Assess the aims of Hitler’s foreign policy in the period 1933–41.

Hitler had a variety of motives in the period. Revising the Treaty of Versailles, creating a Greater Germany, Lebensraum in Eastern Europe, and arguably racial imperialism.
Domination of Europe, military strength, and then arguably global conquest. He also wanted to avoid a two- front war with the Soviet Union for as long as possible and until
Western Europe was defeated. His foreign policy was also designed to increase his own popularity at home, at least in the early years and finally he wanted to make Germany
economically self-sufficient using Autarky from 1936 to allow war to be followed as a policy. He intended to make himself the Master of Foreign Policy replacing traditional
diplomats such as Von Neurath with Von Ribbentrop and military tactics, replacing Von Blomberg and Von Fritsch with Keitel. From 1933 he wanted German equality and
revoked the Treaty of Versailles, left the World Disarmament Conference and then the League of Nations. 1935 saw the Saar Plebiscite and the Anglo-German Naval Treaty,
1936 the reoccupation of the Rhineland, a decisive step, which showed neither France nor Britain would stand up to him at this stage. The Spanish Civil War was simply a
chance to test his air force. The RomeBerlin-Tokyo Axis was an anti-Soviet alliance and the Hossbach Memorandum of 1937 set out his future plans. 1938 saw the Anschluss
and then the Munich Agreement handing Germany the Sudetenland. Hitler in his foreign policy was playing on the Pro-Appeasement policies of Britain and France whilst
regaining territory taken at the Treaty of Versailles. 1939 was a decisive year in his occupation of Rump Czechoslovakia and the NaziSoviet Pact of August 1939. The Pact of
Steel with Italy might be mentioned here too. September 1st and the invasion brought war and then Hitler’s aims were to quickly conquer Western Europe which he did
apart from Britain. In 1941 Germany launched Operation Barbarossa which has racial and economic and political motives

Evaluate the causes of the Great Terror.

The murder of Kirov in 1934 is usually seen as a starting point of the Great Terror and the fact that Stalin felt threatened at the 17th party Congress and there was pen
questioning of his economic policies. This lead on to the removal of former Bolsheviks and rivals in the show trials of the 16, 17 and 21. These were state managed with pre-
determined outcomes and held in public to demonstrate Stalin’s power. Rivals such as Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky were all removed. The Yezhovschina
starting in 1936 was a mass and indiscriminate use of terror orchestrated by Yezhov, who had in turn replaced Yagoda, who was later executed. These purges involved
wholesale murder and involved the general population and were designed to subdue the population. In 1938 Yezhov was replaced by Beria, who continued terror and made
the Gulags part of the economic system of the Soviet Union. Yezhov was executed to show that no one was safe and indeed, he was publicly blamed for the excesses of the
Yezhovschina. During the Great Terror there was also the purge of the military. Motives might include removing rivals, subduing the population, providing cheap labour for
the Five-Year Plans, but also the character of Stalin and the nature of the Soviet State. This also leads on the degree of centralised control or local excess by the NKVD and
local party bosses.

Assess the impact of Mussolini’s foreign policy on Italy.

Responses may consider the significance of events such as the Corfu Incident, the Stresa Front, attempted Anschluss by Germany in 1934, the Abyssinian Crisis, The Rome
Berlin Tokyo Axis, the Munich meetings, the Pact of Steel and the Cavallero Memorandum. When looking at the foreign policy actions of Mussolini it is important to look at
his aims, actions, and the outcomes of his policies. His aim to create a strong man image and the boast of recreating the Roman Empire need assessing and his increasing
isolation from Britain and France and the ever- closer relationship with Germany. His aim to be a power broker and particularly his courting by Britain and France in the policy
of Appeasement as for example by the reluctance to impose sanctions over Abyssinia or his help in organising the Munich Conference. Responses ought to assess what
benefits and what negative consequences came about from his policies and in particular being drawn into a disastrous World War Two, which Italy was not prepared to fight
and which lead to his fall from power and allied occupation of Italy.

Assess the extent to which the Corporate State achieved its aims.
 The central theory of the Corporate State was that the economy would be organised by corporations in which both employers and workers would be equally represented in
a field of economic activity. Firms would remain in private hands but would be regulated by the corporations in order to ensure that production was directed in the national
interest. The corporations were to be state bodies and so included state and Fascist Party officials among the membership precisely in order to ensure that the interests of
the state were paramount. These self-governing corporations would bring about good labour relations, provide rational plans for production, stimulate enterprise, negotiate
working conditions and pay and generally encourage the production of wealth in a setting free from traditional class conflicts between labour and management, thus
avoiding strikes and other labour disputes. The corporations became consultative bodies, largely over labour issues, and not the direct managers of industrial undertakings.
This dilution of syndicalist theory was inevitable, given the compromises Mussolini had to make with capitalist forces in Italy in order to build up the fascist movement. The
fascist government mediated a settlement between these syndicates and the largest employers' organisation, which agreed to recognise only the fascist syndicates in future
negotiations. In return, the syndicates accepted that they would exert no control in managing the factories where authority would remain in the hands of the owners.
Because they had no representation within the factories, the syndicates were unable to monitor the behaviour of the employers. The fascist syndicates were denied any say
in economic policy and the new system also constituted a major loss of previously hard-won workers' rights. The workers' syndicates were also deliberately fragmented and
unsurprisingly these soon proved incapable of defending the interests of their members, particularly in the difficult economic conditions brought on first by the revaluation of
the lira, then the onset in the early 1930s of the worldwide trade depression. The Charter of Labour, which supposedly defined workers' rights promising not only fair
judgments in labour disputes, but also social reforms such as improved health and accident insurance schemes posed no threat to the employers private ownership of
businesses was declared the most efficient method of running an economy, and, as for worker's rights, employers were not obliged to provide annual paid holidays, were
given the power to alter working hours and night shifts without any real consultation. The Ministry of Economics worked throughout to limit the powers and responsibilities
of the corporations and the great employers were happy to work outside the restrictions on their freedom that corporatism implied. Initiatives, reorganising or expanding
major industries, usually with the aid of state money, were undertaken by the Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) and without reference to the corporations. During
the early 1930s depression, the banking system and many great manufacturing firms came under state supervision and sometimes control but this, a massive extension of
the role of the state in economic matters happened outside the corporate system and through negotiations between owners and state officials

