African Peace and Security Architecture.

APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

This work is published under the sole responsibility of the African Union
Commission / Peace and Security Department. All rights reserved.

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© African Union Commission, Peace and Security Department,

Addis Ababa, December 2015

1st edition, December 2015

African Union Commission

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Roosevelt Street
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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Design Ira Olaleye, Eschborn, Germany

Title photo
© PRO South African Tourism, The Karoo, Eastern Cape, South Africa’
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Strategic Priorities
and Indicators

Strategic Priority 1:
Conflict Prevention

Strategic Priority 2:
Crisis/Conflict Management

Strategic Priority 3:
Post-Conflict Reconstruction
and Peace Building

Strategic Priority 5:
Coordination and
Partnerships

Strategic Priority 4:
Strategic Security Issues

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 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

4
 Table of Content

Preface ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
Executive summary ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Foreword ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
APSA Legal and institutional dimensions .................................................................................................................................................. 12
Progress made in implementing APSA ........................................................................................................................................................ 14
The APSA Roadmap 2016–2020: Strategic Priorities and Indicators ................................................................................ 22
1 Strategic Priority 1: Conflict Prevention ............................................................................................................................................... 23
1.1Capacities of CEWS and the EWS ........................................................................................................................................................... 23
1.2Interaction between CEWS, regional and national EWS ................................................................................................. 25
1.3Engagement of CEWS/EWS with decision-makers ............................................................................................................... 25
1.4Collaboration of CEWS/EWS with external stakeholders ............................................................................................... 26
1.5Capacity for structural conflict prevention . ................................................................................................................................. 27
1.6 Capacity to deploy and conduct preventive diplomacy ................................................................................................. 29
2 Strategic Priority 2: Crisis/Conflict Management ........................................................................................................................ 31
2.1Political/legal decision-making mechanisms .............................................................................................................................. 32
2.2Capacity to plan, deploy, manage, sustain and liquidate ............................................................................................... 33
2.3Mission support systems and mechanisms ................................................................................................................................. 34
2.4Capacities and capabilities pledged/on standby .................................................................................................................... 35
2.5Capacity to plan, deploy, manage, support and monitor mediation interventions . ........................... 36
2.6Coordination on mediation interventions . ................................................................................................................................... 37
3 Strategic Priority 3: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building ..................................................................... 39
3.1PCRD Mechanisms and regional policies ....................................................................................................................................... 39
3.2PCRD responds to specific needs in different conflict phases ................................................................................... 40
3.3 AU and RECs coordination function of PCRD ............................................................................................................................ 41
3.4Resources for the implementation of PCRD programmes ............................................................................................ 42
3.5Capacities for support to post-conflict Member States . ................................................................................................. 43
3.6Capacities to implement the SSR policy framework ........................................................................................................... 44
3.7Capacities of the AUC and the RECs/RMs to respond to DDR challenges ..................................................... 44
4 Strategic Priority 4: Strategic Security Issues ................................................................................................................................... 46
4.1Illicit flow of SALW ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 46
4.2Mine action and counter-IED/explosives management .................................................................................................. 47
4.3Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) disarmament and non-proliferation ............................................ 48
4.4Counter-terrorism measures ...................................................................................................................................................................... 48
4.5Illicit Financial Flows ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 50
4.6Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) . .......................................................................................................................... 52
4.7 AFRIPOL as coordination mechanism .............................................................................................................................................. 52
5 Strategic Priority 5: Coordination and Partnerships .................................................................................................................. 54
5.1Coordinating function of the PSC .......................................................................................................................................................... 54
5.2Intra- and inter-departmental collaboration/coordination . ........................................................................................ 55
5.3MoU between the AU and the RECs/RMs . ................................................................................................................................... 56
5.4The AU Liaison Offices ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 57
5.5Policy and strategic dialogue within APSA partnerships . ............................................................................................... 57
5.6Financial ownership of APSA ...................................................................................................................................................................... 58
Cross-cutting issues . ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 60

Monitoring and Evaluation .................................................................................................................................................................................... 61

Annex ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 63
APSA Roadmap Impact Indicators ......................................................................................................................................................................... 64
Results Framework Strategic Priority 1: Conflict Prevention ...................................................................................................... 66
Results Framework Strategic Priority 2: Crisis/Conflict Management .............................................................................. 81
Results Framework Strategic Priority 3: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building ......................... 96
Results Framework Strategic Priority 4: Strategic Security Issues ......................................................................................... 108
Results Framework Strategic Priority 5: Coordination and Partnerships ....................................................................... 121
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 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

List of Abbreviations

ACIRC . ............. African Capacity for Immediate Response EWS .................. Early Warning Systems
to Crises FATF .................. Financial Action Task Force
ACSRT .............. African Centre for Studies and Research FIU ..................... Financial Intelligence Unit
on Terrorism
GBV ................... Gender-Based Violence
AfDB ................. African Development Bank
HR ...................... Human Resources
AFRIPOL ......... African Police Cooperation Mechanism
ICT . .................... Information and Communications
AIMS ................ Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy Technology
AHSG ............... African Heads of State and Government IDTFCP ............ Inter-Departmental Task Force on
AML/CFT ....... Anti-Money Laundering/ Conflict Prevention
Combating the Financing of Terrorism IED ..................... Improvised Explosive Device
APSA ................ African Peace and Security Architecture IGAD ................. Intergovernmental Authority for
ASC .................... African Standby Capacity Development
ASF .................... African Standby Force KMF .................. Knowledge Management Framework
ASI ..................... African Solidarity Initiative LEAs .................. Law Enforcement Agencies
AU ...................... African Union M&E ................. Monitoring and Evaluation
AUC ................... African Union Commission MARAC ........... Early Warning Mechanism on Central
AULOs ............. African Union Liaison Offices Africa
C3IS . ................. Command, Control, Communication MoU ................. Memorandum of Understanding on
and Information Systems Cooperation
CAAS ................ Conflict Alerting and Analysis Tools MSU ................. Mediation Support Unit
CAPCCO ......... Central African Police Chiefs’ Committee NEPAD . ........... New Partnership for Africa’s
Development
CBOs ................ Community Based Organizations
NGOs ............... Non-Governmental Organizations
CEN-SAD . ...... Community of Sahel-Saharan States
OAU .................. Organisation of African Unity
CEWARN . ...... IGAD Early Warning System
PCNA . .............. Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
CEWS ............... Continental Early Warning System
PCRD ................ Post-Conflict Reconstruction and
CISSA . .............. Committee of Intelligence and Security Development
Services of Africa
PLANELMs ... Planning Elements
CLB .................... Continental Logistics Base
PSC .................... Peace and Security Council
CMCC . ............. Continental Movement Control Centres
PSD . .................. Peace and Security Department
COMESA ........ Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa PSO ................... Peace Support Operations
COMWARN . COMESA Early Warning System PSP .................... Peace Strengthening Projects
ConOps .......... Concepts of Operations QIPs .................. Quick Impact Projects
COPAX ............. Council of Peace and Security in RDC ................... Rapid Deployment Capability
Central Africa RECs . ................ Regional Economic Communities
CSCPF .............. Continental Structural Conflict RECSA .............. Regional Centre For Small Arms
Prevention Framework RMCC .............. Regional Movement Control Centres
CSO ................... Civil Society Organization RMs .................. Regional Mechanisms
CSVA ................. Country Structural Vulnerability SADC ................ Southern African Development
Assessments Community
CSVMS ............ Country Structural Vulnerability SALW . .............. Small Arms and Light Weapons
Mitigation Strategies
SARPCCO ...... Southern African Regional Police Chiefs
DDR . ................. Disarmament, Demobilization and Cooperation
Reintegration .............................. Organisation
DDRCP ............ Disarmament, Demobilisation and SOP ................... Standard Operating Procedure
Reintegration
.............................. Capacity Programme
SSR .................... Security Sector Reform
DNFBPs .......... Designated Non-Financial Businesses SVA .................... Structural Vulnerability Assessment
and Professions TCC .................... Troop Contributing Countries
DPA ................... Department for Political Affairs TOC ................... Transnational Organized Crime
EAC . .................. East African Community ToR .................... Terms of Reference
EACWARN .... EAC Early Warning System TQM ................. Technical Quarterly Meeting
ECCAS .............. Economic Community of Central African UN ..................... United Nations
States UXO .................. Unexploded Ordnance
ECOWAS ........ Economic Community of West African VPN ................... Virtual Private Network
States
WAPCCO ....... West African Police Chiefs Committee
ECOWARN .... ECOWAS Early Warning System Organization
EU ...................... European Union WMD ............... Weapons of Mass Destruction
EWR . ................ Early Warning Reports

6
Executive summary

In line with the Solemn Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity/
African Union of the African Heads of State and Government, that was adopted at the meeting
of the AU Assembly on 25 May 2013, and in order to substantially contribute to achieving the
goals of the AU initiative on “Silencing of the Guns: Pre-requisites for realising a conflict-free
Africa by the year 2020”, the “APSA Roadmap 2016-2020” is a strategic document, which builds
on the achievements and challenges resulting from the implementation of the previous APSA
Roadmap (2011-2013). The Roadmap is the result of an inclusive and participatory process in-
volving different departments at the AUC and at the RECs/RMs.

The APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 provides a shared understanding of the results to be achieved
by all APSA stakeholders, it articulates a shared understanding of the roles and functions each
stakeholder involved in APSA is expected to play; it highlights a shared understanding of the
need to increased collaboration and coordination among all stakeholders involved in APSA; and
finally the roadmap is the most relevant tool to communicate APSA project plans and expected
results to Member States, partners and other external actors.

With a focus on concrete activities and strategic objectives, this Roadmap aims at mapping out a
way forward to enable the consolidation of gains made, and address the most pressing challeng-
es, so as to make the African Peace and Security Architecture fully functional and operational,
and in this way contribute effectively to the maintenance and preservation of peace and security
in Africa.

The APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 details the AUC and RECs/RMs joint aims in five strategic priority
areas: Conflict prevention (incl. early warning and preventive diplomacy), crisis/conflict man-
agement (incl. ASF and mediation), post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, strategic
security issues (such as illegal flows of SALW, IEDs, WMD disarmament, counter-terrorism, illicit
financial flows as well as transnational organised crime and cyber crime) and coordination and
partnerships. In addition, cross-cutting issues are covered by the Roadmap.

7
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

Foreword

Fourteen years ago, the African Union (AU) started im-

plementing the African Peace and Security Architecture
(APSA) as articulated in the 2002 Protocol Relating to
the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council
(PSC) of the African Union. Since then, the Union has
made significant progress, not only in establishing the
APSA institutions and mechanisms, but also in increas-
ingly utilizing them for the purpose of conflict pre-
vention, management and resolution, with a view to
promoting “peace, security, and stability on the conti-
nent”, as envisaged by the 2000 Constitutive Act of the
AU and in lie with the aspirations of the Africa’s people. This is all the more important given the
nexus between peace, security and development. The APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020 presented
here manifests the continued determination to ensure further progress, and paves the way for
future collaboration between the AU, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional
Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs) to effectively address
security issues and contribute to a more peaceful Africa.

The Roadmap is a strategic document, which builds on the achievements and challenges result-
ing from the implementation of previous APSA Roadmaps. It is based on the 2008 Memorandum
of Understanding on Cooperation in the area of Peace and Security signed between the AU and
the RECs/RMs in 2008. The Roadmap is in line with the Solemn Declaration adopted by the As-
sembly of AU Heads of State and Government on the 50th Anniversary of the Organization of
African Unity/African Union, held on 25 May 2013, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It further serves
to achieve the goals of the AU’s initiative on Silencing the Guns: Pre-requisites for realising a
conflict-free Africa by the year 2020, in order not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the
next generation of Africans. This Roadmap is the result of an inclusive and participatory process
involving different Departments at the AU Commission (AUC) and at the RECs/RMs.

The APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020 provides a shared understanding of the results to be achieved
by all APSA stakeholders, articulates a shared understanding of the roles and functions each
stakeholder involved in APSA is expected to perform, highlights a shared understanding of the
need for increased collaboration and coordination among all stakeholders involved in APSA, and
finally, it is the most relevant tool to communicate APSA project plans and expected results to
Member States, partners and other external actors.

8
With a focus on concrete activities and strategic objectives, this Roadmap aims at mapping out
a way forward to enable the consolidation of gains made, and address the most pressing chal-
lenges, so as to make the APSA fully operational, and in this way contribute effectively to the
maintenance and preservation of peace, security and stability in Africa. The Roadmap details
the joint aims of the AUC and the RECs/RMs in five strategic priority areas: Conflict prevention
(including early warning and preventive diplomacy), crisis/conflict management (including the
African Standby Force and mediation), post-conflict reconstruction and development and peace-
building, strategic security issues (such as proliferation of small arms and light weapons, disar-
mament, counter-terrorism and transnational organised crime among others), and coordination
and partnerships. In addition, cross-cutting issues – such as gender-mainstreaming in peace and
security and climate change – are addressed by this Roadmap.

Building on the conclusions of the workshop of the AU-RECs/RMs senior officials and experts held
on 19 – 21 November 2013 in Abuja, Nigeria, the 10th meeting of AU-RECs/RMs senior officials
held on 20 – 21 November 2014 in Cairo, Egypt, as well as the outcome of the 8th PSC Retreat
on enhancement of cooperation between the PSC and the RECs/RMs held on 14 – 16 Septem-
ber 2015 in Abuja, Nigeria, the AU and RECs/RMs senior officials finalised this APSA Roadmap
2016 – 2020 at their 11th meeting held on 23 – 25 November 2015 in Harare, Zimbabwe.

The APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2010 consists of an introduction, followed by a section that recalls
its legal and institutional dimension and a brief review of APSA implementation and progress
made so far. In the main part of the Roadmap, APSA strategic priorities and related indicators are
detailed. The Roadmap then concludes with brief observations on monitoring and evaluation. A
detailed results framework for the various strategic priorities is annexed to the Roadmap.

Making the APSA fully operational through implementing this Roadmap, will further contribute
to the capacitation of the AU and the RECs/RMs to effectively address the scourge of conflicts
and crises in the continent, and promote lasting peace, security and stability in Africa.

Ambassador Smaïl Chergui

AU Commissioner for Peace and Security

9
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

Introduction

At the meeting of the African Union Assembly on 25 May 2013, African Heads of State and Gov-
ernment (AHSG) adopted a Solemn Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the Organization of
African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU). In this landmark declaration, the Assembly expressed its
determination to achieve the goal of a conflict free Africa, to make peace a reality for all people
and rid the continent of civil wars, civil conflicts, human rights violations, humanitarian disasters
and violent conflicts, and to prevent genocide. The African leaders also pledged not to bequeath
the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans and undertook to end all wars on the
continent by 2020, a commitment that has taken practical expression in the AU initiative on “Si-
lencing of the Guns: Pre-requisites for realising a conflict-free Africa by the year 2020”.

As a key component of Agenda 2063, “Silencing the Guns by 2020” underlines the necessity of
making the continent’s mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution op-
erational at all levels – at the heart of which is a fully functional and operational African Peace
and Security Architecture (APSA). Following the recommendations of the APSA Roadmap 2011-
2013, priority has been given to pushing ahead with the operationalization of all pillars of APSA,
including those tasked with conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace support
operations, national reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction and development. These are
in line with the Strategic Plan of the African Union Commission 2014-2017 (AUC), which posits
that “the overall goal of achieving an integrated, prosperous and inclusive Africa at peace with it-
self playing a dynamic role on the continent and global arena cannot be realized if durable peace
and stability is not established”. In addition, improved harmonisation, collaboration and coor-
dination between the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mecha-
nisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs) in the full operationalization
of APSA remains a key strategic and operational priority.

The development and implementation of the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 is guided by the follow-
ing principles:

zz The Roadmap is informed and driven by the spirit of collective security and self-reliance.
zz The overarching goals and aspirations of the Roadmap are anchored in, and contribute to-
wards achieving the objectives of “Silencing the Guns by 2020” and the first 10-Year Imple-
mentation Plan of the Union’s “Agenda 2063”.
zz The Roadmap aims at strengthening ownership, consensus and synergy between the AU and
the RECs/RMs.
zz Sustainability is at the heart of the APSA Roadmap.
zz The Roadmap is results-oriented.
zz The AU maintains a leadership role in the implementation of the APSA Roadmap 2016-2020.

The “APSA Roadmap 2016-2020” is a strategic document, which builds on the achievements and
challenges resulting from the implementation of the previous APSA Roadmap (2011-2013). This
draft Roadmap aims at mapping out a way forward to enable the consolidation of gains made,
and address the most pressing challenges, so as to make APSA fully functional and operational,
and in this way contribute effectively to the maintenance and preservation of peace and security
in Africa.

10
This Roadmap is the result of an inclusive and participatory process involving different depart-
ments at the AUC and at the RECs/RMs. It fulfils five major functions, which might be summa-
rized as follows:

zz First, it provides a shared understanding of the results to be achieved by all APSA stakehold-
ers. The AUC and the RECs/RMs have collectively developed the roadmap and its results
frameworks, and this document reflects a collective agreement on the strategic priorities and
on the objectives that need to be reached during the period 2016-2020.

zz Second, the roadmap articulates a shared understanding of the roles and functions each
stakeholder involved in APSA is expected to play. APSA is intended to effectively deal with a
wide range of issues, conflicts and crises, whose nature, intensity and geographical scale vary
greatly and require specific and adapted responses. The clarification, common understanding
of and the respect for the complementarity between the roles and functions of each stake-
holder is crucial to the effective implementation of APSA.

zz Third, the roadmap highlights a shared understanding of the need to increased collaboration
and coordination among all stakeholders involved in APSA. Not only does APSA deal with a
wide range of issues, but it also involves a wide range of stakeholders, of organisations with
their own history, mandate, priorities and competences. Bringing all these stakeholders to
work in a coordinated manner is a key condition to increase the probability that the expected
results might be achieved.

zz Finally, the roadmap is the most relevant tool to communicate APSA project plans and expect-
ed results to Member States, partners and other external actors. APSA is, indeed, supported
by a large number of technical and financial partners. Moreover, APSA is of great interest for
Member States and a multitude of actors (other continental bodies, academia, etc.). Having
a single communication tool is of utmost importance for clarity and transparency purposes
and guide interventions on the continent.

11
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

APSA Legal and institutional dimensions

At the heart of APSA are the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union and the 2002 Protocol
Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). APSA aims to outline the
system (roles, instruments and procedures) by which the AU, the RECs as well as the RMs can
realise their conflict prevention, management and resolution mandates. The APSA, as enshrined
in the PSC Protocol, embraces an expanded and comprehensive agenda for peace and security
that includes (direct and structural) conflict prevention, early warning and preventive diplomacy,
peace-making and peace building, the encouragement and promotion of democratic practices
as well as intervention and humanitarian action and disaster management.

Before the transition of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union, an OAU
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution existed (it was established July
1993 in Cairo), to provide the Organization with instruments capable of enabling it to deal with
the scourge of conflicts and to facilitate collective African action in matters of conflict manage-
ment. However, the scope and gravity of the conflicts, as well as their complex nature, soon
revealed the limitations of the Mechanism, which among other things, was not equipped with
the means for the deployment of peace keeping operations, a responsibility left exclusively to
the United Nations (UN).

The AU recognizes eight RECs, including:

zz CEN-SAD – Community of Sahel-Saharan States

zz COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
zz EAC – East African Community
zz ECCAS – Economic Community of Central African States
zz ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States
zz IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development
zz SADC – Southern African Development Community
zz UMA - Union du Maghreb Arabe

These RECs are also key drivers of African economic and political integration as defined in the
1991 Abuja Treaty.

The path that led to the creation of APSA is rooted in the genesis of the African Union. Concerned
by the great number of conflicts that erupted in Africa and their devastating impact on African
countries and key events such as the Rwanda genocide, African leaders declared their deter-
mination to deal with both inter- state and intra-state conflicts. The promotion of peace and
security, therefore, became one of the key objectives of the AU as enshrined in its Constitutive
Act. It was adopted on 11 July 2000 at the 36th Ordinary Summit of the OAU in Lomé, Togo; and
the African Union was subsequently launched at a summit held in Durban, South Africa, on 9 July
2002. At the same time the RECs/RMs were consolidating their respective legal arrangements.
The African Heads of State and Government recognized the negative consequences of violent
conflicts on civilians and the impact on socio-economic development and as a consequence en-
shrined in the Constitutive Act that the Union shall promote peace, security and stability on the
continent; and promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good
governance. The adoption of the Constitutive Act marked a radical shift from the cardinal OAU
principle of national sovereignty and non-intervention in national affairs. Although the Consti-
tutive Act upholds the principle of non-interference, it also reserves the right of the Union “to

12
intervene in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances namely: war crimes, genocide
and crimes against humanity” (article 4h). The Constitutive Act also articulates the inseparable
link between development and security, stating in its preamble that “the scourge of conflicts in
Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and
of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of
our development and integration agenda”. On the relationship between the Union on the one
hand and the RECs/RMs on the other, the Constitutive Act underlines the need to “coordinate
and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for
the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union.”

In furtherance of this new and clear paradigm on security and development, the Union adopted
the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol),
which entered into force on 26 December 2003. The Protocol embraces an expanded and com-
prehensive agenda for peace and security that includes conflict prevention, early warning and
preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, peace build-
ing and post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian and disaster management. It establishes the
PSC as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of
conflicts in the continent and to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situ-
ations in Africa. The PSC is supported by further APSA pillars, namely: the Panel of the Wise, the
Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund.
There is a complimentary African Governance Architecture (AGA) that is based on the African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. It was adopted in January 2007 and entered
into force in February 2012.

Article 16 of the PSC Protocol deals with the relationship between the AU and the RMs. It states
that the RMs are an integral part of APSA. Article 16 furthermore stipulates that with respect to
conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding, there shall be regular exchange of infor-
mation, close harmonization, coordination, cooperation and effective partnership between the
PSC and the RMs. In addition, the RECs are a constituent part of this continental architecture,
and are expected to play a set of vital functions. They are the building blocks of the AU and rec-
ognized in the PSC Protocol as part of the overall continental security architecture. In January
2008 a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation (MoU) in the area of peace and security
between the African Union, the RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Brigades
of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa was signed to provide the framework for cooperation
in order to strengthen coordination towards their shared goal of ridding the continent of the
scourge of conflicts and laying the foundation for sustainable peace, security and stability on the
continent.

13
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

Progress made in implementing APSA

APSA implementation has constantly been reviewed by the PSC. It has also been assessed exter-
nally twice, 2010 and 2014. The 2010 assessment “Moving Forward Africa” (the so-called Fisher
report) recognised progress particular in those areas where roadmaps had been adopted, i.e.
the ASF and CEWS. However, the report also noted that there remained challenges with regard
to the vertical integration of APSA (i.e. between the Union and the RECs/RMs) and the limited
levels of coordination between other pillars. It also highlighted the need for increased horizontal
integration (i.e. within the AUC itself). Various components were developing at different paces,
and the level of horizontal coordination had been limited. In addition challenges with regard to
APSA’s sustainability and subsidiarity were identified. This assessment has translated into the
APSA implementation roadmap for 2011-2013.

With the support of partners, the AU and the RECs used the period 2007 to 2011 to build the
Union’s and REC/RM’s capacity for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. In
particular, the AU and the RECs/RMs focused on developing the APSA pillars. These efforts en-
hanced the capacity of the Union and RECs/RMs in designing and implementing conflict early
warning systems; strengthened these institutions’ preventive diplomacy capabilities and the
planning and conduct of Peace Support Operations (PSOs); and set out to operationalize the ASF
by providing the ASF at Union and RECs/RMs levels with the required staff, training and tools to
work with. The aim of the APSA Roadmap 2011-2013 was therefore set to achieve the full oper-
ationalization of APSA. To this end, significant progress has been made in the operationalization
of the APSA as documented in the 2010 and 2014 APSA assessment reports.

The 2014 APSA Assessment, which was tabled in March 2015, mapped out key priorities that are
being addressed in the current APSA Roadmap. The Report addresses the following topics: the
main APSA pillars, namely the PSC, the Panel, the ASF, CEWS and the Peace Fund; the AU’s stra-
tegic partnerships on peace and security with the RECs/RMs, with the UN and with the European
Union (EU); mediation and preventive diplomacy; gender, peace and security; disarmament, de-
mobilization and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); maritime safety and security;
counter-terrorism; climate change and security; the AU Border Programme; Post-Conflict Recon-
struction and Development (PCRD); the AU Liaison Offices in conflict and post-conflict countries;
engagement with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs); donor assistance to APSA; the RECs/RMs’
capacity-building needs for the operationalization of APSA; and the APSA Roadmap.

Notably, the following progress has been made with regard to the five APSA pillars and some
other important policy fields.

1. Peace and Security Council

The PSC has become the centre of major decision-making on peace and security on the conti-
nent and it is viewed as such by the international community. The PSC provides leadership on
peace and security challenges on the continent. It holds meetings and briefing sessions on a
timely basis to address conflict and crisis.

The workload of the PSC has grown exponentially because of its visibility and its leadership and
coordination role on the continent on issues of peace and security. The PSC has contributed to
the resolution of many conflicts in the continent, inter alia in Somalia, Burundi, Mali, the Demo-

14
cratic republic of the Congo, Comoros, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire and actively involved with the
relevant RECs to address threats and conflicts in their regions, for instance in the Central African
Republic (CAR), Guinea Bissau, Sudan, South Sudan, Guinea, Niger, Kenya and Mauritania.

What remains to be addressed is the absence of an enforcement and compliance mechanisms

with regard to the implementation of decisions made; the low level of interaction between the
PSC and similar structures at the REC level; interaction between the PSC, the Panel of the Wise
and the Chairperson’s Special Envoys, Representatives and Mediators needs to be structured;
and the increasing work load of the PSC Secretariat needs to be addressed.

2. Early Warning

Early Warning Systems (EWS) are established both on the continental and regional levels. The
Continental Early Warning system (CEWS) at Union level, regional early warning systems of the
Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD: CEWARN), the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS: ECOWARN), the East African Community (EAC: EACWARN), the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA: COMWARN), the Economic Commu-
nity of Central African States (ECCAS: MARAC). The Southern African Development Community
(SADC) early warning system is intelligence based. CEWS, CEWARN and ECOWARN have been
rather functional for some time. The early warning systems have been established to provide
decision makers at continental level (PSC, the Chairperson, Commissioner and Director of Peace
and Security) and at regional level with timely information, analysis and response options.

The CEWS and RECs have made considerable progress in terms of putting the necessary infra-
structure, methodology and systems in place. CEWS continuously monitors and gathers infor-
mation through its Situation Room, producing various reports, including early warning reports,
situation updates, flash reports and weekly updates. The CEWS is making efforts to enhance
coordination with AUC Peace and Security Department (AU PSD) Divisions and programmes.
An Inter-Departmental Task Force on Conflict Prevention (IDTFCP) has been set up to facilitate
dialogue among AUC Departments working on conflict prevention, more specifically structural
conflict prevention. CEWARN, COMWARN and ECOWARN, too, have started disseminating EWS
to decision-makers.

Coordination between CEWS and the EWS of the RECs continues through regular technical
meetings, which are held twice a year. To date, 16 meetings have been held which discussed
and reviewed, among other things, the customisation and sharing of CEWS tools as well as joint
trainings on Strategic Conflict Assessments. Staff exchange visits and technical support pro-
grammes have also been carried out. CEWS continued to provide support in the establishment
and strengthening of the EWS of AU Member States to enhance collaboration. Engagement with
CSOs has been initiated through a workshop at the Union and the elaboration of modalities for
collaboration. Collaboration with the UN (Cluster on conflict prevention), EU (Joint Research
Centre) and the World Bank has also been established. Improving connectivity between CEWS
and the REC EWS is in progress, three RECs have been connected and the others are in the pro-
cess of being connected to the Union’s VSAT (very small aperture terminal) network or other
alternative means. CEWS and the RECs are in constant communication through other means,
including the CEWS online portal. Progress has also been made in the REC-to-REC cooperation,
particularly between CEWARN, EACWARN and COMWARN. The EWS of the Union and the RECs
have developed methodological systems of monitoring to help establish a baseline for conflict
analysis. The level of harmonisation and coordination between the AU and RMs has made tre-
mendous progress and would be maintained and strengthened. The individual EWS of most
RECs have made major advances.

15
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

However, some challenges remain to be vigorously addressed, including the weak linkage be-
tween early warning and early response by decision-makers; the gathering of non-adequate
data due to the ever-changing conflict dynamics; the low connectivity between the CEWS and
the EWS of the RECs; the lack of connectivity between National EWS and REC EWS; and the var-
iation of levels of operationalization of various EWS at the level of the RECs.

3. Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation

In its mandate to perform preventive diplomacy functions, the PSC is supported by the AUC
Chairperson, which must, under its authority and in consultation with all parties involved in
a conflict, deploy efforts and take all initiatives deemed appropriate to prevent, manage and
resolve a dispute. Indeed, the chairperson can, at his/her own initiative or when so requested
by the PSC, use his/her good offices, either personally or through special envoys, special rep-
resentatives, members of the AU Panel of the Wise or RECs/RMs, to prevent potential conflicts
and resolve those that do occur. In exercising his/her powers, the chairperson is assisted by the
Commissioner for Peace and Security and PSD.

In terms of structured mediation, the AUC Chairperson has frequently appointed special envoys
and special representatives to act as the organisation’s mediators. Mediation processes are by
their very nature intensive, medium-to-long-term commitments, requiring a permanent, flexible
and time-consuming engagement. Not only are the situations under mediation complex and
protracted, the very environments within which mediation occurs are at times complex, often
with a number of organisations and individuals involved (or wishing to be involved). There are
currently approximately 25 high-level representatives, special envoys and special representa-
tives deployed across the continent, many of whom act as mediators.

As a preventive diplomacy structure, the Panel of the Wise was constituted under Article 11 of
the PSC Protocol to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the AUC Chairperson, particularly
in the area of conflict prevention. The Panel is therefore an integral part of the AU preventive
diplomatic framework.

The Panel has over the years focused on preventive diplomacy missions, in particular to coun-
tries undergoing election processes. In these missions, Panel members provide advice, open
channels of communication, carry out fact-finding missions, undertake shuttle diplomacy and
promote the adoption of confidence-building measures, among others. In addition, the Panel
has included a thematic approach to its work and published a series of documents relating to
election related violence, women and children in armed conflict, non-impunity, truth, justice
and reconciliation, and strengthening governance for peace, security and stability.

The RECs are developing or have developed corresponding structures to the AU Panel of the
Wise. SADC has established a mediation, conflict prevention and preventative diplomatic struc-
ture that includes a Panel of Elders and a Mediation Reference Group. ECOWAS has established
the Council of the Wise and is in the process of creating a mediation facilitation unit. The EAC
has decided to establish a Panel of Eminent Persons and is in the process of establishing a me-
diation unit. COMESA has established as part of its preventive diplomatic strategy, a Committee
of Elders. In the 2015 crisis in Burundi, COMESA and EAC collaborated closely on mediation. The
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) has established the Permanent High-Level Me-
diator for Peace and Security. IGAD has established a Mediation Unit and uses its committee of
Ambassadors for mediation. And ECCAS is in the process of developing its mediation infrastruc-
ture with the assistance of the Union.

16
In 2013 the AU and the RECs have established the Pan-African Network of the Wise (PanWise)
that aims to bring together relevant mediation actors of the Union, the RECs and African civil
societies in order to enhance collaboration between the structures and harmonise approaches
of the AU and RECs through workshops, joint missions and research.

The establishment of PanWise represents a great opportunity for developing and improving
cooperation in the context of the African peace and security framework. Collaboration between
the Panel of the Wise and the RECs has been tentative, but effective. ECOWAS and the Pan-
el have been engaged in a number of preventive diplomacy and good offices missions, pay-
ing particular attention to election-related issues. The level of collaboration with the COMESA
Committee of Elders is also very high. The Panel has progressively and effectively established
links with all the RECs and has initiated several consultations with RECs to explore modalities of
strengthening national capacities and establishing linkages between the national and regional
and continental efforts in this regard. Coordination and collaboration efforts being undertaken
should be encouraged and further institutionalised to avoid duplication of efforts, overlapping
preventive diplomatic processes. The increased operationalization of PanWise is absolutely nec-
essary, especially in the spirit of Agenda 2063.

Challenges remain with regard to inadequate levels of interaction between the Panel of the
Wise, the PSC and the Chairperson; inadequate involvement of members of the Panel of the
Wise in AU-led structured mediation engagements (with AU special envoys, representatives and
mediators); the slow process of operationalization of PanWise; and, finally, the insufficient ca-
pacity of the Panel of the Wise Secretariat at AU.

4. The African Standby Force

It should be noted as underlined in the ASF Roadmap III that a great deal has been achieved so
far in the development of the ASF. These achievements include a suite of common policy docu-
ments, an annual continental training implementation and coordination meeting, harmonised
training standards and annual training directives that guide Member States and RECs/RMs and
facilitate utilization of training centres in implementation of training programmes and standby
forces that can be used collectively to address conflicts on the continent.

Good progress has also been made towards developing the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC)
concept. Considerable progress has equally been made in the development of the Civilian and
Police Components of the ASF, notably in the area of policy development and the establishment
of management capabilities at the strategic level of the AU and the operational level of the RECs/
RMs. However, the establishment of the civilian component has continued to lag behind the
military and police components.

The ASF assessment report recognises that on the overall, the capacity of African peace support
operations has increased in numbers and quality. Implementation of the ASF Action plan 2014-
2015 recommended by the independent team of experts has been a good basis and direction to
ensure Full Operational Capability for the ASF by the end of 2015. Steps have also been taken to
harmonise the ASF and the African Capacity for immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), including
the incorporation of ACIRC into the Amani Africa II Field Training Exercise that is aimed at vali-
dating the operational readiness of the ASF.

17
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

This is in line with the objective of the Union and the 25th AU Assembly’s decision to ensure the
development of an ASF capacity that is able to deploy rapidly, with sustainable administrative
and logistics support as well as management capabilities. However, the challenge of an ade-
quate structure, framework and system to support the planning, deployment, management and
sustenance of AU PSOs on a round-the-clock basis remains.

5. Other APSA Programmes

a. Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building

In its 10th Anniversary Declaration of May 2014, the PSC called for a stronger and more sustained
support to countries emerging from conflict with regard to reconciliation and PCRD. The Decla-
ration stresses the importance of consolidating the peace and security gains in the post-conflict
phase to prevent relapse into conflict. The importance of post-conflict reconstruction has also
been underlined in the Solemn Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the OAU/AU. The need to
support sustainable peace, stability and development in countries that have emerged or emerg-
ing from conflict through the APSA is of paramount importance.

The focus of the AUC has been on developing the partnerships to operationalize the PCRD Policy
(2006) and put into place the necessary mechanisms and consultative platforms for its imple-
mentation. At the AUC-level, there has been a notable increase of joint activities with various
Departments of the Commission, particularly with the Department of Political Affairs and of
Social Affairs with a view to leveraging the comparative advantage of the various Departments
on PCRD. In that regard, in September 2014, the AUC held a joint meeting in Bangui, CAR, on the
Union’s support to the transition plan prepared by the CAR authorities. At the national level, the
PCRD provided the African Union Liaison Offices (AULOs) with timely support through the fund-
ing of Peace Strengthening Projects (PSPs) aimed at addressing early recovery through support
to reconciliation processes, peace building and rehabilitation/construction of small infrastruc-
ture projects at community level.

The heightened pace of awareness towards the mobilization of alternative resources for Afri-
ca’s development as epitomised in the convening of an African Solidarity Conference at level of
Heads of State and Government held on 1 February 2014, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as part of
activities marking 50th anniversary of the OAU/AU was a major achievement. A total of USD 3
million was pledged, however, the pledges still need to materialize.

AUC is currently establishing a funding mechanism for the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI).
“Champion countries” are being mobilized to steer the process of further resource mobiliza-
tion from within Africa. The PCRD is assessing its support to the African Union Youth Volunteer
(AUYV) programme with a view to enhancing the collaboration to respond to PCRD strategy and
priorities in countries emerging from conflict. Discussions on the location of the AU Centre for
PCRD have reached final stages.

At regional level, the RECs as building blocks for peace and security in Africa must be able to
articulate clear regional positions on relevant PCRD efforts. However, most of the RECs lack the
capacity to undertake this critical role. The AUC is contributing to the establishment of PCRD
units and formulation of policies, strategies and programmes at REC level.

18
Much work has been done with respect to Security Sector Reform (SSR). The AU Security Sector
Policy Framework provides a framework for Member States and the RECs in the formulation,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of SSR processes. The AUC has conducted series of
SSR orientation, sensitisation and training at various levels throughout the continent. The AUC
undertook assessment missions to Madagascar and CAR and deployed experts to Comoros, CAR
and South Sudan. Most RECs are also promoting governance through SSRs and taking initiatives
in their various Member States with the active collaboration with internal partners. The joint AU,
ECOWAS, EU and UN Security Assessment Mission to Guinea Bissau conducted in March 2015
stands as a good example.

In addition, the AU has developed an AU Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Ca-

pacity Programme (AU DDRCP). The objective of the AU DDRCP is to strengthen capacities within
the AUC, its Member States, RECs and RMs. The AU DDRCP was officially launched in 2013. The
AUC is already providing assistance to national DDR processes pursuant to requests made by
member states. It collaborates closely with international partners. The capacity of the AU and
RECs would continue to be enhanced in order to address specific request from Member States.

Remaining challenges include the complex nature of post-conflict issues and the level of re-
sources PCRD requires; lack of coordination to align PCRD efforts with other peace and security
programs both at the AU and RECs level; understaffed Unit at the level of the AUC and limited
financial resources; the low level of capacity at the RECs levels and lack of shared learning be-
tween the RECs; and aligning regional peace building objectives to national stabilization plans.

b. Strategic Security Issues

It is recognized that in the past 50 years since the establishment of the OAU, countries in all
regions have experienced varying degrees of state fragility, caused by poor economic manage-
ment, ethnic conflict and civil wars, and natural and man-made disasters as indicated in the
Agenda 2063 framework document. Although African countries are stronger institutionalized
today, the threat of state fragility lingers on through important “neighbourhood effects” such
as narcotic drugs, maritime piracy, human trafficking and small arms proliferation. The Solemn
Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the OAU/AU expressed the determination of the African
Heads of State and Government to eradicate recurrent and address emerging sources of con-
flict, including piracy, trafficking in narcotics and human beings, all forms of extremism, armed
rebellions, terrorism, transnational organized crime and new crimes such as cybercrime. In its
10th Anniversary Declaration the PSC also noted with concern the growing threat of terrorism
in Africa and called on the AUC and the Secretariats of the RECs/RMs to come up with a com-
prehensive Union strategy for addressing the phenomenon of extremism, terrorism and other
emerging threats to peace and security in Africa such as piracy, human trafficking, drug traffick-
ing, religious tensions, and the spread of small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, the PSC
calls for the development of mechanisms within APSA to deal with these emerging threats.

