ins t it u t e for int egr at ed t r a nsit ions

IFIT Discussion Paper October 2021

Media and Narrative:

Managing Conflict in Polarised
Societies

The rise of digital platforms and social media has transformed the media sector and
affected which narratives are widely circulated and how. Focusing primarily on news-
related content, this discussion paper outlines the role of different types of media in
promoting simplified narratives that drive conflict in deeply divided societies. In addi-
tion to measures for promoting accurate and unbiased content that counters disinfor-
mation, it proposes practical approaches for ensuring that the media amplifies diverse
and complex stories to nurture a richer narrative landscape, which encourages engage-
ment – especially across groups – in polarised contexts.

Building on IFIT’s narrative framework, this paper offers guidance to a range of stake-
holders – civil society, policy makers and donors, among others – on understanding
narrative dynamics and working with narrative in the media to help manage conflict at
the national level. It is based on extensive IFIT research and in-depth consultations with
diverse experts in narrative theory, journalism, communications, internet governance
and conflict, including members of IFIT’s Inclusive Narratives Practice Group.

Context
The first part of this paper offers context on: the role of narrative in driving or mitigating
conflict; the impact of a transformed media on narrative landscapes; and the role of
media in promoting social divisions. The analysis summarises well-known evolutions
in the media landscape, but through the lens of narrative.

The Role of Narrative in Driving or Mitigating Conflict

Narratives are the stories that groups tell about their own and others’ origins, identities
and beliefs. On the individual level, a narrative constitutes the life story and experiences
that help a person derive meaning from daily living. On the collective level, narratives
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relate to the interpretation of historical events and joint experiences, using particular
language to form group belief systems and a symbolically constructed shared identity.
These narratives shape behaviour, offering a storyline with clear roles to make it easier
to act with purpose. We are all influenced by our society’s narrative landscape and un-
derstand ourselves and others through it.

In countries marked by deep divisions, narratives can encourage social engagement and
political action to address grievances and manage intergroup conflict. They can also,
however, increase polarisation by inflaming grievances and weakening social trust, to
the point of motivating violence. Various stakeholders – particularly political and social
elites and institutions – use narratives to pursue their own objectives, and often have
incentives to spread divisive narratives that secure their influence. A divisive narrative
highlights the validity of one group’s grievances and the moral superiority of its claims,
while placing blame for conflict on ‘others’. It shrinks diverse and complex group narra-
tives into a simple, self-reinforcing story that side-lines inconvenient facts and evidence.
A highly polarised society tends to be dominated by two or three simple and opposing
narratives, in which extreme views eclipse moderate views in public debates and other
narratives are hidden from view.

When simple narratives dominate a society’s narrative landscape, individuals and

groups in conflict compete with one another for attention and support. They often fail
to participate in the same reality, with opinion driving observation and their facts con-
forming to the story they prefer to tell rather than the other way around. For example, if
one side only sees a world in which ‘dangerous enemies’ threaten the lives of innocent
civilians, they reject a rival narrative in which the other side is fighting poverty or state
violence (Table 1). In such contexts, debates are more emotional than rational, stories
do not complement as much as marginalise each other, and the apparent gaps between
narratives can lead to a breakdown in civil conversation and political processes, well
in excess of the actual variations in privately held opinions of the great majority of the
population.

For this reason, a key approach to managing conflict in deeply divided societies is 1) to
expose how narratives drive the conflict, 2) to understand the multiplicity and complex-
ity of the stories behind simplified narratives, and 3) to amplify the many less domi-
nant group narratives that are circulating in society. The aim is not to impose or select
a unifying narrative to disseminate, or even to promote neutrality, but rather to disrupt
unconscious preconceptions, enable self-reflection on narrative bias, and encourage a
greater diversity of narratives to thrive together. As the narrative landscape is enriched,
simple and divisive narratives lose power. Groups and individuals are able to perceive
the relationships and commonalities among their stories, acknowledge others’ griev-
ances, and engage with each other to handle conflict in a more constructive way. The
media is central to this process.
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ta bl e 1 . differ ence s be t w een simpl ified a nd compl e x n a r r at i v e s

