Journal of Contemporary China

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Reassessing Seoul’s “One China” Policy: South
Korea-Taiwan “Unofficial” Relations after 30 Years
(1992-2022)
Chaewon Lee & Adam P. Liff
To cite this article: Chaewon Lee & Adam P. Liff (2022): Reassessing Seoul’s “One
China” Policy:
South Korea-Taiwan “Unofficial” Relations after 30 Years (1992-2022), Journal of
Contemporary
China, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2022.2113959
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2022.2113959
Published online: 14 Sep 2022.

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JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2022.2113959
Reassessing Seoul’s “One China” Policy: South Korea-Taiwan
“Unofficial” Relations after 30 Years (1992-2022)
Chaewon Lee and Adam P. Liff
Indiana University, USA
ABSTRACT
Amid U.S.-led efforts to “internationalize and multilateralize” support for
Taiwan in response to mounting pressure from China, the 2021 U.S.-South
Korea presidential statement’s unprecedented reference to “peace and
stability across the Taiwan Strait” made global headlines. This study
analyzes contemporary Korea-Taiwan relations in historic and compara
tive perspective, focusing especially on Seoul’s official 1992 position on
“One China” and its implications for Korea’s Taiwan policy. It demonstrates
that Seoul has never recognized Beijing’s self-defined “One China princi
ple” concerning its essential claim of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan.
Comparative analysis of Korea’s position and subsequent policies with
the U.S.’, Japan’s, and others’ further reveals significant (potential) flex
ibility in Korea’s approach to Taiwan. The relatively distant state of KoreaTaiwan
relations today is the collective political choice of Korea’s demo
cratically-elected leaders—not the legacy of some (non-existent) putative
commitment made to Beijing 30 years ago.

Introduction
On 22 May 2021, Republic of Korea (ROK; below, ‘Korea’) President Moon Jae-in and
U.S.
President Joe Biden made global headlines when they jointly ‘emphasize[d] the
importance of
preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait’.1 This marked the first such
joint reference
to the Taiwan Strait by the U.S. and Korean presidents since Seoul recognized the
People’s
Republic of China (PRC) ‘as the sole legal government of China’ in 1992, thereby
ending
official relations with the government of Taiwan (officially, the Republic of China
(ROC))—the
ROK’s last and oldest diplomatic partner in Asia. The fact that 2021’s historic
statement
occurred in a bilateral document with Korea’s U.S. treaty ally, which is also
Taiwan’s de
facto security benefactor, and during a period when both cross-Strait tensions and
U.S.China relations are widely considered to be at a half-century nadir, implied
additional
significance.
Given longstanding, widespread perceptions of Seoul’s relative reluctance to risk
Beijing’s ire by
significantly deepening ties or practical cooperation with Taiwan, over which the
PRC government
claims sovereignty, the Biden-Moon statement caught many observers by surprise. In
Taiwan, and
elsewhere, some leading analysts saw it as auguring a potential inflection point in
Korea’s long
standing preference for avoiding official public comment in support of Taiwan and
as a signal of
Seoul’s commitment to the U.S.-led effort to ‘internationalize and multilateralize’
(guojihua yu
CONTACT Adam P. Liff
[email protected]
Hamilton Lugar School of Global & International Studies, Indiana University,
355 N. Eagleson Ave, Bloomington, Indiana, USA 47405
1
‘U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement’ (The White House, 22 May 2021)
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-
leaders-joint-statement/> accessed 24 May 2021.
