CSPC NANHAI PETROCHEMICALS PROJECT

PROCESS DESIGN SPECIFICATION

PROJECT SPECIFICATION: SP-8110-0000-0001

Project Management Contractor (PMC)

NO DATE REVISION BY CHK’D APPR.

A 27 July 01 Issued for BDEP MC SFH RR
00 27 Feb 02 ITB Issue DL SFH RR
01 26 Jun 02 Update for EPC RSB SFH SFH
CSPC Nanhai Petrochemicals Project
Bechtel – SEI – Foster Wheeler PMC

Process Design Specification

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION 2
2.0 SCOPE 2
3.0 PROCESS FLOW SCHEMES,
SAFEGUARDING FLOWSCHEMES & MEMORANDA 4

3.1 Process Flow Schemes 4

3.2 Process Safeguarding Memoranda and Process Safeguarding Flow Schemes 5

4.0 DATA SHEET PREPARATION 2

4.1 Equipment 5

4.2 Instruments and Relief Valves 5

5.0 HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE IDENTIFICATION 2

5.1 Special Guidelines for Benzene 2

6.0 PLANT SAFEGUARDING SYSTEMS 2

7.0 DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE 2
8.0 PRESSURE VESSELS 2

8.1 Drums 2

8.2 Columns 2

8.3 Level Setting and Surge Requirements 2

8.4 Vortex Breakers 2

9.0 EXCHANGERS 2
10.0 PUMPS 2

10.1 Service Category 2

10.2 Service Type 2

10.3 NPSH 2

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10.4 Downstream Design Pressures and Surge 2

10.5 Minimum Flow 2

10.6 Design Margins 2

10.7 Hydraulic Checks 2

11.0 COMPRESSORS 2

11.1 General 14

11.2 Hydraulic Checks 2

12.0 RELIEF SYSTEM DESIGN 2

12.1 Hazardous Services Table on PSFS

13.0 LINE SIZING CRITERIA 2

14.0 PIPING DESIGN CONDITIONS 2
15 CONTROL VALVE BYPASSES 19

16.0 DRAINAGE PHILOSOPHY 19

ATTACHMENT 1 HAZARDOUS SERVICES TABLE 2

ATTACHMENT 2 GUIDELINES FOR 'BENZENE' 2
ATTACHMENT 3 RELIEF SYSTEM DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 2

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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This procedure outlines the process design philosophies and procedures to be
employed on the CSPC Nanhai Petrochemicals Project. The process design shall
follow the Project Engineering Standards and Specifications, which were developed,
based on the Shell DEPs. Project specific DEPs contain the suffix ‘-CSPC’ in
place of ‘-gen’ in the original. Original DEPs shall still apply where a project specific
DEP, Standard or Specification has not been issued. Except where indicated by the
suffix “-gen” all references below are to the Project Specific DEPs. The purpose of
this procedure is to provide direction where these standards are incomplete, and
provide additional project-specific details to ensure that the design is implemented in
accordance with the Project Requirements.

This amendment retains the design requirements given in the previous version which
was issued for the BDEP phase (and have been implemented) in order that EP(C)
contractors may verify that these requirements have been included. It also
incorporates changes to design requirements in the original specification but its main
purpose is to ensure that the Process Design intent is correctly interpreted during the
Engineering and Procurement phase. This amendment therefore includes additional
information on the minimum level of checking to be undertaken by Engineering
Contractors.

2.0 SCOPE

This procedure outlines the requirements for the process specification of major
equipment items (columns, drums, exchangers, pumps, compressors, etc), piping
systems, and relief system design, with particular attention to those requirements
necessary for the BDEP and Engineering deliverables.

3.0 PROCESS FLOW SCHEMES, SAFEGUARDING FLOWSCHEMES & MEMORANDA

3.1 Process Flow Schemes

The Process Flow Schemes (PFS), also known as Process Flow Diagrams, were
received by BSF from the licensors. Not all of these have been redrawn in
accordance to the standards supplied in DEPs. Contractors shall redraw those that
are not in the correct format in accordance with the Project Standards. They shall

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maintain all current and if necessary reissue to be consistent with the final (as built)
PEFSs.

3.2 Process Safeguarding Memoranda and Process Safeguarding Flowschemes

Contractors shall maintain these current, that is in-line with engineering

developments, and reissue when appropriate. Refer to DEP 01.00.02.12-CSPC.

See also section 6.0 below for safeguarding philosophy.

4.0 DATA SHEET PREPARATION

4.1 Equipment

The philosophy for data sheet preparation is to have all disciplines work with the
same data sheets, which are included in the BDEP (there are not separate process
and mechanical data sheets). These data sheets are referred to as EDRSs
(Engineering Data Requisition Sheets). BSF mechanical engineers in Reading have
modified Shell EDRSs to meet project requirements. Contractors shall ensure these
documents are maintained current and include any changes which may arise during
Engineering; such changes could include pump and compressor pressure profiles,
instrument pressure drops and package unit operating requirements. Further
changes might arise from vendor feedback.

The split between Process and Mechanical Engineers for data entry and
maintenance on the data sheet is not identified. This split will be determined on an
office-by-office and/or unit-by-unit basis.

The standard data sheets include data sheets for vessel internals (trays, the
schoepentoeter inlet device, demisters, and spray nozzles and distributors).

4.2 Instruments and Relief Valves

Relief valves, control valves, and other instruments are specified using the INtools
database. Engineering Contractors shall maintain this database current and in
particular shall input data that are not included in the BDEP version of the database.
Engineering Contractors’ Process Engineers shall update information as necessary to
be consistent with Engineering Development; such changes might arise due to
changes in hydraulic profile (pressure drops, elevations) or changes in assumed

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equipment data. New instruments might be required to satisfy the operating needs of
mechanical equipment or package units.

For package units Engineering Contractors shall ensure that instruments are
adequately and accurately specified. For relief devices Engineering Contractor shall
ensure that the requirements of the PEFS are met and all relief cases considered and
relief rates correctly determined.

5.0 HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE IDENTIFICATION

The design of several classes of equipment (including pressure vessels, rotating

equipment and relief valves) is impacted by the hazardous substance classification
for the material being processed. The classifications of concern are for “lethal”, “very
toxic” and “toxic” substances. Lists of substances are given in Project Procedure
“Health Design Criteria Procedure” (PR-8560-0000-0012) for substances likely to be
encountered on this project. Health, Safety, and Environmental should be contacted
for the proper classification of substances not included on these lists.

The hazardous substance classification does not affect all equipment; in addition, the
classification system itself is different for different equipment classes. Refer to the
details given below for the individual equipment classes for more information.

5.1 Special Guidelines for Benzene

There are special guidelines for the design of units containing benzene. These
guidelines were given in the BOD, as an attachment to the HSE chapter, and are
presented here as Attachment 2. The threshold concentration below which special
safeguards are not necessary is 5 wt.% benzene.

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6.0 PLANT SAFEGUARDING SYSTEMS

Safeguarding can be defined as the protection provided against uncontrolled

loss of containment.
Safeguarding systems include:

a) Ultimate safeguards that serve as the final level of protection against

uncontrolled loss of containment (e.g. relief valves, rupture discs, IPFs).

b) Mitigating systems that are designed to limit the consequences of an

uncontrolled loss of containment (e.g. ROVs in pump suctions,
depressurising systems, ESD, water spray/ deluge systems).

c) Capacity determining components, which are designed to limit relief, loads

(e.g. control valves, capacity restriction orifices).

DEP 01.00.02.12 gives further guidance.

OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION

Overpressure protection is required where a process, system or equipment

failure can cause the pressure in an item of equipment or pressure system to
exceed the maximum pressure allowed by the pressure vessel design code.
Wherever possible and cost-effective, the process design of the facilities shall
be inherently safe and shall minimise the requirements for overpressure
protection and disposal systems.

The devices for overpressure protection are covered in (a) above.

For the design of mechanical relief devices and relief systems refer to section
12 of this document, ‘Relief System Design’. Use of IPFs for relief load
mitigation is also discussed.

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IPF / IPS

An Instrumented Protective Function (IPF) is defined as one or more initiators,

a logic solver and one or more Final Elements whose purpose is to prevent or
mitigate Hazardous Situations.

An Instrumented Protective System (IPS) is the logic-solving equipment that

performs the IPF.

