred structures (following
Levinson 1983)
(Yule, 1996: 79)
In considering requests or offers as first parts, acceptance is the preferred and
refusal is the dispreferred second part. In examples [15a.-d], the responses in each
second part all represent preferreds. Thus, acceptance or agreement is the preferred
second part response to a request [15a.], an offer [15b.], an assessment [15c], or a
proposal [15d.].
[15] First part Second part
Can you help me? Sure.
Want some coffee? Yes, please.
Isn’t that really great? Yes, it is.
Maybe we could go for a walk That’d be great.
(Yule, 1996:79)
To elaborate more about the difference between preferred and dispreferred
second turns, we will look at the below example:
(8) invitation - accept
Amy: w’d yuh like tuh come over t' morrow night
Jane: yea:h. = that' d be nice.
(8') invitation - decline
Harry: I don' have much tuh do on
We:nsday. ( . )
w’d yuh like tuh get together then.
(0.3)
Joy: huh we: :llhh I don' really know if yuh see

28
 i' s a bit hectic fuh me We:nsday yih know
Harry: oh wokay
(Liddicoat, 2007:110)
In (8) and (8'), the FPP which launches the sequence is the same - an invitation
- but the SPP which responds to the FPP is different - (8) accepts the invitation, while
(8') declines it. In both cases the adjacency pair is completed, but the possibilities for
doing this vary and so we can talk about invitation adjacency pairs having two types
of SPP.Most types of adjacency pairs have such alternative realizations of the SPP;
however, this does not mean that each of these possible SPP types is interactionally
equal. In fact, in the examples above, the SPP in (8) is socially and interactionally
'easier' to perform than the SPP in (8'). The differences in these two SPP types are
dealt with through preference organization.
(Liddicoat, 2007:110)
Returning to extracts (8) and (8'), it can be seen that the acceptance was done
without delay, while the declining is delayed in its turn, and, in fact, the
invitation is not even explicitly declined. The immediate and direct acceptance of an
invitation is usually treated as unremarkable, as nothing unusual being done; however,
an equally immediate and direct refusal of an invitation would not normally be
treated as unremarkable, but would more likely be interpreted as rude or hostile
(C. Goodwin and Heritage, 1990). Actions which are routinely performed
immediately, and whose immediate production is unremarkable are termed
preferred actions, while those which would not normally be performed in this way are
called dispreferred actions.
(Liddicoat, 2007:111)
(Liddicoat, 2007:111)
Similar to Yule, Levinson proposed a general pattern of preferred and
dispreferred structure as follows in Table 6.1 indicates the sort of consistent match
between format and content found across a number of adjacency pair seconds. Given a
structural characterization of preferred and dispreferred turns we can then correlate the
content and the sequential position of such turns with the tendency to produce them in
a preferred or dispreferred format. And here we find recurrent and reliable patterns,
e.g. refusals or requests or invitations are nearly always in dispreferred format,
acceptances in preferred format.
(Levinson, 1983: 336)
FIRST Request Offer/Invite Assessment Question Blame
PART

SECOND PART

29
 Preferred Acceptance Acceptance Agreement Expected Denial
answer

Dispreferred Refusal Refusal Disagreement Unexpected Admission

answer
or
non-answer
(Levinson, 1983:336)
3.2. Dispreferred signals
3.2.1. Silence
According to Oxford Dictionary, “silence” is a situation when nobody is
speaking
There are signals to define a dispreferred. To get a sense of how expected these
preferred second parts are in the examples in [15], imagine each of the first parts
being met with silence. We might say that in any adjacency pair, silence in the
second part always indicates a dispreferred response.
( Yule, 1996:80)
Indeed, silence often leads the first speaker to revise the first part to get a
second part that is not silent from the other speaker. This may be clearer via an
example, such as [16], where Jack's silence in response to Sandy's comment prompts
Sandy to restate her assessment. Jack then agrees (a preferred) with Sandy's
assessment.
( Yule, 1996:80)
[16] Sandy: But I’m sure they’ll have good food there.

(1.6 seconds)

Sandy: Hmm–I guess the food isn’t great.

Jack: Nah–people mostly go for the

music.

( Yule, 1996:80)

Note that Jackson’s silence occurs where he would have had to produce a
disagreement (i.e. a dispreferred response) regarding Sandy’s assessment.
Non-response communicates that the speaker is not in a position to provide the

30
preferred response. (Sự không phản hồi cho thấy người nói không ở vị trí đưa ra
những lời đáp được ưa dùng)

However, silence as a response is an extreme case, almost risking the

impression of non-participation in the conversational structure. Generally speaking,
when participants have to produce second-part responses that are dispreferred, they
indicate that they are doing something very marked.

( Yule, 1996:80)

3.2.2. Hesitation

Hesitation is the act of being slow to speak or act because you feel uncertain
or nervous. (Oxford Dictionary)

In the next example, the first speaker has made a statement that the second
speaker appears to disagree with. The agreement would be the preferred second part,
eliciting a response such as ‘Yeah’ or even ‘I think so’. The second speaker Julie finds
herself in the position of producing a dispreferred (because a chiropodist is actually a
person whose job is the care and treatment of people’s feet, not hands.)

( Yule, 1996:80)

[17] Cindy: So chiropodists do hands I guess.

Julie: Em–well–out there–they they

mostly work on people's feet.

(Yule, 1996:80)

Julie’s dispreferred second part is marked with initial hesitations as if it is

difficult to perform this action (she is essentially correcting the other person here).
There is a delay (‘em’, plus pause) in getting started, and the actual statement which
indicates disagreement only comes after a preface (‘well’), an appeal to the views of
others (‘out there’), and a stumbling repetition (‘they they’). Even the statement
contains an expression (‘mostly’) which makes the information less challenging to the
claim in the first part. The overall effect is that the speaker is presenting herself as
having difficulty and is unwilling to have to say what is being stated.

3.3. How to do a dispreferred

The patterns associated with a dispreferred second in English are presented as

a series of optional elements in [19].
How to do a dispreferred Examples

31
delay/hesitate (trì hoãn/ngập ngừng) pause; er; em; ah

preface (dạo đầu) well; oh

express doubt (diễn đạt sự hoài nghi) I’m not sure; I don’t know

token Yes (Vâng chiếu lệ) that’s great; I’d love to

apology (xin lỗi) I’m sorry; what a pity

mention obligation (nói ra sự ràng buộc) I must do X; I am expected in Y

appeal for understanding (kêu gọi sự thấu you see; you know
hiểu)

make it non-personal (tránh dùng ngôi nhân everybody else; out there
xưng)

give an account (nêu lời phân trần) too much work; no time left

use mitigators (dùng từ ngữ giảm nhẹ) really; mostly; sort of; kinda

hedge the negative (rào đón cho sự phủ I guess not; not possible
định)

(Yule, 1996:81)

According to Cambridge Dictionary, “preface" is an event that comes before

something more important.

[18] Becky: Come over for some coffee later.

Wally: Oh–eh–I’d love to-but you see–I–I’m

supposed to get this finished–you know.

(Yule, 1996:81)

As is often the case, the expression of a refusal (a dispreferred second) can be

accomplished without actually saying ‘no’. Something that isn’t said nevertheless gets
communicated. After a preface (‘oh’) and a hesitation (‘eh’), the second speaker
produces a kind of token acceptance (‘I’d love to’) to show appreciation for the
invitation. Then, the other’s understanding is invoked (‘you see’) and an account is
presented (‘I’m supposed to get this finished’) to explain what prevents the speaker
from accepting the invitation. There is also a meaning conveyed here that the
speaker's

32
circumstances are beyond his control because of an obligation (‘I’m supposed to’)
and, once again, the inviter’s understanding is invoked (‘you know’).

(Yule, 1996:81)

The overwhelming effect of a dispreferred is that more time and more language
are used than in a preferred. From a pragmatic perspective, the expression of a
preferred (in response to an offer or invitation, for example) clearly represents
closeness and a quick connection. The expression of a dispreferred, on the other hand,
would represent distance and lack of connection. From a social perspective, it is easy
to see why participants in a conversation might try to avoid creating contexts for
dispreferreds. It must follow, then, that conversations between those who are close
familiars will tend to have fewer elaborate dispreferreds than conversations between
those who are still working out their social relationship. The amount of talk employed
to accomplish a particular social action in conversation is a pragmatic indicator of the
relative distance between the participants.

(Yule, 1996: 82)

4. Pre-sequences and repair (Tiền dẫn nhập và sửa)
4.1. Pre-sequences (Tiền dẫn nhập)
4.1.1. Definition
The term pre-sequence is used, with a systematic ambiguity, to refer both to a
certain kind of turn and a certain kind of sequence continuing the type of turn.
(Levinson, 1983:345)
Utterances which serve as “precursors' to others are often called pre-sequences.
They can be considered as purely formal tools of conversation management, but their
function is more than that when they occupy a position which is midway between the
formal and the content aspect of conversation. Pre-sequences may include attention
getters (‘Hey’, ‘Excuse me’, ‘You know something?’), pre-announcement (such as
'Whaddyaknow', 'Guess what'), pre-invitations (e.g., 'Are you doing anything
to-night?"), pre-threats (‘Watch it') and numerous others (cf. Levinson 1983:346ff)
(Mey, 1993:144)
Some of the most frequent pre-sequences are of the type sometimes called
'inquirers' (ướm hỏi). These usually precede a request of some kind; their function is
to make sure that the request about to be made is indeed, from the point of the
requestee, within the limits of the possible. For example, before purchasing an item in
the shop or requesting information about something, help with a task, or any favor at

33
all, we inquire about the available possibilities of obtaining that item, information,
help or favor.
(Mey, 1993:144)
A well-known pre-sequence in shopping would be: (Mey, 1993:144)
I wonder if you have X?
Do you by any chance have X?
Does your shop carry X?
(where X is some item that I might want to
purchase).

There are two post-request possibilities occurring. First, if the sales clerk
provided a negative answer, the sequence would come to an end then and there
(unless some information is offered, for example, where else to buy the wanted item).
The other scenario is if the answer was in the affirmative, the pre-sequences would
change its type from being a pre-sequence of an informatory kind to being a prelude
to an act of buying.

4.1.2. Category
a. A generic pre-sequence: summons-answer (tiền dẫn nhập chung: gọi - đáp)
There is one pre-sequence which is not designed with reference to the nature of
the action to which it is prior, but is rather a generic pre-sequence which can be used
to launch any sort of next talk. This is the summons-answer sequence which is
designed to gain the attention of a recipient (Liddicoat, Dopke, Brown and Love,
1992; Schegloff, 1968, 2002). This is a basic interactional necessity as interaction can
only occur when the participants in the interaction are attending to each other and are
available as speakers and recipients
(Liddicoat, 2007:126)
In this type of pre-sequence, first pair parts (FPPs) have a number of possible
realizations, including an address term, a politeness term (such as “Excuse me”), an
attention-getting token (such as “Hey”), or an act of touching the intended recipient
(cf. Nofsinger, 1975, 1991; Schegloff, 1968, 1979a, 1986, 2002). They all serve a
common function of providing an indication that a speaker is seeking a recipient, and
where address terms are used, providing an indication of who the desired recipient is.
(Liddicoat, 2007:126)
Second pair parts (SPPs) take in a variety of forms. Most common SPP
following a summons in face-to-face interaction is to redirect eye gaze to the
summoner. The redirection of eye gaze to the prior speaker is enough in itself to show
that the gazer has made himself available as a recipient for further talk. Other possible

34
SPPs include verbal tokens such as “What” or “Yes/yeah”, which likewise signal
availability for further talk. The production of these verbal tokens is frequently
connected with redirecting eye gaze and other non-verbal manifestations of attention,
such as changing body position to orient to the summoner. (C. Goodwin, 1980, 1981)
(Liddicoat, 2007:126)
The summons-answer does not achieve completion in and of itself, but rather
makes a next action relevant as the result of its completion. It projects some future
action as the reason for the summons-answer sequence and it is heard as prior to this
action. Not all responses to a summons lead immediately to further talk, there are
responses which register a summons has been produced, but to seek to block or delay
the projected next talk. These can be:
- indicating availability for further talk after a delay (just a minute, I’ll be right
here, etc.)
- providing a warrant for not becoming a recipient for the talk at that time (I’m
busy, I’m on the phone, etc.)
- outright rejection of recipiency of the projected talk (leave me alone, go away,
etc.)
(Liddicoat, 2007:127)
b. Type-specific pre-expansions
Most types of pre-expansion project some specific next activity and are
designed to be, and are regularly produced as, prior to a particular base sequence …
They are used to project actions such as invitations, requests, offers, etc.
(Liddicoat, 2007:128)
b.1. Pre-invitations (Tiền lời mời)

Invitations are very commonly preceded by pre-expansions, typically of the

type “Are you doing anything?” (Atkinson and Drew, 1984; Levinson, 1983).
Pre-invitations are not treated as questions seeking information about what the
recipient is doing, but as precursors to invitations (Sacks, 1992: II:529), which help
the speakers to check availability for an invitation.

[17] Him: What are you doing this Friday? (= pre-

invitation) Her: Hmm, nothing so far. (= go ahead)

Him: Come over for dinner (=

invitation) Her: Oh, I’d like that (=

accept)

(Yule, 1997:68)

35
 The answer which indicates that one is not doing anything indicates that the
invitation is likely to be welcomed, which is considered to be a ‘go ahead’ response to
the invitation. The first speaker interprets the answer and he immediately proceeds to
the invitation FPP, which in turn receives a preferred SPP: an acceptance of the
invitation.

[18] Him: Are you doing anything later? (= pre

invitation) Her: Oh, yeah. Busy, busy, busy. (= stop)

Him: Oh, okay (= stop)

(Yule, 1997:68)

Conversely, if the recipient of the pre-invitation produces a turn which describes some
activity, there is a likelihood that an invitation would be declined because of a
competing commitment.

In summary, availability is a necessary precondition for an invitation being

accepted as this factor determines whether or not a preferred or dispreferred SPP is to
be expected (Levinson, 1983).

(Liddicoat, 2007:132)

b.2. Pre-requests (Tiền yêu cầu)

Rather than simply make a request, speakers will often first produce what can be
described as a pre-request.

[7] A: Hi. Do you have uh size C flashlight

batteries? B: Yes sir

A: I'll have four

please B: ( (Turns to

get))

(Liddicoat, 2007:132)

A’s initial turn launches a sequence to ascertain whether the conditions necessary for
the request to work actually exist. Once this pre-request has been completed, A
continues the sequence by producing a request FPP, which then receives a go-ahead
response.

(Liddicoat, 2007:132)

36
There is, however, a general pattern of pre-requests actually being treated as requests
and being responded to, as in [15], with the (unstated, hoped for) action being
performed

[15] Her: Do you have a spare

pen? Him: Here. (hands over

a pen)

(Yule, 1997:67)

b.3. Pre-offers (Tiền ngỏ ý)

Like other pre-sequences, pre-offers can also be receiving blocking responses as in:

[15] [NJ]

Nick: so: : have yuh got a lift?

Joan: yeah. I' m go in' with Jodie.

Nick: okay.

(Liddicoat, 2007:136)

Nick’s question turn deals with the pre-conditions of an offer being accepted by
examining if his recipient has a need which his offer could fulfill. Joan’s answer
indicates that she is not in need of a lift and that offer is likely to be rejected (because
of the already arranged lift with Jodie). Receiving the response, Nick does not proceed
to an offer and the pre-offer is recast as a simple question-answer sequence.

b.4. Pre-tellings (Tiền thông báo)

When a speaker wishes to convey news to another, there is a constraint on what is

tellable to a particular recipient. Ordinary one should not tell a recipient something
that s/he already knows (C.Goodwin, 1979; Sacks, 1973).

( Liddicoat, 2007:136)

Many are quite formulaic, consisting of the basic components:

guess what + information

(do) you know who
remember when
where

( Liddicoat, 2007:137)

37
The minimal form of a pre-telling is 'Guess what'. This structure indicates that the
speaker has something to tell, but gives no additional information about the telling.

In some cases, pre-tellings may give the recipient more information about what the
telling will be involved. (Tiền thông báo có thể cung cấp cho người nhận thêm thông
tin về những gì sẽ liên quan đến việc kể.)

For example,

“Guess who I saw on the weekend”

( Liddicoat, 2007:137)

As with other pre-sequences, pre-tellings have more than one possible response type.
Often, the response to a pre-telling is a go-ahead response. One common design for
go-ahead responses is a repetition of the question word in a formulaic pre-telling as in
'guess what/what' a 'no' answer to a 'do you know ...?' or 'have you heard ...?'
pre-telling
( Liddicoat, 2007:137)
4.2. Repair
Sửa trong hội thoại
Repair refers to the processes available to speakers through which they can deal with
the problems which arise in talk. The practices of repair are independent of the nature
of the thing which needs to be repaired (Liddicoat, 2007: 197). This phenomena is not
‘contingent upon error, nor limited to replacement' (Schegloff et al., 1977: 363); in
other words, repair is a broader concept than simply the correction of errors in talk by
replacing an incorrect form with a correct one (Liddicoat, 2007: 198). Therefore,
according to Schegloff et al. (1977: 363), we will refer to 'repair' rather than
'correction' in order to capture the more general domain of occurrence.
Repairs may relate to problems of production of talk (speakers having trouble
producing talk) or to problems of reception (recipients having trouble in receiving
talk). (Liddicoat, 2007: 198).
- Problems of reception may include:
- Problems of hearing or understanding
- Problems of preference organisation or affiliation
Conversational repair aims at success and in the vast majority of cases, successful
repair is achieved very quickly (Schegloff, 1976b). It is also important to bear in mind
that repair may fail (Liddicoat, 2007: 198).

38
4.2.1. Types of repair
Repair can be initiated by the speaker of the repairable (self-initiated repair) or it may
be initiated by its recipient (other-initiated repair). In addition, a repair can be made
by the speaker of the repairable (self-repair) or it may be made by the recipient of the
item (other-repair). In combination, these possibilities allow for four types of repair:
1. Self-initiated self-repair: in which the speaker of the repairable item
both indicates a problem in the talk and resolves the problem.
2. Self-initiated other-repair: in which the speaker of the repairable item
indicates a problem in the talk, but the recipient resolves the problem.
3. Other-initiated self-repair: in which the recipient of the repairable
item indicates a problem in the talk and the speaker resolves the
problem.
4. Other-initiated other-repair: in which the recipient of the repairable item
both indicates a problem in the talk and resolves the problem.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 199)
4.2.2. Positions of repair
These types of repair interact with sequential locations for repair so that some types of
repair are typically found in the same position or the same sequence type in
conversation. Locations for repair are locations relative to the trouble source and
repair is designed to resolve the trouble as quickly as possible. It is possible to
identify the following positions for repair:
1. within the same turn as the trouble source (same-turn repair);
2. in the transition space following the turn containing the trouble
source (transition space repair);
3. in the turn immediately following the trouble source (second position repair);
4. in a third positioned turn (third position repair); and
5. in a fourth positioned turn (fourth position repair).
These positions for repair interact with repair initiation in such a way that each
position is specialised to provide for a particular participant to initiate the repair.
This means that self-initiation and other-initiation are also organised in terms of their
sequential position. The two types of initiation are ordered so that possibilities for
self-initiation precede possibilities for other-initiation (Kitzinger, 2013; Schegloff et
al., 1977), as in (9.5).

(9.5) same turn: self-initiation

↓ ↓

transition space: self-initiation

39
 ↓ ↓

second position: other-initiation

↓ ↓

third position: self-initiation

↓ ↓

fourth position: other-initiation

4.2.3. Same-turn repair
Điều chỉnh trong cùng
lượt
Repair initiated by the current speaker in the same turn as the trouble source initiation
is accomplished by non-lexical perturbations in speech (Schegloff, 1979b; Schegloff
et al., 1977). These perturbations are sensitive to the environment in which they are
deployed and consist of cut-off, sound stretches, items such as uh and uhm and
pauses, and are listed by Liddicoat (2007) as follows:
- Cut-offs are interruptions of the word (or sound) under way and typically take
the form of a glottal or some other stop. The cut-off therefore works to stop
the next sound due from being articulated. Usually a cut-off is used to initiate
repair on some trouble source which has already been produced in the turn so
far. That is, it is placed after the repairable or post-positioned. Cut-offs often
interrupt the projected syntax of the turn (Schegloff, 1979b; Liddicoat, 2007:
203).
(9.12) [AN:04:03]
Anna: oh so then he is coming back on Thur- on Tuesday
- Uh, uhm and pauses are repair initiations which occur outside word
boundaries and stop the articulation of the next word due in the turn
(Jefferson, 2018b).
They are typically used to repair a next element in the talk. These repair
initiations are syntactically congruent with the projected TCU (Schegloff,
1979b; Liddicoat, 2007: 204).

→ Tommy: … You haven’t u:h added up any of these

answers, (0.3) or anything like that yet.
Pete: A::h (.) no (.) not ye:t,

40
 - Sound stretches have as one of their functions initiating repair, especially a
search for some unavailable item. A sound stretch is therefore employed
within a word but serves to initiate repair of some next element (Schegloff,
1979b; Liddicoat, 2007: 204).
(9.15) [AB:01:17]
Ben: an so we wen’ to: the::: La Paella restaurant
- The various types of repair initiations are often found in combination as a
repair segment (Schegloff, 1979b; Liddicoat, 2007: 205).

1→ Sasha: o:h. we saw some briyant ones recently, like

2 uhm (1.0) oh what was that one about- (0.4)
3→ like Double In- (.) Indemnity= n like lots
4 of movies from the thirties that ha- had
5 amazing plot lines?
6 (0.9)
7 some of them were really full on: like um:
8 (0.3) A Place in the Sun?

- A repair initiated by the current speaker in the same turn as the trouble source
may be repaired by the recipient in a next turn (self-initiated other-repair).
The repair may or may not be solicited. (Liddicoat, 2007: 205)
(9.18) [Car Conversation]
1 Sasha: like this man: (0.8) was um (0.6) out in a
2 boat and his wife drowned or something,
3 and (0.6) he did d-=was it he didn’t
4 do it (.) Elly¿
5 Elvis: yeah.

- Repair initiated within the same turn can also be used to deal with
interactional problems other than those related to the talk of the speaker. This
is the case for some recycled turn beginnings. (Liddicoat, 2007: 208)
(9.26) [(Goodwin, 1981)]
Barbara: Brian you’re gonna ha[v- You kids’ll have to go
→ Brian: [X

41
In this extract, Barbara begins her turn without having a gazing recipient, but Brian
later moves his gaze to Barbara (at the X). Barbara does not complete her original talk
but begins a new sentence at the point where she receives her recipient’s gaze.

4.2.4. Transition space

repair Sửa tại điểm chuyển
tiếp
- The next structurally provided place at which self-repair can be done is within
the transition space after a TCU containing the trouble source (Schegloff et
al., 1977).
- Transition space repair can be done with no explicit repair initiation
marker other than further talk in the transition space (Liddicoat, 2007: 211)
(9.34) [SBL:3:1:2 (Schegloff et al., 1977)]
B: -then more people will show up. Cuz they won’t
→ feel obligated to sell. tuh buy.
- Sometimes transition space repair is accompanied by a very reduced
transition space (e.g. latching as in (9.36)). This reduced transition space
shows an orientation to the need to get an additional TCU to provide for
repair before speaker change can be effected.
(9.36) [Lunch]
Joy: Well yuh see I w’z talking with Carol and she
said she wannid to come along=wu-Emma
did.
- Speakers may deploy devices such as uh and uhm indicating that a repair is
being initiated in the transition space. These devices serve to gain speakership
in the transition space and provide for time to carry out the repair by
indicating a repair on some next item. (Liddicoat, 2007: 212)
(9.37) [KC-4:14 (Schegloff et al., 1977)]
A: … well I was the only one other than the uhm
→ tch Snows [uh Mrs. Randolph Snow?
B: [( )
A: (uh huh)
- Transition space repair may also be initiated by a device such as I mean.
(Liddicoat, 2007: 212)
(9.38) [NJ:4 (Schegloff et al., 1977)]

42
 N: She was givin me a:ll the people that were
→ go:ne this yea:r I mean this quarter y’[know
- Speakers may also use a not X, Y format for initiating transition space
repair. (Liddicoat, 2007: 212).
(9.39) [GTS 1:28 (Schegloff et al., 1977)]
Louise: Isn’t it next week we’re outta
school? Roger: Yeah next week.
→ No [not next week, [the week after
Both the I mean and the not X, Y formats locate the repairable in the prior talk, with
the not X, Y format doing so more explicitly than the I mean format. (Liddicoat,
2007: 212)

4.2.5. Second position repair

Repair in second position, that is, in the turn following the trouble source, is initiated
by the recipient of the trouble source. Second position is the first structurally
specified place for other-initiated repair (Schegloff, 2000b). Many of these other-
initiated repairs are spread over two turns, being initiated in second position and
completed in third position relative to the trouble source: they form sequences of an
FPP initiation and an SPP repair. (Liddicoat, 2007: 212-213)
Speakers use a range of turn constructional devices to initiate repair in second
position and these devices are fundamentally different from those employed in self-
initiated repair (Schegloff et al., 1977; Wilkinson & Weatherall, 2011). Liddicoat
(2007) listed three types of other-initiation, ordered in terms of their relative strength
in terms of their ability to locate the repairable in the prior talk. These types of repair
initiation include: huh? or what?, question words such as who, where, and when,
along with partial repeats serving a similar function, and you mean with a possible
understanding of the trouble in the prior turn (Liddicoat, 2007).
- Using huh? or what?:
(9.40) [CD:SP (Schegloff et al., 1977)]
D: Wul did’e ever get married ‘r anything?
→ C: Huh?
D: Did jee ever get married?
C: I have [no idea
- These tokens indicate that there is a problem in the prior talk but give
no indication of the nature of the trouble source itself, meaning that they

43
 are a very generic way of initiating repair in second position (Liddicoat,
2007: 213).
- Using question words such as who, where and when:.
(9.42) [BM:FN (Schegloff et al., 1977)]
B: By the way, I haveta go ta Lila’s.
→ A: Where?
B: Lila’s ta get ( )
These forms are more specific than the earlier ones because they not only indicate
that the preceding talk contained something problematic but also give some indication
of what the trouble source was. They indicate more strongly what information needs
to be made more specific in reformulating the talk (Wilkinson & Weatherall, 2011).
- Partial repeats serve a similar function in locating the trouble source in
the prior talk (Liddicoat, 2007: 214). Partial repeats may also be done
with a question word (Robinson, 2013; Schegloff et al., 1977).
- Using you mean with a possible understanding of the trouble in the prior turn:
(9.46) [Lunch]
Joy: Kerry’s no good. She’s haven a fight with Sally.
→ Harry: Yih mean Sarah dontchuh. Those two are always
fightin’ Joy: Yeh. ‘s a bitch isn’ it,
- Other-initiation may also be resolved by other-repair produced in the same
second position turn. Jefferson (1987, 2018c) calls these sorts of repairs
corrections. Corrections have their own sequential properties, which vary
according to whether the correction is exposed or embedded (Liddicoat,
2007: 216).
- In exposed correction, the other-initiated other-repair is produced
in second position by the recipient of a trouble, as in extract (9.49).
(9.49) [SF:II:7 (Jefferson, 1987)]
1 Larry: They’re gonna drive ba:ck Wednesday.
2→ Norm: Tomorrow.
3 Larry: Tomorrow. Righ[t.
4 Norm: [M-hm,
5 Larry: They are working half day.