© 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2
C. LEE AND A. P. LIFF
duobianhua) concerns about cross-Strait stability.2 Unsurprisingly, the response
from Beijing was
swift and fierce: the PRC foreign ministry spokesperson warned Seoul and Washington
to ‘refrain
from playing with fire’ (jinyanshenhang, buyaowanhuo).3
Though President Moon asserted at the time that the joint statement’s historic
reference to the
Taiwan Strait was not due to U.S. pressure, such claims were widely questioned. An
exchange a few
hours later between a reporter and Choi Jong-kun, Korea’s vice foreign minister,
suggested Seoul’s
apparent eagerness to avoid angering Beijing: its number-one trading partner. Choi
took pains to
contrast the U.S.-ROK statement from the more assertive April 2021 U.S.-Japan
statement, which had
explicitly criticized China’s recent behavior. He pointed out that the U.S.-ROK
statement avoided any
explicit mention of ‘China’ and contained only ‘generalities’. Choi concluded,
remarkably, that
China’s leaders would ‘highly assess’ it.4 In stark contrast to the situation in
Washington and
Tokyo, after the May 2021 Biden-Moon summit neither Korea’s Taiwan policy nor a
possible crossStrait crisis appeared as mainstream policy concerns in Seoul. This
was true both for the remainder of
the Moon administration and the just-concluded 2022 presidential campaign, during
which both
issues attracted strikingly little attention.5
What explains the relative reluctance on the part of Seoul to adopt a more
assertive position and
to deepen practical ties with Taiwan in recent years—as the U.S., Japan, Australia,
and major
U.S. democratic allies in Europe have been doing? Is it because, as much existing
scholarship on
the Korea case suggests, Seoul, in the interest of positive ties with its massive
neighbor, gave in to
pressure from Beijing to recognize the PRC’s ‘One China principle’ in 1992? More
generally, how have
South Korea’s policies toward Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait evolved vis-à-vis
Seoul’s official position
on ‘One China’ in the thirty years since Seoul and Taipei formally severed official
diplomatic relations?
And how do they compare to those of the United States and Japan, the U.S’. other
democratic treaty
ally in Northeast Asia, today?
This article analyzes Korea-Taiwan relations in historical and comparative
perspectives
against the backdrop of widespread and deepening global concerns about cross-Strait
ten
sions, the U.S.-led effort to internationalize and multilateralize concerns about
peace and
stability and expand international support for Taiwan in the face of increasing
pressure from
Beijing, and worsening frictions between China and the United States and major U.S.
demo
cratic allies. Inspired by the landmark May 2021 Biden-Moon statement and the 30th
anni
versary of ROK-PRC diplomatic normalization, its analysis focuses on clarifying
Seoul’s official
1992 position on ‘One China’ and its implications for how scholars should
understand the
reasons and manner in which ROK leaders have operationalized Seoul’s Taiwan policy
over
the three decades since.
Beyond its real-world implications, this study also contributes to addressing
several gaps in
related academic literatures. Whereas scholarship on U.S.-China relations regularly
distinguishes
between Beijing’s unilaterally-asserted ‘One China principle’ (yi ge zhonguo
yuanze), which claims
that Taiwan is part of the PRC, and the U.S’. officially ambiguous 1979 position
and effective (and
evolving) ‘One China’ policy (yi ge zhongguo zhengce) in the decades since, no
analogous analysis of
2
Yizhong Lai, ‘Taihai anquan de dianfan zhuanyi—yu taiwan qiuji’ermen de shidai tian
da’ Sixiang Tanke (26 May 2021) <https://
voicettank.org/%E5%8F%B0%E6%B5%B7%E5%AE%89%E5%85%A8%E7%9A%84%E5%85%B8%E7%AF
%84%E8%BD%89%
E7%A7%BB%E8%88%87%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E9%82%B1%E5%90%89%E7%88%BE%E5%80%91%E7%9A
%84%E6%
99%82%E4%BB%A3%E5%A1%AB%E7%AD%94/> accessed 23 October 2021.
3
’2021nian 5yue24ri Waijiaobu Fayanren Zhao Lijian Zhuchi Lixing Jizhehui’ Waijiaobu
(PRC) (24 May 2021) <https://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1878152.shtml.>> accessed 23 October 2021.
4
Seung-yeon Kim, ‘Vice FM Expects China to ‘highly assess’ S. Korea for Not
Mentioning Beijing in Moon-Biden Statement’ Yonhap
News Agency (Seoul, 24 May 2021) <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210524005600325>>
accessed 24 September 2021.
