Experience Seamless Full Ebook Downloads for Every Genre at ebookmeta.

com

Obstetric Anaesthesia 2nd Edition Rachel Collis

https://ebookmeta.com/product/obstetric-anaesthesia-2nd-
edition-rachel-collis/

OR CLICK BUTTON

DOWNLOAD NOW

Explore and download more ebook at https://ebookmeta.com

 Recommended digital products (PDF, EPUB, MOBI) that
you can download immediately if you are interested.

Obstetric Anaesthesia 2nd Edition Rachel Collis (Editor)

https://ebookmeta.com/product/obstetric-anaesthesia-2nd-edition-
rachel-collis-editor/

ebookmeta.com

Obstetric Anaesthesia 2nd Edition Rachel Collis Sarah

Harries Abrie Theron

https://ebookmeta.com/product/obstetric-anaesthesia-2nd-edition-
rachel-collis-sarah-harries-abrie-theron/

ebookmeta.com

Oxford Handbook of Anaesthesia Rachel Freedman

https://ebookmeta.com/product/oxford-handbook-of-anaesthesia-rachel-
freedman/

ebookmeta.com

Biting the Hand 1st Edition Julia Lee

https://ebookmeta.com/product/biting-the-hand-1st-edition-julia-lee/

ebookmeta.com
The Markets for Force Privatization of Security Across
World Regions Molly Dunigan Editor Ulrich Petersohn Editor

https://ebookmeta.com/product/the-markets-for-force-privatization-of-
security-across-world-regions-molly-dunigan-editor-ulrich-petersohn-
editor/
ebookmeta.com

Adventures of Huckleberry Finn Tom Sawyer s comrade Mark

Twain (Editor)

https://ebookmeta.com/product/adventures-of-huckleberry-finn-tom-
sawyer-s-comrade-mark-twain-editor/

ebookmeta.com

Writing Analytically 8th edition David Rosenwasser

https://ebookmeta.com/product/writing-analytically-8th-edition-david-
rosenwasser-2/

ebookmeta.com

Flower Frenzy Pride Street Paranormal Cozy Mystery 2 1st

Edition T Thorn Coyle

https://ebookmeta.com/product/flower-frenzy-pride-street-paranormal-
cozy-mystery-2-1st-edition-t-thorn-coyle/

ebookmeta.com

Mapping the Field of Adult and Continuing Education An

International Compendium 1st Edition Simone C. O.
Conceição
https://ebookmeta.com/product/mapping-the-field-of-adult-and-
continuing-education-an-international-compendium-1st-edition-simone-c-
o-conceicao/
ebookmeta.com
Doing Critical Social Work Transformative Practices for
Social Justice 1st Edition Bob Pease Editor Sophie
Goldingay Editor Norah Hosken Editor Sharlene Nipperess
Editor
https://ebookmeta.com/product/doing-critical-social-work-
transformative-practices-for-social-justice-1st-edition-bob-pease-
editor-sophie-goldingay-editor-norah-hosken-editor-sharlene-nipperess-
editor/
ebookmeta.com
OXFORD MEDICAL PUBLICATIONS

Obstetric Anaesthesia
Oxford Specialist Handbooks published and forthcoming
General Oxford Specialist Handbooks Oxford Specialist Handbooks in Infectious
Addiction Medicine Disease
Applied Medicine and Surgery in Infectious Disease Epidemiology
Dentistry
Day Case Surgery Oxford Specialist Handbooks in Neurology
Infection in the Immunocompromised Parkinson’s Disease and Other
Host Movement Disorders, 2e
Perioperative Medicine, 2e Stroke Medicine, 2e
Pharmaceutical Medicine
Postoperative Complications, 2e Oxford Specialist Handbooks in Oncology
Renal Transplantation Practical Management of Complex
Retrieval Medicine Cancer Pain

Oxford Specialist Handbooks in Oxford Specialist Handbooks in Paediatrics

Anaesthesia Community Paediatrics
Anaesthesia for Emergency Care Manual of Childhood Infections, 4e
Global Anaesthesia Paediatric Dermatology 2e
Neuroanaesthesia Paediatric Endocrinology and Diabetes
Obstetric Anaesthesia, 2e Paediatric Gastroenterology,
Paediatric Anaesthesia, 2e Hepatology, and Nutrition, 2e
Regional Anaesthesia, Stimulation and Paediatric Intensive Care
Ultrasound Techniques Paediatric Nephrology, 3e
Thoracic Anaesthesia Paediatric Neurology, 3e
Vascular Anaesthesia Paediatric Palliative Medicine, 2e
Paediatric Radiology
Oxford Specialist Handbooks in Cardiology Paediatric Respiratory Medicine
Adult Congenital Heart Disease, 2e Paediatric Rheumatology
Cardiac Catheterization and Coronary
Intervention Oxford Specialist Handbooks in Pain
Cardiovascular Computed Medicine
Tomography, 2e Spinal Interventions in Pain Management
Cardiovascular Imaging
Cardiovascular Magnetic Resonance Oxford Specialist Handbooks in Psychiatry
Echocardiography, 2e Addiction Medicine, 2e
Fetal Cardiology, 2e Forensic Psychiatry
Heart Disease in Pregnancy Medical Psychotherapy
Heart Failure, 2e
Hypertension Oxford Specialist Handbooks in Radiology
Inherited Cardiac Disease Head and Neck Imaging
Nuclear Cardiology Interventional Radiology
Pacemakers and ICDs, 2e Musculoskeletal Imaging
Pulmonary Hypertension Thoracic Imaging
Valvular Heart Disease
Oxford Specialist Handbooks in Surgery
Oxford Specialist Handbooks in Burns
Critical Care Cardiothoracic Surgery, 2e
Advanced Respiratory Critical Care Colorectal Surgery
Cardiothoracic Critical Care Current Surgical Guidelines
Gastric and Oesophageal Surgery
Oxford Specialist Handbooks in End of Hand Surgery, 2e
Life Care Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, 2e
Dementia Otolaryngology and Head and Neck
Heart Failure Surgery
Kidney Disease Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
Respiratory Disease Surgical Oncology
Urological Surgery
Vascular Surgery, 2e
Oxford Specialist Handbooks in
Anaesthesia

