JOKER P. ARROYO v. JOSE DE VENECIA, GR No.

127255, 1997-08-14
Facts:
hallenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240... charging violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which
he was interpellated.
He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum,... although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate
on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November
22, 1996.
etitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody... the "constitutional mandate" in
Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that,
consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They
contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was... properly passed is
false and spurious.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21,
1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo
from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No.
7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry
sought by the petitioners is barred.
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone... objection of petitioner Rep.
Lagman.[8]
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned
until four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval
except Rep. Lagman.
Issues:
Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that
Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's
motion approved.
Ruling:
"When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to asce... n this case
no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for
the approval of the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and
later the individual votes of the Members should have been taken. They say that the method
used in... this case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact
was that one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in
cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must
restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.
It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of
submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the
pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep.
Arroyo's... question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege
entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's
motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any further...
consideration of the question.[31]
To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the
roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying
the... business of the House.[
Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so
doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.[3
34 Phil. 729, 735
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and
the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
Much... energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by
Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the
decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill
embodies a... conclusive presumption. In one case[38] we "went behind" an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the
certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under
this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to
pass a... proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts."[39] This
Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good,... if
old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost
the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that
they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the... wrong
direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they
should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual
errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities... with the
Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the
work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of
popular government.[40]
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the
President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference
committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been
observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline... the
invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government.[41]
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a
bill in violation of Art. VI, §26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment shall be allowed." [42]
In other cases,[43] this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as
certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval
by text writers here and abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests on the following
considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by
the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due
to... coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so... authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.[45]
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of
our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except
to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be
assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three
but four
(Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in
the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco,
Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change
in the... membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the
Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that day. The keeping
of the Journal is... required by the Constitution. Art. VI, §16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays
on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be... entered in
the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the
Constitution to be recorded therein.[46] With respect to other matters, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive... effect. Thus, in
United States v. Pons,[47] this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding
the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be
public, because all are required to conform to them;... they should be permanent, that rights
acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed
tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of
individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240... is shown in the Journal.
Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this
Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to
seek... a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its
power and... would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The
suggestion made in a case[48] may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek
the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence...
of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof
acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference
rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.[49]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Romero, J., has a separate opinion.
Puno, J., has a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Davide, Jr., J., joined the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Puno.
Vitug, J., has a separate concurring opinion.
Regalado, J., in the result.
Bellosillo, J., took no part due to relationship with parties.
Panganiban, J., took no part. Former counsel of a party.
Torres, Jr., J., on leave during the deliberations.
[1] Journal No. 39, pp. 66, 68; Rollo, pp. 210, 212; Transcript of November 21, 1996 session,
pp. 39-52; Rollo, pp. 368-381; Petition, p. 6, par. 10; Rollo, p. 8.
[2] Rule VIII, §35. Voting. Every member present in the session shall vote on every question
put unless he inhibits himself on account of personal pecuniary interest therein.
Rule XVII, §103. Manner of Voting. The Speaker shall rise to put a question saying "As many
as are in favor of (as the question may be), say Aye" and, after the affirmative vote is
counted, "As many as are opposed, say Nay ...."
[3] Rule XIX, §112. Reading and Withdrawal of Motions. The Speaker shall state the motion
or, if in writing, shall cause it to be read by the Secretary General before being debated. A
motion may be withdrawn any time before its approval.
[4] Rule XVI, §97. Recognition of Member. When two or more members rise at the same
time, the Speaker shall recognize the Member who is to speak first.
[5] Rule XX, §121. Definition. Questions of privilege are those affecting the duties, conduct,
rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation of the House or of its members, collectively
or individually.
§122. Precedence. Subject to the ten-minute rule, questions of privilege shall have
precedence over all other questions, except a motion to adjourn and a point of order.
Rule XXI, §123. Definition and Precedence. A privileged motion pertains to a subject matter
which, under the rules, takes precedence over others.
The order of precedence of privileged motions is determined in each case by the rules.
