Multilateralism in China’s foreign relations:

A normative-rhetorical tool for suasion and

system reform
Steven Langendonk, Doctoral Researcher, Leuven International and European Studies,
KU Leuven
Input Paper
28 April 2022

Input Paper prepared for the April EU & China Think-Tank Dialogue. It provides context and serves
as a starting point for discussion at the event.

Introduction

L ike its main competitors, China

has its own set of conceptions of
multilateralism (多边主义) and frequently
Establishing what foreign policy concepts
mean and do is no mean feat. They are,
by definition, polysemic – meaning
employs rhetoric about multilateralism different things to different people.3
for diplomatic suasion. Unlike its One way to approach a concept is by
competitors, however, the frequency studying its genealogy, and its
and character of China’s rhetoric entanglements with other concepts.
underwent significant changes in recent This Input Paper therefore opens with a
decades, and is now regularly employed historical overview of the conceptual
to contest ‘Western’ ideas of development of multilateralism in China.
multilateralism.1 This gives us a good idea of its
importance and main function, but not
To get a clear picture of the role of of the broader range of meanings the
multilateralism in China’s foreign concept conveys in the diverse settings
relations, comparing its multilateral that make up global politics. To explore
behaviour with the yardstick of this dimension and assess the political
international relations or political science utility of multilateralism, the Input Paper
theory, as is the Western norm, is discusses the different logics which
insufficient.2 As this Input Paper inform its application in the second
illustrates, a more useful understanding section. In the third section, it applies
is obtained when multilateralism is the overall assessment to the EU–China
situated in its domestic context, in terms relationship.
of the political functions it (and its
associated concepts) is expected to fulfil.

1 Throughout this paper, multilateralism refers to the concept as it is understood and used by
the Chinese Communist Party leadership and diplomatic actors. It specifically excludes
‘multilateral diplomacy’.
2 See e.g. Nathan, Andrew J. and Boshu Zhang (2021), "‘A Shared Future for Mankind’:

Rhetoric and Reality in Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping", Journal of Contemporary China,
Volume 31, Issue 133, pp.1-15.
3 See Freeden, Michael (1998), Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Multilateralism, from Jiang to Xi

T he conceptual development of
multilateralism in China is
fundamentally shaped by the CCP’s
selective initiative-taking’ attitude.7
This did not lead to the adoption of
multilateralism as a foreign policy
understanding of ‘correct thought’ as concept, however, as this notion was
the basis for action, and the leadership’s perceived to be ideologically dominated
assessment of China’s international by ‘the West’ and therefore ill-suited to
situation.4 The former is a stabilising legitimate China’s multilateral
factor, in the sense that invoking diplomacy. Together with multilateral
multilateralism, like other formulations diplomacy, multilateralism was also
(提法) and ideas (理念), is consistently avidly debated in Chinese scholarly
understood as a political act. The latter circles.8
accounts for most changes in when and
how state representatives use The conscious separation of these
multilateralism, and the formulations concepts differentiates China’s
they associate it with. What can be understanding from that of its
gleaned from these changes in the competitors, and establishing the
context of China’s evolving foreign precise relationship between the two is
an ongoing process that continues to
policy thought (外交思想)?
this day. A first adjustment occurred
when the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Following a long period of suspicion
Affairs (MFA) adjusted its definition of
during the Mao era and relative neglect
multipolarity (多极化) in 2003 to include
in the Deng era, the notion of
more multilateralism-oriented language,
multilateralism became more common
such as the ‘democratisation of
in official and scholarly circles in the
1990s.5 This occurred as China international relations’ (国际关系民主化).9
attempted to improve its international
reputation and neighbourly relations, During the early Hu era, multilateralism
and to hedge against expected US gained official approval and saw
pressure in Asia.6 Accordingly, scholars increased use as a rhetorical cudgel
Zheng Qirong and Niu Zhongjun identify against hegemonism, unilateralism and
a qualitative shift in its multilateral power politics (i.e. a veiled reference to
diplomacy (多边外交); from ‘passive the US). From 2006 onward, the notion
of a ‘harmonious world’ (和谐世界)
participation’ to ‘a conscious and