The state increasingly ignored the corporations in the late 1930s when the economic priority became self-sufficiency. As state contracts, subsidies and directives took on
greater economic significance, so state officials preferred to deal directly with the big industrialists. At the level of national policy, the corporations became spectators of the
new direction taken by the economy. The corporate system became a vast and unwieldy bureaucracy. Far from rationalising production and encouraging enterprise this
corporate bureaucracy became a brake on economic development and an additional obstacle to be overcome by entrepreneurs. The corporations played no part in defining
economic policy or developing the economy. Employers had undue influence within the corporations, especially as the workers' representatives were selected by the Fascist
Party or the ministry of corporations, rather than being chosen directly by the workers. Only on other less significant issues such as sick pay for workers and the belated
introduction of paid national holidays in 1938 did the corporations further workers' interests. The employers were nearly always supported by the three government
representatives, who were Fascist Party members, even though they were supposed to be neutral. The corporations’ voice was subordinate to Mussolini. The economy
remained in private ownership and the government worked alongside and in support of large private firms. The regime allowed major companies to merge into near-
monopoly organisations. For example, Fiat controlled car manufacturing, Pirelli the rubber industry and Montecatini the chemicals industry. The imposition by the
government of wage cuts in 1927, 1930 and 1934 reduced wages below the cost of living; these were facilitated by the weakness of Fascist unions, and the unbalanced
corporative structure. All this fitted with fascist ideas on the overriding importance of the state and the subordination of citizens to the purposes of the state. The Corporate
State gained the support and further approval of the Catholic Church to the regime. The corporate state was a useful propaganda device for the fascist regime both internally
and internationally. Italian propaganda presented it as a unique ‘middle way’ between the failed anarchy of capitalism and the oppressive command economy favoured by
communists. The corporate state has been seen largely as a means of sharing power between Fascism and the economic interests of the landowners and industrialists. It was
more about creating a subservient labour force than about providing a structure capable of undertaking genuine economic change. It acted as an effective tool for the
centralising fascist state to control the working classes Strikes and lockouts were made illegal by the Rocco Law in 1926 and independent trade unions were also abolished.
Hence, it can be concluded that Fascist Italy had complete control over the labour force but very little control over the nation's economic structure.

Analyse the reasons for Stalin gaining power by 1929.

Stalin rose to this unprecedented level of power as a result of his capabilities and his understanding of the workings of the Communist Party. Stalin translated these strengths
into total control of the Soviet Union after the Russian Civil War (1917–20). Stalin was not the natural successor of Vladimir Lenin, but he was able to use his position within
the Soviet Communist Party to become the undisputed leader of the Soviet Union. Stalin made his reputation during the Russian Civil War. He was appointed as a Political
Commissar to several Generals and ensured that they were loyal to the Bolsheviks. Eventually, he was given a military command and brutally suppressed White
Counterrevolutionaries and bandits. Lenin was worried about the influence of Trotsky, and he employed Stalin to build up a base of support for him. Stalin did this but also at
the same time, built up a body of supporters that were loyal to him in the Party. In 1921, Stalin was appointed to the position of General Secretary. This position gave him
great power in the Party. Stalin created a network of supporters in the Party. Lenin became suspicious of Stalin and was beginning to mistrust his former protégée. Despite
Lenin’s doubts, Stalin began to grow popular with the rank-and-file Party members. Unlike Lenin and Trotsky, he was not an intellectual and had the common touch, and he
was well-liked by many. In 1922, after surgery, Lenin had a stroke and many feared that he would not have long to live. Lenin was largely confined to a country retreat and
cut off from politics. Stalin, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, was one of the few people who still had access to him. Stalin used his position to cut Lenin off from
the party and effectively to isolate him. He knew that Lenin’s disliked him because Lenin perceived him as cruel and authoritarian. As the relationship between Lenin and
Stalin deteriorated, Lenin dictated his Testament. This Testament was, in effect, his analysis of the current Bolshevik Part, the future of the Revolution and an indictment of
Stalin's character. Lenin called for the removal of Stalin as General Secretary. Before Lenin could publish the Testament, he suffered a heart attack and was paralyzed. Stalin
received the Testament from one of Lenin’s secretaries, who was his agent. Stalin repressed Lenin’s criticism of him. If the Testament had come to light Stalin’s career would
have been finished. Allies of Stalin colluded to repress all mention of the document. Lenin died of a suspected stroke on January 21st, 1924. Stalin was given the honour of
organizing the official funeral. Stalin also gave an oration at the funeral, despite the opposition of Lenin’s window. Stalin under the rules of the Party was now the de-facto
successor of Lenin. However, the party was not under his control, he had to share power with a collection of other Soviet leaders, including Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev.
Stalin was officially the leader of the Communist party, but to many in the Party, he was only a figurehead. Many dismissed him as a nonentity and a political figure of no real
substance. Many prominent Bolsheviks had always underestimated Stalin because he was not well educated. Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev all saw themselves as the
logical choice as the successor of Lenin. However, they were not as popular as they believed, and that Stalin was very popular with the ordinary Party member

Stalin was shrewd enough not to appear to be seeking the leadership of the Party. Furthermore, Stalin publicly denounced Kamenev and Zinoviev when they tried to involve
him in a conspiracy against Trotsky in 1925.The rivalry between Trotsky and Stalin was not only personal because both men had radically different views on the nature of
Communism. More importantly, they held antithetical ideas on the future of the worldwide Communist revolt. Influenced by Marx, the Bolsheviks, believed that there was
going to be a world-wide Communist Revolution. Stalin began advocating ‘Socialism in One Country,’ which says that the Bolsheviks should focus building communism in the
countries they already controlled rather than spreading the revolution. Stalin placed himself in ideological opposition to Trotsky. The Party accepted Stalin’s position, and this
meant that Trotsky was increasingly marginalised. He then decided to organize public protests, along with others, against Stalin’s growing control of the Party. However,
Stalin, employed a law passed by Lenin, ordering unity in the Party (Ban on Factions). Stalin asserted that Trotsky, was trying to split the party and this ploy managed to side-
line Trotsky even further. Another factor, in the growing isolation of Leon Trotsky, was his Jewish heritage. There was a great deal of antisemitism in Russian, and this made
Trotsky unpopular. By 1927, Stalin was so powerful that he could force Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev from the Politburo and later expelled from the Bolshevik Party.
Trotsky was forced into exile. Increasingly, Stalin appointed his loyalists to the Politburo. Many of Lenin’s former lieutenants realised that Stalin was making himself a de-
facto dictator. Bukharin led the opposition to Stalin in the Politburo. He opposed Stalin’s policy of rapid industrialisation. Stalin prevailed, and later he had Bukharin expelled
as he turned against the New Economic Policy
‘Terror was the crucial factor in the Nazi regime consolidating its power in Germany by 1934.’