Rule XVIII, §109. Who May Vote; Procedure; Exceptions. When a bill, report or motion is
adopted or lost, a member who voted with the majority may move for its reconsideration on
the same or succeeding session day. The motion shall take precedence over all other
questions, except... a motion to adjourn, a question of privilege, and a point of order.
[6] 235 SCRA 630 (1994).
[7] Rollo, p. 228.
[8] Id., p. 229.
[9] Art. VI, §16(3).
[10] E.g., United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 1, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1862); Exxon Corp.
v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582 (1978); Murray v. Buchanan, 674 F.2d 14 (1982); Metzenbaum v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n, 675 F.2d 1282 (1982). See also Osmeña v.
Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).
[11] 109 Phil. at 870-71. See also EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA
630.
[12] 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25 (emphasis added).
[13] 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) (emphasis added).
[14] 124 Ohio St. 256, 177 N.E. 910, 911 (1931) (emphasis added).
[15] 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 (1906) (emphasis added).
[16] 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185, 186 (1891) (emphasis added).
[17] 5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897) (emphasis added).
[18] Enrique M. Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines Annotated 188-189 (1977);
Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58 (1971).
[19] Petition, p. 25, quoting the sponsorship speech of former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, chairman of the Committee on Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, in 1
Records of the Constitutional Commission 436 (Session of July 10, 1986).
[20] Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668,
695 (1989); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).
[21] Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692,701 (1991);
Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA at 480-481
(emphasis added).
[22] 4 Cong. Rec. 413-414 (Feb. 15, 1957).
[23] United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25; State v. Lewis,
186 S.E. 625, 630 (1936).
[24] United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 76 L.Ed. 954 (1931).
[25] Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 549 (1985).
[26] Art. VI, §26(2).
[27] Id., §16(4).
[28] Id., §27(1).
[29] Id., p. 17; id., p. 19.
[30] Inocencio Pareja, Rules of the House of Representatives Commented and Annotated
331 (1963); Reynaldo Fajardo, Principles of Parliamentary Procedure 157-158, 172-173
(1963).
[31] Rule XIX, §13.
[32] 1 Records of the Constitutional Commission 436 (Session of July 10, 1986).
[33] Alice Sturgis, Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure, 17 (1950).
[34] Paul Mason, Manual of Legislative Procedure 335 (1953).
[35] Conference Committee Report, Rollo, p. 36; Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.
[38] Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).
[39] Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 12 (1947).
[40] Id. at 17, quoting 4 John Wigmore, Treatise on the Law on Evidence §1350 at 702
(1940). This excerpt is preserved in the Chadbourne edition of this locus classicus. See 4
Wigmore on Evidence §1350 at 834 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972).
[41] EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA at 672. Cf. Morales v.
Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969).
[42] Philippine Judges Ass'n v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 710 (1993); Morales v. Subido, 27
SCRA 131.
[43] Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963); Resins, Inc. v.
Auditor General, 25 SCRA 754 (1968).
[44] 4 Wigmore on Evidence §1350 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972); 6 Manuel V. Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court 115 (1980); 7 Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of
Court (Pt. II) 454 (1973).
[45] Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L.Ed. 294, 303 (1891).
[46] The following are required to be entered on the Journal: (1) The yeas and nays on the
third and final reading of a bill (Art. VI, §26(2)); (2) the yeas and nays on any question, at the
request of one-fifth of the members present (Id., §16(4)); (3) the... yeas and nays upon
repassing a bill over the President's veto (Id., §27(1); and (4) the President's objection to a bill
which he has vetoed. (Id.)
[47] 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44 Ohio 348 (1886).
[48] Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 529.
[49] Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n, 675 F.2d 1282.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION... tags
Principles:
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every
time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third
readings of a bill,[26] at the request of one-fifth of the Members... present,[27] and in
repassing a bill over the veto of the President.[28] Indeed, considering the fact that in the
approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been
taken, it would have been sheer... tedium to repeat the process.
Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess... of jurisdiction"
has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval
by text writers here and abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests on the following
considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by
the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due
to... coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so... authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution