I i''

n1'-,

CHAPTER 16
This is inctti:.
History of Logic deriving them
showing that t
of syllogism'
from what. I-::
such as defir..:
Logic was born in ancient Greece and reborn a century ago. Logic keeps grow-
ing and expanding, and has contributed to the birth of the computer age. We
Aristotle ::
states that tlE
can better understand and appreciate logic by studying its history.
to the same .:
true at the sa:
ments. Arist,-:
76.7 Ancient logic more certain :
an infinite se:
The formal study of valid reasoning began with Aristotle (384-322 BC) in ancient Deniers of th-;
Greece. An unprecedented emphasis on reasoning prepared for Aristotle's logic. point home. -,,,'
Greeks used complex reasoning in geometry, to prove results like the Pythago- to stop. Arisi;
rean theorem. Sophists taught rich young men to gain power by arguing effec- or "S is not P
tively (and often by verbal trickery). Parmenides and Heraclitus reasoned about Aristotle :...
being and non-being, anticipating later disputes about the law of non-contradic- Chapters 10;:
tion, and Zeno reasoned about paradoxes. Socrates and Plato gave models of care- not happen (
ful philosophical reasoning; they tried to derive absurdities from proposed views battle tomorr,:'
and sought beliefs that could be held consistently after careful examination. necessarv u-he
Reasoning is an important human activity, and it didn't begin in ancient
Greece. Is this ability biologically based, built into our brains by evolution
because it aids survival? Or does it have a divine origin, since we're made in the
"image and likeness" of God? Or do both explanations have a place ? Logic raises
fascinating issues for other Cisciplines.
Aristotle began the study of logic. He was the first to formulate a correct prin-
Aristotle relec;
ciple of inference, to use letters for terms, and to construct an axiomatic system.
He seemed to
He created syllogistic logic (Chapter 2), which studies arguments like these
,

excluded midJ
(using "all A isB," "no A is B," "some A is 8," or "some A is not B"):
he anticipateJ
)
A11 humans are mortal. all H ls M t'alse ($77.7).
Valid , Al1 Greeks are humans. all G is H box-inside/bor
argLtment
.'. A11 Greeks are mortal. .'. ail G is M them doubtfu-
After Aristc,
This is aslidbecause of its formal structure, as given by the formulation on the "arrd," and "or
right; any argument having this same structure will be valid. If we change the defended, for e
structure, we may get arr invalid argument, iike this one: tollens (denr ir.
 HISTORY OF LOGIC 349

tnoatfi t All mortal.

Romans are all R is M
argument All mortal.
Greeks are all G is M
.'. All Romans.
Greeks are .'. all G is R

This is inaalid because its form is wrong. Aristotle defended valid forms by
deriving them from self-evidently valid forms; he criticized invalid forms by
showing that they sometimes give true premises and a false conclusion. His logic
of syllogisms is about logic in a narrou) sense, since it deals with what follows
from what. He also pursued other topics that connect with appraising arguments,
such as definitions and fallacies; these are about logic in abroader sense.
:keeps grow-
Aristotle proposed two principles of thought. His law of non-contradiction
uter age. We states that the same property cannot at the same time both belong and not belong
v. to the same object in the same respect. So "S is P" and "S is not P" can't both be
true at the same time, unless we take "5" or "P" differently in the two state-
ments. Aristotle saw this law as so certain that it can't be proved by anything
more certain; not all knowledge can be demonstrated, since otherwise we'd need
an infinite series of arguments that prove every premise by a further argument.
BC) in ancient Deniers of the law of non-contradiction assume it in their practice; to drive this
istotle's logic. point home, we might bombard them with contradictions until they plead for us
the Pythago- to stop. Aristotle also supported the law of exduded middle, that either "S is P"
rrguing effec- or "S is not P" is true. Some deviant logics today dispute both laws (Chapter 17).
:asoned about Aristotle also studied the logic of "necessary" and "possible" (see modal logic,
ron-contradic- Chapters l-0 and L1). He discussed future contingents (events that may or may
rodels of care- not happen). Consider a possible sea battle tomorrow. If "There utill be a sea
roposed views battle tomorrow" ("S" below) is now either true or false, this seems to make
mination. necessary whether the battle occurs:
3in in ancient
by evolution Either it's true that S or it's false that S.
:e made in the If it's true that S, then it's necessary that S.
e? Logic raises
If it's false that S, then it's necessary that not-S.
.'. Either it's necessary that S or it's necessary that not-S.