44
 In this extract, the activity under way in the prior turn, in this case a
telling, is discontinued and the correction itself becomes the
activity which is being pursued by the following talk.
In all cases of exposed correction, regardless of what other talk may be
done, Jefferson argues that there is a basic sequential structure. This
structure consists of:
a A speaker produces some object (X)
b A subsequent speaker produces an alternative (Y)
c The prior speaker produces the alternative (Y) (accepts
correction) c’ The prior speaker produces the original (X) (rejects
correction)
- In embedded correction, there is a similar sequential structure but
the talk runs differently (Liddicoat, 2007: 218).
(9.53) [GTS:II:60 ST (Jefferson, 1987)]
1 Ken: Well-if you’re gonna race, the police have
2 said this to us.
3 Roger: That makes it even better. The challenge of
4→ running from the cops!
5 Ken: The cops say if you wanna race, uh go out at
6 four or five in the morning on the freeway…
Sequential arrangement of embedded corrections:
a A speaker produces some object (X).
b A subsequent speaker produces an alternative (Y).
c The prior speaker produces the alternative (Y) (accepts
correction) (extract (9.53)).
c’ The prior speaker produces the original (X) (rejects
correction) (Liddicoat, 2007: 218)
- However, embedded correction differs from exposed correction in that it does
not disrupt the action under way but rather is incorporated (embedded) into it.
The talk is not about the correction and the ongoing action is not changed
while correction happens (Liddicoat, 2007: 219).

4.2.6. Third position repair

Third position, after an interlocutor’s response to a previous turn, allows for the
possibility of repairing a trouble in understanding of a prior turn demonstrated by the
recipient’s response to it (Liddicoat, 2007: 219).
Schegloff (1992b, 2007) has proposed a four-component format for third position
repair, consisting of:
1. a repair-initiating component
2. an agreement/acceptance component

45
 3. a rejection component
4. the repair proper
These components have a canonical ordering, 1–4, and as Schegloff (1992b) shows,
this ordering is the result of speaker’s practices in constructing repair turns in third
position (Liddicoat, 2007: 220).
- The repair-initiating component commonly has the form no, possibly repeated
as no no or no no no. No may also be found in combination with oh as oh no
and occasionally oh alone may be used to initiate the repair. These turn initial
no’s do not seem to be constructed as disagreements, as the speaker deals with
a trouble source in their own prior talk, not with features of the second
positioned talk itself; additionally, disagreement tend to be done in a mitigated
form and are usually pushed late in their turn (Liddicoat, 2007: 221). More
will be elaborated on forms of disagreements next week, when Group 10
discusses Pomerantz.
(9.57) [NYI, 6-7 (Schegloff, 1992b)]
1 Bonnie: Because I’m not even sure if we’re goin’ to
2 have it yet because a buncha people say
3 [maybe, maybe,
4 Jim: [Yeah
5 Bonnie: ‘t’s buggin me.
6 (1.5)
7 Jim: Oh uhh hh I’m sorry, Ihh
8→ Bonnie: No, that’s okay, I mean y’know I can
9 understand because- this was just a late
10 idea that Barb had.

- Well is also possible as a repair initiator in third position repairs, but

Schegloff (Lerner & Kitzinger, 2019; Schegloff, 1992b) indicates
that where well is found the repair moves directly to the repair
proper, without the other sequential features found with other
initiators (Liddicoat 2007: 221).
(9.59) [GHY:II:09-10]
1 Gary: Yuh got anymore screws.
2 Harry: Yeah I got lo:ts.
3→ Gary: Well, I wanted one
4 Harry: O:h okay.

46
 - The agreement/acceptance component is usually found where the original
turn has been treated as a complaint and the next speaker has responded with a
response such as an apology or an excuse: a response which is sequentially
relevant for a complaint (Schegloff, 2005). In this case, the speaker accepts
the complaint and then proceeds to deny that the turn was intended as a
complaint, as in extract (9.60) (Liddicoat, 2007: 221).
(9.60) [NB (Schegloff, 1992b)]
1 Agnes: I love it.
2 (0.2)
3→ Portia: Well, honey? I’ll pob’ly see yuh one a’ these
4 day:s.
5 Agnes: Oh:: God yeah,
6 Portia: [Uhh huh!
7 Agnes: [We-
8 Agnes: B’t I c- I jis [couldn’ git down [there.
9→ Portia: [Oh- [Oh I know
10 I’m not askin [yuh tuh [come dow-
11 Agnes: [Jesus. [I mean I jis- I didn’
12 have five minutes yesterday.
- In the rejection component, the speaker overtly rejects the understanding of
the first turn revealed by the recipient’s response to it. Rejection formats listed
by Liddicoat (2007) include:
- I don’t mean X, where X identifies the problematic item in the trouble
source. This format is used to repair problems with reference
(Schegloff, 1987b).
(9.61) [CDHQ, I, 52 (Schegloff, 1992b)]
1 Annie: Which one::s are closed, an’ which ones are open.
2 Zebrach: Most of ‘em. This, this,
3 [this, this ((pointing))
4→ Annie: [I ‘on’t mean on the shelters, I mean on the
6 roads.
7 Zebrach: Oh!

- Another common format for rejecting a prior speaker’s understanding

of a turn is the I’m not X-ing format, where X names an action which
prior speaker has understood the talk to be doing. This format deals
with problems in which the talk in second position shows a problem of

47
 sequential implicativeness – that is, where the next speaker’s talk is
not sequentially appropriate to the prior speaker’s expressed
understanding of the trouble source (Schegloff, 1987b)
(9.62) [GTS (Schegloff, 1992b)]
1 Dan: … See Al tends, it seems, to pull in
2 one or two individuals on his side (there).
3 this is part of his power drive, see. He’s
4 gotta pull in, he can’t quite do it on
5 his own. Yet.
6 Al: W’l
7 Roger: Well so do I.
8→ Dan: Yeah. [I’m not criticising, I mean we’ll just=
9 Roger: [Oh you wanna talk about him.
10 Dan: = uh look, let’s talk.
11 Roger: Alright.

- In the third format for rejection, however, the misunderstanding is not

named but is referred to using a pro-form such as that: that’s not what I
mean, I don’t mean that and so on. Schegloff (1992b) argues that this
format does not show a problem in understanding the nature of
misunderstanding which has occurred but rather some potential
problem in expressing the understanding (Liddicoat, 2007: 223).
(9.63) [Lunch]
1 Joy: I have so much to do at the moment i’s gonna
2 be tight fitting something else in, yih know.
3 (0.2)
4 Harry: Well I don’ mean that yih have to [do
5→ Joy: [No uh-’as
6 no’ what I meant=I jis- (.) I jis’ think I’ll
7 have to do something tuh make room for i’.
8 Yih know reprioritise.
- The repair proper is the component which is most likely to be found in any
third position repair, although it too may be absent (Schegloff, 1992b). In the
repair proper, the speaker takes up the problem that the recipient’s response
has revealed and modifies the prior turn in some way to deal with the problem.
Schegloff identifies a number of ways in which this repair is commonly done,
which are listed by Liddicoat (2007) as follows:

48
 - The speaker may repeat the prior turn with some modifications, such
as prosodic marking, to display that the prior turn is being made
clearer (Liddicoat, 2007: 223)
(9.64) [Office 4:1]
1 Joe: Have the papers arrived yet,
2 Mary: uh-Nuh nothin’s come down from admi[n so far.
3 Joe: [oh no I’m
4→ uh not- Have the papers arrived yet.
5 Mary: Oh you mean the newspapers,
6 Joe: Yeah.
7 Mary: No they don’ usually get here until ten.

- Another possible format for the repair is a contrast with the recipient’s
understanding of the trouble source, usually introduced by I mean, as
in extract (9.65) (Liddicoat, 2007: 224).
(9.65) [CDHQ, I, 52 (Schegloff, 1992b)]
1 Annie: Which one::s are closed, an’ which ones are open.
2 Zebrach: Most of ‘em. This, this,
3 [this, this ((pointing))
4→ Annie: [I ‘on’t mean on the shelters, I mean on the
5 roads.
6 Zebrach: Oh!

- Speakers may also repair a trouble source in this position with a more
specific formulation of the trouble source, as in (9.66) (Liddicoat,
2007: 224).
(9.66) [CDHQ, I, 46-47 (Schegloff, 1992b)]
1 Lehroff: What is the weathuh. Out in the area now.
2 Zebrach: No winds, er its squalling, rain, the winds
3 are probably out of north,-west, at uh
4 estimated gusts of uh sixty to sixty five
5 miles an hours.
6 ( ): (Whew!)
7 Zebrach: Sustained winds of thirty five to forty
8 five miles per hour. and uh anticipated
9 duration,
10→ Lehroff: How is the wah- weather period outside.
11→ Is it- rain(ing)? uh windy? or what?
12 Zebrach: (‘s what I said). ‘s windy?
13 ( ): ()
14 Zebrach: An’ it’s raining.

49
15 Lehroff: S’ an’ it’s raining,
16 Zebrach: An’ it’s raining.

- Repairs may also be done by redoing the trouble source as

an explanation of the prior turn, as in extract (9.67).
(9.67) [BC (Schegloff, 1992b)]
1 Host: and now, dear hearts, let’s go to the
2 next call. Shall we?
3 Host: Good evening, WNBC,
4 Caller: Good evening, this is uh, oh boy.
5 Host: ehh heh heh hyah [hyah!
6→ Caller: [No I was listening to the
7 commercial, and I’m just kinda- confused
8 fer a min[ute.
9 Host: [Sorry about that, it’s a
10 little rattling.

- A final type of repair identified by Schegloff (1992b) is a

characterization of the trouble source as serious or non-serious.
This repair is designed to address this one particular problem of
understanding and is associated also with withdrawing from the
sequence in which the trouble occurred. Schegloff notes that such
repairs do not occur with I mean (Liddicoat, 2007: 225).
(9.68) [TG 1:7-14 (Schegloff, 1992b)]
1 Ava: [<I wan]’ dih know if yih got a-uh:m
2 wutchimicawllit. A:: pah(hh)hking place
3 °th’s mornin’. .hh
4 Bee: A pa:rking place,
5 Ava: Mm hm,
6 (0.4)
7 Bee: Whe:re.
8→ Ava: t! Oh: just anypla(h)ce? I wz jus’ kidding yuh.
9 Bee: Nno?=

50
 - The components Schegloff (1992b) has identified for third position repair are
not obligatory in constructing any repair turn, and any element may be
omitted from a particular repair turn. While no component is necessary for a
repair, the components themselves are ordered as initiation,
acceptance/agreement, rejection and repair and this ordering can be seen as
achieved by participants through their orientation to this ordering.
Schegloff (1997a) describes another trajectory for self-initiated repair after a next
speaker’s turn, as in extract (9.69) (Liddicoat, 2007: 225).
(9.69) [TG 286-289 (Schegloff, 1997a)]
1 Bee: Y’have any cla- y’have a class with
2 Billy this term?
3 Ava: yeah, he’s in my Abnormal class.
4 Bee: Oh yeah, [how
5→ Ava: [Abnormal Psych.

In this extract, Ava’s repair follows Bee’s turn, but it does not respond to problems of
hearing and understanding emerging from this turn. Rather, Ava is performing an
operation on her first turn without reference to Bee’s talk. Ava’s repair, therefore, is
not really in third position as it is not designed sequentially to follow Bee’s second
positioned turn. Schegloff (1997a) terms this third turn repair to distinguish it
structurally and sequentially from third position repair. These third turn repairs, in
fact, seem to have more in common with transition space repair than with third
position repair as they are often repairs on terminal components of the trouble source
turn. The difference between the two is that some talk by a next speaker intervenes
between the trouble source and the repair. The principal difference between the two
repair formats is, therefore, the presence or absence of talk by a next speaker after the
trouble source turn. The phenomenon here is a little like Jefferson’s analysis of
overlapping talk where the overlap occurs just after the beginning of a new TCU
(Liddicoat, 2007: 226).
There is an additional interactional issue involved with third turn repair, which
distinguishes this repair format from transition space repair. In these repairs, the next
speaker has produced a second positioned turn which demonstrates understanding of
the prior talk. The subsequent repair in third position can imply that this claiming of
understanding of the turn was not right at the point where the turn was produced. This
can be seen in extract (9.70) (Liddicoat, 2007: 226).
(9.70) [BC:Gray, 42-43 (Schegloff, 1997a)]
1 Call: I never saw a single piece of action while
2 I was there.
3 Brad: Mhhm,
4 Call: I was (manning the) civil affairs, and I

51
5 had a very good time.
6 Brad: Mm hm,
7→ Call: Nothing uh lewd in any- by way of a good
8 time, I mean
9 Bard: Yes, [I know what you mean
10 Call: [(Perfectly) honest good time.

Third turn repair and third position repair are structurally different repair positions.
Third turn repair refers to a phenomenon in conversation in which repair is done in the
third turn from the trouble source, but it is not designed to be second to a recipient’s
response to the trouble. Third position repair is designed in relation to a recipient’s
response to a trouble source. While this is commonly found in the third turn after the
trouble, this is not the only place in which third position repair can occur. That is,
third position repair is commonly done in the third turn but is not necessarily done in
the third turn (Schegloff, 1992b; Liddicoat, 2007: 227).

4.2.7. Fourth position repair

Fourth position repair allows an opportunity for a recipient of original trouble source
to repair a problem of understanding which has become evident as a result of talk
produced in the third position (Schegloff, 1992b). As third position repair allows a
speaker of some trouble source to deal with talk which displays a problem of
understanding, fourth position repair allows the recipient of the trouble to do the
same, as in extract (9.72) (Liddicoat, 2007: 228).
(9.72) [EAS:FN (Schegloff, 1992b)]
1 Marty: Loes, do you have a calendar
2 Loes: Yeah ((reaches for desk calendar))
3 Marty: Do you have one that hangs on the wall?
4→ Loes: Oh you want one.
5 Marty: Yeah

Fourth position repair consists of two components. The first component is a

change-of-state token oh reflecting a new understanding of the talk under
way
(Heritage, 1984a). The second is a recharacterization of the trouble source addressing
the problem of understanding, you want one in extract (9.72). Reanalyses of the
trouble source such as these are usually confirmed by the speaker of the original
trouble source and this reconfirmation leads to a new response to the matter of the
trouble source (Schegloff, 1992b). The recharacterization may, however, be omitted

52
and the repair turn constructed with the change-of-state token and the revised
response (Liddicoat, 2007: 229).

4.2.8. The multiple repair space

The previous discussion shows that any utterance can be repaired at a number of
points in the following talk and the form the repair takes determines which position
the repair will occupy. Schegloff (1992b) describes this series of possible positions
for repair as a repair initiation opportunity space consisting of four positions which
normally occupy the four turns following the repairable. The repair space, however,
can be longer if some intervening talk expands the sequence involved. As all talk is
subject to repair, each turn can be seen as being followed with a repair space of its
own and, in an ongoing conversation, each turn becomes a site for many possible
repairs of preceding turns. This set of multiple possibilities for next turn repair can be
represented as (Schegloff, 1992b: p. 1327; Liddicoat, 2007: p. 230):

Turn1 A: Q1

Turn2 B: A1 2nd position repair on T1

Turn3 A: Q2 2nd position repair on T2 3rd position repair on T1

Turn4 B: A2 2nd position repair on T3 3rd position repair on T2 4th position repair on T1

Turn5 A: Q3 2nd position repair on T4 3rd position repair on T3 4th position repair on T2

Turn6 B: A3 2nd position repair on T5 3rd position repair on T4 4th position repair on T3

4.2.9. The preference for self-repair

Schegloff et al. (1977) have identified a preference for self-repair in conversation.
They argue that this preference is not simply a matter of an overwhelming number of
instances of self-repair but also that the system is designed to achieve self-repair.
Features of the system that indicate this preference are listed by Liddicoat (2007: 231)
as follows:
- The positions in which self-repair can happen precede the positions in which
other-repair can happen, providing a structurally first opportunity for
speakers to repair their own trouble sources
- Furthermore, the division of repair work into initiation and repair also allows
for further possibilities for self-repair. Other-initiated repair does not
automatically lead to other-repair; rather other-initiated repair most
commonly leads to self-repair.
This means that the four repair types already discussed – self-initiated self-repair,
self-initiated other-repair, other-initiated self-repair and other-initiated other-repair
–

53
are not interactionally equal options. There is a strong preference for some of these
types over the others. The preference does not affect who initiates repair. The need to
deal with trouble in talk applies equally to all participants if conversation is to work as
a self-regulating system. This means that self-initiation and other-initiation are
alternatives responding to different interactional needs. Self-repair and other-repair,
however, are not alternatives in the same way, and the preference organisation
involved in repair is such that self-repair is favoured over other-repair. Other-repair is,
therefore, a dispreferred. (Liddicoat, 2007: 231)

5. Constraint
Systems Hệ thống
khống chế
Although we have established a preference structure for second parts, Pomerantz
(1978) noted that “a large proportion of compliment responses deviate from the model
response of accepting compliments”—as in, though acceptance is considered a
preferred social act (Yule, 1996:79), the response itself is not a preferred second. This
is due to the conflicting preferences on compliment responses, that is, preferences
which are concurrently relevant but not concurrently satisfiable. This causes a large
proportion of compliment responses to be “situated in the middle of a continuum
ranging from acceptances/agreements to rejection/disagreements” (Kieu H., 2006).
According to Pomerantz (1978), compliment responses are subject to two separate
systems of constraint, one of which is a system of recipients’ agreement or
disagreement with prior compliments, in which agreements are generally performed
as preferred seconds and disagreements as dispreferred seconds. The other system is
that of recipients accepting or rejecting prior compliments, in which acceptances are
generally performed as preferred seconds and rejections as dispreferred seconds.
These two systems are interrelated. Additionally, it is proposed that compliment
responses are subject to another system of constraint, which co-operates along with
the former two, and involves speakers' minimization of self-praise (Pomerantz, 1978:
67).

5.1. Action
chains Chuỗi
hành động
Constraint systems operate within “action chains'', which link compliment responses
with prior compliments. An action chain may be characterised as a type of
organisation in which two ordered actions, Action1 and Action2, are linked such that
the performance of A1 provides the possibility of performance if A2 as an appropriate
next action. A given utterance which is an instance of an Action1 in a particular action
chain may simultaneously be an instance of a different Action1. That is, it may

54
provide the possibility of actualization of one of several specifiable Action2s as an
appropriate next action (Pomerantz, 1978: 68).

55
Action chain 1 for compliment:
A1: A compliments B
A2: B accepts/rejects the compliment
- Compliments have the status of “supportive” actions (=offers, invitations,
gifts, praises, etc.) [re: preference structure]
- Relevant next action:
acceptance/rejection (Pomerantz, 1978: 68)
Action chain 2 for compliment:
A1: A compliments B
A2: B agrees/disagrees with the complimentary assertion
- Compliments have the status of assessments
- Relevant next action:
agreement/disagreement (Pomerantz, 1978: 68)
Acceptances
Acceptances and rejections are A2 alternatives subsequent to a number of supportive
actions, including the class “compliments.” The alternatives, however, are
non-equivalent, with acceptances preferred and rejections dispreferred. One basis for
the claim of non-equivalency has already been suggested: that the action of accepting
compliments is referred to in talk as model behaviour and that of rejecting
compliments as puzzling, troublesome, symptomatic, and so forth. In addition to
being considered non-equivalent, the alternatives are sequentially organised
non-equivalently. They inhabit differently shaped turns and sequences and differ
in their potential for termination of sequences. The preferred action chain, that is,
the chain with a preferred A2, for a compliment as a supportive action, is:
A1: A compliments B.
A2: B accepts the compliment
(Pomerantz, 1978: 69)
- Subsequent to compliments, appreciations regularly take the form of
appreciation tokens (biểu thị biết ơn), e.g. “thank you", “thanks", “thank you
so much,” and “well thank you" (Pomerantz, 1978: 69)
- Feature: recognises the status of the prior as a compliment without being
semantically fitted to the specifics of that compliment (Pomerantz,
1978: 69)
- If an appreciation token is to be performed as an A2, it should be performed in
a next turn to a compliment (Pomerantz, 1978: 69).
(1) [SBL:2.2.4.-3]
A: Why it’s the loveliest record I ever heard. [And the organ-
→ B: [Well thank you.
(Pomerantz, 1978: 70)

56
(2) [KC4:33]
F: That’s beautiful [It really
is R: [Yah
→ K: Thank you
- It seems plausible that in doing an appreciation, a recipient recognizes the
prior not merely as a compliment, but as that sort of compliment which
warrants an acceptance, that is, that should be accepted; that with his
acceptance-appreciation, he may be seen to be implicitly agreeing with the
prior compliment.
(Pomerantz, 1978: 69-70)
Agreements
Subsequent to assessments, agreements are A2s. A major type of agreement in this
environment is one achieved with a second assessment. The referent assessed in a
prior assessment is again assessed in a current turn such that current speaker’s
assessment (the second) stands in agreement with the prior speaker’s (Pomerantz,
1978: 70).
- Feature: referent preservation across the pair of assessments
(5) [MC:I]
B: Isn’t he cute
A: O::h he::s a::DORable
(Pomerantz, 1978: 70-71)
The affiliation between acceptances of compliments (appreciation tokens) and
agreements (second assessments in agreement) is demonstrated by the relative
positioning between those components. Acceptance components may be followed by
agreement components within responses to compliments. Those two components
may co-occur in the recipient’s next turn to a compliment (Pomerantz, 1978: 71); for
example,
(8) [SBL:2.2.4.-3]
A: Oh it was just beautiful.
→ B: Well thank you Uh I thought it was quite nice . .
. (Pomerantz, 1978: 71)
or in the recipient’s successive turns within a compliment sequence,
e.g., (1a) [SBL:2.2.4.-3]
A: Why it’s the loveliest record I ever heard. [And the organ-
→ B: [Well thank you.
A: The organ music came out so beautifu[lly in it.

