Direct and indirect reciprocity among individuals and groups

Romano, A.; Saral, A.S.; Wu, J.

Citation
Romano, A., Saral, A. S., & Wu, J. (2021). Direct and indirect reciprocity among individuals
and groups. Current Opinion In Psychology, 43, 254-259. doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.08.003

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Review

Direct and indirect reciprocity among individuals and

groups
Angelo Romano1, Ali Seyhun Saral2 and Junhui Wu3,4

Abstract other people [3,4]. Direct and indirect reciprocity are

Direct and indirect reciprocity are two fundamental mecha- considered two fundamental mechanisms promoting
nisms that promote prosocial behavior within groups and prosocial behavior [5,6]. Direct reciprocity can be
across societies. Here, we review recent work that illustrates broadly defined as a mechanism where people help
how a (direct and indirect) reciprocity framework can illuminate those who have helped them in the past. Indirect reci-
our understanding of several factors related to prosocial procity is the principle that describes the tendency to
behavior — namely group membership, gossip, and third-party help others who have previously helped someone else,
punishment. We propose that each of these factors can pro- also known as downstream indirect reciprocity (or ‘pay-
mote prosocial behavior via proximate psychological mecha- it-forward’ after having received benefits from others,
nisms related to direct and indirect reciprocity: reputational also known as upstream indirect reciprocity) [5,6]. In
concern, expectations, and anticipation of future interaction. direct and indirect reciprocity models, past experience
Finally, we discuss the implications of adopting such a frame- and reputation information are extremely important as
work and highlight a number of avenues for future research. people are hypothesized to condition their prosocial
behavior on others previous behavior and reputation
Addresses ([7e10]). Over the years, an abundance of theoretical
1
Social, Economic and Organizational Psychology, Leiden University,
and empirical research has outlined how past experience
the Netherlands
2
Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy and reputation information are effective in promoting
3
CAS Key Laboratory of Behavioral Science, Institute of Psychology, prosocial behavior in the lab [11], in field settings [12],
Chinese Academy of Sciences, China across human development [13e15], and across several
4
Department of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sci- societies [16].
ences, China

Corresponding author: Romano, Angelo ([email protected]) Direct and indirect reciprocity models not only provide
insights into the ultimate mechanisms promoting the
evolution of prosocial behavior but can also inform the
proximate psychological mechanisms that can govern
Current Opinion in Psychology 2022, 43:254–259
and underlie prosocial behavior in humans [17,18]. In
This review comes from a themed issue on Prosociality this review, we focus on a set of psychological mecha-
Edited by Stefan Pfattheicher and Isabel Thielmann nisms related to direct and indirect reciprocity that can
For a complete overview see the Issue and the Editorial explain how people behave across several situations.1 In
Available online 13 August 2021
our reciprocity framework, we argue that humans are
equipped with complex reciprocity psychology that evolved
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.08.003
to evaluate, enforce, and condition their social behavior
2352-250X/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an on present and/or future opportunities to gain either
open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).
direct or indirect personal benefits [17,19]. We propose
three potential psychological mechanisms related to a
reciprocity framework, reputational concern (i.e. the
Keywords
extent to which people care about others’ evaluations),
Direct reciprocity, Indirect reciprocity, Cooperation, Prosocial
behavior, Review.
expectations (i.e. beliefs about whether one’s interac-
tion partner will behave in a prosocial way), and antici-
pation of future interaction (i.e. assuming or
Introduction understanding whether one will meet their interaction
A large body of literature has examined prosocial partner in the future). Although each psychological
behavior by looking at situations where people pay a mechanism has been hypothesized to play a crucial role
monetary cost to benefit unrelated strangers (for a
1
review on experimental games see Van Dijk and De Other theoretical models, such as partner choice and competitive altruism models
(see for example [50]), highlight similar psychological mechanisms, particularly in
Dreu [1] and Thielmann et al. [2]). Prosocial behavior relation to indirect reciprocity. Here, we will not discuss the differences among these
can be defined as a costly act that confers benefits on models, but rather focus on the predictive power of key psychological mechanisms to
understand prosocial behavior.