4 Schoenhals, Michael (1992), Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies, Berkeley:
University of California; Wang, Hongying (2000), “Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy:
The Limits of Socialization”, Asian Survey, Volume 40, Issue 3, pp.475-491. See also Tsai,
Wen-Hsuan and Nicola Dean (2013), "The CCP's Learning System: Thought Unification and Regime
Adaptation", The China Journal, Volume 69, pp.87-107.
5 Johnston, Alastair Iain (2008), Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000,

Princeton: Princeton University Press. See also Feng, Yuan (2020), China and Multilateralism:
From Estrangement to Competition, New York: Routledge, p.32.
6 Christensen, Thomas J. (2015), The China challenge: Shaping the choices of a rising power,

W. W. Norton. Wu, Guoguang and Helen Lansdowne (2008, eds.), China Turns to Multilateralism:
Foreign Policy and Regional Security, Routledge.
7 Zheng, Qirong and Zhongjun Niu (2012), Chinese Multi-lateral Diplomacy, Beijing: World

Affairs Press. Also illustrated by its inclusion in the foreign affairs guideline: “great powers are
key factors, neighbouring countries are the priorities, developing countries are fundamentals, and
multilateral institutions are stages” （大国是关键、周边是首要、发展中国家是基础、多边是舞台）.
Feng (2020), op.cit., p.32.
8 E.g. 国际经济与政治 articles (2001), Volume 10, pp.1-44; Sohn, Injoo (2012), "After Renaissance:

China’s Multilateral Offensive in the Developing World", European Journal of International

Relations, Volume 18, Issue 1, pp.77-101.
9 Men, Jing (2012), "The EU and China: Mismatched Partners?", Journal of Contemporary China,

Volume 21, Issue 74 pp.333-349.

2
included multilateralism as an important thereby raising its profile in the CCP’s
element, presenting China as a force for foreign affairs vocabulary.11 Following
peace and cooperation in a discordant formal approval, scholars also
world.10 Zheng and Niu posit that at increasingly turned to international
this point, multilateralism was raised organisations (IOs) as an important
from the strategic (战略性) to the arena for achieving national goals,
philosophical–conceptual (理念) level, and China became actively involved in
IO reform.12

Source: Pu and Wang (2018)13

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, (韬光养晦) to ‘actively achieving

Chinese debates about the future of the something’ (积极有所作为) and, in the
international system and US–China
Xi era, to ‘striving for achievement’
relations became more hawkish. At the
same time, China’s foreign policy was (奋发有为).14 As the debate increasingly
subjected to greater bureaucratic shifted to how China could reshape the
fragmentation, popular pressure and ‘unjust’ international order, notions like
international scrutiny. The need for a discourse power (话语权), docking (对接)
vision to provide coordination and and global governance (全球治理) became
manage expectations informed an increasingly popular, especially in
adjustment in China’s foreign policy scholarly circles (see Figure 1).15
paradigm from ‘keeping a low profile’

10 Wang, Hongying and James N. Rosenau (2009), "China and Global Governance", Asian
Perspective, Volume 33, Number 3, pp.5-39. Another legitimating formulation is peaceful
development (和平发展), which was intended to counter the China threat theory (中国威胁论)
perceived to be emanating from the US. See Scott, David A. (2013), "Multipolarity, Multilateralism
and Beyond …? EU–China Understandings of the International System", International Relations,
Volume 27, Issue 1, pp.30-51.
11 Zheng and Niu (2012), op.cit.; Shambaugh, David L. (2013), China Goes Global: The Partial

Power, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.19-20, 123.

12 教学与研究 (2005), “多边主义与中国外交”, Volume 8, pp. 1-17; Wang, Yizhou (2002), “国家利益再思考”,

中国社会科学, Volume 2, pp.160-170; China Internet Information Center, “China’s Position Paper on
UN Reforms”, 08 June 2005.
13 Pu, Xiaoyu and Chengli Wang (2018), "Rethinking China's Rise: Chinese Scholars Debate

Strategic Overstretch", International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 5, p.1026.

