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Singapore Precedents of Pleadings Jeffrey Pinsler Digital
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Author(s): Jeffrey Pinsler, S.C. (ed.)
ISBN(s): 9789810845667, 9810845669
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File Details: PDF, 2.13 MB
Year: 2009
Language: english
Singapore
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any act or omission of any other author, consultant or editor.
Singapore
Precedents of Pleadings
(Reissue Edition)

Jeffrey Pinsler S.C.


Editor-in-Chief
Published in 2010
by The Thomson Corporation Pte Ltd
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#15-00
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reproduced belong the the relevant copyright holders.
CONTRIBUTORS

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Jeffrey Pinsler S.C.

ATMD Bird & Bird LLP

Allen & Gledhill LLP

Donaldson & Burkinshaw

Drew & Napier LLC

Haridass Ho & Partners

Harry Elias Partnership

KhattarWong

Lee & Lee

Rajah & Tann LLP

Rodyk & Davidson LLP

TSMP Law Corporation

Tan Kok Quan Partnership

WongPartnership LLP
FOREWORD TO FIRST EDITION

This publication, the first work on pleading precedents to be produced


in Singapore, will have vital significance for the practitioner. Until 1999,
when the Civil Procedure Rules came into effect in England, Singapore
litigators referred to English precedent books as the rules of pleading
were substantially the same in both countries. The Civil Procedure
Rules introduced major changes to the pleading process in England,
with the result that the current English precedent books are of limited
value and may even mislead the Singapore practitioner, given the
substantial differences between the two systems of procedure. Therefore,
Singapore Precedents of Pleadings is timely and will undoubtedly have an
important impact on civil practice.
Pleading is not merely about the observance of rules. The style of drafting
is often instrumental in clarifying the scope of the dispute. Succinctness,
precision, clear language and proper engagement on the issues are the
hallmarks of an effective pleading and often determine the outcome of
an action. Poorly drafted pleadings frequently lead to applications for
clarification (for example, further and better particulars and amendments),
and are not consistent with the policies of expedition and minimisation of
expense in the interest of the administration of justice.
I am heartened by the involvement of many of Singapore’s most
established law companies, firms and senior practitioners as contributors.
The precedents in this publication are of high quality and will render good
service to the Legal Profession. I congratulate the Editor-in-Chief and the
contributors on their considerable achievement.

Yong Pung How


former Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Singapore
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

This publication is the Legal Profession’s response to its need to have a


home-grown book of pleading precedents. This need became particularly
acute when the civil justice reforms in England in the late 1990s (the
Civil Procedure Rules, which replaced the Rules of the Supreme Court,
came into effect in 1999) radically altered the pleading procedure there.
Singapore decided to keep faith with her pleading rules so that there is
now a gulf between the pleading practices of the two countries. English
precedent books, which have been heavily relied upon by lawyers in many
common law systems since the 19th century, are no longer sacrosanct
in countries which have not adopted the Civil Procedure Rules. The
differences in pleading practice in Singapore and England are considered
in the Introduction.
It is my hope that this work will continue the long tradition of the English
precedent books, albeit in the specific context of Singapore practice. Its
readers will find that the precedents for each topic or sub-topic are preceded
by a commentary giving a brief and convenient account of the principles of
law involved and, where appropriate, specific guidelines on pleading (for
example, when special rules, practice directions or case law requirements
apply). The commentaries are not intended to be substitutes for the more
comprehensive treatment of the law available in specialist works. Readers
will also find that some of the precedents are not strictly pleadings.
Nevertheless, they have been included because their link or similarity to
pleadings should prove useful to the practitioner. For example, the chapter
on Admiralty includes pleadings, the preliminary act, references to the
registrar as well as other vital applications. The chapter on Corporate
Insolvency consists of a variety of proceedings concerning the company.
A loose-leaf format was chosen for this work because its flexibility will
enable new precedents to be added as and when appropriate. It is important
to emphasise that while this work is intended to be comprehensive,
practitioners should not assume that the precedents can be followed
without thought. Every case has its own factual construct and may require
a specifically tailored precedent. Therefore, where necessary, practitioners
should adapt the precedent they wish to use to the specific facts of their
case.
Most of the law corporations/firms involved (‘the contributors’) were
asked to supply precedents for a variety of topics so that a selection process
could operate in the interest of maximising the quality of this publication.
x Singapore Precedents of Pleadings

Therefore, the reader will find that a topic often combines precedents from
two to five contributors. In several instances, commentaries from various
contributors on a particular topic have been adapted and synchronised to
greater effect. The contributors are specifically accredited for their work
on the commentaries and precedents. I am extremely grateful to them for
having given so generously of their valuable time and I am honoured to
have had this opportunity to work with them on such an important project.
My sincere thanks to Ms Teoh Swee Leng for having the vision to initiate
this work, for her motivation and for her very valuable assistance
throughout the course of its preparation. I am also grateful to Ms Norainni
Abdul Rahman and Ms Sandra Tan whose editing skills have made my
role that much easier.
Professor Jeffrey D Pinsler
Editor-in-Chief
CONTENTS

Chapter 1 Introduction to the Pleading Process


Chapter 2 Admiralty
Chapter 3 Assault & Battery
Chapter 4 Banking
Chapter 5 Carriage by Air
Chapter 6 Carriage by Land
Chapter 7 Carriage by Sea
Chapter 8 Companies & Securities
Chapter 9 Computers & Information Technology
Chapter 10 Construction
Chapter 11 Corporate Insolvency
Chapter 12 Defamation
Chapter 13 Employment
Chapter 14 Entertainment
Chapter 15 False Imprisonment
Chapter 16 Goods & Services
Chapter 17 Insurance
Chapter 18 Intellectual Property
Chapter 19 Land Disputes
Chapter 20 Misrepresentation
Chapter 21 Money & Restitution
Chapter 22 Particular Pleas
Chapter 23 Personal Injury, Fatal Accidents & Non-Injury
Motor Accident Claims
Chapter 24 Professional Negligence
Chapter 25 Remedies
Chapter 26 Settlement
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE
PLEADING PROCESS

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Rules of pleading
Singapore and English practice compared
Effect of pleadings
General rule
Amendment
Other qualifications to the general rule that
pleadings are binding
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE
PLEADING PROCESS

Jeffrey Pinsler S.C.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1.01 Pleadings constitute the backbone of civil litigation. Without them
the issues in dispute would be unclear (even unknown) making the
effective presentation of a case impossible. Trials would be rambling affairs
and the process of adjudication would be clouded by irrelevant evidence
and arguments. Injustice would be a very real consequence if the court is
not able to adjudicate on the real points of contention. As a father exhorted
his son over 500 years ago:

… it is one of the most honourable, laudable, and profitable things in


our law, to have the science of well pleading and therefore I counsel
thee especially to set all thy courage and care to learn that.1
1.02 The importance of pleadings is the reason why they have been an
integral part of civil litigation at least from Roman times.2 In England,
pleadings took the form of oral pleas at the bar of the court until the 16th
century. The plaintiff would state his claim and the defendant would
respond. The parties would continue to reply to each other through rebuttal
and surrebuttal until the issues in dispute were as clear as possible. The
‘pleadings’ would then be officially recorded and they bound the parties
so that new issues could not be raised. Eventually, in the 1600s, parties
began to deliver written pleadings to each other but such was the emphasis
on the form of the pleading (even the most insignificant formal error could
be detrimental to a party’s case),3 that one judge commented: ‘pleading has

