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Atmel AVR Microcontroller Primer Programming and
Interfacing 1st Edition Steven F. Barrett Digital Instant
Download
Author(s): Steven F. Barrett, Daniel Pack, Mitchell Thornton
ISBN(s): 9781598295412, 1598295411
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 10.20 MB
Year: 2007
Language: english
A Trader’s First
Book on
Commodities
This page intentionally left blank
A Trader’s
First Book on
Commodities
An Introduction to the World’s Fastest
Growing Market
Carley Garner
Vice President, Publisher: Tim Moore
Associate Publisher and Director of Marketing: Amy Neidlinger
Executive Editor: Jim Boyd
Editorial Assistant: Pamela Boland
Operations Manager: Gina Kanouse
Senior Marketing Manager: Julie Phifer
Publicity Manager: Laura Czaja
Assistant Marketing Manager: Megan Colvin
Cover Designer: Chuti Prasertsith
Managing Editor: Kristy Hart
Project Editor: Lori Lyons
Copy Editor: Apostrophe Editing Services
Proofreader: Language Logistics, LLC
Indexer: Lisa Stumpf
Compositor: Nonie Ratcliff
Manufacturing Buyer: Dan Uhrig
This book is sold with the understanding that neither the author nor the publisher is engaged in
rendering legal, accounting, or other professional services or advice by publishing this book. Each
individual situation is unique. Thus, if legal or financial advice or other expert assistance is required
in a specific situation, the services of a competent professional should be sought to ensure that the
situation has been evaluated carefully and appropriately. The author and the publisher disclaim any
liability, loss, or risk resulting directly or indirectly, from the use or application of any of the contents
of this book. There is substantial risk of loss in trading futures and options.
FT Press offers excellent discounts on this book when ordered in quantity for bulk purchases or special sales. For more
information, please contact U.S. Corporate and Government Sales, 1-800-382-3419, [email protected].
For sales outside the U.S., please contact International Sales at [email protected].
Company and product names mentioned herein are the trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, without permission in writing
from the publisher.
ISBN-10: 0-13-701545-3
ISBN-13: 978-0-13-701545-0
Chapter 3: The Organized Chaos of Open Outcry and the Advent of Electronic Trading . . . . 45
The Pit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Electronically Traded Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
“Side by Side” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Contents vii
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Pearson and the FT Press publishing production team for
bringing this book together.
I am grateful for my friends and family, who have always been by my side and
for encouraging me to keep pushing.
Most of all, I appreciate free market capitalism; without it none of this would
be possible.
chapter #
introduction
(a)Introduction:
In the midst of the excitement, the lure of the commodity rally clouded the
judgment of many. Looking back, it seemed obvious that expecting market
fundamentals to maintain $7 corn, $13 wheat, $17 soybeans, and my favorite,
$148 crude oil, was simply unrealistic. However, nobody knew just how high
prices might go before coming to a more rational level, and those that entered
the market “early” with bearish strategies likely paid a high price. Yet, when the
tides turned they did so in a vicious fashion; the stunning fall from grace was
even steeper than the preceding rally.
tight supplies along with unprecedented demand gave investors the green light
to pour money into the sector, and they did so in droves. Nonetheless, what I
believe to be the silent culprit behind a rallying grain market was the implica-
tions of higher energy costs.
It is easy to see how all these factors combined could have triggered a large
rally in the energy markets. However, what might not be as obvious is the impact
that higher crude oil and gasoline prices had on other commodity markets.
Many grains that were considered viable candidates for alternative fuel
gained strength as scientists and consumers scrambled to find “cheaper” and
domestically produced sources of energy. Some of the largest gains were
witnessed in the corn market, which happened to be the lucky beneficiary of the
ethanol hype.
Ethanol is a fuel created as an alternative to gasoline and is derived from
purely renewable resources such as sugar, corn, and even potatoes. Although it
was later determined that the use of corn in producing ethanol isn’t necessarily
efficient, as it turns out, sugar is a much better alternative to producing ethanol.
Similarly, the sudden interest in biodiesel fuels created from plants with high
amounts of vegetable oils, namely soybeans, paved the way for new all-time
highs in soybeans and bean oil.