a correct prin-
Aristotle rejected the conclusion, saying that there was no necessity either way.
rmatic system.
He seemed to deny the first premise and thus the universal truth of the law of
nts like these
excluded middle (which he elsewhere defends); if we interpret him this way, then
B"),
he anticipated many-valued logic in using a third truth rralue besides true and
;M false ($17.1). Another solution is possible. Many think premises 2 and 3 have a
;H box-inside/box-outside ambiguity ($10.1): taking them as "(A, nB)" makes
rM them doubtful while taking them as "E(A, B)" makes the argument invalid.
After Aristotle, Stoics and others developed a logic that focused on "if-then,"
ulation on the " and," and " or ," Iike our propositional logic (Chapters 6 and, 7). Stoic logicians
rve change the defended, for example, an important inference form that came to be called modus
t ollens (denying mode) :
350 PART FOUR: FURTHER VISTAS

If your view is correct, then The Easte:

If C then S
Valid ) such and such is true.
Not-S covers mai--r.'
argLLment Such and such is false. commenta: : -
Not-C
. Your view isn't correct.
thinking .:- ;,
caution :.:.-:.
Stoics also studied modal logic. Unlike logicians today, they took "necessary"
der.ianr - -- :- -,
and "possible" in a temporal sense, like "true at all times" and "true at some \Iai.','..=
times." They disputed whether there'was a good modal argument for t'atalism, using :.:": -,
the view that all events happen of inherent necessity (see $10.3b #10). They also
thinhr.: :: ,

disputed how to understand "lf A then B" t577.4). Philo of Megara saw it as true
and r,r-=:-:,-
if and only if it's not now the case that A is true and B is false; this fits the modern Ludrvis i'..::=
truth table for "if-then." Diodorus Chronos saw it as true if and only rf Ais nerser a stronE-',' :: -

at any time true while B is false.

Aristotelian and Stoic logic were first seen as rivals, differing in three ways:

o Aristotle focused on "all," "r1o," and "some." Stoics focused on "if-then,"

76.2 \l;.
" and," and " or."
o Aristotle used letter variables and expressed arguments as long conditionals, Mediera- ----
hke "lf ail A is B, and all C is A, then a1l C is B." Stoics used number variables logic beca:: =
and expressed arguments as sets of statements, like "If 1 then 2. But not-2. The C:.:-;:
Therefore, not-1."
Ages. H. '.'.:
o Aristotle saw logic not as part of philosophy but rather as a tool for all think-
box-in'ti= : -
ing. Stoics saw logic as one of philosophy's three branches (the other two being
foreknorr-. i =
physics and ethics). But both agreed that students should study logic early,
before going deeply into other areas. tle's 1oS-; ---:
On lnt;""-'-. ..
Later thinkers combined these approaches into traditional logic. For the next two The -{::: "

thousand years, Aristotle's logic with Stoic additions ruled in the West. Christia:. ::
At the same time, another tradition of logic rose up in India, China, and Tibet. ogy and :-.=:
We call it Buddhist logic even though Hindus and others pursued it too. It taries, tex:r -
studied many topics important in the West, including inference, fallacies, and logic, co:.j-:-
-.'.
Ianguage. This is a common pattern in Buddhist logic: ish Sparn =:
In Ch:-.:,"
Here there is fire, because there is smoke. Anselm i'.:=
Wherever there is sn-roke there is fire, as in a kitchen. terior ,1,:.;.'. :
Here there is smoke. was basei ::.
.'. Here there is fire. Peter of S:.:
The cler'=:
The last three lines are deductively valid:

Al1 cases of smoke are cases of fire.