In the case where malfunction of plant equipment or its associated

instrumentation would give rise to hazards for personnel, environment
pollution or high economic loss, resulting in sufficiently high integrity
requirements, an independent Instrumented Protective System (IPS) shall be
installed in addition to the control system. The IPS system shall incorporate
segregation by process systems to minimise common mode failure plant trips.

IPFs’ shall function independently of the control system with their own
initiating and actuating devices. Process variables used for protection shall be
directly measured where possible and transmitted to the DCS for Measurement
Validation and Comparison (MVC).”

IPF/ IPS implementation on the project is further defined in the ‘Process

Control and Operating Philosophy’ PH-8120-0000-0001. Relevant DEP’s are DEP
32.80.10.10 and DEP 32.80.10.12. PR-8120-0000-0001 Appendix E1 further
describes IPFs for narrative purposes.

EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN AND DEPRESSURISING SYSTEMS

Where required, Process units and their related facilities shall be protected by
specially designed Emergency Shutdown (ESD) and /or Emergency
Depressurising (EDP) systems. They are an integral part of the Safeguarding
platform and shall be installed as part of the IPS.

The ESD system isolates process streams entering or leaving plant equipment
and facilities, removes heat input from process heaters / reboilers and de-
energises rotating equipment. It is a hierarchical system that can activate a
plant wide shutdown, an individual train shutdown or a zonal shutdown.

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ROVs (remotely operated valves) shall be provided on pump suctions as

identified in DEP 80.47.10.30 para. 2.3.2.

Emergency Depressurising will be initiated after ESD is complete. Such

systems are required to limit the hazards associated with large inventories of
flammable gas/liquified gas in emergency situations. DEP 80.45.10.10 has a
requirement for emergency depressurising systems as follows: All process equipment
containing at least 4 m3 of butane or an even more volatile liquid under normal
operating conditions shall be provided with remotely operated vapour depressurising
valves. Guidelines for the design of these systems are given in the DEPs.

7.0 DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

The procedures for setting maximum operating pressures and temperatures and
design pressures and temperatures are described in DEP 01.00.01.30, Definition of
Temperature, Pressure and Toxicity Levels. Please note the following:

 A separate set of design conditions has been set for steaming-out operations,
with a design temperature of 150C and design pressure of 3.5 barg. A separate
steam supply shall be provided for steaming out purposes and utility stations
where there is no other supply which meets these design conditions. A vacuum
rating for steaming-out is not required, as prevention of vacuum will be addressed
by adequate operating procedures. (In general, equipment will be designed for
steam-out.) However, some equipment will not be subject to steam-out for
process and/or operational reasons.

 Equipment shall be designed for full vacuum if it could be subjected to sub-

atmospheric pressure. If this would entail too high a cost, a lower external
overpressure may be selected for the design of the equipment or a vacuum
breaker may be installed. Both solutions require the Principal’s approval (DEP
01.00.01.30, Sect. 4.2.1.4).

8.0 PRESSURE VESSELS

An identification of whether or not a vessel is in “very toxic substance” service must

be made for all vessels (DEP 31.22.10.32). The “very toxic substance” classification
impacts design and fabrication; for instance, in ASME code, vessels are to be
fabricated to ASME VIII Division 2 instead of Division 1. The list of very toxic

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substances encountered on this project is given in given in Project document “Health

Design Criteria Specification” (SP-8560-0000-0015). The threshold concentration
below which this classification does not apply is 5 wt.% of very toxic substance, DEP
01.00.01.30. refers.

In addition, an identification of “hydrogen service” should be made for vessels.

According to DEP 31.22.10.32, hydrogen service applies when the hydrogen partial
pressure is greater than 7 bars (abs).

These classifications shall be included on the equipment data sheet, and on the
Hazardous Service Table, which is to be included on the Process Safeguarding Flow
Scheme. See Section 12.1, Hazardous Service Table, for additional details.

Note that the DEPs do allow use of ASME VIII Div 1 for vessels in very toxic service,
under the following conditions (DEP 31.22.20.31, Part II):

 Approved by the principal

 100% NDE (non-destructive examination) is specified

 Additional requirements, as specified by principal, are met

It is currently envisioned that most vessels will be fabricated in China to Chinese

code; however, some equipment will be fabricated outside China to ASME code. For
Process Engineering, the vessel fabrication code can have some effect on relief
system design work. Refer to the Relief System Design Basis (Attachment 3) for
more information.

For vessel size increments, there are no standards, except for small vessels with full
body flanges, where standard flange sizes are an advantage. For the larger vessels,
since each one is virtually custom-made, there are no cost advantages in
standardising on diameter or length increments.

8.1 Drums

Detailed sizing procedures are given in DEP 31.22.05.11 for gas/liquid separators
and DEP 31.22.05.12 for liquid/liquid and gas/liquid/liquid separators and DEP
80.45.10.10 for flare KO drums. The sizing procedure must be chosen to match the
duty/service of the separator.

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For drum sizing, a design margin is applied. For CSPC, the design margin on flow
shall be 1.15, and shall apply to gas/liquid, liquid/liquid, and gas/liquid/liquid
separators. This margin is used in the drum sizing procedure, but is not applied to
nozzle sizing. The design margin may be modified in the design-to-capacity review
for specific applications, or by the licensor, where they have used a greater design
margin.

Shell has a proprietary inlet device, the schoepentoeter, which is the preferred feed
inlet for separators. However, a cheaper half-open pipe inlet can be used where the
vapor-liquid separation is not critical.

DEP 31.20.20.31 Sect. 2.4, prefers manholes to be at least 610 mm, but in any case
shall be not less than 460 mm.

For compressor suction KO drums, DEP 31.22.05.11 Sec. 3.3.1 lists wire mesh pad
demisters as a “non-recommended use” for compressor suction drums, unless
precautions are taken to prevent loose wire cuttings entering the compressor, or of
the demister mat becoming clogged and thereby increasing the suction pressure
drop. The required precautions are captured as instructions to vendor, and are
included as part of the standard demister pad notes to be included with the process
data (EDRS).

For specification of demister pads, the following notes should be included, for all
services, including compressor suction drums:

 Design and construction shall be in accordance with the requirements of DEP

31.22.05.11.

 The demister mat shall be made of knitted wire formed to give the correct shape,
and not cut so as to leave raw edges and loose pieces of wire, which could
become detached.

 The wire mesh shall have a free volume > 97%, a wire surface > 350 m 2/m3 and a
wire thickness >0.23 mm and < 0.28 mm.

 The wire mat shall be placed between two grids having a free area of at least
97%. The mat shall be fastened in such a way that it cannot be compressed
when being mounted.

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Note that relief valve inlets should originate below the wire mesh pad unless the relief
flow is of similar order of magnitude to the normal flow (DEP 80.45.10.10 §2.8.1).

8.2 Columns

Refer to DEP 31.20.20.31, Internals for Columns.

The schoepentoeter is the preferred feed inlet for tray and packed columns.

Top domes on columns (flanged, with a diameter of 1 to 1.5 m) are recommended but
not required by DEP 31.20.20.31, Sec. 2.4. Such domes are not to be supplied on
this project; access shall be by a manhole.

Per DEP 31.20.20.31 Sect. 2.4, manholes should be at least 610 mm, but in any case
shall be not less than 460 mm. Recommendations on locating manholes are as
follows:

 Every 15 or 20 fractionating trays

 Next to a schoepentoeter
 Below a spray distributor
 Above a gravity liquid distributor
 Below draw-off trays
 In the column sump
 In the flash zone
 At the top of column

8.3 Level Setting and Surge Requirements

The requirements for setting vessel levels and surge requirements are given in DEP
31.22.05.11, Appendix V and DEP 80.45.10.10 Chapter 5 for flare KO drums. The
surge volumes (from low to high level alarms – given as “general principles for hold-
up times for control”, not requirements) are given in the former DEP as:

 One minute on “short” circulation flows (i.e. back to inlet of vessel) PLUS

 Two minutes on longer circulation flows (other upstream vessels within unit)
PLUS

 Two minutes on product to storage OR three minutes on product to other

equipment/vessels OR four minutes on product to a furnace.

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For reflux, use two minutes.

This appendix also gives information on the setting of low to low-low level and high to
high-high level trip settings.