Feature Simplified Narrative Complex Narrative

Their Motivation Power and Domination Rational Interests

Their Powers Exaggerated Ordinary
Their Character Evil Human
Our Past Innocent Complicit
Our Future Romantic Realistic
Our Focus To Damage Them To Benefit/Limit Harm to Us
Causal Factors Reduced to Few or One Multiple and Complicated
Causal Direction Linear Feedback Loops
Causal Context Individuated Structural
Discourse Polarising Elaborating
Representation of Time Compressed Complicated
Relations with Adversary Treasonous Productive
Scope of Conflict Cosmic Mundane
Language of Stories Poetic Prosaic
Adapted from Solon Simmons, Root Narrative Theory and Conflict Resolution: Power, Justice and Values
(London: Routledge, 2020).

The Impact of a Transformed Media on Narrative Landscapes

The media has long played a role in shaping societies’ narrative landscapes. For much
of the 20th century, traditional media outlets – newspapers, radio and later television –
promoted certain group narratives and interests, most commonly of states and political
and business elites. As it professionalised in the second half of the century, the news
media continued to have political leanings and prioritise particular angles or takes on
stories, yet it also increasingly prized objectivity and unbiased reporting on a broader
range of stories relevant to the public interest. Print and broadcast outlets built norms
around fact-checking stories, verifying their sources and providing differing viewpoints.
They filtered the type and quality of news and indicated minimum standards for how
social and political actors should behave.

The 21st century has seen a major shift in the media landscape. Traditional media outlets
have increasingly switched from analogue to digital platforms, expanding their reach,
especially in countries with significant information and communication technology (ICT)
infrastructure and widespread access to low-cost internet and devices. The number
of media outlets, digital content platforms and types of content producers has grown
exponentially. Social media – from platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp,
Telegram and TikTok to the content producers who use them – has created a world where
anyone can be a media outlet. The line between news and entertainment has blurred.
Since they share content, so has the line between traditional and social media. In fact,
for many, social media is their primary source of news.
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Although they continue to play a filtering role in operating around a central news room,
traditional media outlets are under unprecedented stress. They are experiencing more
online and in-person bullying and threats, pressure from corporate management and
tension between maintaining objectivity and meeting financial targets. Many traditional
outlets, particularly independent and small newspapers with a local readership, have
closed or declined in importance. In countries with limited ICT infrastructure or which are
subject to state interference – particularly those with authoritarian traits – traditional
private media outlets may maintain their influence, but often with curtailed freedoms
or overshadowing by state-controlled media. Yet internal and external actors, includ-
ing diasporas, regularly challenge the status quo through social media platforms or by
smuggling content across borders. As such, traditional media is facing a growing crisis
of popularity and legitimacy in a range of different contexts, which is eroding its capac-
ity to shape national narrative landscapes.

The changes in the media sector have given a much larger number of diverse content
producers a voice and the potential to access a broad audience. Content producers are
identifying and disseminating stories that previously would not have been heard at scale.
They are creating larger (virtual) public spaces for marginalised actors, including women
and young people, and providing openings for individuals and groups to engage digitally
and mobilise for social and political action. They are sharing stories using more diverse
and potentially inclusive formats, such as videos, podcasts and infographics. The result
is an increase of content produced outside major outlets and in the global South, ena-
bling learning about events and practices across countries and continents that serves
to boost the periphery. Many more narratives are in public circulation than ever before.

At the same time, competition among content producers and the commercial opportu-
nities presented by new platforms have deepened the drive to grow a following, attract
advertisers and monetise content. As a result, both traditional and social media content
have become far more targeted to their intended audience. In turn, the audience – often
represented by its most vocal members, not the general public – increasingly directs
which facts and events are covered and how. As sensational, simplistic and emotional
messaging attracts attention and drives profits, content producers have an incentive
to circulate stories that provoke outrage and other strong emotional responses among
their followers.