This is a case of smoke.
.'. This is a case of fire.

This omits "as in a kitchen," which suggests inductive reasoning (Chapter 5); in
our experience of smoke and fire, smoke always seems to involve fire. Capitalized :
 HISTORY OF LOGIC 351.

The Eastern logic tradition is poorly understood in the WesU this tradition
i:1en s
:-S
covers many centuries, and many texts are difficult or untranslated. Some
:.C commentators emphasize similarities between East and West; they see human
thinking as essentially the same everywhere. Others emphasize differences and
caution against imposing a Western framework on Eastern thought. And some
,:k "necessary"
deviant logicians see the Eastern tradition as congenial to their views.
i true at some Many see the East as more mystical than logical; Zen Buddhism delights in
:'.: ior t'atalism, using paradoxes (like the sound of one hand clapping) to move us beyond logical
=10). They also thinking toward a mystical enlightenment. But East and West both have logical
ra saw it as true
and mystical elements. Sometimes these come together in the same individual;
irts the modern Ludwig Wittgenstein in the early 20th century invented truth tables but also had
:.lr- if A is nerser
a strongly mystical side.

:r three ways:

,r', "if-then,"
76.2 Medieval logic

: ;rnditionals, Medieval logicians carried on the basic framework of Aristotle and the Stoics, as
:.:.er variables logic became important in higher education.
l, But not-2. The Christian thinker Boethius (480-521) helped the transition to the Middle
Ages. He wrote on logic, including commentaries; he explained the modal
, :, r all think-
box-inside/box-outside ambiguity as he defended the compatibility of divine
:,r,er two being
foreknowledge and human freedom (S10.3b #4 and #14). He translated Aristo-
:',- logic ear1y,
tle's logic into Latin. Many of his translations -were lost; but his Categories and
On lnterpretation became the main source for the logica aetus (old logic).
:,rr the next two The Arab worid dominated in logic from 800-1200. Some Arab logicians were
: \\'est. Christian, but most were Muslim; both groups saw logic as important for theol-
:.rna, and Tibet. ogy and medicine. They translated Aristotle into Arabic and wrote commen-
:;ued it too. It taries, textbooks, and original works. They pursued topics like syllogisms, modal
e iallacies, and logic, conditionals, universals, predication, and existence. Baghdad and Moor-
ish Spain were centers of logic studies.
In Christian Europe, logic was reborn in the 11th and 12th centuries, with
Anselm, Peter Abelard, and Latin translations of Aristotle's Prior Analytics, Pos-
terior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Ret'utations; the logica rzooa (new logic)
was based on these. There was interest in universals and in how terms signify.
Peter of Spain and William of Sherwood wrote logic textbooks.
The ciever Barbara-Celarent verse was a tool for teaching syllogisms:

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque, prioris;

Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, secundae;
tertia, Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton,
Bocardo, Ferison, habet; quarta insuper addit
Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison.
: Chapter 5); in
: iire. Capitalized names are valid syllogisms. Vowels are sentence forms:
352 PART FOUR: FURTHER VISTAS

A all-is- Aff -Irm universal/particular fallacr' -

I some-is- o If the ;:
E no-is- nE-gO universal/particular ment t: -

O some - is not - . If the c--:

So "Barbara," with AAA vowels, has three "all" statements: In the \[::
tron.Ete: -. :
ailMisP MP
priori . . ;'
SM =
irgure I
allSisM
allSisP