Obstetric
Anaesthesia
SECOND EDITION

edited by
Rachel Collis
Consultant Anaesthetist,
University Hospital of Wales,
Cardiff, UK

Sarah Harries
Consultant Anaesthetist,
University Hospital of Wales,
Cardiff, UK

Abrie Theron
Consultant Anaesthetist,
University Hospital of Wales,
Cardiff, UK

1
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Oxford University Press 2020
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published in 2008
Second Edition published in 2020
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018966028
ISBN 978–​0–​19–​968852–​4
Printed and bound in China by
C&C Offset Printing Co., Ltd.
Oxford University Press makes no representation, express or implied, that the
drug dosages in this book are correct. Readers must therefore always check
the product information and clinical procedures with the most up-​to-​date
published product information and data sheets provided by the manufacturers
and the most recent codes of conduct and safety regulations. The authors and
the publishers do not accept responsibility or legal liability for any errors in the
text or for the misuse or misapplication of material in this work. Except where
otherwise stated, drug dosages and recommendations are for the non-​pregnant
adult who is not breast-​feeding
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
 v

Dedication

Reproduced with the kind permission of the Association of Anaesthetists.

Around the world people are suffering or dying unnecessarily from the lack
of safe anaesthesia in surgery, something that is taken for granted in the UK.
The situation is critical in Africa, where millions lack access to safe
anaesthesia.
This book is dedicated to patients globally who aspire to receive the
safest possible anaesthesia care.
The authors will donate their royalties to SAFE Africa, which is the
Association of Anaesthetist’s fundraising campaign aiming to:
• Raise at least £100,000.
• Sale-​up the delivery of three-​day SAFE Obstetrics and SAFE
Paediatrics training courses.
• Sustainably improve anaesthesia education and care in Africa
long term.
 vii

Foreword
The delivery suite can be a very daunting place for the novice, or even ex-
perienced, anaesthetist. Obstetric anaesthesia is both rewarding and chal-
lenging. Helping a mother to give birth and witness all the joy that unfolds is
exhilarating. But childbirth is never without risk and difficulty and things can
go wrong at an alarming speed, threatening the wellbeing of both mother
and baby. Anticipation, early detection, and efficient management of com-
plications are key to a successful outcome. What the obstetric anaesthetist
needs is a clear, practical, and easily accessible manual to assist them. This
Oxford Specialist Handbook is such a book.
I am proud to have been involved in the publication of the first edition
in 2008. Since then, however, obstetric anaesthesia practice has continued
to evolve and the publication of an updated second edition is long overdue
and I am sure, eagerly anticipated. Although some of the editors and au-
thors have changed, it is reassuring to see that the book continues to be
authored by experienced obstetric anaesthetists who practice in busy units.
This ensures that the guidance given in this book is authoritative, practical,
and up to date.
As part of the updating of this edition there are four new chapters re-
flecting the importance of their subject: use of ultrasound, obesity in
pregnancy, the septic mother, and neonatal resuscitation. Ultrasound is be-
coming increasingly important to the anaesthetist and the chapter covers its
use to facilitate difficult neuroaxial block, its use in the increasingly popular
transversus abdominis plane block, and use in assisting central vascular ac-
cess. The last couple of decades has seen a rise in the prevalence of obesity
in all populations and a chapter devoted to the management of the prob-
lems of the obese parturient is a welcome addition. Sepsis remains a major
cause of maternal mortality and morbidity and such an important topic now
warrants a chapter devoted to its prompt recognition and timely treatment,
essential to a successful outcome. Although neonatal resuscitation is usually
the responsibility of the neonatal team, it is important that the obstetric
anaesthetist has a good working knowledge of the subject and the skills to
support paediatric colleagues.
Finally, I’d like to personally thank the editors for donating all royalties
from the sale of this book to the Association of Anaesthetists’ fundraising
campaign for SAFE AFRICA. SAFE (Safe Anaesthesia From Education) is
a ground-breaking project, supported by the Association of Anaesthetists
and the World Federation of Societies of Anaesthesiology, to roll out
educational anaesthesia courses in low- and middle-income countries,
empowering local educators to educate and train anaesthesia providers in
safe anaesthetic practice.
viii Foreword

I also commend the editors for dedicating this book to all patients
worldwide who aspire to receive safe anaesthetic care. This updated and
improved second edition of Obstetric Anaesthesia makes a significant contri-
bution to that laudable aspiration.