Big tech companies such as Google, Twitter and Facebook – but increasingly also tra-
ditional media with a large online presence – use algorithms that further tailor content
to specific audiences. Despite evidence that major companies like Facebook are aware
that targeted content contributes to outrage and polarisation, their business model dis-
incentivises them from curbing provocative content, while the regulatory environment
largely insulates them from accountability. These developments have narrowed the type
and accuracy of content many people access, and thus the array of narratives they see in
circulation. They have also opened new avenues for the spread of simplified narratives
that encourage polarisation.
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The Role of the Media in Promoting Polarisation

Traditional and social media shape narratives by focusing attention on particular events
and issues, to the exclusion of others. They use storytelling techniques to amplify stories
on these topics, making them emotionally engaging to draw in their audience, often by
emphasising the suffering experienced by an individual or a group and by constructing
binaries of heroes and villains. They then repeat and elaborate those particular stories,
placing them in different contexts and looking at them through various lenses, to the
point that the combined stories advance a narrative so stable and normalised that it
seems to be a given. Narratives promoted by the media become highly visible in the
national narrative landscape and internalised by the population.

In some cases, media outlets and content producers deliberately disseminate stories
with an interpretation of events in line with a specific narrative. They may be motivat-
ed by power or profit, pressure from influential actors and institutions, or membership
of a social group and belief in the validity of its grievances and moral superiority of its
claims. In other cases, content is determined by unconscious bias, where content pro-
ducers unwittingly tell stories that bolster a narrative which has shaped their worldview.
Even skilled journalists, who are trained in objective reporting, reveal partiality by what
they choose to cover, who they frame as a hero or a villain, or the language they use to
describe a person or event. Because it is so common, narrative bias can be difficult to
detect.

The rise of digital platforms and media targeting has enabled governments, political and
business elites, and other influential actors to engage with their supporters and promote
their agendas at an unprecedented level, including through propaganda and polarisa-
tion. To build their personal and institutional influence, some use simplified narratives
on digital media to recruit followers; organise virtual campaigns to ‘other’, discredit
or bully their rivals; and instigate real-life events with the aim of provoking collective
violence and destabilisation, usually in a way that conceals their role as orchestrators.
Social media surveillance and spyware enable them to target both supporters and op-
ponents at scale. Many influential actors use traditional and social media to spread
misinformation, disinformation and ‘fake news’, creating a sense of confusion in the
public about what counts as ‘real news’ and which information is factual and credible.

With the transformation of the media, it is commonly observed that people are increas-
ingly exposed to a barrage of stories on various platforms throughout the day, while
being sucked into ‘echo chambers’ that reinforce their worldview and block alternative
perspectives. These often involve amplifying manipulated or redacted accounts of reality
while spreading provocative messaging that attracts attention and engineers outrage,
at times to the point of encouraging hate speech. Once in an echo chamber, these false
or simplified narratives can become so effective that, when exposed to opposing views,
people become more rather than less entrenched in their polarising viewpoints. Individu-
als and groups then spread these narratives to their social networks via online platforms
and messaging services like WhatsApp. Digital technology also makes platforms and
content that render a particular narrative easier to find than ever before.
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As part of this dynamic, the media provides engaging content that can be moulded to
support a group’s origin and development story – in some contexts, facilitating the
spread of stories that marginalise parts of society. In such cases, the media contributes
to a process of moral subjugation whereby the ‘other’ is no longer perceived as a legit-
imate moral actor. The amplification and cross-fertilisation of diverse storylines does
not take place, individuals do not understand the meaning of competing narratives, and
subsequently the prospects for dialogue or any sort of constructive engagement grow
slim. Becoming aware of narrative bias and the value of complex narratives is key to
acknowledging and countering these divisive effects of the media.