14 Smith, Stephen N. (2021), "China's ‘Major Country Diplomacy’: Legitimation and Foreign Policy

Change", Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 17, Issue 2; Feng (2020), op.cit., p.65.
15 Kohlenberg, Paul J. and Nadine Godehardt (2021), “China’s Global Connectivity Politics:

A meta-geography in the making” in Paul J. Kohlenberg and Nadine Godehardt (eds.),

3
Changes to the foreign affairs vocabulary that China should ‘continuously enhance
in the early Xi era accelerated this its ability to speak and act
development, and novel concepts stress internationally’ and ‘take the initiative
China’s ambition and agency in to assume international responsibilities
international politics, including in commensurate to its capacity’.19
multilateral arenas.16 Multilateralism
frequently appears in communications Although the conception of
about the Belt and Road Initiative (一带 multilateralism has remained
一路) and the Human Community of Fate
remarkably stable since 2005, recent
events suggest that changes may be
(人类命运共同体; HCF), formulations that afoot.20 In October 2019, the MFA’s
redrew the Hu-era Going Out Strategy Policy Planning Department put
(周出去战略) and harmonious world forward the notion of ‘multilateralism
concept to match this ambition.17 At this with Chinese characteristics’ (中国特色多边
point, multilateralism remained 主义).21 Then, following global tensions
instrumental to outward image
over the origins of the COVID-19 virus
management, but was still not central
and the relaunching of the Quadrilateral
to the leadership’s view of the external
Security Dialogue in 2020, the
environment. This is illustrated by the
leadership started to contrast
absence of multilateralism in top-level
‘true’ multilateralism (真正的多边主义) with
discourses about global governance
(全球治理) and system reform.18 A 2016
speech by President Xi to the Politburo
Standing Committee shows that system
reform continued to be associated with
multilateral diplomacy instead of
multilateralism. He argued that ‘[the]
global governance structure hinges on
the balance of international power’ and

The multidimensionality of regions in world politics, New York: Routledge, Ch.10. See also Pang,
Zhongying (2012), “全球治理的转型—从世界治理中国到中国治理世界？”, 国外理论动态, Volume 10, pp.13-16;
Qin, Yaqing (2013), “全球治理失灵与秩序理念的重建”, 世界经济与政治, Volume 4, pp.4-18.
16 E.g. new type of international relations (新型国际关系), major-country diplomacy with
Chinese characteristics (中国特色大国外交). See Xinhua, “习近平出席中央外事工作会议并发表重要讲话”,
29 November 2014.
17 Liu, Hongsong (2020), "Chinese Perception of China’s Engagement in Multilateralism and Global

Governance", The Pacific Review, Volume 33, Issue 3-4, pp.469-496; Chan, Seng In and Weiqing
Song (2020), "Telling the China Story Well: A Discursive Approach to the Analysis of Chinese
Foreign Policy in the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative", Chinese Political Science Review, Volume 5,
pp.417-437; Cheung, Sophie (2020), “China’s Vision for Global Governance: A Community of
Shared Future for Mankind”, Mapping China Journal 2020, pp.56-90. The ‘Human Community of
Fate is more commonly translated as ‘Community of Shared Future for Mankind’. However, this
does not capture the concept’s origins in the notion of Schicksalsgemeinschaft, nor its organicist
connotations. See Mitchell, Ryan (2022), “The Human Community of Fate: A Conceptual History of
China’s Ordoglobal Idea”, Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism,
and Development, Volume 13, Number 3.
18 Le, Yucheng, “为全球治理体系改革和建设不断贡献中国智慧和力量”, 光明日报, 22 November 2017.