Paul Clyburn
Retired Obstetric Anaesthetist and Past President of the Association of
Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland​
 ix

Acknowledgements
This second edition of the Oxford Specialist Handbook of Obstetric
Anaesthesia has been comprehensively revised with updated information
and current evidence to support changes in practice, since publication of
the first edition 10 years ago. We are very grateful to the authors that have
contributed to this edition. However, this work would not have been pos-
sible without the contribution of the two past editors and all contributors
to the first edition. We wish to sincerely thank and acknowledge the con-
tribution of Dr Paul Clyburn and Dr Stuart Davies, as past editors, and
the following first edition contributing authors; Drs Korede Adekanye, Rafal
Baraz, Fiona Benjamin, Sue Catling, Monica Chawthe, Karthikeyan Chelliah,
Doddamanegowda Chethan, Christine Conner, Libby Duff, Kath Eggers,
Caroline Evans, Moira Evans, Claire Farley, Martin Garry, Shubhranshu
Gupta, David Hill, Val Hilton, Felicity Howard, Jon Hughes, Saira Hussain,
Aravindh Jayakumar, Eleanor Lewis, Anthony Murphy, Vinay Ratnalikar,
Shilpa Rawat, Dan Redfern, Alun Rees, Leanne Rees, Hywel Roberts,
Anette Scholz, Raman Sivasankar, Stephen Stamatakis, Gavin Sullivan,
Daryl Thorp-​Jones, Matt Turner, Ramesh Vasoya, Viju Varadarajan, Dave
Watkins, Shreekar Yadthore.
Editors—​Rachel Collis, Sarah Harries, Abrie Theron
March 2020
 xi

Contents

Contributors xv
Symbols and abbreviations xvii

1 Thinking about obstetric anaesthesia 1

Rachel Collis

2 Confidential Enquiries into Maternal Deaths 29

Nuala Lucas and James Bamber

3 Maternal physiology 45
Korede Adekanye and Abrie Theron

4 Maternal pathophysiology 69
Korede Adekanye and Abrie Theron

5 Antenatal assessment and pain management 133

Rachel Collis, Lucy De Lloyd, and David Hill

6 Non-​regional labour analgesia 161

Matthew Turner and Graeme Lilley

7 Regional techniques in pregnancy 181

Rachel Collis and Sarah Harries

8 Ultrasound in obstetric practice 227

Rafal Baraz

9 Regional analgesia for Labour 237

Sarah Harries and Rachel Collis

10 Anaesthesia for Caesarean section: Basic principles 273

Rachel Collis
xii Contents

11 Anaesthesia for Caesarean section: Regional

anaesthesia 297
Sarah Harries and Rachel Collis

12 Anaesthesia for Caesarean section: General

anaesthesia 325
Stephen Morris and Rhidian Jones

13 Post-​delivery symptom control 355

Gemma Keigthley and Sarah Harries

14 Anaesthesia and analgesia for specific obstetric

indications 365
Sarah Harries

15 Postpartum review and problems 411

Sarah Harries

16 Obesity in pregnancy 439

Huda Al-​Foudri, Stuart Davies, and Abrie Theron

17 The sick and septic mother 455

Lucy de Lloyd and Sarah Bell

18 Major obstetric haemorrhage 469

Rachel Collis

19 Hypertensive disease 493

Eleanor Lewis and Stuart Davies

20 Embolic disease 521

Abrie Theron

21 The collapsed parturient 535

Rachel Collis

22 Anaesthesia for non-​obstetric surgery 569

Martin Garry

23 The fetus 577

Christine Conner
 Contents xiii

24 Neonatal resuscitation 605

Angela Hayward

25 A–​Z of conditions in obstetric anaesthesia 613

David Leslie and Rachel Collis

Index 673
Discovering Diverse Content Through
Random Scribd Documents
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Powers of the
President during crises
 This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away
or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the
laws of the country where you are located before using this
eBook.

Title: Powers of the President during crises

Author: J. Malcolm Smith

Cornelius P. Cotter

Release date: July 18, 2024 [eBook #74067]

Language: English

Original publication: Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1960

Credits: Tim Lindell, Craig Kirkwood, and the Online Distributed

Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book
was produced from images made available by the
HathiTrust Digital Library.)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK POWERS OF THE