1 Lyttleton’s Treatise on Tenures (1481) s 534 (also see Co Litt 1 302a). In Slade v Drake
(1617) Hob 295; 80 ER 440, Sir Henry Hobart, Lord Chief Justice of Common Pleas,
observed that pleading ‘is the principal art of the law’ for it is the means by which
issues ‘… are cast into form and made evident, clear and easier…’.
2 In Roman law, oral pleas would be heard by the Praetor and subsequently recorded as
the ‘formula’ which had binding effect on the parties.
3 According to Coke CJ, ‘more jangling and questions grow upon the manner of pleading,
now got all into paper and since that, of late, men make it but a snare and
trap and a piece of skill’.4
1.03 The current rules of procedure (including those affecting the pleading
process) have their roots in the English Judicature Act of 1875.5 The Civil
Procedure Ordinances of 18786 and of 18807 were the first Singapore statutes
to formally adopt the English system. Subsequently, the Civil Procedure
Codes of 19078 and of 19269 applied England’s first Rules of the Supreme
Court, 1883. Singapore introduced her own Rules of the Supreme Court,
which consolidated existing civil procedure, in 1934.10 In England, the 1883
rules underwent a complete revision between 1962 and 1965. This exercise
resulted in the introduction of a new set of rules – the Rules of the Supreme
Court, 1965 – which came into operation in October, 1966 (the 1883 rules
were repealed). These changes led to the introduction in Singapore of the
Rules Supreme Court, 1970.11 The 1970 Rules were eventually superseded
by new revisions which have now culminated in the Rules of Court, 2004.12

Rules of pleading
1.04 The primary provisions on pleading may be found in Order 18 of
the Rules of Court (ROC). There are a variety of other rules and statutory
provisions which may apply to specific proceedings (for example,
defamation and admiralty proceedings) and these will be revealed by the
commentaries and precedents in this work. It should also be mentioned that
certain Orders, though general in nature, may have particular importance
with regard to pleadings. Order 20, which governs the amendment of
court documents, Order 2 which concerns irregularity, and Order 3, which,
inter alia, addresses the extension of time for serving court documents, are
examples of such Orders.

and exceptions to form, than upon the matter itself, and infinite causes [are] lost or
delayed for want of good pleading’. This statement was pronounced in 1628. (JH Baker
in An Introduction to English Legal History (3rd Ed) (Butterworths, London, 1990) at
p 102.)
4 This was the lament of Hale CJ (JH Baker at p 102 (see note 3 above)).
5 38 & 39 Vict c 77. In particular, the Schedules to that Act.
6 Ordinance No 5 of 1878.
7 Ordinance No 8 of 1880.
8 Ordinance No 31 of 1907.
9 Ordinance No 102 of 1926.
10 S 2941/34.
11 S 274/70.
12 For a history of the pleading process in the 20th century, see Pinsler J, Civil Justice in
Singapore: Developments in the Course of the 20th Century (Lexis Nexis, 2000), Chapter 7.

1.03
1.05 Order 18 is one of the few Orders in the Rules of Court which has
remained largely intact despite the great many reforms over the last 15
years.13 The reason for this outcome may be because, as one English reform
committee put it in 1968: ‘No set of rules could have been more carefully
devised.’14 In England, they have obviously changed their mind as the
approach under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) is radically different to
the former Order 18 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1965. Singapore
has maintained her long established rules which means that practitioners
here have to exercise considerable care in respect of English pleading
procedure and precedents. The differences between the two systems will
be addressed shortly.15
1.06 The provisions of Order 18 can be divided into 4 categories: content;
formal requirements; effect; and timing. Taking these in reverse order, the
timing provisions are found in rr 1-4 (time for service of pleadings,16 which
includes filing (r 21)). Rules 13 and 14 specify the effect of a plea or non-
plea or pleading or omission to serve a pleading. With regard to formal
requirements, r 6 provides instructions concerning the drafting format.
The content of a pleading is governed by rr 7-12, 15-19 and 23. There are
circumstances in which pleadings are not appropriate, in which case an
application may be made for a trial without pleadings (r 22).
1.07 Readers will find that all the above rules are fully annotated
in Singapore Court Practice 2005 (Lexis Nexis, 2005) and Singapore
Civil Procedure 2003 (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2003). However, it is
appropriate to spend a little time here on the fundamental principles
governing the content of pleadings. The primary rule governing
content is r 7(1). All other rules (including the other sub-rules of
r 7) which affect content flow from r 7(1). The rule is simply that every
pleading must contain only material facts. The primary function of the
pleadings is to ensure, through the parties’ respective allegations and
counter-allegations of fact, that they are aware of, and can focus their
preparation on, the issues in dispute. Therefore, it is the material facts

13 Apart from the changes affecting particulars of pleading (O 18, r 12(1A-1C)) and the
extension of the process of trial without pleadings to hitherto excluded proceedings
(O 18, r 22), the amendments have been mainly formal in nature (generally incidental to
the amendment of other Orders). These changes have not affected the basic principles
of pleading.
14 These words are taken from the Report of the Committee on Personal Injuries Litigation
(the ‘Winn Committee’), (1968) Cmnd para 237, at p 71.
15 See paras 1.08–1.12.
16 Rule 5, which used to concern service in the court vacation, has been deleted.

1.07
which form the mainstay of the pleading process. Rule 8 is an extension
of the principle in r 7 to pleadings subsequent to the statement of claim
(ie, normally the defence and reply). Rule 23 applies this principle to the
specific situation of defences under the Merchant Shipping Act. Rule 15(1)
emphasises the inclusion of certain material facts (reliefs and remedies).
Rules 16 and 17 concern conditions relating to specific assertions of material
fact (defence of tender and set-off respectively). Rule 9 tells us that, subject
to certain qualifications (set out in rr 10 and 15(2)), the material fact can
be pleaded whether it has arisen before or after the issue of the writ. Rule
10 prohibits the inclusion of material facts which are inconsistent with the
pleader’s previous pleading subject to the possibility of amendment. In a
similar vein, material facts may not be pleaded in a statement of claim if
they are irreconcilable with the content of the writ of summons (r 15(2)).
Matters not ordinarily material to pleadings may become material in the
appropriate context. Therefore, points of law may be pleaded if they are
material (r 11) as may non-material subsidiary facts which are necessary to
particularise material facts (r 12). The principles governing material facts
in a statement of claim also apply to a counterclaim (r 18). Sanctions apply
where the content of a pleading is improper as when the material facts are
not pleaded or the content of the pleading is otherwise improper (r 19). To
conclude, Order 18 provides a code of pleading which seeks to address a
variety of circumstances which, in the absence of regulation, may defeat
the objective of clarifying the scope of the dispute.

Singapore and English practice compared


1.08 There is considerable divergence between the pleading procedure
under Order 18 of the Singapore ROC and under the English CPR. The
following illustrations of these differences should underline the need for
circumspection on the part of the Singapore pleader when considering the
system of the CPR. In England, the pleading is referred to as a ‘statement
of case’ which includes the claim, the defence and the reply.17 The term
‘material,’ so fundamental to Order 18 of the ROC, is absent. Instead, the
claim form must, inter alia, ‘contain a concise statement of the nature of
the claim,’ specify the remedy sought and contain any matters required
by the applicable practice direction.18 Vital to the claim are the ‘particulars
of claim,’ which are required to be incorporated in, or served with, the
claim form. If they are not incorporated in, or served with, the claim form,

17 CPR, Pt 16.
18 Ibid, Pt 16.2(1)(a), (b), (d), Pt 16.2(2) and Pt 16.4. If the claim is for money, the claim form
must contain a statement of value (Pt 16.2(1)(c) and Pt 16.3).