57
→ B: [I thought it did too
(Pomerantz, 1978: 71)
Acceptance and agreement components, then, may be used in combination and/or as
alternatives by recipients within compliment sequences (Pomerantz, 1978: 72).
Rejections
Subsequent to instances of some classes of supportive actions, for example, offers and
invitations, rejections often contain appreciation components, including negated
appreciations (e.g., “No thanks”) and/or accounts for the rejection. The accounts are
frequently formed with reference to the occasion at hand, that is, provides something
which stands as an explanation of why this particular invitation, offer, etc., at this
particular time is not being accepted (Pomerantz, 1978: 72).
(10) [BC:l]
John: You wanna sandwich? [offer]
Dave: No thanks, [neg
appreciation] I ate before I left [account]
(Pomerantz, 1978: 72)
(11) [JS:II:142]
L: Bill? Whaddiyou drink. [offer]
( ): Thank you dear [appreciation]
I’m not- not drinking right now. [account]
(Pomerantz, 1978: 72)
In contrast to the type of rejection construct above, rejections to compliments are not
formed with (negated) appreciations plus account. Rather, the primary way in which
compliments are rejected is with disagreements or qualifications of the prior
complimentary assertions (Pomerantz, 1978: 73).
Disagreements
(A) [First example reported by husband]
H: Gee, hon, you look nice in that dress
W: Do you really think so? It’s just a rag my sister gave
me. (Pomerantz, 1978: 73)
In response to the husband’s complimentary assessment, the wife does a second
evaluation, that is, her evaluation, which stands in some disagreement with the prior.
Disagreement machinery is utilized at least with respect to recipient’s selection of a
contrastively classed (negative) evaluative term, “just a rag,” from the positive one
contained in the prior, “nice.” (Pomerantz, 1978: 73)

58
⇒ Interrelatedness between acceptances and agreements, and rejections and
disagreements:
- Appreciations and agreements are affiliated components, they are not
sequentially interchangeable (Pomerantz, 1978: 73), as illustrated by
example (8)
- Agreements tend to occur less frequently than appreciations and seem to
have more restrictive conditions for their productions (Pomerantz, 1978: 73)
- Agreements do occur with appreciations, they are proffered routinely
after initial appreciations (Pomerantz, 1978: 74)
→ Appreciations over agreements seem to be preferentially selected for
accepting compliments (Pomerantz, 1978: 74)
- Rejections are routinely performed with disagreements (Pomerantz, 1978: 74)
Self-Praise Avoidance
- There is a system of constraints governing how parties may credit or
praise themselves. Self-praise avoidance names a system of constraints
which is enforceable by self and/or other, in that order. (Pomerantz, 1978:
74)
- If self-praise is performed by a speaker, that is, if a speaker does not
enforce upon himself self-praise avoidance, a recipient may make notice of
the violation and enforce the constraints in the next turn. (Pomerantz, 1978:
74)
(14) [HS:S]
cared.
A: Just think of how many people would miss you. You would know who
B: Sure. I have a lot of friends who would come to the funeral and say
what an intelligent, bright, witty, interesting person I was.
→ A: They wouldn’t say that you were
humble B: No. Humble, I’m not.
(Pomerantz, 1978: 75)
(15) [v.D.Il]
J: I heard that on my radio that night Richie.=I-I knew I (was hearing)
your voice coming into my bedroom.
R: O::h. Could you have taped that?=I’d’ve loved t’hear my voice ( )
→ S: “M(hh)odesty is o(hh)ne of my gr(h)eatest virt(hh)ues”
hhh (Pomerantz, 1978: 75)
- Self-praise constraints may be enforced by the speaker, himself, in a variety
of ways (Pomerantz, 1978: 75), including:

59
 - Incorporation of a disclaimer within self-praising talk (Pomerantz,
1978: 75)
(17) [BC:III:28]
B: So he- so then, at this- y’see, I don’ like to brag but see he sorta
like backed outta the argument then.
(Pomerantz, 1978: 75)
- Incorporation of a qualification within self-praising talk
(Pomerantz, 1978: 75)
(18) [S.2]
G: Ken gave that internship to Peter?! I’m much better than he is!
Well maybe I shouldn’t say that.
(Pomerantz, 1978: 75)
- The system of self-praise avoidance is not limited to violation markers by self
and other. It also bears on how crediting is done. The constraints on self-
praise are collaboratively oriented to and interactionally satisfied with co-
participant praise activities. That is, an orientation that co-conversationalists
display with respect to each other is to see that others are properly credited.
(Pomerantz, 1984). In other words, self-praise constraints orient
conversationalists to compliment other(s) instead of self.
(21) [v.D.II]
→ R: You should see this paper she wrote. -Eighty
pages. (1.0)
→ R: I have to brag about you Dotty.
(1.5)
→ R: Quite a
masterpiece D: Thank
you.
(Pomerantz, 1978: 76)
- Subsequent to a co-participant’s praise of other-than-self, credit may
be shifted to that co-participant (Pomerantz, 1978: 77).
(23) [SBL:1.1.12.-27]
B: . . . I really think it was the C.F.O. Camp that worked this out for me.
A: Uh huh, Uh huh, Well, (it’s true)-You
mean (1.0)

60
 A: you were inspired there,
B: Yeah, I think was uh huh, I
→ A: But it was with- it was with- It was within
yourself (Pomerantz, 1978: 77)

5.2. Solution types

Praise
downgrades
One solution type includes responses that display a sensitivity to, and partial
satisfaction of, the two conflicting preferences: to accept/agree with prior compliment
and to avoid self-praise. These responses exhibit features of both agreements and
disagreements, that is, the agreements display some features of disagreements and
vice versa (Pomerantz, 1978: 78).
Agreements:
- Recipients of praise sometimes agree with the prior praise assessment. When
agreements are performed in this environment, they have a characteristic
form. They are second assessments which are systematically altered relative to
the prior assessments, containing scaled-down or more moderate praise terms
than the priors. In the following sequence, the praise profferer (P) incorporates
strong-positive evaluative terms (↑); the praise recipient (R) responds with
scaled-down agreements containing more moderate-positive terms (↓)
(Pomerantz, 1978: 79).
(33) [AP:fn]
B: I’ve been offered a full scholarship at Berkeley and at
UCLA (P)↑ G: That’s fantastic
(R) ↓ B: Isn’t that
good (Pomerantz, 1978: 80)
- Scaled-down agreements exhibit features of both agreements and
disagreements. Their format is that of agreement turns: They frequently have
initially positioned agreement tokens or appreciations. Although scaled
down relative to the priors, they are, nonetheless, similarly classed, that is,
likewise positive evaluations. As such, they may be treated by co-
participants as agreements with prior compliments (Pomerantz, 1978: 80)
- Recipients of praise are subject to self-praise avoidance, or modesty
constraints. Praising self with strong-positive descriptors has a violative
status (Pomerantz, 1978: 81).
- Productions of scaled-down agreements seem to be subject to the following
restriction: They do not normatively occur subsequent to compliments which
directly praise the co-participant. Compliments that may engender scaled-
down

61
 agreements contain reference terms that locate objects, persons, activities, and
so on, other than the co-participants directly (“you”), namely, referents through
which co-participants are accorded credit. The more indirectly recipients are
credited, that is, with compliments locating referents which are isolable as
external to recipients, the more likely agreements are to occur. The agreements,
however, are scaled down, the scale-down reflecting the constraints imposed
by indirect praise of the recipient (Pomerantz, 1978: 82).
Disagreements
- Recipients of compliments frequently disagree with prior compliments. They
may disagree by proposing that the creditings within the prior compliments
are overdone, exaggerated, etc., and counterpropose that lesser amounts of
credit are justified (Pomerantz, 1978: 83):
(37) [JG:3C:6] ((The referent is an athletic award R has
received.)) C: Well we’ll haftuh frame that.
→ R: Yee- Uhghh it’s not worth
fra(hh)mi(h)ng, C: W’sure it is.
(1.0)
R: Well?
C: You’ll have a whole wall of framings.
→ R: Tch! No, it’s not really impo:rtnt,
C: Well I think it’s very important=En I’m very
pleased. (Pomerantz, 1978: 83)
- Disagreements as seconds to compliments are frequently marked as
qualifications of the prior compliments rather than directly contrastive
counterassertions. Disagreement markers used with such qualifications
include “though,” “yet,” and “but” (Pomerantz, 1978: 84).
(42) [AP:FN]
A: Good shot
→ B: Not very solid
though (Pomerantz, 1978: 84)
Praise downgrades represent one type of solution to the incompatible preferences
operating on compliment responses—that of “compromise.” With downgrades, the
referent of the prior is preserved, but the praise is neither totally agreed with (i.e., it is
responsive to self-praise avoidance) nor totally disagreed with (i.e., it is also
responsive to acceptance/agreement preferences) (Pomerantz, 1978: 86).

62
Agreement and disagreement downgrades are responses which partially satisfy each
of the conflicting preferences (Pomerantz, 1978: 86).
Referent shift
A second solution type of compliment responses works on the principle of referent
shifts. In a compliment (A1), a recipient is praised either directly or indirectly; in this
type of response, the recipient performs a subsequent praise (A2) which has
other-than-self as referent (Pomerantz, 1978: 86).
A1 A praises B.
A2 B praises other-than-
self. (Pomerantz, 1978: 86)
Reassignment of Praise
In responding to a compliment, a recipient may reassign the praise, shifting the credit
from himself to an other-than-self referent, for example, an object. The following
sequence contains one such typical credit shift (Pomerantz, 1978: 87):
(47) [WC:YCC.-4]
R: You’re a good rower, honey.
J: These are very easy to row. Very
light. (Pomerantz, 1978: 87)
In R’s compliment, J is praised as “a good rower.” In J’s second to the compliment,
the type of boat is praised as “very easy to row. Very light.” In response to the
compliment, J forms an assessment in which the referent being praised is shifted from
himself to other-than-himself, namely, the boat (Pomerantz, 1978: 87).
Negotiations over the placement of credit are structured relative to the sets of
constraints operant on the respective parties. Profferers of credit accord credit to
co-participants. Recipients of credit shift credit away from themselves (Pomerantz,
1978: 87).
Returns
A second kind of referent shift are those within return compliments. Recall that a
general procedure used in second assessment agreements is that of referent retention.
A second speaker refers to the same referent as has the prior speaker within an
assessment which stands in agreement with the prior assessment. Referent retention is
one kind of inter-turn linking system for topical, sequential units (Pomerantz, 1978:
89).

63
Within returns, a slightly different linking system is employed: Rather than
agreeing/disagreeing with the assessment of the referent that the prior speaker
assessed, a second speaker preserves the relationship of referent to speaker across the
turns. That is, if the initial speaker compliments the compliment recipient (“you”), the
compliment recipient returns the compliment by praising the prior speaker (“you”)
(Pomerantz, 1978: 90).
The action sequence for return
compliments: A1 A
compliments B.
A2 B compliments
A. (Pomerantz, 1978: 90)
A recipient of a compliment may proffer a return compliment—a compliment that is
“similar” to the prior compliment. Returns use an agreement construct. In contrast to
the prior credit shifts (from “you” to “it”) that are typically viewed as disagreements
(i.e., as recipients’ creditings of “it not me”), returns are constructed as agreements
(i.e., “and you too”) (Pomerantz, 1978: 90).
(51) [MC]
C: Ya sound (justiz) real nice
→ D: Yeah you soun’ real good
too (Pomerantz, 1978: 90)

64
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Discourse Analysis versus Conversation Analysis..................................................5
1. Conversation analysis..........................................................................................5
1.1 Definition.......................................................................................................5
1.2 Conversational style.......................................................................................6
2. Discourse analysis................................................................................................7
2.1 Definition.......................................................................................................7
2.2 Coherence......................................................................................................7
2.3 Background knowledge.................................................................................8
3. Similarities............................................................................................................9
3.1 Talk as topic...................................................................................................9
3.2 Attention to properties of data.....................................................................10
3.3 The influence of ethnomethodology............................................................11
4. Differences..........................................................................................................12
4.1 Analysing actions vs analysing action orientations in accounting
practices... 12
4.2 Warranting analytic claims...........................................................................14
II. Jefferson’s contributions to Conversation Analysis...........................................16
1. Introduction about Gali Jefferson...................................................................16
2. Gali Jefferon’s contributions to Conversation Analysis (CA).......................16
2.1. Jefferson Transcription System...................................................................17
2.1.1. Overview............................................................................................17
2.1.2. Jefferson’s Transcription Symbols......................................................18
2.2. Overlap in Jefferson’s papers......................................................................24
2.2.1. Overlap’s definitions and features......................................................24
2.2.2. Some orderly aspects of overlap in natural conversation...................25
2.2.2.1. Overview about Overlap Onset, Within-overlap Talk and
Post-overlap Talk....................................................................................25
2.2.2.2. Some cases overlap happen in natural conversation..................26
2.2.2.3. Resolutions for overlap..............................................................30
2.2.2.4. Problems happen after overlap has been resolved.....................38
III. Sacks’ investigations of conversation analysis...................................................43
1. Biography of Harvey Sacks..............................................................................43
2. Turn-talking.......................................................................................................45

2
 2.1. Model of turn-taking...................................................................................45
2.2. The turn constructional component.............................................................47
2.2.1. Turn constructional units....................................................................47
2.2.2. Possible completion and turn construction.........................................48
2.2.3. Transition relevance places................................................................48
2.2.4. Extending turn constructional units....................................................49
2.3. The turn allocation component...................................................................50
2.3.1. Current speaker can select the next speaker.......................................50
2.3.2. Next speaker self-selects....................................................................50
2.4. Rules linking turn construction and turn allocation....................................51
2.5. Features of turn-taking in conversation.......................................................52
3. Adjacency pairs.................................................................................................55
3.1. Definition....................................................................................................55
3.2. Core features of adjacency pairs.................................................................56
3.3. Types of adjacency pairs.............................................................................56
4. Description and Categories of Talk.................................................................58
4.1. Dialogic Talk...............................................................................................58
4.2. Exploratory Talk.........................................................................................58
4.3. Socratic talk................................................................................................59
IV. Schegloff's Insights Into Conversation Analysis................................................60
1. Biography of Emanuel A. Schegloff.................................................................60
Notable publications of Schegloff in Conversation Analysis............................60
2. Schegloff's Insights into Conversation Analysis.............................................61
2.1. Introduction to Sequence Organisation.......................................................61
2.2. The adjacency pair as the unit for sequence construction...........................68
2.2.1. Adjacency, nextness, contiguity, progressivity...................................69
2.2.2. Counters..............................................................................................71
2.2.3. Relevance rules and negative observations........................................73
2.2.4. Conclusion..........................................................................................75
V. Pomerantz: Agreeing and Disagreeing with assessments...................................75
1. Introduction.......................................................................................................75
1.1. Assessments................................................................................................75
1.2. Second assessments.....................................................................................76
2. Second-assessment productions: agreement preferred..................................77

3
 2.1. Agreements (agreement preferred).............................................................77
2.2. Disagreements (agreement preferred).........................................................79
3. Second-assessment productions: agreement dispreferred.............................83
3.1. Disagreements with prior speakers' self-deprecations................................83
3.2. Agreements with prior speakers' self-deprecations.....................................87
VI. Strategies to preferred and dispreferred seconds: Disagreeing in English and
Vietnamese
92
1. Strategies for Disagreements as Dispreferred Seconds..................................92
1.1. English corpus.............................................................................................92
1.2 Vietnamese corpus.......................................................................................94
2. Strategies for Disagreements as Preferred Seconds.....................................100
2.1. English corpus...........................................................................................100
2.2. Vietnamese corpus....................................................................................103
REFERENCE............................................................................................................108

4
I. Discourse Analysis versus Conversation Analysis (Ngô Bá Tùng)
1. Conversation analysis
1.1 Definition
The structure of conversation is the structure of talk, also the basic pattern of “I
speak - you speak - I speak - you speak” will derive from that fundamental kind of
interaction we acquire first and use most often. (Yule, 1996: 71)

In this chapter of Conversation and Preference Structure, we will be looking more

closely at that structure as a crucial aspect of pragmatics. (Yule, 1996: 71)

There are many metaphors used to describe conversation structure. For some,
conversation is like a dance, with the conversational partners coordinating their
movements smoothly. However, the most widely used analytic approach is based on an
analogy with the workings of a market economy. In this market, there is a scarce
commodity called the floor which can be defined as the right to speak. (Yule, 1996:
72)

Because it is a form of social action, turn-taking operates in accordance with a

local management system that is conventionally known by members of a social group.
The local management system is essentially a set of conventions for getting turns,
keeping them, or giving them away. This system is needed most at those points where
there is a possible change in who has the turn. (Yule, 1996: 72)

Dave: What? What's

wrong? Jan: Never mind.

As shown in [2], the non-response of Dave is treated, by his girlfriend, as possibly

communicating something. Normally, those who wish to get the floor will wait for a
possible TRP before jumping in. Of course, those holding the floor in a competitive
environment will avoid providing TRPs. To do so, they must avoid an open pause at
the end of a syntactic unit. As illustrated in [5], the speaker fills each of his pauses
('um' or 'uh'),

[5] I wasn't talking about—um his first book that was—uh really just like a start
and so—uh isn't—doesn't count really.

Another type of floor-holding device is backchannel speaking.

[6] a. There are three points I'd like to make—first...

5
 b. There's more than one way to do this—one example

would be ...

[7].
Caller: if you use your long distance service a lot then you'll

Mary: uh-uh

Caller: be interested in the discount I'm talking about because

Mary: yeah

Caller: it can only save you money to switch to a cheaper

service Mary: mmm

1.2 Conversational style

Many of the features which characterize the turn-taking system of conversation
are invested with meaning by their users. Even within a broadly defined community of
speakers, there is often sufficient variation in style to cause potential
misunderstanding.

For that there are 2 conversation style. The active, fast speaking rate, with almost
no pausing between turns, and with some overlap or even completion of the other's
turn, is called high involvement style. The slower rate, take longer pauses between
turns, do not overlap, and avoid interruption or completion of the other's turn. This
non-interrupting, non-imposing style, is called high considerateness style (Yule, 1996:
73)

When a speaker who typically uses the first style gets into a conversation with a
speaker who normally uses the second style, the talk tends to become one-sided. The
active participation style will tend to overwhelm the other style. Instead, the more
rapid-fire speaker may think the slowerpaced speaker just doesn't have much to say, is
shy, and perhap boring or even stupid. In return, he or she is likely to be viewed
asnoisy, pushy, domineering, selfish, and even tiresome. Many social scientists regard
conversation analysis and discourse analysis asroughly similar kinds of approaches:
they both offer qualitative analyses ofthe functional and sense-making properties of
language. And viewed from thestandpoint of traditional social science, which by and
large has not been concerned to understand the role or nature of language use, there do
appear to be overlaps. (Yule, 1996: 73)

6
 However, it will become apparent that conversation analysis and discourse
analysis share assumptions and approaches only at a broad level. When we consider in
more detail the substantive focus of research, and the methodological assumptions
which inform empirical analysis, significant differences begin to emerge. (Wooffitt,
2005: 71)

2. Discourse analysis
2.1 Definition
According to Cambridge dictionary, discourse analysis is the analysis of spoken
or written texts that contain more than one sentence, including their social context.

Discourse analysis focuses on pragmatics on what is unsaid or unwritten, yet

communicated, within discourse. (Yule, 1996: 84)

In this expanded perspective, speakers and writers are viewed as using language
not only in its interpersonal function, but also in its textual function, and also in its
ideational function. Investigating this much broader area of the form and function of
what is said and written is called discourse analysis. (Yule, 1996: 83)

About the origin of discourse analysis, Woofitt (2005: 18) stated that Discourse
analysis emerged in the sociology of scientific knowledge. It established a departure
from realist accounts of scientists’ actions to a study of scientists’ accounting
practices.It proposes that language is used variably. Accounts are constructed from a
range of descriptive possibilities, and are intimately tied to the context in which they
are produced and the functions they perform.

2.2 Coherence
Generally, what language users have most in mind is an assumption of coherence,
that what is said or written will make sense in terms of their normal experience of
things.For example:

[i] a. Plant Sale

b. Garage Sale
Although these notices have an identical structure, they are interpreted differently.
[ia] means that someone is selling plants, but [ib] does not mean that someone is
selling garages. Indeed, the interpretation of [ib.], that someone is selling household
items from their garage, is one that requires some familiarity with suburban life. This

7
emphasis on familiarity and knowledge as the basis of coherence is necessary because
of evidence that we tend to make instant interpretations of familiar material and tend
not to see possible alternatives. (Yule,1996: 84)

2.3 Background knowledge

(Yule, 1996; 85) Background knowledge refers to the information and experience
that individuals have accumulated over time. It shapes how they understand and
interpret information. According to Brown and Yule, this general knowledge about the
world underpins our interpretation not only of discourse, but of virtually every aspect
of our experience. These structures function like familiar patterns from previous
experience that we use to interpret new experiences.

2.3.1 Schemata
A schema or in the plural form is schemata is a pre-existing knowledge structure
in memory. Schemata can be seen as the organized background knowledge which
leads us to expect or predict aspects in our interpretation of discourse. Example:

A: There's a party political broadcast coming on - do you want to watch

it? B: No - switch it off - I know what they're going to say already.

In this situation, when talking about the “political broadcast”, the hearer immediately
expects to hear political discussions or debates among politicians that he/she doesn't
like to hear. Therefore, the hearer refuses to turn the broadcast on.

2.3.2 Frames
If there is a fixed, static pattern to the schema, it is sometimes called a frame. A
frame is shared by everyone within a social group which would be something like a
prototypical version.We have this below advertisement: (Yule, 1996: 85-86)

[5] Apartment for rent. $500. 763-6683.

The interpretation of [5] will be based on 2 frames. The first is “apartment” frame
as apartment can be framed as a place for a human to live with other utility such as
kitchen, bathroom and bedroom. It then combined with the second ‘apartment for rent
advertisement’ frame, the advertiser expect that $500 will be the amount of the money
paid per month and the number 763-6683 as the leaser contact. The viewer however,
can misunderstood it by expect $500 to be paid per week or per day, however , the

8
pragmatic point will be the same: the reader uses a pre-existing knowledge structure to
create an interpretation of what is not stated in the text.

2.3.3 Cultural schema

Cultural Schemata are pre-existing knowledge structures based on experience in a
particular culture. It is almost inevitable that our background knowledge structures, our
schemata for making sense of the world, will be culturally determined. (Yule, 1996:87)

We can readily modify the details of a cultural schema for some obvious
differences .For many other subtle differences, we often don't recognize that there may
be a misinterpretation based on different schemata. Yule (1996, p.87).

Ngô Hữu Hoàng’s example (2012):

A: Hôm nay rét quá.
B: Mai ông Táo về trời rồi còn

gì! A: Thế à! Mua cá chép chưa?

To us Vietnamese readers, we share the culture schemata with the author. With
the above dialogue, A and B don’t have to say who Kitchen God is, when is the time of
Kitchen God's day, why it is carp and not any other fish. Because, it is a cultural
knowledge like background knowledge that two people share. It is "I say what I
understand" and "I understand what I hear".

If one of the two communicating members has no cultural background to the

issue they are talking about, they cannot understand each other, or at least, cannot have
complete and fluent native communication between them like the given dialogue.

That is why we need the so-called “culture knowledge” to comprehend the given
information and to produce our own discourse.

3. Similarities
3.1 Talk as topic
CA and DA examine discourse as a topic in its own right, and not as a reflection of
wider structural conditions. So, for example, we did not examine the turn-taking
system for ordinary interaction to allow them to draw conclusions about wider social
inequalities.

9
 [5] I wasn't talking about—um his first book that was—uh really just like a start
and so—uh isn't—doesn't count really.

The example suggests that the pause occurs to mean that the speaker is trying to
protect his turn. Which is how the language was used and how the systematic way of it
used to make meaning.

And neither did we understand cultural schemata so we can arrive at the different
between Vienamese culture and other countries culture.

Ngô Hữu Hoàng’s example (2012):

A: Hôm nay rét quá.
B: Mai ông Táo về trời rồi còn

gì! A: Thế à! Mua cá chép chưa?

The example also suggest that the we used cultural schema that to comprehend the
given information and to produce our own discourse. Which is also how the language
be used and how the systematic arrangement of word can be decipher.

Wooffitt (2005:71-72) stated that the prime concern of conversation analysis and
discourse analysis was with language in use: the systematic ways it was being used,
and what it was being used to do.

3.2 Attention to properties of data

In keeping with their explicit focus on language, conversation and discourse
analysis are attentive to the properties of how language is actually used. Research
questions derive from observations on features plainly exhibited by the data. For
example, Sacks and his colleagues’ careful transcription of talk-in- interaction revealed
that there were few gaps between turns; moreover they noted that although periods of
overlapping speech were common, these were relatively short-lived. These simple
observations informed their empirical research. They argued that any adequate analysis
of the methods for turn-taking had to be able to account for these properties of
talk-in-interaction. (Wooffitt, 2005:72)

Similarly, Gilbert and Mulkay realised that in their interview data, scientists were
producing variable accounts. Instead of trying to expunge this variability from their
datain order to produce a single, coherent sociological narrative, they began to
examine the organisation of these varied accounting practices to identify the
functions they

10
performed. In both cases empirical research questions were thus generated from an
open-minded assessment of the data. (Wooffitt, 2005:72)

3.3 The influence of ethnomethodology

According to Dictonary.com, ethnomethodology is the sociological study of the
rules and rituals underlying ordinary social activities and interactions.

Pioneered by Harold Garfinkel (1967) the fundamental tenet of ethnomethodology

is that the sense of social action is accomplished through the participants’ use of tacit,
practical reasoning skills and competencies. Sacks was a colleague of Garfinkel, and
their work shares many concerns: for example, analysing the normative basis of social
action, and the way that sense-making procedures are embedded in mundane activities.
Ethnomethodology was central to their attempt to highlight the implications for social
psychology of the constructive and constitutive properties of ordinary language.
(Wooffitt, 2005:73)

The influence of ethnomethodology in conversation analysis from the example:

(1) J: It’s really a clear lake, isn’t it?
→ R: It’s wonderful.
(2) L: Maybe it’s just ez well you don’t know (2.0)
→ W: Well uh-I say it’s suspicious it could be something good

too. (Kieu T. Thu Huong, 2006:118)

The preferred/dispreferred second in the two example. Ethnomethodology pointed

out the psychological impact on the participant to choose their turn and explain the
delay of the dispreferred second.

In discourse analysis, ethnomethodological research was cited to establish that the

study of people’s own sense-making should be a central part of social psychology. But
it was also important as part of their wider critique of experimental methods in social
psychology. The influence of ethnomethodology in discourse analysis from the
example:

A: There's a party political broadcast coming on - do you want to watch it? 17

11
 B: No - switch it off - I know what they're going to say already.
Ethnomethodological can explain how the schema of people can be used as pre
existing knowledge structure in memory involving the normal expected patterns of
things which people rely on to interpret or predict their new experiences.

4. Differences
The discussion of the differences between conversation analysis and discourse
analysis will be organized around various substantive and methodological issues.
(Wooffitt, 2005:78)

4.1 Analysing actions vs analysing action orientations in accounting practices

(Wooffitt, 2005:78) argue that it is useful to identify the core analytic concern of
CA as the study of social action through language, and to identify the core analytic
concern of DA as the investigation of the way that accounts and formulations display
an action orientation.

Conversation analytic studies of interaction, on the whole, tend to exhibit specific

methodological characteristics, and there is a consistent style to formal published
studies. There is, however, greater diversity in discourse analytic research, in terms of
both the treatment of data and the range of analytic issues being explored, and some
later discourse analytic studies have much in common with conversation analytic
research. Moreover, some areas of research associated with CA, such as Sacks’ earlier
writing on the organisation and use of membership categories, exhibit a less formal
and more interpretative stance characteristic of DA studies.

We can illustrate these differences by comparing two passages from published

research in which analytic claims about data are presented. The first comes from Potter
and Edwards’ (1990) discourse analytic study of the dispute about ‘what was really
said’ at a meeting between the then Chancellor of the Exchequer and ten political
journalists. Potter and Edwards consider these data. (4.1) (From Potter and Edwards,
1990: 412)

[1] How on earth did the Chancellor, as a former journalist, manage to

mislead so many journalists at once about his intentions?

[2] As all the Sunday newspapers carried virtually the same story, is the

Chancellor saying that every journalist who came to the briefing – he

has

12
 not denied that there was one – misunderstood what he said?
[3] The reporters, it seemed, had unanimously got it wrong. Could so

many messengers really be so much in error? It seems doubtful.

Their analysis is:

In the sequence of events, Extracts 1 to 3 follow Lawson’s [the Chancellor] claim
that the reporters were wrong. That is, he has questioned the factual status of the
reports. Using the idea of witnesses corroborating versions, we take the rhetorical force
of these accounts to be something like this: it is reasonable to imagine that some of the
journalists might be misled in a briefing of this kind but not that they all should. If a
number of observers report the same thing, that encourages us to treat the status of that
thing as factual. The consensuality of the reports’ accounts is offered as the basis for
scepticism about the Chancellor’s ... the passages do not merely state that the
consensus is present, but provide the basis for a rhetorical appeal to the reader to
construct it herself. For example, the extracts work on the quality or adequacy of the
consensus and its unanimity ... The large size of the consensus is worked up using the
description ‘so many’ journalists, which pick out the number of journalists as
exceptionable or notable. (Potter and Edwards, 1990: 412)

Now consider the following passage from Heritage and Greatbatch’s conversation
analytic study of news interview interaction. Here they are discussing how the
interviewee observes the normative expectation that the interviewer should be seen to
be neutral, and not offering his or her own opinions. (4.2) (From Heritage and
Greatbatch, 1991: 117)

IR: ·hhh we What’s the difference between

your Marxism and Mister McGaehy’s

Communism.

IE: er The difference is that it’s the press that constantly call me a Ma:rxist when I
do not, (.) and never have (.) er er given that description of myself.

Heritage and Greatbatch offer the following analysis:

The question rests on two claims about the individuals involved: first, that Mr
McGahey is a communist, and second, that Mr Scargill [the interviewee] is a Marxist.
Within the format of the IR’s turn, neither of these claims is overtly asserted as either a
fact or as an opinion. Rather the claims are embedded within the question as factual

13
presuppositions about the individuals involved ... In his response to the question, the
IE (Scargill) rejects one of the presuppositions – that he is a Marxist. But it is
noticeable that this rejection (which is framed as an ‘answer’ to the question – note the
answer preface ‘the difference is’) is managed as the rejection of an error of fact

(ascribed to ‘the press’) and not as the rejection of an opinion expressed by the IR.
In this, and innumerable other cases, IEs treat IR questions – no matter how hostile or
in other ways prejudicial to their viewpoints – as activities which are not accountable
as the ‘expressions of opinion’. (Heritage and Greatbatch, 1991: 117)

We can arrive at these differences after examine the analysing actions and
analysing action orientations from the two group of authors :

● Potter and Edwards examine sections from newspaper reports, and seek to
distil a general orientation in these texts to the use of consensus information;
Heritage and Greatbatch explicate from one question–answer sequence to show
how both participants orient to and reproduce the neutrality conventionally
associated with news interviews.
● Potter and Edwards argue that their data are organised to have a ‘rhetorical
force’; Heritage and Greatbatch discuss activities at the level of turn design.
Potter and Edwards’ analysis is not couched in a technical vocabulary;
Heritage and Greatbatch’s analysis is more technical in that it refers to ‘turn
format’;
● Finally, Potter and Edwards examine the way the details of the extracts are
organised to portray the broad factual status of the journalists’ claims; Heritage
and Greatbatch’s analysis reveals how the participants have designed their
turns to accomplish a specific interactional task, namely, achieving neutrality
within a news interview. (Wooffitt, 2005:82)

4.2 Warranting analytic claims

One of the key problems in any research project is to warrant whatever empirical
statements are made. In conversation analysis, however, it is not the job of the analyst
to interpret the significance or nature of conversational activities, but to reveal how
participants’ own. interpretations of the on-going exchange inform their conduct.
Because of this, CA has a distinctive resolution to the problems involved in warranting
analytic claims.

To illustrate this, look at these fragments. The first comes from the corpus of calls
to the British Airways flight information service, and the second comes from a
courtroom cross-examination.

14
 (4.3) (From Wooffitt et al, 1997: 80)

1 A: British Airways ^flight information

2 can I help you

3 (1.3)

4 A: hel↑lo↑

(4.4) (From Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 52)

C: Is there something bothering you?

(1.0)

C: Yes or no?

The concept of the adjacency pair suggests that an acceptance or a refusal should
follow an offer; and after a question, there should be an answer. In each case, though,
the recipient does not produce the appropriate second pair part. On first inspection,
these extracts seem to provide evidence which undermines claims about the properties
of paired actions. However, the speakers’s responses to these absences demonstrate
that for them the normative expectations which underpin paired sequences are still
relevant. In extract 4.3 the agent’s ‘hel↑lo’ is designed to check that there’s a caller on
the line, thus not only demonstrating her understanding that the caller should produce a
request for flight information, but displaying her reasoning as to why it is not
forthcoming (there may be a problem with the line); and in 4.4, the counsel’s ‘Yes or
no?’ stands as a prompt for the answer. In both cases, but in different ways, the
speakers’ turns indicate that the absence of the appropriate second pair part is a
noticeable and accountable deviation from the norms of interactional practice.
However, discourse analysts do not have the same kinds of resources by which to
ground their empirical observations. There is no next turn position, for example, when
studying the use of consensus information in newspaper articles. Similarly, it is
difficult to envisage how a concern with deviant cases might be of use to discourse
analytic studies: they are not focused on the kinds of normative expectations which
deviant cases so neatly expose. Other ways of grounding analytic claims, however,
have been developed.

As in conversation analysis, there is an emphasis on the presentation of data in the

body of research reports to substantiate the analyst’s empirical statements, and to allow
the reader to check analytic claims against the data from which they were generated.
And with respect to verbal data, such as those generated by informal interviews,

15
Wetherell and Potter (1988) have argued that participants will seek to address
inconsistencies which arise from the clash of mutually competing or incompatible
linguistic repertoires. This reparative work provides evidence, intrinsic to the
participants’ conduct, of the operation of those repertoires, and to some degree mirrors
the resources provided by next turn analysis available to the conversation analyst.
Despite these steps, though, it is clear that the burden of warranting analytic claims is
greater for the discourse analyst than for the conversation analyst.
II. Jefferson’s contributions to Conversation Analysis (Nguyễn Thảo Vi)
1. Introduction about Gali Jefferson
Gail Jefferson (22 April 1938 – 21 February 2008) was an American sociologist
with an emphasis in sociolinguistics. She was, along with Harvey Sacks and Emanuel
Schegloff, one of the founders of the area of research known as conversation analysis
(CA).

She is remembered for the methods and notational conventions she developed for
transcribing speech, the latter forming the Jefferson Transcription System. This is now
used widely in CA research.

Jefferson's work in conversation analysis began as a part of her coursework in a

class she took in the spring of 1965 that was taught by Harvey Sacks. She enrolled in
the class to fulfill her graduation requirement for her dance major. She had learned
basic transcription skills through her work as a clerk typist at the UCLA Department of
Public Health and her experience and work there in transcribing sensitivity-training
sessions for prison guards.

This gave her the experience that allowed her to begin transcribing some of the
recordings that served as the materials out of which Sacks’ earliest lectures were
developed.

(University of Transcription)

2. Gali Jefferon’s contributions to Conversation Analysis (CA)

Notable contributions of Gail Jefferson to Conversation Analysis

● Jefferson, Gail (1973) A case of precision timing in ordinary

conversation: Overlapped tag-positioned address terms in closing
sequences. Semiotica, 9(1), 47-96.

16
 ● Jefferson, Gail (1974) Error correction as an interactional resource.
Language in Society, 3(2), 181-199.
● Jefferson, Gail (2002) Is 'no' an acknowledgment token? Comparing
American and British uses of (+)/(-) tokens. Journal of Pragmatics, 34, 1345-
1383.
● Jefferson, Gail (2004) Glossary of transcript symbols with an Introduction. In
G. H. Lerner (Ed.) Conversation Analysis: Studies from the first generation
(pp. 13-23). Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
● Jefferson, Gail (2004) A sketch of some orderly aspects of overlap in
natural conversation (1975). In G. H. Lerner (Ed.) Conversation Analysis:
Studies from the first generation (pp.43-59). Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
● Jefferson, Gail (2004) 'At first I thought' A normalizing device for
extraordinary events. In G. H. Lerner (Ed.) Conversation Analysis:
Studies from the first generation (pp.131-167). Philadelphia: John
Benjamins.
2.1. Jefferson Transcription System (Hệ thống phiên âm Jefferson)
2.1.1. Overview
Jefferson developed a set of meticulous transcription conventions that enabled
researchers to capture the nuances of spoken interaction with great precision. These
conventions included symbols for indicating overlapping speech, intonation patterns,
pauses, and other features crucial for analyzing conversation.

“Jeffersonian Transcription” or the “Jefferson Transcription System” is a

conversational analysis code used by academics looking at speech patterns. It can also
be useful for anyone trying to annotate a conversation or the style of a participant to a
conversation. It takes quite a bit more time than conventional transcription and as such
it usually comes at a premium cost.

(University of Transcription)
2.1.2. Jefferson’s Transcription

Symbols Symbols for Overlap

17
Symbols Explanations

[ A left bracket indicates the point of overlap onset.

Louise: 'N how tall [are you, Al,
Roger: [How tall 'r you Al.

] A right bracket indicates the point at which two overlapping utterances

end, if they end simultaneously, or the point at which one of them ends in the
course of the other. It also is used to parse out segments of overlapping
utterances.
Louise: 'N how t[all u h r] you ↓A:]l,
Roger: [How tall 'r] ↓you] Al, ]

= Equal signs indicate no break or gap.

A part of equal signs, one at the end of the line and one at the beginning
of a next, indicate no break between the two lines.

Maggie: …en’e wieghs about a hundred ‘n thirty five pounds.=

Ronald: =AAUUGH! WHADDA L-LIE!

The pair is also used as a transcript convenience when a single speaker’s

tall is broken up in the transcript, but is actually through-produced by its
speaker.

Pammy: Yeah well okeeoe=

18
 Myra: =[Yeah.
Pammy: [ I j’s thought Is’d ask
A single equal sign indicates no break in an ongoing piece of talk, where
one might otherwise expect it, e.g., after a completed sentence.

Ehrlichman: … so I said I jis’ find that hard to ima↓gine.= Now

(0.4).p ↑since ↓then I’ve retained coun↓sel.

Symbols for silences

Symbols Explanations

(0.0) Numbers in parentheses indicate elapsed time by tenths of seconds.

Al: ...j's be a lot'v (shh) lotta work- lotta hassle.

(0.2)

Al: =[Well,
Roger: [Well if yer goin' t' all that trouble,

(.) A dot in parentheses indicates a brief interval (# a tenth of a second)

within or between utterances.
Mrs A: 'Ello:?

19
 Guy: 'Ello is Curly there?
→ (.)
Mrs A: → Oo jis (-) e-Who:?

Guy: Johnny?h An[sin?]

Mrs A: [Oo j] ist ↑a minnih,

__ Double dashes indicate a short, untimed interval without talk, e.g., a

‘beat’. (No longer in use)

Vic: I’m intuh my thing, intuh my - - attitude

against othuh pih - .hh

Symbols with relative markers

Symbols Explanation

— Underscoring indicates some form of stress, via pitch and/or

amplitude.

A short underscore indicates lighter stress than does a long

underscore.

Ehrlichman: Well Dean has: uh:,h totally

coop'rated with the U.S. Attorney.

20
WORD Upper case indicates syllables or words louder than surrounding
speech by the same speaker
Kalmbach: I returned it 'n went over the:re (•) tih↑ da:y, (0.5)
A::ND

uh (0.8) he said the ↑rea:son thet...

– A dash indicates a cut-off.

Vic: He said - yihknow, I get- I get sick behind it.

() Empty parentheses indicate that the transcriber was unable to get

what was said. The length of the parenthesized space reflects the length
of the ungotten talk.

Mike: No
(0.4)
Mike ( ),
In the speaker-designation column, the empty parentheses indicate
transcriber’s inabi;ity to identify a speaker.

Roger: Paz’m z’m Miller Highlitgh*e.h

( ): hnh Yhehh

(( )) Double parentheses contain transcriber’s

descriptions. Ray: ehh-heh-heh-heh-heh-he:h-eh=

Maggie: =((dainty snort))

…

21
 Vic: ((dumb slob voice)) Well we usetub do dis

Symbols show another common change such as speed, stretch and pitch speed:

Symbols Explanation

＞＜ Right/left carats bracketing an utterance or utterance-part

indicate that the bracketed material is speeded up, compared to the
surrounding talk.

<> Left/right carats bracketing an utterance or utterance-part

indicate that the bracketed material is slowed down, compared to the
surrounding talk.

:: Colons indicate prolongation of the immediately prior sound.

The longer the colon row, the longer the prolongation.

↑↓ Arrows indicate shifts into especially high or low pitch.

22
 CAPITALS Louder or shouted words.

Symbols represent laughter

Symbols Explanation

(h) Laughter in the conversation/speech.

.hhh Inbreath. Three letters indicate ‘normal’ duration. Longer or shorter

inbreaths indicated with fewer or more letters.

hhh Outbreath. Three letters indicate ‘normal’ duration. Longer or

shorter inbreaths indicated with fewer or more letters.

w(h)o Indicates abrupt spurts of breathiness, as in laughing while talking

Punctuation marks

Symbols Explanation

23
 .,? Puntuations markers are used to indicate ‘the usual’ intonation.
(The italcized question-marl [?] substitutes for the question-mark/
comma of my non-computer transcripts, and indicates a weaker rise than
that indicated by a standard question-mark). These symbols usually
occur at appropriate syntantical points, but occasionally there are such
displays as the following.

Maggie: Oh I’d say he’s about what.=five three enna ha:lf?=

aren’t chu Ronald,

Sometimes, at a point where a punctuation marker would be

appropriate, there isn’t one. The absence os an ‘utterance-final’
punctuation marker indicates some sort of ‘indeterminate’ contour.

(Jefferson 2004)
2.2. Overlap in Jefferson’s papers (Sự trùng lời trong nghiên cứu của Jefferson)
2.2.1. Overlap’s definitions and features
If two or more activities, subjects, or periods of time overlap, they have some
parts that are the same.

(Cambridge Dictionary Online)

It is also important not to consider overlap simply as something that
the speaker entering the talk does to the speaker who currently has the floor.
Overlapping talk is an interactional phenomenon which is produced by speakers
together.

[Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974)]

Overlapping talk is often thought of as interruption, but the term interruption
really conflates a number of different interactional features of overlapping talk.

24
Overlapping talk can be either problematic or unproblematic. Small amounts of
overlap do not usually seem to be problematic, as they are not treated as such by
participants. Longer overlaps, however, may be problematic and speakers may do
things through their talk to deal with the problem.

[Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974)]

2.2.2. Some orderly aspects of overlap in natural conversation
Basically, it appears that overlap can be orderly phenomenon, and, as inquiry
proceeds, its orderliness is turning up finer and finer detail.

(Jefferson 1973; Schegloff 1987 [1973])

2.2.2.1. Overview about Overlap Onset, Within-overlap Talk and

Post-overlap Talk

(1) Overlap Onset can be the product of systematic procedures, those procedures
constituting means of performing specifiable activities; specifically, a party can
precision-place his talk in the course of another's, can select and hit a target point.
With such a capability a display of independent knowledge of what is about to be said
can be achieved by starting to talk just as some object comes due in an ongoing
utterance; a display of recognition of what is in the course of being said can be
achieved by starting to talk midway through the recognized object; and it appears that
a not infrequently targeted starting point is the moment of completion of an ongoing
utterance, this last resulting in overlap should be the currently speaking party continue
talking beyond that point.

(2) Within-Overlap Talk can involve systematic procedures for resolving

overlap and/or attempted solutions to a problem which arises as to who should drop
out. It can also involve systematic procedures for competing within overlap,
negotiating for who shall drop out via, e.g., pronunciational and segmental
adjustments. Further, it appears that participants routinely distribute their talk into
displays of Turn Occupancy (with a single coherent continuous utterance) and Turn
Claimancy (with a repeated recycle of an utterance component). These activities can be
examined for their status as Marked and Unmarked competitive forms; i.e., for their
explicit attention to, or displayed dismissal of, the fact of overlap and the
trouble it might cause for hearing-understanding.

25
 (3) Post-Overlap Talk can be investigated for its relationship to the prior
overlapping talk, and can involve systematic procedures for retrieving talk potentially
not heard due to its occurrence in overlap; i.e., for providing for its consequence in
subsequent talk. And these procedures seem to be distributed into types: Self-Retrieval
and Other-Retrieval, each type with its marked and unmarked forms; restarts
constituting marked self-retrieval, continuations constituting unmarked self-retrieval,
repeat-requests constituting marked other-retrieval, and acknowledgment tokens and/or
embedded repeats constituting unmarked other-retrieval.

(Jefferson 2004)

2.2.2.2. Some cases overlap happen in natural conversation

It has been found that overlap-onset can be the product of systematic procedures.
Specifically, a party can precision-place his talk in the course of another’s, can select
and hit a target point.

For example:
a. A display of independent knowledge of what is about to be said can be
achieved by starting to talk just as some object comes due in an ongoing
utterance.
Joe: So he come[s home one night’n the sonofa] bitch [bit him.
Carol: heh heh heh heh heh heh ] [bit hi:m
b. A display of recognition of what is in the course of being said can be
achieved by starting to talk midway through the recognized object.
Caller: Fire Department, out at the Fairview Food [mart there's

a- Desk: [Yes.

Desk: We've already got the uh call on that ma'am,

26
 c. And it appears that a not infrequently targeted starting point is the
moment of completion of an ongoing utterance, no sooner and no later. That
activity is a "latch", and is indicated by equal signs at the end of the prior and
beginning of the next utterance.
Earl: How's everything look.=
Bud: =Oh looks pretty goo:d,
(Jefferson 2004: 44)
Note:
Latching someone’s talk to the talk of the prior speaker is one way to reduce the
transition space for the next speaker. When a speaker latches talk to the prior turn,
there is no beat of silence between the turns, but there is also no overlap.

[NB:II:3:R:1 (Jefferson, 1986)]

Emma: G’morning Letitia=
Lottie: =u-hHow’ r YOU:.=
Emma: = FI:NE
(cited in Liddicoat 2007)
And such a procedure provides a systematic locus of overlap. For example, when
an ongoing speaker turns out to have stretched his last syllable and a next speaker is
starting up in latch position, overlap occurs. The prolongation of a sound is indicated
by colons.

Joe: Just like tha: [:t.

Mike: [Right.

(Jefferson 2004: 44)

Jefferson (1986) has identified cases in which a next speaker does not wait for
possible completion but starts speaking just before a possible completion, as in extracts
(8).

27
 (8) [Her:01:2:2 (Jefferson, 1986)]
Jean: So well they won’t be here Boxing [ Day¿
Doreen: [ Oh ↓well
that doesn’t mattuh
In this extract, the next speaker begins to talk slightly before possible completion.
Doreen's talk begins one word (or alternatively one syllable) before possible
completion. The speakers have reduced the transition space through the timing of their
own talk.

d. Another routine locus of overlap is post a possible completion and a pause.

Regularly enough, more than one party simultaneously starts to talk. This feature
holds for relatively long pauses, for example, seven tenths of a second.

Timing is shown in parentheses between the two utterances.

Ava: He'n Jo were like on the outs,

yihknow? (0.7)

Ava: [[So uh,

Bee: [[They always a(h)re hhh!
It holds as well for relatively short pauses, for example, one and a half tenths of a
second.

James: (I'll) set it dehr own the sidewalk.

(0.15)
Vic: [[No.
James: [[Izzat ehkay No.
(Jefferson 2004: 45)

28
 In some cases, overlapping talk begins just after a prior speaker has begun to
speak, as in extract (18).

e. Another cases
In some cases, overlap is brought about by the first speaker producing more talk,
where such talk is not usually expected, as in extract (10).

In this extract, Katie produces a complete question selecting a next speaker and
requiring her to talk. At this point she should normally stop to allow the answer to be
produced. Doreen's talk orients to the production of the question and she begins as next
speaker. However, Katie also produces a candidate answer at the same time.

These examples reveal that overlapping talk is an interactional achievement rather

than being simply the case of mistiming of the next speaker's entry into the talk or an
interruption of the current talk.

(cited in Liddicoat 2007:84)

Another possible source of overlapping talk is a simultaneous start by two
self-selecting speakers. This can happen when the prior speaker does not select a next
speaker and two (or more) next speakers begin at the same time (16). It can also
happen where, in the absence of some other speaker starting a turn at talk, the prior
speaker self-selects as next speaker at the same time as some other speaker self-selects
(17).

29
 In both these extracts, two speakers begin a TCU at the same time. Sacks et al.
(1974) have noted that where two speakers self-select as next speaker, the first to begin
gets the turn.

2.2.2.3. Resolutions for overlap

a. There are, then, various indications that overlap-onset can be a systematically
generated occurrence. This leads to inquiry into possible systematicity within overlap:
i.e., examination of how parties deal with the fact that they are producing
more-than-one-party-at-a-time talk when a fundamental feature of conversation is that
one party talks at a time.

(Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson:1974)

A basic course of action is to resolve the overlap; i.e., one of the overlapping
parties drops out, i.e., stops talking, and a state of one-at-a-time is (re)established. This
feature appears to hold across a set of starting positions for overlap, e.g., one of two
simultaneously starting parties can be found to drop out.

Tracy: [[T-
Lady: [[Ye:s.
First starter can be found to drop out as the second starter begins.

30
 Essie: I think Cookie [ta-
Janet: [I didn' even know'e was i::ll.
(Jefferson 2004: 45)
And a second starter can be found to drop out immediately after an attempted
start.

Dan: May [be yer brother is

... Louise: [()-

Multiple serial starts and drop outs can be found in association with an ongoing
utterance which has several points of possible completion plus continuation by
ongoing speaker, with a next speaker attempting to start at latch position for each
possible completion point. In this fragment the equal signs indicate no elapsed time
between one utterance component and a next. The utterance is produced as a single
continuous object by its speaker and has been decomposed for clarity in this fragment.

Polly: I jus' thought it was so kind of

stupid= Janet: =[[Y-

Polly: [[I didn' even say anything=

Janet: =[[Eh-
Polly: [[when I came

home. (0.3)

Janet: Well Essie jus' called 'n I- an' I aftuh call 'er back ...
(Jefferson 2004: 46)
b. While a fundamental feature of conversation is that one party talks at a
time, and a basic procedure for achieving such a state from a state of overlap is

31
that one party drops out, (Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson:1974) find that it is not
always unequivocal for participants who shall drop out.

For example, they found each party to an overlap dropping. Thereafter, following
a 'micropause' (for now, roughly, an untimed pause of less than 2/10 second, indicated
by a dot in parenthesis), one of them takes and is given the turn space.

Johnson: [[I-
Roberts: [[Uh-
(•)
Johnson: I heard uh first that there was really some water in...
And in some cases both parties drop, both parties start up again after a
micropause, both parties drop again, and subsequently one takes and is given the turn
space.

Edna: [Well-
Bud: [[Un-
(.)
Edna: [[uh-
Bud: [[less-
(•)
Bud: If ev’rything goes well.
And in the following, after an initial pair of drop/restarts, both parties pursue their
utterances a bit further before each again drops. Subsequently one party takes and is
given the turn space.

Tracy: But [had-

Lady: [But

32
 (•)
Lady: [this-
Tracy: [[hh

Ha- (•)

Lady: [[Ni:neteen s e]ven]ty I,

Tracy: [[Hadju finished] (

)] (•)

Lady: was:: had 'n invitation to, (0.3) Bucking'm Palace,

(Jefferson 2004)
c. Given that parties can and do drop out of overlap almost instantly, it becomes
an observable event when one or both persevere beyond an initial drop point. And
given a possible initial equivocalness as to which of them shall drop out,
perseverance can be seen as negotiation for which of them shall drop, one (or
both parties indicating to the other that he is not dropping and the other should.

Some systematic procedures for negotiation within overlap can be sketcher and
two types of procedures can be isolated: Within-word pronunciational adjustments;
i.e., manipulation of the sounds of the word a speaker is currently producing (its speed,
pitch, amplitude, etc.), and within-utterance segmental adjustments; i.e., manipulation
of larger parts of the utterance a speaker is currently producing (its words, clauses,
phrases, etc.)

● Pronunciation adjustments
(a) "Stutters". Depending upon our transcripts' detailedness, stutters are roughly or
precisely available for their relationship to overlapping talk. Some collection of them
appear to be roughly or precisely coterminous with that overlapping talk, and the
subsequent, unstuttered portion of the utterance coincides with overlap resolution.

Johnson: [[I'm glad to hear it.

Roberts: [[But-uh-uh, uh understand that um Franklin...

33
 ……………………………………………………………….

Gladys: [[En-

Edna: [[En you need [som:e ]uh,]

Gladys: [S- s- ] sh:)redded lettuce?
(b) "Stretches". In the following fragments a word is prolonged, and the
prolongation roughly or precisely coterminates with the utterance it overlaps, the
production of the subsequent portion of the utterance coinciding with overlap
resolution.

Ken: Heck [a lotta-

Roger: [Les::::::::::try it!
……………………………………………………………….

Carol: Tha: [t's what they say, ]

Denise: [will soo::::::::::::::::: n) learn.

The observable cotermination of stutter or stretch with the overlapping talk leads
to a posing of these objects as resources for overlap management. They can be
extended across the span of the overlap, permitting subsequent utterance components
to be produced clear of overlap.

● Segmental adjustments
A similar provision for some part of an overlapped utterance's occurrence in the
clear can be observed for these devices. While the pronunciational adjustments are
perhaps addressed to preserving talk across an overlap, the segmental adjustments
appear to be explicit attempts by one party to claim a turn space occupied by another.
So, for example, in the following fragments we can have an intuitive sense that one
party is Turn Occupant, the other Turn Claimant, with Turn Occupant simply
producing an utterance while Turn Claimant produces serial segmental adjustments.
Mike: [[Th-

34
 Vic: [[Y'know I cut [myself [on you:r freakin [gla:ss,]
Mike: [Th least 'e [ cdo- [Th' least 'e coulda (do::ne,]

(.)

James: [[Ye: h , ]
Mike: [[Least 'e c]’d'v done w'z come down en letchu know

what happen'

Of the two overlapping utterances, one has a phrase recycled over the continuous
course of another, permitting some projectable part of the recycled utterance to occur
clear of overlap. The same feature holds for the following fragment.

Ken: No, they're women who'v devo[ ded their 1-

Roger: [They're women that hadda=
Roger: =[[bad love [life'n became nuns.hh (heh hh !
Ken: [[their [their life- [their life, to

uh (0.6)

Ken: the devotion of the church.

d. Another ways to resolve overlapping talk
Overlapping talk is characterized by the deployment of two types of resources
within turns: resources which interrupt the continuity of the talk and resources which
depart from the prosody of the turn so far.

Commonly occurring hitches include:

1. cutting off the talk so far, usually in conjunction with an oral stop, such as a
glottal or velar stop;

2. prolonging a segment of talk;

35
 3. repeating a just prior element.
Common perturbations found in overlap are:
1. increased volume;
2. higher pitch;
3. faster or slower pace of talk.
These resources are found in other places in talk, but they are very frequent in
overlap and are deployed strategically in overlap to achieve relevant interactional
goals.

(cited in Schegloff 2000)

Schegloff (2000b) has outlined an overlap resolution device which is employed by
conversationalists to deal with problematic instances of overlap. This device is
composed of three elements:

1. a set of resources which can be used in the production of a turn;

2. a set of places in a turn at talk in which these devices can be deployed;
3. an interactional logic which relates the resources and places.
● Overlapping talk, like other forms of talk, can be projected by certain speaker
behaviours and overlap resolution devices can be deployed where overlap is
projectable as a future action, but before overlap actually occurs. Schegloff
(2000b) refers to this place as the pre-onset phase of overlapping talk.

The sorts of behaviours which can project future overlap include: repositioning of
the recipient's body, deploying a gesture, or prebeginning practices such as audible
in-breathing, all of which can indicate that the recipient is about to begin a turn. In the
presence of such practices, a current speaker may deploy overlap resolution devices to
address the possible overlap even before it has occurred, as in extract (25).

36
 Here Joy speeds up her talk by rushing through from all to /and also upgrades her
prosody producing the I didn’ a little louder than the preceding talk. The 'trigger' for
these seems to be Harry's audible breathing (.hhghn-) although some non-verbal device
may also have preceded this. Joy's talk deploys overlap resolution devices before the
onset of the overlap and Harry's overlap does not proceed. By speeding up her talk, Joy
seems to be allowing room for the overlapping talk to begin, while the increase in
volume competes with any talk which may be produced.

Post-onset overlap resolution typically has the form of slowing down the pace of
the talk through such devices as sound stretches and repetitions: marking time until the
overlapping speaker reaches completion and talk can emerge in the clear. This shows
that overlap resolution is qualitatively different in different places: resolution in
pre-onset position involves speeding up talk to pre-empt starting, while in post-onset
position it involves slowing down talk to delay finishing. As such, the idea of places
for overlap resolution is not a convenient way for analysts to categorize the location of
a particular type of talk in relation to other talk happening at the same time, rather it is
a reflection of the ways in which participants themselves resolve overlap.

(Schegloff 2000b)
● Overlap resolution devices are also sometimes employed after a speaker's talk
has emerged into the clear: that is, after the resolution of the overlap itself.
Schegloff (2000b) calls this post-resolution position. Post-resolution position
is the place in which adjustments can be made in the way of speaking once the
overlap has been resolved and to return to more usual ways of solo speaking
(Schegloff, 2000b).

37
 In extract (28), Joy's talk emerges into the clear after Harry's talk has stopped,
leaving Joy's talk still at a high volume. Almost immediately after Harry's withdrawal
from the overlapping talk, Joy cuts off her talk (a hitch) and resets her volume to her
more 'normal' speaking level and completes the turn at this level. This means that,
while the talk in this position does not seem to be used to resolve overlap, it is used to
deal with some of the consequences of overlap resolution.

2.2.2.4. Problems happen after overlap has been resolved

Once an overlap has been resolved there can be a problem: What, if any, of the
talk which occurred in overlap shall have been 'heard'; ie., shall have consequence for
subsequent talk? There seems to be a collection of procedures by which talk that is
possibly hearing-understanding impaired via the state of overlap in which it occurred
can be retrieved. These procedures fall into two types:
+ Self-Retrieval, via which a party to an overlap provides for his own
talk's consequence
+ Other-Retrieval, via which a party to an overlap provides for someone
else's, not his own, talk's consequence.
These two groups each have Marked and Unmarked forms; forms
which announce trouble and explicitly retrieve talk out of the prior over-lap,
and forms which do not recognize trouble nor explicitly retrieve talk out of
overlap.
(Jefferson 2004)
a. Marked self-retrieval: Restart
A party to an overlap, having dropped out to resolve overlap and re-establish a
state of one party talking at a time, can, upon the other party's dropping out or
reaching completion, retrieve the utterance he himself had potentially relinquished by
restarting it. This procedure holds across the three positions for overlap-onset; i.e., at
simultaneous starts:
Edna: |[Hy -
Olive: [[Yeah.
(.)
Edna: Hide it.

38
At first starter's dropping out as second speaker
starts: Rich: I think if [ you-
Carol: [ Am 1
right? (.)
Rich: If you bring it intuh them.
And at second starter's dropping out after an attempted start:
Louise: I w'nd' if [rilly is someone back the
[re,
Roger: [That- [That
attractedtheir attention,
This retrieval device appears in affiliation with overlap competitive
procedures; ie., a party may continue to talk until the other drops out and immediately
thereafter perform a restart (see Schegloff 1987 (1973, for a detailed consideration of
this procedure). For example:
Ann: [[He : ha- ]
Marty: [[Course wi-) widespread is a double edged sword.
……………………………………………………………….
Вес: T! [Except thet diju-
Ava: [that's not
ba:d.] (0.2)
Bee: That class is suhs: yihknow this is the Indian class…
……………………………………………………………….
Fran: He's not gunnuh listen [tuh tha: it. ]
Jim: [I'm not say]in- I'm not sayin that …
b. Unmarked self-retrieval: Continuation
A party to an overlap, having dropped out to resolve overlap and re-establish a
state of one party talking at a time, can, upon the other party's dropping out or
reaching completion, retrieve the utterance he had potentially relinquished by
continuing from the point of dropout. Whereas the prior retrieval device announces,
and specifically pulls a word out of, overlap, this device proposes that the overlap, as
an event which might have consequence for the coherent production of an utterance,
was of no consequence. For example:
Fred: [[ The-
Bert: [[
[Yah-
(.)

39
 Fred: waves 'r about tuh wash us away.
……………………………………………………………….
Roger: I happen tuh wear buloo jeans constantly.
(0.3)
Ken:

Well
, (.)
Roger: Even [in-
Ken: [so do I now,
Roger: formal occasions, y'know?hheh hh!
The materials considered earlier as instances of problems as to who should
drop out (p. 47), can be re-examined for the presence of marked and unmarked
self-retrieval. So, for example, in one case both parties appear to be doing
unmarked self-retrieval; i.c., continuation, one constructing a continuous "Well uh"
while the other constructs a continuous "Unless".
Edna: [[ Well-
Bud: [[Un-
(.)
Edna: [[ uh-
Bud: [[less-
And in another case, one party does unmarked self-retrieval; i.e., constructs a
continuous "But this..." and then a continuous "Nineteen seventy I, was:..." across
overlap and micropause, while the other does marked self-retrieval, restarting each
time, "But had-", "hh Ha-", "Hadju finished ()".
Tracy: But
[had Lady: [But-
(.)
Lady: [[ this-
Tracy: [[.hh Ha
(.)
Lady: [[ Nineteen seventy I,
Tracy: [[ Hadju finished (
) (.)
Lady: was:: had 'n invitation …
c. Marked other-retrieval: Repeat request

40
 This procedure appears to have some regularity of occurrence after
competitive overlap. One of the competing parties announces trouble and explicitly
initiates repair procedures by requesting a repeat of his co-competitor's overlapped
utterance.
In the following fragment, each party displays Turn Occupancy and the
continuously produced utterances reach completion simultaneously. There after, one
way to characterize the conditions under which it is decided who should yield is to
find that a continuation of prior talk has yielded to initiation of a new topic; the
explanation "Before he gets home" yielding to "You goin up'n getcher hair fixed
tuhday". (Whether this is a generalizable feature of overlap management remains to
be seen.)
Gladys: En then you could return it uhb, oh along about noon.
(.)
Edna: You goin up 'n get [cher hair fixed tubday,
] Gladys: [Before he gets home. ]
(0.5)
Gladys: What
deah
? (.)
Edna: Yer goin up t'day en getcher hair fi
[xed. Gladys: [Oh no.
(Jefferson 2004)
In the following, each party displays Turn Occupancy, with one party's
utterance extending beyond overlap resolution. Perhaps a way to characterize the
conditions under which it is decided who should yield is to find that First Stopper has
yielded to Last Stopper. (Again, whether this is a generalizable feature of overlap
management remains to be seen.)
Lil: Ain' I'm hoping a lot,=
Lil := hh thet [you'll) [do a few a them,]
Tony: [(Yeh)] I [bet yooer t e r r] ibly
hoping, (0.2)
Lil: t! Hu:h?
(0.2)
Tony: t! I bet yer terribly [hopi [ng-
Lil: [-hhh [I'm terribly terribly hoping.
d. Unmarked other-retrieval: Acknowledgment and embedded repeat
These devices appear to have their home in situations of minimal overlap,
where competition is not marked or protracted.

41
(a) Acknowledgment. With the post overlap-resolution proffering of an
acknowledgment token ("Yeah", "Uh huh", etc.), one party treats the other's
overlapped utterance as if it had occurred in the clear; does not recognize the
consequence of, or explicitly retrieve the object from, overlap, but simply responds
to a prior utterance.
Bea: Come to think of it, I think I can manage uh::
otherwise. (.)
Francis: Well [ten people-
Bea: [So don’t
(.)
Bea: Un huh, because part of them were going to drink coffee,
………………………………………………………………………..
Martha: …because she w-you know, was [in the house[
Bea: [so near- [Yes.
………………………………………………………………………..
Ray: Okay Maggie,=
Maggie: =Okay [Love
Ray: [See yuh then yeah.
The acknowledgment token does appear in conjunction with competitive talk,
serving as a minimal acknowledgment of a co-competitor's utterance, but not directed
to its subsequent consequence. So, for example, in the following fragment an
acknowledgment token turns out to preface a restart i.e. a marked self-retrieval.

(Jefferson 2004)
(b) Embedded repeat. With this device a party can retrieve another's overlapped
talk by incorporating the other's possibly-unheard materials into his own next
utterance, resulting in an undisrupted flow of talk. For example:
Clara: Isn’t that place
[something. May: [I
tell yuh.
(.)

42
 May: It is really something.
…………………………………………………………………..
Lottie: How come yih didn’ stay. Oh ih w’zis [too hot huh,
Emma: [OH-::
there-
(.)
Emma: Jus’ too hot Lottie, an’ it was…
And the combination of acknowledgment and repeat provides for an unequivocal
retrieval of another party's talk.
Ken: I-I made pretty good time, but it’s [tiresome.
Louise: [But it was one pers-=
Louise: =Yeah it’s tiresome.
………………………………………………………………………….
Carol: [[He-
Denise: [[He’s ser[vin
Jody.] Carol: . [ serves? ]
Carol: [[Jo:dy?
Carol: [[Yeh!
(.)
Denise: He serves Jody.
(Jefferson 2004)
III. Sacks’ investigations of conversation analysis (Đào Kiều Trang)
1. Biography of Harvey Sacks
Sacks, Harvey (1935–1975) was a pioneering figure in the development of
conversation analysis (CA), a field within sociology, linguistics, and social
psychology. His work laid the groundwork for understanding how conversations are
structured, organized, and produced in everyday interactions. Here are some key
achievements and contributions of Sacks to conversation analysis:
● Development of Turn-Taking System: Sacks, along with his colleagues
Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson, observed and analyzed the intricate
system of turn-taking in conversation. They discovered that conversations are

43
 highly organized, with participants following rules for when to start and end
their turns.
● Preference Organisation: Sacks introduced the concept of preference
organisation, which refers to the ways in which participants in conversation
indicate their preferences for particular actions or responses. He demonstrated
how speakers use linguistic cues and strategies to display their preferences and
manage the flow of conversation.
● Indexicality and Context Sensitivity: Sacks emphasized the importance of
indexicality in conversation, which refers to the ways in which language use is
sensitive to the context in which it occurs. He showed how participants in
conversation draw on shared knowledge, cultural norms, and situational
context to interpret meaning and produce appropriate responses.
● Adjacency Pairs: Sacks identified adjacency pairs as a fundamental unit of
conversational structure. Adjacency pairs are sequences of utterances that are
related in a specific way, such as question-answer pairs or greeting-response
pairs. Sacks demonstrated how adjacency pairs contribute to the organisation
and coherence of conversation.
● Preference Organisation: Sacks explored how participants in conversation
display their preferences for particular actions or responses. He showed how
speakers use linguistic cues and strategies to indicate their preferences and
manage the flow of conversation.
● Institutional Talk: Sacks also examined talk in institutional settings, such as
medical encounters or courtroom proceedings. He showed how the structure
and organisation of conversation in these contexts differ from informal,
everyday talk, and how participants negotiate roles and responsibilities through
language.

44
 ● Transcription Conventions: Sacks developed detailed transcription
conventions for analyzing spoken interaction, which have become standard
practice in conversation analysis. These conventions allow researchers to
capture the nuances of spoken language, including pauses, overlaps, and
intonation patterns.
Overall, Sacks' contributions revolutionized our understanding of how
conversation works as a social phenomenon, laying the groundwork for further
research in conversation analysis and related fields.
2. Turn-talking (Lượt lời)

Turn-taking is one of the basic mechanisms in conversation. Conversations

typically have one person speaking simultaneously, with smooth transitions between
speakers. This is the default setting. Gaps and overlaps, though less frequent, can
signal something extra is happening in the conversation. Interestingly, this turn-taking
is a social norm, not a physical limitation. People can and do talk over each other in
certain situations, like laughter or group greetings.

2.1. Model of turn-taking

How do people take turns speaking in conversation? It argues that these
turn-taking rules aren't pre-set instructions, even though people might think so (e.g.,
waiting for a pause). Instead, participants in a conversation develop these rules
together through interaction. Pausing after a turn isn't a reliable indicator of someone
being done speaking, and long pauses might even suggest a problem in the
conversation (2)

(2) [Lunch]
Harry: Didjih speak tuh Mary today?
-> (0.2 )
Harry: Did yih speak tuh Mary?

45
 Joy: Oh, yea:h I saw her at lunch.
(The excerpt focuses on how pauses can influence turn-taking in conversation.
● In a conversation, a long pause after someone finishes speaking (like Harry's
case) isn't seen as an invitation for the next person to talk.
● Instead, it's interpreted as the listener (Joy) failing to respond.
● This is because questions typically require answers, so silence suggests a
problem.
● Harry repeats his question to get Joy talking, showing he views the silence as
Joy's inaction.
● The silence needs explanation (becomes "accountable"). Here, Harry assumes
Joy didn't hear him.
● This example highlights that pauses between turns are more complex than just
indicating the end of a speaker's turn.)
The example (3) below challenges the idea that silence always creates an opening
for someone new to speak. There are situations where silence occurs even though it
wouldn't be a good time for someone to jump in and take the turn.
(3) [Mary and Jo]
Jo:[ |No. that' s lovely. |No, no• T1 can see::, gorgeous. So she hiring a car.
—> Mary: No: :, she' s gone on a (0.3) tour .
Jo: Right.
—> Mary: and .h uh (0.3) they go by plane from here
toSydney^ Jo: Right^
Mary: and then h uh I think h uh >I don' t know how they get from Sydney to the
other place, [ but then it' 11 be a bus .<
Jo: [ °Right.°
(as cited in Liddicoat 2007)
Example 3 explains that pauses aren't automatic turn-taking cues. Even though
arrows in Mary’s speech mark short pauses, they aren't points where someone else
could take over. If Jo tried to speak during those pauses, it would be seen as
interrupting Mary's unfinished thoughts. This emphasizes that pauses have different
meanings in conversation besides indicating a speaker change.

Conclusion

46
 The everyday conversation doesn't follow pre-set rules for turn-taking. Things like
turn length and content can vary greatly. This makes it difficult to predict when a turn
will end based on these factors. Existing models used in debates or rituals (fixed
length, pre-planned content) don't apply to everyday conversations. An effective
turn-taking model needs to consider the unpredictable nature of conversations,
focusing on "what's said next" instead of the entire conversation. This is because
participants can only react to the conversation as it unfolds. Turn-taking is managed by
the participants themselves "in the moment" rather than by external rules. The next
sections will explore a specific model for turn-taking proposed by Sacks and
colleagues, which involves separate turn construction and allocation components
governed by rules.
2.2. The turn constructional component (Thành tố cấu thành lượt lời)
Turns in conversation are made up of spoken language, but the length and
structure of this language can vary greatly. Sacks and colleagues introduced the
concept of "turn constructional units" (TCUs) as the basic units that make up a turn.
Importantly, the way these TCUs come together depends on the specific conversation
context.
2.2.1. Turn constructional units
The building blocks of turns in conversation (TCUs) can be various grammatical
units like words, phrases, clauses, or even entire sentences. Basically, any piece of
language can potentially be a TCU.
Unlike traditional grammar where units like sentences are defined by structure
alone, TCUs depend on the context of the conversation. You can't just look at the
structure of something to know if it's a TCU.
This highlights that people don't always speak in complete sentences during
conversation, and they can use a variety of structures to build their turns.
(4) [Lunch]
Joy: hh. so we decided tub go to that place th' s jus' opened up.
Harry: where' s that
—> Joy over near dee jays.
Harry: oh I haven' seen *t.
(as cited in Liddicoat 2007)
The example (Extract 4) shows how even small grammatical units can be
complete turns in conversation. The phrase "where's that," marked by an arrow, is just
a prepositional phrase, but in this context, it functions as a whole and appropriate turn.

47
This reinforces the idea that TCUs (turn constructional units) depend on the
conversation's flow, not just the grammatical structure of the spoken language.
2.2.2. Possible completion and turn construction
Sacks' idea of possible completion in conversation:
● Possible completion is a key concept in understanding how turns work in
conversation.
● Three factors are considered for possible completion:
○ Syntactic completion: grammatically correct and complete sentence.
○ Intonation completion: using intonation (like rising or falling pitch) to
signal the end of a thought.
○ Pragmatic completion: functioning as a complete action in the
conversation's flow.

It doesn't refer to an actual finished turn, but rather a point where the
current speaker's talk could be complete as a conversational action
(question, answer, invitation, etc.)
Sacks argues that pragmatic completion (action-oriented) is the most
important factor.

● It's difficult to define possible completion with a set of fixed rules because
conversations are contextual.
● Speakers project possible completion, meaning they anticipate when the
current speaker might be done, not wait for them to actually finish.
● This projection allows for smooth turn-taking with minimal gaps between
speakers.

2.2.3. Transition relevance places (Điểm chuyển lượt lời)

Here's a summary of the paragraph on possible completion and transition
relevance places (TRPs):

● Possible completion points in a speaker's talk are also transition relevance

places (TRPs). These are moments where a change in speaker is a natural next
step in the conversation.
● Importantly, TRPs are opportunities for speaker change, not guarantees.
Someone can choose to keep talking even at a TRP.
● Speaker changes at TRPs are generally smooth and not seen as interruptions.
Trying to take a turn outside a TRP might be considered rude or disruptive.

48
 ● Basically, each speaker gets one chance to speak (one TCU or turn
constructional unit) at a time, and the right to speak next needs to be earned
through conversation after a possible completion point.
● There can be exceptions for extended turns, like storytelling, where the speaker
might signal their intent to continue and hold the floor for a bit longer. But
even these extended turns rely on participants being sensitive to the turn-taking
system.

2.2.4. Extending turn constructional units

● Speakers can continue talking even after reaching a point where their turn
could be considered complete (TRP).
● This additional talk can either be:
○ A completely new turn constructional unit (TCU).
○ An "increment" that adds onto the existing TCU, like an extension of the
same thought.
● Increments help build on the current TCU without creating a separate unit.
(11) [Sacks, et al. (1974)]
Penny: An' the fact is I- is- I_ jus' thought it was so kind of stupid [ I didn' even
say anything [ when=

Janet: [ Y- [ Eh-
Penny: =1 came ho:me.

(0.3 )

Janet: Well Estelle jus' called'n . . .

(as cited in Liddicoat 2007)

Penny's sentence ("and the fact is I just thought it was so kind of stupid I didn't
even say anything when I came home") is a single turn constructional unit (TCU).

● Even though grammatically correct (syntactic), spoken with ending intonation

(intonational), and completes an action (action-oriented), Janet tries to take a
turn at several points.
● These points ("stupid" and "anything") are also possible completion points for
the sentence.

49
 ● However, Penny designs her turn so that these continuations sound like
extensions of the same thought, not new turns.
● This shows that even when intonation suggests completion, speakers can
design their talk to keep going beyond these points, ending with a single TCU.

2.3. The turn allocation component (Thành tố phân phối lượt lời)
2.3.1. Current speaker can select the next speaker
Sacks et al. (1974) explains how questions function in their turn-taking model:
● Choosing the next speaker: The current speaker can't simply pick someone;
their words have to guide the selection.
● Question as a selection tool: Questions are a good way to indicate who should
speak next because they point towards a specific action (answering) and
potentially a specific person to perform it.
● Questions don't guarantee selection: Asking a question doesn't automatically
choose the next speaker. For instance, a question directed to a group allows
anyone to answer.
● Questions encourage turn change: Regardless of who answers, questions
make it very likely someone will speak next.
● Guiding the next speaker: The question itself limits what kind of response is
appropriate from the new speaker (e.g., an answer, not another question).

In short, questions can't directly force someone to speak next, but they strongly
nudge the conversation towards a turn change and subtly suggest who might be the
most appropriate person to respond.

2.3.2. Next speaker self-selects

Sacks et al. (1974) clarifies a nuance in their turn-taking model:
● Bias but not a rule: There's a tendency for the person who spoke before the
last speaker (last speaker but one) to talk next. However, this is not a built-in
rule, just a common outcome.
● Turn allocation is fluid: The system only allocates the next speaker, not a
sequence of speakers. At each turn's end, any participant can be chosen by the
current speaker or can try to speak themselves (self-select).
● Observed pattern, not a rule: Seeing the "last speaker but one" speak next
isn't proof of a specific rule, but simply the result of applying the general
turn-taking rules at that particular moment in the conversation.

50
 ● Rules guide speaker change: The model uses a set of rules to explain how and
when speaker changes happen, considering these options for who might speak
next.

In simpler terms, while there might be a natural tendency for the conversation to
flow to the person before the last speaker, the turn-taking system itself is flexible and
allows for anyone to be the next speaker based on the choices made at each turn's end.

2.4. Rules linking turn construction and turn allocation

Sacks et al. (1974) dives deep into the specifics of their turn-taking model,
outlining a set of rules for how conversations flow:
Key Rules:
● Transition Relevance Places (TRPs): These are points in a turn where it
could be considered complete (possible completion).
● Speaker Selection Order:
○ Rule 1(a): If the current speaker explicitly picks the next speaker (e.g.,
"You answer"), that person has the right and obligation to speak next.
○ Rule 1(b): If no speaker is chosen (default), the first person to start
talking after a TRP gets the turn.
○ Rule 1(c): If no one speaks after a TRP, the current speaker can
optionally continue (but isn't obligated to).
● Ordered Rules: These rules have a hierarchy:
○ Rule 1(a) overrides 1(b) and 1(c) if used.
○ Rule 1(b) applies only if 1(a) isn't used.
○ Rule 1(c) applies only if neither 1(a) nor 1(b) is used.
● Single TCU Limit: The system inherently limits turns to one "TCU" (turn
constructional unit) - a complete thought unit. Speakers have the right to speak
for one TCU and then the right to speak lapses.

Implications of the Rules:

● Preventing Overlap: The ordered rules ensure only one person speaks at a
time. Choosing a speaker (1a) prevents others from interrupting (1b).
● Turn Size and Completion: Each TCU's end becomes a critical point. Current
speakers risk losing the floor, and potential speakers need to be ready to talk.
This encourages speakers to structure their thoughts within a TCU and listeners
to monitor for completion cues.

51
 ● Understanding and Response: Turn changes are a social negotiation. How
someone responds to a TCU ending shows their understanding. The next action
can display how much they grasped from the previous speaker.
● Listening and Responding: The system motivates active listening because
understanding completion cues is crucial. Responding quickly (especially in
groups) is important to claim the next turn.

Overall, these rules provide a framework for turn-taking that is dynamic and
responsive to the conversation's flow. Participants constantly analyze and react to each
other's TCUs, shaping the conversation together.
2.5. Features of turn-taking in conversation (Đặc điểm của lượt lời trong
hội thoại)

Sacks et al. (1974) argue that any model of conversation needs to explain some
basic observations about turn-taking. These observations include things like people
taking turns speaking, smooth transitions between speakers with little overlap, and
speakers using cues to signal who will talk next. Their proposed turn-taking model
addresses these "grossly apparent facts" by outlining rules for how conversations flow.

- Speaker change recurs, or at least occurs

The power of the Sacks et al. (1974) model lies in the fact that it
accounts for turn-taking, but does not make it an inevitable consequence
of the system. The model does not prevent one participant from
dominating the conversation nor does it require all those present to
participate at all points in the conversation.

- One person talks at a time and occurrences of more than one

speaker at a time are common but brief

How the conversation turn-taking model by Sacks et al. (1974) manages speaker
transitions and potential overlaps. Here are the key points:

● Single speaker at a time: The model assumes one person speaks at a time, but
brief overlaps are common.
● Turn completion and exclusivity: A speaker holds the "floor" until they
finish their turn (TCU - Turn Construction Unit). Attempts to interrupt before
completion face consequences.
● Turn-taking competition: Transitions typically happen at "possible
completion" points of a TCU, where competition for the floor arises.

52
 ● Simultaneous starts: The model allows for simultaneous attempts to speak,
but the first speaker gets priority.
● Overlaps at transition points (TRP): Overlaps can occur between the current
speaker finishing and the next speaker starting (due to projections of
completion, not actual silence).
● Quick overlap resolution: The model facilitates resolving these overlaps
swiftly.

In essence, the model acknowledges the natural flow of conversation where

people might talk over each other slightly, but provides mechanisms for smooth
turn-taking and minimizing disruptions.

- Transitions with no gap and no overlap are common

How the turn-taking model by Sacks et al. (1974) explains seamless transitions in
conversations. Here's the breakdown:

● Smooth transitions: The model predicts frequent transitions between speakers

with minimal gaps or overlaps.
● Possible completion as the key: Transitions occur at points where a speaker's
current turn (TCU) is likely finished ("possible completion").
● Predicting completion: By anticipating when a turn might end
(projectability), speakers can begin their own turn smoothly without waiting
for complete silence. This allows for:
○ No gaps: The conversation keeps flowing without noticeable pauses
between turns.
○ Starting after another finishes: A speaker can begin even if the
previous speaker hasn't finished their utterance entirely, as long as the
completion is foreseeable.