5
For example, neither major presidential candidate even mentioned Taiwan in their
respective articles in Foreign Affairs. This is
especially revealing, as the venue suggests a desire to appeal to foreign—and
especially American—audiences. Suk Yeol Yoon,
‘South Korea Needs to Step up’ Foreign Affairs (17 February 2022)
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-korea/202202-08/south-korea-needs-
step&gt> accessed 6 March 2022; Jae-Myung Lee, ‘A Practical Vision for South Korea’
Foreign Affairs
(24 February 2022)
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2022-02-23/practical-vision-
south-korea.&gt> accessed
6 March 2022.
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA
3
the Korean case exists. 6 Also absent is a study closely analyzing the 1992 ROK-PRC
Normalization
Communique’s text and its implications for Seoul’s official position on ‘One China’
and subsequent
policies vis-à-vis Taiwan. Lastly, the literature lacks both a systematic
comparison of the Korean case
with those of the U.S., Japan, and other major U.S. democratic allies, and a study
which situates the
Korean case in the larger literature on the ‘One China’ framework in international
politics.
This study aims to address these important gaps and contribute to scholars’
understanding about
a critical matter with real-world implications for contemporary China, Korea,
Taiwan, and the United
States, as well as fellow U.S. ally Japan and East Asian international relations
more generally. Coupled
with a Korea-Taiwan-focused historical overview to baseline post-1992 developments,
its compara
tive analysis of Korea’s official position and policies vis-à-vis Taiwan the past
thirty years helps
elucidate an important but neglected analytical distinction in the literature on
the Korean case:
between what the ROK actually agreed to when it normalized diplomatic ties with the
PRC in 1992
and the political choices Korean leaders have made since concerning in what manner
and how
robustly Seoul should engage Taiwan.
Contrary to widespread claims in the existing literature, this study finds that in
1992 Seoul did not
give in to pressure to recognize Beijing’s ‘One China principle’. Rather, Korea’s
official position on
Taiwan’s status is strikingly ambiguous, and differs from that asserted by Beijing.
A comparative
analysis further reveals that (1) Seoul’s stance bears underappreciated
similarities to the more
famously vague Japanese (1972) and U.S. (1979) positions on Taiwan; and (2) the
relative reluctance
in Seoul to significantly deepen support for or pragmatic cooperation with Taiwan
that characterizes
its effective ‘One China’ policy today is due to Korean leaders’ political choices,
not any putative
commitment made to Beijing thirty years ago. When assessed in the context of the
Biden-Moon
statement and more recent changes in the rhetoric and posture of the U.S., Japan,
and several other
major U.S. democratic allies, this study’s findings suggest that, at least in
theory, Seoul’s effective
policies vis-à-vis Taiwan could also change—even if its official position on ‘One
China’ remains frozen
in time.
In addition to this study’s scholarly contributions, several real-world factors
also make this an
opportune moment for critically reflecting on the past, present, and possible
future evolution of
Seoul’s ‘One China’ policy and Korea-Taiwan ‘unofficial relations’, and for
understanding the impor
tance of both international and domestic politics in shaping them. First, 2022
marks the 30th anniver
sary of the normalization of ROK-PRC relations. Second, U.S.-China frictions today
are arguably worse
than they have been at any time since the 1970s and the U.S. government has openly
called for greater
cooperation with U.S. allies in confronting associated challenges. And third, over
the past two years
global interest in cross-Strait stability and prospects for enhanced support for
and cooperation with
Taiwan from the U.S. and its democratic allies have reached unprecedented heights.