In addition, not only did ethanol and other bio fuel hopes increase the
demand for grain products, but higher crude and gasoline prices also amplified
the costs associated with growing agricultural products. For instance, if farmers
must pay more in fuel costs to operate their tractors and other necessary farm
equipment, they will then be forced to charge more for the goods that they
produce.
Furthermore, many farmers dedicated relatively more acreage to crops that
could see higher demand and prices due to their alternative food uses. Mean-
while, the price of commodities unrelated to energy or bio fuel, such as cotton,
benefited from tighter supplies resulting from less dedicated acreage.
factor. Grain prices are highly dependent on weather and growing conditions;
at times they will be minimally influenced by currency fluctuations. Equally,
crude oil is often driven by geopolitical tension. With the dollar considered a
“flight to quality” currency, it is likely that crude and the greenback can move
higher together if Middle East turmoil occurs. Nonetheless, in general,
commodity traders should keep the strength of the U.S. dollar in mind when
constructing their analyses because it is part of the equation. During the 2007
commodity rally, it appears as though dollar weakness played a significant role.
Figure I.1 A lower domestic currency makes goods and services produced in that
country more affordable for foreign buyers and, therefore, increases the demand and
price for such.
The Overflow
The commodity bull overflowed into the precious metals markets, namely gold
and silver. Although, cash market supply-demand fundamentals weren’t neces-
sarily as intriguing as the others, the market psychology was.
Conversely, industrial metals such as copper were seeing incredibly high
levels of demand as China and India raced to modernize. Thus, investors were
convinced that the fundamental picture was supportive of $4 copper. We now
know that this wasn’t necessarily sustainable.
6 A Trader’s First Book on Commodities
Unfortunately, markets and their participants are complex, and this often
makes it impossible to pinpoint the driving force behind any price move.
A Day of Reckoning
What goes up must eventually come down…and
commodity prices weren’t an exception. Although At first it is easy to confuse a
some are reluctant to refer to the 2007/2008 rally as a bull market with trading
bubble, I am not. In finance, a bubble is defined as a genius, but it can’t last.
scenario in which market prices rise and become
overvalued by any measure of valuation, and in my opinion this seems to fit the
bill.
A market bubble is a rally that is artificially and temporarily driven by a mob
mentality of market participants. In reality, it is difficult to quantify and analyze
the true driving force behind prices as they are moving, but what happens next
can provide insight. I believe that what ultimately categorizes a market move as
a bubble is the manner at which prices adjust to more realistic levels. The sharp
price decline that succeeded the 2007/2008 commodity rally suggests that the
market was grossly overvalued and this conforms to the characteristics of a
bubble.
During the commodity “bubble,” the benchmark index for commodity
prices, the Reuters-Jefferies CRB Index, nearly doubled in value. Commonly
referred to simply as the CRB, it is designed to provide a representation of a
diversified holding of long-only futures.
The CRB reached its peak of nearly 475 on July 3, 2008. From there the
commodity bull came crashing down in a magnificent fashion. In December
2008, the Reuters-Jefferies CRB Index had fallen more than 50% from its peak
and was valued near 200. This was the lowest level in 6 1⁄2 years and became the
perfect example of the tendency for market prices to go down faster than they
go up regardless of the slope of the incline, as shown in Figure I.2.
As prices deflated to what were debatably more rational levels, traders were
faced with difficult decisions in terms of speculation. Historical price envelopes
had been intensely magnified; thus, in a post-bubble world, speculation in the
commodity markets potentially became more lucrative, but the risks were
exaggerated as well.
8 A Trader’s First Book on Commodities
Figure I.2 The irrational exuberance in commodities can best be depicted by the
rally and subsequent plunge in the CRB Index.
an investment arena utilized only by the über-rich and risk hungry investors,
began to see money inflows from average retail investors and even pension
funds. However, as investors began redeeming funds from their commodity
holdings, it was as if someone had pulled the floor from underneath the markets.
In my opinion, speculators didn’t cause the bubble, but unfamiliar and inexpe-
rienced speculators might share some of the blame for the size of it.