Aristotelian syllogisms have two premises. Middle term "M" is common to both
16.-1 :. -_
premises; predicate "P" occurs in the first premise, while subject "S" occurs in
the second. There are four figures (arrangements of premise letters): A -l --, -
ntt:._.: -
i
COnil-: -:= - -
1 (prioris) 2 (secundae) 3 (tertia) 4 (quarta) isB':-:,.--
MP PM MP PM with =--- . .
SM SM MS MS Venn :'-. = -
har-e a::= = -
Aristotle's four axioms are valid first-figure forms: logrc :._:.- -
impro..'. :., -
Barbara Celarent Darii Ferio rer.olu:- - :
allMisP noMisP allMisP noMisP Ihe (,=-
allSisM allSisM someSisM some S is M Hegel F:-:,::
.'. all S is P noSisP .'.someSisP some S is not P evolr-es i.-i -.
together .--. , -

The other 15 forms can be derived as theorems. The consonants give clues on applied il".:, :
how to do this; for example, "m" says to switch the order of the premises. logic as a:. .-,=
Thomas Aquinas (722+-74), the most influential medieval philosopher, had flicting p:. :. -
little impact on logic's development; but he made much ,r" of logic. Since he self -contr;. i, ::
emphasized reasoning and wrote so much, he likely produced more philosophical and time ;--.: :
arguments than anyone else who has ever lived. I'he p1-.--, . .
Fourteenth-century logicians include William of Ockham and |ean Buridan. future der'. -:
Ockham's razor says "Accept the simplest theory that adequately explains the reduce reai :--
data." Ockham developed modal logic and tried to avoid metaphysics when their pencrl- :.:
analyzing language. Buridan's ass was a fictional donkey whose action was par- like that oi
"c
alyzedwhen he was placed exactly midway between two food bowls. Buridan also Many thr:..
formulated the standard rules for valid syllogisms; one version says that a syllo- Morgan prt: -
gism is aalid just if it satisfies all of these conditions: "A08"; a lei:=
known for hr'
. Ever] term distributed in the conclusion must be distributed in the premises.
(A term is distributed in a statement just if the statement makes some claim
about e-oery entity that the term refers to.)
. The middle term must be distributed in at least one premise. (The middle term
is the one common to both premises; if we violate this rule, we commit the He complarneJ
 HISTORY OF LOGIC 353

Llar
fallacy of the undistributed middle.)
. If the conclusion is negative, exactly one premise must be negative. (A state-
Iar ment is negatiae if it contains "rro" ot "not"; otherwise it's positive.)
. If the conclusion is positive, both premises must be positive.

In the Middle Ages, logic was important in philosophy and in higher educa-
tion. Even today, logic, like biology, uses many Latin terms (modus ponens, e
prioril a posteriori, de rel de dicto, and so on).

; common to both
76.3 Enlightenmentlogic
iect "5" occurs in
tters): Aristotelian logic dominated until the end of the 19th century. Several logicians
contributed to syllogistic logic; for example, Leonhard Euler diagrammed "all A
fta) is B" by putting an A-circle inside a larger B-circle, Lewis Carroll entertained us
[,
with silly syllogisms and points about logic in Alice in Wonderland, andlohn
; Venn gave us diagrams for testing syllogisms (52.6). But most logicians would
have agreed with Immanuel Kant, who said that Aristotle invented and perfected
logic; nothing else of fundamental importance could be added, although we might
improve teaching techniques. Kant would have been shocked to learn about the
Ferio revolution in logic that came about a hundred years later.
fisP The German thinkers Georg Hegel and Karl Marx provided a side current.
:SisM Hegel proposed that logic should see contradictions as explaining how thought
:SisnotP evolves historically; one view provokes its opposite, and then the two come
together in a higher synthesis. Marx saw contrafictions in the world as real; he
nts give clues on applied this to political struggles and revolution. While some saw this dialectical
e premises. logic as an alternative to traditional logig critics objected that this confuses con-
philosopher, had flicting properties in the world (like hot/cold or capitalist/proletariat) with logical
of logic. Since he self-contradictions (like the same object being both white and, in the same sense
rore philosophical and time and respect, also non-white).
The philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, the co-inventor of calculus, anticipated
md Jean Buridan. future developments. He proposed the idea of a symbolic language that would
rtely explains the reduce reasoning to calculation. If controversies arose, the parties could take up
retaphysics when their pencils and say, "Let us calculate." Leibniz created a logical notation much
;e action was Par- like that of Boole (and much earlier); but his work was published after Boole.
rwls. Buridan also Many thinkers tried to invent an algebraic notation for logic. Augustus De
says that a syllo- Morgan proposed symbolizing "all A is B" as "A))B" and "some A is B" as
"A0B"; a letter on the concave side of the parenthesis is distributed. He became
known for his De Morgan laws for propositional logic:
in the premises.
rkes some claim Not both A and B = Either not-A or not-B
Not either A or B = Both not-A and not-B
fhe middle term
we commit the He complained that current logic couldn't handle relational arguments like "A11
 354 PART FOUR: FURTHER VISTAS