Though the justdeparted Moon administration (2017–2022) appeared reluctant to upset
Beijing on the sensitive
matter of Taiwan, vicissitudes across the Taiwan Strait and in Korean domestic
politics could shift
policy preferences in Seoul. Of particular note are a striking surge of negative
popular sentiment in
Korea vis-à-vis China, and the May 2022 inauguration of conservative President Yoon
Suk Yeol, who has
pledged to deepen security cooperation with Tokyo and Washington.7
This article is structured as follows: The next section provides historical context
for the
contemporary Korea-Taiwan relationship through a brief overview of ROK-ROC
relations during
the Cold War and the gradual twenty-year ROK-PRC rapprochement that culminated in
Seoul’s
fateful 1992 decision to switch official diplomatic recognition from Taipei to
Beijing. Next, the
authors analyze the foundational pillars of Korea’s effective ‘One China’ policy
today, with
particular focus on the 1992 ROK-PRC Normalization Communique and the 1993
framework
6
The authoritative post-Cold War study of U.S. “One China” policy is Alan D.
Romberg, Rein in at the Brink of the Precipice: American
Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Stimson 2003). More recently, see
Richard C. Bush, A One-China Policy Primer
(Brookings Institution 2017).
7
Sang-hun Choe, ‘South Koreans Now Dislike China More Than They Dislike Japan’ New
York Times (Seoul, 8 March 2022) <https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/08/20/world/asia/korea-china-election-young-voters.html&gt>
accessed 9 March 2022.
4
C. LEE AND A. P. LIFF
for Korea-Taiwan ‘unofficial’ relations. The subsequent section explores how Seoul
has chosen
to operationalize its official position through a brief summary of the vastly
different trajectories
of Korea-PRC and (officially ‘unofficial’) Korea-Taiwan relations over the three
decades since.
Next, the authors further elucidate the underappreciated ambiguity and practical
significance of
Seoul’s official position on ‘One China’ through a comparative analysis of the ROK-
PRC, JapanPRC (1972) and U.S.-PRC (1979) communiques, and of Seoul’s post-
normalization approach visa-vis Taiwan to those of the U.S., Japan, and other major
democratic U.S. allies. Against the
backdrop of the May 2021 Biden-Moon summit and U.S., Japanese, and other parties’
efforts to
‘multilateralize and internationalize’ support for Taiwan and calls for a ‘peaceful
resolution’
today, the penultimate section critically reflects on the implications of this
study’s findings for
scholars’ understanding of Korea’s effective ‘One China’ policy and the prospects
for deeper
Seoul-Taipei ties in the years ahead. A final section concludes this article.

Historical Background: ROK-ROC Relations During the Cold War (1948–1991)

The Beginnings of ROK-ROC Relations and Their Anti-Communist “Blood Alliance”
To a time-traveler from the early Cold War, the contemporary political and popular
distance between
Seoul and Taipei would probably be surprising. Indeed, in the decades after Korea’s
division into
North and South and the ROK government’s establishment (1948) there were striking
similarities
between Taipei and Seoul’s ideological inclinations, geopolitical alignments, and
domestic political
and economic trajectories.
During the early Cold War, both governments were led by staunchly anti-communist,
U.S.-aligned,
autocratic, and nationalistic leaders determined to reunify their divided nations
by force, if necessary.8
They were also closely linked politically and diplomatically from the moment of the
ROK’s establishment.
On 13 August 1948, the ROC became the first national government to convey its
intent to recognize the
newly-established ROK.9 One month later, on September 16, it established a
consulate in Seoul. On
November 11, the ROK returned the favor with a diplomatic office in Nanjing. And on
2 January 1949—
just one day after the U.S.—the ROC become the first Asian government to publicize
its diplomatic
recognition. After the ROC moved its seat of government from the Chinese mainland
to Taiwan following
the establishment by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of the new PRC, the ROK
became the first
foreign government to move its embassy to Taipei.10 Anti-communist solidarity and
the 1949 founding of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also inspired the ROK and ROC to
pursue a military,
political, economic, and cultural alliance, which included the Philippines (the
Pacific Pact).11
The Korean War (1950–1953) exacerbated nascent Cold War tensions regionally and
glob
ally, pushed the U.S., ROK, and ROC closer together, and locked in divisions in
Northeast Asia
along communist and anti-communist lines.12 In the eyes of Washington and many in
Seoul
and Taipei, the Korean War also directly linked the security of Korea and Taiwan.