19 Xi, Jinping, “加强合作推动全球治理体系变革 共同促进人类和平与发展崇高事业”, 28 September 2016a;

Sun, Jisheng (2021), "China’s Efforts to Shape and Improve Its International Discursive Power:
Diplomatic Practice", The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Volume 16, Issue 2-3, pp.334-347.
20 He, Kai and Huiyun Feng (2015), "Transcending Rationalism and Constructivism: Chinese

Leaders' Operational Codes, Socialization Processes, and Multilateralism after the Cold War",
European Political Science Review, Volume 7, Issue 3, pp.401-426.
21 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “以习近平外交思想为指引深入推进中国特色多边主义”, 学习时报,

25 October 2019; Rudyak, Marina, “Multilateralism / 多边主义”, Decoding China (accessed 11 April
2021).

4
‘pseudo-multilateralism’ (伪多边主义).22 the HCF. It is more likely, however, that
The long-term impact of these as external contestation of China’s
developments is uncertain. They could international behaviour sharpened, it felt
signal that multilateralism’s domestic the need to legitimise that behaviour
profile is growing, portending a possible and delegitimise its competitors’
future as a top-level concept alongside rhetoric.23

The major functions of multilateralism in Chinese

diplomacy

T he particular genealogy of the

concept of multilateralism within
China’s foreign policy apparatus and
actor. The argument that China ‘has
always’ practised its (virtuous) form
of multilateralism often reinforces this.
its various purposes in diplomacy render To paraphrase politics scholar Jonathan
its range of meanings extensive. In fact, Holslag, China’s rhetoric of
five interconnected logics guide its use. multilateralism is “a continuation of
realpolitik by other means”.26
First, China’s conception of
multilateralism is derived from its Second, per the CCP’s adaptation of
assessment of the international situation Marxist class theory, the global practice
and its practical experiences, and not of multilateralism is assumed to be
the other way around. As scholar Wang shaped by the ideational influence of
Jianwei points out, “multilateralism powerful countries.27 As China becomes
might put some checks and balance[s] stronger, it is only natural that its
on American power.”24 Whereas conception of multilateralism becomes
multilateralism mainly served economic more influential. Attempts to resist it
modernisation before President Xi’s are rearguard actions doomed to failure.
time, it now serves to underline the The argument that China’s practice is
‘righteousness’ of China’s behaviour ‘of the times’, ‘follows world opinion’ or
and delegitimise that of the US.25 ‘brings real benefits’ – unlike that of its
Multilateralism is thus associated with competitors – often reinforces this.
China’s national character and acts as Recently, such arguments have been
a normative yardstick for evaluating given a Confucian overhaul with
international behaviour, especially President Xi’s ‘correct concept of
that of great powers. By practising righteousness and interests’ (正确义利观).
multilateralism, China distinguishes itself
from the hegemonic conduct (霸权行径) Third, from 2005 onward,
of other great powers in history and multilateralism became a key
positions itself as a morally superior legitimating device for China’s global

22 Chen, Zhimin, “真正的多边主义的理论内涵”, 人民日报, 17 January 2022; Zhang Guihong, “维护和践行真正

的多边外交（思想纵横）”, 人民日报, 18 November 2021; People’s Republic of China (2021), “Position
Paper on China’s Cooperation with the United Nations”.
23 Another example of this behaviour is the rhetoric on democracy, which similarly distinguishes

between ‘real’ (真实) and ‘pseudo-democracy’ (为民主). Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “外交部发
言人就美国举办‘领导人民主峰会’发表谈话”, 11 December 2021.
24 Wang, Jianwei (2015), “China’s Evolving Attitudes and Approaches toward UN Collective
Security” in G. John Ikenberry; Jisi Wang; and Feng Zhu (eds.), America, China, and the Struggle
for World Order: Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies, and Global Visions, New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, p.124.
25 Feng (2020), op.cit., p.81; Sohn (2012), op.cit.
26 Holslag, Jonathan (2011), "The Elusive Axis: Assessing the EU-China Strategic Partnership",

Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 49, Issue 2, p.309. Wuthnow, Joel; Xin Li; and
Lingling Qi (2012), "Diverse Multilateralism: Four Strategies in China’s Multilateral Diplomacy",
Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 17, Issue 3, pp.269-90.
27 Feng (2020), op.cit., pp.6-8, 23.