PRESIDENT DURING CRISES ***
 POWERS
OF THE
PRESIDENT
DURING
CRISES
 POWERS
OF THE
PRESIDENT
DURING
CRISES

J. Malcolm Smith
and
Cornelius P. Cotter

PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRESS

Washington, D. C.
 Copyright, 1960, by Public Affairs Press
419 New Jersey Avenue, S.E., Washington, D. C.
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 59-14964
 FOREWORD
The use of emergency power in a democracy raises many questions
relative to the constitutional basis for its authorization and the
manner of its exercise. If used too little and too late a democratic
state might be destroyed when the proper use of the emergency
power possibly could have saved it. If used arbitrarily and
capriciously, its use could degenerate into the worst form of
dictatorship.
As a boy I was the chauffeur for a country doctor. One day while
driving to see a patient who was gravely ill, the doctor opened his
medicine chest and pointed to a glass vial containing morphine.
“That drug,” he said, “is the most potent medicine in my chest but
requires great skill in prescribing. Used properly it relieves pain and
suffering. Used improperly it makes animals of men.” Emergency
power bears to government the same general relationship of
morphine to man. Used properly in a democratic state it never
supplants the constitution and the statutes but is restorative in
nature. Used improperly it becomes the very essence of tyranny.
By reference to particular statutes and specific instances this volume
affords a graphic picture of the broad extent to which emergency
power has been employed by the United States government in
recent years. Many will view this development with alarm for the
many instances of its use make a lengthy list. Military emergency
today is but one type of national emergency. Catastrophes and
economic emergencies may also require the exercise of this type of
power. Indeed, its use in this day and time has been so frequent that
the very term “emergency” is being “shorn of meaning.”
In the present volume the authors describe and comment upon the
use of emergency power in the United States since 1933. It is their
contention that the use of emergency power was contemplated and
provided for in the Constitution. The law also provides restraints
upon its use. As Professor McIlwain has concluded, the proper test
of constitutionalism is the existence of adequate processes for
keeping government responsible. It is comforting to know that these
processes exist within our government. The primary requirement of
all Americans, then, is to keep government responsible and within
these limitations, for only when this is done can emergency power
be justified under the law of the land.
The always present danger is that emergency power may be used by
an officer or an agency of the government in order to have its own
way when constitutional or other legal restrictions might irritate or
interfere. This danger can be lessened by the selection of good
governmental personnel, but removed to a greater degree by the
enforcement of these constitutional and statutory limitations which
are made effective at times by resort to judicial review.
Readers will be indebted to the authors for this first exhaustive
account of the actual use of emergency power by the United States
government since 1933. The restraint on the freedom of the
individual, the regulation of private enterprise, the control of
communications are but some of the topics that receive minute and
careful treatment. Some readers will be concerned with the
frequency of the resort to emergency power and will view with
uneasiness, as does this writer, the possible curtailment of individual
rights. Yet the authors would be the first to agree with the statement
that, “Freedom and civil liberties, far from being incompatible with
security, are vital to our national strength.” Security and rights are
here made interdependent. Others will take satisfaction in the
flexibility of the United States government that can maintain its
democratic character and still have the means of preserving its
existence under the tremendous pressure of a world war and periods
of economic crises. Irrespective of attitude, the present volume is a
telling account of the manner in which the government of the United
States has been made adaptable under the Constitution to the
problems and exigencies of the modern world.
Robert S. Rankin
Washington, D. C.
 PREFACE
A preface is a kind of last call to dinner, as it were, in which the
authors suggest the purpose of their undertaking, chart the course
they have chosen to pursue, and acknowledge the help they have
received.
This study of the President’s use of emergency powers grew out of
research and discussions in Washington, D. C., and at Harvard, the
University of California, and other institutions. In one sense, it is a
sequel to Dr. Cotter’s study of emergency powers in Great Britain,
prepared under Harvard’s Sheldon Travelling Fellowship during the
academic year 1951-52.
In preparing a political science course at the University of California’s
Riverside campus, one of the most significant gaps in available
sources and treatises about the Presidency concerned the vast range
of power, generally called emergency powers, available to the Chief
Executive should he choose to follow the prescription used by many
predecessors, notably F.D.R.
Both authors have, of course, profited from the monumental work of
Professor Edward S. Corwin, whose classic study, The President:
Office and Powers remains the outstanding work in the field.
Professor Robert S. Rankin’s study, When the Civil Law Fails,
contained valuable historical data of particular importance. Both
authors have also had the inestimable privilege and opportunity of
studying under Professor Charles Fairman, now at Harvard Law
School. Professor Fairman’s study, The Law of Martial Rule, was very
helpful in providing the historical setting for government under
military control. The authors were fortunate in having read Professor
Fairman’s paper delivered at the National War College, “A Post-
Atomic Attack Situation,” wherein it is clearly brought forth that a
complete plan and pattern for dealing with a nuclear attack must be
worked out that does envisage the restoration of civil government to
the nation as quickly as circumstances permit, should the cold war
ever turn into an all-out nuclear holocaust.
While the original work on the manuscript was completed before
either of the authors came to Washington, both have benefitted
from the experience of working in the Pentagon, the Commission on
Civil Rights, the Republican National Committee and the U. S.
Senate. One is apt to view the executive branch of government from
a slightly different perspective, once having been associated with
“the Hill.” And, while the Congress may feel powerless to act against
a determined Chief Executive, the power of the purse still provides
the most effective of all the “checks and balances” in our national
government, except in time of war.
The Fund for the Republic provided the authors with a grant-in-aid in
1955 to begin work on the book, although the Fund had no contact
or association with the authors during the preparation of the
manuscript.
Parts of some chapters have previously appeared as article in the
Western Political Quarterly and The Journal of Politics, and the
authors wish to acknowledge their appreciation at being able to
reproduce all or parts of these articles.
Mr. Warren Campbell served as a helpful research assistant while a
graduate student at Stanford and rendered invaluable aid. Dr.
Norman Small of the American Law Division of the Library of
Congress performed an essential editorial task in reading the entire
manuscript and suggesting very useful changes.
The authors are both grateful to Mrs. Connie Smith, a patient wife,
who spent long, dreary hours typing and re-typing the manuscript.
And, last, but by no means least, the authors reserve a special vote
of the very deepest appreciation to the Executive Director of Public
Affairs Press, Mr. M. B. Schnapper whose patience, confidence and
continued good humor made publication possible.
J. Malcolm Smith and Cornelius P. Cotter
Washington, D. C.
 CONTENTS