Without support from basic supply-and-demand fundamentals, a market
cannot sustain pricing in the end. Thus, if and when speculation does move
prices beyond what the equilibrium price might be, it eventually has to correct
itself. The problem is that there is no telling how far and how long prices can
remain distorted; unfortunately, many traders were introduced to this the hard
way. This is a phenomenon that is not exclusive to commodities; I am sure that
you remember the tech bubble in the 1990s in which similar market actions took
place.
Perhaps the single largest contributing factor to the speculator’s role in the
commodity bubble was the increasing popularity of the Electronic Traded Fund.
Before the existence of commodity related ETFs retail investors were largely
excluded from the asset class due to fears of the futures markets in terms of
leverage, margin calls, and perceived risk.
During the 2007/2008 commodity frenzy, investment firms issued several
new commodity-based ETFs. This should have been a warning sign as fund
companies are notorious for providing sector-specific products near the bursting
of a bubble. This makes sense; by the time that a firm identifies the trend,
assembles the fund, and gets approval from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), the sector might have exhausted its popularity.
Keep in mind that the magnificent rally and retreat was highly correlated
with available leverage. Many of the gains made on the way up were backed by
leverage as opposed to actual capital. As traders and fund managers de-levered,
the markets suffered dramatically.
The role of speculators in the commodity rally was exacerbated by the toll
that margin calls took on the markets. As the commodity boom began to fizzle,
exchanges and brokerage firms began issuing margin calls to those that entered
long positions at the tail end of the rally. As positions were liquidated to satisfy
margin calls, prices dropped sharply, and new margin calls were issued. It isn’t
difficult to identify the snowballing effect of such events and how they could
quickly alter the mentality of the market and, more important, prices.
It is critical that you realize that from a trading standpoint, it doesn’t neces-
sarily matter whether the market is driven by fundamentals, technicals, specu-
lators, or hedgers. What does matter is that prices move, and it is up to you to
10 A Trader’s First Book on Commodities
be on the right side of it or at least get out of its way. Markets are unforgiving,
regardless of how strongly that you feel that prices are overvalued due to
irrational speculation; they might remain so for much longer and much farther
than you can financially and psychologically afford to be involved.
to $130 and sell the rallies. Knowing what we know now, this would have been
lucrative enough to afford a savvy trader a new luxury-priced car, but for many
trading it in real time, it might have been pure agony. Better yet, imagine being
long crude from the high $140s after hearing predictions for $200 crude oil
from some of the industry’s most respected analysts. We all know what
happened next (see Figure I.3).
The oil futures “tycoons” that you hear about on TV rumored to have netted
millions of dollars buying crude oil futures contracts are few and far between.
Those who were the beneficiaries of the now infamous energy rally were likely
people who had significant risk capital backing their speculation or simply a
magnificent streak of luck and an incredible amount of fortitude. Unlike you and
me, the success stories were, based on my observations, traders that executed a
position and stepped back without micromanaging the details or even losing sleep.
Figure I.3 This chart is a continuous front month futures chart and is therefore an
approximation and might not represent the most-active contract data. Nonetheless,
the magnitude of the move is identifiable by this depiction. A trader exposed to the
market during the entire move would have made or lost approximately $116,000 per
contract!
I will be the first to admit that I was wrong in my expectations of crude oil
in 2007/2008. I never anticipated to see prices above the $100 mark, or at least
not in such a short time frame. Clearly, I was wrong. Luckily, I was wise enough
12 A Trader’s First Book on Commodities
to realize that that the energy markets aren’t for everyone. Although I recognize
that my clients are free to speculate in any market that they choose, and there
can be great opportunities in energies, I took the opportunity to kindly remind
them of the potential hazards.
Ironically, based on my experience and conversations with those within the
futures and options industry, the commodity rally was paralyzing for many
veteran traders. The price moves were impossible for those unfamiliar with the
markets to fathom, but for those that have been trading grains and energies for
many years, it was not only unimaginable but in some cases career-ending.