5
governance preferences. For instance, in between China and states or IOs on
response to the Trump administration’s the BRI, as well as the inclusion of HCF
unilateralism, the CCP leadership into Human Rights Council documents.30
presented itself as a defender of
multilateralism, global trade and Fifth, to gain recognition for the
globalisation at the Boao Forum for Asia, righteousness of its form of
World Economic Forum, China multilateralism, China consistently
International Import Expo, and second mentions it in connection with its
Belt and Road Forum for International official foreign policy principles
Cooperation.28 In the Xi era, this logic (e.g. non-interference, mutual respect)
frequently appears in discussions of to stress that it is a genuine expression
discursive power and the need to build of its values. This focus on abstract
a discourse system (话语体系).29 principles allows China to indirectly
legitimate important dimensions of
Fourth, multilateralism eases its preferred practices of multilateral
relationships, enabling value diffusion cooperation, such as bi-multilateralism
and the recognition of China’s righteous via strategic partnership relationships
behaviour by other states and IOs. (战略伙伴关系) and China-centric agenda
‘Uploading’ Chinese concepts to the setting.31 Since 2016, China has also
UN level and other states repeating increasingly presented multilateralism
Chinese rhetoric makes for both alongside examples of multilateral
domestic and international legitimacy. diplomacy that it considers useful
As such, recent years saw a litany of models for the future.32
memorandums of understanding

Quo vadis? The EU’s and China’s multilateralism

A ccording to researcher Feng Yuan,

China is entering a mode of
‘competitive multilateralism’, turning it
above, what are the challenges and
opportunities?

into “the most important method to There is a risk that the EU will perceive
reshape international order and form China’s use of multilateralism for image
China’s identity”.33 What does this entail management and delegitimisation of the
for an EU–China relationship already US’ role in the world as an ideological
subject to various structural stress challenge. This sense can be found in
factors? Based on the five-part typology not only the European Parliament but

28 Xi, Jinping (2020), The Governance of China, Vol. III, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
29 Sun (2021), op.cit.; Xi, Jinping, “习近平在哲学社会科学工作座谈会上的讲话”, 17 May 2016b.
30 Sun (2021), op.cit.
31 Chung, Chien-Peng (2008), "China's Approaches to the Institutionalization of Regional

Multilateralism", Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 17, Issue 57, pp.747-764; Sohn (2012),
op.cit.; p.81; Jakóbowski, Jakub (2018), "Chinese-Led Regional Multilateralism in Central and
Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America: 16 + 1, FOCAC, and CCF", Journal of Contemporary
China, Volume 27, Issue 113, pp.659-673.
32 Examples include the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Belt and Road Initiative,

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, BRICS, the G20,
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, East Asia Summit,
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, and various regional multilateral fora.
Alden, Chris and Ana Cristina Alves (2017), "China’s Regional Forum Diplomacy in the Developing
World: Socialisation and the ‘Sinosphere’", Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 26, Issue 103,
pp.151-165. Since 2017, there are also references to the South-South Human Rights Forum,
World Political Parties Summit and instances of ‘host diplomacy’.
33 Feng (2020), op.cit., p.28.