1.08
there must be an indication in the claim form that the particulars will
follow.19 In the Singapore ROC, particulars are to be pleaded if necessary.20
Although there is no mention of ‘material facts’ in the English CPR, the
‘particulars of claim’ require ‘a concise statement of the facts on which the
claimant relies’.21 This means that all facts which establish the claim must
be pleaded and this would include material facts. However, the wording
does not limit the claim (or, indeed, other statements of case such as the
defence and reply) to material facts. A party would not be prevented from
pleading non-material facts which he wishes to rely on in making the
claim.22 Evidence is not specifically excluded as it is under the Singapore
ROC.23 In England, he may refer to his witnesses in his statement of case
and attach any documents which he considers to be necessary24 (including
contractual documents).25 He may also plead evidence in relation to
a judicial finding which he wishes to cite in his favour.26 Although in
Singapore a party ‘may raise a point of law’27 and usually does so when he
wishes to rely on a statutory provision, international convention or other
source of law, points of law do not feature too often in pleadings here. The
position under the CPR is that a party is invited to refer to matters of law
on which he relies in the interest of clarification of the area of dispute.28
Unlike in Singapore, the plaintiff in English proceedings who asserts that
he mitigated his damages must make this plea in his claim form.29 Whereas
in Singapore, lawyers have to consider various Orders in the ROC and
even specific statutes30 to ascertain the nature of particulars they have to
plead in specific proceedings, the CPR has accumulated many of these

19 Ibid, Pt 16.2(2), Pt 16.4 and Practice Direction 16, para 3.3.


20 See ROC, Ord 18 r 12.
21 Ibid, Pt 16.4(1)(a).
22 Although this is not likely to be the normal practice.
23 See ROC, Ord 18 r 7(1).
24 Practice Direction 16, para 13.3(2), (3).
25 Practice Direction 16, para 7(3).
26 See Practice Direction 16, para 8.1 concerning the evidence which may be pleaded.
27 See ROC, Ord 18 r 11.
28 Practice Direction 16, para 13.3(1). See Barclays Bank v Boulter [1999] 1 WLR 1919, at
1923, where Lord Hoffmann encourages this practice.
29 Practice Direction 16, para 8.2(8).
30 See, e.g. s 20 of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 1999 Rev Ed) in relation to claims by the
estate of a deceased person.

1.08
‘special particulars’ in a practice direction.31 The nature of these particulars
can differ quite markedly between the two systems.32
1.09 The differences between the ROC and the CPR in respect of the
drafting of the defence are even more significant than those pertaining to
the claim. A mere denial of the plaintiff’s allegation, which is normal in
Singapore (assuming a specific plea is not required by O 18, r 8 or other
statutory provision), is contrary to current English practice. Under the
CPR, where a defendant denies an allegation in the claim, he must ‘state
his reasons for saying so’ and, if ‘he intends to put forward a different
version of events from that given by the claimant, he must state his own
version’.33 Furthermore, in Singapore, the defendant must specifically
traverse (ie, deny or not admit) an allegation in the statement of claim,
failing which that allegation will be deemed to be admitted.34 Under the
CPR, the omission of a specific traverse would not have this effect if the
defendant has included facts in his defence substantiating his version of
the events.35 The CPR is characterised by a high standard of specificity.
Therefore, the general traverse (seriatim clause)36 and ‘general rejoinder’
paragraph,37 so common in Singapore defence and reply pleadings

31 See, e.g. Practice Direction 16, paras 4-6 in relation to personal injury claims, fatal
accident claims and hire purchase claims. Particulars may also be governed by other
parts of the CPR.
32 Compare, for example, the more detailed particulars required by Practice Direction 16,
para 4 (in relation to personal injuries) with Ord 18 r 12(1A)–(1C) of ROC.
33 CPR, Pt 16.5(2)(a) and (b). He does not have to deny the amount of a money claim as
such a claim has to be proved unless the defendant has expressly admitted it (ibid, Pt
16.5(4).
34 See ROC, Ord 18 r 13(1)–(3).
35 CPR, Pt 16.5(3)(a) and (b).
36 The general traverse or seriatim clause essentially states that the defendant denies every
allegation in the statement of claim which has not been expressly admitted. The general
rule is that an allegation of fact made in a statement of claim or counterclaim which a
party does not intend to admit must be specifically traversed by the defending party
in his defence or defence to counterclaim (Ord 18 r 13(3)). A general denial is not a
sufficient traverse of such allegations. Accordingly, the general denial clause cannot
be used as a substitute for the specific traverse. Its use lies in the fact that it can cover
such material as introductory averments and other matters (for instance, ‘filling-in’
information) which do not go to the root of the case, as opposed to issue-orientated
allegations which must be specifically traversed. For a further discussion of this
principle, see Singapore Court Practice 2005 (Lexis Nexis, 2005) at para 18/13/2; Singapore
Civil Procedure 2007 (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2007), at para 18/13/6.
37 This essentially states that the plaintiff denies every allegation in the defence pleading
unless that allegation is expressly limited.

1.09
respectively, are no longer recognised in England.38 Another specific point
of pleading in the CPR which has no parallel in the ROC is the requirement
of a specific and detailed plea in the defence in response to the claimant’s
statement of value if this is disputed.39
1.10 Apart from these specific areas of difference, there are important
general distinctions between pleading practice in Singapore and England.
Every statement of case, (whether a claim, defence or reply) must be verified
by a statement of truth.40 Either the party or his legal representative (on the
party’s behalf) must sign the statement of case certifying the party’s belief
that the facts are true. The basis of this approach is that the statement of
case is ‘less likely to include assertions that are speculative and fanciful
and designed to obfuscate’.41 The intention of the CPR is to preclude
the former practice under the Rules of the Supreme Court whereby ‘…
pleaders strove to keep their options open and to avoid restricting issues,
leaving room for manoeuvre as the case developed’.42 This was possible
under the former English rules and the current Singapore rules because
Order 18 does not prevent the pleader from relying on facts the truth of
which cannot be established at the time of the pleading but which will or
may be proved at trial.
1.11 Defence pleadings, in particular, might include various alternative
defences, based on facts which are not known with certainty to be true at
the time, so that the defendant can keep his options open. The availability
of the discretionary remedy of amendment enables pleaders to change
initial stances taken in their pleadings.43 Under the CPR, the facts pleaded
in a statement of case must be believed to be true at the time of pleading. It
is also probably true to say that the former English rules and Singapore’s
ROC focus on causes of action and defences in contrast to the factually
oriented approach of the CPR.44 The result is that Singapore lawyers have
more flexibility in pleading under Order 18 than English lawyers do under
the CPR.45

38 This is because the defendant must deal with every allegation in accordance with Pt
16.5(1) and (2) (Practice Direction 16, para 10.2).
39 CPR, Pt 16.5(6).
40 CPR, Pt 22.
41 Access to Justice, Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor (June 1995), p 161.
42 Access to Justice, Interim Report, at p 153.
43 The court’s discretion to allow an amendment is considered below (under ‘Effect of
pleadings’).
44 Compare, for example, O 18, rr 7 and 8 of the ROC with Pt 16 of the CPR. Also note the
observations of Lord Woolf set out in the following footnote.
45 Lord Woolf decried the practice under the former RSC: ‘(a) they [the pleadings] often