Options
Against the context described above, this section proposes five avenues for nurturing a
rich narrative landscape via the media: training and education; collaboration and dia-
logue; verification; funding; and regulation. Intended to prompt new thinking, it presents
a wide range of options for various stakeholders to consider advocating or implementing
depending on type of government and sociopolitical dynamics, degree of polarisation,
level of ICT infrastructure, and amount of press freedom and liberty of expression, among
other factors. The endnotes point to concrete examples of these options.

The premise is that when a society has a varied media that disseminates accurate content
and amplifies many diverse and complex stories, this produces a rich narrative landscape
that encourages engagement among different social groups and institutions, making it
more likely that conflict will be managed in a constructive manner. Groups with particular
narratives and identities can coexist in tension, and individuals can identify with multi-
ple narratives explaining their origins, identity and behaviour. The effect is to highlight
common roots and interwoven elements across different group narratives, enabling
mutual understanding and dialogue driven more by facts than by antagonistic myths.

Training and Education

Through training and education, the general public – in addition to influential public
and private sector actors and traditional and social media content producers – can learn
how narrative biases shape our worldviews; identify simplified narratives and disinfor-
mation; and locate and disseminate stories that demonstrate social complexity. Specific
training and education actions could include to:

• Initiate and amplify information campaigns for the general public on what narratives
are, how they are mobilised by different actors, and the role of monetisation and
new media business models in shaping the content people see and share. These
campaigns could also cover how to identify fake news, disinformation and misinfor-
mation, including through the use of online tools and apps that track manipulation
of information.
1
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• Offer narrative competency training to diverse stakeholders in the public and private
sectors, as well as to members of the public, including components on why and how
2

different actors use the media to promote polarisation and disinformation, as well as
on how unconscious bias affects the way we consume media content.
3

• Expand media and information literacy programmes in schools, libraries and youth
hubs.
4

• Establish and publicise a website and virtual forum that provides resources on what
narrative is and how it operates, promotes a media code of ethics and conduct, and
encourages objectivity and viewpoint diversity in traditional and social media via
diverse practical tools, ranging from visually stimulating ‘how to’ guides to video
games.
5

• Re-introduce apprenticeships at traditional media outlets so that diverse content

producers learn about codes of conduct and the habits and norms of the profession
through practice, while gaining deeper knowledge regarding their focus areas.
6

• Promote learning opportunities for different types of content producers via tertiary
education programmes and capacity building trainings, as well as small grants pro-
grammes and fellowships that promote objective content.
7

• Train content producers working in conflict settings, emphasising the importance of

truth seeking over promoting a particular agenda, while also highlighting the need
for conflict-sensitive content that does not exacerbate divisions. The same applies
to content producers in diasporas for countries where the media is constrained and/
or the diaspora is a driver of conflict.
8

Collaboration and Dialogue

Through collaboration and dialogue, media outlets and content producers – in cooper-
ation with influential actors as well as individuals and groups in conflict – can evaluate
their biases, roles and practices from a narrative perspective; develop and spread more
complex narratives; and inspire new thinking among their constituencies. Specific col-
laboration and dialogue actions could include to:

• Organise a series of public dialogues and debates – at community, subnational or

national levels – on narrative bias and the role of the media in promoting polarisa-
tion, with participation and storytelling by individuals and communities affected by
polarisation.
9

• Create a national or regional professional association to help diverse content pro-

ducers exchange experiences and knowledge, understand their audience, and better
conceive their roles as information mediators amid media’s polarising influence, as
well as how conscious and unconscious bias shapes their stories.
10

• Establish networks of small and independent media outlets to collaborate on and

share content that addresses localised conflict, as well as amplifying the content at
the national level, particularly with regard to underreported issues.
11
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• Build networks of media outlets and content producers representing different sides
of a conflict to collaborate on verifying content and countering disinformation and
misinformation, as well as addressing threats to content producers. Fellowships
12

could place content producers in media outlets that subscribe to different narratives
than their own, or enable an exchange of fellows between large and small outlets (in-
cluding between the global South and North), to promote awareness of bias, mutual
understanding and engagement across dividing lines.
• Promote collaboration between content producers and active members of margin-
alised communities across dividing lines to build understanding of grievances that
spur conflict, co-create content and share resources and expertise to reveal threats
to the public interest.
13