I
Introduction 1

II
The Concept of Emergency in Democratic Political Thought 4

III
The Concept of Emergency in American Legislation 14

IV
Emergency Powers Over Persons 26

V
Governmental Acquisition of Property 47

VI
Regulation of Property 55

VII
Control of Communications 73

VIII
Legislative Restraints on the Administration of Emergency
Powers 93

IX
Inter-Agency Relationships 110

X
Judicial Review 125
 XI
Conclusions 144

References 147

Index 177
 ABOUT THE AUTHORS
J. Malcolm Smith received his education at the U.S. Naval Academy,
the University of Washington, and Stanford University. After three
years as an officer in the Army during World War II, he received an
A.B. degree from the University of Washington in 1946, and an M.A.
(1948) and Ph.D. (1951) from Stanford University. He has combined
academic and governmental service since he began his career as an
instructor in political science at Stanford University in 1947. He has
taught at Columbia University and the University of California. He
organized the first World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, for the
Foreign Policy Association and served as its first Executive Director
from 1952-54.
Since coming to Washington, D. C., Mr. Smith served as a consultant
to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (1957-58), and the
President’s Commission on Civil Rights (1958-59) before joining the
staff of Senator Thomas H. Kuchel of California as Assistant to the
Minority Whip of the U.S. Senate.
Cornelius P. Cotter began his academic career at Stanford University
in 1946 following three years as a Navy Seabee in the Pacific during
the Second World War. He received his A.B. in 1949 from Stanford,
and an M.P.A. (1951) and Ph.D. in government (1953) from Harvard
University. He was a Sheldon Travelling Fellow from Harvard
University to the University of London from 1951-52. After serving as
Instructor in Government at Columbia University 1952-53, he
returned to his alma mater, Stanford, in 1953 as an Assistant
Professor of Political Science. He is currently on leave as an
Associate Professor from Stanford University to serve as a special
assistant to the Chairman of the Republican National Committee,
Senator Thruston B. Morton. From December 1958 to December
1959, he served as the Citizenship Clearinghouse Fellow to the
Republican National Committee.
The authors have contributed to the Western Political Quarterly,
Stanford Law Review, the Journal of Politics, and the Midwestern
Political Science Review. Currently they are collaborating on a
textbook in American Government.
This study of presidential emergency powers was initiated by the
authors in 1955 while teaching at Stanford and the University of
California; revision and expansion were undertaken in Washington,
D. C., during 1959 and 1960.
 Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

The general welfare, and military effectiveness of a modern

industrial nation depend upon the harmonious interaction of a
complex, interdependent network of production and transportation
facilities. The interruption of this process at any of a myriad of
critical points can disrupt the supply of essential civilian and military
materials, possibly undermining the economic health or military
security of the nation.[1] The urban concentration of population and
the refinement of communication devices and techniques for
manipulating public opinion make it increasingly possible to instill in
the civilian population an hysteria and terror which could effectively
thwart national mobilization.[2] Realization of the magnitude of the
problem, and a pervasive fear of military assault, vitally influence the
process of continuous redefinition of the balance between collective
authority and individual liberty which is the essential task of
democratic government in war as in peace. Emergency government
has become the norm for twentieth century constitutional states.
An assessment of the adequacy with which democratic government
has, in the recurrent economic and military emergencies since 1933,
combined mobilization of “the ... power of every individual and of
every material resource at its command”[3] toward the objective of
national survival and well-being, with the protection of basic
individual freedoms and the principle of responsible government
which are the heart of democracy, must in substantial part rest upon
an analysis of the contents of the statute books. That is the purpose
of this study. Its classification of legislative delegations of emergency
powers to the executive since 1933 should provide not only
indication of the extent to which coercive powers over persons and
property have been granted the executive in the name of
emergency, but also a framework for the organization of a series of
studies into the use of such powers by the executive branch, and the
success of congressional and other efforts to maintain responsible
administration in time of emergency.
There exists no dearth of recorded efforts to define the ultimate
scope of the constitutional emergency power of the American
executive. Various justices of the Supreme Court have hypothesized,
at one end of a continuum, inflexible constitutional restraints upon
executive response to perceived emergency,[4] and at the other end
an emergency power which is either unrestrained[5] or
unrestrainable.[6] In this manner the Supreme Court has sought to
resolve the conundrum, “How can a virtually unlimited emergency
power and a systematic body of constitutional limitations upon
government action logically coexist? How can constitutionalism be
ought but an anachronism in the twentieth century unless
constitutional governments are equipped with adequate legal
authority to carry the body politic through economic and military
emergencies of staggering dimensions?”
The considerable body of scholarly literature in this field is principally
devoted to speculation on the breadth of the “inherent,” “residual,”
“executive,” or “war” power of the President, and description of
occasions on which the nation’s chief executives have considered it
necessary to exercise a prerogative “power to act according to
discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law
and sometimes even against it.”[7] But despite such incidents as
President Roosevelt’s 1942 Labor Day speech admonishing the
Congress that unless it repealed certain provisions of the Emergency
Price Control Act by October 1st, he would consider them repealed,[8]
emergency administration is overwhelmingly characterized by joint
participation and cooperation of the varying branches of the federal
government. American government in time of war does not
degenerate to anything resembling dictatorship, and to focus
attention upon the exceptions to executive-legislative cooperation in
war administration is to study the pathology of emergency
administration.
The statute books provide at any given time a more accurate
indication of the breadth and limits of executive emergency power
than do exegeses on the Constitution, or histories emphasizing
executive action unsupported by Congress. For in theory[9] and in
practice the President will resort to an “inherent” emergency power
only to the extent to which Congress has failed to anticipate and
prescribe remedial action for such an emergency. On the assumption
that a detailed study of the emergency powers which have been
delegated to the executive by Congress in the immediate past
provides insight into the probable range of such powers which will
be exercised by government in the future, the authors have
undertaken to survey and classify such delegations in the period
1933 to 1955.[10]
It is believed that the accumulation in selected contexts of the
instances of legislative delegation of emergency power will provide
striking revelation of the scope and detail of control over individuals
and groups which is practiced by constitutional governments in time
of emergency. To this we now turn.
 Chapter II
THE CONCEPT OF EMERGENCY IN
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THOUGHT