8.4 Vortex Breakers

Continuous liquid outlets on columns and vessels shall each be provided with a
vortex breaker, and in the following cases internally extended vortex breakers shall
be used:

 In fouling service

 For the hydrocarbon liquid outlets of separators where the liquid is separated from
water or aqueous solutions, except where this would give rise to corrosion
problems in the bottom (DEP 31.22.20.31, Sect. 3.8)

9.0 EXCHANGERS

DEP 31.21.01.30-CSPC gives specifications for exchangers. Please note the

following:

 Maximum cooling water return temperature is 42C (Sect. 3.2). Note also that the
DEP on fouling resistances for heat transfer equipment (DEP 20.21.00.31) says
that the maximum water side skin temperature in clean condition shall not be
higher than 52C.

 There was a maximum nominal shell diameter and tube length specified in the
Shell DEP. However, this requirement has been deleted from the project-
customised DEP (DEP 31.20.01.30) and client approval is not required for larger
shells.

 Also dropped from the project-customised DEP is the requirement that cooling
water be on the tube side, and for minimum cooling water velocities (given in DEP
20.21.00.31); these are now recommendations, not requirements, and do not
require client approval if not followed.

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 The DEP also provides guidelines on use of fixed tube and U-tube exchangers,
and allowed/recommended TEMA types. For instance, no Type P floating heads
are allowed. Where fixed tubesheet or U-tube bundles are specified by licensors
or BSF designers, DEP 31.21.01.30 should be checked to make sure the service
meets the requirements for the use of these types. Otherwise, floating head
exchangers are to be used.

Fouling resistances are given for a number of processing units in DEP 20.21.00.31,
including several units in CSPC Nanhai; however, in general, the fouling resistances
specified by the licensor should be used in the design. For fouling resistances in
water and steam service, there have been no project-specific values generated; the
values in DEP 20.21.00.21, Table 22 should be used.

10.0PUMPS

The identification of service category and service type is required for the proper
mechanical design of pumps. These terms are defined as in DEP 31.29.02.11. Sec.
1.3.2. These classifications need to be included on the equipment data sheet.

10.1 Service Category

Service Category is “vital service”, “essential service”, or “non-essential service”.

The definitions of these terms are given in DEP 31.29.02.11, Appendix 1.

10.2 Service Type

The service types are “abrasive service”, “hazardous service”, and “non-corrosive or
mildly corrosive service”. The hazardous service classification has three categories
(Category 1, Category 2, and Category 3), depending upon the toxicity classifications.
Refer to Project document “Health Design Criteria Specification” (SP-8560-0000-
0015) to determine classification for compounds encountered on this project. The
concentration threshold below which the hazardous service classification does not
apply is 5 wt.%..

The classifications are as follows:

 Abrasive service – Yes or No

 Hazardous service – Category 1, Category 2, Category 3, or No
 Non-corrosive or mildly corrosive service – Yes or No

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For a substance in hazardous service, the distinction among Category 1, Category 2,

and Category 3 affects only the pump shaft sealing system.

In addition to appearing on the data sheet, the hazardous service classification also
appears on the Hazardous Services Table on the PSFS. See Section 12.1.

10.3 NPSH

NPSH requirements are given in the DEP (31.29.02.11, Sect. 3.2.4 and 3.3). They
shall be applied by the Mechanical Equipment Engineer.

10.4 Downstream Design Pressures and Surge

For the BDEP phase, an estimate of the head rise to shut-off will have been made for
setting downstream design pressures for equipment (such as exchangers) and
piping, because manufacturers’ pump curves were not available. The validity of this
estimate must be checked against purchased pumps and design pressures increased
if necessary.

Note that surge pressures must be considered when determining design pressures
for downstream piping. Generally, surge pressures should not exceed the design
pressure of the selected piping class although the excursions allowed by ASME
B31.3 may be applied subject to the conditions therein.

The Offsites and Utility systems contractor shall be responsible for:

 undertaking detailed surge analysis for interconnecting piping using

information supplied by ISBL contractors.

 proposing means for limiting surge pressures to values acceptable within the
selected piping class.

Possible solutions include reducing closing speed of shut-off valves, increasing line
size, selection of pumps with lower head rise to shut off or use of surge buffer
vessels. This last method should only be considered in the absence of other suitable
methods. Note that there is further detail on surge protection in DEP 31.40.10.14-gen
and other DEPs.

ISBL Contractors shall be responsible for implementing surge protection measures.

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The following should be noted:

 Very large lines might not be suitable for vacuum conditions that could occur
on pump trip or upstream valve closure.

 GRE/GRP lines are not permitted any pressure excursion

 GRE/GRP surge calculation should use values of Young’s Modulus obtained

from the pipe manufacturer.

10.5 Minimum Flow

For flows less than about 3.4 m 3/hr (15USGPM), a larger pump is usually purchased
and a fixed recycle is added to provide for recirculation of excess pumped fluid to the
suction supply. An orifice plate is frequently included in the bypass line and the pump
vendor, who can size the orifice for a minimum flow requirement, can supply this.
The pump requisition sheet should specify a capacity equal to the desired flow
(including extra capacity) plus the amount bypassed.

10.6 Design Margins

Pump specifications should include a minimum design margin on flow of 10%. This is
to ensure required flow can be achieved and allow for control. The margin may be
adjusted in accordance with good engineering practice for example increased to 25%
to ensure good control in reflux duty or reduced for non-critical applications such as
batch transfer duties.

10.7 Hydraulic Checks

Engineering contractors shall check hydraulics of pumped systems against the final
pipe routing and suppliers’ equipment pressure drops and revise pump specifications
(EDRS) if necessary. Note that heat exchanger pressure drops should include a
margin for fouled pressure drop in accordance with DEP 20.21.00.31.

Note that DEP 31.38.01.11 proposes that reducers be upstream of suction

valves and downstream of discharge valves this must be checked
hydraulically before implementation.

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11.0COMPRESSORS

11.1 General

In a manner similar to pumps, service classifications must be made for compressors

(See DEP 31.29.40.10, Sec. 1.3.2). The service categories are the same as for
pumps - “vital”, “essential” and “non-essential” service - and use the same guidelines
for classification. However, for service type, the only classification is whether or not
the compressor handles a “very toxic substance”. The list of very toxic substances
for this project is given in Project document “Health Design Criteria Specification”
(SP-8560-0000-0015) in which these are substances give the DEP Category 1 or 2.
The concentration threshold at or above which the more stringent DEP (ie lower
number) category applies is 5 wt.%. These service classifications are to appear on
the equipment data sheet.

In addition, an identification of “hydrogen service” should also be made for

compressors. Per DEP 31.29.40.10, hydrogen service applies when the hydrogen
partial pressure is greater than 7 bar (abs). Hydrogen service classification is to
appear on the equipment data sheet.

In addition to appearing on the data sheet, the DEP Category and hydrogen service
classifications also appear on the Hazardous Services Table on the PSFS

11.2 Hydraulic Checks

Engineering contractors shall check hydraulics of compressor systems against the

final pipe routing and suppliers’ equipment pressure drops and revise specifications
(EDRS) if necessary. Note that heat exchanger pressure drops should include a
margin for fouled pressure drop in accordance with DEP 20.21.00.31.

12.0RELIEF SYSTEM DESIGN

The Relief System Design Philosophy is included in this specification as

Attachment 3.

Note that Engineering Contractors shall ensure that relief system final hydraulics
reflect final (as built) line routings.

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12.1 Hazardous Services Table on PSFS

The hazardous service (DEP) classification, which is made for several classes of
equipment, appears on the equipment data sheet. This information should also be
compiled on the Hazardous Services Table, which is included on the Process
Safeguarding Flow Scheme. The template for this table is included as Attachment 1.

13.0 LINE SIZING CRITERIA

Line sizing requirements are given in the DEP: 31.38.01.11 as follows:

Preliminary Pipe Sizing

Appendix 1 of the above DEP may be used for preliminary pipe sizing of pump
suction and discharge piping.

Appendix 2 of the above DEP gives the flow rates (m3/h) for various velocities (m/s),
which may be used for both liquid and gas piping.

The following velocities should be used for preliminary pipe sizing for interconnecting
piping:

-water and other liquids 0.5 to 5 m/s;

-air and other gases 10 to 20 m/s;
-saturated steam (dry) 15 to 30 m/s;
-superheated steam 30 to 60 m/s;
-vacuum pipes10 to 100 m/s.

The above figures are not applicable to sludge, slurry, erosive fluids or two-phase
flow.

For sizing of flare and vent systems see DEP 80.45.10.10.