Current Opinion in Psychology 2022, 43:254–259 www.sciencedirect.com

 Direct and indirect reciprocity Romano et al. 255

in promoting prosocial behavior [20,21], these mecha- membership and gossip on prosocial behavior, and the
nisms are often not understood within a broad reci- willingness to engage in third-party punishment can be
procity framework. explained by individuals’ tendency to (i) be concerned
about their personal reputations, (ii) have positive ex-
Notably, these three proposed mechanisms are not pectations about the interacting partner’s behavior, and
mutually exclusive, rather they may be related to each (iii) anticipate when the shadow of future benefits (or
other. For instance, people can be highly concerned costs) is salient and at stake. Finally, we briefly outline
about their reputation when they anticipate future in- how future research can use a reciprocity framework to
teractions. However, this is not always the case, as in inform our understanding of several other factors related
some situations, people may anticipate future in- to prosocial behavior.
teractions and not be concerned about their reputation
(e.g. in interactions with outgroup members [22]). Group membership
Moreover, one of these mechanisms may be relatively Past research shows that group membership is an
more relevant in one situation than another. For important factor promoting prosocial behavior. In fact,
example, the presence of bystanders may activate humans have evolved psychology to be more prosocial
greater reputational concern than the anticipation of a with ingroup members than outgroup members [23].
future interaction or a positive expectation about the This tendency is known as ingroup favoritism. The
interacting partner’s prosocial behavior. theory of bounded generalized reciprocity offers an
explanation that is in line with a reciprocity framework
Here, we illustrate a reciprocity framework and specify [22]. Bounded generalized reciprocity predicts that
how these three psychological mechanisms can explain group membership functions as a heuristic for indirect
the effect of three prominent factors related to prosocial reciprocity, such that people are more prosocial with
behavior among individuals and groups: group mem- ingroup members because they expect more prosocial
bership, gossip, and third-party punishment (see behaviors and indirect benefits within their own
Figure 1a and b for a summary of the framework). It is group [18,21,24].
important to note that while group membership and
cues of gossip may influence the actor’s prosocial Recent theoretical and empirical advances have
behavior (own prosocial behavior), one’s punishment enriched the support for this perspective as an expla-
behavior as a third-party observer (i.e. third-party pun- nation for ingroup favoritism in humans [25]. Agent-
ishment) may influence others’ prosocial behavior. For based models show that simple reputation heuristics
each of these factors driving prosocial behavior, we can lead to the endogenous emergence of group for-
present recent empirical evidence that supports mation [26] and have illustrated how groups can
the hypothesis that the positive effects of group coevolve with intra-group cooperation in indirect

Figure 1

Summary of the conceptual framework. Arrows represent the hypothesized relation between pairs of variables. Bold arrows mean stronger relations
between variables than dashed arrows. (a) shows how the effects of group membership and cues of gossip on one’s own prosocial behavior are explained
by reputational concern, expectations, and anticipation of future interaction. (b) shows that reputational concern and anticipation of future interactions
affect third-party punishment, which, in turn, has a positive effect on others’ prosocial behavior.