1.11
1.12 Although the Singapore pleader may have to answer to the court in
a pre-trial conference if his pleading is so poorly drafted so as to hinder the
progress of a case, the court does not regularly interfere with the pleading
process. Applications for further and better particulars, interrogatories,
notices to admit facts, amendments are not discouraged if legitimate.
Under the CPR, the ‘procedural judge’ will consider the statements of case
and give appropriate directions to ensure that they meet their expected
objectives (most importantly, the clarity of issues in dispute). A major
aim of the case management conference in England is ‘to produce a
statement of the issues in dispute’ so that ‘the issues are clarified quickly
without the need for further exchanges between the parties in the form
of the old requests for further and better particulars, notices to admit and
interrogatories’.46 There is provision for clarification of the statement of
case including further information,47 although such orders are unlikely to
be made as frequently as in the past given the new approach to pleadings
in England. The English pleader is now very much more constrained than
his Singapore counterpart. Furthermore, the Singapore pleader should
not forget that while he may consider the rich and vast source of English
cases which were a vital guide to practice under the former RSC, and now
Singapore’s ROC, this advantage is no longer enjoyed under the CPR.48

Effect of pleadings

General rule
1.13 The fundamental objective of pleadings is to identify the issues
in dispute so as to provide the parties with the necessary focus for the
presentation of their cases and the court with the requisite knowledge of the
scope of adjudication. This objective would fail miserably if the pleadings
could be departed from at will and this is the reason for the general rule
that they are binding. The court is not entitled to make a decision on an
issue which has not been raised by the parties in their pleadings. In Ong
Seow Pheng v Lotus Development,49 the Court of Appeal refused to hold the
appellants liable as joint tortfeasors in the absence of a plea to this effect.

fail to set out the facts clearly and so impede the identification of issues; (b) they
concentrate too much on causes of action and defences, rather than on facts … ;(c)
affirmative defences are not pleaded; (d) longwindedness; (e) the orginal pleadings get
out of date as they are superseded by amendments and further and better particulars
…’. (Access to Justice, Interim Report, chapter 20, para 4).
46 Civil Procedure (2005) (‘White Book’) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), para 18.0.2.
47 In CPR, Pt 18 (which is entitled: ‘Further information’).
48 This was made clear by Lord Woolf in Biguzzi v Rank Leisure Plc [1999] 1 WLR 1926.
49 [1997] 3 SLR 137, at para 40.

1.12
Thean JA, in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said: ‘…
where the appellants were alleged to be personally liable as tortfeasors
and were also liable as joint tortfeasors, the facts supporting the respective
cases against them must be pleaded.’ The court reiterated the fundamental
principle that ‘the court cannot make a finding based on facts which have
not been pleaded’.50 In Yap Chwee Khim v American Home Assurance,51 the
Court of Appeal ruled that a court is not entitled to raise issues not brought
up by the parties in their pleadings or otherwise. Unpleaded matters raised
at the last minute upset this balance and may prejudice the opposing party
who is unprepared to contest new allegations. In China Construction (South
Pacific) Development Co Pte Ltd v Shao Hai,52 a case involving a suit by an
employee against his employer for not providing, inter alia, a safe place of
work, the High Court concluded that the district court had been wrong to
make a finding concerning the employer’s system of work as the facts which
gave rise to this finding had not been pleaded by the employee or raised in
his evidence. In Overseas Union Insurance v Home and Overseas Insurance,53
the High Court determined that a party is bound by his pleadings ‘even
if evidence has been given at trial which touches on a matter which is not
pleaded’. Accordingly, the party must apply to amend his pleadings if he
wishes to rely on that matter.54

Amendment
1.14 The rule that pleadings are binding is subject to qualifications. The
court may, in its discretion, permit a party to amend his pleading. The
court may have to consider various factors in exercising its discretion.
In Lam Soon Oil and Soap Manufacturing v Whang Tar Chong,55 the High
Court disallowed applications (on the first day of trial) to amend a

50 Ibid, at para 41.


51 [2001] 2 SLR 421.
52 [2004] 2 SLR 479 at para 21.
53 [2002] 4 SLR 104.
54 Also see Wee Soon Kim Anthony v UBS AG (No 4) [2004] SGCA 33 (allegation could not
be raised at trial as it had not been pleaded in the statement of claim); Abdul Latif Bin
Mohammed Tahiar (trading as Canary Agencies) v Saeed Husain s/o Hakim Gulam Mohiudin
(trading as United Limousine) [2003] 2 SLR 61 (evidence indicating a larger claim than
that pleaded in the statement of claim (for example, an averment in an affidavit)
will not be a basis for granting the increased amount unless the statement of claim is
amended to this effect); Banner Investments v Hoe Seng Metal Fabrication & Engineers (S)
[1997] 1 SLR 461; Multi-Pak Singapore v Intraco [1992] 2 SLR 793 and many other cases.
(See the annotations to Ord 18 in Singapore Court Practice 2005 (Lexis Nexis, 2005) and
Singapore Civil Procedure 2003 (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2003).)
55 [2002] 2 SLR 395.

1.14
defence by including the defence of limitation based on an alternative set
of facts as well as the defence of laches. The High Court stated that the
primary consideration is ‘to ensure a fair trial of the action’ so that the
‘real questions in controversy’ may be considered. However, the court will
also consider whether the amendment will result in unjustifiable delay
(taking into account the policy of expedition of cases) and/or whether
the other party will suffer prejudice. In the circumstances of the case, the
granting of the amendment would have led to the vacation of trial dates
(13 days) and a prolonged period of time for the purpose of introducing
new evidence in relation to the amendments. The delay would also
have resulted in prejudice as the parties were of an ‘advanced age’ and
susceptible to memory loss. Furthermore, the plaintiff would be put into a
state of uncertainty regarding the further development of his trade marks.
The court also pointed out that a distinction in judicial approach applied
to amendments which merely clarified the issues and amendments which
introduced new and separate matters (such as a new defence). If new
matters are raised when they could have been appropriately raised at an
earlier stage, the court may be inclined, in the interest of efficiency and
expedition, to disallow the amendment and leave it to the party concerned
to pursue his own remedy against his lawyer for negligence.
1.15 Lam Soon Oil and Soap Manufacturing is one of the first cases to
emphasise the importance of the interest of the administration of justice
(in avoiding delay) in its discretion to permit an amendment. The cases on
amendment can be categorized according to those in which an amendment
is sought before the trial, during the trial and after the conclusion of the trial
(even after judgment).56 It seems to be clear that the later the application
for the amendment, the more likely that the opposing party will suffer
injustice, particularly if the amendment is significant.57 However, this
is not a strict rule. The primary criterion is the effect of the amendment
(whatever its nature and however late the application for it is made) on the

56 In Midlink Development Pte Ltd v The Stansfield Group Pte Ltd [2004] SLR 258, the defendant
sought leave to argue an additional defence based on s 6(d) of the Civil Law Act nine
days after judgment had been given. The application was dismissed as this provision
had not been pleaded and it was too late in the day for such an amendment to be
permitted (ibid, at paras 63-65). Furthermore, the defence would have failed even if it
had been pleaded (ibid, paras 66-67). In Hub Warrior Sdn Bhd v QBE Insurance (Malaysia)
Bhd [2004] SGHC 279 at para 36, the High Court ruled that it could not make a finding
on the basis of facts alleged in closing submissions as those facts had not been pleaded.
57 See the annotation of Ord 20 in Singapore Court Practice 2005 (Lexis Nexis, 2005) and
Singapore Civil Procedure 2003 (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2003) for the numerous cases
which have involved amendments at different stages of the pleadings.