dogs are animals; therefore all heads of dogs are heads of animals,, (S9.5b
#25). formal sv:::'
The Boolean algebra of George Boole
iig15-64) was a breakthro,lgh, ,ir.,." it of formulas :
used math to check the correctness of inferences. Boole used letters io,
,.,r; ,o Frege's rrc
"M" might be the set of mortals and "H" the set of humans. putting two letters
early 20th ce:
togetherrepresents the intersectiott ol the sets; so ,,HM,, is the set J those
who for "not," "ti
are both human and mortal. Then "All humans are mortal,, is ,,H
= HM,,, which
says that the set of humans = the set of those who are both human
and mortal.
A syllogism is a series of equations:

Valid All humans are mortal. H = HM

argutnent
, All Greeks are humans. G = GH
. . All Greeks are mortal. ... G = GM
These can .c:

we can derive the conclusion by substituting equals for equals. In premise 2,

/tHM/'/ (premise
9 = GH,_replace "H" wirh f ,ry, H = HMj to get G = GHM.
Then replace "GH" w_r1h "G" (premise 2 says G = GH) ,o g.i G GM.
= This n'as :-s -
Boolean formulas, like those on the left below
lwhiih .,r. , lrt", symbolism), simpler n.:::-
can be interpreted to be about sets or about statements:
Frege ie '. ;-
" -4" can mean ,,the set of non_A s,, or ,,not_A,,
wanted ta ::.-
" AaB" can mean "the intersection of sets A and 8,, or ,,A and B,, purelr, lol::"-
" AwB" can mean ,,the union of sets A and 8,, or ,, A or 8,, axioms ar.; -:
condition --.-. :,

so if " A"is the set of animals, then "-A" is the set of non-animals; but if
is
,,A,, condition : -- -
"Aristotle is a logician," then " -A" is "Aristotle isn't a logician.,, The same iaws some sets ::a
cover both; for example , " A^B = Ba)A" works for eith"er sers or statements. object) rvh:-.
Boolesn op-erators (like "and," " or," and "not") use the statement interpretation. not a men:i'.:
Boole, the father of.mat.hematical logic, thought rhat logic belonged
with members c:::,
mathematicians instead of philosoph"rr. Brrt both
lroups .r-J,o have an inter-
if x is not ; =.,
est in logic, each getting the slice of the action thrtTits it better. While not a merr.ral
Boole was
important, a greater revolution in logic was to come.

76.4 Frege and Russell Russell ask;:

principle, R .;
Gottlob Frege (1848-r92s) created modern logic with his tlzg Begrit'fsschrit't
("conceptwriting"). Its BB pages introduced a symbolism that, for th"" fiirt ti-f,
let us combine in every way Aristotle,s ,,a11,,, ,;no,,,and ,,some,, with the Stoic SoisRam.:
" if-then," " and," and " ot.', we can symbol ize ,,If everything that,s A or B is way we get I :
-So
then C and D, then everything that's non-D is non-A.,, Thus"the gap between provable in F:
Aristotle and the stoics was overcome in a higher synthesis. r.ege"rlro showed life work coll:
how to analyze arguments with relations (like-"x loves y,,) and m"ultiple Russeil gre,
q.ranti-
fiers; so we can show that "There is someone thut loves,, entails minds worke:
"Everyone loves someone" - but not conversely. F.ege "r"ryone
presented logic as a needed fixins
 HISTORY OF TOGIC 355