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256 Prosociality

reciprocity systems (i.e. social interactions based on defection and promote prosocial behavior. Gossip is a
reputation information) [27]. Experimental research has pervasive feature in human interactions and widespread
also highlighted the importance of anticipated future across cultures and organizations [32]. Gossip can be
interactions or expectations in regulating intergroup defined as a situation where a sender communicates to a
relations. Across several studies, researchers found that receiver about a target who is absent or unaware of the
anticipation of future interactions with outgroup mem- content [33]. Gossip is a key factor that helps the
bers can eliminate ingroup favoritism in prosocial functioning and efficiency of reciprocity, and it has been
behavior and this holds true for both adults and young documented to influence reputation formation and
children [13]. In an experiment on the intergroup re- prosocial behavior [34]. For example, an abundance of
lations between Taiwanese and mainland Chinese, studies found that people are more prosocial toward
Chiang [28] investigated the relevance of eight unknown others when possibilities for gossip are present
different theoretical perspectives (e.g. extended con- [20,35,36]. In line with a reciprocity framework, this
tact theory, social identity theory) and found strong positive effect of gossip on prosocial behavior is
evidence for indirect reciprocity: people were more explained by greater reputational concern [20]. A recent
likely to reward outgroup (vs ingroup) members who experience sampling study tested several key hypothe-
had behaved generously with fellow ingroup members, ses from indirect reciprocity to understand the content
which decreased intergroup discrimination. This is an of gossip in daily life [34]. The authors found that
example of downstream indirect reciprocity, an unin- people who receive positive gossip about a specific
volved ingroup member rewards an outgroup member target are more inclined to help these targets in future
for having been prosocial toward another ingroup interactions. This is most likely due to expectations of
member. These positive interactions shaped individuals’ more prosocial behavior from these interactions. These
expectations of their partners’ prosocial behavior and, in results suggest that gossip is used in daily life to influ-
turn, moderated the influence of partner’s group ence and update reputations in a way that enables in-
membership on prosocial behavior [29]. Moreover, ex- direct reciprocity. In line with this, recent research also
pectations seemed to explain why people show ingroup shows that even inaccurate gossip can promote trust
favoritism in situations where interacting partners have among strangers via enhanced reputational
different (economic) returns from their prosocial concern [36].
behavior [28]. Expectations also accounted for why
people favor fellow citizens across 42 nations around the Third-party punishment
world [16]. Another recent study found that people tend Another factor promoting prosocial behavior in social
to positively or negatively reciprocate an outgroup interactions is third-party punishment (Figure 1b).
member based on their previous (positive or negative) While second-party punishment can be considered a
experience with other outgroup members. This finding clear instance of negative reciprocity under the antici-
further supports the idea that expectations (via up- pation of future interaction [37], third-party punish-
stream indirect reciprocity) govern group relations [30]. ment represents a more interesting case as the
In line with this argument, past positive (or negative) importance of a direct and indirect reciprocity frame-
interactions between ingroup and outgroup members work may not be clear at first glance. In fact, prominent
are also shown to be relevant in moderating ingroup studies have found that uninterested third parties often
favoritism in economic transactions between refugees in punish defectors by incurring a personal cost, and this,
Syria and Iraq [31]. In this case, the past experience of in turn, promotes prosocial behavior among defectors
conflict between groups affected the expected proso- [38]. Thus, third-party punishment can also be
ciality of outgroup members and this, in turn, exacer- conceptualized as a form of prosocial behavior that
bated the intergroup conflict. promotes prosocial behavior in others. However,
whether third-party punishment is always prosocial in
Overall, this collection of evidence provides convergent nature is still debated [39]. Theoretical accounts in line
support for a reciprocity framework. People are more with a reciprocity framework hypothesize that third-
prone to help ingroup members because they anticipate party punishment is used as (a) a tool to manage repu-
future interactions with them and have greater reputa- tation even in one-shot interactions (e.g. to signal
tional concern within their group. In particular, the trustworthiness to potential future partners) [40,41],
effect of group membership on prosocial behavior (and and (b) a way to avoid the mistreatment by the defector
its variation across situations) is explained by changes in whom the third party may encounter in the future [19].
the extent to which people expect ingroup or outgroup
members to be prosocial with them. Recent research supports the potential role of psycho-
logical mechanisms related to a reciprocity framework in
Gossip explaining why people engage in third-party punish-
Prosocial behavior can also be promoted by other factors, ment. For example, previous research found robust ev-
such as gossip. Gossip is an indirect way to punish idence that participants who witness a distant stranger