1.15
proceedings. As VK Rajah JC (as His Honour then was) stated in Chwee Kin
Keong and others v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd:58 ‘The essential point remains:
will prejudice be caused and/or are any policy considerations called into
play. The essence is not so much in the nature of the amendment but rather
in the consequences flowing from any amendment to the pleadings.’ His
Honour stated that the old rule in Moss v Malings59 — that amendments
will not be permitted at trial – is no longer consonant with current practice.
In Chwee Kin Keong, an application for the amendment of the defence after
closing submissions at trial was permitted because it would not result
in injustice (the subject matter of the amendments had already been
developed by the defendant and addressed by the plaintiffs). Particular
difficulties may arise in respect of an application for an amendment where
there is an issue of limitation.60

Other qualifications to the general rule that pleadings are binding


1.16 Apart from amendment, there have been circumstances in which
the courts have permitted a party to depart from his pleading. In Geo W
McKnight,61 Lord Normand made the following controversial statement:
‘… the court is not bound by the pleadings of parties and must proceed
on the evidence which it deems to be most accurate and trustworthy.’ This
proposition was adopted in Thai Kenaf v Keck Seng (S),62 in which the High
Court held that a company had acted as an agent for the plaintiffs even
though this was not pleaded in the statement of claim. In Boustead Trading
(1985) v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank,63 Gopal Sri Ram JCA expressed the
view that a party could depart from his pleading if this is in the interest of
justice. According to the learned judge, the court will not hold the party to
his pleading if he wishes to raise a matter in circumstances which would
not cause injustice.
1.17 With regard to Lord Normand’s sentiment that a court should reach
its conclusion on the best evidence available, it is essential that the courts
pay heed to the vital concern that the parties should be cognisant of all
material matters to be raised at trial so that they are not misled, prejudiced,
embarrassed or otherwise taken by surprise. The parties will not have
sufficient confidence in the pleadings if they believe that a court could

58 [2004] 2 SLR 594 at 87–88.


59 (1886) 83 Ch D 603.
60 Consider the annotation to Ord 20 r 5 in Singapore Court Practice 2005 (Lexis Nexis, 2005)
and in Singapore Civil Procedure 2003 (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2003).
61 (1947) 80 Ll LR 419.
62 [1993] 2 SLR 92.
63 [1995] 3 MLJ 331.

1.17
change the scope of the dispute through mere discretion. The party who
wishes to rely on a matter which he has not pleaded must take the initiative
of applying for an amendment (if leave is needed for this purpose) so that
the opposing party has a full opportunity to argue against the application.
It is at the hearing of the application for an amendment that the court
should take into account considerations of justice (including the issues of
whether the opponent would suffer injustice as a result of the alteration of
the pleading and the effect of any delay on the administration of justice) in
determining whether that amendment should be granted.64
1.18 Not every departure from a pleading would be contrary to the
principle of its binding effect. A material fact in the pleading is often
expanded at trial by evidence as to detail. This is entirely legitimate as
long as the scope of the material fact is not extended beyond the clear
parameters of the issues raised in the pleadings so as to surprise the
opposing party. In Superintendent of Lands and Surveys (4th Div) v Hamit bin
Matusin,65 the Malaysian Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs were not
surprised in the circumstances as the evidence concerning certain defences
was ‘not such a radical departure but a mere development of what had
been alleged by the defendants’ in their defence.66 Furthermore, this
non-radical departure [from the pleadings] ‘was waived or inferentially
consented to when the evidence was adduced without objection by the
plaintiffs ’.67 It has been said that if evidence is admitted on an unpleaded
point without objection and argument is directed on the matter, the court
has ‘the bounden duty … to consider the evidence and the submissions
and come to a decision on the issue’.68
1.19 The approach in Superintendent of Lands may be compared to that of
Judith Prakash J in Goh Kim Hai Edward v Pacific Can Investment Holdings.69
The case involved an action for damages for wrongful dismissal brought
by the former chairman of the Board of Directors of the defendants. The
defendants stated in their pleading that the plaintiff had deliberately
concealed the fact that he was to be removed as a director of another company
(which was a substantial shareholder in the defendant company). Although
the defence also contained various allegations of breach of fiduciary duty

64 See Lam Soon Oil and Soap Manufacturing v Whang Tar Chong [2002] 2 SLR 395, which is
considered in para 1.14 above.
65 [1994] 3 MLJ 185.
66 Ibid, at 190–191.
67 Ibid, at 191.
68 Boustead Trading (1985) v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank [1995] 3 MLJ 331 at 341.
69 [1996] 2 SLR 109.

1.18
on the part of the plaintiff, it did not specify that the plaintiff’s deliberate
concealment amounted to such a breach. The court found that this was
an omission which precluded the defendants from pursuing this line of
defence.70 The allegation that the deliberate concealment had occasioned a
breach of fiduciary duty was a highly material fact which could not have
been properly or justly gleaned from the more general allegations in the
pleading, even if the plaintiff had realised that the omission might have
had this effect.
1.20 Sometimes, a matter raised at trial, although not expressed in a
pleading, may be implied in a more general allegation that has been
pleaded. In Lee Kuan Yew v Vinocur,71 the court ruled that the plaintiff’s
pleas of grave injury to his character, credit and reputation and of having
been brought into public scandal, odium and contempt encompassed
injury to feelings. In Morello v Jaques (International),72 the majority of the
Federal Court ruled that the seller could recover the deposit even though
it had only claimed damages for repudiation. However, in Tan Kia Poh v
Hong Leong Finance,73 the failure of the appellants to plead a variation of
contract precluded them from raising arguments on the issue on appeal.74
1.21 The court may also permit a party to depart from his pleading where
he relies on the facts raised by his opponent. This may occur, for instance,
where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant is liable to him on the basis
of the facts pleaded by the defendant. Strictly speaking, the plaintiff is
seeking to prove his case on facts which he has not pleaded. Although such
a practice is exceptional, it has been held to be valid where no injustice
would result.75

70 Ibid, at paras 139–140. Also see Seven Seas Supply v Rajoo [1965–1968] SLR 51, [1966] 1
MLJ 71 at 73; Pengiran Othman Shah bin Pengiran Mohd Yusoff v Karambunai Resorts [1996]
1 MLJ 309 at 321.
71 [1995] 3 SLR 477.
72 [1995] 1 MLJ 577 at 597.
73 [1994] 1 SLR 270.
74 Also see Seven Seas Supply v Rajoo [1965–1968] SLR 51, [1966] 1 MLJ 71 at 73; Pengiran
Othman Shah bin Pengiran Mohd Yusoff v Karambunai Resorts [1996] 1 MLJ 309 at 321.
75 See Wong See Leng v C Saraswwathy Ammal [1954] MLJ 141, in which a majority of the
Singapore Court of Appeal considered the adoption by one party of another party’s
allegations of fact to be valid in the absence of abuse and prejudice. For example, the
court would be reluctant to allow the practice if the defendant would be surprised by
the plaintiff’s sudden change of approach late in the proceedings. See Rosita bte Baharom
v Sabedin bin Salleh [1992] 1 MLJ 379 at 389 (HC), [1993] 1 MLJ 393 at 396 (SC), where
the plaintiff sought to raise the plea of contributory negligence (on the basis of the facts
relied upon by the defendant) for the very first time during the closing speech. Also see
Seng Chong Metal Works v Lew Fa [1966] 2 MLJ 63 at 64, in this connection. In Tan Lian

1.21
1.22 Actions against two or more parties in the alternative may raise
additional considerations in pleading. For example, the plaintiff is not
estopped from proceeding against one of the parties merely because he has
pleaded a particular responsibility on the part of the other. The plaintiff
would only be prevented from pursuing his claim against the former if he
has unequivocally elected to obtain judgment (and does obtain it) against
the latter.76
1.23 To conclude, lawyers must take great care in ensuring that
their pleadings conform to the issues intended to be raised at trial. An
amendment (whether leave is necessary or not) is preferable to taking
the risk that the court may decide against the presentation of evidence in
relation to an unpleaded issue.