6
also the Commission’s 2019 Strategic relationship will be shaped by how both
Outlook: sides respond to this dissonance in
perspectives.
“China has expressed its
commitment to a fair and One possibility would be to reject each
equitable global governance other’s vision wholesale and adopt a
model. At the same time, China’s ‘resist and limit’ approach anchored in a
engagement in favour of ‘principled’ multilateralism, as some in
multilateralism is sometimes the EU advocate.37 But European
selective and based on a different proponents often do not consider that
understanding of the rules-based the EU has very limited sway over
international order.”34 China’s multilateral diplomacy in light of
its proven ability to marshal
Again, this misses the fact that
international support and create outside
multilateralism is understood differently
options.38 They also tend to downplay
in China and fails to consider the
Chinese status quo behaviour and the
likelihood that China’s ‘selective
areas both sides agree on, such as the
multilateralism’ simply mirrors its pursuit
centrality of the UN.39 China’s conception
of national goals by multilateral means.
of the international system is often
similarly coloured by black-and-white
On the other hand, the Chinese side is
thinking.
also ill-equipped to address ‘conceptual
gaps’ in EU–China relations, often
Another possibility would be to adopt a
misreading not only the EU’s balance of
form of ‘pragmatic multilateralism’,
values and interests but also the deep
recognising different readings of
significance of rules-based
multilateralism for what they are and
multilateralism in internal EU politics. 35
advancing cooperation on an issue-by-
Moreover, given the disparity between
issue basis. This is how China moved
conceptions, instances like the
closer to the EU’s position over the
EU Mission’s 2018 campaign about
years. A recent Joint Communication on
multilateralism often appear
the topic points to a similar dynamic
disingenuous to the European public.36
taking place on the EU side.40
Moving forward, the balance between
Specifically, the European Commission
challenges and opportunities in the

34 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security
Policy (2019), EU-China – A strategic outlook, JOIN(2019) 5 final, Strasbourg, p.2.
35 Pan, Zhongqi (2012), Conceptual Gaps in China-EU Relations: Global Governance, Human Rights

and Strategic Partnerships, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Scott (2013), op.cit. See also
Callahan, William A. (2007), "Future Imperfect: The European Union's Encounter with China
(and the United States)", Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 30, Issue 4-5, pp.777-807;
Geeraerts, Gustaaf (2015), “China, the EU and Global Governance in Human Rights” in Jianwei
Wang and Weiqing Song (eds.), China, the European Union, and the International Politics of Global
Governance, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.60.
36 Huang, Zhao Alexandre and Rui Wang (2019), "Building a Network to ‘Tell China Stories Well’:

Chinese Diplomatic Communication Strategies on Twitter", International Journal of

Communication, Volume 13.
37 Huotari, Mikko and Katja Drinhausen (2020), “Advancing Liberal Multilateralism” in Mikko

Huotari, Jan Weidenfeld and Claudia Wessling (eds.), “Towards a ‘Principles-First Approach’ in
Europe’s China Policy”, Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies, Ch.4.
38 Stephen, Matthew D. (2020), "China's New Multilateral Institutions: A Framework and Research

Agenda", International Studies Review, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp.807-834. Kastner, Scott L.;
Margaret M. Pearson; and Chad Rector (2019), China's Strategic Multilateralism: Investing in
Global Governance, New York: Cambridge University Press.
39 Johnston, Alastair Iain (2019), "China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and

Challenge in Beijing's International Relations", International Security, Volume 44, Issue 2,

pp.9-60.
40 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy

(20201), Joint Communication on strengthening the EU’s contribution to rules-based

multilateralism, JOIN(2021) 3 final, Brussels.

7
seems to have subordinated the EU’s creative and competitive mode of action
pursuit of multilateralism to the reality would allow the EU to continue to
of a multipolar world, in line with its position itself as a champion of
novel self-identification as a geopolitical multilateralism without souring the
actor.41 If confirmed by the Council, this political atmosphere of the bilateral
would constitute a major development in relationship by negating China’s vision
the decades-long tug of war between the as a whole.44
two over which principle should guide
the relationship.42 A turn to competition would also allow
the EU to signal openness to different
This convergence of worldviews, forms of multilateralism and promote
albeit limited in scope, may provide its preferred form by exemplary action. 45
an opportunity to enhance the scope According to political scientist Tang
for effective multilateralism.43 This is Shiping, the Chinese leadership remains
because the deprioritisation of undecided whether to reshape an unjust
multilateralism as a goal in and of international order by leading an
itself may create space for competition aggrieved developing world or by
over its meaning and practice. working with a broader range of
Competing with China by, for instance, partners.46 At a time when changes in
experimenting with novel initiatives the international order follow a pattern
in region-to-region fora like the of two-way socialisation and the demand
Asia–Europe Meeting, would deflate for leadership and public goods is high,
the impression that there are two ideal the EU still enjoys considerable
models of multilateralism which opportunities for shaping this choice. 47
countries have to choose from. Such a