To determine the flow pattern of two-phase flow see DEP 31.22.05.11.

Final Pipe Sizing Considerations

The following should be considered in determining a suitable pipe size:

1) The available pressure drop.

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2) The fact that pressure surges may occur in the piping system.

3) The fact that erosion may occur in the piping system.

4) The fact that the piping system may be subjected to vibrations.

5) The fact that settlement of solids if the fluid is a slurry may occur.

6) Type of flow pattern of two-phase flow. An intermittent flow pattern shall be

avoided.

7) The allowable temperature drop if the fluid is highly viscous.

8) An economic pipe diameter should be chosen taking into consideration the capital
expenditure and operating expenditure of the pumps, compressors and the piping
system.

The above considerations shall be taken into account both for the design capacity
and for conditions such as starting up, shutting down and regeneration.

Relief valve piping

For sizing of relief valve inlet and discharge piping, see DEP 80.45.10.10. Note that
full-bore ball valves should generally be used for relief valve isolation.

Two Phase Flow

Extra precautions shall be taken for two-phase flow. Particularly if the flow pattern is
intermittent (slug or plug flow), the piping system will be subjected to high excitation
forces and these flow regimes shall be avoided whenever possible. These flow
regimes can be prevented or reduced by proper location of pressure control valves.
The graphs in DEP 31.22.05.11. should be used to determine what type of flow
pattern will occur, but they are only a rough indication. Furthermore the actual
conditions in the plant could largely deviate from the design conditions. This shall be
taken into account and in case of doubt the worst case flow pattern shall be taken
(3.5).

For two-phase flow in flare pipes see DEP 80.45.10.10.

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14.0 PIPING DESIGN CONDITIONS

A piping system shall be designed for the most severe conditions to which it may be
subjected. The following may determine the design conditions:

 steaming-out pressure and temperature;

 surge pressure (see DEP: 31.38.01.11, Section 2.3.4);

 pump shut-off pressure;

 static pressure;

 pressure drop;

 vacuum caused by cooling and possible condensing of trapped medium;

 steam/nitrogen purge pressure.

In situations where different design conditions exist in one piping system, different
piping classes may be used. These "spec. breaks" shall be located such that the
more severe design condition can never occur in the part of the system with the lower
piping class.

In situations where in-line equipment (e.g. control valves) with a higher ASME rating
class than the run pipe is fitted, the connecting flanges shall have the same rating as
the in-line equipment and the same wall thickness as the pipe.

If a system operating above 0 °C is connected to a system operating at 0 °C or

below, the first 50 D (with a maximum of 10 m) shall be designed to the specifications
of the lower temperature system.

ASME B31.3 provides allowances for pressure and temperature variations. Allocating
a design pressure below the maximum surge pressure according to these allowances
shall only be considered if major cost reductions can be achieved. Allowance for
excursions above the design pressure shall be strictly in accordance with the
requirements of ASME B31.3.

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If an external pressure can only result from structural failure of equipment, failure of
safety devices or other unpredictable events, it shall not be taken in consideration
when establishing the design pressure of the piping.

For the definition of various pressure and temperature levels, see DEP 01.00.01.30.

Piping subject to sub-atmospheric pressure shall be designed for full vacuum.

15.0 CONTROL VALVE BYPASSES

Control valve bypasses should be provided for aggressive service such as erosive or
corrosive duties.

By-passes shall not be provided where the control valve is subject to trip action (fail
closed) or for batch or intermittent duties. Where the control valve by-pass increases the
relief device size for the gas break-through case, even though the test pressure is used
as the relieving pressure (as allowed by DEP 80.45.10.10 Sec. 2.2.1), the by-pass may
be reduced in size or eliminated.

By-pass elimination may be considered in other cases where they provide little or no
benefit in terms of plant reliability/availability; such elimination would be subject to HAZOP
review.

16.0 DRAINAGE PHILOSOPHY

The project Drainage philosophy is described in Project Specification SP-8310-

0000-0009.

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ATTACHMENT 1

HAZARDOUS SERVICES TABLE

Attached is the template Hazardous Services Table. This table should be included on the
Process Safeguarding Flow Scheme.

HAZARDOUS SERVICE TABLE

VESSELS (DRUMS AND COLUMNS)

Equip. No. Name Very Toxic Service Hydrogen Service

Yes/No Yes/No

PUMPS

Equip. No. Name Hazardous Service

(Category 1,2, or 3 or
No)

COMPRESSORS

Equip. No. Name Very Toxic Service Hydrogen Service

Yes/No Yes/No

RELIEF VALVES

Equip. No. Name Very Toxic Service

Yes/No

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ATTACHMENT 2

Date: 17 July 1998

From: H.Heetveld Shell Global Solutions-OGCH/1 The Tel: 3776136

Hague

To: OGTB, OGPP, OGBP, SI-HEH/1, SI-HEL/5

Copy: OGCH/1 (circulation), SIC-CTES/3

GUIDELINES FOR THE DESIGN AND ENGINEERING OF UNITS CONTAINING BENZENE.

1. Introduction:

Benzene is a known human carcinogen and has a Shell advised occupational exposure limit for
personal exposures of 1 ppm 8 hour Time Weighted Average (TWA). Action should be taken to
ensure compliance with this limit to minimise the health risk Note 1.

The Shell Group HSE-MS requires that all HSE risks to the business are reduced to ‘as low as
reasonably practicable’ (ALARP)Note 2. This is further supported for health risks by the HSE panel
guide on ‘Health Risk Assessment’, 1994, which advocates implementation of exposure controls
according to the following hierarchy:-

elimination

substitution

engineering

procedural

personal protective equipment (PPE)

With the use of PPE as a secondary line of defence, or where no alternative is practicable, e.g. in
emergency situations.

As a carcinogen, benzene is of particular concern to health for which elimination or substitution is

advocated. Where this cannot be achieved, control at source should be adopted by the
preferential use of closed systems, as far as possible, supported by procedures to ensure
exposures are minimised and ongoing maintenance of control measures. Exposure monitoring
and health surveillance may be required to monitor compliance.

The use of closed systems for benzene is further supported by the EEC Council Directive
90/394/EEC which specifies in article 5.2 that …quote: “where it is not possible to replace the

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carcinogen by a substance, preparation or process, which under its condition of use is not
dangerous or is less dangerous to health and safety, the employer shall ensure that the
carcinogen is, in so far as is technically possible, manufactured and used in a closed system.”
(unquote). The next article 5.3 states (quote): “Where a closed system is not technically possible,
the employer shall ensure that the level of exposure of workers is reduced to as low a level as
technically possible”.

In the past, some design and engineering guidelines for benzene-rich streams were generated
on an ad-hoc basis, as evidenced by the fact that for past projects the maximum benzene
concentration in streams, for which specific precautions were required, varied between 5-20 %
wt. There should, however, be clear and consistent guidance on the design and engineering of
processing, storage and handling facilities for products, containing benzene.

The German TA-Luft legislation states, that special precautions are required for streams
containing more than 5% wt. of benzene and this is also the accepted basis for new plants within
SIC. The requirement appears to be very stringent but it is fully in accordance with the before-
mentioned specification in article 5.2 of the EEC Council Directive. We therefore recommend
applying the below-stated guidelines for new plants for all process streams containing over 5%
wt. of benzene, in line with the current TA-Luft guideline.

2. Health Risk Assessment and Controlling Exposures:

For new units, a Health Risk Assessment should be implemented at the design stage to ensure
that consideration is given to adopting the most appropriate engineering measures to minimise
exposures at source, taking account of the design and engineering guidelines given below.

For existing units, Health Risk Assessment should be carried to establish the existing measures
being used to control personal exposures to ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ and their
effectiveness in ensuring compliance with the occupational exposure limit Note 1. Where
necessary, additional control measures should be introduced taking account of the design and
engineering guidelines given below.

In addition to controlling exposures to ‘ALARP’, it is recommended that a leak detection and

remediation programme be set up to monitor the tightness of the equipment. This will also
provide plant personnel with a better awareness of the areas of potential leak sources.

HEH/1 or HEL/5 may be contacted for further advice and details

References:

Shell HSE Panel publications:

Benzene Briefing Note, 1991

HSE-MS, 1994

Health Risk Assessment, 1994

Chemical Hazards: Health Risk Assessment and Exposure Evaluation, 1995

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3. Design and Engineering Guidelines for Hydrocarbon Streams, containing over 5% wt.
of Benzene.