Chye v Malayan Railway Administration [1967] 2 MLJ 276 at 279, the court determined
that a plaintiff who gives evidence which is or may be untrue should not be allowed
to resile from his account and rely on the evidence of his opponent. Also see Siti Aisha
bte Ibrahim v Goh Cheng Hwai [1982] 2 MLJ 124; Ang Koon Kau v Lau Piang Ngong [1984]
2 MLJ 277; Playing Cards (Malaysia) v China Mutual Navigation [1980] 2 MLJ 182; KEP
Mohamed Ali v KEP Mohamed Ismail [1981] 2 MLJ 10.
76 See Trigen Industries Limited v Sinko Technologies Private Limited & Anor [2002] 1 SLR 183
at para 53.

1.22
CHAPTER 2

ADMIRALTY

PRECEDENTS
P2.01 Claim for personal injury

P2.02 Claim for fatal accident

P2.03 Claim in mortgage action

P2.04 Claim for damage done by a ship in a collision

P2.05 Preliminary Act

P2.06 Claim for master’s wages and disbursements

P2.07 Claim for crew’s wages

P2.08 Claim for goods and materials supplied to ship

P2.09 Claim for repair

P2.10 Claim for salvage

P2.11 Claim for towage

P2.12 Claim on reference to Registrar

P2.13 Defence in a mortgage action


P2.14 Defence in response to claim for master’s wages and
disbursements

P2.15 Defence and counterclaim in response to claim for goods and


materials supplied to ship

P2.16 Defence and counterclaim in response to claim


for repair

P2.17 Defence to claim on reference

P2.18 Reply and defence to counterclaim

RELATED DOCUMENTS
P2.19 Warrant of arrest

P2.20 Affidavit leading to arrest

P2.21 Request for caveat against warrant of arrest

P2.22 Request for warrant of arrest

P2.23 Request for withdrawal of caveat

P2.24 Undertaking (for arrest)

P2.25 Release of vessel

P2.26 Request for caveat against release and payment

P2.27 Request for issue of release

P2.28 Application for intervention

P2.29 Affidavit in support of intervention

P2.30 Order of court concerning intervention

P2.31 Application for omnibus order

P2.32 Affidavit in support of omnibus order

P2.33 Omnibus order

P2.34 Commission for appraisement and sale

P2.35 Request for commission for appraisement and sale

P2.36 Application for sale of vessel


P2.37 Application for discharge of cargo

P2.38 Endorsement of claim for limitation

P2.39 Application for decree of limitation

P2.40 Affidavit in support of decree of limitation

P2.41 Bail bond


CHAPTER 2

ADMIRALTY

PRECEDENTS

P2.01 Claim for personal injury


[Drew & Napier LLC]
1. At all material times, the Defendants were the owners of the ship
or vessel “A” (“the Vessel”).
2. At all material times, the Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants
as a fitter on board the Vessel by or pursuant to a contract evidenced
by or contained in a shipboard contract dated [date]. The Plaintiff
had been working on the vessel since [date].
3. It was an implied term of the contract of employment and/
or alternatively, it was the duty of the Defendants to take all
reasonable precautions for the safety of the Plaintiff while he
was employed on board the Vessel to ensure that the Plaintiff is
adequately protected from the risk of injury. Further, the Plaintiffs
were obliged to provide and/or maintain adequate and suitable
appliances and devices to enable the Plaintiff to carry out his duties
safely and/or to provide or maintain a safe place and system of
work for the Plaintiff.
4. On or about [date], while the Vessel was anchored in the Eastern
Anchorage of Singapore, the Plaintiff was injured whilst on board
the Vessel and in the course of employment, as particularised
below:

Particulars
(1) On the morning of [date], the Plaintiff was instructed by the
Chief Engineer and the 1st Engineer of the Vessel to attend to the
maintenance of the antenna of the vessel’s satellite navigation
system.
(2) In order to attend to the matters as aforesaid, the Plaintiff proceeded
to a storeroom near the engine room to retrieve certain spare parts.
(3) The Plaintiff observed two spare valves for the main engine that
were stored at the lift landing immediately outside the storeroom,
which were not secured to the frames on the landing used to
prevent the spare valves from shifting.
(4) At or about the same time, the Plaintiff observed that the 1st
Engineer was attempting to hook one of the valves to the engine
room crane, to one of the two slings of the said crane.
(5) The Plaintiff informed the first Engineer that he should utilise
both slings, and attempted to assist the first Engineer in so doing.
(6) Whilst the Plaintiff was in the course of doing so, one of the valves
shifted and landed on the Plaintiff, causing him injury.
5. By reason of the aforesaid matters, the Plaintiff suffered injuries,
pain and suffering, loss of amenities and expense as particularised
hereunder.

Particulars of Injury
[Particulars of injury, pain and suffering and treatment received]
Particulars of Special Damage
[Particulars of special damage]
6. The Plaintiff’s aforesaid pain and suffering, loss of amenities,
injuries and expense were caused by the breach of duty and/or
contract of employment and/or negligence of the Defendants, their
servants and/or their agents, as particularised hereunder:

Particulars
(1) The Defendants failed to secure and/or properly secure the spare
valves so as to prevent the same from shifting.
(2) In the premises, exposing the Plaintiff to a risk of injury or damage
of which they knew or ought to have known and/or failing to
provide or maintain a safe and proper system or place of work
for the Plaintiff and/or failing to or to properly instruct their other
employees or workmen on the storage, handling, removal or
replacement of the spare valves.
These are the best particulars the Plaintiff is able to provide at this
time. The Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement these matters upon
the administration of interrogatories and/or conclusion of discovery.
AND the Plaintiff claims:
(1) General damages pursuant to paragraph 5 to be assessed;
(2) Special damages pursuant to paragraph 5;
(3) Interest;
(4) Costs; and
(5) Such further or other relief as the Honourable Court may think fit.

P2.02 Claim for fatal accident


[Haridass Ho & Partners]
1. The Plaintiff is the widow [or state other relationship with
deceased] and executrix [administratrix] of the estate of John
Doe, deceased (“the Deceased”), Grant of Probate [Letters of
Administration] having been given on [date].
2. The Plaintiff brings this claim on her own behalf, and on behalf of
the other dependants of the Deceased and on behalf of the estate
of the Deceased pursuant to Section 20 of the Civil Law Act (Cap
43).

Particulars Pursuant to Section 20(6) of the Civil Law Act


The names of the persons for whose benefit this action is brought are
as follows:
(1) [Name], the widow of the Deceased, aged [age of widow],
born on the [date];
(2) [Name], a daughter of the Deceased, aged [age of daughter],
born on the [date];
(3) [Name], a son of the Deceased, aged [age of son], born on the
[date].
The nature of the claim in respect of which damages are sought are set
out in paragraph […] below.
3. The Defendants were at all material times and are the owners of
the vessel “ABC” (“the Vessel”).

P2.02
4. At all material times, the Deceased was employed by the
Defendants under a contract of employment dated [date] and
served on board the Vessel as the Chief Engineer [or other rank/
occupation].
5. It was an implied term of the contract of employment that the
Defendants would provide a safe working environment and that
the Defendants would also provide all employees with equipment
and/or appliances of good and working condition.
6. On or about [date], the Deceased received instructions from the
Master of the Vessel to rectify a fault in the vessel’s main engine.
While descending the stairs to the Vessel’s engine room, the
Deceased slipped and fell. The Deceased fell head first and broke
his neck. He received medical treatment for his injuries. Despite
this, the Deceased succumbed to his injuries and died 3 days later,
on [date].
7. It was subsequently determined by the Master of the Vessel that
the Deceased had stepped on some grease on the stairway and had
slipped and fallen. At the material time, the light near the stairway
had failed due to a bulb fuse. The grease on the stairway would
not have been apparent in the dark.
8. The above accident was caused by the negligence and/or breach of
contract and/or breach of duty of the Defendants, their servants or
agents.

Particulars
(1) The Defendants, their servants or agents failed to promptly
replace the bulb which was fused.
(2) The Defendants, their servants or agents failed to provide a
safe working environment in that the grease was not cleaned
up and removed from the stairway leading to the Vessel’s
engine room.
[Other particulars as may be the case]
9. By reason of the matters aforesaid, the Deceased sustained injuries,
pain and suffering. The Deceased succumbed to his injuries from
which he died on [date].

Particulars of Injury
[Particulars of the deceased, his injuries, pain and suffering]

P2.02
10. His estate and dependants have suffered loss and damage as a
result of the Deceased’s death.

Particulars of Loss
(1) Special Damages:
(a) Medical Expenses
(b) Funeral Expenses
(c) Costs of Probate
(d) Loss of Earnings (if any) for the period between the date of
occurrence of the accident and the death of the Deceased.
(2) General Damages
(a) Loss of Earnings (for the period after the death of the Deceased)/
Loss of Dependency (eg loss of support and services);
(b) Pain and Suffering.
11. The Plaintiff also claims damages for bereavement pursuant to
Section 21(1) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43).
AND the Plaintiff claims:
(1) Damages aforesaid on behalf of the dependants;
(2) Damages aforesaid on behalf of the estate of the Deceased;
(3) Damages for bereavement;
(4) Interest at the rate of [amount] per cent per annum pursuant to
Section 12 of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43);
(5) Costs.

P2.03 Claim in mortgage action1


[Allen & Gledhill LLP]
1. The Plaintiffs were at all material times the mortgagees of the vessel
“HAPPY SUE” under a mortgage dated [date] and registered
in the Singapore ship registry on [date] in accordance with the
Merchant Shipping Act (Cap 179) (“the Mortgage”).

1 Also see P2.13.

P2.03
2. The Defendants are and were at all material times the lawful and
registered owners of 64/64th shares in the ship or vessel “HAPPY
SUE” (“the Vessel”) of the port of Singapore.
3. By the Mortgage, the Defendants mortgaged their 64/64th shares
in the Vessel to the Plaintiffs to secure an account current between
the Plaintiffs and the Defendants.
4. The Mortgage was executed pursuant to a Loan Agreement dated
[date] (“the Loan Agreement”) and Deed of Covenants dated
[date] (“the Deed of Covenants”).
5. By the Deed of Covenants, it was provided, inter alia, that:
(a) the Defendants repay the amounts due to the Plaintiffs
pursuant to the Loan Agreement in the manner and at the
times specified in the Loan Agreement and to pay interest
thereon at the rate and at the times and in the manner specified
therein;
(b) the principal sum secured by the Mortgage, or the balance
thereof for the time being outstanding, shall become
immediately due and repayable on demand upon the
happening of any of the “events of default” therein specified,
including any failure by the Defendants to pay any instalment
on the due date; and
(c) the Defendants shall indemnify the Plaintiffs against and pay
on demand all monies whatsoever which the Plaintiffs shall
or may expend, be put to, or become liable for in or about
the protection, maintenance or enforcement of the security
created by the Mortgage and/or the Deed of Covenants or in
or about the exercise by the Plaintiffs of any of the powers
vested in it under the said Deed.
6. By the Loan Agreement, it was provided, inter alia, that:
(a) interest was to be charged on the amount from time to time
outstanding at the rate of [percentage figure] above the
London Interbank Lending rate from time to time prevailing
until repayment is effected in full; and
(b) in the event of default by the Defendants in the payment on
the due date of any sum due under the Loan Agreement,
the Defendants would pay interest thereon from the date of
such default up to the date of actual payment (as well after as
before judgment) at a rate of [percentage figure] per annum
P2.03
[set out details of the default rate], such interest to be payable
on demand so long as it remains unpaid.
7. The Plaintiffs will refer to the Mortgage, the Loan Agreement and
the Deed of Covenants as may be necessary for their full terms and
the precise effect thereof.
8. The Defendants have failed to pay the third instalment due under
the Loan Agreement on [date] and in the premises, an “event of
default” has occurred.
9. By a letter dated [date], the Plaintiffs gave notice of default to the
Defendants and demanded the repayment of the balance then
outstanding, but the Defendants have failed to pay the same or
any part thereof.
10. In the premises, there is now due and owing to the Plaintiffs from
the Defendants under the Mortgage, the Loan Agreement and
the Deed of Covenants, the principal sum of US$[amount] plus
the sum of US$[amount] being accrued interest for the period
from [date] to [date] calculated in accordance with [the relevant
provisions of the Loan Agreement].
AND the Plaintiffs claim:
(1) A declaration of the validity of the mortgage;
(2) US$[amount] or its Singapore Dollar equivalent being the principal
amount due;
(3) US$[amount] or its Singapore Dollar equivalent being accrued
interest for the period from [date] to [date];
(4) Further interest on the principal amount due at the rate of
[percentage figure] per annum from [date] till the date full
payment is received, alternatively interest under the Civil Law Act
at such rate and for such period as the Court deems fit;
(5) A declaration that the Defendants do indemnify the Plaintiffs [set
out details of indemnity sought] pursuant to paragraph 5(c) above;

P2.03
(6) Costs on an indemnity basis; and
(7) Such further or other relief as the Court thinks fit.