Conclusion

T his Input Paper shows that

China’s conception and use of
multilateralism stem from a process of
turning it from a subversive idea into
a cornerstone of the foreign affairs
vocabulary.48 This selective embrace infused
gradual appropriation and tweaking, the concept with distinct characteristics that

41 Dynamics in the EU–China relationship were fundamental to the geopolitical turn in the EU’s
foreign policy rhetoric. Langendonk, Steven and Edith Drieskens (2022, forthcoming), “The EU’s
embrace of geopolitics: insights from the EU-China relationship” in Olivier Costa and Steven van
Hecke (eds.), The EU Political System after the 2019 European Elections, Cham: Springer
Switzerland.
42 Michalski, Anna and Zhongqi Pan (2017), "Role Dynamics in a Structured Relationship: The EU-

China Strategic Partnership", Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 55, Issue 3, pp.611-
627; Men (2012), op.cit.; Scott, David A. (2014), "Trust, Structures and Track-2 Dialogue in the
EU-China Relationship: Resetting and Resettling a 'Strategic Partnership'?", Asia Europe Journal,
Volume 12, pp.21-34; Scott (2013), op.cit.
43 See Michalski, Anna and Zhongqi Pan (2017), Unlikely Partners: China, the European Union and

the Forging of a Strategic Partnership, New York: Nature America Inc.

44 The tendency of member states to lift multilateral issues to the EU level could facilitate this kind

of pivot. On the other hand, the European Parliament’s growing concern with China and principled
multilateralism since 2018 would be an inhibitor.
45 Keukeleire, Stephan and Bas Hooijmaaijers (2014), "The BRICS and Other Emerging Power

Alliances and Multilateral Organizations in the Asia-Pacific and the Global South: Challenges for the
European Union and Its View on Multilateralism", Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 52,
Issue 3, pp.582-599. Christiansen, T.; Emil J. Kirchner; and Uwe Wissenbach (2019),
The European Union and China, London: Red Globe Press, pp.181-182.
46 Tang, Shipping (2018), "China and the Future International Order(s)", Ethics and International

Affairs, Volume 32, Issue 1, pp.31-43.

47 Loke, Beverley (2018), "China's Economic Slowdown: Implications for Beijing's Institutional

Power and Global Governance Role", The Pacific Review, Volume 31, Issue 5, pp.673-691.
48 Tsai and Dean (2013), op.cit.

8
suit CCP ideology and China’s diplomacy. from both sides are required. Despite
Whereas ambiguity about multilateralism’s significant domestic and international
meaning enabled the EU and China to paper opposition, both parties seem to recognise
over a major conceptual gap in the that their path to political purchase (势) or
relationship in the past, China’s increasingly virtù in the international system is shortened
overt contestation of the term will reduce when they find a workable middle ground.
space for such a tacit agreement. Understanding how multilateralism matters
differently on both sides is a basic condition
If the EU and China want to find a new for such efforts.
modus vivendi on multilateralism,
considerable political courage and creativity

The EU & China Think-Tank Exchanges is a project funded by the European Union that promotes
EU–China dialogue and supports mutual understanding and joint action in cross-cutting policy areas
and issues of mutual concern. The initiative is coordinated by the European Policy Centre (EPC) with
the cooperation of EGMONT – The Royal Institute for International Relations, the China Institute of
International Studies (CIIS) and the Center for China and Globalization (CCG). Over a period of three
years, the project will encourage experts, analysts and policymakers from Europe and China to
discuss issues like post-COVID-19 cooperation, climate action and environment, the global economy,
digitalisation, connectivity, human rights, and peace and security in international affairs.

This Input Paper was produced under the EU & China Think-Tank Exchanges project. Its content is
the sole responsibility of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the EU or the EPC.
The financial support of the EU to the project does not constitute any EU endorsement of the contents
of the project events or any papers and publications produced. Supporters and
partners cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the
information contained therein.
Funded by the
European Union