3.1 General:

Benzene is classified as a "toxic", rather than a “very toxic”, chemical. This classification is
important in view of some of the engineering requirements, as laid down in the Shell Group's
Design and Engineering Practices (DEP), where a distinction is made between toxic and very
toxic streams.

{Note that for the CSPC Nanhai project PR-8560-0000-0012, Health Design Criteria benzene is
classified as DEP Category 2}

Keep inventories of benzene-containing streams as low as possible

The need to retrofit an existing installation with any of the items from the next sections 2-5 should
be based on controlling exposures to ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ based on the Health Risk
Assessment, including compliance for all relevant personnel with the occupational exposure limit
of 1 ppm 8 hour Time Weighted Average Note1. However, double pump seals and frequently-used
sample connections should be retrofitted, where possible.

For better awareness, place warning signs at sample connections and pump seals.

3.2. Equipment.

Pumps should be effectively sealed. For new units, apply double mechanical seals, pressurised
with an adequate ‘inert’ barrier fluid or vented to a closed system, such as a flare. An alternative
is the use of “canned” type pumps. For existing plants, retrofitting with double seals should be
considered whenever a pump needs to come into the workshop for repair. See also item 1.3.

For new plants, pressure vessel codes and rules for “toxic” substances should be applied.
The limits apply mainly to material selection and x-ray of welds.

For new designs, tanks should be equipped with nitrogen blanketing and vapour lines connected
to a treatment facility, to recover or incinerate the benzene. Existing facilities could possibly be
retrofitted without too many problems, if there is a need, based on exposure levels (see item 1.3).

3.3. Pipe-work:

For new plants or for revamp projects, the selection of pipe-work elements should be such to
minimise fugitive emissions. A high quality gasket system, spiral wound with graphite filling or
equivalent should be applied. For existing units, retrofitting cannot be justified, if the system is
sufficiently tight.

For new units, special attention should be given to valve selection in order to minimise emission,
i.e. ball valves or bellows sealed valves. See also note 3

For new units, minimise flanges and valves to a minimum required for operation and
maintenance.

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3.4. Drains & Vents:

For new units, operational drains should be hooked up to a closed drain system. See also note 3.

For new units, operational vents should be connected to a closed system, from which the
vapours can be disposed of or treated (flare, vapour recovery systems, carbon bed absorbers).

For new units vapours from vents, which cannot be connected to a closed system or flare facility
(e.g. at remote locations like jetties), should be treated to remove benzene from the vapours (for
example a carbon bed absorber or vapour recovery system).

Existing plants will most likely not have a closed drain and vent system. Here every effort should
be made to minimise drainage or venting during normal operation and to avoid drainage of
benzene-rich material prior to opening up equipment/piping, by flushing with low-benzene fluids
or by switching to a low-benzene operating mode prior to shutdown.

3.5. Sampling Systems

Sampling of benzene-containing streams should be minimised and for new units low-emission
sample systems should be used as a standard, such as the DOPAK system. For existing plants,
retrofitting is also recommended, at the very least for the more-frequently-used sampling
connections.

Note: Subsequent analysis of samples should be carried out using laboratory facilities designed
to minimise exposure, e.g. fume cupboards.

3.6. Fixed Air Monitoring Systems

For new plants, consideration should be given to a fixed air monitoring system for benzene,
consisting of air sampling points manifolded to a central GC-FID analyser with data logging to
follow release trends. Alarms should be set to trip at 0.5 ppm.

Such a system is also recommended for existing plants, where it is shown to be reasonably
practicable to install. However, if this is not the case, more emphasis must be placed on manual
leak detection and personal exposure monitoring. See note 4 for further details.

Experience indeed indicates that fixed air monitoring equipment for benzene identifies the
occurrence of regular releases, e.g. via valve packing, sight glasses. Air monitoring data assists
in identifying failure trends and the severity of the release, thereby allowing for a more targeted
maintenance regime and maximising available resources. In turn, this reduces the amount of
personal exposure monitoring required.

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Notes:

1. A company should comply in the first instance with their own country’s occupational exposure limit for benzene.
Where the Shell-advised limit of 1 ppm 8 hour Time Weighted Average is more stringent, compliance should be
with this limit.

2 ALARP: To reduce a risk to a level which is ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ involves balancing reduction in
risk against the time, trouble, difficulty and cost of achieving it. The higher the risk, the greater the measures
required to achieve ‘ALARP’

3 In Germany, valves with special (carbon) seals are specified for benzene-containing and treating plants and
non-operational drains from e.g. heat exchangers, control valve set-ups, level gauges, etc. are specified to be
connected to the closed drain system).

4 To meet the principle of controlling risk to ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) for carcinogens, a
monitoring regime in its widest sense (e.g. personal exposure, fixed equipment, condition monitoring) is
considered to play a key role in alerting to potential problems, so that prompt action can be taken. Fixed real-
time monitors can demonstrate the effectiveness of such action and in turn assist in providing evidence that
uncontrolled releases, and therefore unplanned exposures, are not occurring.

It is the intention to include these guidelines in the next update of our report MF 92-0304
“Process Engineering Safeguarding Practices Manual”. They should also be included in Process
Guides & Design Manuals for Units with “benzene-rich” process streams.

OGCH/1 -H.Heetveld, 17/7/98 (note prepared with input from SI-HEL/5 and SIC-CTES/3)

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ATTACHMENT 3

RELIEF SYSTEM DESIGN PHILOSOPHY FOR CSPC NANHAI PETROCHEMICALS

PROJECT

1.0 Introduction
The Relief System Design Philosophy document presents the bases, assumptions, and scope
exclusions that are to be used as the basis for developing the safety relief system for the project.

2.0 Terminology

Definitions of the commonly used terms are found in API RP 520, API RP 521, and API STD
2000. Additional special terms or abbreviations are identified in Shell DEP 01.00.01.30.

3.0 Applicable Regulations, Codes, and Standards

Regulations

Supervision Regulation on Safety Technology for Pressure Vessels, QTB GF [1999} No. 154.
China State Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision

Codes

National Standard of the People’s Republic of China, GB 150 – 1998, Steel Pressure Vessels

ASME SECTION I, Rules for Construction of Power Boilers Non-Interfiled (Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Codes)

ASME SECTION VIII Divisions I, II, and III, Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels (Boiler
and Pressure Vessel Codes)

ASME B31.3 Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refinery Piping

NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquid Code

PD 5500 Unfired Fusion Welded Pressure Vessels. British Standards Institute.

The intent is to have most vessels fabricated in China; these vessels will be fabricated to the
Chinese code. However, certain vessels considered more complicated or unusual will be
fabricated outside China to ASME code. China accepts vessels for import when fabricated to
certain recognised codes, of which ASME is one, provided certain criteria are met. Also, the
client apparently has not ruled out the possibility of designing some vessels to the British code
PD 5500.

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Because of differences in the Codes, it will be necessary to know a vessel’s fabrication code for
the final relief system design. In addition, it is possible to have vessels designed to different
codes sharing the same relief valve; for instance a column may be designed to ASME code and
its reflux drum to Chinese code. Care will have to be taken in the relief design of such systems.

It shall be the responsibility of the detailed engineering contractor to ensure compliance with
applicable codes for the final relief system design. For the purposes of the BDEP phase design
work, a decision will be made on an office-by-office and/or unit-by-unit basis on whether to
perform the work simply assuming ASME code for all equipment, or attempt to account for the
various codes based on anticipated point of fabrication/applicable code for the equipment.

Standards and Recommended Practices

API RP 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in Refineries; Part 1
- Sizing and Selection

API RP 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in Refineries; Part 2
- Installation

API RP 521 Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressurising Systems

API STD 526 Flanged Steel Pressure Relief Valves

API STD 620 Design and Construction of Large, Welded, Low-Pressure Storage Tanks

API STD 650 Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage

API STD 2000 Venting Atmospheric and Low-Pressure Storage Tanks

4.0 Project Specific Specifications / Client Requirements

The following Shell Design and Engineering Practice (DEP) publications for safety relief systems
have been adopted as project standards.

Definition of Temperature, Pressure and Toxicity Levels. DEP 01.00.01.30 (Technical

Specification)

Relief Valves – Selection, Sizing and Specification. DEP 80.36.00.30, (Technical Specification)

Pressure Relief, Emergency Depressurising, Flare and Vent Systems. DEP 80.45.10.10.
(Manual)

Interlocking Systems for Safety/Relief Valves. DEP 80.46.30.11. (Manual)

Preparation of Safeguarding Memoranda and Process Safeguarding Flow Schemes.

DEP 01.00.02.12. (Manual)

Classification and Implementation of Instrumented Protective Functions. DEP 32.80.10.10.

(Manual)

5.0 Relief Stream Disposal Systems

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The current basis for the flaring facilities is a single general purpose flare header with 3 x 50%
flare stacks installed in one structure, each with its own KO drum.

For cold releases to the flare at less than -50C, such as from LOP, the intent is to provide
heaters in the cold flare header to allow discharge into the general-purpose header. These shall
be part of the ISBL Engineering Contractor’s supply. As currently envisioned, the flare system is
“closed”. Backpressure is held on the flare header by a 400mm pressure control valve (PCV) set
at 0.25barg and full size pressure switch valves (PZVs), protected by rupture discs. The PZVs
are designed to open at 0.3 barg. The rupture disks have a set pressure of 0.5 barg. A flare gas
recovery system is also included, which compresses flare header gas back into the fuel gas
system. The use of a “PZV / parallel bursting disc arrangement” gives less flaring and increased
flare header gas recovery.

The nominal back pressures to be used for preliminary selection and sizing of relief devices by
the process engineer has yet to be determined for the BDEP phase. The BOD basis (Section
6.14, Flare and Pressure Relief Systems) is as follows:

Pressure in header 0.5 barg (as the rupture discs in the “PZV / bursting disk arrangement”)

Upstream flare header pressure of 1.6 barg

Maximum Backpressure of 50% of set pressure for balanced bellows valves

Minimum equipment design pressure of 4 barg (to allow for pressure drop in subheaders)

The following table presents the disposal systems and the process systems to be vented into
each system.

Assumed Back Pressure

Disposal Process System barg
System
Total Built Constant
Up
HYDROCARBON PRESSURE
General TBD TBD 0.25
Purpose RELIEF DEVICES
Flare

Atmosphere Steam, air, nitrogen, carbon NA NA NA

dioxide, all vapour phase
emergency releases from
atmospheric storage tanks

Process Cooling water, process water NA NA

sewer

Note that in accordance with DEP 80.45.10.10 (§5.1.3) flare system mechanical design pressure
shall be 7.0 barg.

6. Design Criteria

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6.1 Criteria for Handling Relief Streams

General Purpose Hydrocarbon Relief System

Hydrocarbon-containing emergency relief streams from pressure relief devices shall be routed to
the general-purpose hydrocarbon relief system. Any liquid hydrocarbons and water shall first be
separated from the gaseous phase and collected for recycle, preferably back into the process.
Small or short-term discharges, which do not pressure the header beyond 0.3 barg, will be
recovered for fuel by the flare gas recovery system. For other releases, the hydrocarbon vapours
shall be burned in the flare for atmospheric disposal.

Cold Hydrocarbon Relief System

The main flare relief system will be made of fine grain carbon steel suitable for temperatures as
low as –50°C. Emergency relief streams from pressure relief devices, which discharge at
temperatures below -50C shall be routed to the cold pressure collection system (per BOD, Sect.
6.14, para 2.3.2). The discharges shall be heated and then discharged into the general-purpose
hydrocarbon relief system. As an alternative to heating, detailed heat transfer calculations can
be carried out to determine that the stream will enter the main flare header system at a
temperature higher than -50C.

Atmospheric Disposal

There are several types of systems, which are vented to atmosphere:

Non-flammable emergency relief fluids such as steam, air, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, and Freon
shall be discharged directly to the atmosphere at a safe location.

Vapour phase emergency relief from atmospheric storage tanks shall be vented to atmosphere.

Liquid phase emergency relief (overfill protection) from atmospheric storage tanks shall
discharge either into an impound area (dyked or walled area around the tank) or to a liquid
collection and containment system designed for handling of the tank contents.

Two phase relief should be separated so that liquid discharges safely to grade.

There is a special issue with respect to ethylene oxide, which poses both an explosion hazard
and a personnel exposure hazard. EO gives off decomposition flames with pressure effects,
even in the absence of oxygen. Due to this threat, EO relief have been discharged to
atmosphere, in a strictly controlled manner, in other installations and this Project will follow this
practice.

Note that atmospheric discharges must meet the noise criteria of DEP 31.10.00.31 section 4.3.2.
silencers, noise screens or extended outlet pipes may be used to reduce noise at operating
areas. Outlet line pressure drops must include silencer pressure drops.

Process Sewer

Non-hazardous, non-flammable relief liquids such as cooling water shall be discharged into the
process sewer. Relieved process water or hot steam condensate may also be discharged to the
process sewer provided their temperature is below 65C.

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6.2 Relief Device Sparing and Isolation Philosophy

Per DEP 80.45.10.10, “It is mandatory that a pressure system is never without pressure
protection, unless fully emptied and depressurised.” Therefore, as described below, relief valve
services will be spared, unless it can be shown the unit can be operated with the equipment out
of service.

Spares Not Required

Spares are not required for one item out of a multi-stage, series operation when one item can be
isolated without unit shutdown.

Spares are not required for equipment where the unit can be successfully operated by bypassing
the equipment for a short period.

Spares are not required for equipment, which is spared, either 100% x 2 (a full capacity spare) or
50% x 3 (a half capacity spare).

Thermal expansion relief valves (TERVs), which protect a liquid full system when blocked-in, may
be removed while the system is in operation, and therefore need not be spared. A single relief
valve with upstream and (if appropriate) downstream isolation valve should be provided. (DEP
80.45.10.10 Sec 2.8.2)

If maintenance of a non-spared relief valve is required, the protected equipment shall have to be
shut down, drained, and isolated.

Spares Required

In general, spares shall be provided unless specific exemption can be made as described above.

Valve Configuration

(DEP 80.45.10.10 Sec. 2.8.2)

In principle, a relief valve arrangement, which does not utilise any isolation valves, is preferred.
This eliminates the possibility of a relief valve being isolated in error. However, this is not
possible for relief valves, which are spared; nor does it apply to thermal relief valves, where, as
discussed above, isolation valves are supplied to allow removal during operation.

An outlet valve is needed if the relief header cannot be taken out of service. Multiple relief valve
arrangements (including a single valve and a spare) will have an inlet and outlet isolation valve.
Generally, isolation valves will be full-bore ball valves. An exception is for relief valves
discharging to atmosphere with separate discharge piping, which do not require discharge
isolation valves.

A key operating system shall be used to ensure the correct mode (open or shut) of these
isolation valves. The locking system on block valves used on the inlet and outlet of relief valves,
their spares and their open spool pieces shall comply with DEP 80.46.30.11.

6.3 Protection against Solidifying Process Fluids

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Although relief valves are normally installed in a vapour space, there is a potential for liquid to
reach the valve. If solids can form, either by polymerisation or due to high pour point liquid, one
of the following preventative actions shall be carried out:

The provision of heat tracing at the relief valve and along its inlet and outlet piping.

Purging or flushing of the inlet and outlet piping with a clean fluid, which can be accommodated
by the receiving system.

(DEP 80.45.10.10 Sec. 2.9.3)

6.4 Criteria for Determination of Relief Loads

6.4.1 Relief Loads

The pressure relieving device protecting an item of equipment or a pressure system shall
be sized to provide adequate capacity for all overpressure scenarios. The overpressure
scenarios developed shall also take into account start-up, shutdown and intermittent plant
operations.

Relief loads shall generally follow API RP 520/521 (but see also DEP 80.45.10.10 Sec 2.2).

Exchanger tube rupture shall be considered a viable case to be evaluated if the design
pressure on the high pressure side exceeds the test pressure on the low pressure side.
(Refer to para. 6.8 below.) Due account shall be taken of the potential for flashing or
condensation on the low pressure side and, if the rupture flow is vapour into liquid, any
potential short term pressure spike due to acceleration of the liquid.

Reverse flow protection shall be provided on all pumps where reverse flow through the
pump could cause overpressure of the pump suction equipment.

For sizing of relief devices, no relief load mitigation credits shall be taken for:

Reduction of fire heat load due to water spray / deluge system. (DEP 80.45.10.10 Sec 2.2.2)

Reduction of fire heat load due to standard insulation.

Automated control system actuation. If the normal automated response for a given control
device will tend to alleviate the relief event, assume that the control device does not actuate and
stays in its current position. If the normal automated response for a given control device will tend
to add to the relief event, assume that the control device actuates accordingly.

Emergency shutdown systems, except when specifically designed with the appropriate Safety-in-
Design (SIL) level to mitigate the relief load.

6.4.2 Load Mitigation

For sizing of relief devices, credit should be taken for:

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Appropriately designed Instrumented Protective Functions.

In specific circumstances, it may be highly desirable to limit or even to eliminate emergency
relief, since the flare system will become disproportionately large and expensive, or the
environmental impact of such a relief would be unacceptable. In these cases the level of
protection afforded by a relief valve may be complemented with an Instrumented Protective
Function (see DEP 32.80.10.10 , DEP 32.80.10.12 and DEP 80.45.10.10 Sec. 2.4). The latter
has been modified as described under Disposal System Sizing below.

Where an IPF is used to mitigate a relief load, the IPF review will finally determine the
required level of integrity needed in terms of independence, number of trip initiators with
voting, fast acting elements, testing and inspection, etc.

Insulation
Reduction of fire heat load due to stainless steel jacketed insulation is acceptable provided the
integrity of the insulation installation will not be affected by fire or fire fighting measures. Client
approval is required. (DEP 80.45.10.10 Sec 2.2.2)

Operator Intervention
Credit for operator intervention is taken only if the time between the primary failure to the time of
the overpressure event is greater than 20 minutes and at least two separate alarms will actuate
notifying the operator of the impending problem. Under these circumstances the relief load may
be reduced or the upset scenario dismissed.

Dismissal of the upset scenario due to operating procedures for vacuum protection.
Credit for operator training and procedures may be taken for protection against vacuum
conditions during draining and steam-out operations. (DEP 01.00.01.30, Sec. 4.2.1.4)

Upset Conditions during Start-up and Shut-down

Credit for operator training and procedures may be taken for protection against air intake, which
may create explosive conditions during start-up and shutdown operations.

Excess flow from a high-pressure source (high pressure – low-pressure interface)

For this case the largest contribution of either the fully open control valve or the fully open bypass
valve shall be taken into account. The calculation shall be based on the worst-case situation;
typically this will be 100% vapour breakthrough (no liquid) and shall be made for the actually
installed valves. For the highly improbable event that gas breakthrough takes place when both
control valve and bypass are fully open, the capacity of the relief valve shall be such that the
downstream pressure shall not exceed the hydrotest pressure of the system, taking into account
any temperature differences between the hydrotest temperature and the maximum operating
temperature. (DEP 80.45.10.10 Sec. 2.2.1).

6.4.3 Relief Device Sizing

DEP standard relief valve sizes shall be used, and are given in DEP 80.45.10.10, Sec 2.5.1. The
minimum flange rating for inlet flanges shall be ASME Class 300.

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For two-phase flow relieving conditions, the method specified in API 520 should not be used.
Instead, a method based on DIERS should be used, as described in DEP 80.45.10.10, Sec.
2.7.1.

For vessels which are confirmed as built to ASME VIII maximum allowable accumulated pressure
shall follow API RP 520, Part I. This Recommended Practice allows maximum allowable
accumulated pressure of 110% of maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) for single valve
installation (other than fire); 121% of MAWP for fire exposure only; and 116% of MAWP for
multiple-valve installation (other than fire exposure). The maximum allowable set pressure for a
single valve is 100% of MAWP. API RP 520 addresses ASME code; during detailed design,
these values will need to be checked against the actual vessel code. Note that where vessels
are built to PD5500 or Chinese code (GB-150) accumulated pressure allowed is 110% of MAWP.
API 520 and PD 5500 standards allow that for multiple valves the maximum allowable set
pressure is 100% for the first valve and 105% for additional valves.

There are slightly different provisions in the Chinese code GB 150. For non-fire cases second
and subsequent relief valves should be set to no more than 4% above design pressure and
maximum accumulation allowed is 12% or 0.3 barg whichever is the greater. For the fire case
the maximum allowable accumulation is 16%. Note that ”Supervision Regulation on Safety
Technology for Pressure Vessel” issued by China State Bureau of Quality and Technical
Supervision is not quite consistent with this; GB 150 should be followed.

Note that there are special requirements governing design and test pressures for portable
vessels and vessels which are only subject to pneumatic pressure testing.

6.4.4 Disposal System Sizing

It is permissible under the DEPs to reduce the flare load for a common failure affecting multiple
pressure systems simultaneously, using Instrumented Protective Functions. However, it must be
assumed that an IPF can fail and that the greatest relief load that would result from one or more
coincident IPF failure shall be used for the design of the common relief system. DEP
80.45.10.10 Sec 2.4 has been revised as follows:

Reduction of flare size for common failures

In oil and gas processing facilities, a cause of overpressure could be a common failure affecting
a number of pressure systems simultaneously. An example of this is the simultaneous loss of
overhead condensing capacity on a number of columns due to loss of cooling medium (either
loss of cooling water supply or loss of all air cooler fans due to power failure). To reduce the total
load on the common relief system, it may be considered to use Instrumented Protective
Functions (IPFs) consisting of high pressure initiators on each pressure system to eliminate the
cause of overpressure e.g. close the heat input and thus prevent the individual relief case.

Each individual IPF shall be at least SIL 3. Furthermore the relief system shall be large enough
to accommodate the base relief load from the pressure systems not protected by IPFs + the
largest suppressed relief case by an IPF, assuming this particular IPF fails. The connected
pressure systems will stay within the allowed maximum pressures taking into account the
prescribed accumulation. Since the safety integrity level of the flare and relief system shall at
least meet SIL 4 requirements based on potentially multiple relief system failures, the PFD
(probability failure on demand) due to a common mode failure shall be kept as low as possible
(lower than 10-5). This means that the logic solver of each individual SIL 3 IPF shall no longer

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be a common PLC or even a set of interconnected PLCs. Instead, a logic solver that meets the
requirements of SIL 4 (solid state logic) shall be selected.

Following the above guidelines and having not more than 12 IPFs the probability that two IPFs
will fail simultaneously will be sufficiently low. However, the relief system shall be large enough to
cope with the base relief load + the two largest suppressed relief cases after failure of the two
IPFs, such that the hydrotest pressure of any of the connected pressure systems will not be
exceeded. Any difference between hydrotest temperature and the maximum operating
temperature for that particular pressure system should be taken into account.

If more than 12 IPFs are applied, the relief system shall be large enough that it can cope with
three failing IPFs following the guidelines as given in the previous paragraph. In this case the
number of IPFs shall not exceed 72.

If deviating from the above rules a detail analysis shall be carried out, which shows that under all
circumstances the safety integrity level of the relief system will meet at least SIL 4 requirements.
This means that it shall be demonstrated that the provided IPFs will reduce the probability of
having a pressure system above the hydrotest pressure due to the specially designed flare and
relief system by a factor 10,000. This analysis shall be approved by the Principal.

6.5 Emissions Criteria

Due to the use of the closed “PCV/PZV / bursting disk arrangement” system, continuous process
vents to the flare system will not be flared, but recovered to fuel gas by the flare gas recovery
system. Therefore, this flare system is not “emergency only” and small continuous vents are not
prohibited from the flare system.

Waste Water Emissions

All wastewater produced by the emergency relief disposal systems shall be directed to the
wastewater treatment plant.

6.6 Toxic Stream Handling

For relief valves in “toxic duty”, a rupture disk shall be provided upstream of the relief valve, to
prevent the toxic fluid from leaking through, as specified in DEP 80.45.10.10, Sect 2.9.2. There is
no definition of “toxic duty” in this DEP. The list of “very toxic substances” given in Project
Procedure “Health Design Criteria Procedure” (PR 8560 0000 0012) should be used to determine
“toxic duty” for the purpose of this DEP.

6.7 Thermal Expansion Relief Valves (TERVs)

Thermal expansion relief valves are required in liquid-full systems if the system can be blocked in
and subjected to heat input from the atmosphere or process. Refer to DEP 80.45.10.10, Sec 2.3
for guidelines on the need for TERVs.