Traders that spent the bulk of their adulthood speculating as grain prices
moved from high to low within their historical price envelopes, quickly
discovered that the markets no longer had boundaries. For example, prior to
2007 wheat was a commodity that was most comfortable trading between $2.00
and $4.00 per bushel with a few brief stints in the $6.00 range. Looking at a
long-term wheat chart, it is easy to see how a trader could unexpectedly get
caught on the wrong side of a move that eventually got close to doubling the
previous all-time high of the commodity. Those that did find themselves in such
positions were in a state of denial and had a difficult time liquidating positions
with large losses. As a result, the situation became even worse as losses mounted,
as did margin calls (see Figure I.4).
Figure I.4 Few could have predicted the magnitude of 2007/2008 wheat rally that
made a mockery of its previous all-time high.
The Rise and Fall of Commodities 13
You might have heard about the rogue (unauthorized and reckless) wheat
trader whose actions resulted in a large loss at a major financial institution. The
trader, without permission, greatly exceeded his trading limits due to a loophole
in the trading platforms. The culprit was a commodity broker located in
Memphis, Tennessee, who reportedly put his account, and ultimately his
brokerage firm, in the hole more than $141 million. The broker had been a
registered participant of the futures industry for more than 15 years at the time
of the incident; perhaps in this case his experience worked against him in that
he was overly bearish in a market that simply wasn’t “playing by the rules.”
Keep in mind that in a precommodity boom world, the margin to hold a
wheat futures position overnight was less than $1,000. During its “hay day” it
was in the neighborhood of several thousand dollars. Therein lies much of the
problem, as commodities became more and more expensive to hold, short
traders were forced to fold their hands. The liquidation of short positions added
to the buying pressure of speculative long plays, and prices became astro-
nomical.
Conclusion
Throughout this text you find what I believe to be a realistic and candid view of
the commodity markets. My intention isn’t to deter you from trading
commodities. In fact, I am a broker that makes a living from commission and
would love nothing more than to attract traders into what I believe to be some
of the most exciting markets available to speculators. However, as a broker, it is
also my job to ensure that you are aware of the potential hardships and, accord-
ingly, will properly prepare yourself before putting your hard-earned money at
risk.
If you walk away from this book with something, I hope it is the realization
that anything is possible in the commodity markets. Never say never because if
you do, you will eventually be proven wrong. Additionally, the markets, and
trading them, is an art not a science. Unfortunately, there are no black–and-
white answers nor are there fool-proof strategies—but that does not mean that
there aren’t opportunities.
I am often asked what is the best technical tool or indicator to use when
speculating in a market. My answer is always the same; there isn’t a “best tool,”
only a best way to use the tool. The paramount approach to any trading tool,
whether technical, seasonal, or fundamental, is to use it—or better yet, a combi-
nation of a few—to form an educated opinion in your expectations of market
14 A Trader’s First Book on Commodities
price. With their findings, traders should approach the market with a degree of
humbleness and with realistic expectations.
Remember, as a trader you compete against the market, specifically each
participant in that particular market. Therefore, assuming that you can always
beat the markets is assuming that you are somehow smarter and better informed
than all other participants. Not only is this arrogant, it also might be financial
suicide. Instead, you should approach every trade with modesty and with the
understanding that you could be wrong. Having such an attitude might prevent
you from sustaining large losses as the result of stubbornness or a lack of ability
to admit to being incorrect in your speculation.
With that in mind, in its simplest form, trading is a zero sum game. Aside
from commissions paid to the brokerage firm and fees paid to the exchange, for
every dollar lost in the market, someone else has gained a dollar. Becoming a
consistently profitable trader isn’t easy, but it isn’t synonymous with chasing the
proverbial end of the rainbow either. With the proper background, hard work,
and the experience that comes with inevitable tough lessons; long-term success
is possible. I hope that this book will be the first step in your journey toward
victory in the challenging, yet potentially rewarding, commodity markets.
15
chapter 1
A Crash Course in
Commodities
forget the infamous scene in Trading Places in which Billy Ray Valentine plots his
speculation of belly futures? Ironically, pork belly futures are among the least
traded contracts on the CME today in terms of volume and open interest.
The CME is responsible for trading in a vast variety of contracts including
cattle, hogs, stock index futures, currency futures, and short-term interest rates.
The exchange also offers alternative trading vehicles such as weather and real-
estate derivatives. At the time of this writing, and likely for some time to come,
the CME has the largest open interest in options and futures contracts of any
futures exchange in the world.