Current Opinion in Psychology 2022, 43:254–259 www.sciencedirect.com

 Direct and indirect reciprocity Romano et al. 257

being insulted by another person only punish the prosocial behavior in humans. The goal of this review was
insulter when observed by other bystanders and when to present the empirical evidence that illustrates how a
they are concerned about their reputation [42]. By (direct and indirect) reciprocity framework can help us
contrast, in anonymous situations people intervene less understand the role of several factors affecting prosocial
when a stranger is insulted, compared to a friend or a behavior. To do so, we focused on three factors, group
close other [42]. Moreover, in support of a reciprocity membership, gossip, and third-party punishment. For
framework, recent research found that people report each factor promoting prosocial behavior, we presented
more moral outrage in response to defection when they recent empirical and theoretical evidence from social
cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct sciences that supports hypotheses driven by an (in)direct
prosociality, again suggesting that third-party punish- reciprocity framework. In particular, we show that people
ment can be used as a tool to upregulate the punisher’s cooperate with ingroup members because of higher
own reputation [40]. In line with this, across 24 studies, reputational concerns and more positive expectations of
researchers found that the opportunity to gain reputa- ingroup members’ prosocial behavior that people condi-
tional and partner choice benefits explain why third- tion their behavior in situations involving gossip oppor-
parties may prefer compensation over punishment tunities via greater reputational concerns and expected
[43]. Reciprocal interactions also seem to be important partner’s prosocial behavior and people punish defection
in the evolution of parochial third-party punishment for maintaining a positive reputation and deterring future
(i.e., the tendency to punish more harshly outgroup mistreatment of themselves.
members, compared to ingroup members) [44]. A
recent longitudinal study documenting punishment re- To conclude, humans possess complex reciprocity psy-
sponses to norm violations in daily life also suggests that chology to condition their behavior based on the possibility
people upregulate their punishment in situations where to gain either direct or indirect benefits. Key psychological
their reputation is at stake [45]. mechanisms related to direct and indirect reciprocity can
explain why group membership, gossip, and third-party
Future directions punishment promote prosocial behavior among in-
In the earlier sections, we have outlined how a reci- dividuals and groups. When designing studies and in-
procity framework may explain the effect of group terventions on prosocial behavior, researchers and
membership, gossip, and third-party punishment on practitioners should take into account how different situ-
prosocial behavior. Future research may use a reciprocity ational cues may favor reciprocal benefit opportunities.
framework to illuminate our understanding of other
factors related to prosocial behavior, such as observ- Funding
ability (i.e. the degree to which one’s behavior is A.R. was supported by the European Research Council
observed by others), social norms, or other domains such (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020
as cross-societal variation in prosocial behavior [16]. In research and innovation programme (AdG agreement no
fact, recent research shows that cues of observability 785635; PI Carsten K.W. De Dreu). J.W. was supported
(e.g. watching eyes, having one’s name identifiable by by the National Natural Science Foundation of China
potential partners) enhance prosocial behavior (grant No.: 71901028).
[16,23,46] (for a review on observability and prosocial
behavior see [47]). Future research is needed to un- Author contributions
derstand whether the effect of observability on prosocial Angelo Romano: Conceptualization, Writing e original
behavior might be explained by reputational concerns, draft, Visualization. Ali Seyhun Saral: Writing e review
expectations, or anticipation of future interactions. Also, and editing. Junhui Wu: Conceptualization, Writing e
although previous research has highlighted that the review and editing.
positive effects of social norms and conformity on
prosocial behavior can be driven by reputational con-
cerns and expectations [48,49], less is known about Conflict of interest statement
whether social norms remain effective in promoting Nothing declared.
prosocial behavior when there is no anticipation of
future interactions. Finally, future cross-societal References
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societal variation in prosocial behavior is explained by
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differences in reputational concerns, expectations, and  of outstanding interest
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