When President Eisenhower on June 16, 1955 suspended the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declared a nationwide
state of mock martial law, in response to simulated A-bomb and H-
bomb attacks taking a toll of some 14 million civilian casualties, he
acted on the premise that the ordinary processes of democratic and
constitutional government do not suffice to protect the state in time
of emergency and must surrender to a modified authoritarian
regime.[11] This premise is deeply embedded in the teachings of
democratic political theory, which in its traditional and contemporary
expression have counseled the need to abandon the processes of
democratic government as the first essential response to emergency
conditions.
Thus, ironically, the Western democracies which today approach the
close of three decades of economic and military emergency, and turn
their faces to additional decades in the shadow-land between peace
and war, are offered a guiding theory which regards emergency
governance as an aberration, supplanting the relationships between
the various branches of government, and between rulers and ruled
which prevail in “normal” times. In theory the struggle to preserve
limited and popularly responsible government has already been lost,
for this is a luxury we are told we cannot afford.
In the United States we have been especially prone to accept the
alleged need for transition from responsible to authoritarian
government in time of emergency, for we have on the one hand
accepted an interpretation of the Constitution whereunder the rigid
restraints imposed thereby on governmental power are susceptible
of contradiction in time of emergency, and on the other hand we
have with considerable complacence assigned to the Supreme Court
the function of protecting the essentials of constitutionalism and
democracy through periods of emergency. These two attitudes
combine to enhance the sense of need and lull the fear of
supposedly temporary reversions to authoritarian government.
In the belief that it is increasingly essential that emergency action be
sustained by a workable and empirically-based theory of democratic
emergency governance, the authors have undertaken, in the present
study, to survey the treatment of emergency by democratic political
theorists; to review the work of the Supreme Court in assessing the
validity of governmental exercises of emergency powers (placing
special emphasis upon the implications of the 1952 “Steel Seizure”
cases); and, in conclusion, to submit tentatively an approach to
emergency which they consider related to the needs of today and
the realities of recent experience.
Democratic political theorists traditionally have assumed the need in
time of emergency to subvert the governmental processes
prescribed for peacetime and to rely upon a generically different
method of government, frequently designated “constitutional
dictatorship.” Many factors contribute to this tendency.
First, it must be recognized that a theory of democratic government
so comprehensive as to traverse every vicissitude which might
confront it cannot reasonably be demanded of political philosophers.
Second, a certain amount of inertia is inevitable in any phase of
man’s endeavors. Thus it is not surprising that political theorists to
date have picked up the traditional interpretation of emergency in
terms of the Roman dictatorship and fitted it to their schemes of
constitutional government. It is a safely ambiguous doctrine with the
respectability of age. It invests an aspect of the experience of
constitutional democracies, about which very little in the way of
cumulative knowledge has been attained, with an aura of reassuring
and doctrinaire certainty.
A third factor influencing the casual reliance of democratic theorists
on emergency dictatorship is the tendency to polarize the concept of
“limited” government and the supposed need for “unlimited”
emergency action. This is related to the tendency to exaggerate
substantively limited (enumerated) powers, and compartmentalized
powers as integral elements in the concept of constitutionalism.[12] In
positing rigidly circumscribed and divided governmental powers, one
posits a need contingent upon emergency to transcend such
limitations. The doctrine of constitutional dictatorship fulfills this
need.