Upon merger, the CBOT and the CME consolidated all floor-trading opera-
tions into a single location; the historic CBOT. The actual move took place over
three weekends, and no details were spared. The new combined trading floor
spans 60,000 square feet and facilitated the execution of nearly 3.3 million open
outcry contracts in the first quarter of 2008.
IntercontinentalExchange
The newest player in the U.S. futures trading industry is the IntercontinentalEx-
change, most often referred to as ICE or simply “ice.” In stark contrast to the
original models of the CBOT, CME, and NYMEX, ICE facilitates over-the-
counter energy and commodity contracts. This simply means that there is no
centralized location; instead all trading takes place in cyber-
ICE is a newcomer to the
space.
domestic futures markets
and wasn’t necessarily
ICE was established May 2000, with the mission of trans-
welcomed with open arms. forming OTC trading. By 2001, it acquired an European
However, recent platform energy futures exchange, but it didn’t dig its claws deep into
improvements, such as the the heart of the U.S. futures industry until its acquisition of
acceptance of Good ‘Til
the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) in 2007, along with
Canceled orders and stop
orders, have improved the responsibility to facilitate trading in the softs complex.
popularity of the exchange. The term soft is generally used to describe a commodity that
is grown rather than mined; examples of contracts catego-
rized as soft and traded on ICE in the United States include sugar, cocoa, coffee,
and cotton. More recent additions are the Russell 2000 and the U.S. Dollar
Index.
Cost to Carry
Prices in the cash and futures market differ from one another as a direct result
of the disparity in the timing of delivery of the underlying product. After all, if
a commodity is going to be delivered at some point in the future, it must be
stored and insured in the meantime. The costs associated with holding the
physical grain until the stated delivery date is referred to as the cost to carry.
Specifically, the costs to carry include items such as storing and insuring the
commodity prior to the date of delivery.
Naturally, in normal market conditions, the cash price will be cheaper than
the futures price due to the expenses related to carrying the commodity until
delivery. Likewise, the near-month futures price will be cheaper than a distantly
expiring futures contract. The progressive pricing is often referred to as a
normal carrying charge market (see Figure 1.1). You might also hear this
scenario described by the term contango.
Normal carrying charge markets are only possible during times of ample
supply, or inventory. If there is a shortage of the commodity in the near term,
prices in the cash market increase to reflect market supply-and-demand funda-
mentals. The supply shortage can reduce the contango, or if severe enough it can
actually reverse the contango should the spot price, and possibly the price of the
nearby futures contract, exceed the futures price in distant contracts, as shown
in Figure 1.2.
22 A Trader’s First Book on Commodities
It is important to understand that the contango can’t exceed the actual cost
to carry the commodity. If it did, producers and consumers would have the
opportunity for a “risk-free” profit through arbitrage.
1 A Crash Course in Commodities 23
Arbitrage
Arbitrage is a “risk free”
Arbitrage is the glue that holds the futures markets together. profit, but for most of us
Without arbitrage there would be no incentive for prices in the it might as well be a
mirage. Markets are
futures market to correlate with prices in the cash market, and
quick to eliminate such
as I discuss in Chapter 2, “Hedging Versus Speculating,” opportunities.
arbitrage enables efficient market pricing for hedgers and
speculators. Specifically, if speculators notice that the price
difference between the cash and futures prices of a commodity exceeds the cost
to carry, they will buy the undervalued (cash market commodity) and sell the
overvalued (futures contract written on underlying commodity). This is done
until the spread between the prices in the two markets equals the cost to carry.
The true definition of arbitrage is a risk-free profit. Sounds great doesn’t it?
Unfortunately true arbitrage opportunities are uncommon, and those that do
occur are only opportunities for the insanely quick. The chances are that you
and I do not possess the speed, skill, and resources necessary to properly identify
and react to most arbitrage opportunities in the marketplace.