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6.8 Hydrostatic Test Pressure

There are relief scenarios where the designer will make use of the equipment hydrostatic test
pressure instead of the maximum allowable accumulated pressure, such as in tube rupture, or
control valve full open with bypass. The ASME code sets hydrostatic test pressure at 30% above
design pressure (recently reduced from 50% above design). However, the Chinese Code GB-
150 and European Code PD 5500 specify 25% above design pressure.

6.9 Multiple Failure Events

Header and valve sizing shall be based on a single contingency. The sizing shall not be based
upon double or multiple failure events unless such double contingencies have happened
frequently or where multiple contingencies are dependent upon one another, or where a single
contingency can exist undetected for a long period of time. (DEP 80.45.10.10, Sec. 4.4)

Any multiple failure contingencies identified during design of the safety systems shall be
documented as part of the Process Safeguarding Memorandum.

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6.10 Utility Failure Criteria

The impact on the common discharge system design produced by relief flows from connected
process units as the result of a utility or power failure shall be calculated by taking 100% of the
quantities calculated for the relief flow of each unit in turn, together with 50% thereof for the other
units. The case of low rate depressurising should be included in the assessment. (DEP
80.45.10.10 Sect. 4.4)

6.11 Fire Event Criteria

Fire zones shall be established based on the criteria presented in DEP 80.45.10.10, Sec. 2.2.2.
For process units a typical fire area of 300 m2 should be assumed, depending on the drainage
design of the plot.

External fire is considered a potential wherever flammable liquids could leak, pool, and ignite. It
is normally assumed that flame impingement on process equipment and piping is limited to an
elevation of 8 meters above any surface at which a substantial spill or pool fire could be
sustained. During fire events it shall be assumed that power, cooling water, steam, and
instrument air are lost in the area of the fire.

In calculations of wetted surface exposed to fire, the surface area of associated piping and
equipment should be included. The liquid level in the vessel should be based upon the normal
liquid volume plus any liquid draining down from the internals of the vessel.

For the actual fire load calculation procedure, refer to Appendix 1 of DEP 80.45.10.10.

In general, pressure vessels on this project will be designed to either Chinese or ASME
standards. However, the client has not excluded the possibility of designing some vessels to PD
5500 of the British Standards Institute. Neither this standard nor Chinese Code GB-150 allow
21% accumulation for fire; the maximum accumulation is 10%. Therefore, for the final relief valve
design for fire scenarios, the designer needs to confirm the code for the pressure vessel. The
Engineering contractor must check assumptions in the BDEPs to ensure that relief devices are
specified in accordance with the code to which each vessel is purchased. See also 6.4.3 above
regarding accumulation for multiple relief valves.

6.12 Internal Explosion Criteria

Normal Operation

The majority of the processes used in this plant operate at or above atmospheric pressure. For
these processes, the probability of air intake into the process systems is minimal.

The ethylene oxide and propylene oxide processes involve oxidation reactions using oxygen or
air. Much of the process technology has evolved over the years to meet the hazards involved
with these reactions, and is contained in the specifications received from the licensors.

Some units have systems operating under vacuum, which are by their nature subject to air
intake. Proper specification of the process equipment and the vacuum packages, process

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instrumentation (such as compressor suction controls for compressors operating with near-
atmospheric suction pressures) and operating and maintenance procedures to ensure the
systems stay reasonably tight, are sufficient to ensure flammable mixtures are not allowed to
exist in the vacuum equipment.

Flammable Hydrocarbon Storage

Nitrogen blanketing shall be used for cone and dome roof atmospheric storage tanks to prevent
air intake and explosive conditions.

Start-Up and Shutdown

The client has specified that it will use operating procedures and operator training for prevention
of air in-leak into the process during start-up and shutdown operations. Portable analysers will
be utilised to check air and hydrocarbon concentrations. No permanent instrumentation or safety
systems shall be installed to prevent explosive mixtures during start-up and shutdown.

6.13 Vacuum Protection Criteria

Where the potential exists for the creation of a vacuum during normal operations, either the
equipment shall be designed for vacuum operation, or fail-safe vacuum safety devices shall be
installed for protection. The client has elected to utilise operating procedures and operator
intervention for prevention of vacuum during steam-out, start-up and shutdown operations.

In hydrocarbon processes where slight vacuums are normal, such as in atmospheric storage
tanks, a tank blanketing system shall be provided in addition to the fail-safe vacuum safety
device. The tank blanketing system shall utilise nitrogen as the blanket gas, while the
emergency device shall use the atmosphere to break the vacuum.

6.14 ISBL Flare KO Drums

Criteria for the installation of additional knockout facilities within the units are presented in DEP
80.45.10.10, Sec. 4.6.1. Given the size of the CSPC Nanhai facility and the likelihood of liquid
discharges to the flare system, ISBL knockout drums are required; however, it should be possible
to have two or more units share a drum in several cases. For information on sizing criteria for
ISBL flare KO drums, refer to the Flare Drum Sizing Criteria in Section 6.15.

6.15 System Header Design Criteria

System Header Modelling

A simulation model of the flare header for the entire facility, both ISBL and OSBL, is to be
developed. The simulation program to be used is BACKPRES (to be obtained from Shell) or
FlareNet. The model shall be well documented, marking up PEFS presenting the flare and relief
system and using the PEFS line identification number in the model input file. Engineering
Contractor shall ensure the model is kept current so that the final hydraulic analysis reflects the

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final piping layouts. Each ISBL Engineering Contractor shall model the portion of the flare
header which is within his scope.

Disposal Header Sizing

Disposal header sizing shall be consistent with the nominal backpressures presented in Section
5.0. Sizing criteria for the upstream and downstream relief valve laterals are presented in DEP
80.45.10.10, Sec. 4.2 and 4.5. As stated in the DEPs, the design velocity in the main relief
header shall not exceed a Mach number of 0.5. Velocities in subheaders may be higher, up to a
Mach 1.0, according to the guidelines given in DEP 80.45.10.10, Sec. 4.5.

For the inlet lateral to a relief valve, the pressure drop of the inlet piping and fittings shall not
exceed 3% of the valve set pressure, based on the rated relief valve capacity. For the outlet line
the pressure drop shall not exceed 10% of the set pressure.

6.16 Disposal System Design Criteria

Smokeless Operation/Steam Injection

Per DEP 80.45.10.10 (Sect. 7.2), a smokeless flame up to a flaring rate of 15% of the maximum
flaring capacity is required for emergency flaring. Where steam injection is selected, medium
pressure steam (approximately 17 barg) shall be used. Estimates for steam rates are given in
DEP 80.45.10.10, Appendix 8.

Thermal Radiation from Flares

The height of the flare stack shall be selected to meet the following conditions: (DEP
80.45.10.10, Sec. 6.3.2)

The flare’s sterile area radius should be at least 60 meters. Within the sterile area only
equipment directly related to the flare’s operation (such as knockout drums, pumps, valves, etc.)
shall be allowed.

At the boundary of the sterile area the heat radiation level shall be 6.3 kW/m 2 maximum
(excluding the effect of solar radiation)

At the property limit the heat radiation level shall be 1.5 kW/m 2 maximum (excluding the effect of
solar radiation) as required by the Chinese Authorities.

Flare Drum Sizing Criteria

The objectives of a flare knockout drum are to separate liquid from the gas before the gas is
flared, and to hold the maximum amount of liquid, which can be relieved during an emergency
situation.

Shell DEPs do not accept the sizing criteria of API 521 (see DEP 80.45.10.10, Appendix 10 for a
discussion of their objections). Design procedures for flare KO drums are given in DEP
80.45.10.10, Section 5 and Appendix 10. While the DEPs do not accept the API 521 criteria,
they do recognise that application of the standard DEP drum sizing criteria will produce overly
large drums in many cases. Therefore, drum-sizing criteria are relaxed for “essentially dry” gas
and for flare KO drums where ISBL flare KO drums are used. The criteria may be relaxed

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additionally with the approval of the Client. However, there are no criteria for relaxing the drum
sizing criteria for the ISBL flare KO drums. Therefore, relaxation of the drum sizing
specifications for large ISBL flare KO drums will have to be reviewed with the Client.

7.0 Documentation Required

The documentation of the relief system design is done in the framework of the Safeguarding
Memoranda and Process Safeguarding Flow Schemes. The procedures for the preparation of
these documents are described in DEP 01.00.02.12, Preparation of Safeguarding Memoranda
and Process Safeguarding Flow Schemes.

Contractors shall maintain these documents to be consistent with developments in the

Engineering Design and reissue as necessary.

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