P2.04 Claim for damage done by a ship2 in a collision3


[Drew & Napier LLC]
1. The Plaintiffs are, and were at all material times, the owners and/
or occupiers and/or lessees and/or operators of the installation
known as the Utopia Oil Terminal at Jurong Island, Singapore
(“the Terminal”).
2. The Terminal and its facilities comprise, inter alia, two jetties,
which were built and operated by the Plaintiffs. Vessels load and
discharge cargo at the Terminal by coming alongside these jetties
for such operations.
3. The Defendants are, and were at the material times, the owners
of the ship or vessel “AB” (“the Vessel”) registered in the port of
Panama with a gross tonnage of [number] tonnes and a summer
deadweight tonnage of [number] tonnes.
4. At or about [time] hours on [date], the Vessel approached Jetty 1 of
the Terminal where she was due to berth for loading operations.
5. At or about [time] hours, during berthing operations, the bow or
forward section of the Vessel collided into structures at Jetty 1 [or
as may be]. [These are the best particulars that can be given prior
to discovery and/or interrogatories herein.]
6. As a result of the collision, Jetty 1 of the Terminal was damaged,
and the Plaintiffs have suffered loss and damage and have been
put to expense as particularised in paragraph 8 below.
7. The collision, loss, damage and expense were caused solely by the
negligence of the Defendants, their servants or agents:

Particulars of Negligence

2 Actions for damage done by a ship, whether in a collision or otherwise, are typically
governed by the International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions by Sea 1972. For
the details relating to such claims reference should be made to Marsden, Collisions at
Sea (13th Ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003).
3 A preliminary act is required when a claim for damage, loss of life or personal injury
results from a collision between ships. See P2.05.

P2.04
(1) The Plaintiffs will rely on the facts set out above as prima facie
evidence of negligence and will, if necessary, rely upon the maxim
res ipsa loquitur;
(2) The Defendants, their servants or agents were negligent in the
following particular aspects:
(a) They failed to keep any or any proper look-out;
(b) They failed to make proper and timely use of the navigational
equipment and/or other maneuvering equipment on board,
and/or failed to observe and/or act upon its indications in due
time and/or with proper or seaman-like skill and care or at all;
(c) They proceeded and/or approached Jetty 1 and/or the Terminal
at an excessive and/or unsafe speed;
(d) They failed to ease, stop, or reverse their engines in due time
or at all;
(e) They negligently steered and/or altered the course of the
“AB” and/or proceeded on a collision with the Terminal in
circumstances where it was neither safe nor proper to do so;
(f) They failed to manage, control or navigate the “AB” so as to
avoid the collision;
(g) They failed to make any or any adequate or proper use of tug
assistance in maneuvering;
(h) They failed to make any or any proper allowance for the effect
of the wind or tide;
(3) They failed to comply with, inter alia, rules 2, 5, 6, 7 and/or 8 [or as
may be] of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea 1972/Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Collisions by Sea)
Regulations;
(4) They failed to comply with, inter alia, [relevant terminal or port
rules if applicable].
[The above are the best particulars the Plaintiffs are able to provide
pending discovery and interrogatories.]
8. By reason of the aforesaid, the Defendants were deprived of the
use of their berth/s/Terminal and suffered loss and damage and
incurred expense.

P2.04
Particulars
[Particulars of loss and damage and expense such as cost of repairs,
costs relating to diversion of vessels which would otherwise utilise the
berth/Terminal, loss of profits, etc]
AND the Plaintiffs claim:
(1) [Claim amount], alternatively such sums or damages to be
assessed;
(2) Interest;
(3) [A declaration that the Plaintiffs be fully indemnified by the
Defendants for any damages suffered and/or any and all such
claims that may be made against the Plaintiffs by third parties in
any respect as a result of the collision];
(4) [An indemnity for item (3) prayed for above];
(5) Costs; and
(6) Such further or other relief as this Honourable Court deems fit.

P2.05 Preliminary Act4


[Drew & Napier LLC]
Part 1

I
The names of the ships which came (1) “AB” of [name of port]
into collision and their ports of
registry (2) “CD” of [name of port]

II

4 Where a claim for damage, loss of life or personal injury arises out of a collision between
ships, each party sets out its case in a preliminary act. The conventional pleading
process (statement of claim, defence, etc. does not apply in these cirucumstances. See
Ord 70 r 17; The Teng He [2000] 3 SLR 114. Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Collisions
at Sea) Regulations (Rg 10, Cap 179) (Colregs) apply.
Length: [number] metres
Breadth: [number] metres
The length, breadth, gross tonnage, Gross Tonnage: [number] metric
horsepower and draught at the tonnes
material time of the ship and the
Horsepower: [number] kw at
nature and tonnage of any cargo
[number] rpm
carried by the ship;
Draught: [number] metres
forward, [number] metres aft
Cargo: [number] metric tons of
[eg maize] in [bags]
III

The date and time (including the [date] at about [time] local time
time zone) of the collision; (GMT [+ 8] hours)

IV
Approximately latitude [number]
[number] ’ North, longitude
The place of the collision; [number] [number] ’ East on the
westbound lane of the Traffic
Separation Scheme along the
Singapore Strait [or as may be]
V
The direction and force of the wind; [South-Easterly], of about
[Force 3]

VI
Sky: [Partly cloudy]
The state of the weather;
Seas: [Slight]
Visibility: [Good]
VII
The state, direction and force of the The tide was flooding and
tidal or other current; setting South-West at a rate of
approximately 1.8 knots [or as
may be]
VIII
The position, the course steered At about [number] hours “AB”
and speed through the water was steering a course of [number]
of the ship when the other ship (T) at a speed of approximately
was first seen or immediately [number] knots on the westbound
before any measures were taken lane of the Traffic Separation
with reference to her presence, Scheme along the Singapore Strait
whichever was the earlier; [or as may be]
IX
The lights or shapes (if any) carried by Regulation masthead, stern and
the ship; side lights [or as may be]
X
(a) The distance and bearing of the About [number] mile and around
other ship if and when her echo [number] (T)
was first observed by radar;

Approximately [number] points


(b) The distance, bearing and on the starboard bow of “AB”
approximate heading of the other distance [number] miles on a
ship when first seen; heading estimated to be easterly
XI
What light or shape or
combination of lights or shapes (if
Deck lights only [or as may be]
any) of the other ship was
first seen;
XII
What other lights or shapes or
combination of lights or shapes
(if any) of the other ship were Deck lights only [or as may be]
subsequently seen before the
collision, and when;
XIII
What alterations (if any) were Alteration to starboard at
made to the course and speed of [number] hours. At [number]
the ship after the earlier of the 2 hours main engine stopped and
times referred to in Article VIII on double right full astern and
up to the time of the collision, and continuous signal on “AB”’s
when, and what measures (if any) whistle, ie 5 short and rapid
other than alterations of course blasts, repeated call on VHF and
or speed, were taken to avoid the signalling on ALDIS Lamp, ie
collision, and when; 5 short and rapid flashes [or as
may be]

XIV
The heading of the ship, the parts
The starboard bow of “CD”
of each ship which first came into
struck the portside abreast No. 2
contact and the approximate angle
segregated ballast tank of “AB” at
between the 2 ships at the moment
an acute angle
of contact;
XV
5 short and rapid blasts at
What sound signals (if any) were frequent intervals on “A”’s
given, and when; whistle just before the collision
[or as may be]
XVI
What sound signals (if any) were
heard from the other ship, and None [or as may be]
when;

Part II
1. The Plaintiffs repeat the facts and matters set out in Part 1 hereof
and incorporate the same herein.
2. [Set out details of collision as appropriate].
3. The said collision was caused by the breach of duty and/or
negligence of the Defendants, their servants and/or agents, inter
alia, in the following aspects and in breach of, inter alia, rules 2,
5, 7, 8, 10, 14, 16 and 34 of the Merchant Shipping (Prevention of
Collisions at Sea) Regulations 1972 (Rg 10, 1990 Ed) (“Colregs”):
Specimen particulars
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