Democratic Political Theorists

John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called
upon the English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the problem of
emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law set down
by the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal obstacle to
the promptness of action necessary to avert catastrophe. In these
situations the Crown retained a prerogative “power to act according
to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law
and sometimes even against it.”[13] The prerogative “can be nothing
but the people’s permitting their rulers to do several things of their
own free choice where the law is silent, and sometimes too against
the direct letter of the law, for the public good and their acquiescing
in it when so done.”[14]
Properly the prerogative was exercisable only for the public good.
But Locke recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to
avoid abuse of prerogative powers. When one government has
utilized prerogative powers for the public good, a successor may
retain the habit or resort to such powers, utilizing them for a less
worthy purpose.[15] Who shall judge the need for resorting to the
prerogative, and how may its abuse be avoided? Here Locke, too,
readily admits defeat, suggesting that “the people have no other
remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on
earth, but to appeal to Heaven.”[16]
Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of
democratic processes of government in time of emergency:
“The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adapting
themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them
disastrous, and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin
of the State....
“It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions so strong
as to render it impossible to suspend their operation. Even Sparta
allowed its laws to lapse.
“... If ... the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws
are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a
supreme ruler, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a
moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt
about the general will, and it is clear that the people’s first intention
is that the State shall not perish. Thus the suspension of the
legislative authority is in no sense its abolition; the magistrate who
silences it cannot make it speak; he dominates it, but cannot
represent it. He can do anything, except make laws.”[17]
Rousseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or
“supreme magistracy” as he termed it. It would more likely be
cheapened by “indiscreet use.”[18]
He would rely upon a tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid
perpetuation of the dictatorship:
“However this important trust be conferred, it is important that its
duration should be fixed at a very brief period, incapable of being
ever prolonged. In the crises which lead to its adoption, the State is
either soon lost, or soon saved; and, the present need passed, the
dictatorship becomes either tyrannical or idle. At Rome, where
dictators held office for six months only, most of them abdicated
before their time was up. If their term had been longer, they might
well have tried to prolong it still further, as the decemvirs did when
chosen for a year. The dictator had only time to provide against the
need that had caused him to be chosen; he had none to think of
further projects.”[19]
Rousseau was unwilling to rely upon an “appeal to Heaven.”
John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative
government with a shattering aside: “I am far from condemning, in
cases of extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the
form of a temporary dictatorship.”[20] This is not a loose usage of the
term “dictatorship,” but a forthright support of a grant of “absolute
power” to the dictator.
Just as in political theory the nineteenth century liberals neglected
adequately to provide for the problems which war creates, so also in
their economic theory they ignored the dislocations of a war period.
In his study of war in the nineteenth century,[21] Edmund Silberner
has shown how the liberals’ repugnance to the destructiveness of
war, their conviction of its immorality and stupidity, coupled with
their faith that the economic and cultural bonds which would be
created among nations by extensive free trade would prevent future
wars, caused them to neglect adequate theoretical treatment of the
problem of war in their economic thought. Silberner points out, for
example, that in his chief work, Elements of Political Economy
(1821), James Mill virtually does not deal at all with war.[22] And Mill’s
distinguished son is brief on the subject of war. John Stuart Mill,
according to Silberner’s interpretation, seemed to admit that virtually
everything that can be said on this theme had already been
expressed before him.[23]
Thus do democratic political theorists tacitly admit the existence of a
fatal defect in any system of constitutional democracy: Its processes
are inadequate to confront and overcome emergency.

Machiavelli
Machiavelli’s view of emergency powers as one element in the whole
scheme of limited government furnishes an ironic contrast to the
Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to
bridge this chasm in democratic political theory:
“Now in a well-ordered republic it should never be necessary to
resort to extra-constitutional measures; for although they may for
the time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the
practice is once established of disregarding the laws for good
objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under that pretext
for evil purposes. Thus no republic will ever be perfect if she has not
by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every
emergency, and fixed rules for applying it.”[24]
Machiavelli attempted, perhaps without complete success, but with
greater caution than the later theorists, to design a system of
constitutionalized emergency powers.
The incumbent executive authority, on finding that an emergency
existed, could appoint a temporary “dictator”[25] on the Roman
model. The constitution was not suspended, and the emergency
executive did not enjoy absolute power. His narrow function was to
cope with the emergency.[26] He operated under the surveillance of
the regularly constituted legislators and government officials. A key
element of Machiavelli’s scheme was a short term of office—“and I
call a year or more a long time.”[27]
Thus Machiavelli—in contrast to Locke, Rousseau and Mill—sought to
incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of standby
emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls
in time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the
problem of combining a capacious reserve of power and speed and
vigor in its application in time of emergency, with effective
constitutional restraints.

Contemporary Theorists
Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the
problem of response to emergency by constitutional democracies,
have employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship. Criticism
of their schemes for emergency governance is made difficult by the
ambiguities latent in the terminology they adopt. An effort is made
below to distinguish between those who mean dictatorship when
they say dictatorship, and those who say dictatorship when they
mean to refer to any effort by constitutional government to respond
adequately to emergency conditions. However idiosyncratic the
individual definitions of dictatorship, the theories of constitutional
dictatorship explicitly or implicitly posit a transition in time of
emergency from the processes of constitutionalism to those of an
outright or slightly modified authoritarian system.
Frederick M. Watkins, who is responsible for the classic study of the
Weimar experience with emergency powers,[28] appears to have
based his general discussion of emergency powers upon a priori
reasoning rather than upon empirical research.[29] Provided it “serves
to protect established institutions from the danger of permanent
injury in a period of temporary emergency, and is followed by a
prompt return to the previous forms of political life,” Watkins can see
“no reason why absolutism should not be used as a means for the
defense of liberal institutions.”[30] He recognized the two key
elements of the problem of emergency governance, as well as all
constitutional governance: increasing administrative powers of the
executive while at the same time “imposing limitations upon that
power.”[31] He rejects legislative checks upon the exercise of
executive emergency powers as an effective method of imposing
such limitations, for “it is clearly unrealistic to rely on a government-
controlled majority in the legislature to exercise effective supervision
over that same government in its use of emergency powers.”[32] On
the other hand, judicial review of executive emergency action on its
merits is regarded with admiration tempered only by regret at the
delay inherent in judicial proceedings.[33]
Watkins places his real faith in a scheme of “constitutional
dictatorship.” These are the conditions of success of such a
dictatorship: “The period of dictatorship must be relatively short....
Dictatorship should always be strictly legitimate in character.... Final
authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given case
must never rest with the dictator himself....”[34] The objective of such
an emergency dictatorship should be “strict political conservatism.”
“Radical social and economic measures may, of course, be necessary
as a means of preventing political change.... Boldly inventive as it
may be in other directions, however, a truly constitutional
dictatorship must always aim at the maintenance of an existing
status quo in the field of constitutional law. Deviations from the
established norms of political action may be necessary for the time
being. The function of a truly constitutional dictatorship is to provide
such deviations and at the same time to make sure that they do not
go any further than is actually necessary under the
circumstances.”[35]
Carl J. Friedrich casts his analysis in terms similar to those of
Watkins.[36] It is a problem of concentrating power—in a government
where power has consciously been divided—“to cope with ...
situations of unprecedented magnitude and gravity.[37] There must
be a broad grant of powers, subject to equally strong limitations as
to who shall exercise such powers, when, for how long, and to what
end.”[38] Professor Friedrich, too, offers criteria for judging the
adequacy of any scheme of emergency powers. The emergency
executive (“dictator”) must be appointed by constitutional means—
i.e., he must be legitimate; he should not himself enjoy power to
determine the existence of an emergency (and here, strangely
enough, he finds the United States and Great Britain conforming to
the criterion); emergency powers should be exercised under a strict
time limitation; and last, the objective of emergency action must be
the defense of the constitutional order.[39]
Recognizing that “there are no ultimate institutional safeguards
available for insuring that emergency powers be used for the
purpose of preserving the constitution” excepting “the people’s own
determination to see them so used,” Friedrich nonetheless sees
some indefinite but influential role which the courts, even though
“helpless in the face of a real emergency,” may play to restrict the
use of emergency powers to legitimate goals. They may “act as a
sort of keeper of the President’s and the people’s conscience.”[40]
Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the recent history of the
employment of emergency powers in Great Britain, France, Weimar
Germany, and the United States, reverts to a description of a scheme
of “constitutional dictatorship” as solution to the vexing problems
presented by emergency.[41] Like Watkins and Friedrich, he is
concerned to state, a priori, the conditions of success of the
“constitutional dictatorship.”
“1. No general regime or particular institution of constitutional
dictatorship should be initiated unless it is necessary or even
indispensable to the preservation of the state and its constitutional
order....
“2. ... the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should
never be in the hands of the man or men who will constitute the
dictator....”[42]
“3. No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship
without making specific provision for its termination....
“4. ... all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the
organization of the government should be effected in pursuit of
constitutional or legal requirements....
“5. ... no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded,
no regular procedure altered any more than is absolutely necessary
for the conquest of the particular crisis....
“6. The measures adopted in the prosecution of a constitutional
dictatorship should never be permanent in character or effect....
“7. The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative
of every part of the citizenry interested in the defense of the existing
constitutional order....
“8. Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action
taken under a constitutional dictatorship....
“9. The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the
decision to institute one, should never be in the hands of the man or
men who constitute the dictator....
“10. No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the
termination of the crisis for which it was instituted....
“11. ... the termination of the crisis must be followed by as complete
a return as possible to the political and governmental conditions
existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship....”[43]
Rossiter accords to the legislature (in the case of the United States,
at any rate) a far greater role in the oversight of executive exercise
of emergency powers than does Watkins. He would secure to
Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or
termination of an emergency,[44] and he places great faith in the
effectiveness of congressional investigating committees.[45] In this
work he offers no clear statement of the proposed relationship of the
judiciary to his scheme of “constitutional dictatorship.” In a
subsequent study, he concluded on the basis of a critical review of
the Supreme Court that it was impotent “as overseer and interpreter
of the war powers.”[46]

Contemporary Theories in the Light of Recent

Experience.
The suggestion that democracies surrender the control of
government to an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to the
nation is not based upon sound constitutional theory, or the
experience of Great Britain or the United States in this century.
To appraise emergency powers—in spite of all experience to the
contrary—in terms of the Procrustean mold of constitutional
dictatorship serves merely to distort the problem and hinder realistic
analysis. It matters not whether the term “dictator” is used in its
normal sense (as applied to recent authoritarian rulers) or is
employed as Friedrich makes explicit[47] and Rossiter implies, to
embrace all chief executives administering emergency powers.
However used, “constitutional dictatorship” cannot be divorced from
the implication of suspension of the processes of constitutionalism.
Suspension is required because constitutionalism is viewed as a
system imposing and providing inflexible safeguards against evasion
of these limitations.
A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the
analysis of problems of emergency powers, and which is consistent
with the findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H.
McIlwain.[48] While it does not by any means necessarily exclude
some indeterminate limitation upon the substantive powers of
government, full emphasis is placed upon procedural limitations, and
political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need to
repose adequate power in government. And in discussing the
meaning of constitutionalism he insisted that the historical and
proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate
processes for keeping government responsible. He refused to equate
constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by an
exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and substantive
limitations on governmental power. He found that “the really
effective checks on despotism have consisted not in the weakening
of government, but rather in the limiting of it; between which there
is a great and very significant difference.”[49] In associating
constitutionalism with “limited” as distinguished from “weak”
government, McIlwain meant government limited to the orderly
procedure of law as opposed to the processes of force.[50] “The two
fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all
lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power
and a complete political responsibility of government to the
governed.”[51]
If such is the basic nature of constitutionalism, it does not wrap
government in the steel bonds of a series of substantive limitations,
or compartmentalize power in discrete units.[52] The true nature of
the issue which emergency presents for constitutional governments
may then be recognized: It is the two-pronged problem of