Evaluate this view. The period 1933 to 1934 saw the Nazi consolidation of power known as the Gleichshaltung. Various events need examining and assessing. These might
include the Reichstag Fire, the Emergency Decree for the Protection of the People, the banning of the Communist Party (KPD), the March election, the Enabling Act, the Civil
Service Law, the banning of all other political parties, the closing of the Reichsrat, the Night of the Long Knives and the purge of the Sturmabteilung (SA), the death of
President Hindenburg, creation of the new role of Fuhrer and the Armed Forces swearing personal allegiance to Hitler. At the same time, the growth of the Terror State and
the growth of the Gestapo and the SS under Himmler. The opening of the concentration camps at Dachau and Sachsenhausen and the introduction of protective custody and
the Nazification of the police and legal systems needs examining too as it adds to the creation of a police state. The consolidation of power was achieved by creating a state
of panic and crisis with the Reichstag Fire, which in turn allowed the banning of the communists, electoral success in the March election where the Nazis won 288 seats and
then a combination of trickery and physical intimidation by the Sturmabteilung to ensure that the Enabling Law was passed. This was the foundation stone of the Nazi
dictatorship as it allowed the Reichstag to be turned into a one-party assembly and the removal of the last vestiges of Weimar Democracy. Terror was more evident in the
use of the Gestapo and the SS and with the murder of the SA leadership at Bad Wiessee during the Night of the Long Knives. This allowed the Nazi to remove a potential
threat in Ernst Rohm and settle old scores such as the murder of General von Schleicher and Gregor Strasser. The death of President Hindenburg allowed for a final
usurpation of the Weimar Constitution and removal of the final check on Nazi power. Propaganda, reducing unemployment and the Nazification of all walks of life were also
begun and formed a part of the consolidation of power. The key here is to look at the various strands to consolidation and to assess the role of terror amongst the other
methods used.

Assess the extent to which Fascist indoctrination was the main aim of Mussolini’s leadership.

The question asks for an assessment of the main aim of Mussolini’s leadership, chiefly whether the focus was fascist indoctrination or other factors. Benito Mussolini coined
the term ‘fascism’ in 1919 to describe his political movement. He established the first fascist regime and believed in Absolute Power of the State, Rule by a Dictator,
Corporatism. Extreme Nationalism, Superiority of the Nation’s People, Militarism, and Imperialism. Mussolini chose Giovanni Gentile as Minister of Education. He reorganized
Italy’s school system and argued that the private desires and interests of the individual came second to the ‘common will’ of the people. He explained that self-sacrifice and
obedience to the state enabled the individual to achieve unity with the ‘common will.’ He argued that rights do not belong to the individual but to the people as a whole and
that the ‘common will’ of the people is the law of the state. Therefore, individuals must submit to the fascist state in order to be truly free. He declared it is the natural right
of the stronger to conquer and rule the weaker. War has another function in the fascist state: It unites the people and proves their superiority as a nation. Mussolini called
new elections for the Italian parliament in 1924 and after the election, Mussolini closed opposition newspapers and banned public protest meetings. He declared all political
parties illegal except for his own Fascist Party. He outlawed labour unions and strikes. He also established a political police force, the Organization for Vigilance and
Repression of Antifascism. A Fascist Grand Council rubber-stamped Mussolini’s decrees and made parliament irrelevant. By 1925, Mussolini had adopted the title, Il Duce (the
Leader). He delivered emotional public speeches, swaying back and forth, puffing his chest, and holding his hands on his hips. The crowds chanted back fascist slogans such as
‘Il Duce is always right!’ and ‘Believe, obey, fight! ‘Opponents of Mussolini coined the term ‘totalitarianism’ to describe his quest to control not only the political system but
also the economy, schools, police, courts, military, and more. Ironically, Mussolini liked this term and began to use it himself to persuade Italians to come together under his
leadership for a rebirth of society. Mussolini compared the ‘new man’ of Italy to the hardened soldiers of ancient Rome. As for women, Il Duce saw their role as giving birth
and caring for a new generation of warriors. The Fascist Party organized youth organizations for all boys and girls aged 8–18. These groups promoted physical training,
military drills (for boys), and the ideals of the fascist state. Mussolini had little use for religion. Italy, however, was a strongly Catholic country. Gentile, as minister of
education, continued the teaching of Catholic doctrine in the elementary schools. But he replaced it with philosophy at the secondary level. The Catholic Church objected to
this reform. Hoping to keep the church from opposing his fascist regime, Mussolini adopted pro-Catholic policies against abortion and divorce. Then in 1929, he signed a
treaty with the church that made Catholicism the state religion. This agreement also restored the teaching of Catholic doctrine in secondary schools. For its part, the church
accepted Mussolini’s fascist state and ended its involvement in Italy’s political affairs.

Mussolini wanted to create an economic system that provided a ‘third way’ and in the 1930s, he organized industry, agriculture, and economic services into state-controlled
labour unions and employer associations called ‘corporations.’ Government officials appointed the heads of each union and employer corporation. They negotiated wages
and working conditions with each other. This ‘third way’ corporatism attempted to unify workers and employers by requiring them to set aside their private interests in
favour of the best interests of the fascist state. In practice, however, the employers usually benefited more than the workers did. Police crackdowns on dissent were mild
compared to fascism in Hitler’s Germany. But a special court tried anti-fascists, those working against Mussolini’s regime. The Jewish population of Italy was small, and
neither Mussolini nor most other Italians were very anti-Semitic. Jews had fought for Italy in the First World War and participated in Mussolini’s march on Rome. Even so, Il
Duce came increasingly under the influence of Hitler in the late 1930s. Mussolini finally agreed to anti-Semitic decrees such as banning Jews from certain occupations. When
the Germans occupied parts of Italy during the Second World War, they transported 20 percent of Italy’s Jews to Nazi concentration camps. While Italians hid many Jews,
Mussolini did nothing to stop the Nazi deportations. Before the Second World War, popular support for Mussolini’s fascist state was high. His charismatic style of leadership
convinced many that Italy was on a path to greatness.