Most
famously, the Truman Administration responded to North Korea’s June 1950 invasion
of the
ROK by deploying the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, effectively
interjecting the
U.S. into the unresolved Chinese Civil War. Notably, the ROC offered to deploy
30,000 troops
and air support to aid South Korea.13 Though the United States and ROK declined,
Taipei
8
Victor D. Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia
(Princeton 2016).
Taeho Kim, ‘Jungguk Nunchi boda Daeman Nochinda’ Pressian (Seoul, 15 April 2016)
<https://www.pressian.com/pages/articles/
135438&gt> accessed 23 June 2021; Kyu-tae Lee, ‘Hangukgwa Daemanui Gwangye -
‘Junghwa minguk 100nyeon’: HanDaeman Gwangyeui Yeoksawa Hyeonsil’ [2011] 33
Junggukak Nonchong 214.
10
Jun-sik Son, ‘‘Hyeongjejibang’ eseo ‘Hyungjijibang’ euro Daehanmingukgwa
Junghwaminguk ui Oegyogwangye: (1948–1992)’
[2013] 58 Jungguk geunhyeondaesa yeongu 27–31.
11
Junghyun Park, ‘Frustrated Alignment: The Pacific Pact Proposals from 1949 to 1954
and South Korea-Taiwan Relations’ [2015]
12(2) International Journal of Asian Studies 225.
12
Robert Jervis, ‘The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War’ [1980] 24(4) The
Journal of Conflict Resolution 563–92.
13
Park (n 11) 225.
9
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA
5
contributed other material aid. General MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the United
Nations
Command during the Korean War, famously referred to Taiwan as ‘an unsinkable
aircraft
carrier’ and even traveled to Taiwan during the war.14
ROC-ROK cooperation continued following the 1953 armistice ending Korean War hosti
lities. Seoul and Taipei jointly supported the non-governmental Asian People’s
AntiCommunist League, maintained strong ties, and outwardly displayed a shared
commitment
to each other that some scholars describe as ‘a blood alliance’, or
‘brotherhood’.15 As part of
their anti-Communist solidarity, neither recognized the PRC or the Democratic
People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK; or North Korea) as a legitimate government. By the mid-
1950s,
both were also part of the U.S.-centered ‘hub-and-spokes’ system of bilateral,
anti-communist
treaty alliances.
In the 1960s, the ROC and ROK continued to develop their close relations. High-
ranking govern
ment and military officials exchanged visits frequently, such as when ROK President
Park Chung Hee
(1961–1979) visited Taipei in 1966. The ROC and ROK also held annual economic
cooperation
conferences and signed numerous bilateral agreements—e.g., the 1961 Trade
Agreement, 1963
Cultural Agreement, 1964 Friendship Agreement—and jointly participated in the Asian
and Pacific
Council.16 Yet, some conflicting interests also began to manifest, especially
regarding the formation
of an anti-communist regional alliance.17 While the ROC was eager to establish a
military alliance, the
ROK, for various economic and political reasons, wished to avoid a military
relationship and instead
focus on trade and cultural exchanges. Nevertheless, the U.S’. 1969 Nixon Doctrine—
which, inter alia,
called on U.S. allies to take greater responsibility for their own security—led
Park to convene West
Germany, the ROC, South Vietnam, and the ROK at the 1970 Ministerial Conference of
Divided
Nations. The goal was to strengthen relations among divided nations in a setting
absent the major
powers.18
The similarities transcended geopolitics and anti-communist solidarity, as the ROK
and ROC also
followed strikingly parallel economic and political developmental paths. For
example, from the mid1960s on, leaders in Seoul and Taipei pursued heavily export-
oriented industrialization as the largest
of the ‘Four Asian Tigers’. And beginning in the 1980s, both close U.S. partners
also concomitantly
launched far-reaching democratic reforms, culminating in free and fair national
elections and, later,
peaceful transitions of power to progressive-led governments—also around the same
time (in 1998
and 2000, respectively).
Despite close early Cold War-era cooperation and similar political and economic
trajec
tories, however, in 1992 it was—ironically—the ROK’s first-ever democratic
administration that
made Seoul the last Asian government to switch diplomatic recognition from rapidly
demo
cratizing Taipei to the authoritarian CCP-led government in Beijing. What had
happened to the
early Cold War ROK-ROC ‘blood alliance’? To understand how and why this switch of
diplo
matic recognition happened when it did, it is important to consider the gradual
ROK-PRC
rapprochement that began in the 1970s. Remarkably, nearly two decades would pass
until it
ultimately culminated in mutual diplomatic recognition and, consequently, Seoul’s
effective
severance of official relations with Taipei.

14
’Coulter janggun dongsang jemaksigeseo iseungman daetongnyeongui chukayeonseol’
Haengjeonganjeonbu
(16 October 1959) <https://www.mois.go.kr/cmm/fms/FileDown.do?
atchFileId=FILE_000000000049952&fileSn=0&gt>
accessed 31 July 2022; JungHyun Park, ‘Hangukjeonjaenggwa Taiwanui Jiwi’ [2013]
56(3) Asea Yeongu 140.
15
Jun-Young Kang, ‘Han-Daeman Dangyo 20nyeonui Hoegowa Jeonmang- Saeroun Hanguk-
Daeman Gwangyereul Wihayeo’
[2013] 26 Hanjung Sahoegwahak Yeongu 3; Young-Hyun Yoon, ‘Naengjeongi Hanguksahoeui
Jayujungguk(Daeman) Insik’
[2019] 68 Hangukak Yeongu 119–64.
16
Kyu-tae Lee, ‘Hangukgwa Daemanui Jeongchijeok Gwangye: Gwageo, Hyeonjae, Mirae’
[1994] 27 Donga Yeongu 36.
17
Son (n 10) 38–39.
18
ibid.
6
C. LEE AND A. P. LIFF
The 20-Year Denouement of ROK-ROC Diplomatic Relations and Long Road to ROK-PRC
Normalization
By the early 1970s, a rapidly changing geopolitical context had transformed the
Cold War in East Asia
and weakened the strategic logic underpinning both ROK-ROC anti-communist
solidarity and ROKPRC antagonism. During the 1969–1972 period, the Sino-Soviet
split nearly escalated into war, Nixon
and Mao launched a historic U.S.-PRC rapprochement, the PRC effectively took over
‘China’s’ seat at
the United Nations from the Chiang Kai-shek-led government, and many other U.S.-
aligned countries
switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Between 1971 and 1972,
twenty-five foreign
governments officially recognized the PRC, including key U.S. treaty allies Japan
and Australia.19 By
1979, even Seoul’s U.S. ally had followed suit, also abrogating the U.S’. mutual
defense pact with
Taipei and withdrawing its military from Taiwan. These transformative changes
reshaped East Asian
international relations (and the world). They also catalyzed major foreign policy
debates in Seoul.
A turning point was in June 1973, when ROK President Park announced his ‘Peaceful
Reunification
Foreign Policy’ and expressed interest in establishing diplomatic relations with
the PRC and other
communist nations.20 One of Park’s goals was to use improved relations with the
DPRK’s communist
allies to reduce frictions between Seoul and Pyongyang. This new approach heralded
a major shift
away from Seoul’s early Cold War foreign policy posture rooted in anti-Communist
ideology, and
toward a more pragmatic, flexible approach. This included efforts to follow the
lead of the U.S.,
Japan, and others by developing more cooperative ties with Beijing.21
This 1973 shift also marked a turning point for Korea’s approach to Taipei.