.als" ($9.5b #25). t'ormal system, with purely notational rules for determining the grammaticality
kthrough, since it of formulas and the correctness of proofs.
[etters for sets; so Frege's work was ignored until Bertrand Russell (1.872-L970) praised it in the
)utting two letters early 20th century. Frege's difficult symbolism alienated people. He used lines
e set of those who for " not," " if-then," and " all"
'.

"H=H]ly'r," which
urnan and mortal.
Not-A If A then B For all x
---rA --pB
La -\Y

=HM
=GH These can combine to symbolize "Not all A is non-B" (our "-(x)(Ax > -Bx)"):
=GM

ra1s. In premise 2,
-=*[Nx
togetG=GHM.
G=GM. This was also his way to write "Some A is B" (our "(Ix)(Ax'B")"); he had no
r later symbolism), simpler notation for "some" or "and."
Frege developed logic to help show that arithmetic is reducible to logic; he
wanted to define all basic concepts of arithmetic (like numbers and addition) in
purely logical terms and prove all basic truths of arithmetic using just logical
A and B" axioms and inference rules. Frege used a seemingly harmless axiom that every
or B" condition on x picks out a set containing just those elements that satisfy that
condition; so the condition "x is a cat" picks out the set of cats. But consider that
imals; but if "A" is some sets are members of themselves (the set of abstract objects is an abstract
m." The same laws object) while other sets aren't (the set of cats isn't a cat), By Frege's axiom, "x is
rets or statements. not a member of itself" picks out the set containing just those things that are not
rent interpretation. members of themselves. Call this "set R." So any x is a member of R, if and only
gic belonged with if x is not amember of x (here "€" means "is a member of" and"e" means "is
re to have an inter- not a member of"):
:r. While Boole was
For all x, x € R if and only if x c x.

Russell asked in a 1902letter to Frege: What about set R itself ? By the above
principle, R is a member of R, if and only if R is not a member of R:

R e Rif andonlyif R e R.
879 Begrit'fsschrift
rt, for the first time,
So is R a member of itself? If it is, then it isn't - and if it isn't, then it is; either
me" with the Stoic
way we get a contradiction. Since this contrafiction, called Russell's paradox, was
ing that's A or B is
provable in Frege's system, that system was flawed. Frege was crushed, since his
rs the gap between
life work collapsed. His attempts to fix the problem weren't successful.
Frege also showed
Russell greatly admired Frege and his groundbreaking work in logic; the two
nd multiple quanti-
minds worked along similar lines. But the paradox showed that Frege's work
rone loves" entails
needed fixing. So Russell, with his former teacher Alfred North Whitehead,
resented logic as a
355 PART FOUR: FURTHER VISTAS

worked to develop logic and set theory in a way that avoided the contradiction. parado-t --, -

They also developed a more intuitive symbolism (much like what we use in this distort : -,
book), based on the work of Giuseppe Peano. The result was their massive Prln- the de:-:::-
cipia Mathemqtica, which was published in 1910-7973. Principiahad a huge in- Los: i
fluence and became the standard formulation of the new logic. was i:;:
lo'l:: _:. ,,.
in ::.. -:: .