Assess the impact that the Soviet regime had on families.

Lenin had been anti-family, seeing it as a bourgeois construct and allowing easier divorces and abortions. In 1926, a new Family Code consolidated earlier rights, and gave
women in ‘common law’ marriages the same rights as those in registered marriages. In Muslim regions, where feudal forms of social structure remained, women were a
subject class. The communists raised the minimum age of marriage in these regions to 16 (it was 18 in the European parts of Soviet Russia), and polygamy and bride money
were banned. They also organised mass political activity, known as the khudzhum, to mobilise women to oppose traditional practices. At the same time, education was
provided equally for both males and females. State nurseries and workplace crèches and canteens were provided to enable mothers to work outside the home. However,
under Stalin some of these reforms and benefits were reduced or removed. Fear of war was growing following Hitler’s rise to power in Germany in 1933, and Soviet
population growth was in decline. For these reasons, from 1935 Stalin decided on policies to promote ‘traditional’ family values in order to increase the Soviet population.
Although most of the rights established by the 1926 Code remained intact, a new family law was introduced in 1936. This made divorce more difficult, with a rising fee for
each divorce, and restricted abortion to those required for medical reasons only. In addition, in order to encourage bigger families and so raise the birth rate, tax exemptions
were given to families with large numbers of children. From 1944, only registered marriages were recognised, children born outside marriage were no longer allowed to
inherit property from their father, and divorce became even more difficult and expensive. During the Second World War, medals were awarded to mothers with large
families and unmarried people were taxed more heavily. However, women benefited from new welfare reforms introduced under Stalin – a free health service, accident
insurance at work, the expansion of kindergartens for working mothers with children, and paid holidays for many workers. Equal educational provision continued.
Nonetheless, the provision of sufficient and adequate housing continued to be a problem. In employment, women had traditionally been found mainly in agriculture, textiles,
and services. Their position improved considerably under the Bolsheviks, and even more so under Stalin’s rule. Women were actively encouraged to play their part in the
economic development of Soviet Russia, and all employment was thrown open to women, who had the same rights as men. By 1939, a third of all engineers and 79% of
doctors were women. In 1928, the number of women listed as ‘workers–employees’ had been 2 795 000. By 1939, this had risen to just over 13 million. By 1933, women
made up 33% of the industrial workforce, rising to 43% by 1940. Despite the emphasis on family life during the 1930s, women of all ages continued to work. There were
many women ‘hero-workers’ in the Stakhanovite movement, though in a smaller proportion than men; by 1936, a quarter of all female trade unionists were classified as
workers who had exceeded their production targets. However, access to the higher administrative posts was unequal and the patriarchal tradition was still widespread in
society, leaving many working women with the bulk of household chores. Despite these realities, the attitude of the Stalinist state to women was very different from that in
Nazi Germany. Communists believed in total equality between the sexes in education, employment, and the law.
‘Nazi youth policies were a failure.’ Discuss this view.

This question requires and examination of the aims, successes, and failures and then a reasoned overall judgement to be made. The Nazi policies towards young people could
be viewed as one of the most successful aspects of Nazi Germany. This is due to a variety of reasons. The Nazis took advantage of the need for German youth groups and
used what teenagers wanted to slip in Nazi ideals, took over the education system to portray Nazi views, and used the school system to glorify war; they also often alienated
children from their parents. However, it did have its flaws as there were several groups of youths who opposed Hitler such as the ‘Edelweiss Pirates’. The Hitler Youth group
played a major role in Nazi control of youths especially in 1939 when it became compulsory to attend. The Nazis took what the children wanted such as group activities,
hiking, camping, and singing and added in extra activities such as marching, learning about Nazi policies and practicing military exercises. Many of the members were merely
drawn to the youth group due to the leisure opportunities it offered and some just did not have a choice as other organisations were shut down and made illegal. As the
Nazis wanted to control each aspect of a child's life, they realised that education played a very important role. They altered textbooks to include Nazi history and Nazi views
of History. Students were taught about the injustice of German government and how the Jews were slowly taking over. The Nazi’s also managed to glorify the military in each
school subject. They also made sure that the students had to study race and ideology every day. As the Nazis needed to control each aspect of a child's life to have full hold
on the child, they realised that it was a necessity to control a child's home or family life, in many cases this meant isolating a child from his/her family. It became increasingly
common in Germany for the children of the household to be much more pro-Nazi than their parents. This is because the children grew up being controlled by Nazi forces and
therefore found such things as routine household checks normal, whereas older family members found it an invasion of privacy. During the late 1930's the number of
members in the Hitler Youth group drastically increased however as the war progressed the number of enrolments dropped as the group became more war centred rather
than leisure activities. In fact, anti-Hitler Youth groups were set up. One of these was called the ‘swing’ movement. This was a group of teenagers who rebelled against the
Nazi regime by listening to banned music from the US and England and dressing in a more western fashion. Perhaps one of the policies that infuriated the Nazis the most was
the fact that the ‘swing’ movement members allowed Jews in their clubs. Another group which the Nazis greatly feared was the Edelweiss Pirates. This group of Youths
carried out some very similar activities to the Hitler youth group such as singing however the Edelweiss Pirates' songs were criticising the Nazi regime and mocked their ideas
of the German superpower. They also often attacked Hitler Youth group members and indulged in activities that the Nazis looked down upon such as the act of sex and
making the group include both male and female members.

‘The fear of communism was the main reason for the rise of Mussolini by 1922.’ Discuss this view. The support which Mussolini gained from key elements of the Italian elite,
landowners, industrialists, elements in the state and the royal family, and also perhaps from the Church may have derived from the fear of socialism and communism. The
Russian Revolution was seen as dangerous and the existing social tensions before 1914 surfaced again after the strains and disappointments of the First World War. The Left
gave Mussolini and his squads an enemy and took the edge off the radical side of fascism for many of the Italian establishment and middle classes who were fearful of strikes,
trade unionism, political violence and revolution. These fears could be equated with communism even if socialism was stronger. So, fear of communism was greater than the
potential of actual communism. The alternative explanations for the rise of Mussolini might include the organisation of the Fascists and the personal appeal of Mussolini and
an ideology which went beyond simply being opposed to communism and offered nationalism and social harmony. However, the impact of war combined with the
disappointments of Versailles, produced hostility to the liberal politicians, revived pre-war national aspirations and resentments about Italia irridenta. This might be seen as a
more compelling explanation. The ‘trench spirit’ and the disillusion with the liberal establishment’s failures brought Mussolini a popular support which went beyond fear of
communism. This was nourished by post war economic problems and social conflicts in the countryside as well as urban centres. The actual accession of Mussolini to the
premiership depended however less on mass support per se and the sort of trasformismo politics that Giolitti and others had deployed to reduce the threat from the left
before 1915.The political system of Italy allied to the compliance of the King advised by the Duca d’Aosta could be seen as a long term failure of liberal Italy to achieve
stability and need to be weighed against the special characteristics of fascism and its leader and the far of communism, though answers which go beyond a list of factors may
see interconnection as well as arguing for the priority of one element.
Analyse the reasons why Stalin had gained control of the Communist Party in the USSR by 1928.

There could be a discussion between the skills shown by Stalin and the opportunities open to him by the rivalries in the party and the context of the situation in the USSR
after Lenin’s death. Stalin demonstrated important political skills. He had seen the importance of organisation and a power base in the party in his role as Party Secretary and
also the value of establishing links with regional parties as Commissar for Nationalities. He exploited the cult of Lenin and managed to evade the opprobrium of Lenin’s
criticisms of him in the Political Testament. By seeming to carry on the policy of NEP he gained the support of the party’s right and managed by skilful means to isolate
Trotsky and his supporters, even though these included party figured who had been of greater importance than himself in the Revolution and the Lenin era. Stalin
demonstrated expertise in the political in-fighting that resulted in the marginalisation and eventual exile of Trotsky. Through his knowledge of the membership and
organisation, he was also adept as ‘Comrade Card Index’ in solidifying a base of support. However, against this is the weakness of his enemies – Trotsky could not compete
effectively enough. Marginalised by not appearing at Lenin’s funeral, he and those who feared Stalin’s influence could not make use of the warnings made by Lenin or mount
a concerted opposition to Stalin’s rise to power. Despite his links with the Red Army and the huge contribution to the Revolution, and the victory in the Civil War, Trotsky
could not exploit his potential popular appeal. But as well as political and personal factors there was the substantial issue of policy. An exhausted USSR needed the economic
breathing space afforded by NEP and a policy of socialist capital accumulation. Though supported by some in the party, it was seen as dangerous. Many, especially Bukharin
who was highly regarded, were happy to accept Lenin’s justifications for the policy at least until economic problems, revealed by the Scissors Crisis, made it more compelling
to act. By that time, Stalin had enough power in the party for a volte face which essentially adopted Trotsky’s policies. In addition, the policy of Socialism in One Country
seemed the only practical way forward as the world revolution had not happened, and the USSR needed to focus on the considerable domestic problems it faced after the
Civil War. The inheritance of repression and the calls for party discipline in the war meant that the scope for open discussion was far less, and Stalin was able to exploit this to
make his critics seem disloyal.

‘The main reason for the growth of Nazi support between 1929 and 1932 was the growing economic crisis in Germany.’

Assess this view. There is a strong case for this explanation. Even with signs of electoral gains in 1928 and a strong infrastructure, the actual electoral support for the NSDAP
was not great. However, as depression hit from the Autumn of 1929, the votes for both Communists and Nazis grew in response to increased disillusion with the politicians’
response to rapidly rising unemployment, bank, and business failures. The high point of Nazi electoral success in 1932 coincided with a peak in unemployment and
deflationary policies, which left millions lacking basic necessities and hope for the future. Nazi propaganda found scapegoats for the economic problems (the Treaty of
Versailles, the November Criminals, the Jews, the American plutocrats) and unemployment increased. Combined with the threat of communism, which alarmed the
Mittelstand and the German elites, it seems there is an unassailable connection between economic problems and the support for the Nazis both locally and nationally. The
German farmers had already been facing falling prices and now saw a massively reduced market. The Mittelstand already hit by the inflation of the 1920s now saw a collapse
of international and national consumption, and business failures. The industrial workers saw mass unemployment and lost the safety net of Weimar welfare as cuts were
made. The counter argument is more to do with the Nazis’ ability to exploit the crisis which might be seen as more important than the crisis itself. By 1928 support was rising,
especially in depressed rural areas. The party had developed an impressive organisation. It had a flexible ideology, which encompassed all sorts of grievances, and wrapped
them round with some powerful themes; anti Semitism, the Hitler myth, the betrayal of the nation by the politicians, and nationalist traditions. This ideological hold all meant
that all sorts of people could support Nazism even if their interests seemed incompatible. The NSBO had gained a foothold among industrial workers while monarchists were
inspired by nationalist rhetoric and visions of a golden age. National revival propaganda went beyond simply job creation, and the 1920 programme held anti-Capitalist as
well as anti-Communist views. Hitler’s personal appeal did not really depend on economic policy (which was vague) as much as castigation of enemies, and a powerful
emotional appeal for renewal and rebirth. None of this was new, so it could be argued that it only struck a mass chord when economic crisis seemed to show that Germany
had been betrayed. But it was the interplay between the rising economic crisis and the sort of appeal that had been developing since 1920. Developed analyses might see
these connections, and weight the relative importance of the strictly economic factors with other explanations.
Evaluate the significance of terror in the establishment of a dictatorship under Mussolini.

Answers might draw a distinction between the use of violence in the rise to office of Mussolini in 1922 and the subsequent establishment of dictatorial rule which used the
powers of the state against political dissent. In the rise to power fascist groups were adept in using terror against enemies and it was the willingness to use violence against
the forces of the left and in peasant seizures that helped to gain Mussolini the political support of the elite that was a major factor in his accession to office. However, there
were other significant factors such as the more positive propaganda, the unpopularity of many government policies, the disillusion with the peace settlement and ongoing
economic problems. Terror alone could not have gained power without the willingness of political leaders to pursue traditional trasformismo tactics and invite Mussolini into
office. The March on Rome was merely a dramatic gesture though terror was an important element in making Mussolini enough of a threat to make it worthwhile trying to
neutralise him. Terror did play a greater role in the transition from prime minister to dictator. The single most important element could be seen as the murder of Matteotti, in
the context of political violence and the refusal of Mussolini to disown violence. The deployment of the repressive apparatus of the state was a result of the willingness of the
Italian political parties to accept the Acerbo law though and the failure of key elements to oppose state and party violence and the acceptance by many of a more dynamic
and successful regime seemingly capable of bringing more economic stability and foreign policy successes – or perhaps an apathy among many to political authority which
was seen as alien and oppressive whoever wielded it. Though the dictatorship depended to an extent on repression – the arrest and exile of opponents, enforced censorship
and banning of opposition and the watch kept on opposition by the OVRA and party activists, the level of repression was not as high as in Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany.
Alliance with key conservative elements such as the monarchy and church, a divided opposition, effective propaganda and a sense of innovation and renewal with prestige
projects and a greater international respect for Italy have to be considered and the relative significance evaluated.

Assess the impact of Collectivization on the people of the Soviet Union.

Collectivization resumed the revolution after the compromise of NEP and was linked to a drive for industrialization and to provide capital for broader economic growth. It
was intended to solve problems in grain distributions and also create surpluses for export. Begun on a large scale in 1928 and part of a general five-year plan it intensified
after 1929 and by the mid-1930s 90% of land was in some form of collective, whether a Kolkhoz or a more centrally directed Sovkhoz. The effects on the mass of peasantry
were considerable. Richer peasants or those designated ‘Kulaks’ suffered land seizures, deportations and 20 000 deaths by execution as class warfare accompanied enforced
collectivization. The reaction of peasants to requisitioning and then collectivization brought about a virtual war in many areas. The disruption caused by such a rapid and
often inefficient transition reduced production and productivity. Probably productivity did not recover until 1940. As Kulaks were a small minority in fact the definition was
widened to include better off peasants so successful farmers were punished and expropriated, causing hardships in both rural areas and also in urban areas struggling with
the disruptive effects of mass industrialization and there were widespread food shortages. Livestock farming was hit by the peasants slaughtering animals rather than
surrendering them and this sector did not recover until the 1980s. Richer farming areas such as the Volga suffered most. But the principal burden of the policy fell on Ukraine,
Northern Caucasus, Volga Region and Kazakhstan, the South Urals, and West Siberia. The new collectives often did not have the necessary equipment, expertise, or transport.
The policy was defended as necessary to create an industrial base that would prevent the USSR becoming an overwhelmingly peasant country unable to defend itself. The
targets for industrial growth were too high to be met but collectivization did allow a substantial industrial growth which had a considerable effect on the Soviet people in
terms of lifestyle, urban growth, opportunities, and some might argue ultimate survival in the Second World War. The political results of the struggle for Collectivization
might be seen in the greater repression and the Purges. In this life-or-death economic struggle there had to be no dissent and utter control by the party which meant a terror
and repression of hitherto unknown ferocity and scale. Answers might balance the damage done and the deaths and hardships with longer term advances and gain and
assess the relative importance of economic dislocation with social and political impacts.

Assess the impact of foreign policy on the economy in Nazi Germany in the period 1933–39.
 Foreign policy had a consistent and clearly expressed aim of overturning the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles and ensuring that Germany resumed its status as a great
European power. The conduct of foreign policy changed from traditional diplomacy to a more aggressive and threatening form and behind it was the geopolitical aim of
achieving living space for a new racial state. All this depended on rearming and preparation for self-sufficiency. The example of the First World War had shown that
dependence on resources from outside the Reich had made Germany vulnerable to blockades. Economic weaknesses had undermined the military effort and made foreign
policy aims unrealisable. Thus, in Hitler’s mind, foreign policy aims and the means to achieve them were inextricably linked to economic policy. In the more orthodox phase
of economic policy, foreign policy was linked to the recovery of trade – hence in the New Plan Schacht aimed to develop reciprocal trade agreements. Reassuring foreign
policy moves like the Treaty with Poland in 1934 and the Anglo German naval agreement helped to develop a context in which trading links and investments could grow. As
the world economy recovered and with some help from government public works the German economy recovered especially in terms of employment aided by a foreign
policy that was clear in its aims but did not seem too far removed from that of the late 1920s, except for the withdrawal from the League of Nations. Hitler did not try to
invade Austria in 1934 and was not supportive of Japanese expansion. However, as the regime established itself, a more aggressive foreign policy required greater moves to
rearm. Schacht’s orthodoxy was replaced by the Four-Year Plan and as there seemed little chance that foreign powers would stop rearmament, German industry pushed
forward and there were more restrictions on prices, wages, imports, and the allocation of raw materials. The economy was geared more towards war as foreign policy made
that more likely with the Anschluss and the annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938 and the acquisition of Bohemia and Moravia in 1939 and the invasion of Poland. The
economic benefits of the Nazi Soviet pact might be considered. While full autarky was not possible, there was greater self-sufficiency but also problems as there were labour
shortages, some overheating and inflationary pressures. It was unlikely that economic development which was so geared to serve foreign policy ends could be sustained
without gains from foreign conquests so in a sense the economy was having an impact on foreign policy as well as vice versa. Some may argue that foreign policy was not the
only element to have an impact on the economy but that increases in social spending and infrastructure; the removal of women from elements of the workplace, anti-Semitic
measures, the ending of the influence of trade unions and the recovery of world trade had an impact independent of foreign policy and the attendant rearmament.

‘Mussolini’s use of propaganda was highly effective.’ Evaluate this claim.

The argument for effective propaganda could be based on the scale and nature of appeals to the public – rallies, posters, broadcasts, newsreels the promotion of nationalism
and the development of the cult of the Duce – Mussolini ha sempre ragione. The ideological content increased in the 1930s, as did the appeal to support for imperial
expansion in Africa. Fascist symbols were widely used, and the regime was linked to military success, greater prestige in Europe, big public projects and opposition to
Communism, as in Spain. Control of the media was maintained and groups such as young people were targeted. From the 1920s propaganda made use of film with the LUCE
organisation and IRI in 1937. Propaganda was coordinated by a special Ministry of Popular Culture in 1937. Mussolini’s personal image of strength and authority was potently
promoted while the ideology of the Corporate State was the subject of propaganda campaigns. Economic policy was promoted in terms of ‘battles’ with vivid images of
supposed success. The issue is however not necessarily the volume or even energy of propaganda campaigns and their messages but their actual impact in sustaining support
for the regime and the ideology. Counter arguments might include the ongoing influence of the Catholic Church with its different emotional appeal and organisations such as
youth movements which meant hat Fascist secular propaganda did not have a monopoly. Also, creative artists, while not allowed to criticise the regime were given greater
freedom than in say Soviet Russia, limiting the cultural propaganda. Though there was a Syndicate of Artists many worked independently of state propaganda. The gains of
more stable government, reduction of corruption, more efficient public services, foreign policy successes, assaults on crime could be celebrated by propaganda as could
Mussolini’s Vatican agreements because they were generally approved of. But propaganda could not be as effective when there was less public approval, for instance for
racial policies or the closer relationship with Germany after 1944, and the decision to enter war and send forces to the USSR. Evidence of successful ideological indoctrination
is patchy and the failure of Mussolini to remain in power and the ebbing of any support after the dismissal of 1943 might indicate that in contrast with Nazi Germany the
propaganda efforts were only effective when policies were seen to be delivering what Italians wanted. The use of terror might be used to argue that propaganda was not
totally effective as there was opposition.
Assess the aims of Soviet Foreign Policy in the period 1924–41.

The tension in Soviet policy was between the promotion of world revolution and the undermining of capitalism and the practical needs of the USSR for security from invasion
and outside intervention while creating a socialist economy and society. Stalin’s policy of socialism in one country was based on a realistic estimate of the state of the USSR’s
military resources and the failures of revolutionary movements after the First World War, together with the need to create enough industry to develop the proletariat in
whose name the Bolsheviks had taken power. Thus, it was important to establish what links were possible with other European powers through arrangements like those
established with Germany in the Treaty of Rapallo and with trade agreements such as made with Britain in 1924. Also, this meant establishing relations even with regimes
hostile to Communism such as Nationalist China and not giving much support to destabilising revolutionary groups despite the ideological opposition. The rise of the right-
wing dictators changed the situation and made isolation dangerous, but the promotion of united fronts with left wing groups in Europe promoted by Litvinov was
problematic in terms of results. Intervention in Spain caused unrest and fed into the Fascist propaganda machine of a Soviet threat. In France the Popular Front did not
secure a very strong alliance in 1935, but this was enough to intensify isolation and Soviet foreign policy changed course with the appointment of Molotov. The primary aim
was to increase security against a rapidly rearming Germany with stated aims of colonising Russian territory. Better relations with the democracies proved impossible so a
volte face in terms of the Nazi Soviet pact was made. This led to the fulfilment of an aim to overturn the isolation established by the cordon sanitaire of Versailles and to
regain lost territory which would act as an effective defensive buffer in the form of Eastern Poland the Baltic States. So, a clear aim was to regain the land and power lost as a
result of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and the hostility of the victors of World War I to the new Soviet state. The aim of establishing Soviet domination of the leftist political
parties through a Popular Front had not proved so successful. The aim of bringing about worldwide ideological change remained more a pious hope than a guide to actual
policy, pursued by covert underground activities rather than a clear and open foreign policy and specifically rejected in 1939 when exiled German communists were handed
over to Hitler and a pact linking the Communist state to its most bitter ideological foe for reasons of realpolitik was adopted. It could be argued that aims changed, or it could
be argued that security against western attack after the trauma of allied intervention and the overturning of the Paris settlement remained constant.

‘The main reason why the Nazi regime maintained its control of Germany in the period 1933–39 was its use of terror.’

Discuss this view. There is a case for terror being at the heart of Nazi control: Terror eliminated all other possible power bases – the Communists and Trade Unions, the other
parties even the nationalists, it ended the authority of the states and even the elements within the movement which might have been a threat as in the Night of the Long
Knives. Dissenting voices faced an efficient Gestapo, the threat of the Concentration Camps, ‘protective custody’ which undermined court verdicts which went against the
wishes of the regime. Violence accompanied the consolidation of power 1933–4 and repression was seen as highly effective under Himmler and Heydrich. The SS
organisation which developed into a virtual state within a state was widely feared. Small expressions of dissent or even lack of commitment to the regime could result in
quite savage punishment. However, the primacy of terror as a means of control has been questioned: Local studies have revealed that Gestapo numbers were not huge and
there was a reliance on people informing and playing an active part in the suppression of ‘anti-social behaviour’. There was quite widespread interest in and support for the
police and the SS and the repression affected ‘out groups’ like socialists and Jews much more than the bulk of the German people who refrained from political activity and
offered compliance. This was obtained often by popular policies like the reduction of unemployment, welfare schemes and foreign policy successes. The Hitler myth meant
that criticism and discontent was directed more at the party than at the Führer who was seen as being above injustices and cruelties. This was a powerful incentive to remain
loyal which was not dependent on violence alone. Also, the considerable propaganda machine which built on the obvious progress being made in many ways accentuated the
positive rather than the threats, real as these were. Terror alone could bring about cowed and sullen acquiescence but not the genuine popularity of Hitler and many aspects
of the regime and indeed the numbers in concentration camps fell and visitors to the Olympics of 1936 did not see a nation ‘under the cosh’. As pressures mounted with war
preparations and greater Nazification, especially in terms of racial policy and obvious threats of war, the need for repression might have increased, but dissent was limited
and positive belief in the Fuhrer, even if mixed with fear of war remained high.

Evaluate the success of Mussolini’s economic policies.