• Establish depolarisation councils – or incorporate their ideas into existing associa-

tions – to encourage self-reflection among and across key cultural organisations (eg,
movie studios, television production companies, museums and theatres) so as to
nurture the heterodoxic middle at the expense of the polarising edges.
• Organise dialogues and workshops between diverse stakeholders and representa-
tives of big tech companies, particularly in their public policy departments and at the
regional level, to co-develop approaches for self-regulation and maintaining ethical
standards.
• Convene media ‘influencers’ in civic, political and institutional leadership positions
to discuss their narrative biases and promote complex over simplified narratives
among their constituents.
• Consider using and building open-source, decentralised social networks that are run
and overseen by individuals or collectives, rather than big tech companies, and allow
for collaboration and cross-platform engagement.
14

Verification
Improved and standardised verification processes help stakeholders ensure that media
content is accurate, fair and inclusive. Specific verification actions could include to:

• Adopt, elaborate and raise awareness of accepted indicators for accurate, fair and
inclusive content and procedures for verifying content based on these indicators.
15

• Establish and raise awareness of whistle-blowing platforms and other online tools
that help the public track and publicise manipulation of information.
16

• Create partnerships among media outlets/platforms and state, business and com-
munity-based actors, including civil society organisations and academics, to verify
media content and debunk disinformation, including through an international,
17

multi-stakeholder charter on disinformation.

18

• Maintain pressure on social media platforms to limit automated posting, adopt and
maintain transparent verification procedures for accounts of public interest, and im-
plement systems of standards enforcement and warnings for audiences.
19

• Create an independent national observatory with a group of respected stakeholders

to elevate the political cost of financing and promoting content that encourages hate
speech, disinformation and polarisation.
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Funding
Funding for initiatives ranging from ICT infrastructure to collaborative platforms to re-
search is crucial for the initiatives proposed above to succeed. Specific funding actions
could include to:

• Promote investment in ICT infrastructure and access to low-cost internet and devices
in order to address global and local digital divides.
• Support public information and educational initiatives focused on narrative compe-
tency and media and information literacy.
• Establish, and compile information on, national endowments to sponsor independent
and small media outlets as well as fellowships for content producers, with a focus on
best quality work and the principles of investigative journalism.
20

• Invest in pan-regional media in the global South to ensure greater autonomy and se-
curity to investigate and report.
• Invest in small and independent news outlets that focus on reporting local stories
across conflict divides in a fair and accurate manner, with direct knowledge of the
political and other dynamics that shape the local context.
• Support platforms and networks for fact-checking and verification.
• Invest in research on disinformation and its effects as well as experimentation on how
to engage different sides in reducing polarisation through the media.
21

• Invest in a more equitable public technology infrastructure for the web.

22

Regulation
Media regulation is an important tool, although approaches that encourage rather than
dampen storytelling are preferable. Among traditional private outlets, broadcast media
has tended to be subject to statutory regulation or co-regulation by outlets and the state,
whereas print media has relied on self-regulation, largely through press councils. Social
media platforms also rely on self-regulation mechanisms, although content moderation
and removal policies have no clear standard, lack transparency and tend to be reactive
rather than proactive, as well as prone to abuse and uneven implementation. The media
regulation methods proposed here attempt to address some of these shortcomings, and
are intended to supplement the other approaches, particularly education and collabo-
ration, which can also be implemented within a shorter time period and may be more
feasible in repressive or conflict contexts. Specific legislative and financial regulatory
actions could include to:

• Re-assess the legislative framework and government regulations on media outlets

and platforms – including a regulatory agency with diverse representation – to ad-
dress how to reduce their capacity to polarise while preserving press freedom and
liberty of expression. Include provisions for limiting ownership of media organisations
by political actors, ensuring proportionate political coverage of parties, amplifying
minority political and cultural interests, addressing bullying of content producers,
and criminalising the dissemination of false information.
23
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• Offer special tax benefits for independent media outlets and publicly fund news or-
ganisations with a public service mandate, and greatly expand the national and lo-
cal non-profit news sector. Ensure that any publicly subsidised outlet includes rules
for proportionate political and minority coverage, in addition to other measures that
help reduce polarisation. This includes disincentivising staff to drive up traffic via
provocative and polarising content.
24

• Subsidise local news production or establish local news utilities, ensuring in each
case that competition and a fair spectrum of views are maintained.
• Use anti-monopoly powers to reduce the dominance of big tech companies. Push
them to apply technological solutions to addressing problematic content (eg, algo-
rithms against hate speech, transparency plug-ins). Consider requiring them to pay
for news content featured on their platforms, keeping in mind that this might limit
access to information in some countries.
25

• Establish social media councils made up of a range of stakeholders (including aca-

demics and civil society) to encourage self-regulation, maintain ethical standards, ad-
dress content moderation problems and increase transparency and accountability.
26

• Implement a national action plan to prevent and address bullying and violence
against content producers.
27

• Where violent conflicts or repressive governments make country-based regulation

difficult, consider establishing or strengthening regional bodies as a substitute.
28

• Incorporate media mapping into conventional conflict analysis as standard practice,

assessing the influence of different types of outlets and platforms; their ownership,
market concentration, capacity and degree of viewpoint diversity; and the influence
of global and regional versus local sources of information.
29

• Incorporate regulatory reform of media into peace agreements and include media as
a focus in any transitional justice processes.

Conclusion
This paper has discussed the role of the media in promoting simplified narratives that
drive polarisation and conflict in deeply divided societies. It has proposed methods for
nurturing richer narrative landscapes across the media sector via training and educa-
tion; collaboration and dialogue; verification; funding; and regulation. Instead of im-
posing one or two unifying narratives, the paper advocates the value of amplifying and
elaborating numerous narratives already in circulation, in order to demonstrate social
complexity, encourage engagement and improve conflict management.
11 institute for integr ated tr ansitions