Thenceforth, the Park
government quietly discouraged efforts to deepen ROK-ROC ties.22 It also reportedly
expressed
a willingness to adjust its Taiwan policy commensurate with changes in Beijing’s
approach to
Seoul.23 In contrast to Beijing’s welcoming attitude toward Washington, Tokyo, and
many other
U.S. allies, however, the PRC resisted Seoul’s entreaties to normalize diplomatic
relations. Beijing’s
reluctance owed largely to its frictions and competition for leadership of
international communism
with Moscow, as well as concerns about how Pyongyang would react. Under a 1961
treaty, the PRC
and DPRK were allies. And Pyongyang did not consider the ROK a legitimate
government.24 In short,
whereas Sino-Soviet frictions gave Beijing powerful geopolitical incentives to
quickly normalize ties
with Tokyo and Washington, they disincentivized a similarly welcoming posture
toward Seoul.
Under the PRC’s post-Mao ‘Reform and Opening up’ (gaige kaifang), however, Beijing
gradually
softened its position. First, under its self-described ‘separation of politics and
economics’ (zhengjing
fenli) the PRC incrementally expanded trade ties with Seoul, despite the latter’s
continued recogni
tion of the ROC government.25 Beijing sought to benefit from economic exchange
while maintaining
traditional security commitments to Pyongyang.26 Between 1978 and 1991, ROK-PRC
bilateral trade
volume surged from $37,000 to $4.4 billion, catching up to that between Seoul and
Taipei by the
mid-1980s. In 1984, Beijing lifted commercial restrictions and allowed limited ROK
investment.27
Cognizant of the expected economic benefits and eager to weaken one of Taiwan’s
most important
remaining official diplomatic relationships, yet wary of upsetting Pyongyang and
stability on the
Korean Peninsula, PRC leaders gradually deepened and expanded nongovernmental
exchange with
Seoul, such as through ‘sports diplomacy’, ferry and air routes, and local
government links. But they
19
Falu baihuawen yundong, Zhonghua minguo duanjiao shi (Lianhe wenxue chubanshe gufen
youxiangongsi 2019).
Ilpyong J Kim, ‘The Normalization of Chinese-South Korean Diplomatic Relations’
[1992] 16(3) Korea and World Affairs 483; Lee
(n16) 38.
21
Lee (n 9) 215–16.
22
Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States
(Columbia University Press 2007) 30.
23
Jie Dong, ‘Zhong Han jianjiao zhong de zhongguo waijiao juece zai tantao’
Zhonggongdang shi yanjiu August 2019 <http://
www.dswxyjy.org.cn/n1/2019/1226/c219000–31524343.html.&gt> accessed 23 October
2021.
24
ibid.
25
Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Addison-Wesley 1997) 186–
87.
26
Chung (n 22) 65.
27
ibid 35–41.
20
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA
7
refused to normalize diplomatic relations.28 CCP Central Party School scholar Dong
Jie sums up the
period 1973–1988 as one of Beijing’s ‘cautious exploration’ (jinshen tansuo).29
As Beijing cautiously engaged Seoul, under ‘nordpolitik’ (beifang zhengce)
President Roh Tae-woo
(1988–1993), the ROK’s first democratically elected leader, demonstrated
‘extraordinary enthusiasm’
for improving relations with the CCP regime.30 Seoul sought to normalize relations
with Moscow and
Beijing to facilitate eventual Korean unification, enhance access to the PRC’s
growing market, and
encourage the DPRK to improve relations with Washington and Tokyo.31 As one
indication of how
eager Roh appeared to improve relations with Beijing, he remained quiet after the
tragic and deadly
1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown—presenting a stark contrast with the U.S., Japan,
and other G7
countries.32 Confronted with punishing sanctions from Washington and other U.S.
allies, China’s
leaders appreciated Seoul’s positive engagement.33 ROK-PRC trade surged after June
4th—more
than doubling between 1989 and 1991.34
Coupled with a major improvement in Beijing-Moscow relations by the late 1980s, a
series of
events after 1989—especially Soviet-ROK normalization in 1990 and the ROK and
DPRK’s simulta
neous admission to the United Nations in 1991—diminished Beijing’s concerns about
Pyongyang’s
response to improving ties with Seoul .35 By early 1991, newly established trade
offices had begun to
operate similarly to de facto embassies.36 Finally, the Soviet Union’s collapse
that December marked
a decisive coda on the Cold War and lingering fears in Beijing about Moscow
potentially exploiting
ROK-PRC normalization to Beijing’s disadvantage.