An example of an arbitrage opportunity
“If you can take advantage of unrelated to cash market pricing would be a scenario
a situation in some way, it’s in which the e-mini S&P is trading at 1080.50 and
your duty as an American to the full-sized version of the contract is trading at
do it.” C. Montgomery Burns 1080.70. In theory, if you noticed this discrepancy in
(The Simpsons) a timely fashion, it would be possible to buy five mini
contracts and sell one big S&P. (The mini contract is
exactly one-fifth of the size of the original and is fungible.). Consequently, a
trader that can execute each side of the trade at the noted prices can request for
the positions to offset each other to lock in a profit of .20 or $50 before trans-
actions costs. It doesn’t sound like much, but if it truly is an arbitrage oppor-
tunity, a $50 risk-free profit isn’t such a bad deal.
Contract Expiration
By definition, futures contracts are expiring agreements for buyers and sellers of
those contracts to exchange the underlying physical commodity. Most market
participants choose to avoid dealing with the underlying assets by offsetting
their obligation at some point prior to expiration of the futures contract, or in
some cases prior to first notice day. I cover the process of offsetting positions
later in the chapter.
24 A Trader’s First Book on Commodities
Futures Expiration
Expiration is the time and day that a particular delivery month of a futures
contract ceases trading and the final settlement price is determined. The actual
delivery process begins at expiration of the futures contract for those markets
that involve a physical commodity exchange. Conversely, a select number of
futures contracts are cash settled. If this is the case, those holding positions into
expiration are agreeing to allow the exchange to determine a final valuation for
the futures contract at hand and adjust the value of individual trading accounts
accordingly. In my opinion, it is generally a bad idea to hold positions into
expiration in cash settled markets because it leaves the fate of profit and losses
1 A Crash Course in Commodities 25
Figure 1.3 Futures traders can buy and sell in any order but must take the
opposite action to exit. This trader is going long December corn and will later
have to sell it to offset the position.
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
— Taikka kenties pastori tahtoi suoda hänellekin antamisen ilon.
Sillä mielellään hän kumminkin antoi.
Irenestä oli mieluista, että Harald oli kaikki antanut, ja tarkasti hän
rupesi hameita tutkimaan, sanoen:
Jos Irene olisi ollut parikymmentä vuotta vanhempi, niin häntä olisi
voinut luulla hyväksi äidiksi, jota hänen hemmoteltu tyttärensä
nuhteita saatuaan koettaa lepyttää. Mutta nyt hän Haraldista näytti
nuorelta naiselta, jota hänen viaton ja kokematon nuorempi
sisarensa koettaa jonkun erehdyksen johdosta lohduttaa ja
viihdyttää.
Pian oli sanottu hyvästi ja kiesit läksivät liikkeelle. Poika, jonka piti
tuoda hevonen takaisin, ei mahtunut kapealle taka-istuimelle, vaan
kulki jalan, milloin juosten, milloin kävellen jälessä. Sillä vaikka pilvet
nousivat yhä korkeammalle, ajoi Harald vain hiljaista hölkkää.
— Me jo sinuttelimmekin toisiamme.
Siitä huolimatta, taikka ehkä juuri siitä syystä, että oli tullut
huomanneeksi hänen salaperäisen suhteensa vapaaherraan,
Harald, tavattuaan von Nitin ullakolla kummittelemassa ja kuultuaan,
mitä hän unissakäydessään puhui, oli ruvennut pikemmin häntä
surkuttelemaan kuin pelkäämään ja inhoamaan. Ja näin ollen
hänellä ei ollut mitään sitä vastaan, että ryhtyi pitämään hänelle
seuraa.
Yksin, niinkuin oli tullutkin, ajoi myös Irene kotiansa. Harald lähti
molempain pappien seurassa kappalaistalolle ja palasi kotiin vasta
myöhään illalla.
*****
— Tai ehkä pastorin mielestä liian lyhyt aika on kulunut siitä, kun
tyttö kävi ensi kerran ripillä. Mutta…
*****
— Poistu sieltä niin pian kuin suinkin sopii, mutta älä aivan heti, ja
palaa sitten tänne. Minä jään tänne odottamaan. Onneksi olkoon!
— Älä sotke asiaa! Sanon sinulle, Ptolemaeus Seth v. Nit, että tuo
yhdennäköisyys on niin selvä kuin se ikinä voi olla. Juuri sellainen
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