76.5 After Principia tain: -',-:.- :

Neun":.: -.

electrc:..--,:
Classical symbolic logic includes propositional and quantificational logic (Chap-
and so::'.'. ,
ters 6 to 9). A logic is "classical" if it accords with Frege and Russell about which
arguments are valid, regardless of differences in symbolization and proof tech-
marn i.: ':-
T^---- -
LL)q-. _
niques. Classical symbolic logic gradually became the new orthodoxy, replacing
approa-:. .
the older Aristotelian logic.
Much work was done to solidlfy classical symbolic logic. Different proof tech- sensor\- j-,
branch.= -
niques were deveioped; while Frege and Russell used an axiomatic approach, later \'
-1! L- i::
logicians invented inferential and truth-tree methods that were easier to use.
Trvo tr :=-
Different ways of symbolizing arguments were developed, including the Polish
nototion of a school of logic that was strong in Poland between the world wars. classic:, - :
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Emil Post independently invented truth tables, which
for erar.:-:
clarified our understanding of logical connectives (like "if-thetr," "and," and
sical lc:-: '

"or") and led to a criterion of validity based on semantics - on the meaning of The :' .
"nece=ir:-.
the connectives and how they contribute to truth or falsity; Alfred Tarski and
pursue.- _:.
others expanded the semantic approach to quantificational logic.
.

Leu'is's ','.' -
Much work was done in metalogic, the study of logical systems (Chapter 15).
Kurt Godel showed that Russell's axiomatization of classical logic was, given cer- arguei::,:
and qr-.a:.:-.
tain semantic assumptions, correct: iust the right things were provable. But he
also showed, against Frege and Russell, that arithmetic cannot be reduced to any
erties. l:.1
Kripke :, . '
formal system: no consistent set of axioms and inference rules would suffice to
sense oi -. .
prove all arithmetic truths; this result, called Godel's theorem, is perhaps the
most striking and surprising result of 2Oth-century logic. Alonzo Church showed
useful lr. ,:
that the problem of determining validity in quantificational logic cannot be phers r:.:-.
reduced to an mechanical algorithm (a result called Church's theorem). There
properii. i
was also much activity in set theory, which after Russell's paradox became Other .'.
increasingly complex and controversial. of knortl;:,
There was also much work in philosophy of logic (Chapter 1B), which deals tionship l
with philosophical questions about logic, such as these: Are logical truths de- future ti:-..
(Chapter= -
pendent on human conventions (so different conventions might produce differ-
ent logical truths) or on the objective nature of reality (perhaps giving us the supplerr,e:.:
De nili'..
framework of any possible language that would be adequate to describe reality)?
needs to 'le
Can logic help us clarify metaphysical issues, such as what kinds of entity ulti-
mately exist? Should we assume abstract entities (like properties and proposi- values. \1:r
tions) when we do logic? How can we resolve logical paradoxes (such as Russell's fuzzy-1ogii
(0.00). or:
 HISTORY OF LOGIC 357