In simpler terms, the model suggests that because we can anticipate when
someone's turn might be done, we can start talking right away, creating a smooth
conversation flow without awkward silences.

- Turn order varies and the relative distribution of turns is not

specified in advance

Sacks et al. (1974) dive deeper into how the turn-taking model, managing the
order of speakers:

53
 ● One turn at a time: The model allocates only the next speaker's turn, not a
whole sequence.
● Turn changes at transition points (TRP): Speaker changes happen at every
possible completion point in a turn.
● Locally managed order: Participants decide the order locally at each
transition point, using the same set of options repeatedly.
● Bias but no guarantee: There's a tendency for the speaker before the last one
(last speaker but one) to speak next, but it's not a rule. Participants can choose
differently.
● No equal distribution: The model doesn't force even participation or a
specific number of turns for each person.
● Self-selection and first-start priority: Anyone can try to be the next speaker
(self-selection), but the first person to start gets priority (rule 1b).

In simpler terms, the model provides a framework for turn-taking where people
decide who speaks next at each point in the conversation. There's a slight preference
for the person before the last speaker, but it's not a strict rule, and anyone can try to
talk next. The model also doesn't aim for fairness in the number of turns each person
gets.

- Turn size is not fixed, but varies

Sacks et al. (1974) explains how the turn-taking model, allowing for turns to be
different lengths:

● Variable turn size building blocks: Turns can be short (single words) or long
(complex sentences). There's no fixed size requirement.
● Possible completion defines a turn: A turn needs to be a complete unit of
thought, but the specific size or structure isn't predefined. Speakers choose the
unit type freely.
● Continuing as next speaker: The model allows someone to keep talking after
their first possible stopping point, essentially adding more units (TCUs) to their
turn.
● No maximum turn size: There's no limit on how long a turn can be, thanks to
the option to keep adding units.
● Minimum turn size: The model expects at least one complete unit (TCU) per
turn, so single words are the shortest possible turns.

In simpler terms, conversations can flow freely because turns can be as short as a
single word or as long as someone wants to keep talking and adding complete
thoughts.

54
 - Number of parties can vary
● Works for any group size: The system applies to conversations with two
people or larger groups.
● Simpler with two people: Rule 1b (first to start speaks next) is easier to
manage with only one other potential speaker.
● Favors small groups: Despite working for any size, the system is more
efficient in smaller groups for two reasons:
○ Focus on two speakers: The rules mainly consider the current speaker
and the next speaker.
○ Bias towards "last speaker but one": In larger groups, this bias might
leave some people out of the conversation more easily.

In short, while the turn-taking system can handle any number of participants, it
works more smoothly and includes everyone more effectively in smaller conversations.

- Talk can be continuous or discontinuous

Sacks et al. (1974) explains how the turn-taking model, handling silence in
conversations:

● Silence as an option: The model allows for pauses in conversation. No one is

obligated to speak immediately after someone else finishes.
● Silence vs. no speaker: A silence can be because no one wants to talk (lapse),
or because a specific person is choosing not to speak in that moment.
● Selected silence vs. lapse: If the current speaker picks the next speaker
(following rule 1a), silence is unexpected and might be seen as a problem.
● Interpreting silence: The location of a silence in the conversation flow helps
determine its meaning. A silence right after someone finishes might be seen as
their choice, while a silence in the middle of expected speaker change might be
seen as a gap.
● Restarting the conversation: Anyone can break the silence and become the
next speaker, reviving the conversation.

In simpler terms, the model acknowledges that natural conversation has pauses,
and the meaning of those pauses depends on the context and flow of the conversation.

3. Adjacency pairs (Cặp cận kề)

3.1. Definition

55
 In conversation analysis, as introduced by Harvey Sacks, an adjacency pair refers
to a two-part exchange between speakers where the second part is fundamentally
linked to the first. It's basically a way to understand how conversations flow through
turn-taking.

3.2. Core features of adjacency pairs

Here's a breakdown of key features of adjacency pairs:
Two Utterances: An adjacency pair involves two separate statements, one from
each speaker.

Speaker Switch: The utterances are spoken by different people, creating a

back-and-forth exchange.

Ordered: The order matters. The first part sets up an expectation for a specific
kind of second part.

3.3. Types of adjacency pairs

Adjacency pairs are defined as two subsequent utterances constituting a
conversational exchange. Pairs are characterized by their type. The type of a pair is
given by a common illocutionary intention (or 'force', as Austin called it); pairs can
thus be, e.g., 'greeting-greeting', 'order- (verbal) compliance', 'request (e.g. for
information)-providing the re- quested item (e.g. information)' and so on.

Classical conversation analysis (see, e.g., Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974)
distinguishes between the 'first pair part' and the 'second pair part of any adjacency
pair. For instance, the first pair part may be a summons; then what constitutes the
second pair part has to be an utterance which deals with compliance (either positive or
negative), as in the following exchanges:

Could you please close the window?

Sure

and

Could you close the window?

No way

56
 Clearly, the second pair part could be one that contained more infor- mation
(e.g., 'In a minute', or 'No, I'd rather have it open'); but that wouldn't affect the type of
exchange or adjacency pair.

In general, the notion of 'type' is useful when it comes to predicting what the
answer could be, and how it is managed: in a way, it defines the 'base-line' for the
second pair parts that are possible. But it also does more.
(1) question-answer

John: What time' s it?

Betty: Three uh

clock.

(2) greeting-greeting

Amy: Hello.

Jean: Hi.
(3) summons-answer

Terry: hey Paul,

Paul: uh yeah.

(4) telling-accept
John: I' ve jus' finished my las' exam.

Betty: that' s great.

57
 In each of the examples above, the first turn of the pair initiates some action
and makes some next action relevant. The second turn responds to the prior turn and
completes the action which was initiated in the first turn. These two turns together
accomplish an action.
The basic sequence, then, is composed of two ordered turns at talk:

A: first pair part

B: second pair part

4. Description and Categories of Talk (Mô tả và phân loại cuộc thoại)

4.1. Dialogic Talk

Sustained stretches of talk which enable speakers and listeners to explore and
build on their own and others’ ideas to develop coherent thinking. The aim is to
achieve a common understanding through structured cumulative questioning
and discussion.

Dialogic talk is (Alexander, 2005):

• collective: teachers and children address learning tasks

together, whether as a group or as a class

• reciprocal: teachers and children listen to each other, share ideas and consider
alternative viewpoints

• supportive: children articulate their ideas freely, without fear of embarrassment

over ‘wrong’ answers; and they help each other to reach common understandings

• cumulative: teachers and students build on their own and each other’s ideas and
chain them into coherent lines of thinking and enquiry

• purposeful: teachers plan and steer classroom talk with specific educational
goals in view
4.2. Exploratory Talk

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 ● It's a conversation where ideas are challenged helpfully, with reasons and
alternatives offered. Everyone contributes, knowledge is shared openly, and the
goal is to reach a common understanding through reasoned discussion.
● Exploratory talk is where pupils listen critically but constructively to each
other's ideas. The objective of this interaction is to reach an agreement. In the
task, students must explore the different possible answers. They exchange
ideas to share information to solve problems.

• everyone listens actively

• people ask questions
• people share relevant information
• ideas may be challenged
• reasons are given for challenges
• contributions build on what has gone before
• everyone is encouraged to contribute
• ideas and opinions treated with respect
• there is an atmosphere of trust
• there is a sense of shared purpose
• the group seeks agreement for joint decisions Neil Mercer, 2008
4.3. Socratic talk (talking about talk)

Socratic talk involves an outer circle of students observing an inner group of

students discussing a topic, idea of text. The outer group who observes are given a
wide range of questions related to the specific learning objectives of the lesson. The
activity is designed to achieve a deeper understanding about a topic, idea or text.

• This talk involves a discussion group and observers. The pupils in the discussion
group are seated at a table in the centre of the classroom, while the remainder of the
class become observers and are seated around the room.

• The inner group talk can involve any type of learning talk.
• In the outer group talk, each pupil observing is assigned a particular pupil or
aspect of discussion for the focus of their observations; they take notes with the help of
a guidance sheet or card.

• At the end of the discussion, the teacher leads an evaluation where the observers
are invited to comment.

59
IV. Schegloff's Insights Into Conversation Analysis (Phạm Phương Uyên)
1. Biography of Emanuel A. Schegloff

"For me, direct interaction between persons is the primordial site of sociality"
(Emanuel A. Schegloff).
[“Đối với tôi, sự tương tác trực tiếp giữa người với người là điểm cơ bản của xã
hội”].

Emanuel A. Schegloff, along with Gail Jefferson and the late Harvey Sacks, is one of
the founders of Conversation Analysis. He is the Distinguished Professor of Sociology
and Applied Linguistics at the University of California, Los Angeles, where he has
taught a course sequence on "Conversational Structures" on a regular basis for over
twenty-five years. Through his teaching, data sessions he has organized, and his
personal mentoring, Dr. Schegloff has been instrumental in training many of the
practitioners of conversation analysis working today, including researchers working
on a growing variety of languages such as German, Finnish, Swedish, Japanese,
Mandarin, and Korean.

Schegloff's extensive research often delves into the intricate connections between
language use, interactional practices, and social contexts. While he is most widely
known for the foundational articles on turn-taking (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson,
1974) and repair (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977) published in the journal
iMiiguage, and the first published paper in conversation analysis (1968), Dr.
Schegloff has published over 70 articles on talk and interaction, and continues to
publish his ongoing research widely, including recent articles in the American Journal
of Sociology, Social Research, Language in Society, Discourse and Society,
Discourse Processes, Research on Language and Social Interaction, Language and
Speech, Discourse Studies, Aphasiology, and Applied Linguistics.
Notable publications of Schegloff in Conversation Analysis:
★ "Sequencing in Conversational Openings", American Anthropologist, 70, 6 (1968)
1075-1095.
★ "A Simplest Systematics for the Organisation of Turn-Taking for Conversation",
Language 50, (1974) 696-735. (with Gail Jefferson and Harvey Sacks).
★ "Opening Up Closings", Semiotica, VIII, 4 (1973) 289-327 (with Harvey Sacks)
★ "The Preference for Self-Correction in the Organisation of Repair in Conversation",
Language, 53, 2 (1977) 361-382 (with Gail Jefferson and Harvey Sacks).
★ Sequence Organisation in Interaction: A Primer in Conversation Analysis I.
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press (2007).

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 2. Schegloff's Insights into Conversation Analysis
Among the mentioned publications of Schegloff, I have chosen to thoroughly
study his analysis of Sequence Organisation (Bố cục trình tự trong phân tích hội
thoại), specifically discussed in the first two sections of the book "Sequence
Organisation in Interaction: A Primer in Conversation Analysis I" (2007). My decision
is based on the following reasons:

First of all, this is the first volume in a new series of books by Emanuel Schegloff
introducing the findings and theories of Conversation Analysis which he had compiled
over twenty years of researching and teaching "Conversational Structures". He had a
fairly secure sense of what needed doing and how to get it done. Surely that could be
transferred from the lecture hall and discussion room to the pages of a book
(Schegloff, 2007, p.xi). Secondly, this book contains many examples from real-life
conversations, and will be invaluable to anyone interested in human interaction and the
workings of conversation. Thirdly, Schegloff also wrote in the Preface of this book:
"When I set about drafting the primer in conversation analysis, I began, for reasons I
no longer remember, by writing up the chapter on sequence organisation”. (Schegloff,
2007, p.xi). His reflection is understandable, as his first article in Conversation
Analysis, "Sequencing in Conversational Openings" (1968), was also on Sequence
Organisation, proving the importance of this topic in Conversation Analysis.

*The following sections of my analysis are extracted from Schegloff's book

"Sequence Organisation in Interaction: A Primer in Conversation Analysis I" (2007);
therefore, to reduce word count, the in-text citations only include the page number.

2.1. Introduction to Sequence Organisation (Giới thiệu về Bố cục Trình tự)

Before deep dive into Sequence Organisation, it is crucial to consider the
organisation of turn-taking, as it is one of the most fundamental organisations of
practice for talk-in-interaction is (p.1).

The organisation of the practices of turn-taking refers to the possibility of

responsiveness. This means that one participant being able to show that what they are
saying and doing is responsive to what another has said and done, consequently one
party needs to talk after the other, and, it turns out, they have to talk singly. In other
words, the resource relied upon by parties to talk-in-interaction to achieve these
outcomes routinely: they talk singly one at a time, and each participant’s talk is
inspectable, and is inspected, by co-participants to see how it stands to the one that
preceded, what sort of response it has accorded the preceding turn (p.1).

61
 However, it is notable that those turns do not follow one another like identical
beads on a string. They have some organisation and “shape” to them, aside from their
organisation as single turns and as series-of-turns. One might say that they seem to be
grouped in batches or clumps, one bunch seeming to “hang together” or cohere, and
then another, and another, etc. The most common tendency is to think of these clumps
as topical, the turns hanging together because they are somehow “about” the same
topic.

Whatever may be the case about topics and topicality, it is important to register
that a great deal of talk-in-interaction – perhaps most of it – is better examined with
respect to action than with respect to topicality, more for what it is doing than for what
it is about (p.2).

EXAMPLE (p.2): An utterance like “Would somebody like some more ice tea” – as in
Extract (1.01) – is better understood as “doing an offer” than as “about ice tea,” as can
be seen in the response to it, which does not do further talk about iced tea, but accepts
an alternative to what has been offered.

(1.01) Virginia, 11:16-19

1 Mom: = ˙ hhh Whooh! It is so hot tuhnight. *Would somebody like

2 some more ice tea. ((* = voice fades throughout TCU))

3 (0.8)

4 Wes: Uh(b)- (0.4) I(‘ll) take some more ice.

As a result, when we think of clumps of turns in “action” terms, we are dealing

with courses of action – with sequences of actions that have some shape or trajectory
to them, that is, with what we will call “sequence organisation” or “the organisation of
sequences”. Also, Sequences of turns are not haphazard but have a shape or structure,
and can be tracked for where they came from, what is being done through them, and
where they might be going.

Hypothesis: Across all the different kinds of actions which people do through talk,
are there any sorts of general patterns or structures which they use (and which we can
describe) to co-produce and track an orderly stretch of talk and other conduct in which
some course of action gets initiated, worked through, and brought to closure? If so, we
will call them “sequences,” and we will call their organisation “sequence
organisation” (bố cục trình tự).

62
 1.1. Turns (Các lượt lời)
The building blocks out of which turns are fashioned we call turn constructional
units, or TCUs (p.4).

Three key organisational resource in building and recognizing TCUs:

- Grammar is one part; for English and many other languages (so far we know of
no exceptions), the basic shapes that TCUs take are sentences or clauses more
generally, phrases, and lexical items.
- A second organisational resource shaping TCUs is grounded in the phonetic
realization of the talk, most familiarly, in intonational “packaging”.
- A third – and criterial – feature of a TCU is that it constitutes a recognizable
action in context; that is, at that juncture of that episode of interaction, with those
participants, in that place, etc. A speaker beginning to talk in a turn has the right
and obligation to produce one TCU, which may realize one or more actions.

As a speaker approaches the possible completion of a first TCU in a turn,

transition to a next speaker can become relevant; if acted upon, the transition to a next
speaker is accomplished just after the possible completion of the TCU-in-progress.
Accordingly, we speak of the span that begins with the imminence of possible
completion as the “transition-relevance place” (điểm chuyển tiếp lượt lời).

Speakers often produce turns composed of more than one TCU. There are various
ways this can come to pass which cannot be taken up here. Suffice it to say that if a
speaker talks past a possible completion of the first TCU in a turn, whether by
extending that TCU past its possible completion or by starting another TCU, whether
in the face of beginning of talk by another or clear of such overlapping talk, then at the
next occurrence of imminent possible TCU completion transition to a next speaker
again becomes relevant. But how does a party to the interaction come to be in the
position of a speaker beginning to talk in a turn in the first place? There are two main
ways:

+ First, a just-prior speaker can have selected them as next speaker by addressing
them with a turn whose action requires a responsive action next – for example,
with a question that makes an answer relevant next, with a complaint which
makes relevant next an apology, or excuse, or denial, or remedy, etc.
+ Second, if no one has been so selected by a/the prior speaker, then anyone can
self-select to take the next turn and does that by starting to fashion a first TCU
in the turn-space they thereby claim; the first one to do so gets the turn.

63
 There are two features of turn-taking and turn organisation:
+ First, the TCU as a unit of conduct – readers should be alert to the TCU
composition of a turn, to where a TCU is projectably coming to imminent
possible completion, and what action or actions the TCU is recognizably
implementing;
+ Second, that feature of a TCU that serves to select someone as next speaker
(that is, that action), and what sort of responses that action makes relevant for
that next speaker to do.

⇒ It is these two features that, taken together, compose the central organizing format
for sequences – the adjacency pair. Here is one exchange to exemplify some of the
points just discussed.

Context: Vivian and Shane (seated to the left) are hosting Nancy and Michael for a
chicken dinner, and are recording it for use in a college course. Vivian has prepared
the meal, and her boyfriend Shane has been teasing her by complaining about this or
that claimed inadequacy. In this exchange, he is doing this again (p.5).

(1.02) Chicken Dinner, 4:28-5:06

1 (1.1)

2 Sha: Ah can’t- Ah can’t[get this thing ↓mashed.

3 Viv: [Aa-ow.

4 (1.2)

5 Nan: You[do that too:? tih yer pota]toes,

6 Sha: [This one’s hard ezza rock.]

7 Sha: ↑Ye[ah.

8 Viv: [It i:[s?

9 Sha: [B't this thing- is ↑ha:rd.

10 (0.3)

11 Viv: It’s not do:ne? th’potato?

12 Sha: Ah don’t think so,

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 13 (2.2)

14 Nan: → Seems done t' me how 'bout you Mi[chael,]

15 Sha: [Alri' ]who

16 cooked this mea:l.

17 Mic: → 'hh Little ↓bit’v e-it e-ih-ih of it isn’done.

18 Sha: Th'ts ri:ght.

19 (1.2)

The exchange starts with a complaint by Shane at line 2; Nancy tries to divert the
exchange into “shared ways of eating potatoes,” but Shane is insistent at lines 6 and 9,
and Vivian is taken in by the ruse at lines 8 and 11. After Shane reinforces (at line 12)
Vivian’s concern that the potatoes are “not done,” insufficiently cooked (at line 11),
Nancy joins in at line 14. Notice here the following exemplars of matters taken up in
the preceding paragraphs:

a) Nancy’s turn is composed of two TCUs: “seems done t'me,” and “how ’bout
you Michael”;

b) Each of these is a grammatically possibly complete construction, and each does

a recognizable action (the intonational contour of the first TCU is not clearly
“final” for reasons we cannot take up here, except to note that it anticipates and
projects another TCU to come);

c) The first of these TCUs is addressed to the question Vivian has asked at line 11
(It’s not do:ne? th’potato?) – it answers that question in a fashion designed
specifically to disagree with, or contest, the answer previously given by Shane, and
reassures Vivian that the potato has been properly cooked;

d) The second TCU is addressed to Michael – designed as a question that makes an

answer relevant next, it selects its addressee as next speaker and the appropriate
action: answering the question. It is also designed to put Michael on the spot –
having to side with either his friend Shane or his partner Nancy and their host
Vivian, a fix which he tries to finesse with questionable success.

1.2. Actions (Hành động)

65
 A single TCU can embody more than one action, and, indeed, some actions which
a TCU implements are the vehicle by which other actions are implemented. In all three
of the extracts examined so far, questions figure centrally, but in each of them more is
being done than questioning or requesting information (p.9).

→ In Extract (1.02), Nancy’s question to Michael serves to pose a dilemma which

moves him to give other than a straightforward “answer,” and provide instead some
support to each “side”.

With these resources made explicit, we can now return to the central
preoccupation of this book – sequence organisation. Before taking our brief detour, we
had posed the question, Are there any general patterns or general practices which can
be isolated and described through which sequences – courses of action implemented
through talk – get organized? If so, we will call them “sequences,” and we will call
their organisation “sequence organisation”.

⇒ One very large set of sequence types seems to be organized around a basic unit
of sequence construction, the adjacency pair. Most of this book will be concerned
with this resource for talk-in-interaction, and its expansions and deployments.

There are sequence organisations not based on adjacency pairs:

+ Some forms of storytelling and other “telling” sequences (pp. 41–44),
+ Sme forms of topic talk (although adjacency pairs may figure in such talk, even
when not supplying its underlying organisation, see below, at pp. 169–80),
+ What will be discussed under the rubric “retro-sequences” in Chapter 11 below,
+ Quite possibly other ones not yet described, perhaps because the settings in
which they figure have been less studied (or not studied at all).

But a very broad range of sequences in talk-in-interaction does appear to be

produced by reference to the practices of adjacency pair organisation, which therefore
appears to serve as a resource for sequence construction comparable to the way
turn-constructional units serve as a resource for turn construction.

→ Ambition in this work was described as getting at the organisation of “courses

of action implemented through turns-at-talk”. Both parts of that phrase are
consequential:

+ The turn-at-talk is being examined for the actions being implemented in it and
the relationship(s) between those actions, on the one hand;

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 + On the other, the focus is on actions that are implemented through turns-at-talk.
But, of course, not all actions are implemented through talk.
How do actions not implemented through talk figure in this undertaking? How do
they figure in adjacency pair organisation? Perhaps the most important sequence
organisation not basically organized by the adjacency pairs is that organized by other
ongoing courses of actions which take the form, not of talking, but of other physical
activity. That is, a very large domain of what we mean by “action(s)” refers to things
done with the hands, as in Extracts (1.04) and (1.05) (p. 10), in both of which we see
things being passed at the dinner table:

Some “sequences of action” may not involve any talk at all (indeed, do not require
another person at all). Some may have talk going on but not concerning ongoing other
courses of action. Some may involve talk organized to be complementary to courses of
action being otherwise implemented, and thereby be organized by the structure of the
physical activity they are complementary to. Sometimes the course of action being
realized in talk is “functionally” quite distinct from that being realized in other ways,
and yet each has some consequences for the other. Sometimes an action done in talk
gets as its response one not done in talk, as in Extract (1.04), where the request for the
butter is spoken, but its delivery is not accompanied by talk; or, conversely, sometimes
an action not done in talk gets as its response something done by talk.

The examination of adjacency pair-based sequences will be organized as follows.

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 First, we will spell out the main features of the basic minimal form of the
adjacency pair, and the minimal sequence which it can constitute (pp. 13–27).

Second, we will explicate some of the ways in which sequences can expand
well beyond the minimal, two-turn sequence which the adjacency pair itself
constitutes – pre-expansions (pp. 28–57), insert expansions (pp. 97–114), and
post-expansions (pp. 115–68), yielding extensive stretches of talk which
nonetheless must be understood as built on the armature of a single adjacency
pair, and therefore needing to be understood as expansions of it. In the course
of describing these expansions, we will examine a key feature of adjacency
pairs – their “preference” structure (pp. 58–96).

Third, we will take up larger sequence structures to which adjacency pairs can
give rise and of which they may be building-blocks – such as topic-proffering
sequences (pp. 169–80), sequence-closing sequences (pp. 181–94), and
sequences of sequences (pp. 195–216).

Fourth, we will touch on some respects in which sequences and the practices
which give rise to them can vary in particular contexts (pp. 220–30), and can
be flexibly deployed in ways that give rise to non-canonical forms (pp. 231–
250).

At the end (pp. 251–64), we will take up some suggestions for using the
materials that have been presented so that they can become part of the reader’s
analytic resources, ready to be activated by the data you, the reader, have
occasion to examine.

2.2. The adjacency pair as the unit for sequence construction (p.13)
We begin with the most elementary features of adjacency pairs and their basic
mode of operation. In its minimal, basic unexpanded form an adjacency pair is
characterized by certain features. It is:

(a) composed of two turns;

(b) by different speakers;
(c) adjacently placed; that is, one after the other;
(d) these two turns are relatively ordered; that is, they are differentiated into
“first pair parts” (FPPs, or Fs for short) and “second pair parts” (SPPs, or Ss for
short).

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 + First pair parts are utterance types such as question, request, offer,
invitation, announcement, etc. – types which initiate some exchange.
+ Second pair parts are utterance types such as answer, grant, reject,
accept, decline, agree/disagree, acknowledge, etc. – types which are
responsive to the action of a prior turn (though not everything which is
responsive to something else is an S).

Besides being differentiated into Fs and Ss, the components of an adjacency

pair are (e) pair-type related; that is, not every second pair part can properly
follow any first pair part.

→ Adjacency pairs compose pair types; types are exchanges such as greeting–
greeting, question–answer, offer– accept/decline, and the like.

To compose an adjacency pair, the FPP and SPP come from the same pair type.

Pair types FPP SPP

greeting–greeting “Hello,” “Hi,”

question–answer “Do you know what time it is?,” “Four o’clock,”

offer–accept/decline “Would you like a cup of coffee?” “No, thanks”.

Parties to talk-in-interaction do not just pick some SPP to respond to an FPP; that
would yield such absurdities as “Hello,” “No, thanks,” or “Would you like a cup of
coffee?,” “Hi”. The components of adjacency pairs are “typologized” not only into
first and second pair parts, but into the pair types which they can partially compose.

2.2.1. Adjacency, nextness, contiguity, progressivity

The relationship of adjacency or “nextness” is one of the most pervasively
relevant features in the organisation of talk-and-other-conduct-in-interaction. The
default relationship between the components of most kinds of organisation is that each
should come next after the prior.

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 → In articulating a turn-constructional unit, each element – each word, for
example – should come next after the one before; in fact, at a smaller level of
granularity, each syllable – indeed, each sound – should come next after the one before
it.

→ So also with the several turn-constructional units that compose a multi-unit

turn; so also with the consecutive turns that compose a spate of talk; so also with the
turns that compose a sequence, etc.

Moving from some element to a hearably-next-one with nothing intervening is the

embodiment of, and the measure of, progressivity. → Mô hình hoàn hảo, tiến bộ.

Should something violate or interfere with their contiguity, whether next sound,
next word, or next turn – it will be heard as qualifying the progressivity of the talk
(diễn biến của cuộc nói chuyện), and will be examined for its import, for what
understanding should be accorded it.

Each next element of such a progression can be inspected to find how it reaffirms
the understanding-so-far of what has preceded, or favors one or more of the several
such understandings that are being entertained, or how it requires reconfiguration of
that understanding.

⇒ What will matter most is the relationship between successive turns; and what
matters most immediately is the difference between the adjacent turns relationship on
the one hand and adjacency pairs on the other.

The relationship of adjacency or “nextness” between turns is central to the ways

in which talk-in-interaction is organized and understood.

Next turns are understood by co-participants to display their speaker’s

understanding of the just-prior turn and to embody an action responsive to the
just-prior turn so understood (unless the turn has been marked as addressing something
other than just-prior turn).

This is in large measure because of the way turntaking for conversation works;
namely, one turn at a time – and, specifically, exclusively next turn allocation. That is,
as each turn comes to possible completion and transition to another speaker becomes
possibly relevant, it is transition to a next speaker that is at issue.

If the turn is to be allocated by the current speaker selecting someone, it is next

speaker that is being selected; and if no selection by just-ending speaker is done and

70
another participant self-selects, it is for the next turn that they are self-selecting.
However this contingency is handled, each participant has to have been attending to
the just-ongoing-about-to-be-possibly-complete turn to determine

(a) if he or she has been selected as next speaker, or

(b) if anyone has been selected as next speaker in order to determine whether they
can properly self-select as next speaker, and

(c) what action(s) are implicated by the just-ending turn, relative to which any
next turn will be understood.

Each next turn, then, is examined for the understanding of the prior turn which it
displays, and the kind of response which it embodies, and this is endemic to the
organisation of conversation without respect to adjacency pairs.

2.2.2. Counters (Lời điều hướng)

There are alternatives to doing an appropriate SPP next after an FPP, and they will
be taken up as part of our discussion of sequence expansion (and in particular, insert
expansion, in Chapter 6).

Virtually all such alternatives to an SPP in next turn are understood as deferring
the doing of an SPP until a bit later, and are done in the service of a later SPP.

But there is one alternative to an SPP in next turn whose effect is quite different,
and it requires mention at this point. That next turn is the “counter”; that is, before (or
without) responding with an SPP to the just completed FPP, the same FPP (or a closely
related modification of it) is redirected to the one who just did it. A familiar experience
may exemplify this tack anecdotally, before a display of more determinate empirical
instances.

→ Recall emerging with a companion from some entertainment or cultural event

– a movie, performance, exhibit, etc. – especially one testing the boundaries of
familiarity, and asking, “Well, what did you think?” or “How did you like it?” and
getting back not an answer, but instead, “How did you like it?” or “What did you
think?” or just “How about you?” → These are counters.

Counters do not serve to defer the answering of the question (though the one
doing the counter may end up answering later nonetheless); they replace it with a

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question of their own. They thus reverse the direction of the sequence and its flow;
they reverse the direction of constraint.

Here are several empirical instances. In the first, a mother and her child of just
over a year and a half are looking at a children’s picture book together:

In line 1, the child has asked a question (an FPP), but in the next turn the mother
does neither an answer nor a form of turn which projects later answering of the
question. Rather, she redirects the same question back to its asker, for its asker to
answer. Nor does she herself answer the question later.

The second instance is taken from a psychotherapeutic session (p.17):

(2.02) Scheflen, 1961:114, as adapted in Peyrot, 1994:17
1 Pat: F → Do you think I’m insane now.
2 Doc: Fcnt→ Do you think so?
3 Pat: S → No, of course not.
4 Doc: But I think you are.
In this exchange, the doctor does end up answering (at line 4) the question
which the patient asked, and so his redirecting it to the patient and getting an
answer (at lines 2–3) ends up having only deferred the answer, and inserted one
question–answer exchange inside another.

But, following the sequence, as the participants did, in real time, when the
doctor’s question was asked at line 2, it did not project a later answer. It
redirected the question, and could easily have been used to launch a line of
inquiry by the doctor (e.g., at line 4, “Why not,” etc., or “Why did you ask me
then?,” etc.). Again, then, the counter reverses the direction of the sequence.

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 What does that mean, “reverses the direction of constraint”? In order to make
clear what is meant by “reversing the direction of constraint,” we need to take up what
we call “relevance rules,” because the adjacency pair is one main locus of relevance
rules, one place in talk-in-interaction where they have a specially notable bearing.
Because this is an important topic in its own right, we will linger on it a bit, but the
discussion will come back to the sense of "reversing the direction of constraint".

2.2.3. Relevance rules and negative observations

The organisation of turn-taking provides a way (for co-participants and for us as
external observers) to say non-trivially that someone in particular is not speaking,
when in fact no one at all is speaking. It is by virtue of a “rule” or “practice” having
been invoked or activated which makes it relevant for that particular “someone” to be
talking. Even though no one is talking, it is the relevance introduced by a prior speaker
having selected someone as next speaker that makes that person be specifically singled
out as not talking, even when there is general silence.

But this is just a special case of a much more general issue, one concerning what
we will call “negative observations”. There is an indefinitely large and extendable
number of things that have not been said, of events that have not happened, of persons
who are not speaking, of actions that are not being performed by someone who is
speaking.

For the noting of an absence to be non-trivial, we need a “relevance rule” that

makes it relevant for something to happen or be done or be mentioned, etc. Then, if it
does not happen (or is not done or is not mentioned, etc.), it is “missing” in a different
sense than the sense in which everything that does not happen is missing, and with a
different import. We can then speak of it as a “noticable absence” or an “official
absence” or a “relevant absence”. Negative observations imply relevant absences, and
relevant absences imply relevance rules. Noticing that someone in particular is not
speaking constitutes a claim of sorts that this is a relevant absence (as set against the
non-speaking of everyone else), and turns on some relevance rule that makes it so –
such as a prior speaker having selected the noticed one as next speaker. The turn-
taking organisation, then, constitutes (among other things) a set of relevance rules.

→ Adjacency pair organisation is also a major locus of relevance rules. What

relates first and second pair parts can be termed a relationship of “conditional
relevance”. “First” and “second” do not refer merely to the order in which these turns
happen to occur; they refer to design features of these turn types and sequential
positions. The very feature of “first-ness” sets up the relevance of something else to
follow; it projects the relevance of a “second”.

73
 It is the occurrence of a first pair part that makes some types of second pair part
relevant next; that relevance is conditioned by the FPP. If such a second pair part is
produced next, it is heard as responsive to the first pair part which preceded. If such a
second pair part is not produced next, its non-occurrence is as much an event as its
occurrence would have been. It is, so to speak, noticeably, officially, consequentially,
absent. The relevance of some turn type which can be a second pair part is conditional
on the occurrence of a first pair part from the same pair type. Often enough, the person
who can be observed (relevantly) to be “not talking” (by reference to the turn-taking
rules) can be heard as well to be “not answering” when their “non-talking” follows a
prior utterance which was a question. Thus, the silence in a room can nonetheless often
be characterized (and, in the first instance, heard) specifically for who is not talking,
and what kind of talk they are not doing. → The first of these is furnished by
turn-taking organisation, the second by adjacency pair organisation, and specifically by
hearing to be missing the kind of second pair part (or some kind of second pair part)
made relevant by a just-preceding first pair part.

But relevance rules contribute not only to how silences get heard, but also to how
the talk itself gets heard. Just as not talking after a question can thus be “not
answering,” so a great variety of talk after a question invites hearing as, and does get
heard as, “answering” (even if, on occasion, “answering indirectly”).

⇒ Application: Academic inquiry is sometimes puzzled by how some apparently

semantically unrelated talk gets heard as an answer, especially when trying to build the
“artificial intelligence” for computers to answer questions “naturally” or to recognize
answers. (For example, how can “It’s raining” – or even “Isn’t it raining?” – be a
recognizable answer to “Are we going to the game?”) What is critical here is that the
action which some talk is doing can be grounded in its position, not just the words that
compose it, but its placement after a question.

Talk after a question invites hearing for how it could be answering, and invites it
from those who can bring all the particulars of the setting to bear, rather than by some
general rules of interpretation. Just as the questioner presents a puzzle of sorts to its
recipient, so does the one who responds; that challenge is, “how is this an answer?”
and “what answer is it?” At the same time, doing something which is
analyzable/recognizable as a relevant second pair part is its speaker’s way of showing
an understanding that the prior turn was the sort of first pair part for which this is a
relevant second. Doing something which can be an answer displays an understanding
of the prior turn as a possible question.

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 Adjacency pairs organize with special potency these relevance rules, which can
imbue the talk following a first pair part with its sense or meaning, and can imbue the
absence of talk with sense or meaning or import as well.

Given, via the turn-taking organisation, that the absence of talk can be an event in
its own right, the adjacency pair’s relevance rules infuse it with a specifiable action
import. The first pair part thus sets powerful constraints of action (what the recipient
should do) and of interpretation (how what the recipient does should be understood) on
the moments just following it. Relevance rules are a key part of the glue that binds
actions together into coherent sequences. The earlier observation that counters
following first pair parts “reverse the direction of constraint” should now be more
readily accessible. The recipient of some first pair part is put under certain constraints
by it – either to do a relevant second pair part, or be heard as “not doing” such a
relevant second pair part.

2.2.4. Conclusion
What relevance rules do, then, is to set the initial terms for conduct and
interpretation in the next moments following their invocation. They do not define those
next moments and what occurs in them; virtually nothing in interaction is that
unilateral. But it is by reference to a first pair part that what follows gets selected,
done, and understood. The first pair part casts a web of meaning and interpretation
which informs the surrounding talk. But “surrounding talk” can include more than just
second pair parts. As we bring under examination more of the sequences which can
grow out of adjacency pairs, we will see how much more, and where.
V. Pomerantz: Agreeing and Disagreeing with assessments (Nguyễn Tường Vy)

1. Introduction
1.1. Assessments
When persons partake in social activities, they routinely make assessments.
Participating in an event and assessing that event are related enterprises.
(Pomerantz, 1984a: 57)
(1) (VIYMC 1:4)
J: Let's feel the water. Oh, it ...

75
 R: It's wonderful. It's just right. It's like bathtub water.
(Pomerantz, 1984a: 57)
In response to J’s suggestion to “feel the water”, R proffers a series of
assessments. The references within those assessments (“It's wonderful. It's just right.
It's like bathtub water.”) refer to the water that R claims. Assessments are produced as
products of participation; with an assessment, a speaker claims knowledge of that
which he or she is assessing.

1.2. Second assessments

Second assessments are assessments produced by recipients of prior assessments
in which the referents in the seconds are the same as those in the priors. Initial
assessments are notated with A1, second assessments with A2.

(Pomerantz, 1884, p.59)

(10) (JS:II:28)
A1 J: T’ s- tsuh beautiful day out isn’t

it? A2 L: Yeh it’s jus’ gorgeous ...

In a next turn to an assessment that invites agreement, a recipient may, and often
does, elect to agree with the prior. The initial assessment invites a subsequent
agreement; the second assessment is proffered as an agreement.

In proffering an initial assessment, a speaker formulates the assessment so as to

accomplish an action or multiple actions, for example, praise, complain, compliment,
insult, brag, self-deprecate. In the next turn to the initial proffering, an action by the
recipient is relevant: to agree or disagree with the prior.

(Pomerantz, 1984a: 63)

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 2. Second-assessment productions: agreement preferred
Subsequent to initial assessments that invite agreement, recipients' agreements
and disagreements, respectively, are performed in differently organized turns and
sequences.

(Pomerantz, 1984a: 64 & 65)

Sau các đánh giá ban đầu tạo ra sự tán thành, tán thành và không tán thành
tương ứng của người nhận được thực hiện theo các lượt và trình tự có tổ chức khác
nhau.

2.1. Agreements (agreement preferred)

For a recipient to agree with a prior assessment, he or she should show that his or
her assessment of the referent just assessed by the prior speaker stands in agreement
with the prior speaker's assessment. Different types of agreements are produced with
second assessments.

One type of agreement is the upgrade (nâng cấp). An upgraded agreement is an

assessment of the referent assessed in the prior that incorporates upgraded evaluation
terms relative to the prior. Two common techniques for upgrading evaluations are:

(1) A stronger evaluative term than the prior, given graded sets of
descriptors, is selected:

(18) (MC:1)
A: Isn't he cute
B: 0: :h he: :s a: :D0Rable
(2) An intensifier modifying the prior evaluative descriptor is included:
(24) (SBL:2.1.8.-5)
B: She seems like a nice little // lady

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 → A: Awfully nice little person.
Upgrades following assessments may be considered strong agreements on
sequential grounds. When they occur, they occur in agreement turns and sequences
and not in combinations with disagreements.

Another type of agreement is same evaluation (đánh giá tương đương). In this
type, a recipient asserts the same evaluation as the prior speaker's evaluation. To
assert the same evaluation, a recipient may repeat the prior evaluative terms, marking
it as a second in a like series with, for example, "too":

(19) (JK:3)
C: ... She was a nice lady --I liked her
→ G: I liked her too
or include proterms indicating same as prior:
(28) (GTS:4:15)
K: ... He's terrific!
→ J: He is.
The following data show that same evaluations, indicated by (1), may preface
disagreements, indicated by (2).

(30) (NB:IV:4)
P: I wish you were gunnuh sta:y
A: [1] I do too. [2] But I think Oh I've got suh damn much tuh do. I really, I've
gotta get home fer- hh I may stay next week.

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 A third type of agreement is the downgrade (hạ cấp). A downgraded agreement
is an assessment of the same referent as had been assessed in the prior with
scaled-down or weakened evaluation terms relative to the prior.

(31) (GJ: 1)
A: She's a fox!
→ L: Yeh, she's a pretty girl.
Downgraded agreements frequently engender disagreement sequences (chuỗi
không tán thành). One response that conversants make when disagreed with is to
reassert the positions that they have previously taken. In response to downgraded
assessments, participants often reassert stronger assessments.

(31) (GJ:1)
A: She's a fox.
L: Yeh, she's a pretty girl.
→ A: Oh, she's gorgeous!
On the basis that at least some downgraded agreements regularly engender
disagreement sequences, they, like same evaluation agreements, may be considered a
kind of weak agreement.

2.2. Disagreements (agreement preferred)

When conversants feel that they are being asked to agree with coconversants'
assessments, they may nonetheless find themselves in the position of disagreeing with
them. When a conversant hears a coparticipant's assessment being completed and his
or her own agreement/disagreement is relevant and due, he or she may produce
delays, such as "no talk," requests for clarification, partial repeats, and other repair
initiators, turn prefaces, and so on. Incorporating delay devices constitutes a typical
turn shape for disagreements when agreements are invited.

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 One type of delay device is "no immediately forthcoming talk." (không nói
ngay). Upon the completion of an assessment that invites agreement or confirmation,
a conversant, in the course of producing a disagreement, may initially respond with
silence. In the fragments below, gaps are notated with (→), disagreement turns with
(D).

(22) (NB:IV:11.-1)
A: God izn it dreary.
(→) (0.6)
A: //Y’know I don’t think-
(D) B: .hh It’s warm though,
Another class of delay devices includes repair initiators (khởi xướng chỉnh
sửa). In the course of producing a disagreement, a recipient may request clarification
with "what?" "Hm?" questioning repeats, and the like. In the following excerpts,
clarification requests are marked with (*), disagreements/ disconfirmations with (D).

(37) (TG:3)
A: ... You sound very far away.

(0.7)

(*) B: I do?
A: Meahm.
(D) B: mNo? I'm no:t,
Disagreement components may also be delayed within turns (trì hoãn trong lượt
lời). Conversants start the turns in which they will disagree in some systematic ways.
One way consists of prefacing the disagreement with "uh's," "well's" and the like, thus
displaying reluctancy or discomfort.

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 Another way is to preface the disagreement by agreeing with the prior speaker's
position. Agreement prefaces are of particular interest because agreements and
disagreements are, of course, contrastive components. When they are included within
a same turn, the agreement component is conjoined with the disagreement component
with a contrast conjunction like "but."

Agreement components that occur as disagreement prefaces regularly are weak

agreements. They are primarily agreement tokens, asserted or claimed agreements,
same evaluation agreements, and qualified or weakened agreements:

Tokens (biểu thị)

(40) (JG:II.1.-15)
C: ... you've really both basically honestly gone your own ways.
→ D: Essentially, except we've hadda good relationship et home.
→ C: "hhhh Ye:s, but I mean it's a relationship where ...
Asserted agreements (Tán thành khẳng định)
(43) (GTS 4:32)
R: Butchu admit he is having fun and you think it’s funny
→ K: I think it’s funny, yeah. But it’s a ridiculous funny
Weakened and/or qualified agreement assertions (Khẳng định tán thành yếu
và/hoặc đủ điều kiện)

(41) (MC:1.-13)
L: I know but I, I-I still say thet the sewing machine's quicker.
→ W: Oh it c'n be quicker but it doesn' do the jo:b,

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 Disagreement types may be differentiated as strong or weak on sequential
grounds: They differ in their relative capacities to co-occur with agreement
components.

A strong disagreement is one in which a conversant utters an evaluation which is

directly contrastive with the prior evaluation. Such disagreements are strong inasmuch
as they occur in turns containing exclusively disagreement components, and not in
combination with agreement components, for example:

(47) (SPC:144)
R: ... well never mind. It's not important.
→ D: Well, it is important.
The disagreements that occur in the agreement-plus-disagreement turns are not
the strong type. Co-occurring with agreements, the disagreement components are
formed as partial agreements/partial disagreements: as qualifications, exceptions,
additions, and the like.

(43) (GTS 4:32)

R: Butchu admit he is having fun and you think it’s funny.
→ K: I think it's funny, yeah. But it's a ridiculous funny.
K, after asserting an agreement ("I think it's funny, yeah"), produces a
qualification of the agreement by specifying a kind of funny ("it's a ridiculous
funny"). The disagreement component is formed as partial agreement/partial
disagreement with the prior.

When agreements are invited by initial assessments, disagreements that are

proffered regularly are performed in turns and sequences that exhibit the following
features: (1) the inclusion of delay devices prior to stated disagreements like silences,
hesitating prefaces, requests for clarification, and/or (2) the inclusion of weakly stated

82
disagreement components, that is, partial agreements/partial disagreements. These two
features - delaying the stated components of an action being performed, and/or
producing weakly stated components of that action - are partially constitutive of
turn/sequence organizations associated with dispreferred actions.

(Pomerantz, 1984a: 75)

These turn/sequence shapes not only house disagreements when agreements are
invited, but constitute part of the apparatus for accomplishing disagreements as
dispreferred. That the set of devices used in these turn/sequence shapes may be
oriented to as disagreements in the course of production provides for the possibility
and actualization of minimizing the occurrences of overtly stated disagreements in
these environments.

3. Second-assessment productions: agreement dispreferred

3.1. Disagreements with prior speakers' self-deprecations
When disagreements are performed, disagreement components generally occupy
the entire self-deprecation response units. That is, there are routinely no contrastive
components before or after the disagreements as part of the units.

(Pomerantz, 1984a: 83)

Partial repeats (lặp lại một phần). Disagreements may include partial repeats
that challenge and/or disagree with their priors.16 They are often followed in the same
turn or in a subsequent turn by other disagreement components. In the following
fragments, responses to self-deprecations include partial repeats (PR) followed by
stated disagreements (D):

(56) (AP:fn)
L: You're not bored (huh)?
(PR) S: Bored?=

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 (D) S: =No. We're fascinated.
Negations (thương lượng). Disagreements may include negations like "no,"
"hm-mh," "not." A "no" may occur as a first component in an answer to a
selfdeprecating question:

(60) (JG:2)
R: Did she get my card.

C: Yeah she gotcher

card.

R: Did she t'ink it was terrible

→ C: No she thought it was very adohrable.
or as a first component in a response to a self-deprecating assertion:
(55) (SBL:2.2.3.-15)
A: ... I feel like uh her and I play alike hehh
→ B: No. You play beautifully.
A disagreement may be an assertion that contains the prior deprecating term
negated with a "not":

(62) (JK:1)
G: ... but it' s not bad for an old lady.
→ C: You're not old, Grandma ...
Compliments (Khen ngợi). Disagreements with prior self-deprecations very
frequently include evaluative terms. Such terms are contrastively classed relative to
the prior self-deprecatory formulations; they are favorable, complimentary evaluative
terms:

84
 (64) (MC)
C: ... 'ere Momma She talks better than I do
→ B: Aw you talk fine
Disagreements with prior self-deprecations are performed as stated
disagreements. Even in a minimal disagreement, a stated disagreement component
such as "no" is employed, followed by a shift in referent and/or topic:

(67) (fn)
C: I'm talking nonsense now
→ A: No::
A: but I think I'm ready for dinner anyway.
(1) A speaker may disagree by proffering an assessment that claims access to the
attribute critically assessed, that is by proffering a contrastive second assessment
(compliment and/or negation).

(55) (SBL:2.2.3.-15)
A: ... I feel like uh her and I play alike hehh
→ B: No. You play beautifully.
(2) A speaker may disaffiliate with a prior critical assessment by proffering an
assessment that makes no claim of access, that is, by proffering a critical assessment
of the prior talk.

(59) (JG:4.6.-6)
C: I have no dates. I don't go: there // is no sense in hanging onto the

clothes. J: Are you-) ((high pitch))

85
 J: Wha do ya mean you don't have any da:tes.

((low pitch))

C: Well: I just don't go out anymore that's all.

→ J: Oh: that's ridiculous.
(3) A speaker may undermine a prior self-critical assessment by more favorably
recategorizing or reformulating the self-deprecating attribute. Instances include:

(68) (JG:3C.-7)
R: 'hh But I'm only getting a C on my report card in math.
→ C: Yeh but that's passing Ronald,
R's self-deprecatory formulation, "only .. . a C is a member of the collection of
letter grades that has other members ("A" and "B") ranked above it. C's formulation
"passing" involves a shift to the collection of grades, "pass"-"fail," where the selection
is the success member of the set.

(69) (MC:1.-38)
W: Yet I've got quite a distance tun go yet.
→ L: Everybody has a distance.
In response to W's self-deprecation, L proposes that W's condition is a general
condition ("Everybody has a distance"). By proposing that it is a common and normal
condition L undermines the validity of W's self-deprecation.

(4) A speaker may undermine a prior self-deprecation by proposing that it is a

product of an improper activity.

(73) (GTS: 1:19)

86
 R: We're mentally ill , children, run ehhehhh
→ L: ahh ha ha ha ha hehh What' s wrong with you today?
3.2. Agreements with prior speakers' self-deprecations
Agreements with prior self-deprecations may be performed with stated agreement
components. When they are, they are accomplished, prevalently, with weak agreement
types.

(Pomerantz, 1984a: 90)

One kind of agreement that occurs in response to self-deprecations is formed by
the recipient proffering a second self-deprecation (lời tự phê phán thứ hai),
formulating it as second in an agreement sequence. The deprecating attribute that the
prior speaker claimed may also be claimed by the recipient:

(74) (EB:1:2)
B: Not only that he gets everything done.

(pause)

B: Everybody else- not everybody else, I have my desk full of trash.

→ S: Me too ...
or may be upgraded by the recipient:
(75) (SBL:2.2.3.-20)
A: And I shoulda went back tuh diamonds.
→ B: I think we were // all so

confused, A: So-

87
 → B: I know I wasn' t bidding right, I wasn' t -- eh playing right, I wa'nt doing
anything right

With responses such as "Me too" and "I think we were all so confused" recipients
implicitly agree with the prior self-deprecations by proposing themselves as "also"
instances. The agreements are weak in that though they agree they simultaneously
undermine the prior self-deprecations by proposing that the prior deprecating
attributes are more generally shared and/or are less negative than prior speakers had
proposed.

(Pomerantz, 1984a: 90)

Another type of stated agreement with a prior self-deprecation is a confirmation
of the prior. Confirmations, as well, tend to be done in weak forms. One way to
weaken a confirmation is with a suppositional:

(76) (MC:1.-23)
W: ... Do you know what I was all that time?

L: (No).

W: Pavlov's dog.

(2.0)

→ L: (I suppose),
The productions of weak agreement components subsequent to selfdeprecations
may be seen to be an artifact of the dispreferred status of the action, criticizing one's
coparticipants. Given the relevance of coparticipant criticism in the position of
responding to self-deprecations and the norms constraining it, responses that exhibit
dispreferred-action turn shape, like weakly stated agreements, constitute a way of
performing coparticipant criticism and are interpretable as such.

(Pomerantz, 1984a: 91)

88
 A recipient of a prior self-deprecation may produce a response that is neither an
agreement nor a disagreement. Two frequently occurring classes of such responses
include (1) silences, that is, no immediate forthcoming talk, and (2)
acknowledgments.

(1) When a speaker producing a self-deprecation reaches a possible turn

completion point and stops talking, a recipient may respond with no
immediate forthcoming talk. When both parties are silent, a gap emerges.

(Pomerantz, 1984a: 91)

(77) (GTS: 2.-15)
K: I couldn't, I'm a weak //

ling. (): hmhl

→ (1.0)
K: I am. I'm comin t'that conclusion. I'm a damn weakling.
→ 1.0
Recipients' silences after prior speakers' self-deprecations are responses that
exhibit dispreferred-action turn shape. They constitute a turn shape associated with
coparticipant criticism, that is, delaying (or withholding) potential agreements with
prior self-deprecations.

Rather than wait out a recipient response, the prior speaker quite frequently will
resume talk if a recipient silence (or gap) begins to emerge. These alternatives after a
gap are contrasted:

Potential Agreement Is

Actualized A: [Self Deprecation]

[Gap]

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 → B: [Agreement]
Potential Agreement Is Unactualized

A: [Self Deprecation]

[Gap]
→ A: [Resumption]
(Pomerantz, 1984a: 92)
(2) When a speaker producing a self-deprecation reaches a turn completion point,
a recipient may produce an acknowledgement in response such as "uh huh" "mm hm."
Acknowledgements are different from agreements. With agreements - for example,
assessments - recipients of prior assessments claim access to the referents assessed;
with acknowledgments they acknowledge prior deliveries but make no claims of
independent access.

(Pomerantz, 1984a: 93)

(79) (SBL:2.2.3.-27)
B: .. . I wasn't understanding anybody today.
→ A: Uh huh,
When a self-deprecation is neither overtly confirmed nor denied, as in recipient
silence or acknowledgment, the self-deprecating party often will extend the sequence,
the extensions providing subsequent turn spaces for recipient's
disagreements/agreements:

(78) (SBL:2.1.7.-4)
B: Weh-Bea, uh it's just wuh- uh as I say uh I sometimes feel I'm too critical
of these people, an' I have to restrain myself, an' I-cause I think "How do I know. I-I
dunno what their mind works like,' '

90
 A: Mn hm,
→ B: Uh y'know? -how it

is, A: Yeah.

When no overt disagreement is made, the self-deprecating party tends to treat the
self-deprecation as implicitly confirmed by the recipient. The prior self-deprecatory
assertion(s) may be referred to by the self-deprecating party as already established and
accepted between the parties in productions of admissions, justifications,
explanations, laughter, and the like.

(81) (SBL:2.2.3.-13)
(SD) B: ... course I shouldn' be s'damn nosey

either. (Ackn) A: Mn,

→ B: Heh heh heh // heh heh heh 'hh

A: Well I know she musta thought ..
When conversants agree with prior self-deprecations, the turns and sequences are
shaped the same as when agreements are preferred and conversants disagree. For
example, one turn/sequence shape associated with each of these actions in their
respective environments is no immediate forthcoming talk by a recipient of the prior
assessment. When an initial assessment invites agreement and the recipient is silent,
the silence is a way of performing (and is interpretable as such) an unstated, or
as-yet-unstated disagreement. When a recipient of a self-deprecation is silent, that
silence is a way of performing (and is interpretable as such) an unstated, or
as-yet-unstated agreement/coparticipant criticism. A question arises as to what the
actions have in common if a silence is interpretable as an instance of disagreement in
the one environment and of agreement/coparticipant criticism in the other.

91
 An answer to this question may be found in the preference/dispreference statuses
of these actions. In the first environment, the relevant alternative actions for recipients
are agreement/disagreement; in the second, disagreements and agreements take the
form of coparticipant praise/coparticipant criticism.

1
A: Initial assessment that invites agreement
→ B: Agreement/Disagreement

A: Self-deprecation
→ B: Coparticipant praise/Coparticipant criticism
VI. Strategies to preferred and dispreferred seconds: Disagreeing in English and
Vietnamese

1. Strategies for Disagreements as Dispreferred Seconds

1.1. English corpus (Ngô Bá Tùng)

a) Delay devices: In interactional exchanges, the initiating of assessments is often

treated as a way of inviting agreements from co-participants. However, not all
the responses are agreements. According to the data, English Ss tend to delay
or withhold stated disagreements and avoid early delivery of negative answers
within turns and sequences. Such markers as partial repeats (e.g. ‘I do’), repair
initiators (e.g. ‘I mean’), turn prefaces (e.g. ‘Well’, ‘Er’), requests for
clarification (e.g. ‘What?’, ‘Hm’) and so on so forth are frequently employed to
signal the special turn shapes for disagreements as dispreferreds. The following
fragments can be good examples:

(33) Angel: I don’t think Nick would play such a dirty trick on you.

→ Brit: Well, you obviously don’t know Nick very well.

(Finegan 2004: 309)

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 b) Silences: Pomerantz (1984a) and Goodwin & Goodwin (1987) assume that
pauses and silences following the prior assessments are comprehended as
second Ss’ signals of yet-stated disagreements. In the example by Goodwin &
Goodwin (1987: 43) given below, Curt’s forthright disagreement finally comes
after two pauses leading to Mike’s prolonging his turn and the whole
sequence:

(34) Mike: Well I can’t say they’re ol: clunkers- eez gotta

Co:rd? (0.1)

Mike: Two

Co:rds. (1.0)

Mike: //And

Curt: Not original,

c) Downgrading prior assessments: Native speakers sometimes express their

negative answers by downgrading or qualifying the already stated evaluations,
as in the following extract by Pomerantz (1978: 96):

(36) E: That Pat. Isn’t she a do::ll?

→ M: Yeh isn’t she pretty,

Not completely agreeing with and not wishing to publicly be opposite to the
coconversant, M chooses the strategy of downgrading levels of first assessments.

English Ss can also make use of such downtoners as kind of, sort of, a bit, nearly,
almost, slightly, somewhat etc., which will be examined in Chapter five, to qualify
their disagreements, as in an extract by Pomerantz (Ibid.):

(38) A: Oh it was just beautiful.

→ B: … uh I thought it was quite nice.

d) ‘Agreement + Disagreement’ format: English speakers may deploy the

‘agreement plus disagreement’ format or weak disagreement, accompanied
with ‘but’ as in another example by Pomerantz (1984a: 72):

(39) D: We’ve got sm pretty // (good schools.)

93
 → C: Well, yeah but where in the hell em I gonna live.

Disagreements might also be delayed within the turn construction. Ss may

preface disagreement components with “uh’s”, “well’s” (as in the above extract) and
so on, expressing discomfort or inconvenience.

The interesting and mysterious combination of agreeing and disagreeing in this

format is worth noting. In essence, agreements and disagreements are contrastive
elements, and in theory, they should go in opposing directions. In this special format,
however, they go together and form a type of weak or partial disagreements, as in the
two fragments below by Pomerantz (1984a: 73):

(40) R: Butchu admit he is having fun and you think it’s funny.

→ K: I think it’s funny, yeah. But it’s a ridiculous funny.

(41) A: … cause those things take working

at, (2.0)

→ B: (hhhhh) well, they // do, but

A: They aren’t accidents,

→ B: No, they take working at but on the other hand, some people …

Supposing that the agreement tokens in the excerpts above were left out, the
disagreements would then be judged as strong, as the evaluation components would be
directly contrastive with the prior.

1.2 Vietnamese corpus (Nguyễn Tường Vy)

a) Delay devices: When Vietnamese Ss find themselves in disagreement with

prior assessments, they may delay their outright answers by asking for more
information or clarification, as in the following extract:

V03.9.56.

(42) B. … Và nhiều cái nó làm tôi thấy là đầu t- không hợp lý.

and many classifier he do I see be investment no reasonable

(And lots of what he’s done can be considered unsound investment.)

H. Nh- ng mà nó vẫn kiếm tiền tốt.

94
 But he already get money good

(But he can still make plenty of money.)

B: Cái kiếm tiền của thằng N ấy (0.5) tớ thấy không phải là tốt.

classifier get money of address-term N that I see no must be good

(I don’t think the way N makes his money is good.)

H: Ờ, sao lại không tốt?

Yeah why particle no good

(Yeah, why isn’t it good?)

B. Mới chỉ là bằng cái cơ bắp thôi.

New only be equal classifier classifier muscle already

(He’s just used his muscles.)

→ H. Ai bảo bạn là cơ bắp?

Who say you be muscle

(Who told you [he’s just used his] muscle?)

The use of first person pronoun in the prior turn is worth noting. The first S, a
mid-aged man named B, uses ‘tí’ in talking with H, his female classmate at school, and
this exhibits their friendship and closeness. This term for self-reference is exploited in
informal talk between peers and sometimes, in downward speech, from the superior to
the inferior. The talk, assumed to be intimate and open, takes place in B’s house, when
H comes to visit B. Perhaps, all these things affect the way in which the two
conversationalists word their ideas and evaluations.

H does not agree with B in his assessment of N, their mutual friend at school, and
she uses ‘Nh-ng mµ’ (But) to point out the fact that N can still make a lot of money.
When B insists on his view, H prefaces her request for reason with an agreement
element ‘Ờ, Sao lại không tốt?’ (Yeah, why isn’t it good?). Her asking about the
source of information ‘Ai bảo…?’ (Who told…?) is deployed as a way of expressing
disagreeing, and it deserves to be mentioned. It provides the second S with a chance to
better understand her partner’s stance, and at the same time, it helps her avoid
producing an outright disagreement, which might make her sound too critical or

95
aggressive. Vietnamese Ss in my data are inclined to make frequent use of this way to
perform their disagreement.

b) Silences: Native Vietnamese Ss also deploy silences or pauses to signal

potential disagreements in face-to-face interactions. In the fragment given
below, B and H are talking about their mutual friend at school, who is now a
director in a joint-venture. H’s second assessment is followed by B’s long
silence of four seconds, causing H to reassert her evaluation. Only after H’s
completion of her reassertion does B’s forthright disagreement come.

V03.9.57

(44) H: Đàn bà... thế là quá giỏi rồi.

Woman … that be much excellent already

(Women… [like her] are really excellent.)

B. Tớ...mà có vợ nh- thế tới không thích.

I…particle have wife like that I not like

(I don’t like to have a wife like that.)

H: Ông không thích nh- ng mà ng- ời ta thích.

Grandfather not like but particle people like

(You don’t like but people do.)

→ B: (4.0)

H: Ông không thích nh- ng mà ng- ời khác

thích. Grandfather not like but particle

people like (You don’t like but people do.)

→ B. Tớ quan điểm khác.

I point of view different

(I have a different point of view.)

96
 It is of interest to talk about the use of reference terms in this recording. H, a
female friend of B, addresses him as ‘ông’ (grandfather), which is a typical kinship
term used among friends and peers. ‘ông’ in this case indicates that the gender of the
interlocutor is male, and its equivalent for a female is ‘Bà’ (grandmother). When used
in this way, these kinship terms do not demonstrate the normal relationship between
relatives. B in this extract, however, does not make use of ‘Bà’. He uses ‘Tớ’, a first
person pronoun used in informal talk between peers. The utility of person reference
terms in this fragment exhibits an informal and friendly atmosphere.

c) Downgrading prior assessments: The second Ss in the Vietnamese data may

disagree with the first Ss by softening and rewording prior assessments. In the
excerpt given below, T qualifies the frequency of the action mentioned by the
first S, leading to a weakened disagreement within his turn:

V03.8.46.

(45) D: T. Này “chat” ghê lắm ...suốt ngày lên mạng.

T (proper name) this chat extremely much …. all day go up net

(This boy T. chats a great deal…all day on line.)

→ T: Thỉnh thoảng.

Sometimes (Sometimes.)

In other cases, second Ss make use of the preferred format by initially agreeing
and then downgrading prior assessments, thereby producing weak disagreements. The
following fragment may serve as an example:

V03.9.55

(46) B: N- ớc ấy nó cũ::ng (0.5) Kỹ thuật của nó cũng mạnh phết đấy.

Country that it a:::lso technology of it also strong intensifer particle

(That country is also (0.5) its technology is also very powerful.)

→ H: õ, kỹ thuật của nó thì: (1.0) cũng

khá. Yeah technology of it be also

good (Yeah, its technology is also

good.)

97
 B: Cũng siêu phết đấy. Nhất là nông nghiệp của nó (1.0) rất giỏi...

Also super intensifier particle especially agriculture of it very

good (It’s excellent. Especially its agriculture (1.0) is really

good.)

As clearly seen, after agreeing with B’s assessment, H qualifies it by proposing a

lower level of evaluation. Her so doing causes her co-conversant to reaffirm his
position, adding more turns to the sequence to strengthen his point. B seems to adhere
to emphasizers like “rất”, “phết” make clear his stance.

d) ‘Agreement + disagreement’ format: Subsequent Ss in Vietnamese may first

agree with prior assessments, and then begin their contrastive evaluation with
‘but’, i.e., they deploy the ‘agreement plus disagreement’ format, as in:

V03.5.21

(47) H: Con gái nó thuần hơn.

Classifier girl pronoun obedient more

(Girls are more obedient.)

→ V: õ, (1.0) nh-ng mà con trai bây giờ

thì… Yeah but classifier boy now

be… (Yeah, but boys are now…)

Vietnamese Ss tend to make advantage of particles like ‘nào’, ‘nhỉ’, ‘ư’, ‘nhé’,
‘đấy’, ‘đâu’, ‘đó’, ‘vâng’ etc. Among them ‘ạ’ and ‘vâng’ are often utilized in upward
speech from the inferior to the superior or from the junior to the senior (Vu T. T. H.
1997, 2000) to express respect and deference; therefore, they are called
politeness/deference markers or honorifics (cf. Nguyen D. H. 1995). Let us have a look
at the following example:

V03.6.21

(48) H: Con giai là ch-a:: ch-a theo quỹ đạo (1.0) cho nên là bố phải rèn

Classifier boy be not yet follow orbit for need be father must

train nhiều (((c- ời)))…

98
much ((laughs))

99
 (Boys aren’t very obedient, so fathers have to pay more attention.)

→ N: Không phải thế ạ.

No must that particle-

ạ (That’s not true.)

N’s father, a friend of Ms. H, says that he pays more attention to his son N than to
his daughter, N’s older sister. In the excerpt above, H tries to verbally interpret the
father’s purpose of so doing. N, a first-year student at Hanoi Conservatory, is not in
agreement with H, as her overgeneralization might allude that he is among those who
are not very obedient. Although his utterance is full of contrastive components, and the
English version may sound too forthright, his wording in Vietnamese would be judged
as respectful and acceptable thanks to the use of the sentence-final particle ‘¹’. The
politeness level of an utterance in Vietnamese is commonly carried out via the use of
such semantic items as appropriate address terms, particles and other supportive
devices to show solidarity, intimacy, respect and deference, leading to high degree of
discourse indirectness. From time to time, the appropriate level of formality may be of
great help.

In the next fragment, A states her disagreement right after her teacher assesses
the college entrance exams. Her using ‘J’ twice within the turn increases the level of
politeness and respect necessary in her upward speech to her teacher. A’s ‘unpolished’
answer can be treated as an exaggeration in terms of meaning, but it is fine from the
viewpoint of socially accepted norms.

V03.4.13

(49) C: … việc thi rất khó …sẽ đào tạo (1.0) sẽ chọn đ-ợc nhân tài

…work exam very difficult … will train will select gifted

thực sự để vào đại học

really for go college

‘…difficult exams … will train will help select really gifted students

for colleges.’

→ A: Không có đâu ạ. Tiêu cực vẫn cực nhiều luôn ạ.

No have where marker-¹ negative also extremely many often marker-¹

100
 (No, it’s not. There are still a great many secret deals.)

However, ‘ạ’ is not always treated as a means of displaying respect to people

hierarchically higher than second-assessment profferers. In the example given below,
‘ạ’ just plays its normal role of a particle, as there is no need to use it to demonstrate
deference and respect in talk between peers. Also, the use of “cực” as an amplifier in
“cực nhiều” helps to increase the impact of the disagreeing attribute.

4.2.2.3. Comments

The proffering of disagreements as dispreferred seconds is produced in turns and

sequences typically characterized by delaying the overtly stated contrastive
components and performing weakened or qualified assertions. Such turns and
sequences are exploited to express disagreements as unfavorable, and at the same time,
they are oriented to in talk-in-progress to minimize explicitly stated disagreement
tokens.

The data show that Vietnamese Ss construct their disagreements within turns and
sequences in nearly the same ways as the English Ss do. Vietnamese Ss may exploit (i)
delay devices such as asking for more elaboration or evidence to hedge or withhold
their opposite opinion, (ii) silences and pauses to inform interlocutors of upcoming
disagreements. They can sometimes indicate unwillingness or reluctance not to be in
accord with co-participants by (iii) downgrading or modifying/softening prior
assessments, or they may utilize (iv) ‘agreement plus disagreement’ format.
Intensifiers including emphasizers, amplifiers and downtoners (Quirk et al. 1972) are
observed to be exploited in both English and Vietnamese disagreements.

The striking differences that emerge are in the pervasive use of pronouns and
particles in Vietnamese. Unlike English, Vietnamese is full of personal pronouns and
kinship terms (both fictive and non-fictive use) deployed for self-reference or address.
It is the appropriate use of particles, as well as person-referring terms that contribute
much to the production of polite and socially acceptable disagreements. English Ss
probably make more use of repair work, turn prefaces and backchannels (“hm”, “mh”
and the like) compared with their Vietnamese counterparts

2. Strategies for Disagreements as Preferred Seconds

2.1. English corpus (Phạm Phương Uyên)

2.1.1. Immediate disagreements

The English data exhibit that conversationalists tend to avoid dispreferred format
when interacting with others. It is the fact that they are inclined to delay, withhold or

101
qualify their disagreements with prefaces, hesitations, silences, repair initiators and the
like. This, of course, does not mean that English Ss never forthrightly disagree with
their co-conversants. Strong and immediate disagreements are prone to appear after
prior self-deprecations. Disagreements in such cases generally occupy entire turns
subsequent to self deprecation. Second Ss may partially repeat (PR) prior
self-deprecations and then overtly stated disagreement (D) with profferers of
self-deprecations, as in an example by Pomerantz (1984a: 83):

(50) B: …I’m tryina get slim.

(PR) A: Ye:ah? // You get slim, my heavens.

B: heh heh heh heh hh hh

(D) A: You don’t need to get any slimmah,

Such negations as ‘no’, ‘hm-mh’, and ‘not’ may occur in initial spaces in turns
containing answers to self-deprecatory formulations. The following extracts by
Pomerantz (1984a: 84) might be good examples of this kind:

(51) R: Did she get my card?

C: Yeah she gotcher card.

R: Did she t’ink it was terrible?

→ C: No she thought it was very adohrable.

(52) B: I was wondering if I’d ruined yer- weekend // by

uh A: No. No. Hm-mh. No. I just love to have-

a) Partial repeats
b) Negations

6.2.1.2 Compliments
It is obvious that disagreements subsequent to prior self-deprecations are likely to
contain evaluative components. As oppositions to self deprecating assessments, they
are constructed as positive, complimentary attributes. Pomerantz (1984a: 85)
exemplifies this view in the extracts below:

(53) C: …’ere Momma She talks better than I do.

102
 → B: Aw you talk fine.

(54) B: And I never was a grea(h)t Bri(h)dge play(h)er Clai(h)

re, A: Well I think you’ve always been real good,

Given that a self-deprecatory formulation is produced the next S’s response is

made due and relevant in the subsequent turn. The mechanism of preference
organisation in this case is the reverse of the normal case. Agreements turn out to be
dispreferred seconds and disagreements preferred seconds. The reason is simple:
agreements with self-critical assessments are interpreted as criticisms, and
disagreements are conceived as favorable, positively evaluative tokens. As a result,
disagreements with self denigration are performed in preferred-action turns and
sequences.

Disagreements as preferred seconds tend to be overtly stated in a range of various

forms. Second Ss may, for instance, proffer assessments quite contrastive to prior self
deprecating assessments as in the example by Pomerants (1984a: 87):

(55) A: … I’m so dumb I don’t even know it. hhh! – heh!

→ B: Y-no, y-you’re not du:mb, …
6.2.1.3 Undermining self-denigrations
Recipients may criticize self-deprecatory formulations, hence disaffiliating with
their validity, as below:

(56) C: I have no dates. I don’t go: there // is no sense in hanging onto the
clothes

J: (Are you-) ((high pitch))

J: Wha do ya mean you don’t have any da:tes. ((low pitch))

C: Well: I just don’t go out anymore that’s all.

→ J: Oh: that’s ridiculous. (Pomerantz 1984a: 87)

By undermining, recategorizing or reformulating self-critical assessments, second
Ss can produce pleasing disagreements with first Ss. They may, from time to time,
show that prior self-deprecations are not proper actions, as in (Ibid. 88):

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 (57) W: And I’m being irritable right now by telling you so,
→ L: Ah! Ah! .HHHH No. hehhhheh! No but- but uh-yuh-Wilbur agai::n.
again. Stop trying to do this of your se:lf. (1.2)—leave it alone en you’ll be
shown the way to overcome it.

Second Ss may undermine prior self-deprecatory formulations by suggesting that

they are common and normal. It is of interest to pay attention to the deployment of
emphasizers, amplifiers or downtoners in English disagreements. These two points are
illustrated in the following extract:

(58) W: Yet I’ve got quite a distance tuh go yet.

→ L: Everybody has a distance. Pomerantz (1984a: 87)
Native English Ss in disagreements to prior self-deprecations are observed to act
quite directly. They may explicitly negate the first assessments, provide compliments
or downgrade their seriousness.

2.2. Vietnamese corpus (Đào Kiều Trang)

2.2.1 Immediate disagreements

When Vietnamese Ss find themselves in disagreement with prior assessments,

they may delay their outright answers by asking for more information or clarification,
as in the following extract:

V03.9.56.
(3) B. …Và nhiều cái nó làm tôi thấy là đầu tư không hợp

lý. and many classifier he do I see be investment no reasonable

(And lots of what he’s done can be considered unsound investment.)

H. Nhưng mà nó van kiếm tiền tốt.
But he already get money good.
(But he can still make plenty of money.)

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 B: Cái kiếm tiền của thằng N ấy (0.5) tớ thấy không phải là tốt.
classifier get money of address-term N that I see no must be good (I don’t
think the way N makes his money is good.)

H: Ờ, sao lại không tốt?

Yeah why particle no good (Yeah, why isn’t it good?)
B. Mới chỉ là bằng cái cái cơ bắp thôi.
New only be equal classifier classifier muscle
already (He’s just used his muscles.)

H. Ai bảo bạn là cơ bắp?

Who say you be muscle
(Who told you [he’s just used his] muscle?)
The use of first person pronouns in the prior turn is worth noting. The first S, a
mid-aged man named B, uses ‘tớ’ in talking with H, his female classmate at school,
and this exhibits their friendship and closeness. This term for self-reference is
exploited in informal talk between peers and sometimes, in downward speech, from
the superior to the inferior. The talk, assumed to be intimate and open, takes place in
B’s house, when H comes to visit B. Perhaps, all these things affect the way in which
the two conversationalists word their ideas and evaluations.

H does not agree with B in his assessment of N, their mutual friend at school, and
she uses ‘Nhưng mà’ (But) to point out the fact that N can still make a lot of money.
When B insists on his view, H prefaces her request for reason with an agreement
element ‘Ờ, sao lại không tốt?’ (Yeah, why isn’t it good?). Her asking aboutthe source
of information ‘Ai bảo…?’ (Who told…?) is deployed as a way of expressing
disagreeing, and it deserves to be mentioned. It provides the second S with a chance to
better understand her partner’s stance, and at the same time, it helps her avoid
producing an outright disagreement, which might make her sound too critical or
aggressive. Vietnamese Ss in my data are inclined to make frequent use of this way to
perform their disagreement.

In the fragment below, L requests evidence of the information source as she talks
with her classmate about the college entrance exams they just sat.

V03.8.45

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 (3) T: Căn bản là khối A năm nay khó hơn.
essential be block A year present difficult more
(Essentially, group A is moredifficult this year.)

→ L: Ai bảo thế?
Who tell that
(Who told (you) that?)
T: Ðiểm cao hơn nhiều.
Mark high more a lot
(The marks are a lot higher.)

→ L. Ðiểm cao là do mọi người thi giỏi nên điễm nó mới cao.
Mark high be as all beings exam excellent so mark it new high
(They’re high because the candidates did so well in the exams.)

L’s using of ‘Ai bảo…’ (Who told…) seems a way of withholding or hiding her
different point of view. She might change her stance if her partner has good reasons
for his assessment. She may also go on stating her disagreeing if he does not.

In short, the second Ss in these extracts seem to wish their interlocutors to either
prove or elaborate their assertions before verbally stating their opposite positions. In
other words, they use different delay devices to initiate chances for the first Ss to
somehow reconstruct the prior evaluations.

6.2.2.2 Complementary components

1. Native Vietnamese Ss also deploy silences or pauses to signal potential
disagreements in face-to-face interactions. In the fragment given below, B and
H are talking about their mutual friend at school, who is now adirector in a
joint-venture. H’s second assessment is followed by B’s long silence of four
seconds, causing H toreassert her evaluation. Only after H’s completion of her
reasserton does B’s forthright disagreement come.

V03.9.57
(3) H: Ðàn bà…thế là quá giỏi rồi.
Woman … that be much excellent already
(Women… [like her] are reallyexcellent.)

B. Tớ…mà có vợ như thế tớ không thích.

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 I…particle have wife like that I not like (I don’t like to have a
wife like that.)

H: Ông không thích nhưng mà người ta thích. Grandfather not

like butparticle people like (You don’t like but people do.)

→ B: (4.0)

H: Ông không thích nhưng người khác thích. Grandfather not

like butpeople other like (You don’t like but other people do.)

→ B. Tớ quan điểm khác.

I point of view different
(I have a different point of view.)
It is of interest to talk about the use of reference terms in this recording. H, a
female friend of B, addresses him as ‘Ông’ (grandfather), which is a typical kinship
term used among friends and peers. ‘Ông’ in this case indicates that the gender of the
interlocutor is male, and its equivalent for a female is ‘Bà’ (grandmother). When used
in this way, these kinship terms do not demonstrate the normal relationship between
relatives. B in this extract, however, does not make use of ‘Bà’. He uses ‘Tớ’, a first
person pronoun used in informal talk between peers. The utility of person reference
terms in this fragment exhibits an informal and friendly atmosphere.

6.2.2.3 Undermining self-denigrations

1. The second Ss in the Vietnamese data may disagree with the first Ss by
softening and rewording prior assessments. In the excerpt given below, T
qualifies the frequency of the action mentioned by the first S, leading to a
weakened disagreement within his turn:

V03.8.46.
(3) D: T. này “chát” ghê lắm …suốt ngày lên mạng.
T (proper name) this chat extremely much …. all day go up net

(This boy T. chats a great deal…all day on line.)

→ T: Thỉnh thoảng.
Sometimes (Sometimes.)

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 In other cases, second Ss make use of the preferred format by initially agreeing
and then downgrading prior assessments, thereby producing weak disagreements. The
following fragment may serve as an example:

V03.9.55
(4) B: Nước ấy nó cũ::ng (0.5) Kỹ thuật của nó cũng mạnh phết đấy.

Country that it a:::lso technology of it also strong intensifer particle

(That country is also (0.5) its technology is also very powerful.)

→ H: Ừ, kỹ thuật của nó thì: (1.0) cũng khá.

Yeah technology of it be also good (Yeah, its technology is alsogood.)

B: Cũng siêu phết đấy. Nhất là nông nghiệp của nó (1.0) rất giỏi….

Also super intensifier particle especially agriculture of it very good (It’s

excellent. Especially its agriculture (1.0) is really good.)

As clearly seen, after agreeing with B’s assessment, H qualifies it by proposing a

lower level of evaluation. Her so doing causes her co-conversant to reaffirm his
position, adding more turns to the sequence to strengthen his point. B seems to adhere
to emphasizers like “rất”, “phết” make clear his stance.

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