The AU and the RECs have developed a number of policies, instruments and tools to address
these emerging threats. There are the AU Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Proliferation
Strategy and, at the RECs level, strategies on small arms proliferation, such as the Nairobi Pro-
tocol, the Southern Africa Firearms Protocol, the ECOWAS SALW Convention, the Kinshasa Con-
vention for the Control of SALW and their Ammunition in Central Africa as well as the Regional
Centre For Small Arms, the AU Counter Terrorism model law developed by African Centre for
Studies and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), and the AUC counter terrorism framework. EAC has

19
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

adopted a SALW policy. Some RECs have developed strategies on counter terrorism such as the
ECOWAS political declaration on a common position against terrorism, the EAC counter-terror-
ism strategy, and IGAD’s Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Law.

On maritime security, the AU has adopted the 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050
AIMS), the governments of West and Central Africa have adopted a declaration on maritime
safety and security in their common maritime domain. The Southern and Eastern African RECs,
COMESA, EAC, and IGAD together with the Indian Ocean Community have developed and are
implementing a regional maritime programme to combat piracy.

However, some challenges remain, such as the need to develop greater cooperation and harmo-
nization of continental efforts in combatting terrorism and implementation of the continental
frameworks and strategies as well as an effective and appropriate system of follow-up mecha-
nisms; the integration of maritime security into the APSA; and the implementation of existing
agreements on SALW.

6. Cross cutting Issues

Gender mainstreaming in peace and security: UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is the cor-
nerstone on women, peace and security. This global framework is supplemented at the conti-
nental level by the AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa which calls for the need
to ensure the full and effective participation and representation of women in peace processes
including the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and post-conflict resolutions
in Africa. The AU Gender policy seeks to enhance the role of women in creating an enabling,
stable and peaceful environment for the pursuit of Africa’s development agenda.

The RECs and their Member States have developed gender policies, adopted gender declara-
tions and action plans that guide their gender mainstreaming programmes. The AU has launched
a major five-year Gender, Peace and Security Programme 2015-2020. The Programme was
mapped out through a long process of consultation with the RECs and CSOs. Since the launch
of the Programme, the AU, RECs and CSOs have together developed annual work plans for 2015
and 2016. The work plans would continue to address challenges relating to capacity constraints
in implementing and monitoring the Programme at Union and RECs levels, the implementation
of joint activities, support given to AU field missions and, the Special Envoy on Women Peace
and Security in discharging her duties. The Programme is built on high level of cooperation and
collaboration among the AU, RECs, CSOs and relevant partners.

Still, appropriate indicators for gender mainstreaming need to be developed as well as the nec-
essary skills to use the relevant tools to monitor the indicators. In addition, staffing levels need
to be scaled up to implement the gender programme.

Climate change: The manifold consequences of climate change represent another of the many
threats facing Africa. Indeed, climate change is viewed by many as a threat multiplier that ex-
acerbates security trends, tensions and stability. The AU is already taking steps to address the
effects of climate change through the AU Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture. The
Department administers various programmes on climate change, including the Monitoring of
Environment and Security in Africa. The Commission supports the African Regional Strategy for
disaster risk reduction management by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).
The Commission, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the UN Economic Commission for
Africa are supporting a major initiative, the Global Climate Change Observing System – Africa.
The African Climate Policy Centre, which addresses the need for greatly improved climate infor-

20
mation for Africa and strengthening the use of such information for decision making for Africa,
is operational. There are also several regional initiatives on climate change in Africa like the
regional climate change programme for Southern Africa, which has developed GIS (Geographic
Information System) risk and vulnerability guidelines for SADC. ECOWAS is attempting to do
the same. Structures for climate change and early warning exist in Africa. How these structures
would collaborate with the CEWS and the regional early warning mechanisms would need to be
studied.

Enhanced coordination and collaboration between the African Union and REC/RMs structures
that deal with climate change on the one hand and the early warning and conflict prevention
functions of the PSD on the other remain a challenge.

7. Relations between the AU and RECs/RMs in peace and security

The RECs are the building blocks of the African Union and recognized in the PSC Protocol as part
of the overall security architecture of the African Union. The MoU between the AU, the RECs
and the RMs of the Regional Standby Forces of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa provides the
framework for cooperation in order to strengthen coordination towards their shared goal of
ridding the continent of the scourge of conflicts and laying the foundation for sustainable peace,
security and stability on the continent.

The level of cooperation and coordination between the AU and RECs/RMs is very intensive,
particularly in the operationalization of APSA which is one the objectives of the MoU. Liaison
Officers to the AU from the RECs/RMs have been established as well as well as AU Liaison offic-
es to the RECs/RMs. The establishment of the Liaison Offices by the AU and the RECs/RMs has
strengthened linkages between the AU and the RECs/RMs, improving the exchange of informa-
tion. The Senior Officials of the AU and RECs/RMs meet regularly to strengthen coordination and
harmonization in the area of peace and security and discuss the status of the implementation of
the MoU. A Joint Task Force comprising AU Officials and RECs /RMs Liaison Officers to the AU has
been established to work out modalities to ensure implementation of the existing policy frame-
works regarding AU-RECs/RMs collaboration and coordination in the area of peace and security.

In order to fully optimize the partnership between the AU and the RECs/RMs, the principles of
subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage need to be applied. Moreover, the
PSC, in a Communiqué issued after its 477th meeting held on 18 December 2014, underscores
the importance of building more collaboration and synergy between the PSC and RECs/RMs
in the promotion of peace and stability in Africa as envisaged in the PSC Protocol. The Council
stressed the need to uphold the principles of subsidiarity and comparative advantage in a way
that strengthens the efforts of Africa to achieve durable peace and sustainable development.
The PSC also endorsed – through its Communiqué issued after the Council’s 549th meeting held
on 9 October 2015 – the conclusions of a retreat on the enhancement of cooperation between
the PSC and RECs/RMs held in Abuja, Nigeria from 14 to 16 September 2015, particularly relating
to the issue of conflict mediation.

21
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

The APSA Roadmap 2016–2020:

Strategic Priorities and Indicators

This Roadmap is based on an agreed planning methodology, with clear objectives and
priorities for 2016-2020 and the main strategies for achieving them. The emphasis of this
Roadmap is on implementation and an adequate monitoring and evaluation mechanism.
Another principle that guided the development of the Roadmap is the strong need for commu-
nication, cooperation and coordination between the AU, the RECs/RMs and other international
actors. As far as possible, the facilitation of synergies would be encouraged. The Union and the
RECs/RMs have limited resources, and therefore every effort should be made to avoid duplica-
tion and overlaps, which lead to inefficient use of resources.

The Roadmap is built on five thematic priorities with clear broad objectives defined for each the-
matic priority covering the conflict prevention, management and resolution cycle, as indicated
below and as elaborated in the accompanying framework:

1 Strategic Priority 1: Conflict Prevention

2 Strategic Priority 2: Crisis/Conflict Management

3 Strategic Priority 3: Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding

4 Strategic Priority 4: Strategic Security Issues

5 Strategic Priority 5: Coordination and Partnerships

22
 1 Strategic Priority 1:
Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention involves, simultaneously, a direct and operational focus of

intervening before violence occurs as well as a systematic, strategic focus of
addressing the root, proximate, and structural causes of conflict. Effective pre-
ventive action is the accurate identification of factors and timely combined applica-
tion of structural and direct prevention measures. Within the context of APSA, the development
and implementation of early warning systems at the AU and the RECs have been priority activity
areas, marked by the strengthening of existing EWS as well as the development of an early
warning capability at some of the RECs where this capability did not exist. These developments
have been guided by the principles of comparative advantage, non-duplication of efforts as well
as harmonisation, coordination and collaboration as conflict prevention is enhanced by coordi-
nation through collaborative data gathering and joint analysis by relevant APSA stakeholders.

Central to APSA’s fulfilment of direct and structural prevention is the coordination and collabo-
ration between the EWS in place and/or under operationalization at the AU and the RECs/RMs,
the various panels of the wise/panels of elders (at AU and RECs/RMs) mandated with conflict
prevention responsibilities and the high level decision-makers that in each institution are tasked
with conflict prevention responsibilities (at AU, the AU PSC and the AUC Chairperson).

1 The overall strategic objective of strategic priority 1 is to contribute to effective, coordinated

and timely direct and structural prevention of conflicts and crises by the AU and the RECs/
RMs.

Strategic Objective 1 Indicators

zz Evidence of enhanced capacity of CEWS and EWS of the RECs/RMs to individually and
collaboratively monitor, collect and analyse data on the basis of tools and methodologies
developed
zz Conflict prevention interventions (direct and structural) are informed by systematic/joint
early warning and analysis
zz Direct conflict prevention interventions by AU/RECs/RMs (preventive diplomacy) are
timely, coordinated and effective
zz Evidence of structural prevention responses/interventions
zz Evidence of APSA stakeholders cooperation in preventive actions
zz Evidence of use of early warning reports by decision makers.

Strategic priority 1 has been divided into six specific objectives, each of them addressing one
major obstacle to effective response. They are presented in the following sections.

1.1 Capacities of CEWS and the EWS

Although well advanced with regards to the implementation of event data collection tools and
data management and sharing tools, as well as the required Information and Communications
Technology (ICT) infrastructure and methodologies, full implementation of the AU CEWS and
the EWS of the RECs/RMs (ECOWARN, CEWARN, COMWARN, EACWARN, among others),data
collection and monitoring tools has not yet been fully achieved. This is due to: rapid changing
nature of conflicts and their dynamics requiring a constant re-assessment of the adequacy of

23
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

existing data collection tools; insufficient human resources; methodology handbooks and Stand-
ard Operating Procedures (SOPs) is not always followed by analysts and not always relying on
data generated by existing tools; limited frequency of early warning reports; inadequate feed-
back from decision-makers on early warning reports; absence of structured interaction between
CEWS/EWS-RECs and relevant staff from other departments. With regards to analysis, AU CEWS
and the EWS of the RECs/RMs need to strengthen the quality, frequency and timeliness of early
warning reports, situation updates, flash reports, weekly updates and other types of reports,
including the strengthening of scenario-building and policy/response options contained therein.
Moreover, and with specific reference to EWS at the RECs currently in early stages of develop-
ment, additional efforts must be taken to accelerate the development of methodologies and
tools for data gathering and analysis as well as capacity for the production of early warning and
other types of reports.

1 The specific objective 1 is therefore to enhance the capacity of the AU CEWS and the EWS of
the RECs/RMs to systematically monitor, collect and analyse relevant information in order to
provide timely early warning reports, updates and other types of reports.

Priority 1 Specific Objective 1 indicators

zz Existing data collection, analysis and methodology tools developed, tested, fully imple-
mented and customised
zz Evidence of improved quality of data gathered (widened variety, timeliness, relevance,
verifiable)
zz Evidence of trend tracking tools fully implemented (where applicable: Africa Reporter,
CAAS, Democracy Trends Reports)
zz Increased consistency in the production of early warning reports by CEWS and EWS of the
RECs/RMs
zz Increased frequency of production of early warning alerts by CEWS/EWS-RECs
zz Evidence of data tools usage in the reports
zz Reports following adopted methodologies
zz Evidence of interaction with the PSD/Department of Political Affairs (DPA)/RECs staff in
terms of peer reviews, joint writing of reports including situational and analysis reports
zz Evidence of AU CEWS and EWS of the RECs/RMs use of AU DPA Election Risk Management
Tools or similar tools at REC level
zz Evidence of the RECs/RMs use of Election observation and Political Analysis Reports
zz Percentage of African borders demarcated
zz Number of African States having established National Border Commissions to manage
their borders

The main strategies envisaged to reach this objective focus on two key dimensions: (i) the full
operationalization of the data collection, monitoring and analysis systems at both AU and RECs;
and (ii) the improvement of the quality and quantity of early warning reports by AU CEWS and
EWS of the RECs/RMs. In the first dimension, a series of activities are envisaged, including, cus-
tomisation of existing data collection and analysis tools; operationalization of new tools (i.e.
Conflict Alerting and Analysis Tools (CAAS) as well as ICT infrastructure support and secure ac-
cess). With relation to the second key dimension (frequency and quality of reporting) strate-
gies include: the recruitment of requisite number of staff; the expansion of coverage of conflict
typologies and geographical areas; training of AUC and RECs/RMs staff (on tools; on conflict
analysis; on statistical analysis) and also a survey of analysts, desk officers and decision makers.

24
 1.2 Interaction between CEWS, regional and national EWS

Although working relations between CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/RMs have been marked by
increased collaboration over the years (Technical Quarterly Meetings, joint briefings, technical
support missions, experience sharing, etc.), there is still quite some way to go in terms of sys-
tematic collaboration on data collection, early warning analyses and other activities. This limited
systematic collaboration is due to, inter alia, technological and methodological challenges (lack
of system of data and information sharing; need to continue to co-develop data collection tools;
actual sharing of information); varying stages of operationalization of early warning systems;
challenges of information and analysis sharing related to political will.

1 The specific objective 2 is therefore to deepen the substantive and systematic interaction be-
tween CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/RMs, between the EWS of the RECs/RMs, and between
CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/RMs and their national early warning systems.

Priority 1 Specific Objective 2 indicators

zz The CEWS and the EWS of the RECs are regularly connected
zz The EWS of the RECs are regularly connected
zz Evidence of institutionalised early warning systems’ systematic sharing of data (increase
in information sharing)
zz Evidence of strengthened collaboration
zz Attendance and participation by CEWS and EWS of the RECs at the Technical Meetings
zz Evidence of information sharing between CEWS and EWS as well as between RECs
zz Evidence of analysis sharing and co-development of scenario-building and policy response
options formulation
zz The RECs and their national early warning units are regularly connected and systematical-
ly share data

The main strategies envisaged to reach this objective focus on simultaneously strengthening the
connectivity (from a technical ICT perspective) between the CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/
RMs and between the EWS of the RECs/RMs; as well as activities geared towards institutional-
izing the sharing of data, information and analysis between the CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/
RMs on on-going and developing situations. With relation to the first area of focus, activities
envisaged include ensuring connectivity via the AU VSAT; purchasing the necessary equipment
and securing access; addressing the issues relating to hosting application tools. In terms of the
former dimension (related to efforts at institutionalizing collaboration), strategies and activities
focus on supporting the RECs/RMs with the operationalization of their EWS (particular those at
earlier stages of development) through the provision of training and experience-sharing, and
activities focused on deepening the collaboration on analysis (including scenario-building and
policy options formulation; expanding the practice of weekly joint briefings; conducting further
CEWS simulations with the RECs/RMs and promoting joint analyses; promoting deeper exchang-
es of experience between EWS of the RECs.

1.3 Engagement of CEWS/EWS with decision-makers

The two APSA assessments (2010 and 2014) pointed to the limited interaction or “modest en-
gagement” between CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/RMs and their respective decision-makers,
which limits the efficacy of early warning information and analysis. In the case of CEWS, this
interaction relates particularly to the PSC, the office of the Chairperson and other structures
and organs of the AU (Panel of the Wise, DPA, etc.). This “modest engagement” is in part due

25
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

to: (i) limited opportunities for direct interaction between CEWS/RECs and their respective de-
cision-makers; (ii) established information flows at AUC and also at RECs levels which make di-
rect interaction difficult; (iii) in the case of the AU, limited understanding by AU structures and
organs of what CEWS does and what outputs/products it produces; and (iv) lack of monitoring
and feedback mechanisms allowing CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/RMs to measure quality of
interaction, quality of outputs, needs of decision makers, etc.

1 Specific objective 3 is therefore to enhance engagement between CEWS, the EWS of the RECs/
RMs and national early warning centres with their respective decision-makers.

Priority 1 Specific Objective 3 indicators

zz Evidence of interaction between CEWS and the PSC
zz Evidence of interaction between EWS and relevant statutory bodies
zz Evidence of early warning reports being pushed up the decision-making structure (either
in their ‘pure’ form or used in other reports such as the Chairperson’s Report to the PSC)
zz Evidence of deeper inter-departmental collaboration in briefing relevant decision makers
at AU (PSD, DPA, others)
zz At REC level evidence of increased production and dissemination of reports to deci-
sion-makers
zz Evidence of decision makers at different levels using and taking into account the analysis
and recommendations contained in the Early Warning Reports (EWRs) and briefings
zz Feedback on the quality of reports obtained from decision-makers/others as appropriate

The first set of strategies envisaged to reach this objective focuses on enhancing the opportuni-
ties for interaction, including briefings and meetings between the CEWS and AU decision-mak-
ers (PSC, Chairperson, Commissioners) as well as the EWS of the RECs and their respective de-
cision-makers. This includes activities geared towards exploring all possible opportunities for
interaction in the context of each institution (including joint briefings with other departments);
the improvement of reporting templates and the further institutionalization of verbal briefings;
deployment of CEWS and EWS of the RECs/RMs information and sensitization campaigns with-
in their institutions; developing feedback mechanisms whereby decision-makers systematically
provide comments and inputs on early warning products; and, substantive involvement of de-
cision-makers (including at national level) in assessments conducted (example: structural vul-
nerability assessments, SVAs). Second, this objective will require the CEWS and the EWS of the
RECs/RMs to support the development of national early warning capabilities (where appropri-
ate) through training and capacity building, the regular exchange of information and analysis
with Member States’ institutions, and, the hosting of joint simulation exercises with national
early warning centres.

1.4 Collaboration of CEWS/EWS with external stakeholders

Comprehensive, timely and effective early warning information and analysis requires close col-
laboration with key stakeholders such as parliamentarians, partner organisations, in particular
African CSOs (NGOs, research centres, academic institutions, think-tanks, CBOs) and interna-
tional organisations such as the UN, the World Bank and others. Both the AU and the RECs/
RMs regard collaboration with CSOs/International Organisations on matters of data collection
and analysis sharing as necessary for the successful operation of their early warning systems.
African and Africa-based academics, researchers, development practitioners, humanitarian re-
lief personnel, representatives of community based organisations, professional associations and

26
 women’s and youth groups, professionals, etc., possess an impressive wealth of knowledge and
experience, wide access to information and local actors – all of which can strengthen the quality
of the outputs produced by the CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/RMs.

Yet, as pointed out in the 2014 APSA assessment, although at AU level engagement with CSOs
has been initiated and collaboration with the UN (cluster on conflict prevention), the EU (joint
research centre) and the World Bank has been established, there continues to be limited sub-
stantive interaction between CEWS and RECs/RMs and stakeholders such as CSOs, international
organisations and bilateral countries (here the exception being ECOWARN and WANEP). Part
of the reasons for this are related to a lack of detailed understanding of what exactly CEWS/
EWS of the RECs/RMs do (particularly their data collection tools, methodology and approach; a
closed system that uses open-source information); lack of appropriate ‘points of entry/contact’
for external stakeholders to interact on data gathering; analysis and formulation of options; and,
ultimately, lack of political will – as can be seen for instance in the AU, and some of the RECs.

1 Specific objective 4 is therefore to enhance collaboration between CEWS and the EWS of the
RECs/RMs with relevant external stakeholders with regards to information and analysis shar-
ing as well as development of policy and response options.

Priority 1 Specific Objective 4 indicators

zz CEWS-CSOs and other stakeholders Modalities for Collaboration approved and imple-
mented
zz CSOs, International Organisations, Academia, Think Tanks, and parliaments are ‘plugged
into the system’ (information sharing) and contribute with data collection, monitoring
and analysis
zz CEWS and RECs hold briefing sessions with CSOs/International Organisations/Academia
and Think Tanks

The main strategies envisaged to reach this objective focus on the establishment of regular and
systematic communication channels between the CEWS/EWS of the RECs/RMs and relevant ex-
ternal stakeholders (development of the CEWS Portal, joint briefing sessions); development of
the necessary ICT requirements so that relevant external stakeholders can plug into the various
systems’ tools (even data collection, indicator monitoring; other points of entry, such as analy-
sis); adoption and implementation of a CEWS-CSOs modalities of collaboration framework; and,
establishment and strengthening of linkages and networks with national and subnational CSOs.
In addition, and in order for relevant stakeholders to meaningfully contribute to the efforts of
CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/RMs, training and capacity building activities to CSOs, academic
organisations and think tanks in the field of early warning, structural vulnerability analysis and
conflict prevention more broadly are planned.

1.5 Capacity for structural conflict prevention

The AU and the RECs/RMs acknowledge that conflict prevention must include both a direct
focus of intervening before large-scale violence occurs (preventive diplomacy and associated
tools), as well as focus on the structural (root) causes of conflict. However, structural conflict
prevention remains at an incipient stage at both continental and sub-regional levels. This is de-
spite the fact that, for instance, the African Union Border Programme (AUBP) is systematically
addressing the continent’s poorly defined borders in an attempt to prevent conflict that could
stem from disputed borders. The Union has also addressed the issue of structural conflict pre-
vention in numerous key policy documents (on human rights, governance, democratisation, the

27
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

fight against corruption, disarmament, socio-economic development, management of natural

resources among many others). However, it was not until 2014 that a specific framework on
structural conflict prevention has been adopted (it was finally endorsed by the PSC on 29 April
2015). The Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF) aims at strengthening
the AU’s direct prevention actions with activities to assist Member States in addressing/identi-
fying structural vulnerability of countries to conflict at an early stage and is to be supported by
the AUC Inter-Departmental Taskforce on Conflict Prevention (IDTFCP).

At the same time, the African Union has adopted an African Governance Architecture (AGA),
through the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007). It is aiming at ad-
dressing many of the dimensions of structural vulnerability, including good governance, the rule
of law, democracy and human rights, popular participation, management of public funds and
service delivery among others.

Implementation of the CSCPF is still at an incipient stage, a result of lack of resources (staff and
financial), the need to mainstream conflict prevention (in its various dimensions) in the work of
the AUC, among others. Moreover, linkages between APSA and AGA as well as the AU and the
RECs in the domain of structural conflict prevention remain tenuous, partly as a result of a lack
of communication and collaboration between different departments at AUC, and between the
AU and the RECs.

1 Specific objective 5 is therefore to enhance the capacity for structural conflict prevention by
the AU and the RECs.

Priority 1 Specific Objective 5 indicators

zz At Continental level, the CSCPF is finalised (reviewed by PSD and other stakeholders) and
shared
zz CSVAs are conducted jointly with relevant RECs
zz Results of the CSVA are communicated to the IDTFCP and to decision-makers
zz IDTFCP meets regularly
zz Decision-makers take into account the analysis and results of the CSVA
zz The AUC gradually develops an early/early prevention posture
zz Increased harmonization between APSA and AGA
zz Deepened link between the AU and the RECs on structural conflict prevention
zz Evidence of coordination with RECs/RMs on border management and cross border coop-
eration
zz Evidence of implementation of the (to be) adopted Enhanced Border Management
Strategy

The main strategies and activities envisaged for this objective include aspects related to the
finalization and operationalization of related policies, mainstreaming conflict prevention as well
as enhancing APSA actors’ capacity to undertake structural vulnerability analysis/assessments.
At continental level for example, this includes the operationalization of the CSCPF and the con-
duct of CSVAs and Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies (CSVMS) while at REC/
RM level it includes the operationalization of existing conflict prevention frameworks. Activities
focusing on the mainstreaming conflict prevention across the AU Commission but also at the
various RECs/RMs are central to this strategy – for example, at the AUC this includes regular
meetings of the IDTFCP.

28
In addition, activities are proposed in the context of strengthening the institutional linkages
between the APSA and the AGA to support and complement the efforts of Member States to
achieve their commitments in terms of human rights and the rule of law, popular participation,
management of public funds, transparency, elections among others. This includes the regular
provision by the AGA Secretariat of situational analysis to the PSC; AGA participation at the
IDTFCP; conduct of joint missions between DPA and PSD; and elections/post-election joint as-
sessments.

In terms of capacity development, strategies include the sharing of existing methodologies,

manuals and SOPs by the CEWS with relevant RECs/RMs, as well as the training of analysts with
regards to structural vulnerability assessments. It also includes the joint development by CEWS
and the EWS of the RECs/RMs of CSVAs.

1.6 Capacity to deploy and conduct preventive diplomacy

The costs of managing conflict once it has erupted (whether in fielding peacekeeping operations
or providing humanitarian relief), of engaging in lengthy mediation and peace-making efforts, as
well as the very high costs of recovery (rebuilding economic and socio-political systems) and the
incalculable costs in human suffering and loss of human capital have underscored the concern
with conflict prevention at continental and sub-regional levels. Indeed, recognising that the hu-
man, financial and material costs of prevention are considerably less than the devastating con-
sequences of armed violence, the AU and the RECs have for more than two decades developed
policies and instruments designed to prevent violent conflict.

Nevertheless, there is a sense that a ‘culture of fire fighting’ prevails, with these organisations
tending to act (or being prompted to act) only when situations have already turned violent. At
both AU and REC levels there are several actors with a direct conflict prevention mandate – at
the AU, for example, the PSC, the Chairperson, the Panel of the Wise as well as special repre-
sentatives/envoys appointed by the Chairperson can undertake preventive diplomacy missions.
Likewise, at the RECs/RMs several actors are tasked with conflict prevention responsibilities. The
prevalence of a ‘culture of fire fighting’ appears to be related to overall capacity, resources as
well as these organisations’ need not to loose focus on on-going high intensity conflicts/on-go-
ing peace support operations. Yet, this can also be attributed to a lacking culture of prevention
as well as the ad-hoc nature of decision-making, planning and deployment of preventive diplo-
macy missions (absence of a preventive diplomacy system).

29
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

1 Specific objective 6 is therefore to enhance the capacity of the AU and the RECs to effectively
deploy and conduct preventive diplomacy (direct prevention).

Priority 1 Specific Objective 6 indicators

zz Evidence of frequency, relevance and efficacy of preventive diplomacy missions undertak-
en by the AU and the RECs (good offices, fact finding, conciliation, pre-election missions)
zz At the AU, evidence of closer coordination between PSC, Chairperson, Special Envoys and
Members of the Panel of the Wise (both informal as well as formal through participation
in PSC meetings, etc.)
zz Members of the Panel of the Wise/Friends of the Panel/PanWise are regularly tasked with
preventive diplomacy missions
zz REC Policy Organs task their respective Councils of Elders or similar structures to under-
take preventive diplomacy actions
zz Evidence of preventive diplomacy missions undertaken by Councils of Elders or similar
structures
zz Confidential reports of Councils of Elders or similar structures presented to decision mak-
ers
zz PSC and AUC Chairperson as well as Executive Secretary’s at RECs regularly conduct pre-
ventive diplomacy missions/other undertakings
zz Knowledge Management Framework (KMF) implemented as part of an M&E system
zz Evidence of joint missions with RECs under the PanWise umbrella
zz Evidence of strengthened capacity for direct prevention at national level (national infra-
structures for peace)

There are two main strategies to attain the objective above, particularly with regards to an in-
crease on frequency, relevance and efficacy of preventive diplomacy missions undertaken by the
AU and the RECs. On the one hand, AU and RECs/RMs actors involved in preventive diplomacy
missions must be equipped with the relevant skills, capacities and support required for timely
and effective interventions. This involves: targeted training based on needs assessment to spe-
cial envoys, representatives and members of the Panel of the Wise; finalization of recruitment
and training of staff for the various existing institutions/organs responsible for preventive diplo-
macy (AUC, Panel of the Wise Secretariat and related institutions at the RECs/RMs); implemen-
tation of the KMF as well as the 2012 mediation SOPs to preventive diplomacy interventions;
creation and operationalization of an operational support team; operationalization of PanWise;
among others.

Furthermore, and in order for a more predictable and integrated preventive diplomacy system
to develop, strategies at the AU level are geared towards enhancing the coordination between
the PSC, the Chairperson, special envoys, special representatives and members of the Panel of
the Wise. With regards to AU and RECs/RMs, the strengthening of linkages with regard to pre-
ventive diplomacy missions, including decision-making, planning and deployment of joint mis-
sions is key. Indeed, the strategic objective defined above depends on a clearly defined system
and process for decision-making, planning, deployment and conduct of preventive diplomacy
missions in a coordinated fashion – both within as well as across APSA institutions. Here, the first
and perhaps most important activity relates to the finalization of the consultations for the AU
Mediation Support Unit (MSU) as well as those at the RECs/RMs. In addition, the development
of an integrated preventive diplomacy and mediation strategy (capturing the two different but
complementary dimensions) is envisaged as a priority activity. Finally, it is critical that the AU
and the RECs/RMs develop outreach and information actions focusing on their actual roles in
direct conflict prevention as well as develop strategies for fund raising and sustainability.

30
 2 Strategic Priority 2:
Crisis/Conflict Management

The AU and the RECs/RMs are increasingly deploying African-led peace sup-
port operations in response to crisis and conflict situations across the conti-
nent. Although the political will to undertake such operations has grown rapidly,
the operational ability to do so still requires significant investment. To ensure that
African peace operations can deploy rapidly when required, and be effective throughout the
duration of their deployment, the operational readiness of the African Standby Force (ASF), and
the planning, management, deployment and sustainment of Africa peace support operations,
need to be enhanced.

The increase in opportunities for peace-making by regional and sub-regional organisations, and
by civil society organisations including NGOs and CBOs has resulted in an exponential growth in
mediation interventions in Africa at multiple levels. Mediation is increasingly used by the UN,
AU, RECs/RMs and at national level as an approach to the peaceful settlement of disputes and
conflicts. This form of peace-making is here understood as a structured process, involving a third
party who is not a party to the conflict, the acceptance of mediation and a particular mediator
by parties to a dispute, and the voluntary nature of agreements reached. As noted in the 2014
APSA assessment, in most of the major conflicts in Africa, the AU has either engaged directly in
mediation or supported mediation led by one of the RECs. Indeed, between 2007 and 2014, the
African Union deployed special envoys, special representatives or mediators to Guinea, Mada-
gascar, Guinea-Bissau, Comoros, Niger, Burundi, CAR, Somalia, Sudan, the Great Lakes Region,
Liberia and Mali. The importance, complexity and difficulty of mediation and preventive diplo-
macy require a systematic and professional approach, where collaboration and coordination
between actors and a high level of expertise and professional support are required.

2
The first objective for strategic priority 2 of the roadmap is therefore to contribute to enhanced
operational readiness of the ASF, and more effective African PSOs.

First Strategic Objective 2 Indicators

zz Evidence of cooperation between AU, RECs/RMs and Member States in the develop-
ment and retention of PSO capabilities
zz Evidence of cooperation between AU, RECs/RMs and Member States in the planning
and deployment of operations
zz Evidence of systems and procedures which enable the deployment of PSOs
zz Evidence of timely deployment of operations within the context of relevant frameworks
zz Evidence of effective planning and management of operations

31
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

2
The second objective for the strategic priority 2 of the roadmap is to contribute to the effective
and coordinated management and resolution of conflicts and crises through mediation by the
AU and the RECs.

Second Strategic Objective 2 Indicators

zz Evidence of timely and coordinated mediation interventions by the AU,
RECs/RMs
zz Evidence of enhanced capacity at the AU, RECs/RMs to plan, deploy, manage
and support mediation interventions
zz Evidence of enhanced capacity by actors at national level to plan and conduct mediation
interventions
zz Evidence of enhanced cooperation between the AU, RECs/RMs and the UN on media-
tion interventions

Strategic priority 2 has been broken down into six specific objectives, each of them addressing
one major obstacle to effective response. They are presented in the following sections.

2.1 Political/legal decision-making mechanisms

Decision-making for an ASF operation (mandated to use force) requires consultations that will
help determine an appropriate framework, scope and resource requirements for such engage-
ment. In this regard, consultations and actions are required at principally four levels, including
the UN; the AU; the concerned REC/RM; and the potential Troop and Police Contributing Coun-
tries. Coherent and well sequenced decision making is critical to ensuring that an ASF operation
is able to respond swiftly and deploy rapidly within the specified deployment timeframes, for
instance 14-days in the case of rapid response to mass atrocities, war crimes and crimes against
humanity (Scenario 6, ASF Policy Framework). It is also critical to ensure that an operation has
the requisite authority and legitimacy. If political and legal decision-making and authorisation is
lacking any, limited to and/or slow at all (or any of the) four levels of actors, this can significantly
impede rapid deployment. In this regard, political and legal decision-making processes at the
four levels need to be synchronised and/or streamlined to facilitate expedited mandating and
rapid deployment processes.

2
The specific objective 1 is therefore to ensure that political and legal decision making mecha-
nisms are clarified, harmonised and structured between specifically the AU and the RECs/RMs
so as to enable more effective cooperation in the mandating, deployment and management
of operations.

Priority 2 Specific Objective 1 indicators

zz Existence and utilisation of harmonised and streamlined policies, guidance
and procedures (between the AU and the RECs/RMs) informing PSO mandating and
decision making for the planning, deployment and management of PSOs
zz Evidence of planned and structured consultations amongst AUC Departments and Divi-
sions on the planning, mandating/decision making and deployment of PSOs
zz Evidence of joint AU and RECs/RMs planning, programming and assessment in relation to
the development and enhancement of the ASF
zz Evidence of joint AU and RECs/RMs analysis and planning for operations
zz Evidence of AU and RECs/RMs coordination/collaboration in the preparation of deploy-
ments
zz Evidence of timely deployment of operations
zz Increased rapidity in the deployment of PSOs

32
The main set of strategies/activities envisaged for the fulfilment of this objective are focused
on ensuring consultation and agreement amongst the AU, RECs/RMs and Member States to
consider the harmonisation and streamlining of their political and legal instruments, procedures
and timeframes in support of rapid and well-coordinated responses. Specifically, this will include
workshops (of the concerned decision makers of the AU, RECs/RMs and Member States) that will
generate concrete recommendations (on harmonisation and coordination of decision-making),
which in turn will be submitted for formal endorsement and action. A second set of activities
are targeted at actions that need to be taken by the planning elements at the AU and RECs/RMs
to assess each procedure within the decision-making chain and to define and assign responsi-
bilities as appropriate. The review of the MoU on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security
between the AU and the RECs/RMs will need to be facilitated to, amongst other aspects, provide
guidance on legal and procedural aspects as concerned with the mandating, planning, deploy-
ment, management, sustenance and liquidation of ASF operations. All relevant personnel will
require good orientation and training on legal and procedural aspects of the ASF. Additionally,
the AU and RECs/RMs will need to review all existing legal arrangements for ongoing peace sup-
port operations with the view to ensure a sound legal basis and framework for the employment
of the ASF. The last set of activities will pertain to meetings and processes for the development
of a system to monitor decision-making and implementation for the ASF.

2.2 Capacity to plan, deploy, manage, sustain and liquidate

The Planning Elements (PLANELMs) were established to serve as management capability for the
ASF and exist at the level of the AU and the RECs/RMs. The AU PLANELM serves as the strate-
gic-level whilst the RECs/RMs PLANELMs serves at the operational level. RECs/RMs PLANELMs
also serve as strategic level for operations they mandate, and in this instance, the AU PLANELM
provides strategic support to the mandating REC/RM. In broad terms the PLANELMs are respon-
sible for the management of pre-deployment, deployment and post deployment processes for
the ASF. Although significant steps have been taken to ensure multidimensional, well-resourced
and effective PLANELMs, progress across the AU and regions has been mostly mixed and un-
even. It is generally recognized that more work and emphasis should be placed on ensuring
appropriate structures for the PLANELMs, which should also be staffed with highly skilled and
capable planners. The AU and regional PLANELMs should ensure they possess the full suite of
policy guidance and Standard Operating Procedures that will inform and guide their efforts.
There is need to also ensure greater collaboration and communication between the AU and the
Regional PLANELMs. In this regard, the AU will be required to play a stronger role in terms of
leadership and guidance on the ASF. This element has been notably challenging to date.

33
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

2
The specific objective 2 is therefore to enhance the capacities of planning elements as well as
to ensure they possess the required systems, processes and policies to adequately plan, de-
ploy, manage, sustain and liquidate peace support operations.

Priority 2 Specific Objective 2 indicators

zz Existence of adequate human resources capacity within the planning elements
zz Existence of planning and deployment guidelines, policies and procedures aligned to cur-
rent realities and developments
zz Evidence of formal approval of guidelines, policies and procedures
zz Evidence that PSO planners (at the AU and REC/RM levels) are well oriented and knowl-
edgeable of the guidelines, policies and procedures and are accordingly able to apply
these in planning for operations
zz Domestication of ASF guidelines, policies and procedures by the RECs/RMs and Member
States at the regional and Member States levels respectively
zz Evidence that the AU and RECs/RMs systematically apply guidance, policies and proce-
dures in planning, deployment, management, sustainment and liquidation of PSOs
zz Evidence of the allocation of the required resources to the planning elements
zz Evidence of increased PSO efficiency

The main set of strategies/activities envisaged for the fulfilment of this objectives include indi-
vidual and joint assessments of the AU and RECs/RMs to confirm critical gaps (policies, Standard
Operation Procedures, staffing, expert/niche capacities etc.) that need to be addressed, and
recommendations and plans to address these gaps. Steps will also be taken to review the Aide
Memoire on planning for ASF operations and this aide memoire should receive full support
and endorsement by the AU and RECs/RMs. The latter should be directed to domesticate the
planning guidance as relevant. There should also be activities to ensure improved staffing (qual-
itative and quantitative) of the PLANELMs and such a process should include a skills audit and
assessment; training and recruitment. Emphasis should also be placed on further developing
the planning and management capacity of the various planners at the continental and regional
PLANELMs.

2.3 Mission support systems and mechanisms

The development of effective mission support strategies, systems and mechanisms which can
underpin the rapid deployment of peace support operations to the field, and which can ensure
that these operations can be sustained for the duration of deployment, are critical for the con-
duct of African peace support operations.

34
2
The specific objective 3 is therefore to establish critical mission support systems and mecha-
nisms as well as robust administrative and logistics policies and processes for deployment,
management, sustenance and liquidation of operations.

Priority 2 Specific Objective 3 indicators

zz Establishment and operationalisation of the ASF Continental Logistics Base to facilitate
mission start-up
zz Establishment of an AU and RECs/RMs administrative and logistics support system, mech-
anism, process and framework for ASF operations
zz Existence of formal agreements between AU and its partners on administrative and logis-
tics support mechanisms for AU PSO
zz Evidence of joint assessments between the AU, RECs/RMs and other partners on strate-
gic lift capabilities on the continent, including continental movement coordination and
facilitation
zz Existence of formal agreements concluded between AU and its partners on support for
AU PSO strategic lift capabilities and continental movement coordination and facilitation
zz Existence of formal agreements concluded between AU and Member States strategic lift
capabilities on support for AU PSO
zz Existence of formal agreements concluded between AU and its partners on support for
AU PSO strategic lift capabilities and continental movement coordination and facilitation
zz Establishment and operationalisation of the ASF Continental C3IS architecture and system
zz Establishment and operationalisation of the ASF Continental and Regional Movement
Control Centres (CMCC) and (RMCC) respectively

2.4 Capacities and capabilities pledged/on standby

The demand for skilled and trained personnel for the conduct of peace support operations con-
tinues to grow. In this regard, the AU and the RECs/RMs have invested in the development of
the African Standby Capacity (ASC), a continental roster that can be utilized to support the re-
cruitment and deployment needs for African peace support operations. As the roster has been
developed and is in place, it now needs to be populated with personnel, and utilized to service
recruitment needs for operations.

35
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

2
The specific objective 4 is therefore to ensure the efficiency of the ASF human resource man-
agement.

Priority 2 Specific Objective 4 indicators

zz Existence of harmonised training standards and directives
zz Existence of training evaluation, assessment, certification, verification systems
zz Evidence of adequate capacity by training centres and institutions to support AU in facil-
itating required and targeted training processes using AU harmonised training standards
in line with Annual ASF Training directives
zz Continuation of the Training Centres Programme to facilitate support to training institu-
tions to deliver and conduct training for the AU and ASF
zz Evidence that the ASF has sufficiently qualified and skilled capacities and capabilities (mil-
itary, police and civilian) pledged/on standby and on the ASC Roster
zz Evidence of the promotion and utilisation of the ASC roster as a recruitment tool and ap-
proved human resource policy frameworks and field operations procedures that facilitate
rapid deployment and management of field personnel
zz Evidence and utilisation of adequate (civilian) recruitment/deployment policies and pro-
cesses for field missions
zz Evidence of training and rostering linkages to facilitate rapid deployment of qualified, ex-
perienced and well trained personnel pledged for ASF operations

2.5 Capacity to plan, deploy, manage, support and monitor mediation

interventions

Within the context of the AU, the Chairperson normally appoints Special Envoys and Special Rep-
resentatives to conduct structured mediation processes. Similarly, the RECs/RMs also engage in
mediation, often in partnership with the AU and have their own mandates and structures for
peace-making. The 2014 Assessment noted how this form of peace-making is a specialized en-
deavour requiring a high level of expertise and professional support.

There are a number of key challenges at present: the absence of a professionalised approach to
mediation; the absence of sustained professional support to mediators at the AU and the RECs;
and, existing structures and processes are inadequate for rapid deployment of mediation and
preventive diplomacy interventions, including flexible funding.

2
The specific objective 5 is therefore to enhance the capacity of the AU and the RECs/RMs to
plan, deploy, manage, support and monitor mediation interventions.

Priority 2 Specific Objective 5 indicators

zz Evidence of efficient mediation interventions
zz Evidence of operationalization of MSUs) at the AU and the RECs/RMs
zz Evidence and documentation of the use of the guidance contained in the 2012 SOPs
for Mediation Support (note that these have clear guidance on: appointing and hiring
processes for lead mediator; decision to deploy a mediator; creating a mediation roster;
developing mediation mandates; creating an AU mediation team (needed expertise and
capacity, core team members, resource persons); mediator pre-deployment briefings; de-
sign of mediation strategies; funding, etc.
zz Evidence and documentation of the use of the KMF for Mediation (lessons learned, etc.)
zz Evidence of reviews and evaluations of concluded AU and RECs/RMs mediations
zz Evidence of harmonization of national mechanisms with RECs

36
The main strategies/activities envisaged to reach this objective centre on the need to equip the
AU, RECs/RMs and national level actors involved in mediation with relevant capacities for effec-
tive mediation interventions. Indeed, these strategies/activities are designed to strengthen the
AU and RECs’ capacity to design, plan, deploy, manage and monitor preventive diplomacy and
mediation interventions. These strategies include three key dimensions: (i) the full operation-
alization of existing policies and processes relating to mediation at both AU and the RECs/RMs;
(ii) the creation of MSUs at the AU and the RECs with the aim of establishing track I and track
II mediation structures and coordinate technical expertise for effective professional support
to peace processes; (iii) capacity building trainings and retreats for the envoys and mediators
and create inter-face between the AU and RECs; (iv) strengthening regional mediation capacity
building upon national institutional and normative frameworks. Consequently, implementing
the 2012 SOPs for Mediation Support and the Knowledge Management Framework for Media-
tion Processes, as well as finalizing the PSD Roster, will strengthen the process of appointment,
pre-deployment preparation and start-up phase of AU mediation activities, including lessons
learned and monitoring and evaluation of mediation interventions. Finalising consultations for
(and launching) MSUs at both AU and the RECs/RMs, including developing the concept for an
‘Operational Support Team’ at the AU are key areas of intervention for the strengthening of
mediation capacity in the period of this roadmap. Finally, this objective requires that consid-
erable focus be placed on targeted training to mediators and special envoys – training which is
proposed to stem from the conduct of a needs assessment survey.

2.6 Coordination on mediation interventions

Collaboration and coordination between different actors engaged in mediation is a critical fac-
tor in the success of mediation processes. This is particularly the case in the African continent
where a significant number of actors, ranging from States and individuals to organisations such
as the UN, the AU and the RECs have become involved in mediation in one form or another. In
the case of the AU and the RECs, whether through nominated Special Representatives, Envoys,
Chief Mediators, or through the collective efforts of panels of eminent personalities such as the
AU Panel of the Wise and similar mechanisms at sub-regional level (including ECOWAS’ Council
of the Wise; COMESA’s Committee of Elders and SADC’s Panel of Elders), High Level Implemen-
tation Panels (Sudan for example) and International Contact Groups, demonstrate that these
organisations have assumed, and will continue to play key roles in peace-making, including pre-
ventive diplomacy (fact-finding, good offices, conciliation and confidence-building), facilitation
and mediation efforts. These developments have taken place in an increasingly complex interna-
tional mediation environment, where often multi-party mediation has become the norm. With-
in the context of mediation interventions, regular consultations should be held with the RECs/
RMs, which will take, within the framework of APSA, the necessary initiatives in their respective
region and initiate mediations to conduct structured peace process jointly with the AU or on
their own, as decided at the PSC retreat in Abuja in 2015. Yet, at present, collaboration and
coordination are mostly done in an ad-hoc basis, as there is an absence of mechanisms and pro-
cedures for ensuring coordination and cooperation between the AU, RECs/RMs and the UN in
mediation and preventive diplomacy initiatives. There is a need for enhanced consultation and
coordination between the AU and the relevant RECs/RMs regarding decisions on, and conduct
of mediation initiatives.

37
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

2
The specific objective 6 is therefore to enhance coordination between the AU, the RECs/RMs
and the UN on mediation interventions.

Priority 2 Specific Objective 6 indicators

zz Examples of coordinated mediation interventions by AU, RECs/RMs and UN
zz Evidence of information-sharing and joint decision-making between AU and RECs/RMs
zz Evidence of joint mediation endeavours
zz Evidence of joint analysis and assessment between AU and RECs/RMs
zz Forum of AU/REC/RMs mediation focal points

In order to ensure enhanced coordination between the AU, RECs/RMs and the UN on mediation
to take place, a number of strategies and activities are proposed. These include, with regard to
AU-REC relations on mediation: the development and implementation of AU/RECs/RMs Media-
tion Guidelines; increased frequency of joint missions and international contact groups leading
to joint mediations (where appropriate); information sharing and deepened support to the RECs
with regards to the professionalization and support to mediation. The AU and the RECs/RMs
may also consider the creation of the Forum of AU/RECs/RMs focal points. With regards to the
crucial area of coordination and collaboration with the UN, activities include the adoption and
implementation of the AU/UN Mediation Guidelines; information sharing; collaboration through
technical support and exchanges of experiences; and, strengthening the alignment of UN/AU
mediation guidelines.

38
 3 Strategic Priority 3:
Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building

Post-conflict reconstruction, development and comprehensive peace build-

ing efforts are closely linked to all other elements of the APSA and central for
their success. The recent relapses of several post-conflict countries into violence
and instability highlight the challenge, and therefore, the imperative for post-conflict
reconstruction and development in Africa, as well as the need for more concerted action in
consolidating peace in countries emerging from conflict. Drawing the lessons from past experi-
ence in rebuilding countries emerging from conflict, the AU Assembly adopted, in 2006, a PCRD
Policy Framework, as a guide for the development of comprehensive policies and strategies
to consolidate peace and pave the way for growth and sustainable development in countries
emerging from conflict. The Policy highlights six indicative elements of PCRD; namely security;
humanitarian/emergency assistance; socio-economic reconstruction and development; political
governance and transition; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and gender.

3
The objective for the strategic priority 3 of the roadmap is to contribute to effective, coordi-
nated and timely support to post-conflict Member States and communities emerging from
conflict.

Priority 3 Strategic Objective Indicators

zz PCRD interventions and support to Member States are timely and based on a systematic
assessment of post-conflict needs
zz Evidence of joint PCRD programming, including formulation of common objectives,
between AUC departments, between AUC and RECs/RMs, between RECs/RMs and RECs/
RMs and between AUC and Member States as well as RECs/RMs and Member States
zz Evidence of PCRD initiatives in post-conflict Member States that are based on continen-
tal or regional PCRD policies and/or strategies
zz Evidence of enhanced capacities of AU and RECs to provide and coordinate support to
post-conflict Member States, based on policies and strategies
zz Evidence of financial and in-kind support mobilised by AU/RECs and channelled to
post-conflict Member States
zz Evidence of AU and RECs PCRD/DDR/SSR expertise deployed within peace support oper-
ations

Strategic priority 3 has been broken down into seven specific objectives, each of them address-
ing one major obstacle to effective response strategies. They are presented in the following
sections.

3.1 PCRD Mechanisms and regional policies

The AU PCRD Policy Framework of 2006 has identified institutional mechanisms that are to be
implemented by AU and RECs in order to assist post-conflict Member States in their reconstruc-
tion efforts. While AU and RECs made considerable process, some of the mechanisms are not
yet in place or not yet fully operational. The six pillars of PCRD are defined broadly in the policy
framework, and a clear definition and operational guidelines on each of the pillars are missing.
Further, the PCRD policy framework sees a need for regional guidelines for the implementation
of PCRD efforts, which supports the harmonisation of PCRD policies on national level. Some

39
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

RECs played a leading role in developing regional PCRD policy frameworks, but lack implemen-
tation capacities. Other regions strive to develop regional PCRD policy frameworks within the
timeframe of the roadmap.

3
Specific objective 1 is to ensure that PCRD mechanisms at the level of AUC, REC/RM and
post-conflict countries as well as PCRD policies are in place and operational, in line with the
six pillars of the PCRD policy framework.

Priority 3 Specific Objective 1 indicators

zz Evidence that AUC and RECs/RMs have the mechanisms in place according to their man-
date given by their respective policy organs
zz Evidence of regional PCRD policies in place in all regions, and harmonised with the conti-
nental PCRD policy framework

Three main strategies have been identified in order to achieve the specific objective. The first
one relates to the six pillars (indicative elements) of the PCRD policy framework: each of the
pillars will be clearly defined, and operational guidelines or similar strategic documents will be
developed. The second strategy consists of the establishment of PCRD mechanisms at differ-
ent levels. A Multidimensional Committee on PCRD will be established in order to interact with
international actors on the continent on PCRD. A PSC Standing Committee is to be established
in order to monitor actors and provide support to affected countries. Regular briefing sessions
of the PSC will assure the political oversight and support to PCRD efforts. On national level,
post-conflict Member States are to be supported in the establishment of ministerial committees
on PCRD. An interdepartmental taskforce at AU level, involving RECs through their Liaison Offic-
es, will be established and will meet regularly, in order to foster harmonisation and synergies.
The third strategy relates to the development and implementation of regional PCRD policies and
strategies. The PCRD policy framework will be adapted to region specific situations, and guide-
lines will be developed accordingly. Member states of the regions will be closely involved in the
process, and RECs will cooperate with AU and align their policy frameworks and strategies.

3.2 PCRD responds to specific needs in different conflict phases

The high degree of relapse into violence of post-conflict countries, as well as the numerous pro-
tracted crises on the continent, indicate the need for an adequate response of PCRD measures
to different needs in the conflict cycle. This is particularly relevant for the stabilization and early
recovery phase during or directly following peace support operations. If not holistically concep-
tualised, PSOs risk leaving a gap in support to the local communities, which needs to be filled
by early recovery and humanitarian interventions, closely linked to reconstruction and devel-
opment measures. Despite efforts of AU and RECs to closely link PSOs and post-conflict efforts,
there is a lack of conceptual clarity on the phase of stabilization and early recovery, as well as on
the role of conflict preventive measures in peace building. Additionally, there is a need for closer
cooperation between all actors responsible for interventions in post-conflict Member States.

40
3
Specific objective 2 is to ensure that PCRD interventions are responding to specific needs in
different conflict phases.

Priority 3 Specific Objective 2 indicators

zz Evidence that PCRD programmes and strategies are informed by joint analysis on the
structural causes of conflict and include strategies and activities for conflict prevention
zz Evidence of (approved) strategic documents which point out roles and responsibilities of
AU and REC actors in the stabilization phase
zz Evidence of increased joint planning and close cooperation and coordination of all actors/
divisions within AU/RECs which are engaged in post-conflict countries and situations
zz Evidence that the PCRD policy is leveraged in support of stabilization and early recovery
efforts
zz Evidence of early recovery instruments such as Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and peace
strengthening projects being utilised in PSOs or its immediate aftermath as instruments
in support of stabilization and early recovery efforts

Three sets of strategies have been developed in order to address the causes of the problem and
achieve the specific objective. The first one relates to the development of a holistic strategy
of interventions in the stabilization and early recovery phase. PSOs will be assisted in the im-
plementation of QIPs, and in the development of their capacities to timely implement or liaise
with the relevant actors implementing PCRD, stabilization and early recovery measures. The
second strategy relates to the development of a holistic concept on the interaction between
peace building and conflict prevention, involving governance and state building aspects. Here, it
is important to engage with all relevant actors on AU and REC level, map out interventions and
develop guidelines for conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm, taking into account long-term struc-
tural causes of conflict. The third strategy consists of setting up a mechanism for coordination,
joint planning and regular exchange on interventions in post-conflict Member States (interde-
partmental taskforce), involving all relevant actors, such as the AUC as well as RECs through their
Liaison Offices.

3.3 AU and RECs coordination function of PCRD

The effective support to Member States in PCRD requires close collaboration between all rele-
vant actors involved. Besides the AU, RECs and the respective Member States (including relevant
ministries and departments), the UN and other international organisations, post-conflict recon-
struction and peace building efforts also involve civil society organisations at local, national,
regional and continental levels. At the moment, there is still lack of regular and systematic ex-
change between the AU and the RECs as these actors. The AU PCRD Policy Framework of 2006
provides guidance on roles and responsibilities of AU and RECs as well as on mechanisms to be
established for the effective implementation of PCRD measures on member state level. There
is, anyhow, still a lack of clear definitions of roles and responsibilities of the AU and the RECs, as
well as lack of harmonised approaches and regular exchange. Finally, the AU and the RECs partic-
ipation and coordination role in other (often international) mechanisms related to post-conflict
reconstruction of the continent needs to be enhanced.

41
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

3
Specific objective 3 is to ensure that the AU and the RECs exercise their coordination function
effectively and comprehensively.

Priority 3 Specific Objective 3 indicators

zz Planning, monitoring and reporting processes on PCRD between AUC and RECs/RMs are
harmonized
zz AUC and RECs/RMs take up a relevant role in international PCRD processes, such as the
New Deal and Post-Conflict reconstruction frameworks in Member States
zz Implementation strategy for PCRD policy framework clearly highlights different roles and
responsibilities of the various stakeholders

The strategies developed in order to address the causes of the problem are threefold: the first
one consists of organising regular systematic exchange between AU and RECs on PCRD strategies
and interventions, through dialogue sessions as well as through joint stakeholder work plans
and other strategic documents. Secondly, regular systematic exchange is to be established be-
tween AU/RECs and external actors in the field of PCRD (e.g. through regular joint stakeholder
meetings). This includes the UN Peace Building Commission as well as relevant CSOs. Also joint
stakeholder monitoring and evaluation activities for PCRD are envisaged. Finally, AUC and RECs
identify and participate in relevant fora and exchange meetings in the field of PCRD and peace
building, e.g. in the New Deal for Fragile States process as well as in post-conflict needs assess-
ment by international actors.

3.4 Resources for the implementation of PCRD programmes

The PCRD Policy Framework (2006) sees the mobilization of resources for PCRD as a major re-
sponsibility of the AU. At the 19th Ordinary Session of the policy organs of the African Union, in
July 2012, the African Solidarity Initiative (ASI) was launched as an AU-led process for mobilizing
support from within the continent for countries emerging from conflict. A Decision – Assembly/
AU/Dec.425 (XIX) – on the ASI, was adopted, requesting the AUC, in close collaboration with the
countries concerned and all other Member States, RECs, and other relevant African institutions,
to roll-out a full implementation plan, and to mobilize in-kind, capacity building, as well as fi-
nancial contributions, to support post-conflict reconstruction activities and efforts in the African
countries concerned.

3
Specific objective 4 is to ensure that the capacities of the AU and the RECs to generate (finan-
cial and in-kind) resources for post-conflict countries and communities are enhanced.

Priority 3 Specific Objective 4 indicators

zz Resources being pledged and delivered by AU Member States in support to PCRD coun-
tries
zz In kind and financial support given to Member States, CSOs etc. through AUC and RECs/
RMs
zz Amount of funds being channelled through the PCRD funding windows
zz Number of Member States/AUC/RECs/RMs co-financing arrangements in support of PCRD
efforts in countries emerging from conflict

In order to achieve the specific objective, the following four strategies are envisioned: the Afri-
can Solidarity Initiative is to be operationalized through the implementation of its resource mo-
bilization strategy, the development of strategies and mechanisms to operationalize all aspects

42
 of the ASI (including identifying post-conflict needs, channelling funds, reporting and monitor-
ing, etc.). A mechanism is to be developed in the frame of the ASI to support Member States to
engage with each other directly on addressing post-conflict needs, and the necessary capacities
are to be established at the level of the AUC in order to keep the ASI operational. Second, a
funding window is to be established to channel funds from AU to RECs and Member States for
PCRD interventions, especially relating to regional and cross-border interventions. Third, needs
of post-conflict Member States are to be assessed regularly and systematically, and linked to
resource mobilization efforts. Finally, round tables and pledging conferences are organised reg-
ularly to generate additional support for post-conflict Member States.

3.5 Capacities for support to post-conflict Member States

Peace building is a complex and extensive process that involves addressing the root causes of
conflicts, as well as creating social cohesion and establishing peaceful mechanisms and institu-
tions for all members of society. It touches upon all aspects of nation building, humanitarian
interventions in the immediate aftermath of conflict as well as socio-economic development;
it includes rule of law and the reform of the security sector, constitutionalism and democracy,
good governance, human rights aspects as well as reconciliation. It is therefore paramount that
these processes are shaped on national and local level, and that national and local actors receive
the support needed from regional and continental institutions, namely AU and RECs, as per their
mandate in the PCRD Policy Framework.

3
Specific objective 5 is to ensure that the capacities of AU and RECs to respond to post-con-
flict Member States needs through effective coordination and development of PCRD interven-
tions/Member States support are enhanced.

Priority 3 Specific Objective 5 indicators

zz Number of Member States which are supported in the implementing of policies or strate-
gies which are related to PCRD (security, transitional justice and human rights, socio-eco-
nomic reconstruction and development, humanitarian/emergency aid, gender as well as
governance and democracy aspects)
zz Number of PCRD assistance requests addressed by AU and REC
zz Evidence that support to member state is based on post-conflict needs assessment

Strategies to address this specific objective are threefold. AU and REC’s Liaison Offices and field
offices, and post-conflict Member States need to be assessed and supported in enhancing their
capacities in the field of PCRD through training and other capacity development measures. It
will further need to be assured that the review of AULOs mandates keeps in mind the role they
can play in PCRD. Coherence is also to be enhanced between activities of AULOs/field offices
and AU/REC strategies for PCRD. Second, capacities of AU and RECs to assist Member States
in the development and monitoring of tailor made interventions will be enhanced through the
development of implementation strategies for all indicative elements of the PCRD policy frame-
work, the support to Member States in the development of national policies and strategies as
well as in the implementation of national programmes. Third, an expert database/roster is to be
developed based on a mapping of expertise needed in peace building processes, covering all in-
dicative elements of the PCRD policy. A mechanism will ensure that experts are being deployed
to post-conflict Member States, AULOs or PSOs according to the needs on the ground.

43
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

3.6 Capacities to implement the SSR policy framework

The reform of the security sector is often a complex and extremely challenging, but paramount
process for post-conflict reconstruction of Member States. The AU Assembly through Assembly/
AU/Dec.177 (X) in 2008 asked the AUC to develop a comprehensive AU Policy Framework on
SSR, within the context of the Policy Framework on PCRD. The SSR Policy Framework was con-
sequently developed and adopted in 2013. The AUC as well as RECs therefore need to enhance
their capacities in order to effectively fill out the role given to them in the SSR policy framework.
This includes the development of regional SSR policies as well as the enhanced capacities to
assist Member States in their SSR efforts, among others. SSR interventions need to be closely
coordinated with and linked to all other elements of PCRD, including governance and reconcili-
ation aspects.

3
Specific objective 6 is to ensure that AU and RECs have the capacities to effectively fulfil their
role as defined in the SSR policy framework.

Priority 3 Specific Objective 6 indicators

zz Number of Member States supported in implementing SSR policy
zz Evidence of SSR assistance requests addressed by AU and RECs
zz SSR processes supported by AU/RECs are gender sensitive
zz Number of required civilian SSR experts provided in support of AU peace support opera-
tions

There are five strategies to address the specific objective, all rooted in the mandate given to AU
and RECs by the SSR policy framework. First, regional SSR policies are to be developed and to be
used as an instrument for standardization and harmonisation of national SSR policies. AU and
RECs will collaborate not only with each other, but also with Member States on aligning the pol-
icies and developing mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of SSR policies on national
level. Second, capacities of AU and RECs will be developed through several interventions in order
to assist Member States in the development and implementation of national SSR policies. They
include the development and implementation of SSR assessment tools, guidance notes, mobili-
sation of funds, conduction of SSR trainings as well as financial support to Member States. Third,
AU and RECs will, through dialogue forums and other mechanisms, bring together relevant SSR
stakeholders on the continent. Forth, a continental code of conduct for armed forces involved
in African peace support operations will be developed in line with the AU Operational Guidance
Note (OGN) on the Development of Codes of Conduct for African Security Institutions. Finally,
an expert roster will be developed in order to assure that SSR experts are ready to be deployed
in PSOs and to Member States on a short-term notice.

3.7 Capacities of the AUC and the RECs/RMs to respond to DDR challenges

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants is a complex pro-

cess, with political, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. These dimensions are inte-
gral to promoting peace, security and stability in Africa and spans across the initial stabilization
of war-torn societies and into their long-term development through laying of groundwork for
safeguarding and sustaining of communities in which these individuals return, while building
national capacity for long-term peace, security and development.

44
3
Specific objective 7 is to ensure enhanced capacities of AUC, RECs/RMs and Member States to
meet the DDR challenges in post-conflict African countries.

Priority 3 Specific Objective 7 indicators

zz Number of DDR Assistance requests addressed by AU and RECs
zz Number of AU and RECs DDR expertise deployed within peace support operations
zz Number of DDR documents developed and continental dialogue platforms facilitated
zz Evidence of required DDR expertise provided in support to AU peace support operations

There are five main strategies envisaged to reach this objective. The first strategy is geared to-
wards mainstreaming gender through supporting DDR-related gender-sensitive activities that
are also responsive to the needs of children and other marginalised and vulnerable groups. The
second strategy consists of supporting DDR capacity building for Member States, RECs/ RMs and
AU peace support operations, including through the deployment of AU sponsored DDR experts.
The third strategy entails the development of DDR policy documents, SOPs and training material
to harmonize continental language on DDR. The fourth strategy involves convening a number of
DDR forums in support of regional and continental dialogue on DDR. Finally, Member States will
be assisted in fundraising for national DDR activities and in monitoring and evaluation mecha-
nisms for the DDR processes they are engaged in. These strategies will be implemented in close
collaboration with the United Nations and other international partners and organisations.

45
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

4 Strategic Priority 4:
Strategic Security Issues

Based on a broad notion of human security the African continent will be faced with a
series of strategic security challenges in the next five years. Problems identified include
inadequate and disjointed efforts to address illicit flows of Small Arms and Light Weapons
(SALW); mines, explosives and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); terrorism; and organized
crime.

4
The objective for the strategic priority 4 of the roadmap is to contribute to enhancing the time-
liness and effectiveness of the response to strategic security challenges by all stakeholders.

Priority 4 Strategic Objective Indicators

zz Evidence of effective policies, programs and capacities being developed and implement-
ed to address transnational threats.
zz Evidence of Member States incorporating/implementing gender dimensions in SALW
control programmes including national plans, national commissions, legislation, data on
arms and violence against women and vulnerable groups

The strategic priority 4 has been broken down into seven specific objectives, each of them ad-
dressing one major obstacle to effective response strategies. They are presented in the following
sections.

4.1 Illicit flow of SALW

The APSA assessment has drawn attention to the fact that the effectiveness in which illicit flows
of SALW are currently addressed is limited. This is due to a number of circumstances, amongst
others: non-domestication of legal and policy instruments to address the illicit flow of weap-
ons; weak operational capacities of Members States to prevent, detect and respond to illicit
SALW trafficking and circulation; insufficient updated research, data and analysis on trafficking
and circulation of illicit SALW to support evidence-based programming; the lack of a compre-
hensive monitoring and evaluation capacity with regards to illicit SALW control interventions;
the absence of an effective law enforcement cooperation and coordination mechanism with a
continental and regional scope to facilitate inter-state cooperation; as well as limited capacities
of PSOs in managing and accounting for weapons and implementing illicit SALW control inter-
ventions.

4
Specific objective 1 is to effectively implement integrated, comprehensive and sustainable pol-
icies and measures to address the illicit flow of SALW in line with international instruments
and best practices.

Priority 4 Specific Objective 1 indicators

zz Evidence of Member States marking arms and maintaining records
zz Evidence of Member States cooperating in arms tracing and seizure
zz Evidence of Member States securing arms stockpiles
zz Evidence of Member States adopting legislation and measures to regulate arms owner-
ship and transfers, and criminalizing illicit activities
zz Evidence of Member States’ ownership and financial contribution to national policies and
programmes

46
 The main strategies/activities envisaged in order to reach this objective are five-fold. First, bi-an-
nual Steering Committee meetings to strengthen coordination initiatives, financial and technical
resources for Member States will be mobilized and direct technical support given to Members
States. It is expected that this will help effectively domesticating legal instruments to address
the illicit flow of weapons. Second, operational support to priority interventions in SALW con-
trol (training, purchase of equipment, development of guidelines, etc.) will be provided. It is
assumed that this will build operational capacities in Member States. Third, expert studies in
collaboration with RECs/RMs and research groups will be commissioned, reports and data from
RECs, RMs and research groups compiled, findings validated, suggested strategic responses
drafted, and methods of evidence based planning employed. It is expected that these meas-
ures will make comprehensive knowledge on the flow of illicit SALW on the continent available.
Fourth, basic guidelines for the integration of evaluations and assessments in project design by
AU/RECs/RMs will be developed and AU/RECs/RMs and partners will support the compilation
of biennial reports on SALW control. The expected result of these activities is that monitoring
capacity in SALW control has been established. Finally, technical support will be given to PSOs in
developing SOPs and guidelines to manage and account for weapons, and also in streamlining
SALW control into ConOps and mission mandate. In addition, training and operational support
will be provided to PSOs in implementing mandated SALW control interventions. The expected
outcome of these activities is to enhance PSOs’ capacity to manage weapon holdings and stock-
piles and implement SALW control interventions is built.

4.2 Mine action and counter-IED/explosives management

The inability of Member States to fully meet their obligations under the Anti-Personnel land-
mines Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions has been identified as a challenge.
This is due to five reasons: The limited technical and operational capacities of Member States
to implement mine action programmes; a lack of integrated and sustainable policies and pro-
grammes to support victims of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO); the absence of both
inter-state modalities and agreements to clear mines in border areas as well as regional mech-
anisms/platforms to mobilize resources and foster south-south cooperation; and the limited
expertise, financial and operational resources at the level of PSOs to deal with the threat of IEDs
and UXOs.

4
Specific objective 2 is to implement mine action and counter-IED/explosives management pro-
grammes by affected Member States and PSOs in an integrated and sustainable manner.

Priority 4 Specific Objective 2 indicators

zz Evidence of Member States progress towards their clearance deadlines/targets
zz Evidence of victims’ assistance policies and programmes
zz Evidence of participation of women in national mine action
zz Conclusion of agreements and development of cross-border demining projects
zz Resources mobilized through the South-South cooperation platform
zz Percentage of IEDs detected and disposed by AU-PSOs

The main strategies/activities envisaged in order to reach this objective include collaboration
with Mine Action centres to deliver training to member state practitioners. In addition demining
and training equipment will be provided to affected Member States and trainings on various
Mine Action components (awareness, program management, landmine impact surveys, gen-
der mainstreaming, etc.) delivered. The expected result of these measures is that technical and

47
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

operational capacities of Member States to implement mine action programs are built. In ad-
dition, technical support and training to Member States on developing and sustaining victims’
assistance programmes will be provided and guidelines and best practices on victims’ assistance
developed and disseminated. The expected outcome is the integration of victim assistance pro-
grammes into national policies.

Strategies/activities will also include: the conclusion of interstate agreements to survey and
demine border regions under the auspices of the AU Border Programme (AUBP) will be facilitat-
ed with a view to reach agreement reached and develop projects to demine border areas; the
development of south-south cooperation strategy and implementation modalities and a bienni-
al donor conferences and south-south cooperation platforms convened. The expected result of
this is that the South-South Cooperation platform and continental resource mobilization modal-
ities will be established.

Finally, technical support to PSOs in streamlining counter-IED and explosives management in the
development of Concepts of Operations (ConOps) will be provided and technical and operation-
al support to capacitate PSOs in the area of counter-IED and explosives management mobilized.
The expected outcome of these activities is that counter-IED expertise and equipment will be
integrated into PSO mandates and support packages.

4.3 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) disarmament and non-proliferation

Implementing the international regimes on WMD disarmament and non-proliferation has been
identified as being little effective. This is attributed to the non-domestication of legal and policy
instruments against WMD; weak operational and institutional capacities of Members States;
and insufficient research and data on the threat and risks of illicit chemical, biological and nucle-
ar proliferation and trafficking.

4
The specific objective 3 is to effectively implement instruments and policies to address WMD
disarmament and non-proliferation.

Priority 4 Specific Objective 3 indicators

zz Technical assistance and training provided to Member States to domesticate legal and
operational aspects of the international instruments against WMD
zz Member States establishing/designating the required implementation mechanisms/bodies

The main strategies/activities envisaged in order to reach this objective are two-fold. First, there
will be collaboration with the international bodies to sensitize states, identify gaps and assis-
tance will be channelled to Member States. In addition, technical and operational resources for
Member States from donors and international partners will be mobilized. The expected result
of these activities is that legal instruments to address WMD disarmament and non-proliferation
will be effectively domesticated. Furthermore, expert studies will be commissioned and reports
and data available with the international bodies compiled with a view to make available com-
prehensive knowledge on the risks and threats of chemical, biological and nuclear proliferation
and trafficking.

4.4 Counter-terrorism measures

So far, counter-terrorism efforts on the African continent have been mainly ineffective and un-
sustainable. There are a number of reasons for this, including the absence of an effective rule

48
 of law-based criminal justice response to terrorism; poor capacities and training of law enforce-
ment agencies to implement preventive and response measures to terrorist acts; the lack of
integrated approaches to prevent radicalization, address the conditions conducive to the spread
of terrorism and engage civil society; poor coordination and collaboration among states in poli-
cy, legislative and operational counter-terrorism measures; the absence of rigorous and updated
operational research and analysis that informs policy development and response measures; and
also the non-existence of an inclusive continental platform to coordinate counter-terrorism (CT)
action among Member States, RECs, donors and assistance providers.

4
The specific objective 4 is to make national and regional counter-terrorism measures effective
in preventing and responding to terrorist acts.

Priority 4 Specific Objective 4 indicators

zz Evidence of MS authorities foiling terrorist acts
zz Evidence of terrorism cases investigated and tried in courts
zz Evidence of CSO involvement in/support for national counter-terrorism efforts
zz Evidence of inter-state cooperation in terrorism investigations and trials
zz Evidence of Member States sharing and utilizing intelligence, reports and studies on ter-
rorism and counter-terrorism
zz Evidence of effective support and coordination provided to Member States by donors,
partners and RECs
zz Evidence of de-radicalization initiatives by RECs
zz Evidence of programmes implemented by counter violent extremism (CVE) initiatives

The strategies adopted to address the causes of the problem and reach the objective are six-
fold. First, legislative support will be provided to Member States in ratifying and domesticating
regional and international anti-crime and counter-terrorism instruments; likewise training and
capacity building support will be given to judges, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies
in integrating and implementing essential components; in addition best practices will be ex-
changed on criminal justice responses to terrorism, rule of law and human rights (criminali-
zation, investigations, cooperation, detention, trials, corrections, etc.). These activities should
contribute to both the effective domestication of legal instruments to address counter-terrorism
and the strengthening of criminal justice systems.

Second, training and support will be provided to law enforcement agencies in preventing and
responding to terrorist acts (information and intelligence gathering and analysis, protection of
sensitive sites, investigations and evidence gathering and protection, countering IEDs, anti-mon-
ey laundering and countering terrorism financing, recruitment and internet abuse, emergency
response, human rights safeguards, etc.). The expected result is that capacities of law enforce-
ment agencies to implement preventive and response measures to terrorist acts are built.

Third, consultative and inclusive platforms will be provided to develop context-specific ap-
proaches and programmes to prevent radicalization and recruitment and address conditions
conducive to the spread of terrorism and preventing radicalization. In addition, early recovery,
counter-radicalization and community engagement components will be streamlined into region-
al cooperative counter-terrorism operations. The expected outcome is that national and region-
al integrated strategies to prevent radicalization, addressing the conditions conducive to the
spread of terrorism, and civil society engagement is developed and implemented.

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 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

Fourth, consultation and cooperation platforms for intelligence sharing and coordination and
harmonization of counter-terrorism efforts will be strengthened and sustained; political and op-
erational support to the development of cooperative regional counter-terrorism operations and
intelligence sharing mechanisms including within the framework of the Committee of Intelli-
gence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), the African Centre for the Study and Research on
Terrorism (ACSRT) Focal Points and the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes will be provided; the
role of the PSC pursuant to the 2004 Protocol and the relevant communiqués will be operation-
alized; support to the harmonization of legislation and other inter-state modalities regarding
extradition and arrest warrants will be given; and African Arrest Warrant against individuals
accused of terrorist acts will be operationalized and implemented. The expected outcome of
these measures is an enhanced judicial and operational cooperation among Member States and
regions.

Fifth, periodic and thematic expert research and studies will be commissioned; Focal Points will
be designated by Member States to the ACSRT and information will be shared regularly; Mem-
ber States will submit their annual reports pursuant to the 2004 Protocol; counter-terrorism will
be harmonized and integrated into CEWS; the ACSRT CT Situation Room will be operationalized;
and an assessment and evaluation mission to Member States will be conducted. As a result
comprehensive knowledge and analysis will be available on terrorist groups modus operandi,
agendas and structures; recruitment and financing methods; and related trends.

Finally, an annual Consultative Counter-Terrorism Forum will be convened; the AU-RECs Steering
Committee on Counter-terrorism and transnational organized crime (TOC) will be established;
RECs will be supported to replicate the efforts at African Union levels; and sub-region cooper-
ation/coordination centres at RECs levels will be established. It is expected that an effective
coordination mechanism is established among Member States, RECs, donors and assistance pro-
viders in identifying and aligning priorities and allocation of resources.

4.5 Illicit Financial Flows

Implementation of the international instruments on anti-money laundering and countering

the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) is ineffective and incomplete. Due to a combination of
factors that include inadequate capacity among institutions such as Financial Intelligence Unit
(FIUs) and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) that are undertrained, understaffed or lack a clear
mandate and powers to enforce AML/CFT measures; and law awareness among financial and
non-financial reporting entities; many jurisdictions have inadequate AML/CFT laws while others
have implementation challenges. There is also inadequate inter-state cooperation on AML/CFT
issues including on judicial, institutional and operational matters; the existence of regulatory
and operational challenges to address AML/CFT in the informal sector and cash-based econo-
my; inadequate regulatory measures to address the vulnerability of non-profit organizations to
abuse by terrorists; and, finally, poor capacities and integrated approaches to address proceeds
of criminal activities such as environmental crimes, trafficking and smuggling.

50
4
The specific objective 5 is to fully and effectively implement international legal instruments
and recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the High Level Panel on
Illicit Financial Flows recommendations.

Priority 4 Specific Objective 5 indicators

zz Evidence of Member States developing and enforcing national legislation and practices
on AML/CFT
zz Evidence of FIU and LEAs adequately capacitated to fulfil their mandate
zz Evidence of preventive and response measures to deal with AML/CFT in the informal
economy and charity establishments and other designated non-financial businesses and
professions (DNFBPs)
zz Evidence of effective policies and practices linking anti-environmental crime efforts to
AML/CFT
zz Evidence of increased suspicious transaction reports received by FIUs
zz Evidence of increased awareness of AML/CFT among reporting entities

The main strategies/activities envisaged in order to reach this objective are five-fold.

First, the delivery of technical and legislative support to Member States in establishing and
strengthening FIUs, and developing/strengthening their mandate and operational modalities
will be facilitated; and FIUs and financial establishments will be sensitised and trained in imple-
menting FATF recommendations, the recommendations of the High Level Panel on Illicit Finan-
cial Flows and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. It
is assumed that Financial Intelligence Unit (FIUs) are established, capacity is built and effective
mandates are provided.

Second, regular forums/sessions to foster exchanges, common understanding and approaches

to enhance inter-state cooperation will be facilitated; and joint trainings for Member States on
international cooperation in judicial matters regarding AML/CFT will be conducted. This will lead
to effective inter-state cooperation on AML/CFT issues, including on judicial, institutional and
operational matters.

Third, operational guidance notes will be developed and best practices compiled to assist Mem-
ber States address AML/CFT within the context of the informal sector and cross border trans-
portations of currency. In addition, joint trainings and sensitisation exercises will be organized to
address cash couriers and cross border cross-border transportations of currency also including
other DNFBPs. It is expected that this will strongly support the implementation of effective reg-
ulatory and operational measures to address AML/CFT in the informal sector and cash-based
economy.

Fourth, technical and legislative support will be provided to Member States in regulating op-
erations of non-profit organizations, and non-profit organizations and CSOs will be trained on
transparency and preventing abuse for terrorist financing purposes. It is expected that this will
lead to the implementation of effective regulatory and transparency measures to prevent the
abuse of non-profit organizations.

Fifth, LEAs such as police, the judiciary and office of the prosecutor, customs, authorities etc.
will be sensitised and trained on investigation of AML/CFT crimes including capacity building in
asset recovery.

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 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

Sixth, studies and research will be commissioned and supported to identify trends in terrorism
financing and gaps in response measures; and the development of integrated and comprehen-
sive approaches and policies will be assisted to address terrorism financing through environ-
mental crimes, trafficking and smuggling. It is expected that these measures will lead to the de-
velopment of effective policies and guidelines to address terrorist financing from environmental
crimes, trafficking and smuggling.

4.6 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS)

The African Union’s maritime security policy is weakly integrated into APSA: This has mainly
three reasons: the absence of a Plan of Action for the Operationalization of the 2050 AIM Strat-
egy; a lack of effective mainstreaming of maritime security into CEWS; and the non-alignment of
RECs strategies on maritime security to AIMS 2050.

4
The specific objective 6 is to fully integrate the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy
(AIMS) into APSA.

Priority 4 Specific Objective 6 indicators

zz Evidence of the AUC developing an implementation matrix and Member States adopting
a Plan for the Operationalization of the 2050 AIMS
zz Evidence of revised CEWS indicators and guidelines
zz Evidence of RECs developing and adopting harmonized strategies on maritime security

The main strategies/activities envisaged in order to reach this objective are three-fold. First, a
Plan of Action for the Operationalization of the 2050 AIMS in accordance with AU Assembly Dec.
496 (XXII) will be developed and adopted – paving the way for the effective implementation
of a Plan of Action for the Operationalization of the 2050 AIMS. Second, the CEWS Indicators’
Module (data collection and monitoring) will amended and the CEWS Handbook (2008) revised,
with a view to effectively mainstreaming maritime security is into CEWS. And third, regional
workshops will be held to harmonize RECs strategies on maritime security. The expected effect
will be that RECs strategies on maritime security are aligned to AIMS 2050.

4.7 AFRIPOL as coordination mechanism

Coordination in combating Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) has been limited due to 4 main
reasons: a lack of effectively domesticating legal instruments to address TOC; weak legal codes
to address TOC; a lack of information, analysis and response options for members states and
RECs/RMs with regard to TOC; and insufficient knowledge about the nexus between TOC, ter-
rorism and violent extremism. In addition a collective anti-cyber crime policy is missing due to
4 main reasons: a lack of effectively domesticating legal instruments to address cyber crime;
non-tabling of the AUC Chairperson report on cyber security; the absence of national cyber
security frameworks as well as the absence of REC and REC-to-REC agreements on mutual assis-
tance in combating cyber crime. Moreover, Africa is faced with not only conventional security
threats such as internal and interstate conflicts, but also non-conventional threats arising from a
changing international environment, which include transnational organized crime and terrorism.
It is in this context that AU Member States agreed to establish a mechanism for police coopera-
tion, AFRIPOL, at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. In pursuance of Executive Council
Decision EX.CL/Dec.820 (XXV), adopted at its 25th Ordinary Session held in Malabo, Equatorial
Guinea, from 20 to 24 June 2014, the Commission has facilitated the meeting of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the operationalization of AFRIPOL on 2 July 2014 in Addis Ababa; on 2 October
2014 in Kampala, Uganda; from 18 – 19 March 2015 in Algiers, Algeria; and on 2 June 2015 in Ad-
52
 dis Ababa. The Ad Hoc Committee will report its work and present the to the meeting of African
Police Chiefs to be held in Algiers, Algeria from 13-14 December 2015 the drafts of the Statute,
Structure, Program of Work and Action Plan for consideration.

4
The specific objective 7 is to effectively strengthen the cooperation and coordination in the
combat of TOC and a continental anti-cyber crime policy is actively promoted.

Priority 4 Specific Objective 7 indicators

zz Evidence of ratification and domestication of legal instruments on TOC and cyber crime
in Member States
zz Evidence of the establishment – in collaboration with AFRIPOL – of a regional TOC centre
zz Evidence of Member States efficiently addressing the nexus between TOC and terrorism
and violent extremism
zz Evidence of Member States adopting cyber crime frameworks
zz Evidence of increased REC-to-REC assistance in combating cyber crime

The main strategies/activities envisaged in order to reach this objective are nine-fold. First, an-
nual reports will be submitted by Member States to the AUC. Second, a mapping of the status
quo will be organized and areas for follow-up activities identified. Third, AUC with AFRIPOL and
regional police organisations will establish a centre to systematically provide Member States
and RECs with information, analysis and response options for with regard to TOC; and guide-
lines for the establishment of national specialised TOC investigation units will be developed.
Four, a workshop will be organized to explore the nexus between TOC and terrorism and violent
extremism, on whose basis detailed policy recommendations will be developed. Five, the AU
Convention of Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection in accordance with AU Executive
Council Dec. 846 (XXV) will be ratified and domesticated. Six, an AUC Chairperson report on cy-
ber security will be tabled which (1) describes the extend of the threat to peace and security in
Africa, (2) maps national efforts of Member States to counter-act IT-based threats against peace
and security, (3) documents some best practice and lessons learned, (4) follows up on the AU
Assembly decision to harmonize national legislations through a convention on cyber security,
(5) suggests coordinating activities by the AUC vis-à-vis the RECs, and (6) details a strategy of
how to mobilize the support of international partners such as the UN or the EU in these efforts.
Seven, regional workshops on the design of national cyber security frameworks in accordance
with AU Executive Council Dec. 846 (XXV), §24 will be facilitated. Eight, an agreement on mutual
assistance in cyber-crime agreements in accordance with AU Executive Council Dec. 846 (XXV)
will be drafted, adopted and ratified. Finally, efforts will be undertaken to establish and make
AFRIPOL effective.

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 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

5 Strategic Priority 5:
Coordination and Partnerships

At policy level, the implementation of APSA shall be guided by the roadmap under the
leadership of the AUC. RECs/RMs commit to harmonize respective strategies and priori-
ties with the roadmap and ensure the roadmap informs their engagements. Following the
harmonisation role of the AUC, the implementation of APSA is based on effective collabora-
tion and coordination of several actors, including the AU, RECs/RMs, Member States, financial
and technical partners and also CSOs, including academia and think tanks. Furthermore, for
the effective operationalization of the required capacities for conflict prevention, management
and resolution in each stakeholder institution, considerable intra-organisational development
remains a priority. The full operationalization of APSA is therefore predicated upon collaboration
and coordination (inter and intra institutional) as one of the priorities to be addressed with the
utmost attention.

5
The objective for the strategic priority 5 of the roadmap is to contribute to enhanced effective-
ness of coordination and partnership within the APSA framework.

Priority 5 Strategic Objective Indicators

zz Evidence of regional peace and security strategies designed and implemented in line
with the AU policy framework
zz Evidence of common programming, including formulation of common objectives, be-
tween AUC departments and between AU and RECs/RMs
zz Evidence of common positions on APSA framework between AU and RECs/RMs
zz Evidence, documentation and joint analysis of the implementation of the subsidiarity
principle in several operations in the field
zz Evidence of lessons learned from the implementation of the subsidiarity principle (re-
sults and challenges) that are feeding new programming
zz Evidence of implementation and monitoring of decisions the AUC has committed to
zz Evidence of efficient use and possible mutualisation of human resources between the
AUC and RECs/RMs
zz Evidence of timely deployment of the Panel of the Wise from the AUC

Strategic priority 5 has been broken down into six specific objectives, each of them addressing
one major obstacle to effective coordination. They are presented in the following sections.

5.1 Coordinating function of the PSC

The analysis of the previous roadmap highlighted the limited effectiveness of the coordinating
function of the PSC with the RECs/RMs mechanisms (see PSC Protocol 2002). This limited effec-
tiveness was due to three main reasons:

First, there were limited interactions between the AU-PSC and similar mechanisms within RECs/
RMs. Second, there was a lack of common understanding of the principles of subsidiarity, com-
plementarity and comparative advantage (what they mean and entail) between different actors.
Finally, there was a lack of clear guidelines to make the interactions between PSC and RECs/RMs
mechanisms fully operational.

54
5
Specific objective 1 is therefore to make the coordinating function of the PSC effective.

Priority 5 Specific Objective 1 indicators

zz Evidence of decisions from PSC taking into account RECs/RMs inputs
zz Evidence of common PSC-RECs/RMs positions
zz Operation of joint AU-RECs/RMs Field Missions/Liaison Offices

The main strategies/activities envisaged in order to reach this objective are three-fold. The first
one consists of allowing the participation of RECs/RMs in relevant PSC meetings in order to make
sure that the interactions between the AU-PSC and similar mechanisms within RECs/RMs are
in place. The second strategy consists of organizing a series of dialogue sessions between the
AUC and RECs/RMs on the definition of subsidiarity (and/or of partnership) and between PSC
and RECs/RMs on the nature of their necessary interactions. It is expected that these activities
will lead to the development of two strategy documents (one that highlights guiding princi-
ples and expected results from using the subsidiarity principle, the second one being dedicated
to highlighting principles and expected results from PSC – RECs/RMs interactions) and to clear
agreements between the AUC, RECs/RMs and PSC to use these strategy documents as a basis
for future interactions. Finally, dialogue sessions between PSC and RECs/RMs on the nature of
RECs/RMs interactions with PSC will be organized. The expected outcome of this activity is the
development of guidelines/policy document stipulating the nature of RECs/RMs interactions
with PSC.

5.2 Intra- and inter-departmental collaboration/coordination

Evaluations and consultations between APSA stakeholders have highlighted the limited intra-
and inter-departmental collaboration and coordination at AUC/RECs/RMs levels as a problem
that required special attention. The analyses identified two main causes explaining the limited
level of coordination: each department is characterized by weak horizontal linkages and the
horizontal linkages between the various APSA components are also weak.

5
Specific objective 2 is therefore to reach an enhanced intra and inter-departmental collabora-
tion and coordination at the level of the AUC and RECs/RMs.

Priority 5 Specific Objective 2 indicators

zz Evidence of collaboration/coordination between PSD and other AUC Departments in dif-
ferent conflict phases (prevention, management, resolution and PCRD)
zz Evidence of deepened collaboration and linkages between the various APSA components
and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) both at the AU and REC level
zz Evidence of joint APSA activities and programming between the PSD and other relevant
Departments within the AUC

The main strategy consists of organising a series of information sharing and coordination meet-
ings between different PSD divisions and units at the level of the AUC and of each REC/RM and
to perform joint planning sessions. It is expected that once these strategies are implemented,
the coordination mechanisms within various PSD divisions and units will be in place. The second
strategy consists of institutionalizing the Inter-Departmental Task Force on Conflict Prevention
(IDTFCP) at technical and policy levels, in order to make sure that the horizontal linkages be-
tween the various departments are functioning.

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 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

5.3 MoU between the AU and the RECs/RMs

The third problem that needs to be addressed relates to the limited implementation of the MoU
between the AUC and the RECs/RMs in the realization of APSA. This problem is due to: a lack of
a clear and commonly shared understanding of the concepts of subsidiarity, complementarity
and comparative advantage (what they mean and entail); a lack of a clear and commonly shared
understanding of the concept of coordination (what it means and entails); policies/standard op-
eration procedures between the AUC and the RECs/RMs are not harmonized; and, finally, there
is no adequate monitoring system for the implementation of the MoU.

5
Specific objective 3 is therefore to ensure that the MoU between the AU and the RECs/RMs is
implemented effectively.

Priority 5 Specific Objective 3 indicators

zz Participation of AU and RECs/RMs Liaison Officers in all relevant statutory meetings of the
AU and RECs/RMs
zz Evidence of the fact that RECs/RMs Liaison Offices have access to all relevant reports re-
quired to fulfil their mandate under the PSC Protocol
zz The Chairperson of the AU Commission and Chief Executives of the RECs/RMs meet at
least once a year
zz Evidence of institutionalised and systematic use of channels for information sharing at
higher political level and technical level between the AU and the RECs/RMs
zz Evidence of institutionalisation and use of common conflict analyses
zz Examples of joint fact finding and/or monitoring missions between the AU and the RECs/
RMs
zz Evidence of common reports – RECs/RMs contributing to AUC and PSC reports to the AU
Assembly of Heads of State and Government

The strategies adopted to address the causes of the problem and reach the objective are four-
fold. First, dialogue sessions aiming at clarifying and agreeing on the concepts underlying the
implementation of the MoU (subsidiarity, coordination) will be organized, a strategy document
making the subsidiarity concept operational developed, and a strategy document drafted. It is
expected that through these measures the concepts of subsidiarity, complementarity and com-
parative advantage (and/or partnership) are clearly defined and agreed upon.

Second, policies and standard operation procedures between the AUC and the RECs/RMs will be
harmonized; a strategy document making the concept of coordination operational will be devel-
oped and a strategy document drafted; and the AU-RECs/RMs Task Force on strengthening the
relations between the AUC and RECS/RMs in the area of peace and security will be institution-
alized. As a result it is expected that the concept of coordination is clearly defined and agreed
upon.

Third, through dialogue sessions between AU and RECs/RMs on the types of policies and stand-
ard operation procedures that need to be harmonised, in the end harmonized policies and
standard operation procedures between the AU and the RECs/RMs will be put in place.

Fourth, a monitoring system will be developed; staff will be allocated to specific monitoring
functions; common AU and RECs/RMs monitoring missions will be conducted (one per year in
each REC/RM); and common AU and REC/RMs monitoring meetings will be held (one per year).
It is expected that these steps will lead to the establishment of an adequate monitoring system
for following-up on the MoU implementation.

56
 5.4 The AU Liaison Offices

Liaison Offices play a fundamental role in the implementation of APSA. However, evaluations
and consultations between stakeholders indicated that the relevance and efficiency of AU Liai-
son Offices established by the PSC and of AULOs within the RECs/RMs is rather limited. Analyses
show that his problem is due to the following: the AU Liaison Offices/Field Missions mandate
is not revised despite changes on the ground (there are no clear exit strategies for AULOs and
unclear lines of communication and reporting); there are limited direct links between different
Liaison Offices (AULOs/Field Missions and AULOs to the RECs/RMs and AU Regional Offices);
and, AULOs suffer from limited (in numbers and relevance) technical capacities.

5
Specific objective 4 is therefore to ensure that the AU Liaison Offices are relevant and efficient.

Priority 5 Specific Objective 4 indicators

zz Participation of AU Liaison Offices in all relevant statutory meetings of the AU and RECs/
RMs
zz Evidence of institutionalised and use of common conflict analyses
zz Evidence of close involvement of AU Liaison Offices in the organisation of joint fact-finding
and/or monitoring missions done by the AU, the RECs/RMs and/or partners
zz Evidence of improved quality of monitoring of peace agreements, political situations on
the ground, and implementation of PSC decisions on the ground

The strategies developed to address the causes of the problem and reach the objective are
threefold. First, a series of analyses/evaluations of the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of
AULOs will be launched; the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of AULOs will be evaluated;
and guidelines for formulating relevant mandates for AULOs depending on changes in political/
security situation on the ground will be developed. It is assumed that this leads to a regular re-
view of AULO’s mandates and reflection of the political/security situations on the ground.

Second, needs in terms of human resources specific to each Liaison Office (directly linked to the
mandate of the AULO) will be analysed; clear guidelines for staff recruitment will be developed;
and staff will be recruited. It is expected that through these measures AULO will be equipped
with relevant staff (in adequacy with their respective mandate).

Third, a comprehensive monitoring system will be developed; staff will be allocated to specific
monitoring functions; and common AU-RECs/RMs (and partners) results-monitoring meetings
will be held. It is anticipated that these steps will bring about an adequate monitoring system for
following-up on the performance of AULOs.

5.5 Policy and strategic dialogue within APSA partnerships

Since its creation, the relations with financial and technical partners of APSA are crucial to the
success of its implementation. However, the analysis of the previous roadmap reveals the lim-
ited relevance and efficiency of partnership(s) between the AUC and its external partners. This
problem is due to six main causes:

zz Limited common understanding of the concept of partnership (what it means and entails);
zz Limited common understanding of the concept of capacity building (what it means and en-
tails);
zz Lack of capacity at the AU level to monitor the extent to which it complies with the different
decisions it has committed to implement;

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 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

zz Disconnect (i.e. absence of clear strategic and results-based links) between the AU-partners
dialogue at higher political level and its implementation at technical level;
zz Lack of adequate coordination between partners;
zz Lack of monitoring mechanisms allowing the AU and its partners to regularly assess the rele-
vance, efficiency and effectiveness of their partnership.

5
Specific objective 5 is therefore to ensure that the policy and strategic dialogue within APSA
partnerships are effective.

Priority 5 Specific Objective 5 indicators

zz Evidence of institution-to-institution (AU-RECs/RMs-EU-UN) common policy dialogue
zz Evidence of joint reports based on results
zz Evidence of AU and RECs/RMs quality/results-based and timely financial and narrative
reports to their partners
zz No/limited evidence of conflicts/tensions between AU and partners

The strategies envisaged for addressing the causes of the problem are five-fold. First, dialogue
sessions between AU and partners as well as between RECs/RMs and their partners on the con-
tent of the strategy document and on the most appropriate process leading to its conception
will be organized; and a strategy document will be drafted. It is expected that, as a result, the
AU and its partners as well as each REC/RM and their partners, share a common understanding
of the concept of partnership. Second, dialogue sessions between AU and partners on the con-
tent of the strategy document and on the most appropriate process leading to its conception
will be facilitated; and a strategy document drafted. The expected outcome will be that the AU
and its partners as well as each REC/RM and their partners, share a common understanding of
the concept of capacity building. Third, a monitoring system will be developed, staff will be allo-
cated to specific monitoring functions, and common AU-partners results-monitoring meetings
will be held (twice a year). This will lead to the establishment of an internal monitoring system
that allows for following-up on the different decisions it has committed to implement. Fourth,
strategic meetings between AU and partners gathering high level representatives and technical
staff will be held to address the disconnect between different AU-partners dialogue levels. Fifth,
dialogue meetings between AU and partners will be held and a harmonised programme support
plan covering the roadmap timeframe will be developed with a view to the joint development of
harmonised and aligned partnership tools between the AU and international partners.

5.6 Financial ownership of APSA

Despite several decisions by the AU Assembly of heads of State and Government and/or pro-
visions made in the establishment of the PSC, APSA still suffers from the absence of financial
ownership by the AUC and RECs/RMs, and from a high dependency on donors and international
partners. This problem is due to two main reasons: the Member States’ contribution to Peace
Fund is low and the APSA has attracted very limited additional funding from alternative sources
of finance.

58
5
Specific objective 6 is therefore to ensure that the financial ownership of APSA has increased
and dependency on donors and international partners decreased substantially.

Priority 5 Specific Objective 6 indicators

zz Evidence of increased revenues into the Peace Fund and similar regional funding mech-
anisms
zz Evidence of increased AU operational budget from Member States
zz Evidence of increased AU programme budget from Member States
zz Evidence of increased AU PSO budge from Member States
zz Evidence of increased funds emanating from private sector

The strategies envisaged for addressing the causes of the problem are two-fold. First, resource
mobilization by Member States will be facilitated through the implementation of §8(5) of the
PSC Protocol and the conclusions of the retreat of the PSC on working methods (5-7 July 2007)
on the establishment of a Resource Mobilization Committee well as implementation of AU As-
sembly Dec. 578 (XXV) on targets for the new scale of assessment. As an effect, Article 21(4) of
the PSC Protocol on the establishment of a Revolving Trust Fund with the Peace Fund will be
made operational. Second, a detailed AU budget (including revised or amended versions) will
be published as part of the AU Assembly documentation; a detailed annual activity plan of the
programmes/projects to be funded from the Peace Fund will be developed; a robust annual re-
view mechanism will be introduced; and an expert study on fundraising from private sector and
resource-based extraction industries will be commissioned. It is expected that these steps will
make AU Assembly Decision 561 (XXIV) on alternative sources of funding operational.

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 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

Cross-cutting issues

An important aspect of the roadmap consists of mainstreaming and addressing cross-cutting

issues of gender, climate change, natural resource governance, human rights and youth. Gender,
Peace and Security is at the core of APSA, which strives to strengthen women’s participation in
peace, security and post-conflict reconstruction in Africa and improve the quality and effective-
ness of mechanisms and institutions in charge of addressing issues of protection of women and
children in conflict and post-conflict contexts. The roadmap should be seen as a key contribution
to mainstreaming gender issues into the continental peace and security agenda and ensuring
women’s increased participation and protection in time of conflict. This will be done through
enhancing capacities of relevant African Institutions to integrate gender into the continental
peace and security agenda, supporting RECs/RMs in implementing regional action plans on Res-
olution 1325 and other key resolutions and strengthening capacity to monitor national action
plans as well as strengthening advocacy, partnership, research and dialogue on gender, peace
and security.

The promotion and defence of human rights is also mainstreamed in the roadmap, as the AUC
and the RECs/RMs attempt to enhance capacities and coordination of Member States, institu-
tions and other stakeholders to address human rights concerns in Conflict Prevention, Manage-
ment and Reduction. Similarly, the roadmap addresses the issues of continental coordination,
collaboration and research to mitigate the impact of climate change as a threat to peace and
security in Africa. Likewise, natural resource governance is of great concern, and the roadm-
ap engages APSA stakeholders to build their capacity to prevent conflicts and/or relapse into
violence through inclusive and sustainable management of natural resources. Finally, special
attention should be given to the youth, the roadmap encouraging the AUC and the RECs/RMs
to develop and implement sustainable youth empowerment policies that aim to educate and
integrate the youth of the continent in peace and security. Migration and refugee issues relate
to all strategic priorities of the APSA Roadmap. During the implementation of the Roadmap,
efforts must be undertaken to address the relationship between displacement, migration and
peace and security.

60
Monitoring and Evaluation

During the period covered by the previous roadmap, efforts have been put into monitoring pro-
grammes at the level of the AUC and RECs/RMs. However, despite indicators of improvement,
the AUC and RECs/RMs have not yet reached their full potential to systematically report on
results. As demonstrated in this document, the AUC, RECs/RMs have embarked on the develop-
ment of the roadmap for the period 2016-2020 using a results-sensitive approach and commit to
putting in place a comprehensive monitoring system that will allow highlighting results through-
1

out implementation.

The first phase of APSA implementation will be dedicated to developing a comprehensive mon-
itoring system that aims to:

zz Share monitoring roles and responsibilities among all stakeholders involved in APSA;
zz Allow RECs/RMs review and document their contribution to the implementation of the
Roadmap
zz Allow the AUC and RECs/RMs to collect and analyse indicators that have been specified dur-
ing the APSA planning phase, and to collect and analyse indicators that have not been spec-
ified but that are likely to be as important to qualify progress as the ones initially identified;
zz Allow relevant and timely management responses at AUC, RECs/RMs and between AUC and
RECs/RMs during the implementation APSA;
zz Allow AUC and RECs/RMs to be at the forefront of the development of peace and security
indicators at regional and continental levels;
zz Allow the AUC and RECs/RMs to deepen its partnerships’ dialogue using monitoring data
and, thereby, enhance the relevance and effectiveness of APSA.

The monitoring system will be developed in order to collect and analyse data/indicators at ac-
tivity, output, specific objective and strategic objective levels. This implies, beyond the estab-
lishment of clear monitoring responsibilities of all stakeholders involved in APSA, the need to
enhance their monitoring skills. For this purpose, the first phase of development of the mon-
itoring system will consist of an in-depth dialogue with all stakeholders on their expectations,
on their current capacities and on the definition of mechanisms allowing for the monitoring to
take place effectively. On the basis of this in-depth dialogue, a monitoring method and tool, as
well as a capacity building plan, will be developed. Once approved, the monitoring system will
be put into practice with technical support provided by the AUC. It is of utmost importance that
the monitoring system integrates all the outputs, the specific and strategic objectives, as well as
each cross-cutting issue, defined in the results frameworks in order to fine-tune and concretise
progress indicators throughout the implementation of the roadmap.

The AUC, RECs/RMs also commit to regularly evaluate the implementation of APSA: an internal
mid-term review is planned to take place during the first half of 2018 in order to assess the
extent to which progress indicators are being achieved, and to formulate recommendations on
how to possibly enhance the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the imple-
mentation of the APSA roadmap.

1
Monitoring is defined as “a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide
management and the main stakeholders of an intervention with information regarding the use of allocated funds, the extent of
progress, the likely achievement of objectives and the obstacles that stand in the way of improved performance” (OECD, 2002)

61
 African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

62
Annex
Strategic Priorities
and Indicators

Strategic Priority 1:
Conflict Prevention

Strategic Priority 2:
Crisis/Conflict Management

Strategic Priority 3:
Post-Conflict Reconstruction
and Peace Building

Strategic Priority 5:
Coordination and
Partnerships

Strategic Priority 4:
Strategic Security Issues

63 63
64
APSA Roadmap Impact Indicators

Vision 2016-2063
An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena

APSA Impact Indicators 2016 – 2020

Objective: To contribute to the full implementation of APSA
zzPercentage of all armed conflicts in Africa where AUC and/or RECs have intervened
zzEvidence (number or percentage) of conflicts arising within individual Member States as well as trans-border conflicts being successfully defused through use of coordinated conflict preven-
tion and crisis management measures by the AUC and/or RECS/RMs;
zzEvidence of violent national and/or trans-border conflicts being halted/deescalated through use of coordinated AUC and/or RECs/RMs mediation and other crisis management efforts (e.g.
PSOs);
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

zzNumber of peace agreements reached following AUC and/or RECs/RMs interventions;

zzEvidence of increasing women and youth participation in processes leading to peace agreements;
zzEvidence of gender-sensitive peace agreements;
zzEvidence of post-conflict peacebuilding (peace consolidation) processes being inclusively initiated and supported;
zzEvidence of gender-sensitive post-conflict peacebuilding programmes (gender-sensitive constitution-making processes, gender-sensitive budgeting, policies and strategies addressing gen-
der-based violence, etc.)
zzEvidence of post-conflict peacebuilding projects (peace consolidation) being effectively implemented and monitored by AUC/RECs;
zzNumber of countries where violence did not flare up again during three years after an intervention of AU/REC;

Impact Level 2: APSA 2016-2020

zzEvidence of compliance of the results of Peace Support Operations with core aspects of their respective mandate.

Means of Verification
APSA monitoring system; African Human Security Index (AHSI); Member countries’ progress reports; AUC General Assembly reports

Strategic Priority 1 Strategic Priority 2 Strategic Priority 3 Strategic Priority 4 Strategic Priority 5
Conflict Prevention Conflict/Crisis Management PCRD Strategic Security Issues Coordination and Partnership
To contribute to effective, coordinat- Strategic Priority I To contribute to effective, coordinat- To contribute to enhancing the To contribute to enhanced effective-
ed and timely direct and structural To contribute to enhanced opera- ed and timely support to post-con- timeliness and effectiveness of the ness of coordination and partnership
prevention of conflicts and crises by tional readiness of the ASF, and more flict Member States and communi- response to strategic security chal- within the APSA framework.
the AU and RECs/RMs. effective African PSOs. ties emerging from conflict. lenges by all stakeholders.
Strategic Priority II
To contribute to the effective and

Impact Level 1
coordinated management and reso-
lution of conflicts and crises through
mediation by the AU and the RECs.
 Strategic Priority Indicators Strategic Priority Indicators (I) Strategic Priority Indicators Strategic Priority Indicators Strategic Priority Indicators

zzEvidence of enhanced capacity of zzEvidence of cooperation between zzPCRD interventions and support zzEvidenceof effective policies, zzEvidence of regional peace and
CEWS and EWS of the RECs/RMs AU, RECs/RMs and Member States to Member States are timely and programs and capacities being security strategies designed and
to individually and collaboratively in the development and retention based on a systematic assessment developed and implemented to implemented in line with the AU
monitor, collect and analyse data of PSO capabilities of post-conflict needs address transnational threats policy framework
on the basis of tools and methodol-
zzEvidence of cooperation between zzEvidence of joint PCRD program- zzEvidence of Member States incor- zzEvidence of common programming,
ogies developed
AU, RECs/RMs and Member States ming, including formulation of porating/implementing gender including formulation of common
zzConflictprevention interventions in the planning and deployment of common objectives, between AUC dimensions in SALW control pro- objectives, between AUC depart-
(direct and structural) are informed operations departments, between AUC and grammes including national plans, ments and between AU and RECs/
by systematic/joint early warning RECs/RMs, between RECs/RMs and national commissions, legislation, RMs
zzEvidenceof systems and proce-
and analysis RECs/RMs and between AUC and data on arms and violence against
dures which enable the deploy- Member States as well as RECs/ women and vulnerable groups zzEvidence
of common positions on
zzDirectconflict prevention interven- ment of PSOs APSA framework between AU and
RMs and Member States
tions by AU/RECs/RMs (preventive RECs/RMs
zzEvidence of timely deployment of
diplomacy) are timely, coordinated zzEvidenceof PCRD initiatives in
and effective operations within the context of post-conflict Member States that zzEvidence, documentation and joint
relevant frameworks are based on continental or region- analysis of the implementation of
zzEvidence
of structural prevention the subsidiarity principle in several
zzEvidence
of effective planning and al PCRD policies and/or strategies
responses/interventions operations in the field
management of operations zzEvidenceof enhanced capacities
zzEvidenceof APSA stakeholders zzEvidence of lessons learned
of AU and RECs to provide and
cooperation in preventive actions Strategic Priority Indicators (II) coordinate support to post-conflict from the implementation of the
Member States, based on policies subsidiarity principle (results and
zzEvidenceof use of early warning zzEvidence
of timely and coordinated challenges) that are feeding new

Strategic Priority Indicators

reports by decision makers mediation interventions by the AU, and strategies
programming
RECs/RMs zzEvidenceof financial and in-kind
zzEvidenceof implementation and
zzEvidence of enhanced capacity at support mobilised by AU/RECs and
channelled to post-conflict Mem- monitoring of decisions the AUC
the AU, RECs/RMs to plan, deploy, has committed to
manage and support mediation ber States
interventions zzEvidenceof efficient use and
zzEvidenceof AU and RECs PCRD/
DDR/SSR expertise deployed within possible mutualisation of human
zzEvidence of enhanced capacity by resources between the AUC and
actors at national level to plan and peace support operations
RECs/RMs
conduct mediation interventions
zzEvidenceof timely deployment of
zzEvidence
of enhanced cooperation the Panel of the Wise from the AUC
between the AU, RECs/RMs and the
UN on mediation interventions

65
66
Results Framework Strategic Priority 1:
1 Conflict Prevention (including Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy)

Strategic priority objective Strategic Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

To contribute to effective, coordinated and zzEvidence of enhanced capacity of CEWS and zzMinutes of CEWS/REC EWS meetings zzFull implementation of CEWS and the EWS at
timely direct and structural prevention of con- EWS of the RECs/RMs to individually and zzCEWS/REC EWS planning documents (Log the RECs is achieved
flicts and crises by the AU and the RECs/RMs collaboratively monitor, collect and analyse Frame, etc.) zzAU and the RECs strengthen vertical and
data on the basis of tools and methodologies zzProgramme evaluations and assessments horizontal cooperation with regards to early
developed. zzFeedback from analysts and decision-makers warning
zzConflict prevention interventions (direct and zzSamples of reports
structural) are informed by systematic/joint
early warning and analysis.
zzDirect conflict prevention interventions by AU/
RECs/RMs (preventive diplomacy) are timely,
coordinated and effective.
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

zzEvidence of structural prevention responses/

interventions.
zzEvidence of APSA stakeholders cooperation in
preventive actions.
zzEvidence of use of early warning reports by
decision makers
Problem definition 1
Although well advanced with regards to the implementation of event data collection tools and data management and sharing tools, as well as the required ICT infrastructure and methodologies, full
implementation of the AU CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/RMs data collection and monitoring tools has not yet been fully achieved. With regards to analysis, AU CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/RMs
need to strengthen the quality, frequency and timeliness of early warning reports, situation updates, flash reports, weekly updates and other types of reports, including the strengthening of scenar-
io-building and policy/response options contained therein. This is due to:
zzRapid changing nature of conflicts and their dynamics require a constant re-assessment of the adequacy of existing data collection tools;
zzInsufficient human resources;
zzMethodology Handbooks and SOPs not always followed;
zzAnalysts not always relying on data generated by existing tools;
zzLimited frequency of early warning reports;
zzInadequate feed-back from decision-makers on early warning reports;
zzAbsence of structured interaction between CEWS/EWS-RECs and relevant staff from other departments
(in the case of the AU CEWS these are Peace and Security Department staff such as desk officers/Panel of the Wise Secretariat and also Department of Political Affairs).
 Specific objective 1 Specific objective 1 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions
Enhanced capacity of the AU CEWS and the EWS of the zzExisting data collection, analysis and zzMinutes of CEWS/REC EWS meetings zzImplementation of data collection tools
RECs/RMs to systematically monitor, collect and analyse rel- methodology tools developed, tested, zzCEWS/REC EWS planning documents proceeds as planned (where appropri-
evant information in order to provide timely early warning fully implemented and customised (Log Frame, etc) ate);
reports, updates and other types of reports. zzEvidence of improved quality of data zzProgramme evaluations and assessments zzA system of feedback from decision
gathered (widened variety, timeliness, zzFeedback from analysts and decision- makers is implemented
relevance, verifiable) makers zzStaff complement (analysts) is strength-
zzEvidence of trend tracking tools fully zzInternal CEWS/REC EWS activity reports ened
implemented (where applicable: Africa zzSamples of reports zzCoordination of each early warning unit
Reporter, CAAS, Democracy Trends zzChairperson’s report to the PSC on the oversees quality control of reporting, us-
Reports) state of peace and security in Africa age of tools and existing methodologies
zzIncreased consistency in the production zzEWS of the RECs/RMs reports to their zzCEWS and EWS: Cooperation and trust
of early warning reports by CEWS and respective chief executives/assemblies is built among the implementing entities
EWS of the RECs/RMs zzDPA Political Analysis Reports at Member States level to support data
zzIncreased frequency of production of zzSituation Room reports (CEWS and EWS) collection systems.
early warning alerts by CEWS/EWS-RECs
zzEvidence of data tools usage in the
reports
zzReports following adopted methodolo-
gies
zzEvidence of interaction with PSD/DPA/
RECs staff in terms of peer reviews, joint
writing of reports including situational
and analysis reports
zzEvidence of AU CEWS and EWS of the
RECs/RMs use of AU DPA Election Risk
Management Tools or similar tools at
REC level
zzEvidence of the RECs/RMs use of Elec-
tion observation and Political Analysis
Reports
zzPercentage of African borders demar-
cated
zzNumber of African States having estab-
lished National Border Commissions to
manage their borders
Conflict Prevention (including Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy)
Results Framework Strategic Priority 1:

67
Strategic Priority 1
68
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 1.1 zzImproved quality of data gathered (issues zzCustomisation of existing data collection zzData from CEWS event data tools zzImplementation of data collection tools
AU CEWS and of widened variety, relevance, verification and analysis tools zzAfrica Prospects results proceeds as planned (where appropriate)
EWS of the addressed) zzFinalisation of Africa Prospects zzTechnical requirements purchased and zzA system of feedback from decision mak-

RECs/RMs data zzTrend tracking tools (Africa Reporter; zzDevelopment of Conflict Alerting and operational ers is implemented
collection and CAAS) fully implemented and being used Analysis Tools (CAAS) zzTraining conducted zzStaff complement (analysts) is strength-

monitoring and by analysts zzSupport MIS (bandwidth payments) zzCEWS and EWS: Activity/Progress Re- ened
analysis system zzTimely, relevant and up-to-date informa- zzSecuring access (purchase VPN client and ports, situation and incident reports zzCoordination of each early warning unit

is fully in place tion monitoring, gathering and dissemi- server software; domain name registra- oversees quality control of reporting, us-
nation tion; purchase certificates) age of tools and existing methodologies
zzFeedback from the survey of early zzSurvey of analysts, desk officers and
warning analysts/desk officers and de- decision makers
cision-makers provides useful inputs for zzExpand the coverage of conflict typolo-
further improvement gies and geographical areas (IGAD/CE-
zzAT IGAD/CEWARN, Conflict Monitoring, WARN and SADC)
Mapping and Reporting is implemented zzEAC to further develop, integrate and
zzAt ECCAS, evidence of effective function- customise EACWARN tools for data
ing of the national offices of MARAC in all collection
Member States zzAt ECCAS, training of staff and national
zzAt ECCAS, evidence of a fully functioning correspondents
situation room zzAt ECCAS development of early warning
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

related software and specialised tools

zzAt ECCAS, setting up of MARAC national
offices in all Member States
zzTraining of AUC and RECs/RMs staff (on
tools; on conflict analysis; on statistical
analysis)
zzAt COMESA – regular review, update and
rationalise structural data to ensure it is
relevant
zzUpdate COMWARN to incorporate sys-
tematic analysis of dynamic data
zzEnhance skills of COMWARN staff though
training courses and exchange visits
 Output 1.2 zzNumber of reports increased zzRecruitment of the requisite number zzInternal CEWS activity reports zzImplementation of data collection tools
Enhanced quality zzEvidence of gaps/under-utilisation of of staff as provided for in the CEWS zzSamples of reports proceeds as planned (where appropriate)
and quantity of data tools in the writing of early warning Roadmap zzProgramme evaluations and assessments zzA system of feedback from decision mak-

Early Warning reports addressed zzTraining of early warning officers and (CEWS) ers is implemented
Reports by AU zzEvidence of full utilisation of the Method- desk officers on using CEWS/RECs tools zzChairperson’s report to the PSC on the zzStaff complement (analysts) is strength-

CEWS and EWS ologies/SOPs observed zzDeepen system of peer review of early state of peace and security in Africa ened
of the RECs/RMs zzParticipation/interaction with other rele- warning reports zzSurvey of decision makers zzCoordination of each early warning unit
vant staff in the development of reports zzAt COMESA, continuous improvement zzReports of briefings to PSC on elections oversees quality control of reporting, us-
observed (in the AU CEWS this relates to of COMWARN SVAs (and incorporating and the political situation on the Conti- age of tools and existing methodologies
PSD/DPA) dynamic data) nent;
zzFeedback on the quality of reports zzPromote joint analysis and writing of zzDPAs briefings to the PSC on elections
obtained from decision-makers/others as early warning reports (as appropriate and and the political situation on the conti-
appropriate across the AUC/RECs) nent
zzAU CEWS and EWS of the RECs/RMs in- zzSurvey of decision makers zzCEWS and EWS: situation and incident
tegrate into their early warning reporting zzOperationalisation of the Election Risk reports
the AU DPA Election Risk Management Management Tool
Tool zzElection observation and political analysis
reports by DPA
zzECCAS: Election observation and political
analysis reports by relevant structures
within the RECs
zzCEWARN: Production of regular EW
reports
zzAt CEWARN: operationalize the situation
rooms with all the relevant early warning
staff
Problem definition 2
Although relations between CEWS and the Early Warning Systems of the RECs/RMs have been marked by increased collaboration (Technical Meetings, joint briefings, technical support missions,
experience sharing, etc.), there is still quite some way to go in terms of systematic collaboration on data collection, early warning analyses and other activities:
zzThe regular connection between the Situation Room in Addis Ababa (CEWS) and the Early Warning Systems at the RECs (Article 12 of the PSC Protocol) remains “very low” due to technological and
methodological challenges (lack of system of data and information sharing; need to continue to co-develop data collection tools; actual sharing of information);
zzLevels of operationalisation of early warning systems are at varying stages of development “hampering harmonisation efforts”;
zzChallenges of comparable/compatible methodologies;
zzChallenges of information and analysis sharing;
zzTimely coordination of activities.
Conflict Prevention (including Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy)
Results Framework Strategic Priority 1:

69
Strategic Priority 1
70
Specific objective 2 Specific objective 2 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions
Substantive (deepened) and systematic interaction between zzThe CEWS and the EWS of the RECs are zzInternal CEWS activity reports zzWill from AU, RECs and RMs to putting
CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/RMs, between the EWS of regularly connected zzQuarterly Technical Meeting Minutes into practice vertical and horizontal link-
the RECs/RMs, and between CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/ zzThe EWS of the RECs are regularly con- zzProgramme evaluations and assessments ages between early warning systems
RMs and their national early warning systems. nected (CEWS and RECs) zzMember States are ready to develop
zzEvidence of institutionalised early warn- zz“increase in the amount of relevant national early warning capabilities
ing systems’ systematic sharing of data information shared and communication zzMobilisation of adequate resources takes
(increase in information sharing) between the RECs and CEWS” place
zzEvidence of strengthened collaboration zzTechnical quarterly meetings continue to
zzAttendance and participation by CEWS take place in order to improve harmoni-
and EWS of the RECs at the Technical sation and collaboration
Meetings
zzEvidence of information sharing between
CEWS and EWS as well as between RECs
zzEvidence of analysis sharing and co-de-
velopment of scenario-building and
policy response options formulation
zzThe RECs and their national early warning
units are regularly connected and system-
atically share data
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions

Output 2.1 zzCEWS and Early Warning Systems of the zzEnsure connectivity to RECs and Liaison zzCEWS/REC Programme evaluations and zzWill from AU, RECs and RMs to putting

CEWS and Early RECs connected (technology) Offices through AU VSAT or other alterna- assessments into practice the vertical and horizontal
Warning Systems z zCEWS and Early Warning Systems of the tive means z zQuarterly Technical Meeting Minutes linkages between their early warning
of the RECs con- RECs systematically sharing data zzPurchase necessary equipment zzData and information gathered by CEWS/ systems
nected for data z zCEWS hosting of application tools z zSupport MIS (bandwidth payments) RECs z zICT resources are available for the task
sharing zzCEWS support to acquisition of equip- zzSecuring access (purchase VPN client and zzMobilisation of adequate resources takes
ment server software; domain name registra- place
zzRECs and their national early warning tion; purchase certificates) zzEWS at the RECs have the necessary
units (where applicable) are regularly zzHosting of application tools (installation human and financial resources to fully
connected and sharing data of applications, ensuring access to appli- implement their EWS
cations)
zzSecure communication system between
EACWARN and the CEWS

Output 2.2 zzREC EWS fully operational (particularly zzCEWS to continue to provide support to zzQuarterlyTechnical Meeting Minutes zzSame as above
Early Warning those in earlier development stages) RECs (joint trainings on methodology, zzREC programme documents
Systems of the zzREC EWS generating data and analysis sharing and customisation of CEWS tools) zzCEWS/REC Programme evaluations and

RECs at differ- zzREC EWS data gathering methodology zzEstablish and or strengthen RECs and assessments
ent stages of their national situation rooms
development
are supported in
their efforts at
full implemen-
tation
 Output 2.3 zzCEWS and EWS at the RECs have compat- zzCEWS to continue to provide support to zzInternal CEWS activity reports zzSame as above

Channels and ible/complementary methodologies RECs (joint trainings on methodology, zzQuarterly Technical Meeting Minutes

tools for CEWS zzJoint briefings (CEWS and EWS of the sharing and customisation of CEWS tools) zzProgramme evaluations and assessments
and EWS from RECs) zzCEWS to expand the practice of joint (CEWS and RECs)
the RECs/RMs zzJoint early warning reports (CEWS and weekly briefings to all the EWS at the zz“increase in the amount of relevant

to coordinate EWS of the RECs) RECs (example of the weekly briefings information shared and communication
and collaborate with ECOWAS/ECOWARN) between the RECs and CEWS”
on analysis, zzCEWS to host further “CEWS Carana

including scenar- Simulation Exercises” with the EWS of

io-building and the RECs
policy/response zzJoint RECs and their national early warn-

options’ formula- ing units scenario building

tion are in place
Problem definition 3
Limited interaction/“modest engagement” between CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/RMs and their respective decision-makers (in the case of CEWS particularly the PSC, the office of the Chairper-
son and other structures and organs of the AU (Panel of the Wise, DPA, etc). This is in part due to:
zzLimited opportunities for direct interaction between CEWS/RECs and their respective decision-makers (e.g. the PSC, although some steps taken with the scheduling of CEWS briefings to the PSC);
zzInformation flow at AUC and also at RECs levels
zzLimited understanding by AU structures and organs of what CEWS does and what outputs/products it produces;
zzLack of monitoring and feedback mechanisms allowing CEWS to measure quality of interaction, quality of outputs, needs of decision makers, etc.

Specific objective 3 Specific objective 3 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Enhanced engagement between CEWS, the EWS of the RECs/ zzEvidence of interaction between CEWS zzPSC Secretariat (PSC Agenda) zzWorkflows and outputs are improved and
RMs and national early warning centres with their respective and the PSC zzPSC communiqués aligned in a more systematic way with
decision-makers. zzEvidence of interaction between EWS zzInternal CEWS activity reports decision-makers needs
and relevant statutory bodies zzProgramme evaluations and assessments zzDecision-makers are fully briefed on the
zzEvidence of early warning reports being (CEWS) outputs and methodology of the respec-
pushed up the decision-making structure zzChairperson’s report to the PSC on the tive EWS
(either in their ‘pure’ form or used in state of peace and security in Africa zzDecision maker at continental, regional
other reports such as the Chairperson’s zzSurvey to decision-makers and national levels regularly use the out-
Report to the PSC) zzCEWS and CPS meeting reports puts from EWS and act on their informa-
zzEvidence of deeper inter-departmental tion and recommendations
collaboration in briefing relevant decision zzThere will be interest and effective coop-
makers at AU (PSD, DPA, others) eration from Member States in establish-
zzAt REC level evidence of increased pro- ing national early warning capabilities
duction and dissemination of reports to
decision-makers
zzEvidence of decision makers at different
levels using and taking into account the
analysis and recommendations contained
in the EWRs and briefings
zzFeedback on the quality of reports
obtained from decision-makers/others as
appropriate
Conflict Prevention (including Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy)
Results Framework Strategic Priority 1:

71
Strategic Priority 1
72
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 3.1 zzEvidence of meetings and briefings zz“identify ways and mechanisms to zzPSC Secretariat (PSC Agenda) zzWorkflows and outputs are
The CEWS and EWS of the RECs regu- conducted by EWS to decision mak- effectively engage decision-makers” zzPSC communiqués; improved and aligned in a more
larly brief relevant decision makers ers (at AU, including the PSC, the zzCEWS to participate at PSC meetings zzInternal CEWS activity reports systematic way with decision-mak-
Chairperson as well as the Panel of when appropriate and to brief PSC zzProgramme evaluations and assess- ers needs
the Wise among others) members informally, during ‘break- ments (CEWS) zzDecision-makers are fully briefed on
zzDecision makers take into account fast briefings’) zzChairperson’s report to the PSC on the outputs and methodology of the
the analysis and recommendations zzCEWS to brief Chairperson and Com- the state of peace and security in respective EWS
contained in the EWRs and briefings; missioner for Peace and Security Africa zzEnhanced will from decision makers
zzFeedback on the quality of briefings zzCEWS and EWS of the RECs to devel- zzCOMESA/COMWARN reports; to use reports in decision making
obtained from decision-makers/oth- op/improve the template for its oral zzIGAD/CEWARN reports; processes
ers as appropriate briefings; zzResults of the survey to
zzEvidence of dissemination of reports zzCEWS and EWS of the RECs to devel- decision-makers
to Member States, including con- op training/information sessions on zzOfficial communications from
sultative meetings at member state their methods, activities and tools Member states
level (for example COMESA’s SVAs) to key decision-makers; zzMinutes of COPAX meetings
zzEvidence of joint assessment of zzAt IGAD/CEWARN, evidence of
structural vulnerability reports initi- strengthening of decision support
ated by Member States products to decision makers;
zzMember states collaborate with zzSurvey to decision-makers
CEWS/EWS-REC to convene internal zzCOMWARN make regular reports
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

dialogues around SVA reports to the Committee on Peace and

zzRequests from Decision Makers/ Security
Member States to CEWS/EWS-RECs zzCOMESA/COMWARN hold joint
to discuss Reports and response reviews of SVAs with respective a
option recommendations wide range of sectors of respective
zzAt ECCAS, MARAC’s participation to Member States,
the Council of peace and security zzCOMWARN convene regional meet-
in Central Africa (COPAX) statutory ing for skills building and peer-re-
meetings view of SVAs
zzAt ECCAS, MARAC briefs regularly on
the political and security situation in
the region
Output 3.2 zzEvidence of joint briefings by rele- zzTo be completed zzTo be completed

At AU, relevant departments (PSD, vant departments (PSD, DPA, others)

DPA) jointly brief the PSC on de- to the PSC
mocracy, peace and security on the
continent
Output 3.3 zzEvidence of strengthening and de- zzCEWS and EWS of the RECs to zzto be completed zzThere will be interest and effective
The CEWS and the EWS of the RECs/ velopment of national early warning provide support to Member States cooperation from Member States in
RMs support the development of centres in the development of national early establishing national early warning
national early warning capabilities zzEvidence of sharing of information warning centres (joint trainings on capabilities.
(and where appropriate the regular and analysis between CEWS and methodology, sharing and customi-
exchange of information and analysis EWS of the RECs/RMs and national sation of tools)
with Member States institutions and early warning centres zzCEWS to host “CEWS Carana Sim-

existing national infrastructures for zzRECs support national units en- ulation Exercises” with the EWS of
peace) gagement with policy makers at the Member States
national levels zzSupport to Member States in the
operationalisation of Election Situa-
tion Rooms
 Problem definition 4
Although “engagement with CSOs has been initiated through a workshop at the AU and the elaboration of modalities for collaboration” and “collaboration with the UN (cluster on conflict preven-
tion), EU (joint research centre) and the World Bank has also been established”, at present, there is limited substantive interaction between CEWS and stakeholders such as CSOs, international
organisations and bilateral countries. Part of the reasons for this are:
zzLack of detailed understanding of what exactly CEWS does (particularly its data collection tools, methodology and approach; a closed system that uses open-source information);
zzLack of appropriate ‘points of entry/contact’ for external stakeholders to interact with CEWS (data gathering; analysis and formulation of options)
zzLack of political will/perception

Specific objective 4 Specific objective 4 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Enhanced collaboration between CEWS and the EWS of the zzCEWS-CSOs and other stakeholders Mo- zzCEWS-CSOs Modalities for Collaboration zzCEWS and EWS systems of the RECs
RECs/RMs with relevant external stakeholders with regards dalities for Collaboration approved and zzInternal CEWS activity reports actively implement systems and proce-
to information and analysis sharing as well as development implemented; zzProgramme evaluations and assessments dures for regular interaction with external
of policy and response options. zzCSOs/International Organisations/Aca- (CEWS and RECs) stakeholders
demia and Think Tanks, and parliaments zzExternal stakeholders are fully briefed
are ‘plugged into the system’ (informa- on the outputs and methodology of the
tion sharing) and contribute with data respective EWS
collection, monitoring and analysis. zzThere will be interest and effective coop-
zzCEWS and RECs hold briefing sessions eration from external stakeholders
with CSOs/International Organisations/
Academia and Think Tanks
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 4.1 zzCEWS Portal contains an entry point for zzSpecifically for AU/CSOs: Decide one of zzCEWS Portal zzCEWS and EWS systems of the RECs

Channels and CSOs, International Organisations, Aca- the following options: (i) strengthen CIDO zzReports by CSOs, International Organisa- actively implement systems and proce-
tools for CSOs, demia and Think Tanks as a civil society focal point within the tions, Academia and Think Tanks dures for regular interaction with external
International zzCEWS incorporates event data from CSOs, AUC; (ii) CSO accreditation via ECOSOCC; zzInternal CEWS activity reports stakeholders
Organisations, International Organisations, Academia (iii) a CEWS-specific accreditation proce- zzProgramme evaluations and assessments zzExternal stakeholders are fully briefed
Academia and and Think Tanks dure; (CEWS and RECs) on the outputs and methodology of the
Think Tanks to zzJoint briefings/meetings zzConnect CSOs/International Organisa- respective EWS ;
contribute to zzEvidence of IGAD’s strengthening of net- tions/Academia and Think Tanks to CEWS zzThere will be interest and effective coop-

the CEWS data works with local, national, regional and through the CEWS Portal; eration from external stakeholders
gathering and continental CSOs zzDevelop points of entry for these stake-

analysis function zzEvidence of ECCAS’ strengthening of net- holders as regards context and structural
are in place. works with local, national, regional and information, actor and group information
continental CSOs and behaviour and event information
(situation reports and incident reports)
zzIGAD: establish and strengthen networks
with local, national, regional and conti-
nental CSOs involved in or with potential
for involvement in early warning and
early response
zzECCAS: establish and strengthen net-
works with local, national, regional and
continental CSOs involved in or with po-
tential for involvement in early warning
and early response
Conflict Prevention (including Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy)
Results Framework Strategic Priority 1:

73
Strategic Priority 1
74
Output 4.2 zzEvidence of CSOs advocating for imple- zzCOMESA build capacity of accredited zzCEWS and EWS systems of the RECs
Capacity for menting recommendations from SVAs CSOs to support COMESA SVAs actively implement systems and proce-
CSOs, Academic zzEvidence of think-tank contribution to zzCOMESA establish regional think-tank on dures for regular interaction with external
organisations, COMWARN SVAs SVAs stakeholders
academic and zzExternal stakeholders are fully briefed

think tanks to on the outputs and methodology of the

support EW is respective EWS
enhanced zzThere will be interest and effective coop-
eration from external stakeholders
Problem definition 5
While both the AU and the RECs/RMs acknowledges that conflict prevention must include both a direct/operational focus of intervening before large-scale violence occurs, as well as focus on the
structural (root) causes of conflict, structural conflict prevention remains at an incipient stage. At Continental level, although structural conflict prevention is contained in numerous key policy docu-
ments (on human rights, governance, democratisation, the fight against corruption, disarmament, socio-economic development, management of natural resources among many others), it was not
until recently that a specific framework on structural conflict prevention has been adopted. In order to strengthen its direct prevention actions with activities to assist Member States in addressing/
identifying structural vulnerability of countries to conflict at an early stage, the Commission has elaborated a Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework and launched an Inter-depart-
mental taskforce on conflict prevention. At the same time, the AUC has developed an African Governance Architecture (AGA) which addresses many of the dimensions of structural vulnerability,
including good governance, the rule of law, democracy and human rights, popular participation, management of public funds, service delivery among others. Implementation of the CSCPF is still at
an incipient stage, a result of lack of resources (staff and financial), the need to mainstream conflict prevention (in its various dimensions) in the work of the AUC, among others. At the same time,
linkages between APSA and AGA as well as the AU and the RECs in the domain of structural conflict prevention remain tenuous, partly a result of lack of communication and collaboration between
different departments at AUC, and between the AU and the RECs.
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

Specific Objective 5 Specific Objective 5 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Enhanced capacity for Structural Conflict Prevention by the zzAt Continental level, the CSCPF is finalised zzContinental Structural Conflict Prevention zzAt the level of the AU, Member States
AU and the RECs. (reviewed by PSD and other stakeholders) Framework (AU) volunteer for structural vulnerability
and shared zzRECs/RMs Conflict prevention frame- assessments;
zzCSVAs are conducted jointly with relevant works zzAU and Member States commit to imple-
RECs zzSamples of CSVA reports menting the CSCPF, including the country
zzResults of the CSVA are communicated to zzProgramme evaluations and assessments mitigation strategy dimension;
the IDTFCP and to decision-makers (CEWS) zzAt the AU, all relevant departments
zzIDTFCP meets regularly zzAGA operationalization reports; recognise the importance of the In-
zzDecision-makers take into account the zzOther DPA reports ter-Departmental Task Force on Conflict
analysis and results of the CSVA Prevention and actively participate in its
zzThe AUC gradually develops an early/ear- activities and meetings
ly prevention posture zzClose collaboration between APSA and
zzIncreased harmonization between APSA AGA
and AGA
zzDeepened link between the AU and the
RECs on structural conflict prevention
zzEvidence of coordination with RECs/RMs
on border management and cross border
cooperation
zzEvidence of implementation of the (to be)
adopted Enhanced Border Management
Strategy
 Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 5.1 zzAt AU, CSVA and CSVMS are conducted zzMethodology, manuals and SOPs for zzContinental Structural Conflict Preven- zzSame as above
The AU and the according to the agreed ToR. Country Structural Vulnerability Assess- tion Framework
RECs have the zzEvidence of utilisation of the methodolo- ment are finalised; zzSamples of CSVA/CSVMS reports

capacity for sys- gy, manuals and SOPs observed; zzAgreement is formalised with initial (vol- zzInternal CEWS activity reports

tematic structur- zzConsideration/tabling of the CSVA/CSVM unteer) Member States to be the subject zzProgramme evaluations and assessments

al vulnerability at the Inter-departmental taskforce on of the CSVA/CSVMS; (CEWS)

assessment/ conflict prevention zzTraining of analysts and other research- zzAGA reports

analysis. zzEvidence of collaboration with DPA ers on CSVA/CSVMS;

(within the AGA framework) zzProduction of the CSVA/CSVMS following
zzFeedback on the quality of reports the template;
obtained from decision-makers/others as zzDissemination of the results.
appropriate zzDevelopment of closer linkages between
APSA and AGA
Output 5.2 zzInter-departmental taskforce on conflict zzRegular meetings of the Taskforce; zzMinutesof meetings zzSame as above
At AU, the prevention meets regularly; zzTraining across AUC on the Continental zzInternal
CEWS activity reports
Inter-depart- zzInter-departmental taskforce on conflict Structural Conflict Prevention Policy zzProgramme evaluations and assessments

mental Task- prevention meetings are attended by Framework and related instruments (CEWS)
force on Conflict all AUC stakeholders involved (and not zzTaskforce to consider inter-departmental

Prevention simply PSD staff); briefings to decision-makers on situa-

convenes regu- zzInter-departmental taskforce on conflict tions under consideration
larly and guides prevention meetings substantively ad-
the organisation dress the mandate of the taskforce;
in its efforts at
mainstreaming
of conflict pre-
vention across
AUC through
policy recom-
mendations,
direct support
to programmes
and depart-
ments.
Conflict Prevention (including Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy)
Results Framework Strategic Priority 1:

75
Strategic Priority 1
76
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 5.3 zzEnhanced and deepened conduct of free zzAGA Secretariat regularly provides zzDPA Reports zzAtthe AU, relevant departments are
Strengthened and fair elections situational analysis to members of the zzAGA technical and political meetings’ cognisant of the need to develop strate-
institutional zzStrategy to address unconstitutional PSC (and other APSA pillars) on issues reports gies and activities to facilitate AGA-APSA
linkages and changes of government is in place. ranging from elections, human rights, zzReports of the Interdepartmental Task- synergies
synergy be- zzEnhanced understanding on constitu- constitutionalism and rule of law, and force on Conflict Prevention
tween APSA and tional issues in Africa; humanitarian situations; zzConcluding observations and recommen-

AGA to support zzEnhanced popularisation of AU norms zzAGA technical and political meetings are dations on the status of implementation
and compli- and legal principles attended by Peace and Security Council of the African Charter on Democracy,
ment efforts by Members Elections and governance
Members State zzAGA participates in the Inter-departmen- zzOutcome statement for the high Level

to achieve their tal Taskforce on Conflict Prevention Dialogue on Democracy

commitments zzJoint missions between DPA and PSD (for

on human rights example PCRD related)

and the rule of zzAnnual High Level Dialogue on Democra-

law, popular cy, Human Rights and Governance

participation, zzStudy on the State of Constitutionalism

management in Africa
of public funds zzDevelopment of a strategy to address

(accountability, unconstitutional changes of government

African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

corruption), zzPopularisation of AU normative frame-

transparency, works on democracy, elections, govern-

legal and judi- ance and human rights
cial frameworks, zzCapacity building of African institutions

elections and to strengthen rule of law in Africa

public participa- zzPost elections joint assessments and di-

tion and human alogues on implementation of elections

rights. observers recommendations
zzDevelopment of an inventory of stand-
ards and best practices in elections
 Output 5.4 zzEvidence of member state sensitisation zzTechnical and financial support as well zzAU M&E reports zzPolitical
commitment of Member States
Enhanced and engagement with the issue of bor- as provision of necessary equipment to zzInter-stateborder conventions or pro- zzAvailability
of financial and human
capacities in der delimitation and demarcation Member States for the delimitation and tocols resources
delimitation and zzUpdated data collected on current bor- demarcation exercises zzTrans-border cooperation infrastructures

demarcation ders (AUBIS – Border Information System zzSensitisation of member states on the (roads, hospitals, schools, markets, water
of borders as a up to date) benefits of delimitation and demarca- fountains, etc.)
conflict preven- zzStaff recruited and trained tion of borders as a conflict prevention zzMember States can consult the archive

tion measure zzRatification and entry into force of the measure at the AU and RECs bureau of archives
AU convention on Cross Border Coopera- zzEncourage joint integrated management
tion also called Niamey Convention of border areas
zzTraining of border management agencies
on enhanced border management
zzSensitisation missions to Member States
for the entry into force of the cross bor-
der cooperation (Niamey Convention)
zzSustain annual coordination meetings
between AUBP and RECs on Border
Management
zzData collection on the status of current
borders in Africa (through field missions
and updated reports to be sent by MS)
zzAvail colonial border archives to support
delimitation process by Member States
through the establishment of a border
archives bureau with the AUBP and at
the RECs level
zzOffer platform to facilitate discussions
between Member States to find solu-
tions to common border issues
zzRecruitment of 2 experts on delimitation
and demarcation and recruitment of 3
experts on cross border cooperation,
capacity development and project man-
agement
zzProcurement of the software for the AU
Border Information System
zzECCAS: Development of the software for
the RECs’ Border Information System
Conflict Prevention (including Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy)
Results Framework Strategic Priority 1:

77
Strategic Priority 1
78
Problem definition 6
Although conflict prevention has been repeatedly considered a key priority of the AU and the RECs, many respondents talk about a prevailing ‘culture of fire fighting’, with the organisations tending
to act when situations have already turned violent. Partly, this appears to be related to overall capacity, resources as well as the need not to lose focus on on-going high intensity conflicts/AU peace
support operations, but also this can be attributed to:
zzLack of capacity for preventive diplomacy (human resources, skills, financial)
zzAd-hoc nature of decision-making, planning and deployment of preventive diplomacy missions

Specific Objective 6 Specific Objective 6 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Enhanced capacity by the AU and the RECs to effectively de- zzEvidence of frequency, relevance and zzPSC Communiqués and Press Releases zzWill and commitment from relevant
ploy and conduct preventive diplomacy (direct prevention). efficacy of preventive diplomacy mis- zzChairperson’s Communiqués and Press stakeholders to regard preventive diplo-
sions undertaken by the AU and the RECs Releases macy as a key tool for the maintenance
(good offices, fact finding, conciliation, zzPanel of the Wise Secretariat reports; of peace and security
pre-election missions); zzChairperson’s report to the PSC on the zzCommitment by relevant stakeholders to
zzAt the AU, evidence of closer coordina- state of peace and security in Africa streamline a preventive action approach
tion between PSC, Chairperson, Special zzKnowledge Management Framework to CPMR;
Envoys and Members of Panel of the zzMedia reports zzCommitment by all relevant stakehold-
Wise (both informal as well as formal zzJoint political missions reports ers to putting into practice what they
through participation in PSC meetings, zzElection Observation Mission Reports committed to;
etc) (election disputes and crisis prevention zzAvailability of resources and capabilities
zzMembers of the Panel of the Wise/ meetings)
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

Friends of the Panel/PanWise are regu- zzREC activity reports

larly tasked with preventive diplomacy zzProgramme evaluations and assessments
missions;
zzREC Policy Organs task their respective
Councils of Elders or similar structures to
undertake preventive diplomacy actions
zzEvidence of preventive diplomacy mis-
sions undertaken by Councils of Elders
and similar structures
zzConfidential reports of Councils of Elders
or similar structures presented to deci-
sion makers
zzPSC and AUC Chairperson as well as
Executive Secretary’s at RECs regularly
conduct preventive diplomacy missions/
other undertakings
zzKnowledge Management Framework
implemented as part of a M&E system
zzEvidence of joint missions with RECs
under the PanWise umbrella
zzEvidence of strengthened capacity for
direct prevention at national level (na-
tional infrastructures for peace)
 Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 6.1 zzAU Panel of the Wise Secretariat fully staffed; zzFinalise the recruitment of staff for the Panel of zzPSC Communiqués and Press zzAvailability of resources and
AU and RECs/ zzAgreement on the location and staffing of an AU the Wise Secretariat Releases capabilities
RMs actors Mediation Support Unit (MSU) (*to be discussed zzFinalise the consultations on a Mediation Support zzChairperson’s Communiqués zzAvailability of timely and rele-

involved in pre- in the next specific objective) Unit and Press Releases vant early warning information
ventive diplo- zzTargeted/tailored training to all relevant stake- zzFinalise the operationalisation of PanWise (code zzPanel of the Wise Secretariat and analysis
macy missions holders conducted of conduct and accreditation procedure) reports; zzWill and commitment from

are equipped zzPanel of the Wise/Friends of the Panel/PanWise zzCreate an Operational Support Team (*discussed zzChairperson’s report to the PSC relevant stakeholders to regard
with relevant members deployed frequently below under mediation) on the state of peace and secu- preventive diplomacy as a key
capacities for zzPSC members and Chairperson deployed fre- zzConduct needs assessment survey with Special rity in Africa tool for the maintenance of
timely and effec- quently Envoys, Representatives, Panel of the Wise/ zzKnowledge Management peace and security
tive preventive zzPSD Roster is used for the selection of “preven- Friends of the Panel/PanWise members and also Framework zzCommitment by relevant stake-

actions tive diplomats” and their teams PSC and Chairperson’s Office zzMedia reports holders to streamline a preven-
zzJoint missions undertaken (including different zzTargeted/tailored training to Panel of the Wise/ zzREC activity reports tive action approach to CPMR
sectors within the AUC) Friends of the Panel/PanWise members on the zzProgramme evaluations and
zz2012 SOPs for Mediation Support are being used basis of needs assessment survey; and also PSC assessments
in preventive missions (*including pre-deploy- members and staff at Chairperson’s office
ment start-up phase, operational plans, etc) zzCloser interaction with CEWS and PSD Desk
zzThe Knowledge Management Framework for Officers
Mediation Processes is being used in preventive zzOperational support to preventive actions;
diplomacy missions zzSubstantive participation of Panel of the Wise
zzCEWS and PSD Desk Officers engaged (*see Secretariat, as well as representatives of the PSC
below) and the office of the Chairperson in the activities
zzFund raising/financial sustainability strategy of the Inter-departmental Taskforce on Conflict
agreed. Prevention
zzEvidence of enhanced capacity of the ECOWAS zzFinalisation of the PSD Roster (preventive
Council of the Wise on techniques of managing diplomacy and mediation sections; envoys and
and mitigating crises technical experts)
zzSubstantive participation of Panel of the Wise
Secretariat, as well as representatives of the PSC
and the office of the Chairperson in activities
related to the Continental Structural Conflict
Prevention Framework
zzAt RECs level:
zzSupport to preventive diplomacy missions and
capacity enhancement of the Council of the Wise
or of similar structures
zzDevelop a strategy for fund raising and sustaina-
bility
zzEstablish, where applicable, missing preventive
diplomacy structures
Conflict Prevention (including Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy)
Results Framework Strategic Priority 1:

79
Strategic Priority 1
80
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 6.2 zzEvidence of coordination between AU zzDevelopment of an integrated preven- zzPSC Communiqués and Press Releases zzWill and commitment from relevant
Clearly defined actors and between AU and RECs/RMs tive diplomacy and mediation strategy (* zzChairperson’s Communiqués and Press stakeholders to regard preventive diplo-
system and involved in preventive diplomacy see also specific objective on mediation Releases macy as a key tool for the maintenance
process for zzExistence of a preventive diplomacy and below) zzPanel of the Wise Secretariat reports; of peace and security
decision-mak- mediation strategy document zzOutreach and information actions on the zzChairperson’s report to the PSC on the zzCommitment by relevant stakeholders to

ing, planning, zzChairperson, Special Envoys, and mem- preventive roles of different AU institu- state of peace and security in Africa streamline a preventive action approach
deployment and bers of the Panel of the Wise meet more tions and bodies; zzKnowledge Management Framework to CPMR;
conduct of pre- regularly zzPanel of the Wise Secretariat/Mediation zzMedia reports zzCommitment by all relevant stakeholders

ventive diplo- zzPreventive diplomacy interventions Support Unit staffed and equipped for zzREC activity reports zzCommitment by all relevant stakehold-

macy missions are conducted on the basis of shared enhanced coordination of management/ zzProgramme evaluations and assessments ers to putting into practice what they
in a coordinated analysis admin/logistical support components of committed to;
manner is in zzIncreased frequency of joint missions preventive diplomacy; zzAvailability of resources and capabilities

place. (PanWise, AU/RECs) zzAdapt/adopt 2012 SOPs for Mediation

zzEvidence of coordination between AU, Support specifically to preventive mis-
RECs and other actors involved in pre- sions (*including decision on appoint-
ventive diplomacy ments, pre-deployment start-up phase,
zzSupport to “preventive diplomats” during operational plans, etc)
interventions on the ground zzPanel of the Wise Secretariat/Media-
zzEvidence of enhanced national capacities tion Support Unit to develop a plan to
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

for preventive diplomacy strengthen systematic linkages between

the PSC, Chairperson, Panel of the Wise/
Friends of the Panel, and AU Special
Envoys
zzImplement a practice of timely, relevant
and shared analysis (see above, CEWS)
zzStrengthen the linkages with RECs/RMs
with regards to preventive diplomacy
interventions;
zzTechnical support to the RECs for
strengthening their preventive diploma-
cy capacities
zzExpand the one-day meeting of Panel of
the Wise members with Special Envoys
(Annual High Level Retreat);
zzUndertaking regular reviews and evalua-
tion of conflict prevention activities
 Results Framework Strategic Priority 2:
2 Crisis/Conflict Management
African Standby-Force

Strategic Priority Objective Strategic Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

To contribute to enhanced operational readiness of the ASF, zzEvidence of cooperation between AU, zzDecisions by relevant decision-making zzWill and commitment from all stakehold-
and more effective African PSOs RECs/RMs and Member States in the organs ers involved in the ASF in putting into
development and retention of PSO zzAvailability of comprehensive mission practice what they committed to
capabilities planning and management documenta- zzRelevance and suitability of the ASF con-
zzEvidence of cooperation between AU, tion cept to African PSO requirements and
RECs/RMs and Member States in the zzDocumented capabilities available for deployment needs
planning and deployment of operations deployment zzAvailability of resources and capabilities
zzEvidence of systems and procedures zzAbility to rapidly and efficiently plan and
which enable the deployment of PSOs deploy operations
zzEvidence of timely deployment of op- zzEnhanced capacity and capabilities for
erations within the context of relevant the management and sustenance of
frameworks operations
zzEvidence of effective planning and man-
agement of operations
Problem definition 1
The political and legal decision-making processes have not been sufficiently developed and structured to enable rapid deployment of peace support operations
and cooperation among AU, RECs/RMs and Member States in this regard.
Crisis/Conflict Management
Results Framework Strategic Priority 2:

81
Strategic Priority 2
82
Specific Objectives 1 Specific Objectives 1 Indicators Sources of Verification Assumptions
Political/legal decision-making mechanisms are clarified, zzExistence and utilisation of harmonised zzDevelopment and utilisation of policies, zzSufficient political will and commitment
harmonised and structured between specifically the AU and and streamlined policies, guidance and guidance and SOPs on planning and de- at the various decision making levels of
the RECs/RMs so as to enable more effective cooperation in procedures (between the AU and the cision making processes and corporation the AU, RECs/RMs and Member States
mandating, deployment and management of operations RECs/RMs) informing PSO mandating and coordination approaches, systems to ensure effective cooperation for more
and decision making for the planning, and mechanisms among AU, RECs/RMs rapid and efficient interventions
deployment and management of PSOs and Member States zzDefinition of cooperation mechanisms in
zzEvidence of planned and structured zzReports and/or minutes from AU, REC/ line with the concept of shared respon-
consultations amongst AUC Departments RM meetings sibilities across these three levels and
and Divisions on the planning, mandat- zzMinutes from AU-RECs/RMs and Mem- facilitation of common/similar/replicable
ing/decision making and deployment of ber States meetings systems and procedures that will facil-
PSOs zzStrategy document itate sharing required information for
zzEvidence of joint AU and RECs/RMs zzMonitoring document, monitoring data, monitoring and reporting purposes
planning, programming and assessment data analysis zzRelevant AUC Departments and Divisions
in relation to the development and zzManagement decision understand their roles in supporting
enhancement of the ASF zzMinutes from monitoring meetings PSOs and are willing to support the
zzEvidence of joint AU and RECs/RMs anal- central role of the Peace and Security
ysis and planning for operations Department in execution of political and
zzEvidence of AU and RECs/RMs coordina- legal decisions as concern PSOs
tion/collaboration in the preparation of zzPresence of individual, organisational
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

deployments and institutional capacities among the

zzEvidence of timely deployment of oper- stakeholders within the ASF structures to
ations implement what is required
zzIncreased rapidity in the deployment of
PSOs
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 1.1 zzDevelopment of guidelines and proce- zzAU, REC/RM, Member States Workshop zzReports from consultative meetings/ zzPolitical
will to adopt a clear definition
Political decision dures aligned to current realities and to assess layers of decision making, workshops and facilitate development of Political
making guid- developments implications for rapid employment of the zzDecisions taken by the AU authorities decision making guidance/processes
ance/processes zzAU (+ Member States) and RECs/RMs ASF (and RDC), and to harmonise and and cooperation mechanisms for PSOs
and cooperation formally endorse guidelines and proce- streamline respective procedures and by both the AU, RECs/RMs and Member
mechanisms for dures timeframes States
PSOs are devel- zzEvidence that the entire system of actors zzSeek formal endorsement (at all levels as

oped, formally systematically applies and references relevant) of agreed upon procedures and
endorsed and the guidelines and procedures for the timeframes
utilised by the purposes of political decision making zzEnsure planners and other relevant staff

AUC RECs/RMs and stakeholders are sensitised/orient-

and Member ed on decision making procedures and
States policies
 Output 1.2 zzEstablishment of clear procedures for zzConsultative meeting between AU, RECs/ zzReports
from consultative meetings zzPolitical
will of the AU, RECs/RMs and
Decision making decision making/mandating of missions RMs and Member States to map out zzDecisions
taken by the AU, REC-RM and Member to harmonise and streamline
processes and zzRECs/RMs and Member States take spe- a decision making process which also Member State authorities their decision making processes and
procedures for cific decisions at the regional and nation- assigns roles and responsibilities, se- procedures for PSOs
PSOs of the AU, al levels on the mandating and planning quencing and harmonisation of decision
RECs/RMs and of AU led/mandated PSOs in accordance making procedures
Member States with collective decisions undertaken at zzFormal endorsement of agreed process-

harmonised and the continental level es/procedures

streamlined zzPSC and other relevant decision making
authorities systematically adhere to
established processes and procedures
Output 1.3 zzExistence of approved legal arrange- zzConduct workshop to develop legal zzReports from workshop(s) zzWill
of AUC, RECs/RMs and Member
Legal arrange- ments and procedures for PSOs framework for the ASF (to include rele- zzMission mandates and legal frameworks States to develop and abide by legal arrange-
ments and pro- zzAll relevant stakeholders are adequately vant templates of legal documentation (including key mission guidance docu- ments and procedures for the employment
cedures for the sensitised on the legal requirements and as required for operations) ments and/or templates) of the ASF
employment of arrangements zzDevelop a joint AU – REC/RM MoU for zzMonitoring and evaluation reports

the ASF by the the employment of the ASF

AUC and RECs/ zzEnsure full endorsement of legal frame-

RMs concluded works at all levels as relevant (AUC,

and agreed RECs/RMs, Member States)
upon zznsure sensitisation and/or training of
legal frameworks and arrangements for
all relevant personnel, including Legal
Officers at the AU, RECs/RMs and exist-
ing missions
zzReview legal arrangements for on-going
missions with view to aligning these with
revised arrangements and procedures
Output 1.4 zzExistence of a strategy document that zzDialogue sessions between AU and RECs/ zzMinutes from AU-RECs/RMs and Mem- zzWillof AU, RECs/RMs and Member
Concepts of co- highlights guiding principles and expect- RMs on the definition of coordination; ber States meetings States to agree on the concepts of coor-
ordination and ed results from coordinating the work zzAgreement to develop a strategy docu- zzStrategy document dination and collaboration and ensure
collaboration zzEvidence that this strategy document ment making the concept of coordina- implementation of all ASF processes
clearly defined highlights and clarifies key coordination tion operational; follow this concept
and agreed components and procedures zzDrafting of the strategy document

upon by AU, zzAgreement between the AU and RECs/

RECs/RMs and RMs to use this strategic document as a

Member States basis for future deployment of opera-
tions
Output 1.5 zzAUand RECs/RMs are able to work to- zzDialogue sessions between AU and RECs/ zzPolicydocuments zzAgreement by the AU, RECs/RMs and
Harmonized gether in a more predictable manner RMs and Member States on the types of zzStandard Operating Procedures Member States to harmonize their poli-
policies and policies and standard operating proce- zzReports of meetings cies and standard operating procedures
standard operat- dures that need to be harmonised zzDecisions by decision-making organs that will facilitate better coordination
ing procedures and cooperation among them
between the AU
and the RECs/
RMs and Mem-
ber States put in
place
Crisis/Conflict Management
Results Framework Strategic Priority 2:

83
Strategic Priority 2
84
Output 1.6 zzThe monitoring system clearly highlights zzDevelopment of the monitoring system; zzMonitoring document, monitoring data, zzPolitical
will and agreement among the
Existence of an the different types of information that zzManagement decision to allocate staff to data analysis AU, RECs/RMs and Member States to
adequate mon- need to be collected, documented and specific monitoring functions; zzManagement decision develop and utilise monitoring system
itoring system analysed; zzCommon AU and RECs/RMs and Mem- zzMinutes from monitoring meetings developed by themselves to achieve
for following-up zzThe monitoring system establishes clear ber States monitoring missions the required level of coordination and
on implemen- responsibilities for performing monitor- zzCommon AU and REC/RMs and Member corporation in the implementation of
tation ing tasks; States monitoring meetings ASF initiatives
zzThe monitoring system is closely linked
to management decision processes.
Problem definition 2
The planning elements do not have sufficient capacity as well as systems and procedures to adequately plan, deploy, manage, sustain and liquidate operations at the scale and pace with which
deployments are being mandated.
Specific Objectives 2 Specific Objectives 2 Indicators Sources of Verification Assumptions
The capacities of planning elements as well as the required zzExistence of planning and deployment zzAvailability and utilisation of comprehen- zzCommitment and desire by AU and REC/
systems, processes and policies to adequately plan, deploy, guidelines, policies and procedures sive policies and SOPs RM leadership to logical and systematic
manage, sustain and liquidate PSOs are enhanced aligned to current realities and develop- zzMission planning documents and tem- planning, deployment and management
ments plates procedures for PSOs
zzEvidence of formal approval of guide- zzMonitoring and Evaluation reports zzRelevant AUC Departments and Divisions
lines, policies and procedures zzLessons learned and best practise (plus those at RECs/RMs) understand
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

zzEvidence that PSO planners (at the AU reports their roles in supporting PSOs and are
and REC/RM levels) are well oriented willing to support the central role of the
and knowledgeable of the guidelines, Peace and Security Department to en-
policies and procedures and are accord- sure more effectively planned, deployed,
ingly able to apply these in planning for managed and liquidated PSOs
operations zzPartners (multilateral and bilateral) to
zzDomestication of ASF guidelines, policies the AU and RECs/RMs desire to continue
and procedures by the RECs/RMs and cooperation in support of African PSO
Member States at the regional and capabilities and capacities
Member States levels respectively
zzEvidence that the AU and RECs/RMs
systematically apply guidance, policies
and procedures in planning, deployment,
management, sustainment and liquida-
tion of PSOs
zzEvidence of the allocation of the
required resources to the planning
elements
zzEvidence of increased PSO efficiency
 Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 2.1 zzEvidence that all ASF policy documents zzMapping of all required systems, poli- zzReports/minutes from consultative zzAU has the required capacity and
Policies, pro- are updated in light of recent PSO expe- cies, procedures and guidance with view meetings/workshops capability to facilitate development and
cedures and riences to determining gaps and/or status zzDecisions taken by the AU authorities utilisation of these policies, procedures
other guidance zzDevelopment of planning guidelines and zzDevelop comprehensive action plan for zzAction plans (that support mission and other guidance for planning, deploy-
for planning, procedures taking into account existing addressing gaps, ensuring responsibili- planning, deployment, management and ment, management and liquidation of
deployment, realities and constraints ties and timeframes are assigned liquidation) PSOs
management, zzThe AU formally endorses planning, zzEnsure all ASF policy documents are zzSOPs

sustenance and guidelines and disseminates internally, reviewed and forwarded for formal
liquidation of ensuring orientation of all planners endorsement
PSOs available and other Commission stakeholders as zzWorkshop to review/refine of the AU

and utilised by relevant (Human Resources, Finance, Aide Memoire on PSO planning and
the AU Procurement, Legal etc.) decision making
zzSubmission of the Aide Memoire for for-
mal endorsement by relevant principles
zzEnsure all planners and AU staff are suf-
ficiently oriented to the Aide Memoire
and able to apply it consistently
zzEncourage RECs/RMs to develop similar
guidance which to the degree possible/
logical aligns with AU guidance
Output 2.2 zzPlanning elements have sustainable zzDevelopment of human resource plans zzHuman resource plans and strategies zzPolitical will to strengthen the planning
Human resource mid-term human resource plans and and strategies and approval thereof zzReports of post and staffing assessments elements at the AU Commission and the
capacity of Plan- strategies zzPost and staffing assessment conducted zzToR RECs/RMs
ning elements zzPlanning elements are staffed at the zzAdjustment of ToR for all posts based on zzReports of skills assessments zzAbility of the AU Commission and RECs/

are enhanced required levels outcomes of assessments and human zzReports of training needs assessments RMs to recruit personnel in a timely
to the required zzDetailed ToR are developed for all posts resource plans zzRecruitment statistics manner
levels within planning element structures zzConduct of skills assessments zzAbility to attract and retain trained and
zzSkills assessments are conducted on a zzConduct of training needs assessments skilled personnel within the planning
regular basis, and human resource plans zzRecruitment of personnel elements
are adjusted accordingly
zzTraining needs assessments are conduct-
ed, and targeted training is provided to
address training needs
Output 2.3 zzDetailed guidance for the planning of zzDevelopment of planning guidance zzPlanning guidance zzPolitical will to develop a structured
Systems and operations is in place zzDialogue forums on the planning guid- zzReports of meetings approach to the planning of operations
procedures for zzStaff in the planning elements utilise and ance zzDocumented systems and procedures zzPolitical will to institutionalise planning

the planning of adhere to the planning guidance zzApproval of the planning guidance at the zzReports of training and workshops systems and procedures
operations are zzThe necessary systems and procedures required levels zzManagement decisions zzAbility to clearly outline roles and re-

developed and to support the planning processes are zzDevelopment of the necessary systems sponsibilities in the planning processes
institutionalised in place and procedures that underpin the plan-
ning process
zzTraining of planning personnel to enable
them to plan operations as per the
guidance
Crisis/Conflict Management
Results Framework Strategic Priority 2:

85
Strategic Priority 2
86
Output 2.4 zzDetailed guidance for the management zzDevelopment of management guidance zzManagement guidance zzPolitical will to develop a structured
Systems and of operations is in place zzDialogue forums on the management zzReports of meetings approach to the management of oper-
procedures zzStaff in the planning elements utilise and guidance zzDocumented systems and procedures ations
for the man- adhere to the management guidance zzApproval of the management guidance zzReports of training and workshops zzPolitical will to institutionalise man-

agement of zzThe necessary systems and procedures at the required levels zzManagement decisions agement systems and procedures and
operations are to support the management processes zzDevelopment of the necessary systems willingness of other relevant depart-
developed and are in place and procedures that underpin the man- ments to contribute to these processes
institutionalised agement process as required
zzTraining of planning personnel to enable zzAbility to clearly outline roles and
them to manage operations as per the responsibilities in the management
guidance processes
Problem definition 3
Critical mission support systems and mechanisms for accessing and activating strategic lift and facilitating the Command, Control, Communication and Information Systems (C3IS) as well as robust
administrative and logistics policies and processes are not in place, constraining the ability to deploy personnel and assets into mission areas and facilitate management as required.
Specific Objectives 3 Specific Objectives 3 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions
Critical mission support systems and mechanisms as well as zzEstablishment and operationalization zzStatus Report on the establishment of zzCommitment by all stakeholders to es-
robust administrative and logistics policies and processes for of the ASF Continental Logistics Base to the Continental Logistics Base (CLB) and tablish, stock and operationalize the CLB
deployment, management, sustenance and liquidation of facilitate mission start-up available strategic stocks for mission zzAfrican Member States are committed to
operations are established zzEstablishment of an AU and RECs/RMs start-up finding ways to address critical challeng-
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

administrative and logistics support zzStatus Report on the establishment and es as pertain to strategic lift capabilities,
system, mechanism, process and frame- operationalisation of the C3IS architec- CMCC, RMCC, C3IS for PSOs
work for ASF operations ture, CMCC and RMCC zzPartners for African PSOs are committed
zzExistence of formal agreements between zzFramework agreements between AU and willing to continue working with
AU and its partners on administrative (RECs/RMs) and Member States on the AU and RECs/RMs to address critical
and logistics support mechanisms for provision of strategic lift for AU PSOs challenges as pertain to strategic lift
AU PSO zzPartnership, framework agreements and capabilities for PSOs
zzEvidence of joint assessments between Letters of exchange by AU and partners
the AU, RECs/RMs and other partners on zzecisions by authorities in AU and partner
strategic lift capabilities on the conti- organisations/bilateral donors
nent, including continental movement zzReports and/or minutes of meetings
coordination and facilitation zzReports of assessment visits
zzExistence of formal agreements conclud- zzPress releases
ed between AU and its partners on sup-
port for AU PSO strategic lift capabilities
and continental movement coordination
and facilitation
zzExistence of formal agreements con-
cluded between AU and Member States
strategic lift capabilities on support for
AU PSO
zzEstablishment and operationalisation of
the ASF Continental C3IS architecture
and system
zzEstablishment and operationalisation
of the ASF Continental and Regional
Movement Control Centres (CMCC) and
(RMCC) respectively
 Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 3.1 zzExistence of formal agreements conclud- zzConduct assessment of strategic lift and zzPartnership agreements zzWill of AU Member States to offer and
The AU has a ed between AU and its Member States CMCC/RMCC infrastructure and capabili- zzLetters of exchange by AU and partners agree with the AU on modalities for the
robust strategic and partners on support to the provision ties at continental and regional levels zzDecisions by authorities in AU and part- provision of support for strategic lift
lift concept for of strategic lift, and CMCC/RMCC, for AU zzAU, REC/RM Workshop to review ner organisations/bilateral donors capability, and CMCC/RMCC, for PSOs
PSOs PSOs and finalise ASF strategic lift concept zzReports and/or minutes of meetings zzWill of partners to augment, if required,
zzExistence of agreements with private (considering especially possibility for zzReports of assessments the support of AU Member States for
contractors for ASF strategic lift capabil- pre-approved contracts for strategic lift zzPress releases the provision of support for strategic
ities capabilities) lift capability, and CMCC/RMCC, for AU
zzDevelop action plan for strategic lift, and PSOs or PSOs
CMCC/RMCC for AU PSOs
zzSubmit finalised concept and implemen-
tation plan for consideration and formal
endorsement by political principles
zzEstablish the CMCC and the RMCCs in
line with the African Standby Force Stra-
tegic Lift Capability Concept
zzConsultations with partners such as the
UN on strategic lift support
zzBuild HR trained capacity to manage the
CMCC and the RMCCs

Output 3.2 zzEvidence that the AU has in place a zzDevelopment of a detailed strategy for zzVerificationReport of the AU C3IS infra- zzAfrican Member States are committed to
A sufficient- robust and effective C3IS architecture for enhanced and effective capabilities for structure finding ways to addressing critical chal-
ly functional its PSOs information sharing and command and zzReports of technical assessments, work- lenges as it pertain to C3IS for PSOs
continental C3IS zzExistence of CIS connectivity and C2 control of its PSOs shops zzPartners for African PSOs are committed

system for the capability between the strategic HQ in zzReview lessons and experiences on C3IS zzDecisions by AU, REC/RM, Member State and willing to continue working with
purposes of Af- Addis and the RECs/RMs PLANELMs and in past and ongoing PSOs authorities African organisations to address critical
rican peace sup- PSOs zzUndertake review of the continental C3IS zzAgreements with partners challenges as related to C3IS
port operations zzExistence of reliable expertise, funding architecture strategy zzPress releases zzHigh degree of cooperation between AU

established and other resources for the optimum zzDevelop of policies, SOPs and guidelines and the RECs/RMs
functioning of the C3IS system for interoperability
zzExistence of guidelines and SOPs to sup- zzWorkshop (AU, RECs/RMs, and partners
port management of C3IS capabilities as relevant) to review and validate the
zzExistence of trained and highly compe- strategy
tent expert personnel for the manage- zzDevelop a training (exercise) plan and
ment of routine and operational tasks schedule for testing and validating C3IS
and activities of the C3IS infrastructure capabilities for PSOs
zzFacilitate training of highly competent
expert personnel for the management
of routine and operational tasks and
activities of the C3IS infrastructure
zzVerification of the C3IS infrastructure
Crisis/Conflict Management
Results Framework Strategic Priority 2:

87
Strategic Priority 2
88
Output 3.3 zzEstablishment and operationalization zzUndertake a comprehensive technical zzStatus Report on the establishment of zzCommitment by all stakeholders to es-
The CLB is of the ASF Continental Logistics Base to assessment of logistics capabilities of the CLB and available stocks for mission tablish, stock and operationalize the CLB
established and facilitate mission start-up RECs/RMs and Member States (with start-up zzReports and/or minutes of workshops

operationalized zzExistence of sufficient infrastructure, view also of identifying potential region- zzAvailability of Generic Tables of Equip- and meetings
and existence of equipment, human capacity and other al mounting bases) ment for AU PSOs across all components zzDecisions by political authorities (AU/

sufficient level integral resources to ensure effective- zzDevelopment of generic Tables of Equip- (military, police and civilian) REC/RM/Member States)
of field support ness and efficiency in its management ment for AU PSOs across all components zzRevised Mission Support concept for zzWill by AU, RECs/RMs and Member

mechanisms of PSOs (military, police and civilian) implementation in AU PSOs States to approve the facilitation of
to support its zzEvidence that where AU will continue to zzFacilitate AUC-wide workshop on key zzPre-approved contracts (for certain pre-approved contracts (for certain
operations rely on external support, it has the ability mission support lessons learned in AU services and equipment), particularly for services and equipment)
and capacity to effectively manage and operations Mission Start-ups
report on that support zzFacilitate Workshop of the AU and RECs/
zzExistence of list of required stocks and RMs to review the logistics depot con-
equipment and determination on which cept of the ASF for both the continental
are required in strategic reserve, and and regional levels
which will be sourced via pre-approved zzRevision of ASF mission support strategy
contracting arrangements (including ASF support manual and ASF
logistics concept) ensuring it is fully in-
tegrated; and that it prescribes financial,
administrative, procurement, human
resource, engineering, communications
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

and other structures, processes and

procedures as relevant for the unique
needs of PSOs
zzSubmission of revised Mission Support
concept for formal endorsement by AU,
REC/RM and Member State Authorities
zzFacilitation of pre-approved contracts
(for certain services and equipment),
particularly for mission start-ups
Output 3.4 zzExistence of formal agreements con- zzConduct joint assessments with the AU zzPartnership agreements zzWillingness of partners to corporate with
The AU has cluded between AU and its partners on to assess PSO requirements zzLetters of exchange by AU and partners the AU
enhanced support the ASF zzConsultations with UN to agree on and zzDecisions by authorities in AU and part- zzDecisions by the policy organs or

cooperation zzEvidence of coordinated mission support develop MoU on use of Entebbe logistics ner organisations/bilateral donors decision-making bodies of partners to
with partners on requirements between the AU and multi- depot for essential equipment and zzReports and/or minutes of meetings provide the required support needed by
predictable and lateral/bilateral partners stocks etc. for the ASF and especially for zzPress releases the AU
flexible support mission start up purposes
for the ASF zzMeetings and formal agreements with
other core developmental partners to
discuss ASF mission support and logistics
approach and areas for support
 Problem definition 4
Uncertainty about the predictability of the pledges made by Member States for military and police personnel as well as cooperation in populating the ASC Roster with the required civilian person-
nel, including the challenge to verify and adjust training of these capabilities to better meet operational requirements
Specific Objective 4: Specific Objective 4 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions
To ensure the efficiency of the ASF human resource manage- zzExistence of harmonised training stand- zzTraining Directives and standards zzHigh degree of cooperation between AU
ment ards and directives zzReports of meetings Commission, RECs/RMs, Member States,
zzExistence of training evaluation, assess- zzTraining certification strategy training centres and training providers
ment, certification, verification systems zzMonitoring reports can be attained
zzEvidence of adequate capacity by train- zzTraining statistics zzWill by training stakeholders to adhere
ing centres and institutions to support zzTraining verification system to training certification
AU in facilitating required and targeted zzReports from simulation and verification zzWill by training stakeholders to support
training processes using AU harmonised exercises training verification
training standards in line with Annual zzRoster statistics zzASC Roster is fully owned and deemed
ASF Training directives zzReports of exercises useful by the AU Commission and RECs/
zzContinuation of the Training Centres zzRecruitment statistics and analysis RMs
Programme to facilitate support to train- zzReports of recruitment after action zzRostering systems and procedures are
ing institutions to deliver and conduct reviews implemented and utilised
training for the AU and ASF zzSufficient human resources at the
zzEvidence that the ASF has sufficiently required points within the Roster system
qualified and skilled capacities and to enable it to function appropriately
capabilities (military, police and civilian)
pledged/on standby and on the ASC
Roster
zzEvidence of the promotion and utilisa-
tion of the ASC roster as a recruitment
tool and approved human resource poli-
cy frameworks and field operations pro-
cedures that facilitate rapid deployment
and management of field personnel
zzEvidence and utilisation of adequate (ci-
vilian) recruitment/deployment policies
and processes for field missions
zzEvidence of training and rostering
linkages to facilitate rapid deployment of
qualified, experienced and well-trained
personnel pledged for ASF operations
Crisis/Conflict Management
Results Framework Strategic Priority 2:

89
Strategic Priority 2
90
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 4.1 zzIssuance of Training Directives and zzDrafting of training standards based on zzTrainingdirectives and standards zzAbility to translate operational lessons
Training direc- existence of training standards that are lessons learned from current operations zzReports of meetings learned into training guidance which is
tives, standards aligned to operational requirements zzDialogue forums on training standards zzRealignment of the training centres suited to operational requirements
and require- zzEvidence that these standards are regu- with stakeholders programme to meet specific training zzAbility to translate training guidance into

ments which larly reviewed, adjusted and disseminat- zzSupport to training centres to enable requirements training outputs at a rapid pace
meet operation- ed to relevant stakeholders them facilitate ASF training in line with zzBuy-in to, and ownership of, training

al requirements zzAgreement between AU, RECs/RMs, AU strategic direction and guidance standards by all stakeholders
are developed training centres, training providers and zzDevelop training module with support zzWill and available funding for the

by the AU partners on their roles in line with their from African training providers and other continuation of the Training Centres
levels of responsibilities as per the conti- experts as relevant Programme to support Training Cen-
nental training architecture zzConduct training for all relevant stake- tres in facilitating AU specific training
zzExistence of a system for training eval- holders at the AU, RECs/RMs and field programmes
uation, assessment, certification and operations
verification
zzEvidence that training needs and
requirements are regularly reviewed as
against experiences and lessons
zzContinuation of the Training Centres
Programme to facilitate support to train-
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

ing institutions to deliver and conduct

training for the AU and ASF
Output 4.2 zzExistence of a training certification zzDesign and development of a training zzTraining certification strategy zzWill by all stakeholders to participate
The AU has system certification system zzReports of meetings in the development of, and be held
developed a zzAcceptance of, and buy-in to, the train- zzDialogue forum with stakeholders on zzMonitoring reports accountable to, a training certification
training certifica- ing certification system development of the certification system zzTraining statistics system
tion system zzAdherence to the training certification zzRoll-out of training certification system zzSuitability of the system, and the ability
system zzMonitoring of, and reporting on, compli- to implement it at the required levels
zzAccessible certified training statistics on ance with certification system
a regularly updated basis zzGathering, compiling, analysing and
disseminating training statistics
Output 4.3 zzExistence of a training verification zzDesign and development of a training zzTrainingverification system zzWill by all stakeholders to participate
The AU has system verification system zzReports of meetings in the development of, and be held
developed a zzAcceptance of, and buy-in to, the train- zzDialogue forum with stakeholders on zzReports from verification exercises accountable to, a training verification
training verifica- ing verification system development of the verification system system
tion system zzConduct of training verification exercis- zzConduct of training verification exercises zzSuitability of the system, and the ability
es/activities on a regular basis to implement it at the required levels
zzAbility to undertake verification exercises
 Output 4.4 zzPopulation of the database with suitable zzAwareness-raising by AU, RECs/RMs and zzReports of meetings zzSufficient number of candidates are
The ASC Roster candidates Member States of the ASC Roster zzReports of assessments interested in becoming members of the
is populated zzAdherence to the selection standards zzRoster recruitment drives zzRoster statistics roster, and apply
with candidates and criteria zzConduct of assessments of members of zzReports of simulation exercises zzApplication procedures are transparent

as per the re- zzAvailability of a proportion of the candi- the roster to set standards zzReports on level of adequacy of training and open to those who are interested
quired standards dates for deployment if required zzRecruitment simulation exercises and skills enhancement programmes zzThe roster database which underpins the

contained in zzTraining and skills enhancement process- zzConduct of training courses on the AU system works to the degree required
the Selection es facilitated to prepare personnel for PSO course categories to facilitate skills zzScreening and selection standards are

Guidelines rapid deployment enhancement of ASC personnel implemented

Manual and zzTraining and skills enhancement pro-

other similar/ grammes are targeted at ASC personnel

relevant policy according to their areas of expertise and
documents expected deployment roles and respon-
sibilities
Output 4.5 zzCooperation between user departments zzDialogue forums within AU and RECs/ zzReports of meetings zzBuy-in to, and ownership of, the roster as
The ASC Roster and HR departments on recruitment for RMs between relevant departments on zzRecruitment statistics and analysis a useful tool for recruitment by stake-
is utilised as the operations recruitment for field operations zzReports of recruitment after action holders
recruitment tool zzUtilisation of ASC Roster procedures for zzUtilisation of roster systems and proce- reviews zzCooperation between the AU and RECs/

for deployments recruitment for operations dures for full recruitment cycle RMs to enable efficient recruitment
into field oper- zzA pre-determined percentage of person- zzAssessment of recruitment processes for zzUtilisation of roster recruitment systems

ations nel are recruited from the roster operations, and generation of lessons and procedures
learned zzSuitable number of qualified personnel
zzUtilisation of lessons learned in further available in the roster when required
recruitment cycles
Crisis/Conflict Management
Results Framework Strategic Priority 2:

91
Strategic Priority 2
92
Mediation
Strategic Priority Objective Strategic Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions
To contribute to the effective and coordinated zzEvidence of timely and coordinated media- zzChairperson’s report to the PSC on the state zzWill and commitment from all stakeholders to
management and resolution of conflicts and tion interventions by the AU, RECs/RMs of peace and security in Africa regard mediation as a key tool for the mainte-
crises through mediation by the AU and the zzEvidence of enhanced capacity at the AU, Knowledge Management Framework (AU) nance of peace and security
RECs RECs/RMs to plan, deploy, manage and sup- Reports of joint missions by AU and RECs/ zzWill and commitment by AU and RECs to
port mediation interventions RMs collaborate on mediation interventions;
zzEvidence of enhanced capacity by actors at Reports from RECs/RMs mediation structures zzCommitment by all relevant stakeholders to
national level to plan and conduct mediation and other activity reports professionalise mediation in their respective
interventions Media reports organisations
zzEvidence of enhanced cooperation between Programme evaluations and assessments zzCommitment by all relevant stakeholders to
the AU, RECs/RMs and the UN on mediation putting into practice what they committed to;
interventions zzAvailability of resources and capabilities

Problem definition 5
Mediation is increasingly used by the AU, RECs/RMs and at national level as an approach to the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts. Mediation is here understood as a structured process,
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

involving a third party who is not a party to the conflict, the acceptance of mediation and a particular mediator by parties to a dispute, and the voluntary nature of agreements reached. Within the
context of the AU, the Chairperson normally appoints Special Envoys and Special Representatives to conduct structured mediation processes. There are a number of key challenges at present:
zzThe absence of a professionalised approach to mediation and sustained professional support to mediators at the AU and the RECs (Mediation Support Units) that would constitute a centre of
excellence on mediation within the AU and the RECs, coordinate the development of expertise in mediation and preventive diplomacy, and coordinate support to mediators
zzExisting structures and processes are inadequate for rapid deployment of mediation and preventive diplomacy interventions, including flexible funding.

Specific Objective 5 Specific Objective 5 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Enhanced capacity of the AU and the RECs/RMs to plan, zzEvidence of efficient mediation interven- zzChairperson’s report to the PSC on the zzCommitment by all relevant stakeholders
deploy, manage, support and monitor mediation interven- tions state of peace and security in Africa to streamline a professional approach to
tions. zzEvidence of operationalization of Medi- zzPanel of the Wise Secretariat reports; mediation in their respective organisa-
ation Support Units at the AU and the zzKnowledge Management Framework tions;
RECs/RMs; zzReports from RECs/RMs mediation zzPolitical will and commitment by all
zzEvidence and documentation of the use structures relevant stakeholders to collaborate and
of the guidance contained in the 2012 zzMedia reports coordinate their mediation interven-
SOPs for Mediation Support (note that zzREC activity reports tions;
these have clear guidance on: appointing zzProgramme evaluations and assessments zzAvailability of resources and capabilities
and hiring processes for lead mediator; zzReports of consultative workshops/joint
decision to deploy a mediator; creating a missions between AU and RECs/RMs
mediation roster; developing mediation
mandates; creating an AU mediation
team (needed expertise and capacity,
core team members, resource persons);
mediator pre-deployment briefings;
design of mediation strategies; funding,
etc.
zzEvidence and documentation of the use
of the Knowledge Management Frame-
work for Mediation (lessons learned, etc)
zzEvidence of reviews and evaluations of
concluded AU and RECs/RMs mediations
Evidence of harmonization of national
mechanisms with RECs
 Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 5.1 zzMediation Support Units at the AU and zzFinalise consultations and strategies for zzChairperson’s report to the PSC on the zzAvailability of resources and capabilities;
AU, RECs/RMs the RECs/RMs are created and functioning implementation of Mediation Support state of peace and security in Africa
and national zzAU Operational Support Team is created Units at AU and the RECs/RMs; zzKnowledge Management Framework

level actors (in- and functioning; zzImplementation of the 2012 SOPs for zzMedia reports

cluding parties zzTargeted/tailored training to special Mediation Support (including decision zzREC activity reports

to a negotia- envoys, representatives and their teams on appointments, pre-deployment start- zzProgramme evaluations and assessments

tion/mediation) conducted; (special envoys and repre- up phase, operational plans, etc); zzReports of trainings provided/experience

involved in me- sentatives have strengthened capacity to zzImplementation of the Knowledge sharing workshops between the AU and
diation missions design, plan, deploy, manage and monitor Management Framework for Mediation the RECs/RMs
are equipped mediation interventions); Processes is being used in preventive zzAU/RECs/RMs national mediation struc-

and supported zzSupport to mediators in the field is diplomacy missions; tures capacity and needs assessment
with relevant provided; zzConduct needs assessment survey with reports
capacities for zzPSD Roster is operational (as regards the Special Envoys, Representatives, PSC and
effective medi- mediation dimension) and used; Chairperson’s office;
ation interven- zzCEWS and PSD Desk Officers are involved zzTargeted/tailored training to Special

tions in mediation planning and practice; Envoys, Representatives and also AU

zzEnhanced capacity of the RECs to initiate Liaison Offices;
and carry out mediations in their respec- zzDevelopment of concept note for “Oper-
tive regions ational Support Team”;
zzRECs/RMs establish and operationalize zzPromote closer interaction between all
Mediation Support Units special envoys and representatives by,
zzRECs/RMs are adequately prepared to among others, expanding the one-day
deploy mediators with logistical and meeting at the High Level Retreat
financial support when the need arises zzCloser interaction with CEWS and PSD
zzEvidence of AU provision of support to desk officers (including deploying them
RECs/RMs ongoing efforts to develop more often in mediation interventions);
mediation rosters; zzAU, UN and other partners provide
zzThe Knowledge Management Framework support in building the capacity of newly
is being used; established mediation support units at
zzThe AU and the RECs/RMs makes more the RECs/RMs;
use of women mediators; zzPromotion of women as mediators and
zzEvidence that gender issues are systemat- gender issues in mediation
ically included in the mediation process;; zzEstablishment of a Continental Network
zzContinental Network of Women media- of Women mediators;
tors established; zzRECs/RMs to undertake assessments of
zzLinkages between national efforts/peace national mediation capacities;
processes regional mediation efforts zzRECs/RMs to develop capacity building
established programmes on mediation to national
zzEvidence of strengthened collaboration actors;
between AU and RECs/RMs mediation zzTraining of negotiation/mediation dele-
structures/support units gations;
zzEvidence of enhanced networking among zzDevelop a strategy for fund raising and
women based CSOs engaged in Track II sustainability
processes
zzRECs to establish Regional Associations of
Women Mediators;
zzParties to a negotiation/mediation are
equipped with the technical knowledge to
participate in negotiations/mediation
zzFund raising/financial sustainability strate-
gy agreed
Crisis/Conflict Management
Results Framework Strategic Priority 2:

93
Strategic Priority 2
94
Problem definition 6
In addition, and as regards mediation:
zzThe absence of a preventive diplomacy/mediation “system” that promotes, coordinates and synchronises early peacemaking actions by the PSC, the Chairperson, the Panel of the Wise/Friends of
the Panel/PanWise
zzThe absence of mechanisms and procedures for ensuring coordination and cooperation between the AU, RECs/RMs and the UN in mediation and preventive diplomacy initiatives.

Specific Objective 6 Specific Objective 6 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Enhanced coordination between the AU, the RECs/RMs and zzExamples of coordinated mediation zzKnowledge Management Framework zzWill and commitment from all stakehold-
the UN on mediation interventions interventions by AU, RECs/RMs and UN; zzChairperson’s report to the PSC on the ers to regard preventive diplomacy and
zzEvidence of information-sharing and state of peace and security in Africa mediation as inter-linked tools for the
joint decision-making between AU and zzReports of mediation interventions by maintenance of peace and security
RECs/RMs; RECs/RMs zzCommitment by all relevant stakeholders
zzEvidence of joint mediation endeavours; to streamline a preventive action and
zzEvidence of joint analysis and assess- mediation approach to CPMR;
ment between AU and RECs/RMs zzCommitment by all relevant stakehold-
zzForum of AU/REC/RMs mediation focal ers to putting into practice what they
points committed to;
zzAvailability of resources and capabilities

Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions

Output 6.1 zzAU-RECs/RMs mediation guidelines zzIncrease frequency of joint mediation zzGuidelines adopted; zzPoliticalwill and commitment from all
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

The modalities adopted; missions (following the example of zzPanel of the Wise Secretariat reports; stakeholders to collaborate and coordi-
of coordination zzEvidence of AU/RECs/RMs coordination PanWise); zzChairperson’s report to the PSC on the nate their mediation interventions;
and collabora- and collaboration in their mediation zzIncreased use of International Contact state of peace and security in Africa zzCommitment by all relevant stakehold-

tion between the interventions Groups; zzKnowledge Management Framework ers to putting into practice what they
AU and RECs/ zzEvidence of increased frequency of joint zzContinue to strengthen regional/sub-re- zzMedia reports committed to;
RMs on medi- mediations; gional collaboration through technical zzREC activity reports zzAvailability of resources and capabilities

ation interven- zzEvidence of increased use of Internation- support to the RECs; zzProgramme evaluations and assess-

tions are clearly al Contact Groups; zzDeveloping the AU-REC/RM partnership ments
defined and zzForum of AU/REC/RMs mediation focal on mediation through agreement on
agreed upon. points launched and functioning; joint mediation guidelines, including
zzEvidence of enhanced desk to desk streamlining agreed upon normative
consultations principles of conflict prevention and me-
zzAU/REC system of communication, diation; strengthening alignment of AU/
information, knowledge and resources RECs mediation guidelines; interpreting
sharing and decision-making on media- the subsidiarity principle; decentralising
tion are enhanced mediation by focusing more on the RECs
zzSimulation exercises conducted; and national level; address a modus
zzJoint trainings conducted; operandi (who goes first)
zzRECs/RMs incorporate the Knowledge
Management Framework to their media-
tion activities;
zzDevelop concept for Forum of AU/REC/
RMs mediation focal points (system of
communication, information sharing and
decision-making on mediation);
zzConduct simulation exercises with the
purpose of training working together;
 Output 6.2 zzAU-UN mediation guidelines adopted; zzIncrease frequency of joint mediation zzGuidelines adopted; zzSame as above
The modalities zzEvidence of AU/UN coordination and missions; zzUnited Nations Secretary General
of coordination collaboration in their mediation inter- zzIncreased use of International Contact Reports;
and collabora- ventions Groups; zzChairperson’s report to the PSC on the

tion between zzEvidence of increased frequency of joint zzContinue to strengthen UN/AU/RECs state of peace and security in Africa;
the AU, the mediations; collaboration through technical support, zzPanel of the Wise Secretariat reports;

RECs/RMs and zzEvidence of increased use of Internation- exchange of experiences, best practices zzKnowledge Management Framework

the UN on medi- al Contact Groups; and lessons learned; zzMedia reports

ation interven- zzEvidence of enhanced desk to desk zzDeveloping the AU-UN partnership on zzREC activity reports

tions are clearly consultations mediation through adoption of joint zzProgramme evaluations and assessments

defined and zzAU/UN system of communication, infor- mediation guidelines, including stream-
agreed upon. mation sharing and decision-making on lining agreed upon normative principles
mediation are enhanced of conflict prevention and mediation;
zzSimulation exercises conducted; strengthening alignment of UN/AU
zzJoint trainings conducted; mediation guidelines; interpreting the
subsidiarity principle; decentralising
mediation by focusing more on the AU/
RECs and national level; address a modus
operandi (who goes first)
zzConduct simulation exercises with the
purpose of training working together;
Crisis/Conflict Management
Results Framework Strategic Priority 2:

95
Strategic Priority 2
 Results Framework Strategic Priority 3:

96
3 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building

Strategic Priority Objective Strategic Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

To contribute to effective, coordinated and timely support zzPCRD interventions and support to Member zzProgramme documents. zzPolitical will from all stake-
to post-conflict Member States and communities emerging States are timely and based on a systematic zzAnalysis of data by monitoring system; holders involved in PCRD to
from conflict assessment of post-conflict needs zzNarrative reports. translate commitments into
zzEvidence of joint PCRD programming, in- actions;
cluding formulation of common objectives, zzPresence of individual, or-
between AUC departments, between AUC ganizational and institutional
and RECs/RMs, between RECs/RMs and RECs/ capacities amongst APSA
RMs and between AUC and Member States as stakeholders to implement the
well as RECs/RMs and Member States; various components of the
zzEvidence of PCRD initiatives in post-conflict PCRD policy and to monitor
Member States that are based on continental results
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

or regional PCRD policies and/or strategies

zzEvidence of enhanced capacities of AU and
RECs to provide and coordinate support to
post-conflict Member States, based on poli-
cies and strategies
zzEvidence of financial and in-kind support
mobilised by AU/RECs and channelled to
post-conflict Member States
zzEvidence of AU and RECs PCRD/DDR/SSR
expertise deployed within peace support
operations
Problem definition 1
Institutional mechanisms and policies identified by policy organs are not operational due to the three following reasons:
zzLack of clear definition and operational guidelines of the six pillars (indicative elements) of the PCRD policy Mechanisms for PCRD are not in place or not operational
zzPCRD policies on regional level are often missing, or not harmonised with continental approach

Specific Objective 1 Specific Objective 1 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

PCRD mechanisms at the level of AUC, REC/RM and zzEvidence that AUC and RECs/RMs have the zzPCRD country specific implementation strat- zzAll stakeholders (AUC, RECs/
post-conflict countries as well as PCRD policies are in place mechanisms in place according to their man- egies RMs, countries) are receptive
and operational, in line with the six pillars of the PCRD date given by their respective policy organs zzMember states strategic plans and support the operation-
policy framework zzEvidence of regional PCRD policies in place in zzAUC/REC mandates and M& E reports alization of consultation and
all regions, and harmonised with the conti- collaboration mechanisms
nental PCRD policy framework
 Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 1.1 zzOperational guidelines or other strategic zzDevelop operational guidelines or other zzStrategies/guidelines zzWillingness of relevant departments and
The six pillars documents for the operationalization of strategic documents on each of the divisions to collaborate
(indicative each pillar are in place pillars of PCRD, in close cooperation with
elements) of relevant actors in AUC and RECs
the PCRD policy
framework are
clearly defined
Output 1.1 zzThe African Union Standing Multidimen- zzEstablish the AU standing multidimen- zzProgramme of PSC meetings zzPolitical
will of all relevant stakeholders
Mechanisms sional Committee on PCRD established sional committee on PCRD for interac- zzMinutesof PSC meetings (AUC, RECs/RMs, Member States) and
for PCRD are zzThe PSC Standing Committee on PCRD is tion with international actors on PCRD zzPCRD country reports decision makers (PSC)
established and established zzEngage with PSC in order to establish

functioning, as zzMinisterial committees on PCRD re- a PSC Standing Committee on PCRD to

defined by AU/ construction in post-conflict countries monitor actors and provide support to
REC decision established affected countries, and to review state
makers of reconstruction on the continent on
regular basis
zzConvene PSC reporting session on PCRD
countries based on the implementation
of the 6 pillars of the PCRD policy high-
lighting progress and challenges. RECs
to provide regular reporting to such PSC
sessions.
zzAssist post-conflict Member States in the
establishment of ministerial committees
on national level
zzat AUC level, establish an inter-depart-
mental task force on PCRD which meets
regularly, with participation of RECs/RMs
Output 1.2 zzRegional (REC) PCRD policies/strategies zzAdapt PCRD policy framework to region zzStakeholders engagement reports zzPolitical
will of all relevant stakeholders
PCRD policies exist and are based on the continental specific situation and develop policies/ zzStrategy documents (AUC, RECs/RMs, Member States) and
and implemen- PCRD policy framework strategies/guidelines at the level of RECs zzJoint work plans decision makers (PSC)
tation strategies zzAUC and RECs/RMs have joint implemen- zzAssure involvement of Member States as

for all regions tation strategies for PCRD well as close cooperation with AU in the
are developed zzMember states are involved in the devel- development of regional policies
and harmonised opment of regional PCRD policies
zzRegional policies guide the development
of selected national PCRD policies/plans
and implementation strategies
Problem definition 2
PCRD support is not always responding to specific needs in different conflict phases. This is due to the following main causes:
zzLack of conceptual clarity on the phase of stabilization & early recovery at AU and RECs/RM
zzLack of conceptual clarity on the conflict preventive element in peace building (PCRD not conceptualised in a holistic manner)
zzLack of cooperation between actors responsible for different interventions in post-conflict Member States
Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building
Results Framework Strategic Priority 3:

97
Strategic Priority 3
 Specific Objective 2 Specific Objective 2 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

98
PCRD interventions are responding to specific needs in zzEvidence that PCRD programmes and zzProject documents zzWill of AUC management for Increased
different conflict phases strategies are informed by joint analysis zzReports from Liaison Offices and field collaboration between in-house units
on the structural causes of conflict and offices zzWill of Member States to develop na-
include strategies and activities for con- zzConOps tional PCRD strategy documents under
flict prevention zzImplementation plan the guidance of the REC(s) they belong
zzEvidence of (approved) strategic to
documents which point out roles and
responsibilities of AU and REC actors in
the stabilization phase
zzEvidence of increased joint planning and
close cooperation and coordination of all
actors/divisions within AU/RECs which
are engaged in post-conflict countries
and situations
zzEvidence that the PCRD policy is lever-
aged in support of stabilization and early
recovery efforts
zzEvidence of early recovery instruments
such as Quick Impact Projects and peace
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

strengthening projects being utilised

in PSOs or its immediate aftermath as
instruments in support of stabilization
and early recovery efforts
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 2.1 zzStrategy/policy on stabilization/early zzDevelop AUC strategy/and policy on zzJointWork plans highlighting role and zzAUC and RECs/RMs have a common un-
AU and RECs/ recovery is in place stabilization and early recovery in close responsibility of each actor derstanding of what PCDR programmes
RMs have devel- zzQIPs are being implemented in “stabi- coordination with PSOD, Department zzMonitoring reports entail
oped a holistic lized areas” according to stabilization of Political Affairs, Department of Social
strategy of inter- strategy and within a defined time frame Affairs and RECs/RMs
ventions in the zzEvidence of enhanced PCRD capacities/ zzLiaise with PSOs/missions to implement

stabilization and expertise in PSOs (including DDR SSR) QIPs and PSPs in conflict in crisis or
early recovery emerging from crisis.
phase zzAssist PSOs/missions in the develop-
ment of capacities in order to timely
implement PCRD/early recovery/SSR/
stabilization/QIPs based on the needs of
targeted communities
 Output 2.2 zzEvidence that PCRD planned intervention zzMap out all processes AU & RECs engage zzJointWork plans highlighting role and zzWill and capacities of actors working on
AU and RECs take into account recommendation of in in peace building/state building responsibility of each actor the AGA and other governance aspects
have devel- Pre-Election Assessment Reports; Early situations, including monitoring of peace zzMonitoring reports to collaborate
oped a holistic Warning Reports; structural conflict agreements, preventive diplomacy, zzWill from Member States to be involved

concept on prevention and vulnerability assessment human rights, transitional justice and in conflict analyses highlighting the long-
the interaction reports, as well as other early warning reconciliation, election support, DDR/ term structural causes of conflicts
between peace data SSR etc.
building and zzEngage with all AU/REC actors involved

conflict preven- in post-conflict situations (as per the

tion as well as mapping) in order to develop a strat-
governance/ egy on how to cooperate and create
state building synergies
aspects zzDevelop guidelines where necessary
in order to make sure that do no harm
approach and conflict sensitivity is as-
sured; that interventions address or take
into account long term structural causes
of conflict and are in accordance with
post-conflict needs
Output 2.3 zzThe interdepartmental task force on zzEstablish interdepartmental taskforce zzToR of task forces on AU and REC level zzWilland capacities of actors working on
Mechanisms for PCRD fully functional with all actors at AUC as well as REC zzMinutes of Task Force Meetings the AGA and other governance aspects
coordination, zzRECs take regularly and actively part Liaison Offices on PCRD to collaborate
joint planning in the interdepartmental Taskforce zzPossible establishment of intradepart-

and regular Meetings mental taskforces at REC level, which

exchange on interact with REC Liaison Offices and
interventions provide input into task force at AU level
in post-conflict zzClarify roles and responsibilities and

Member States develop ToR for interdepartmental

established and taskforce
functioning zzDiscuss thematic as well as regions/
countries and map out as well as coordi-
nate and harmonize all interventions in
the respective region/country
zzConduct joint stakeholder monitoring
and evaluation activities
Problem definition 3
AU and RECs are tasked with exercising a coordination function when it comes to PCRD/peace building on the continent. They do not fully fulfil their coordination function due to the following
reasons:
zzLack of clear definition of roles and responsibilities between AU and RECs, as well as harmonised approaches & regular exchange
zzLack of regular and systematic exchange/cooperation and partnership agreements with relevant actors in the field of PCRD
zzLack of participation of AU and RECs in other coordination mechanism on the continent, and lack of harmonizing approaches to those mechanisms
Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building
Results Framework Strategic Priority 3:

99
Strategic Priority 3
 Specific Objective 3 Specific Objective 3 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

100
The AU and the RECs exercise their coordination function zzPlanning, monitoring and reporting pro- zzReporting and evaluation as well as mon- zzWillingness of continental, regional,
effectively and comprehensively cesses on PCRD between AUC and RECs/ itoring within AUC and between AUC and national and international actors in PCRD
RMs are harmonized RECs/RMs and other relevant stakehold- to collaborate with AU and RECs, and
zzAUC and RECs/RMs take up a relevant ers harmonized accept coordination function of AUC
role in international PCRD processes,
such as the New Deal and Post-Conflict
reconstruction frameworks in Member
States
zzImplementation strategy for PCRD policy
framework clearly highlights different
roles and responsibilities of the various
stakeholders
Output 3.1 zzAUC and RECs/RMs have joint implemen- zzDialogue sessions between AUC and zzReport on Stakeholders engagement zzAll
stakeholders are willing to collaborate
Regular system- tation strategies for PCRD RECs/RMs on the types of policies and meetings on sustained implementation of PCRD
atic exchange zzAU and RECs engage regularly on PCRD strategies that need to be harmonized; zzJoint strategy and workplan interventions
between AU and zzAssure regular interaction between AUC zzJoint monitoring mission

RECs on PCRD and RECs/RMs through coordination

strategies and mechanism as well as joint stakeholder
interventions work plans
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

established zzHarmonisation of policies and strategies

in indicative elements of PCRD/peace
building between AU and RECs
Output 3.2 zzEvidence of cooperation agreement zzEstablish and operationalize coordinating zzMinutes from joint stakeholder monitor- zzAllstakeholders are committed to col-
Regular system- between AUC-RECs/RMs and AfDB mechanisms between AUC and UN Peace ing activities laborate on sustained implementation of
atic exchange zzEvidence of established cooperation Building Commission zzMinutes of meetings PCRD interventions
between AU/ agreement with relevant UN organi- zzIdentify relevant CSOs in the area of zzCooperation agreements with interna- zzAUC, RECs/RMs, national, local and other

RECs and exter- sations as well as other international PCRD tional partners, NGOs etc. relevant stakeholders are willing to take
nal actors in the organisations zzConduct joint stakeholder monitoring zzEvaluation report ownership of the PCRD interventions
field of PCRD zzEvidence of cooperation agreements and evaluation activities
established with international and African NGOs on zzPromote and enhance partnerships
peacebuilding, reconciliation and recon- among AUC, RECs/RMs and other stake-
struction activities holders
zzHold quarterly joint stakeholder meet-
ings to enhance partnerships
zzHold joint AUC/RECs/RMs and other
stakeholder annual planning meetings to
enhance partnerships in PCRD interven-
tion implementation
zzStrengthening women and youth en-
gagement in PCRD countries;
zzTraining of CSOs to engage in political
dialogue and peace building
 Output 3.3 zzEvidence of AUC and RECs/RMs take up zzIdentify and participate in relevant fora zzCooperation framework between the zzAllstakeholders are willing to collaborate
AUC and RECs a relevant role in international PCRD and exchange meetings in the field of AUC-RECs/RMs and other stakeholders on sustained implementation of PCRD
play an active processes, such as the New Deal and PCRD and peace building zzJoint work plan interventions
role in inter- Post-conflict reconstruction frameworks zzEngage in the New Deal process and zzMonitoring mission

national and in Member States participate in New Deal Compacts for

regional fora zzEvidence of AU and REC engagement in African Member States
and processes New Deal Compacts for African Member zzParticipate in Needs Assessments and

on PCRD (New States, or similar forums other assessments of post-conflict coun-

Deal, Donor tries on the continent by international
forums, Groups actors
of Friends etc.)
Problem definition 4
The PCRD policy sees a major role for AU in the generation of alternative resources for post-conflict Member States. The AU (and RECs) so far were not able to generate resources despite launching
of the so called African Solidarity Initiative due to the following reasons:
zzThe ASI mechanism for mobilizing additional resources to support PCRD efforts in countries emerging from conflict is not fully conceptualised and operational;
zzThere is no clearly defined PCRD funding windows for implementation of regional and national PCRD programmes (through which AU would channel funds to RECs or MS)
zzFunding needs of post-conflict Member States are not regularly and systematically assessed, PCRD interventions often not based on member state needs
zzContributions (financial and in kind) for support to post-conflict MS and communities are not generated/pledged systematically and regularly

Specific Objective 4 Specific Objective 4 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Capacities of AU and RECs to generate (financial and in-kind) zzResources being pledged and delivered zzFinancial Statements zzAUC, Members states RECs/RMs, and
resources for post-conflict countries and communities are by AU Member states in support to PCRD zzFinancial reports other relevant stakeholders are willing to
enhanced countries take ownership of PCRD interventions
zzIn kind and financial support given to zzAUC members states, partners and
Member States, CSOs etc. through AUC donors are willing to allocate resources
and RECs/RMs for the postconflict reconstruction and
zzAmount of funds being channelled development of countries emerging from
through the PCRD funding windows conflict
zzNumber of Member States/AUC/RECs/
RMs co-financing arrangements in
support of PCRD efforts in countries
emerging from conflict
Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building
Results Framework Strategic Priority 3:

101
Strategic Priority 3
102
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 4.1 zzA resource mobilization strategy is for- zzDevelopment and implementation of ASI zzPledges zzAU members states are willing to
The African Sol- mulated and implemented resource mobilization strategy zzIn kind support provided allocate resources for the post-conflict
idarity Initiative zzContributions made by AU members zzDevelopment of strategies and mecha- zzFinancial statements reconstruction and development of
is fully concep- States, private sector, philanthropist and nisms to operationalise the ASI with all countries emerging from conflict along-
tualised and foundations in support of PCRD aspects (identifying post-conflict needs, side traditional development partners
operational zzA mechanism for matching support and matching of needs with support pledged
needs of Member States is in place and by Member States or other actors; chan-
functioning nelling of funds or deploying of technical
support etc.)
zzDevelopment of a mechanism to support
Member States to engage with each oth-
er and implement support (e.g. second-
ment of staff from one member state to
another) to post-conflict countries
zzEstablish the necessary (staffing) capac-
ities to track appeals, donor pledges,
commitments, disbursement of funds
and ensure reporting on use of the
same.
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

Output 4.2 zzPCRD activities of RECs/RMs are imple- zzEstablishment of funding window for zzCooperation framework between the zzAdequatefunding allocated in the PCRD
Funding win- mented through an AUC/REC funding AUC and RECs/RMs to implement region- AUC-RECs/RMs and other stakeholders fund windows to address PCRD needs
dows to channel window al and cross-border PCRD interventions zzJoint work plan

funds from AU zzFunding is provided to Liaison Offices zzDefine financial and technical require- zzMonitoring mission

to RECs and MS and field missions in accordance with ments for the funding window at AU
for PCRD inter- Peace Strengthening Projects (PSP) level
ventions are handbook and guidelines zzDefine financial and technical require-

clearly defined ments for the recipients

and established zzDefine reporting mechanism etc.

Output 4.3 zzPost-conflictneeds assessment (PCNA) zzAssessment of PCNA methodology & zzPCNA methodology documents zzAdequate funding and human resources
Needs of methodology defined etc. stocktaking of past PCNA missions zzPCNA reports available
post-conflict zzPCNAs conducted in post-conflict Mem- zzDevelop harmonized PCNA zzMission reports

Member States ber States zzConduct PCNA missions in post-conflict zzProgramme documents (proposals, pro-

are regularly zzResources pledged through ASI/chan- countries gramme and evaluation reports)
and systemat- nelled through funding window are zzPlan interventions of AUC, RECs/RMs,

ically assessed based on assessed post-conflict needs AULOs, regional missions etc. based on
and linked to PCNAs
resource mobi- zzEnsure that AUC and REC programmes

lization efforts (e.g. Comprehensive Africa Agriculture

(financial and Development Programme, Programme
in-kind) for Infrastructure Development in Africa
etc.) in post-conflict countries are based
on PCNA
 Output 4.4 zzPledges made during pledging confer- zzConvene round table resource mobi- zzMinutes from resource mobilization zzAUC members states, partners and
Financial and ences lization for countries emerging from meetings donors are willing to allocate resources
in-kind resourc- conflict; zzPledge documents for the post- conflict reconstruction and
es are regularly zzEnsure technical capacities of AU/RECs development of countries emerging from
mobilised in to receive pledges in a timely manner, conflict
pledging confer- and to forward them to recipient in
ences and other accordance with rules and regulations
occasions, based of AU
on post-conflict zzBase resource mobilization on recently

needs assessed post-conflict needs

zzEnsure matching of pledges and needs
through established mechanism
Problem definition 5
The AU & RECs have limited capacities to respond to post-conflict Member States needs by developing and implementing country suitable, timely support measures, due to the following reasons:
zzAULOs and REC LOs in Member States have limited capacities & unclear mandate to closely interact with Member States on their needs
zzAU and RECs have limited capacities to assist Member States through development & monitoring of tailor made interventions according to Member States needs
zzAU and RECs have limited access to expertise in all fields of PCRD which can be deployed to support Member States (on short term basis)

Specific Objective 5 Specific Objective 5 Indicator Sources of verification Assumptions

Capacities of AU and RECs to respond to post-conflict zzNumber of Member States which are zzPCRD strategies zzAll stakeholders are willing to collaborate
Member States needs through effective coordination and supported in the implementing of pol- zzImplementation plans on sustained implementation of PCRD
development of PCRD interventions/Member States support icies or strategies which are related to zzMonitoring plans interventions
are enhanced PCRD (security, transitional justice and zzPost-conflict Member States request
human rights, socio-economic recon- support from AU/RECs
struction and development, humanitar- zzFunds for PCRD interventions are availa-
ian/emergency aid, gender as well as ble and mobilised in due time
governance and democracy aspects)
zzNumber of PCRD Assistance requests
addressed by AU and REC
zzEvidence that support to member state
is based on post-conflict needs assess-
ment
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 5.1 zzAUC PCRD has adequate capacities in zzAssess AUC, RECs/RMs and Liaison Offic- zzAssessment report zzAdequate funding is available to support
AU and REC’s place in line with the 6 pillars of the es and field offices capacities required zzRecruitment reports capacity gap
Liaison Offices PCRD Policy for addressing PCRD gaps in policy zzStaffing lists
and field offices zzLiaison Offices and field offices in implementation
are equipped post-conflict countries have adequate zzDevelop strategies to address the capac-

with relevant capacities to work with Member States ity gaps identified for AUC, RECs/RMs
PCRD capacities on identification of post-conflict needs Liaison Offices and field offices
and clear man- and to generate matching support via zzProvide training and capacity develop-

dates AU/RECs/ASI PCRD roster functioning ment to AULOs, as well as clarification on

zzMandates of liaison offices and regional their role in regards to the PCRD policy
missions are regularly revised and reflect implementation
post-conflict needs of the Member zzMake sure that PCRD needs of post-con-
States flict Member States are considered in
zzLiaison Offices and field offices and the review of AULOs mandates
regional missions have implementation zzEnsure coherence between Liaisons
strategies in place to fulfil their mandate Offices/field offices programmes and
activities and AUC-RECs/RMs strategies
for country emerging from conflict
Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building
Results Framework Strategic Priority 3:

103
Strategic Priority 3
104
Output 5.2 zzTechnical assistance to post-conflict zzDevelop implementation strategies for zzImplementation strategies and plans zzAdequate funding is available to support
Capacities of Member States provided through the all indicative element of the PCRD policy zzReports on implementation capacity gap
AU and RECs to identification of relevant expertise framework zzEvaluation/assessment reports

assist Member making use of the PCRD roster of experts zzAssist Member States upon request to zzReports on countries implementing

States in the Liaison Offices and field offices contrib- develop or harmonise and implement PCRD in line with the 6 pillars of the
development ute to the enhancement of MS capacities national policies in the field of PCRD/ continental PCRD policy
and monitor- through peace strengthening projects peace building, aligned with regional/
ing of tailor zzSelected Member States are supported continental policies
made national, in the implementation of PCRD pro- zzAssist Member States in the implemen-

regional, and cesses (security, Transitional Justice, tation of policies and programmes in the
cross-border Governance, Gender, Humanitarian, indicative elements of PCRD
interventions socio-economic development) zzEngage national, local and other stake-

according to zzNational and local stakeholders are holders in development of PCRD policies
Member States engaged in the development of PCRD zzand promote the implementation of

needs enhanced policies and strategies such policies

zzEvidence of PCRD Assistance requests zzEnhance capacities at level of AU and
addressed by AU and REC RECs as well as Liaison Offices in indica-
tive elements of PCRD through training
etc.
zzDevelopment of best practices in the 6
PCRD pillars
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

Output 5.3 zzToR for expertise in PCRD existing zzExpertise needed for PCRD and peace zzDatabase in place at AUC level zzTechnical
assistance in requested in
AU and RECs zzRoster developed and filled with quali- building processes defined and ToR zzFrequency of positive feedback to AU peace support operations / by AU
have access to fied staff developed requests for deployment in AU peace Member States
experts in all zzNumber of experts deployed via the zzDevelopment of PCRD roster to respond support operations
indicative ele- roster to the 6 pillars of the PCRD policy (in-
ments of PCRD cluding CSOs)
and a mecha- zzMechanisms in place to deploy experts

nism to deploy to post-conflict Member States or AU-

the expertise LOs/missions
to post-conflict
Member States
according to
their needs
Problem definition 6
The AU & RECs have limited capacities to effectively fill out the role given to them in the SSR policy framework due to the following five main reasons:
zzRegional SSR policies are not developed and/or not used to standardize and harmonise national SSR policies
zzAU and RECs have limited capacities to assist Member States in the development and implementation of national SSR policies and strategies
zzAU and RECs have limited capacities to engage with and bring together relevant stakeholders on all levels on SSR on the continent
zzStrategic documents & policy document which guide the conduct of armed forces in the field of SSR are not developed or not in place
zzAU and RECs have limited access to expertise in all fields of SSR which can be deployed to support Member States or African led PSOs
 Specific Objective 6 Specific Objective 6 Indicator Sources of verification Assumptions
AU and RECs have the capacities to effectively fulfil their role as zzNumber of Member States supported in imple- zzReports zzWill and capacities
defined in the SSR policy framework menting SSR policy zzSSR Project/Programme documents among Member
zzEvidence of SSR assistance requests addressed States to embark
by AU and RECs on SSR processes
zzSSR processes supported by AU/RECs are gender zzAvailability of
sensitive funds and of
zzNumber of required civilian SSR experts provid- qualified human
ed in support of AU peace support operations resources (military
and civilian)
Outputs Output Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 6.1 zzRegional SSR policies are in place and based on zzDevelop regional SSR and governance frame- zzReports on MS aligned national policies with AU zzWillingness of MS
Regional SSR continental policy works to assist MS to comply with continental SSR to align their pol-
policies are zzNumber of Member States that aligned their policy framework (SSR Policy) zzReports on developed mechanism for monitor- icies to regional
developed policies to AU/REC SSR policies zzAU in collaboration with RECs, RMs facilitate and ing and reporting the implementation of AU SSR and national poli-
and serve as support MS align national policies with AU and guidelines and guidance notes cy frameworks
instruments for regional policy framework on SSR
standardization zzRECs, RMs, in collaboration with MS develop

and harmonisa- mechanisms for monitoring and reporting on

tion of national the implementation of AU SSR guidelines and
SSR policies guidance notes
Output 6.2 zzSSR assessment tools and guidance notes in zzDevelop and operationalise SSR policy and best zzReports
on SSR request addressed zzMember states
Capacities of place practice documents zzReports
on SSR assistance delivered within the request for or
AU and RECs to zzBest practices generated and disseminated for zzDevelop SSR assessment tools, guidance notes, framework of PSOs agree to the sup-
assist Member SSR best practices, evaluation templates, training port of AU/RECs
States in the de- zzEvidence of transfer of relevant skills during modules and other SSR implementation tools for national SSR
velopment and the SSR training workshops and other capacity (SSR Policy) processes
implementation building exercises zzAssist in the mobilization of funding and other

of national resources for implementation of SSR process in

SSR policies, MS (SSR Policy)
strategies and zzAssist in assessment, implementation, moni-

programmes are toring and evaluating SSR processes in MS (SSR

enhanced Policy)
zzAssist MS in holding national, local, and other
stakeholder meetings to build consensus on
implementation of SSR policies
zzpromote implementation of regional and na-
tional security policies and strategies based on
democratic principles, human security needs,
respect for human rights and international
humanitarian law (by national and regional
stakeholders)
zzConduct SSR training workshops with RECs, MS,
and other relevant stakeholders (SSR Policy)
zzRECs to provide financial support for institution-
al capacity building, integrated M&E systems
which can be linked to early warning and situa-
tional analysis (SSR Policy)
Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building
Results Framework Strategic Priority 3:

105
Strategic Priority 3
106
Output 6.3 zzEvidence of experience shared relevant zzRECs to designate an SSR focal point to zzMinutes/documentation from continen- zzWillingness
of other stakeholders to
AU and RECs to AUC and RECs/RMs coordinate SSR activities in MS and with tal dialogue forum engage meaningful on SSR with AU and
bring together zzEvidence of agreements with UN and AU & international communities (SSR zzMinutes/documentation from engage- RECs
relevant SSR other international actors on common Policy) ment with UN and other international
stakeholders on engagement in SSR processes zzProvide a continental dialogue forum for stakeholders
the continent exchange of national SSR experiences
(SSR Policy)
zzAU and RECs to collaborate with UN and
other international partners and stake-
holders in all aspects of security sector
reform and especially those aspects of
SSR that affect the African continent (SSR
Policy)
zzEngage international partners with the
view to encourage them to be account-
able to their agreed commitments in
support of the SSR activities of MS (SSR
Policy)
Output 6.4 zzContinental code of conduct for armed zzDevelop a continental code of conduct zzCode of conduct zzWill from stakeholders to engage in the
Strategies and forces in place for African armed forces, security institu- zzManual on SSR best practices on the development of the code of conduct
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

policy docu- tions and AU missions, a manual on SSR continent zzAdequate human and financial resources

ments that best practices in Africa, and guidance on are available

guide the con- harmonization of national security, in
duct of armed partnership with the UN (SSR Policy)
forces in the
field of SSR are
developed
Output 6.5 zzSSRexperts are available and ready for zzCreate,maintain and update a roster of zzDatabase in place at AUC level zzSSR
technical assistance is requested in
Roster of African deployment to Member States or Afri- African experts on SSR including on pillar zzFrequency of positive feedback to re- AU PSOs
experts on SSR can-led PSOs experts (Defence, Police, etc.) quests for deployment in AU PSOs
is in place and
functional
Problem definition 7
The AUC, RECs/RMs and Member States have limited capacities to respond to DDR challenges within the African continent due to 3 main reasons:
zzDDR processes are not sufficiently promoted at national and local levels;
zzAU and RECs/RMs and Member States have limited capacities in DDR;
zzCivilian DDR expertise is not fully institutionalised in AU peace support operations
 Specific Objective 7 Specific Objective 7 Indicator Sources of verification Assumptions
Enhanced capacities of AUC, RECs/RMs and Member States zzNumber of DDR Assistance requests zzReports on capacity enhancement of AU, zzAUand RECs address member state’s
to meet the DDR challenges in post-conflict African countries addressed by AU and RECs RECs and Member States in DDR requests in DDR as well as requests
zzNumber of AU and RECs DDR expertise zzReports on DDR requests addressed within the framework of peace support
deployed within peace support opera- zzReports of DDR assistance delivered operations
tions within the framework of peace support
zzNumber of DDR documents developed operations
and continental dialogue platforms zzReports of forums and development of
facilitated documents
zzEvidence of required DDR expertise
provided in support to AU peace support
operations
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 7.1 zzNumberof countries promoting and zzSupport the planning and implement of zzReports on engagement of stakeholders zzNational,
local and other stakehold-
DDR processes implementing DDR strategies comprehensive and well-blended disar- on development of DDR strategies ers promote implementation of DDR
promoted at na- mament, demobilization, rehabilitation zzEvidence on provision of assistance to processes
tional and local and reintegration programs, as a basis women and children in DDR programs
levels for consolidating safety and security zzNumber of staff deployed
zzSupporting the development of gender
aware and child protection mainstream
in DDR among national, local and other
stakeholders
zzProviding technical staff to support the
development and implementation of
DDR programs.
Output 7.2 zzNumberof member states supported in zzEngage National, local and other stake- zzReports on countries implementing DDR zzAU,RMs and RECs use their enhanced
AU,RECs/RMs implementing DDR policies holders on development of DDR policies policies capacities to promote DDR processes
and Member zzDevelopment and operationalization of zzReports on development and operation-

States capacities DDR policies alization of DDR policies

enhanced in zzPromote and support processes on zzReports on implementation of DDR

DDR implementation of DDR policies policies

Output 7.3 zzEvidence of quality human resource in zzCreate,maintain and update a roster of zzDatabase in place at AUC level zzDDRtechnical assistance in requested in
Civilian DDR ex- the roster African experts on DDR zzFrequency of positive feedback to AU peace support operations
pertise is institu- requests for deployment in AU peace
tionalised in AU support operations
peace support
operations
Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace Building
Results Framework Strategic Priority 3:

107
Strategic Priority 3
108
Results Framework Strategic Priority 4:
4 Strategic Security Issues

Strategic Objective Strategic Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

To contribute to enhancing the timeliness and effective- zzEvidence of effective policies, programs zzPolicyand programme documents
ness of the response to strategic security challenges by all and capacities being developed and zzSALW control programme documents
stakeholders implemented to address transnational (national plans, commission reports)
threats zzLaws on SALW control
zzEvidence of Member States incorporat- zzReports on data on arms and gen-
ing/implementing gender dimensions der-based violence
in SALW control programmes including
national plans, national commissions,
legislation, data on arms and violence
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

against women and vulnerable groups.

Problem definition 1
Limited effectiveness in addressing illicit flows of SALW due to:
zzLegal and policy instruments to address the illicit flow of weapons are not domesticated;
zzWeak operational capacities of members states to prevent, detect and respond to illicit SALW trafficking and circulation;
zzInsufficient updated research, data and analysis on trafficking and circulation of illicit SALW to support evidence-based programming;
zzLack of a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation capacity with regards to illicit SALW control interventions;
zzAbsence of an effective law enforcement cooperation and coordination mechanism with a continental and sub-regional (RECs) scope to facilitate inter-state cooperation;
zzLimited capacities of PSOs in managing and accounting for weapons and implementing illicit SALW control interventions;

Specific Objective 1 Specific Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Integrated, comprehensive and sustainable policies and zzEvidence of Member States marking zzBiannual PSC Report to the AU Assembly zzMember States have the will and the
measures to address the illicit flow of SALW are effectively arms and maintaining records; on the state of peace and security in capacity to mark arms, maintain records
implemented in line with international instruments and best zzEvidence of Member States cooperating Africa and secure stockpiles
practices in arms tracing and seizure; zzThematic AUC Chairperson reports to zzMember States have the capacity and
zzEvidence of Member States securing the PSC the will to make funds available for
arms stockpiles; zzReports by RECs and Regional Bodies national policies and programmes on
zzEvidence of Member States adopting leg- SALW control
islation and measures to regulate arms
ownership and transfers, and criminaliz-
ing illicit activities;
zzEvidence of Member States’ ownership
and financial contribution to national
policies and programmes
 Outputs Outputs Indicators Activities/strategies Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 1.1 zzFinancial, technical and operational zzStrengthened coordination initiatives: zzReports
of the Steering Committee on zzAUC/RECs having the required human
Legal instru- gaps at national and regional levels are bi-annual Steering Committee meetings SALW/DDR and financial resources to assume an
ments to ad- identified zzMobilization of financial and technical effective coordination role
dress the illicit zzResponse measures to address the gaps resources for Member States zzDonor interest and commitment

flow of weapons agreed upon zzDirect technical support to members

are effectively zzLegal and regulatory instruments devel- states

domesticated oped
zzInvolvement/consultation of women
groups in development of legislation and
provisions for the prevention/penaliza-
tion of Gender-based violence (GBV) in
national legislation
Output 1.2 zzMember states have technical and zzProvidingoperational support to priority zzTraining curricula and reports zzMember states ability to capitalize on
Operational operational skills to mark arms, maintain interventions in SALW control (training, zzReports to the Assembly and PSC support provided
capacities are records, secure arms stockpiles, regulate purchase of equipment, development of
built arms ownership, cooperate in arms guidelines, etc.)
tracing, etc.
zzMember states have acquired the skill
necessary to evidence-based program-
ming
zzPercentage of women trained on SALW
control issues and women working in
supported national programmes
Output 1.3 zzInformation on illicit SALW suppliers, fi- zzCommissioning of expert studies in col- zzPublication of AUC study zzAvailability of donor or Member State
Comprehensive nanciers and facilitators as well as transit laboration with RECs/RMs and research funding
knowledge points and recipients is compiled groups zzRelevant expertise is located in Africa

on the flow of zzStudies highlight gaps and challenges zzCompilation of reports and data from zzCollaboration with African and inter-

illicit SALW on that undermine states capacities to RECs, RMs and research groups national illicit arms tracking CSOs and
the continent is address the illicit SALW flow zzValidation of findings research institutes
available zzData gathered/reports produced on GBV zzDrafting suggested strategic responses zzCollaboration with United Nations
and impact of illicit/misuse of SALW on zzEvidence based planning zzCooperation of Member States in re-
women, girls, children and vulnerable search and data gathering
groups
Output 1.4 zzBasic guidelines developed, agreed zzDevelopment of basic guidelines for the zzPublication of guidelines zzCooperation of Member States and
Monitoring upon and integrated into project design, integration of evaluation and assessment zzPublication of reports implementing agencies in evaluation and
capacity in including assessment and evaluation of in project design by AU/RECs/RMs assessments
SALW control gender dimensions zzBiennial reports on SALW control sup- zzHuman and financial capacities at the

established zzConsolidated information on SALW con- port by AU/RECs/RMs and partners AUC/RECs level to manage knowledge
trol activities compiled
Strategic Security Issues
Results Framework Strategic Priority 4:

109
Strategic Priority 4
110
Output 1.5 zzSOPs/guidelines developed, validated zzTechnical support to PSOs in developing zzRegular
PSOs reports to the PSC zzCommitment of PSOs/TCC/PSC to ac-
PSOs capacity to and adopted SOPs and guidelines to manage and zzPublication
of guidelines countability in arms management
manage weap- zzPSOs mandates inclusive of arms man- account for weapons zzPSO mandate and ConOps zzCommitment by donors to support

ons holding agement components zzTechnical support to PSOs in streamlining arms management components of PSO
and stockpiles zzPSOs acquiring the skills necessary to SALW control into ConOps and mission mandates
and implement implement SALW control interventions mandate
SALW control including response to SALW/GBV zzTraining and operational support to PSOs

interventions in implementing mandated SALW control

built interventions
Problem definition 2
Inability of Member States to fully meet their obligations under the Anti-Personnel landmines Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions due to:
zzLimited technical and operational capacities of Member States to implement mine action programmes;
zzLack of integrated and sustainable policies and programmes to support victims of landmines and UXO;
zzAbsence of inter-state modalities and agreements to clear mines in border areas;
zzAbsence of regional mechanisms/platforms to mobilize resources and foster south-south cooperation;
zzLimited expertise, financial and operational resources at the level of PSOs to deal with the threat of IED and UXO;

Specific Objective 2 Specific Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Mine action and counter-IED/explosives management pro- zzEvidence of Member States progress to- zzProgress reports submitted by Member zzCommitment and capacity of Member
grammes are implemented by affected Member States and wards their clearance deadlines/targets States to the responsible international States to implement effective mine
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

PSOs in an integrated and sustainable manner zzEvidence of victims’ assistance policies bodies action programs
and programmes zzReports by UNMAS and implementing
zzEvidence of participation of women in agencies
national mine action zzPSOs incident reports
zzConclusion of agreements and develop-
ment of cross-border demining projects
zzResources mobilized through the South-
South cooperation platform
zzPercentage of IEDs detected and dis-
posed by AU-PSOs
Outputs Outputs Indicators Activities/strategies Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 2.1 zzMember states practitioners have ac- zzCollaboration with Mine Action centres zzTrainingreports (including assessment of zzCapacity of mine action centres to train
Technical and quired the skills and resources necessary to deliver training to member state effective transfer of skills) practitioners
operational to implement mine action programmes practitioners zzAbility of Member States to utilize and

capacities of zzProvision of demining and training capitalize on technical and operational

Member States equipment to affected Member States support provided
to implement zzDelivery of training on various Mine

mine action pro- Action components (awareness, program

grams are built management, landmine impact surveys,
gender mainstreaming, etc.)
 Output 2.2 zzMember states acquiring the necessary zzTechnical support and training to Mem- zzCurricula and reports of training sessions zzActive engagement and collaboration
Victim assis- knowledge to develop victims assistance ber States on developing and sustaining zzPublication of guidelines of the relevant AU departments (Social
tance pro- policies, legislation and programmes victims assistance programmes Affairs) and AU agencies (African rehabil-
grammes are zzMember states developing victims assis- zzDevelopment and dissemination of itation Institute)
integrated into tance components tailored specifically guidelines and best practices on victims zzCommitment of Member States to ad-

national policies for women and children assistance dressing needs of mine victims
Output 2.3 zzCross-border cooperation agreement zzFacilitate
the conclusion of interstate zzDocumentation of the agreements zzCommitment, cooperation and trans-
Agreement concluded agreements to survey and demine bor- zzProjectdocuments (proposals, reports parency of concerned states to border
reached and der regions under the auspices of the AU and evaluations) demining initiatives
projects devel- Border Program zzCapacity of the AU, RECs and partners in

oped to demine developing, managing and coordinating

border areas border areas demining programs
Output 2.4 zzStrategy and implementation modalities zzDevelopment of the south-south coop- zzStrategy documents zzHuman and financial capacity of the AU/
South-South validated by experts eration strategy and implementation zzPledge documentation RECs to manage the platform
Cooperation zzPledges made by donors and interna- modalities zzInterest and commitment of Member

platform and tional partners zzConvening of biennial donor conferences States and donors to enhance south-
continental re- and south-south cooperation platforms south cooperation
source mobiliza-
tion modalities
established
Output 2.5 zzPSOs mandates inclusive of arms man- zzTechnical support to PSOs in streamlining zzPSOs mandates zzCommitment of PSOs/TCC/PSC to
Counter-IED agement and counter-IED components counter-IED and explosives management zzTraining reports (including assessment of enhancing PSOs capacity in explosives
expertise and zz% of women who acquired knowledge in the development of ConOps effective transfer of skills) management and counter-IED
equipment on counter-IED and explosive manage- zzMobilization of technical and operational zzCommitment by donors to support ex-

integrated into ment and % of women serving in the support to capacitate PSOs in the area of plosives management and counter-IED
PSO mandates relevant units counter-IED and explosives management
and support
packages
Problem definition 3
Limited effectiveness in implementing the international regimes on WMD disarmament and non-proliferation due to:
zzLegal and policy instruments against WMD are not domesticated;
zzWeak operational and institutional capacities of members states;
zzInsufficient research and data on the threat and risks of illicit chemical, biological and nuclear proliferation and trafficking;

Specific Objective 3 Specific Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Instruments and policies to address WMD disarmament and zzTechnical assistance and training pro- zzMember states reports to the bodies zzInterestand commitment of Member
non-proliferation are effectively implemented vided to Member States to domesticate administering the regimes States in implementing international
legal and operational aspects of the regimes against WMDs
international instruments against WMD
zzMember States establishing/designating
the required implementation mecha-
nisms/bodies
Strategic Security Issues
Results Framework Strategic Priority 4:

111
Strategic Priority 4
112
Outputs Outputs Indicators Activities/strategies Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 3.1 zzTechnical and operational gaps at nation- zzCollaboration with the international bod- zzReports of workshops and assessment zzMemberstates allocating the required
Legal instru- al and regional levels are identified ies to sensitize states, identify gaps and missions to states human and financial capacities to imple-
ments to zzLegal and regulatory instruments devel- channel assistance to Member States zzMember states reports to the bodies ment WMD related regimes
address WMD oped zzMobilization of technical and operation- administering the regimes
disarmament al resources for Member States from zzAnnual reports of bodies administering

and non-pro- donors and international partners the regimes

liferation are
effectively
domesticated
Output 3.2 zzInformation and data on illicit trafficking zzCommissioning of expert studies zzPublication of studies zzAvailability
of data and cooperation of
Comprehensive networks, incidents and security gaps is zzCompilation of reports and data availa- Member States in research and evidence
knowledge on compiled ble with the international bodies gathering
the risks and zzStudies highlight gaps and challenges

threats of chem- that undermine states capacities to

ical, biological domesticate regimes against WMD
and nuclear
proliferation
and trafficking is
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

available
Problem definition 4
Ineffective and unsustainable counter-terrorism efforts due to:
zzAbsence of an effective rule of law-based criminal justice response to terrorism;
zzPoor capacities and training of law enforcement agencies to implement preventive and response measures to terrorist acts;
zzLack of integrated approaches to prevent radicalization, address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism and engage civil society;
zzPoor coordination and collaboration among states in policy, legislative and operational counter-terrorism measures;
zzAbsence of rigorous and updated operational research and analysis that informs policy development and response measures ;
zzAbsence of an inclusive continental platform to coordinate Counter Terrorism action among Member States, RECs, donors and assistance providers;

Specific Objective 4 Specific Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

National and regional counter-terrorism measures are effec- zzEvidence of MS authorities foiling terror- zzDebates and reports on terrorism at zzCommitment of Member States to
tive in preventing and responding to terrorist acts ist acts National Parliaments counter-terrorism based on a rule-of-law
zzEvidence of terrorism cases investigated zzTrial documentation approach
and tried in courts zzReports from CSOs zzCommitment of Member States to effec-
zzEvidence of CSO involvement in/support zzDonors’ reports tively share intelligence
for national counter-terrorism efforts
zzEvidence of inter-state cooperation in
terrorism investigations and trials
zzEvidence of Member States sharing and
utilizing intelligence, reports and studies
on terrorism and counter-terrorism
zzEvidence of effective support and coor-
dination provided to Member States by
donors, partners and RECs
zzEvidence of de-radicalization initiatives
by RECs
zzEvidence of programmes implemented
by counter violent extremism (CVE)
initiatives
 Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 4.1 zzStatus of ratification of the international zzLegislative support to Member States in zzReports of legislative assistance missions zzCommitment of Member States to
Legal instru- instruments ratifying and domesticating regional and and programmes counter-terrorism based on a rule-of-law
ments to zzMember states practitioners have ac- international anti-crime and counter-ter- zzReports and records of training pro- approach
address coun- quired the knowledge and skill necessary rorism instruments grammes
ter-terrorism to implement good practices on criminal zzTraining and capacity building support

are effectively justice Reponses to terrorism to judges, prosecutors and law enforce-
domesticated zzMember states develop and implement ment agents in integrating and imple-
and criminal strategies/practices taking into consider- menting essential components and best
justice systems ation women’s role in Counter Terrorism practices on criminal justice responses to
strengthened terrorism, rule of law and human rights
(criminalization, investigations, coopera-
tion, detention, trials, corrections, etc.)
Output 4.2 zzMember states practitioners have zzTraining and support to law enforcement zzTraining curricula and reports zzAbilityof Member States to utilize and
Capacities of acquired the knowledge and skill to pre- agencies in preventing and responding to capitalize on the support provided
law enforce- vent and respond to terrorist acts terrorist acts (information and intelli-
ment agencies zz% of women capacitated gence gathering and analysis, protection
to implement of sensitive sites, investigations and
preventive and evidence gathering and protection,
response meas- countering IEDs, anti-money laundering
ures to terrorist and countering the financing of terror-
acts are built ism, recruitment and internet abuse,
emergency response, human rights
safeguards, etc.)
Output 4.3 zzConditions conducive to the spread of zzConsultative and inclusive platforms to zzMinutes from meetings zzAbility
and commitment of the AUC and
National and re- terrorism harmonized into national and develop context-specific approaches and zzStrategy documents RECs to coordinate their action
gional integrat- regional counter terrorism strategies and programmes to prevent radicalization
ed strategies to workplans and recruitment and address conditions
prevent radical- zzMandates of regional cooperative conducive to the spread of terrorism and
ization, address counter-terrorism operations under the preventing radicalization
the conditions AU and RECs auspices are integrated and zzEarly recovery, counter-radicalization and

conducive to holistic community engagement components

the spread of streamlined into regional cooperative
terrorism and counter-terrorism operations
civil society
engagement are
developed
Strategic Security Issues
Results Framework Strategic Priority 4:

113
Strategic Priority 4
114
Output 4.4 zzInformation shared, priorities and gaps zzStrengthening and sustaining consul- zzConsultation minutes and reports zzWillingnessof Member States and trust
Enhanced identified and cooperative response tation and cooperation platforms for zzPSC decisions and reports amongst them to cooperate on counter
judicial and op- measures agreed upon intelligence sharing and coordination zzDocumentation related to the extradi- terrorism issues
erational coop- zzConOps of regional security operations and harmonization of counter-terrorism tion and judicial cooperation agreement
eration among and endorsement by the PSC efforts zzAUC decisions and reports (AU Commis-

Member States zzDecisions and directives issued by the zz sion on International Law and AU Confer-
and regions PSC in response to annual reports of zzPoliticaland operational support to the ence of Ministers)
Member States development of cooperative regional
zzAgreement reached regarding extradi- counter-terrorism operations and intel-
tion and judicial cooperation ligence sharing mechanisms including
zzEndorsement by the AU Commission on within the framework of CISSA, ACSRT
International Law and the AU Confer- Focal Points and the Nouakchott and
ence of Ministers of Justice and Attor- Djibouti Processes
neys General zzOperationalization of the role of the PSC
pursuant to the 2004 Protocol and the
relevant communiqués
zzSupport to the harmonization of legis-
lation and other inter-state modalities
regarding extradition and arrest warrants
zzOperationalization and implementation
of an African Arrest Warrant against
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

individuals accused of terrorist acts;

Output 4.5 zzInformation on terrorist groups, financi- zzCommissioning of periodic and thematic zzPublication of AUC study zzCapacity of the AUC/RECs to develop
Comprehensive ers and collaborators and interlinkages expert research and studies knowledge and willingness of Member
knowledge with organized crime is compiled zzFocal Points designated by Member States to cooperation on data gathering
and analysis zzStudies highlight gaps and challenges States to the ACSRT and information
available on that undermine states capacities to shared regularly
terrorist groups prevent terrorist acts zzSubmission by Member States of their

modus-oper- zzUndertaking of studies focusing on the annual reports pursuant to the 2004
andi, agendas role of women and concepts of gender in Protocol
and structures; terrorism and counter-terrorism zzCounter-terrorism harmonized and inte-

recruitment and grated into CEWS

financing meth- zzACSRT counter terrorism Situation Room

ods, and analy- operationalized

sis of trends zzAssessment and evaluation mission to
Member States
Output 4.6 zzPrioritiesand gaps identified and re- zzConvening of the annual Consultative zzReport of the CT forum zzWillingness of regional and international
Effective coordi- sponse measured agreed upon Counter-Terrorism Forum zzToR of the Steering Committee actors to join and actively participate
nation mecha- zzSteering Committee proposal endorsed zzEstablishment of the AU-RECs Steering zzPSC communiqué endorsing the estab- in the coordination platform under the
nism established and ToR of the steering committee Committee on Counter-terrorism and lishment of the Steering Committee AUC umbrella
among states, adopted TOC
RECs, donors zzSupporting RECs to replicate the efforts

and assistance at AU levels

providers in zzEstablishing sub-region cooperation/co-

identifying ordination centres at RECs levels

and aligning
priorities and
allocation of
resources
 Problem definition 5
Ineffective and incomplete implementation of the international instruments on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism due to:
zzFinancial Intelligence Unit (FIUs) are absent, undertrained, understaffed or lack a clear mandate and powers to enforce AML/CFT measures;
zzInadequate inter-state cooperation on AML/CFT issues including on judicial, institutional and operational matters;
zzRegulatory and operational challenges to address AML/CFT in the informal sector and cash-based economy;
zzInadequate regulatory measures to address the vulnerability of non-profit organizations to abuse by terrorists;
zzPoor capacities and integrated approaches to address proceeds of criminal activities such as environmental crimes, trafficking and smuggling;

Specific Objective 5 Specific Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

International legal instruments and recommendations of zzEvidence of Member States developing zzAnnual report by MS pursuant to the
the FATF and the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows and enforcing national legislation and 2004 Protocol on terrorism
recommendations are fully and effectively implemented practices on AML/CFT zzMutual Evaluations of the FATF
zzEvidence of FIU and LEAs adequately zzReports by UN agencies and Security
capacitated to fulfil their mandate Council bodies
zzEvidence of preventive and response zzReports commissioned by the AU Confer-
measures to deal with AML/CFT in the ence of Finance Ministers and relevant
informal economy and charity establish- AU STC
ments and other designated non-finan-
cial businesses and professions (DNFBPs)
zzEvidence of effective policies and prac-
tices linking anti-environmental crime
efforts to AML/CFT
zzEvidence of increased suspicious transac-
tion reports received by FIUs
zzEvidence of increased awareness of
AML/CFT among reporting entities
Outputs Outputs Indicators Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 5.1 zzMember states receive as- zzFacilitate the delivery of technical and zzLegislative support missions reports zzInterestof Member States in developing
Financial Intelligence Unit sistance required to develop legislative support to Member States zzChairperson report to the PSC on coun- active FIUs
(FIUs) are established, legislation and regulations in establishing FIUs and developing/ ter-terrorism
capacity built and effective zzMember States acquire strengthening their mandate and opera- zzTraining curricula and reports

mandates provided knowledge and skills neces- tional modalities

sary to implement interna- zzTraining to FIUs and financial establish-
tional standards and best ments in implementing FATF recom-
practices mendations, recommendations of the
High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows
and the International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism
Strategic Security Issues
Results Framework Strategic Priority 4:

115
Strategic Priority 4
116
Output 5.2 zzAgreements reached and measures zzFacilitate regular forums/sessions to fos- zzWorkshop reports zzWillingness
of Member States and trust
Effective adopted ter exchanges, common understanding zzmeetings conclusions/declarations amongst them to cooperation on issues
inter-state coop- zzMember States acquire knowledge and and approaches to enhance inter-state zzTraining curricula and reports of AML/CFT
eration on AML/ skills to enhance cooperation cooperation
CFT issues in- zzJoint training for Member States on

cluding on judi- international cooperation in judicial

cial, institutional matters regarding AML/CFT
and operational
matters
Output 5.3 zzMember states acquire the knowledge zzDevelop operational guidance notes and zzPublication of guidelines zzRecognitionby Member States of the
Effective regula- and skills necessary to address AML/CFT compile best practices to assist Mem- zzTraining curricula and reports need to have effective measures to deal
tory and opera- within the context of the informal sector ber States address AML/CFT within the with AML/CFT in the informal sector
tional measures and cash couriers context of the informal sector and cross
implemented border transportations of currency
to address zzJoint trainings to address cash couriers

AML/CFT in the and cross border cross-border transpor-

informal sector tations of currency
and cash-based
economy
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

Output 5.4 zzMember states receive assistance zzTechnical and legislative support to zzLegislative support missions reports zzRecognitionby Member States of the
Effective required to develop legislation and Member States in regulating operations zzChairperson report to the PSC on coun- need to have effective measures to deal
regulatory and regulations of non-profit organizations ter-terrorism with AML/CFT in the non-profit sector
transparency zzNon-Profit Organizations and CSO ac- zzTraining to non-profit organizations and zzTraining curricula and reports

measures imple- quire the skills and knowledge necessary CSOs on transparency and preventing
mented to pre- to prevent abuse abuse for terrorist financing purposes
vent the abuse
of non-profit
organizations
Output 5.5 zzLEAsin Member States acquire skills to zzAssessment of capacities needed zzAssessment/workshop and training zzPolitical
will to support anti-money laun-
Law enforce- investigate and prosecute money laun- zzMapping of relevant LEAs on the AML/ reports dering is provided
ment agencies dering crimes CFT
including police, zzSensitisation
exercises on AML/CFT train-
judiciary, pros- ing workshop
ecution etc. are
capacitated
Output 5.6 zzInformation available on terrorists spon- zzCommission/support studies and zzPublication of research findings zzCapacity of the relevant national author-
Effective policies sors and sources of financing research to identify trends in terrorism zzMeeting reports/conclusions/recom- ities to coordinate their action
and guidelines zzRegional approaches/initiatives devel- financing and gaps in response measures mendations
developed to oped and adopted zzFacilitate the development of integrated zzProject documents/concept papers

address terrorist and comprehensive approaches and

financing from policies to address terrorism financing
environmental through environmental crimes, traffick-
crimes, traf- ing and smuggling
ficking and
smuggling
 Problem definition 6
Weak integration of maritime security policy into APSA due to 3 main reasons:
zzAbsence of a Plan of Action for the Operationalization of the 2050 AIM Strategy;
zzMaritime security is not effectively mainstreamed into CEWS;
zzRECs strategies on maritime security are not aligned to AIMS 2050.

Specific Objective 6 Specific Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

The 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) is zzEvidence of the AUC developing an im- zzAUC Chairperson report to AU Assembly zzActive
support of ECOWAS, ECCAS and
fully integrated into APSA plementation matrix and Member States zzRevised CEWS Handbook and SOPs the Gulf of Guinea Commission
adopting a Plan for the Operationaliza- zzREC harmonization workshop reports
tion of the 2050 AIMS and effective harmonized strategies on
zzEvidence of revised CEWS indicators and maritime security
guidelines
zzEvidence of RECs developing and adopt-
ing harmonized strategies on maritime
security
Outputs Outputs Indicators Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 6.1 zzImplementation matrix of AIMS is zzDeveloping and adopting a Plan of zzAU Chairperson report to AU Assembly zzCoordination by AUC
Plan of Action drafted Action for the Operationalization of the
for the Oper- 2050 AIM Strategy in accordance with
ationalization AU Assembly Dec. 496 (XXII)
of the 2050
AIM Strategy
is effectively
implemented
Output 6.2 zzCEWS Indicators’ Module is amended zzAmending the CEWS Indicators’ Module zzAmended CEWS Indicators’ Module
Maritime secu- zzCEWS Handbook is revised (data collection and monitoring) zzRevised CEWS Handbook
rity is effectively zzRevising the CEWS Handbook

mainstreamed
into CEWS
Output 6.3 zzRECs strategies on maritime security, zzHarmonizing RECs strategies on maritime zzRECs strategies on maritime security zzWilland capacity from RECs to align their
RECs strategies particularly on piracy, armed robbery security through regional workshops strategies
on maritime and other
security are zzillegal activities committed at sea, con-

aligned to AIMS sistent with the 2050 AIM Strategy, are

2050 designed
Strategic Security Issues
Results Framework Strategic Priority 4:

117
Strategic Priority 4
118
Problem definition 7
Poor coordination in combating Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and anti-cyber crime policy missing due to 8 main reasons:
zzLegal instruments to address TOC are not effectively domesticated;
zzLegal codes to address TOC are weak;
zzThere is a lack of information, analysis and response options for members states and RECs/RMs with regard to TOC;
zzThe nexus between TOC, terrorism and violent extremism is not well known;
zzLegal instruments to address cyber crime are not effectively domesticated;
zzAUC Chairperson report on cyber security is not tabled;
zzAbsence of national cyber security frameworks;
zzAbsence of REC and REC-toREC agreements on mutual assistance in combating cyber crime.

Specific Objective 7 Specific Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Cooperation and coordination of combating Transnational zzEvidence of ratification and domesti- zzMember State reports and AUC ratifica- zzCooperation with the UN Office on Drugs
Organised Crime (TOC) is strengthened and a continental cation of legal instruments on TOC and tion register and Crime (UNODC)
anti-cyber crime policy is actively promoted cyber crime in Member States zzAUC Chairperson reports
zzEvidence of the establishment – in col-
laboration with AFRIPOL – of a regional
TOC centre
zzEvidence of Member States efficiently
addressing the nexus between TOC and
terrorism and violent extremism
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

zzEvidence of Member States adopting

cyber crime frameworks
zzEvidence of increased REC-to-REC assis-
tance in combating cyber crime
Outputs Outputs Indicators Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 7.1 zzRatification register is compiled zzAnnual reporting by Member States to zzAUC
website on status of legal docu- zzCoordination by AUC
Legal instru- AUC ments
ments to
address TOC
are effectively
domesticated
Output 7.2 zzAU/RECs conference on mapping of legal zzOrganise mapping of status quo and zzConference documentation
Legal codes are codes is organised identify areas for follow-up activities
strengthened to
address TOC
Output 7.3 zzCentre(similar to ACSRT in the field of zzAUC establishing with AFRIPOL and zzWorking plan of a AFRIPOL TOC Centre zzCollaborationwith UNODC
An African TOC counter-terrorism) is established regional police organisations a centre to zzCounter-TOC guidelines zzClosecooperation with AFRIPOL (under
Centre under systematically provide Member States construction), CAPCCO, SARPCCO and
the aegis of and RECS with information, analysis and WAPCCO
AFRIPOL is response options for with regard to TOC
established zzDeveloping guidelines for the estab-
lishment of national specialised TOC
investigation units
 Output 7.4 zzAU/RECs workshop on TOC and terrorism zzOrganise workshop to explore the nexus zzWorkshop documentation zzTobe coordinated by the African Centre
The nexus be- is held between TC and terrorism and violent for the Study and Research on Terrorism
tween TOC and extremism (ACSRT) and the Chairperson’s Special
terrorism and vi- zzDetail policy recommendations on the Representative for Counter-Terrorism
olent extremism basis of the workshop Cooperation
is addressed
Output 7.5 zzRegister of ratification is compiled zzRatification
and domestication of the AU zzAUC
website on status of legal docu- zzCoordination function of AUC
Legal instru- Convention of Cyber Security and Per- ments
ments to sonal Data Protection in accordance with
address cyber AU Executive Council Dec. 846 (XXV)
crime are effec-
tively domesti-
cated
Output 7.6 zzAUC Chairperson reports to AU Assembly zzAUC Chairperson report on cyber securi- zzAUC Chairperson report
AUC Chairper- ty which (1) describes the extend of the
son report on threat to peace and security in Africa, (2)
cyber security is maps national efforts of Member States
tabled to counter-act IT-based threats against
peace and security, (3) documents some
best practice and lessons learned, (4) fol-
lows up on the AU Assembly decision to
harmonize national legislations through
a convention on cyber security, (5)
suggests coordinating activities by the
AUC vis-à-vis the RECs, and (6) details a
strategy of how to mobilize the support
of international partners such as the UN
or the EU in these efforts
Output 7.7 zzAUC Chairperson reports to AU Assembly zzFacilitating
regional workshops on the zzAUC Chairperson report on the adoption
National design of national cyber security frame- of national cyber security frameworks
cyber security works in accordance with AU Executive
frameworks are Council Dec. 846 (XXV), §24
facilitated
Output 7.8 zzRegister
of multilateral agreements zzDrafting mutual assistance in cy- zzREC
Press Statements on conclusion of
REC and REC- between RECs is complied ber-crime agreements in accordance mutual assistance in cyber crime agree-
toREC agree- with AU Executive Council Dec. 846 (XXV) ments
ments on mu- zzAdopting and ratifying mutual assistance

tual assistance in cyber-crime agreements

in combating
cyber crime are
in place
Strategic Security Issues
Results Framework Strategic Priority 4:

119
Strategic Priority 4
120
Output 7.9 zzEvidence of adequate staff in place at zzConduct training for Secretariat Staff to zzTrainingdocuments and training evalua- zzWillfrom different stakeholders and
AFRIPOL is AFRIPOL enhance capacities for strategic plan- tion reports availability of adequate funding
effective in zzEvidence of modalities for collaboration ning, programming, coordination and zzStrategy/policy documents related to

coordinating and information sharing between Mem- cooperation; coordination among Member States
police and law ber States zzSupport the development and adoption

enforcement of modalities for cooperation, collabo-

agencies to ration and information-sharing between
combat Transna- Member States within the framework of
tional Organized AFRIPOL;
Crime zzConduct capacity building, at regional
level, for police for combating cyber-
crime and counter terrorism;
zzConduct training in counter-narcotics;
zzSupport implementation of activities
to fight organized crime, including illicit
trafficking of arms and persons, wildlife
and environmental crimes.
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020
 Results Framework Strategic Priority 5:
5 Coordination and Partnerships

Strategic Objective Strategic Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

To contribute to enhanced effectiveness of coordination and zzEvidence of regional peace and security zzProgramme documents. zzWill from all stakeholders involved in
partnership within the APSA framework strategies designed and implemented in zzAmount and quality of common posi- APSA to putting into practice what they
line with the AU policy framework tions. committed to;
zzEvidence of common programming, zzExamples of implementation of subsidi- zzPresence of individual, organisational
including formulation of common ob- arity principle. and institutional capacities within APSA
jectives, between AUC departments and zzProgramme documents stakeholders to implement the different
between AU and RECs/RMs; zzAnalysis of data by monitoring system; strategies included in the roadmap and
zzEvidence of common positions on APSA narrative reports. to monitor results
framework between AU and RECs/RMs;
zzEvidence, documentation and joint
analysis of the implementation of the
subsidiarity principle in several opera-
tions in the field;
zzEvidence of lessons learned from the
implementation of the subsidiarity prin-
ciple (results and challenges) that are
feeding new programming;
zzEvidence of implementation and moni-
toring of decisions the AUC has commit-
ted to;
zzEvidence of efficient use and possible
mutualisation of human resources be-
tween the AUC and RECs/RMs;
zzEvidence of timely deployment of the
Panel of the Wise from the AUC;
Coordination and Partnerships
Results Framework Strategic Priority 5:

121
Strategic Priority 5
122
Problem definition 1
Limited effectiveness of the coordinating function of the PSC with the RECs/RMs mechanisms (Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC), 2002)
due to 4 main reasons:
zzLimited interactions between the AU-PSC and similar mechanisms within RECs/RMs;
zzLack of common understanding of the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage (what they mean and entail);
zzLack of clear guidelines to make the interactions between PSC and RECs/RMs mechanisms fully operational;

Specific Objective 1 Specific Objective 1 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

The coordinating function of the PSC is effective zzEvidence of decisions from PSC taking zzMinutes from PSC meetings, reports, zzWill of PSC to open its sessions to RECs/
into account RECs/RMs inputs; communiqués RMs
zzEvidence of common PSC-RECs/RMs zzData from monitoring system
positions
zzOperation of joint AU-RECs/RMs Field
Missions/Liaison Offices
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 1.1 zzEvidenceof RECs/RMs substantive inputs zzParticipation
of RECs/RMs in relevant zzMinutes from RECs/RMs – PSC meetings zzWill of PSC to open its sessions to RECs/
Interactions into PSC meetings; PSC meetings RMs
between the
AU-PSC and
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

similar mech-
anisms within
RECs/RMs are in
place
Output 1.2 zzExistence of a strategy document that zzDialogue sessions between AU and RECs/ zzMinutes from AU-RECs/RMs meetings; zzWill
to adopt a clear definition of these
The concepts highlights guiding principles and expect- RMs on the definition of subsidiarity zzStrategy document; terms by both the AU and the RECs/RMs
of subsidiarity, ed results from using the subsidiarity (and/or of partnership);
complementari- principle; zzAgreement to develop a strategy docu-

ty and compar- zzEvidence that this strategy document ment making the subsidiarity concept
ative advantage highlights and clarifies key subsidiarity operational;
(and/or partner- components and procedures for appli- zzDrafting of the strategy document;

ship) are clearly cation;

defined and zzAgreement between the AU and RECs/

agreed upon RMs to use this strategic document as a

basis for future implementation of APSA.
Output 1.3 zzExistence of guidelines/policy document zzDialogue sessions between PSC and zzMinutes from PSC-RECs/RMs meetings; zzWill
of PSC to engage on regular basis
Clear guidelines highlighting principles and expected re- RECs/RMs on the nature of RECs/RMs zzGuidelines document with RECs/RMs
to make the sults from PSC – RECs/RMs interactions; interactions with PSC;
interactions zzAgreement between the PSC and RECs/ zzDevelopment of guidelines/policy docu-

between PSC RMs to use this document as a basis for ment stipulating the nature of RECs/RMs
and RECs/RMs future interactions. interactions with PSC.
mechanisms
operational are
in place
 Problem definition 2
Limited intra and inter-departmental collaboration/coordination at AUC/RECs/RMs levels due to:
zzWeak horizontal linkages within each department;
zzWeak horizontal linkages between the various APSA components;

Specific Objective 2 Specific Objective 2 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Enhanced intra and inter-departmental collaboration/coor- zzEvidence of collaboration/coordination zzMinutes from meetings zzManagement buy-in
dination at the level of the AUC and RECs/RMs between PSD and other AUC Depart- zzData from monitoring system
ments in different conflict phases zzMission reports
(prevention, management, resolution
and PCRD)
zzEvidence of deepened collaboration
and linkages between the various APSA
components and the African Governance
Architecture (AGA) both at AU and REC
level
zzEvidence of joint APSA activities and pro-
gramming between the PSD and other
relevant Departments within the AUC
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 2.1 zzEvidence that PSD staff have access to zzOrganisation of a weekly information zzMinutes from coordination meetings zzWillfrom PSD to commit to building
Coordination the same level of information regarding sharing (PSD staff and management internal synergies
mechanisms PSD activities; level)
within various zzEvidence of harmonization of planned zzOrganisation of bi-monthly coordination

PSD divisions activities; meetings

and units are in zzOrganisation of joint planning sessions

place between PSD divisions/units

Output 2.2 zzEvidence of shared responsibilities be- zzInstitutionalisation
of the Interdepart- zzMinutes from Task Force meetings; zzWill from AUC Departments to commit
Horizontal link- tween different departments; mental Task Force on Conflict Prevention zzJoint analyses reports to building synergies;
ages between zzEvidence of joint analyses and joint activ- at technical and policy levels; zzHuman resources are made available for

the various ities between various AUC departments participating in coordination meetings.
departments are and between PSD divisions;
functioning zzEvidence of information sharing;

Problem definition 3
Limited implementation of the MoU between the AU and the RECs/RMs in the realization of APSA due to 4 main causes:
zzLack of a clear and commonly shared understanding of the concepts of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage (what they mean and entail);
zzLack of a clear and commonly shared understanding of the concept of coordination (what it means and entails);
zzLack of harmonized policies/standard operation procedures between the AU and the RECs/RMs;
zzLack of adequate monitoring system for the MoU implementation;
Coordination and Partnerships
Results Framework Strategic Priority 5:

123
Strategic Priority 5
124
Specific Objective 3 Specific Objective 3 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions
The MoU between the AU and the RECs/RMs is implement- zzParticipation of AU and RECs/RMs zzMinutes from meetings zzWill from all stakeholders involved in
ed effectively Liaison Officers in all relevant statutory zzData from monitoring system APSA to putting into practice what they
meetings of the AU and RECs/RMs; zzMinutes from meeting committed to;
zzEvidence of the fact that RECs/RMs zzData from monitoring system zzPresence of individual, organisational
Liaison Offices have access to all relevant zzConflict analyses and institutional capacities within APSA
reports required to fulfil their mandate zzMission reports stakeholders to implement the different
under the PSC Protocol; strategies included in the roadmap and
zzThe Chairperson of the AU Commission to monitor results
and Chief Executives of the RECs/RMs
meet at least once a year;
zzEvidence of institutionalised and sys-
tematic use of channels for information
sharing at higher political level and
technical level between the AU and the
RECs/RMs;
zzEvidence of institutionalisation and use
of common conflict analyses;
zzExamples of joint fact finding and/or
monitoring missions between the AU
and the RECs/RMs;
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

zzEvidence of common reports – RECs/

RMs contributing to AUC and PSC reports
to the AU Assembly of Heads of State
and Government.

Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions

Output 3.1 zzExistence of a strategy document that zzDialogue sessions between AU and RECs/ zzMinutes from AU-RECs/RMs meetings; zzWill
to adopt a clear definition of these
The concepts highlights guiding principles and expect- RMs on the definition of subsidiarity zzStrategy document; terms by both the AU and the RECs/RMs
of subsidiarity, ed results from using the subsidiarity (and/or of partnership);
complementari- principle; zzAgreement to develop a strategy docu-

ty and compar- zzEvidence that this strategy document ment making the subsidiarity concept
ative advantage highlights and clarify key subsidiarity operational;
(and/or partner- components and procedures; zzDrafting of the strategy document;

ship) are clearly zzAgreement between the AU and RECs/

defined and RMs to use this strategic document as a

agreed upon basis for future implementation of APSA.
 Output 3.2 zzExistence of a strategy document zzDialogue sessions between AU and RECs/ zzMinutes from AU-RECs/RMs meetings; zzThereis will to define the concept of
The concept of that highlights guiding principles and RMs on the definition of coordination; zzStrategy document; coordination
coordination is expected results from coordinating and zzAgreement to develop a strategy docu-

clearly defined harmonizing the activities of the RECs/ ment making the concept of coordina-
and agreed RMs with those of the AU; tion operational;
upon zzEvidence that this strategy document zzDrafting of the strategy document;
highlights and clarifies key coordination zzInstitutionalisation of the AU-RECs/RMs
components and procedures; Task Force on strengthening the relations
zzAgreement between the AU and RECs/ between the AUC and RECS/RMs in the
RMs to use this strategic document as a area of peace and security.
basis for future implementation of APSA.
zzEvidence of shared responsibilities be-
tween AUC and RECs/RMs;
Output 3.3 zzDocument highlighting standard opera- zzDialoguesessions between AU and RECs/ zzMinutes of meetings zzWill
to develop the standard operation
Harmonized tion procedures developed RMs on the types of policies and stand- zzSOPs procedures by the AU and the RECs/RMs
policies and ard operation procedures that need to
standard opera- be harmonised;
tion procedures
between the AU
and the RECs/
RMs put in place
Output 3.4 zzThe monitoring system clearly highlights zzDevelopment of the monitoring system; zzMonitoring document, monitoring data, zzWill
and capacity to develop an ade-
Existence of an the different types of information that zzManagement decision to allocate staff to data analysis; quate monitoring system
adequate mon- need to be collected, documented and specific monitoring functions; zzManagement decision

itoring system analysed; zzCommon AU and RECs/RMs monitoring zzMinutes from monitoring meetings

for following-up zzThe monitoring system establish clear missions (one per year in each REC/RM)
on the MoU im- responsibilities for performing monitor- zzCommon AU and REC/RMs monitoring

plementation ing tasks; meetings (one per year)

zzThe monitoring system is closely linked
to management decision processes.
Problem definition 4
Limited relevance and efficiency of AU Liaison Offices established by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and of AU Liaison Offices within the RECs/RMs due to 3 main reasons:
zzLack of revision of AU Liaison Offices/Field Missions mandate despite changes on the ground (No clear exit strategies for AULOs; Unclear lines of communication and reporting)
zzLimited direct links between different Liaison Offices (AULOs/Field Missions and AULOs to the RECs/RMs and AU Regional Offices);
zzLimited (in numbers and relevance) technical capacities of the Liaison Offices;
Coordination and Partnerships
Results Framework Strategic Priority 5:

125
Strategic Priority 5
126
Specific Objective 4 Specific Objective 2 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions
The AU Liaison Offices are relevant and efficient zzParticipation of AU Liaison Offices in all zzMinutes of meetings; zzWill from all AU, RECs and RMs to put
relevant statutory meetings of the AU zzContent of conflict analyses; into practice what they committed to;
and RECs/RMs; zzMission reports zzPresence of individual, organisational
zzEvidence of institutionalised and use of zzMonitoring reports and institutional capacities within AU
common conflict analyses; and RECs/RMs to implement the differ-
zzEvidence of close involvement of AU Li- ent strategies included in the roadmap
aison Offices in the organisation of joint and to monitor results
fact-finding and/or monitoring missions
done by the AU, the RECs/RMs and/or
partners;
zzEvidence of improved quality of mon-
itoring of peace agreements, political
situations on the ground, and implemen-
tation of PSC decisions on the ground;
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 4.1 zzEvidence of gaps between the mandate zzEvaluation of AULOs relevance, efficiency zzEvaluation report zzThoseLiaison Offices whose mandates
Liaison Offic- of some AULOs and the political/security and effectiveness; are not clearly defined shall be defined
es’ mandates situation on the ground addressed; zzDevelopment of guidelines for formu-
zzExistence of a clear exit strategy for each lating relevant mandates for AULOs
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

are regularly
reviewed and AULO (in post-conflict countries); depending on changes in political/securi-
reflect the po- zzLines of communication and reporting ty situation on the ground;
litical/security are clarified
situations on
the ground
Output 4.2 zzExistence of clear job descriptions based zzAnalysis of needs in terms of human zzAdministrative documents (guidelines, zzPartnersand/or members states agree to
AU Liaison on specific roles and functions that each resources specific to each Liaison Office job descriptions, AULOs mandate, etc.) support staff recruitment
Offices are staff has to play in order to implement (directly linked to the mandate of the zzMinutes recruitment process

equipped with APSA; Liaison Office)

relevant staff (in zzStaff recruited according to clear guide- zzDevelopment of clear guidelines for staff

adequacy with lines recruitment

their respective zzRecruitment of staff

mandate)
Output 4.3 zzThe monitoring system clearly highlights zzDevelopment of the monitoring system; zzMonitoring and evaluation system zzThe AU will develop a monitoring system
Existence of an the different types of information that zzManagement decision to allocate staff to zzManagement guidelines and decisions for following-up of the performance of
adequate mon- need to be collected, documented and specific monitoring functions; zzMinutes of the meetings the Liaison Offices
itoring system analysed; zzCommon AU-RECs/RMs (and partners)

for following-up zzThe monitoring system establishes clear results-monitoring meetings

on the per- responsibilities for performing monitor-
formance of ing tasks;
Liaison Offices zzThe monitoring system is closely linked
to management decision processes.
 Problem definition 5
Limited relevance and efficiency of partnership(s) between the AU and its external partners due to 6 main reasons:
zzLimited common understanding of the concept of partnership (what it means and entails);
zzLimited common understanding of the concept of capacity building (what it means and entails);
zzLack of capacity at the AU level to monitor the extent to which it complies with the different decisions it has committed to implement;
zzDisconnect (no clear strategic and results-based links) between the AU-partners dialogue at higher political level and its implementation at technical level;
zzLack of adequate coordination between partners;
zzLack of monitoring mechanisms allowing the AU and its partners to regularly assess the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of their partnership;

Specific Objective 5 Specific Objective Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Policy and strategic dialogue within APSA partnerships are zzEvidence of institution to institution zzReports on policy dialogue zzPartners are willing to engage in
effective (AU-RECs/RMs-EU-UN) common policy zzNarrative reports constructive assessment of previous
dialogue; partnership periods;
zzEvidence of joint reports based on zzDecision to embark on such a process is
results; supported by different decision-making
zzEvidence of AU and RECs/RMs quality/ levels within each institution;
results-based and timely financial and
narrative reports to their partners;
zzNo/limited evidence of conflicts/tensions
between AU and partners;
Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 5.1 zzExistence of a partnership strategy doc- zzDialogue sessions between AU and zzMinutes from AU-partners meetings; zzPartners are willing to engage in
The AU and its ument that highlights guiding principles partners on the content of the strategy zzStrategy document; constructive assessment of previous
partners, as well and expected results from engaging into document and on the most appropriate partnership periods;
as each REC/RM partnership; process leading to its conception; zzDecision to embark on such a process is

and its partners, zzEvidence that this strategy document zzDialogue sessions between RECs/RMs supported by different decision-making
share a common highlights and clarifies key partnership and their partners on the content of levels within each institution;
understanding components and concepts (mutual the strategy document and on the
of the concept accountability, transparency, etc.) most appropriate process leading to its
of partnership zzAgreement between the AU and its part- conception
ners to use this strategic document as a zzDrafting of the strategy document
basis for future partnership.
Output 5.2 zzExistence of a capacity building policy zzDialogue sessions between AU and zzMinutesfrom AU-partners meetings; zzPartners are open to use a common
The AU and its document common to the AU and all partners on the content of the strategy zzStrategy
document; capacity building strategy document.
partners, as well partners; document and on the most appropriate zzAgreement document Different decision-making levels within
as each REC/RM zzEvidence that this capacity building doc- process leading to its conception; each institution support this decision.
and its partners, ument clearly highlights the expected re- zzDrafting of the strategy document zzPartners are willing to engage in

share a common sults and the strategies to be implement- constructive assessment of previous
understanding ed in order to increase the probability of partnerships;
of the concept achieving these results;
of capacity zzExistence of an agreement between the

building AU and its partners to use this strategy

document as a basis for capacity building
support.
Coordination and Partnerships
Results Framework Strategic Priority 5:

127
Strategic Priority 5
128
Output 5.3 zzThe monitoring system clearly highlights zzDevelopment of the monitoring system; zzMonitoring document, monitoring data, zzThere is a clear management support
The AU has the different types of information that zzManagement decision to allocate staff to data analysis; (at different organisational levels within
put in place need to be collected, documented and specific monitoring functions; zzManagement decision the AU) for the systematic use of the
an internal mon- analysed; zzCommon AU-partners results-monitoring zzMinutes from monitoring meetings monitoring system;
itoring system zzThe monitoring system establishes clear meetings (twice a year) zzPresence of individual, organisational

that allows for responsibilities for performing monitor- and institutional capacities within the
following-up ing tasks; AU to systematically use the monitoring
on the different zzThe monitoring system is supported by system;
decisions it has management decision-making processes
committed to
implement
Output 5.4 zzFormulation of clear strategic and re- zzStrategic
meetings between AU and part- zzMinutes
from dialogue meetings zzPartners are willing to engage in such a
Disconnect be- sults-based links between the AU-part- ners gathering high level representatives between AU and partners at technical dialogue
tween different ners dialogue at higher political level and and technical staff; levels
AU-partners its implementation at technical level
dialogue levels
addressed
Output 5.5 zzEvidence of harmonised and aligned zzDialogue meetings between AU and zzMinutes from meetings zzPartners are willing to engage in such a
The AU and partners’ financial and technical support partners; zzProgramme support plan dialogue
African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020

partners have on AU programme calendars; zzDevelopment of harmonised programme

jointly de- zzExistence of an agreement on one com- support plan covering the roadmap
veloped and mon reporting template among partners; timeframe;
agreed on
harmonised and
aligned partner-
ship tools
Problem definition 6
No financial ownership of APSA, high dependency on donors and international partners due to 2 main reasons:
zzMember States’ contribution to Peace Fund is low;
zzLimited additional funding from alternative sources.

Specific Objective 6 Specific Objective 6 Indicators Sources of verification Assumptions

Financial ownership of APSA increased and dependency on zzEvidence of increased revenues into the zzAU operational budget zzMember States comply with AU Assem-
donors and international partners decreased substantially Peace Fund and similar regional funding zzAU programme budget bly decisions
mechanisms zzAU PSO budget zzPreparedness of Member States to trans-
zzEvidence of increased AU operational fer these additional sources of funding to
budget from Member States the Union
zzEvidence of increased AU programme zzCapacities in Member States to collect
budget from Member States the additional sources of funding
zzEvidence of increased AU PSO budge
from Member States
zzEvidence of increased funds emanating
from private sector
 Outputs Outputs Indicators Strategies/Activities Sources of verification Assumptions
Output 6.1 zzEvidence of clear guidelines for the Re- zzFacilitatingresource mobilization by zzGuidelines zzMember States comply with AU Assem-
The Article source Mobilization Committee Member States through the implementa- zzMinutes
from Resource Mobilization bly decisions
21(4) of the PSC zzDecisions/strategies suggested by the tion of §8(5) of the PSC Protocol and the Committee
Protocol on the Committee conclusions of the retreat of the PSC on
establishment zzEvidence of revised regulations of the working methods (5-7 July 2007) on the
of a Revolving Peace Fund establishment of a Resource Mobiliza-
Trust Fund with zzExistence of relevant targets tion Committee
the Peace Fund zzImplementing AU Assembly Dec. 578

is made opera- (XXV) on targets for the new scale of

tional assessment
Output 6.2 zzEvidence of detailed annual budget zzPublishing a detailed AU budget (includ- zzBudget publication zzStrongAUC leadership and coordination
The AU Assem- monitoring ing revised or amended versions) as part zzAnnual plans zzMember States compliance with AU
bly Decision 561 zzEvidence of recommendations to adjust of the AU Assembly documentation zzAssessment reports Assembly decisions
(XXIV) on alter- the budget when and where necessary zzDeveloping a detailed annual activity zzConclusions of the expert study zzConsultation with Ad Hoc Ministerial

native sources zzEvidence of recommendations and strat- plan of the programmes/projects to be Committee
of funding is egies to access funds from private sector funded from the Peace Fund
made opera- and extraction industries zzIntroduction of a robust annual review

tional mechanism
zzCommission expert study on fundraising
from private sector and resource-based
extraction industries
Coordination and Partnerships
Results Framework Strategic Priority 5:

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Strategic Priority 5
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