 Detailed economic policy did not play a large part in the appeal of Fascism prior to 1922 though they were critical of government failures, post war depression and
unemployment. Initial policy tended towards orthodoxy. De Steffani, the finance minister reduced taxes and offered fiscal incentives for overseas investment. Despite the rise
of dictatorship, economic and financial policies remained liberal and the role of the state in price controls and subsidies was reduced. The new regime benefited from an
upsurge in trade and economic activity and a rise in employment. However, purely economic considerations did not guide policy and the prestige of the lira was put before
the economic consequences of overvaluation. For Mussolini a strong lira was a symbol of the renewal of Italian strength and overseas power but the revaluation in 1926,
after De Steffani’s dismissal in 1925 from 100 to 90 lira to the pound undermined export growth. Long term sluggishness and the fall in world agricultural prices in the 1920s
left Italy vulnerable to the great depression and unemployment once again rose. Rather than deficit spending the dictatorship pursued orthodox financial policies, cutting
spending and doing little directly to stop unemployment and underemployment becoming a problem. A more interventionist policy produced a drive for self-sufficiency.
Reclamation schemes like the draining of the Pontine Marshes and drives to increase production such as the Battle for Grain offered effective propaganda material and the
impression of action to overcome depression. However, they did little for productivity and while wheat imports were reduced, there was more limited action taken in other
agricultural sectors. Real wages of agricultural workers fell by 50% by the mid-1930s. Faced with pressure from falling industrial production and the demands of industrialists
for support, the regime fell back on direct control. Larger firms were encouraged to take over small firms in difficulties with the depression. In 1933 the Institute for industrial
Reconstruction as established and by 1940 the Fascist state had a fifth of the capital holdings of increasing large industrial firms like Fiat. This form of state capitalism was
evident in firms which were key to preparation for imperial expansion in war- aviation, shipping and fuel, As in Germany public works – Land reclamation, rail electrification,
the building of autostrada was undertaken but the overall domestic demand fell and industrial growth and even survival became dependent on the state. Existing problems
of poverty especially in the South were not effectively addressed by raising demand despite an increase in spending on regional development. The lira was devalued in 1936
and by 1937 the mixture of a relative shortage of goods and high sending had begun to cause inflationary pressures. However, the wars in Ethiopia and Spain and the
increase in arms spending did create more growth. The disappointing results of autarky – impossible given Italy’s resources and heavy dependence on state spending with
falling real wages and limited stimulus from internal demand did not produce an economy well equipped for the demands of a major world war. Some answers may consider
that the development of the Corporate State is an economic policy in the sense that attempts at cooperation and harmony did have some economic motivation. There were
22 Corporations set up but their overall effect was to increase the power of employers and link them more closely to the state at the expense of workers and while
production was not interrupted by strikes there was limited effect on productivity as such and the depression of wages resulting from reduced workers’ rights had a negative
economic effect.

‘Stalin came to power because Lenin failed to plan for his successor.’ Assess this view.

Lenin’s later months in power were marred by illness – the effects of an assassination attempt and a stroke. The factional struggles within the party were allowed to grow and
Lenin’s Testament which warned against Stalin who had built a power based as Secretary and Commissar for nationalities was never the basis for any action after Lenin’s
death because Trotsky had internal enemies. Lenin left not only a divided hierarchy but internal problems and contradictions. Internal disturbances had led to a retreat with
NEP, however ingenious the political justification and the world revolution had had to be shelved. So, Lenin’s legacy was not just a failure to establish one group with a clear
line of succession but to leave a gap between the ideology and the practical needs to build up food supplies and to allow enough industrial goods to fulfil basic demands.
Trotsky adhered to a belief in the need to establish the true rule of the party-led proletariat, but that proletariat hardly existed. However much he wanted a world revolution,
the failures of revolutions in Germany, Hungary and the establishment of the cordon sanitaire round the USSR made this unachievable. The supporters of NEP like Bukharin
and the political and personal enemies of Trotsky ensured that there were divisions at the top of the party which could be exploited by Stalin. Against the explanations that
Lenin’s failure to establish a clear succession are the more fundamental divides and the political abilities of Stalin to use his party base and his skills to isolate Trotsky and to
establish his supremacy by 1928 before adopting key policies of his exiled political foe. This was helped by Trotsky’s own limitations and the failure to attend Lenin’s funeral
might be explored. Stalin used the cult of Lenin that developed to his advantage. He also used his powers of advancement and patronage in the party and his influence in the
Republics. Trotsky’s skills as orator, theoretician and war minister were not those which helped him dominate committees, gain key supporters and to know how to isolate
his opponents. ‘The grey blur’ or ‘comrade card index’ knew how to use and exploit the police state that the Bolsheviks had created to win the civil war and the party
discipline of the Lenin period. To many in the party it was Trotsky who seemed to pose more of a threat of domination and of undermining the gains of NEP. Factional rivalry
played a huge role and Stalin’s ability to build support while obviously lacking the more threatening intellectual and leadership abilities of his rival was key. If Lenin had been
more decisive in removing or demoting a leader whom he perceived as potentially damaging, then obviously this would have been crucial but in the end it was a mixture of
Stalin’s political skills and the position he took on the key issues of the 1920s that exploited both Lenin’s failure to effect a successor and Trotsky’s unwillingness or inability to
offer enough resistance to demotion and banishment that might be seen as more significant.

Evaluate the effectiveness of Nazi Youth policy in achieving its aims

There were various aims behind youth policy: young people had to be militarised and prepared for war; linked to this was the need for them to buy into the long-term
ideology and mission for a greater Germany led by an allpowerful leader and guided by racial aims. The demarcation of roles for boys and girls in this mission-led totalitarian
ideal had to be clear and accepted. Boys needed to be as hard as steel and relentlessly obedient and committed to the racial and military aims. Girls needed to see their
importance as wives and mothers and also to rise to any demands made by the state. Both boys and girls needed to be able to put the Volk and its needs as expressed by the
racial state before private lives and considerations. So not only formal education but also party led organisations worked hard at highly ambitious goals central to the long-
term vision. It is easier to outline the structures and methods the control of the curriculum, the racial segregation, the youth movements, camps, rallies, propaganda and the
establishment of a cult of youth, with far more opportunities for responsibility for younger people and support by the party for those who embraced the ideals but were not
strong in school subjects. Many did relish the stress on physical activities against formal learning, the comradeship of the movements, the freedom from traditional restraints
of home or dull jobs. The perverted idealism found its supporters. Many girls relished the traditional values and also found in the party unexpected opportunities for
responsibility. For others there was frustration and a sense of being exploited. Hitler and the leadership flattered the young and gave them a sense of importance and
through to the bitter end many young people showed a loyalty to the regime. However, in practice there was much boredom and disillusion. The pushing of complex ideology
was often seen as tedious, and the youth movements often lacked skilled leaders. There was a lot of bullying. The creation of elite party schools did not reach the majority of
youngsters and the requirements of military and labour service were not always welcome. Much has been made of opposition groups, but these were often more the result
of wartime breakdown of discipline than of principled resistance. The notorious Edelweiss Pirates were seen more as juvenile delinquents and were never a national
movement. Reaction to the demands and opportunities of youth policy varied considerably and generalisation is difficult especially as the demands of war imposed their own
disciplines on young people.