led the contradiction. paradox and the liar paradox) ? Are logical truths empirical or a priori? Does logic
le what we use in this distort ordinary beliefs and ordinary language, or does it correct them? What is
as their rnassive Prin- the definition and scope of logic?
incipia had a huge in- Logic was important in the development of computers. The key insight here
)sc. was that logical functions like "and" and " or" can be simulated electrically by
logic gates; this idea goes back to the American logician Charles Sanders Peirce
in the 1880s and was rediscovered by Claude Shannon in 1938. A computer con-
tains logic gates, plus memory and input-output devices. Logicians like |ohn von
Neumann, Alan Turing, and Arthur Burks helped design the first large-scale
electronic computers. Since logic is important for computers, in both hardware
iicational logic (Chap-
and software, it's studied today in computer science departments. So now three
d Russell about which
main departments study logic - philosophy, math, and computer science.
:ation and proof tech-
Logic today is also an important part of cognitioe science, an interdisciplinary
'orthodoxy, replacing
approach to thought that includes linguistics, psychology, biology (brain and
sensory systems), computers (especially artificial intelligence), and other
. Different proof tech-
branches of philosophy (especially epistemology and philosophy of mind).
omatic approach, later
As classical symbolic logic became the orthodoxy, it started to be questioned.
at were easier to use.
Two types of non-classical logic came to be. Supplementary logics accepted that
l, including the Polish
classical logic was fine as far as it went but needed to be supplemented to deal,
:ween the world wars.
for example, with "necessary" and "possible." Deviant logics thought that clas-
ed truth tables, which
sical logic was wrong on some points and needed to be changed.
"if-then," "and," artd
The most important supplementary logic is modal logic, which deals with
r - on the meaning of
"necessary" and "possible" (Chapters 1,0 and tt). Ancient and medieval logicians
ity; Alfred Tarski and
pursued modal logic; but 2Oth-century logicians mostly ignored it until C. L
.logic.
Lewis's work in the 1930s. Modal logic then became controversial. Willard Quine
systems (Chapter 15).
argued that it was based on a confusion; he thought logical necessity was unclear
al logic was, given cer-
and quantified modal logic led to an objectionable metaphysics of necessary prop-
were provable. But he
erties. There was lively debate on modal logic for many years. In 1959, Saul
rnot be reduced to any
Kripke presented a possible-worlds way to explain modal logic; this made more
rules would suffice to
sense of it and gave it new respect among logicians. Possible worlds have proved
eorem, is perhaps the
useful in other areas and are now a common tool in logic; and several philoso-
ilonzo Church showed
phers (including Alvin Plantinga) have defended a metaphysics of necessary
ional logic cannot be
properties. Today, modal logic is a well-established extension of classical logic.
rch's theorem). There
Other extensions apply to ethics ("A ought to be done" or "A is good"), theory
sell's paradox became
of knowledge ("X believes that A" or "X knows that A"), the part-whole rela-
tionship ("X is a part of Y"), temporal relationships ("It will be true at some
apter 18), which deals
future time that A" and "lt was true at some past time that A"), and other areas
Are logical truths de-
(Chapters 12toL4). Most logicians would agree that classical logic needs to be
might produce differ-
supplemented in order to cover certain kinds of argument.
perhaps giving us the
Deaiant logics say that classical symbolic logic is wrong on some points and
te to describe reality)?
needs to be changed (Chapter 17). Some propose using more than two truth
at kinds of entity ulti-
values. Maybe we need a third truth value for "half-true." Or maybe we need a
roperties and proPosi-
fuzzy-logicrange of truth values, from completely true (1.00) to completely false
oxes (such as Russell's
(0.00). Or perhaps " A" and "not-A" can both be false (intuitionist logic) or both
358 PART FOUR: FURTHER VISTAS

be true (paraconsistent logic). Or perhaps the classical approach to "if-then" is

flawed; some views even reject modus ponens ("If A then B, A .'. B") and modus
tollens ("lf A then B, not-B .'. not-A"). These and other devrant logics have been
proposed. Today there is much questioning of basic logical principles.
This brief history of logic has focused on deductive logic and related areas.
There has also been much interest in informal logic (Chapters 3 and 4), inductive
logic (Chapter 5), and history of logic (this chapter).
So logic has a complex history - from Aristotle and the Stoics in ancient
Greece, through the Middle Ages and the Enlightenment, to the turmoil of the
19th century and logic's transformation with Frege and Russell, and into recent Deviant l:+:
classical and non-classical logics and the birth of the computer age.1 5LaL(1,ic-.-: i-:
onh :r;:: . '.
t\4'O tru::. '. : '.

trUelPa:::-,:
IF-THE\.- .=
Der-t,":-. -, ,

SOme ai:;-=. .
ard 1oe-; =-:
would h.:::.:
are r.aiii ": i '

17.7 \l::
Most 1oE-:.-
proposit - :.=.
and false ..
tences th.;: ..:
is whrte ".:
SentenCe: :,:
stipulate :: -.:
Many-vi'-

might api,, -

or plausi'b,=
decided. -\ :-

1
For *or. on the history of logic, I suggest P. H. Nidditch's The Development ot' Mathematical
Logic (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,1962) and, for primary sources, Irving Copi and James
Gould's Readings on Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1954). Also useful are William and Martha
Kneale's The Deaelopment of Logic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962) and Joseph Bocheisl<t's A History This table s:
of Formal Logic, trans.Ivo Thomas (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1951).