Endnotes
1. Eg, https://osome.iu.edu/tools/botslayer; while avoiding the extreme views at either end.
https://trusted-news.com; https://hoaxy.osome. The government also sends literacy trucks to rural
iu.edu areas to educate people on how to spot fake news.
2. Eg, https://www.partnersglobal.org/newsroom/ This approach combines top-down interventions
narrative-competency-the-power-of- (with government introducing new technologies to
intentional-communication increase transparency and combat disinformation)
3. Eg, https://insidepolarisation.nl/en with bottom-up engagement (with thousands of
citizens enlisted to address disinformation, includ-
4. Eg, https://mediasmarts.ca
ing most recently during COVID-19 when pharma-
5. Eg, https://heterodoxacademy.org; https:// cists played this role).
mediainitiatives.am/en
18. Eg, https://cbc.radio-canada.ca/en/media-
6. Eg, https://www.bbc.com/careers/ centre/trusted-news-charter-fight-disinformation
trainee-schemes-and-apprenticeships/
19. Eg, https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-
apprenticeships/dja
your-account/about-twitter-verified-accounts
7. Eg, https://mediahelpingmedia.org/2017/
20. Eg, https://www.nfnz.cz/en
07/25/from-citizen-reporting-to-citizen-journalism
21. Eg, https://www.cima.ned.org
8. Eg, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/
communication-and-information/resources/ 22. Eg, https://www.projectliberty.io
publications-and-communication-materials/ 23. For examples, see, https://www.loc.gov/law/
publications/full-list/conflict-sensitive-report- help/social-media-disinformation/compsum.php.
ing-state-of-the-art-a-course-for-journalists-and- Germany has adopted the Network Enforcement
journalism-educators Act (NetzDG) to counteract hate speech, fake news
9. For examples, see, https://www.comminit.com and illicit content by threatening social networks
with a fine of up to 50 million EUR if they do not re-
10. Eg, https://sanef.org.za/about-us
move “clearly illegal” material within 24 hours of a
11. Eg, https://periodistasdeapie.org.mx; https:// complaint (or a week if it is not clear if the content
ligacontraelsilencio.com; https://www.elclip.org is illegal). This model depends on self-regulation,
12. Eg, https://credibilitycoalition.org but is within the parameters of the state’s regula-
13. Eg, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/ tory framework (like broadcast media). However,
explainers/about-the-project the NetzDG matrix has been replicated by author-
14. See, https://sopa.tulane.edu/blog/decentral- itarian states to provide a cloak of legitimacy for
ized-social-networks; https://www.wsj.com/ digital censorship and repression and most have
articles/frank-mccourt-wants-to-build-a-new- explicitly referred to the NetzDG as justification for
model-for-social-media-11633710479 restricting online speech.
15. Eg, https://thetrustproject.org 24. See, https://www.publicmediaalliance.org/
changing-times-for-public-media-funding
16. Eg, https://english.atlatszo.hu/
about-us-fundraising 25. Eg, Australia has adopted codes of conduct
that oblige social media platforms to pay news
17. Eg, https://firstdraftnews.org, especially
organisations for news snippets. They mandate ad-
https://start.me/p/vjv80b/first-draft-basic-
vance notice of changes to algorithmic ranking and
toolkit. In addition, Taiwan has adopted a
presentation of news, appropriate recognition of
public-private partnership model to deal with dis-
original news content, and provision of information
information. While diverse stakeholders work with
on the use of personal data collected during inter-
social media companies to debunk and downrank
actions with news content. The aim is to reduce so-
viral conspiracy theories, the main focus is the
cial media’s ability to contribute to polarisation (by
messaging service Line (used by 90% of the pop-
impacting its bottom line) and increase funding for
ulation). The Line Fact Checker strategy encourag-
traditional media, especially smaller, regional and
es users to refer suspect stories to fact-checking
rural content producers (by bolstering their ability
bots like Cofacts, where the posts are added to
to compete).
a database and verified by volunteers. Working
in tandem, the independent Taiwan FactCheck 26. See, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/
Center curates an online repository of disproven social-media-councils
conspiracy theories and conducts peer-reviewed 27. Eg, http://rm.coe.int/090000168097fa83
fact checking. In addition, the partnership hones 28. See, eg, https://www.cima.ned.org/
public media literacy through projects such as the publication/the-untapped-potential-of-regional-co-
state-sponsored vTaiwan, which uses software to operation-for-media-reform-in-southern-africa
visualise consensus clusters among citizens and 29. Eg, https://www.dw.com/en/tool-2-conflict-
allows lawmakers and stakeholders to design pol- mapping/a-57051871
icies that respond to the evolving middle ground
12 institute for integr ated tr ansitions

Acknowledgements
Mary Harper, Miguel Silva, Seth Kaplan and Solon Simmons of IFIT’s Inclusive Narratives
Practice Group (INPG) developed these ideas on narrative and media, in cooperation
with IFIT’s Jasmina Brankovic, who drafted the paper. IFIT is grateful to the INPG and IFIT
experts who provided input on the paper, and to Anriette Esterhuysen, Carlos Dada,
Juanita León, Julia Roig, María Teresa Ronderos, Moky Makura, Nerma Jelačić, Roxane
Farmanfarmaian and Therese San Diego Torres for their valuable feedback.

Founded in 2012, the Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT) is an independent, international,
non-governmental organisation offering comprehensive analysis and technical advice to national
actors involved in negotiations and transitions in fragile and conflict-affected societies. IFIT has
supported negotiations and transitions in countries including Afghanistan, Colombia, El Salva-
dor, Gambia, Libya, Nigeria, Syria, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.