Negotiating the Foundations of Korea-Taiwan “Unofficial” Relations Today (1992–

1993)
On 24 August 1992, the ROK and PRC released a historic communique normalizing
diplomatic
relations. The consequences for Taiwan were especially significant because the ROK
was Taipei’s
last and oldest diplomatic ally in Asia. The rebuke from Taipei, which received
only a few days’
advance warning, was severe. 37 The official ROK-ROC relationship was no more. What
precise form
a newly ‘unofficial’ Korea-Taiwan relationship would take, however, was (and still
is) to be deter
mined by political leaders in Seoul and Taipei.

The 1992 ROK-PRC Normalization Communique: Debunking the Myth of Consensus

The existing literature in multiple languages leaves one with the impression that
Seoul came
to the negotiating table in May 1992 as an ardent suitor willing to concede to
Beijing’s
demands, including the latter’s claim of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. For example,
a recent
Korean-language study argues that Seoul accepted Beijing’s ‘One China principle’
early on
during the negotiations.38 A recent English-language study of Sino-Korean relations
claims
28
See Dong (n 23); Byung-joon Ahn, ‘Prospects for Sino-South Korean Relations: A
Korean Perspective’ [1992] 6(1) The Journal of
East Asian Affairs; and Chung, Between Ally and Partner (n 24) 30–35 and 43–52 for
more detailed analyses.
Dong (n 23).
30
ibid.
31
Tae Dong Chung, ‘Korea’s Nordpolitik: Achievements and Prospects’ [1991] 15(2)
Asian Perspective 153; Dong (n 23); Seong-Il
Lee, ‘1992nyeon Han-Jungguk Gyojeongsanghwa uiuie Gwanhan Jaegochal—Hanbandowa
Junggukgwaui Gwangye
Gujobyeonhwareul Jungsimeuro’ [2011] 40 Junggukak 538.
32
Chung (n 22) 44.
33
Dong (n 23).
34
’K-Statistic: Specific Country (Pr. China)’ (Korea International Trade Association)
<http://www.kita.org/kStat/byCount_SpeCount.
do.&gt> accessed 29 September 2021.
35
Chae-Jin Lee and Doo-Bok Park, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations (Hoover
Institution Press 1996), 123; Chung (n 22) 69–70;
Dong-gyu Lee, ‘Naengjeonsigi Hanjunggwangyeui Baljeonyoingwa Teuksuseong’ [2018]
74(2) Hanguk Gunsahak Nonjip 179.
36
Dong (n 23).
37
Chung (n 22) 72–73.
38
Hee-ok Lee, ‘Hanjungsugyo Gyoseop Gwajeong Yeongu’ [2019] 43(3) Jungso Yeongu 134,
139–40.
29
8
C. LEE AND A. P. LIFF
that the 1992 joint statement “mutually confirm[ed] the ‘One China’ principle”.39
Similarly,
a recent Chinese-language study from the CCP Central Party School asserts that
Seoul
‘accepted China’s principles for normalization, agreed that the PRC was China’s
only legal
government, and that Taiwan was part of China’.40
Yet a close reading and comparative analysis of the 1992 ROK-PRC normalization
communique’s
actual text reveals what much existing scholarship overlooks: Seoul’s official 1992
position on Taiwan
is both distinct from Beijing’s and is similarly ambiguous to the U.S’. and Japan’s
more famously
vague 1979 and 1972 positions. Seoul joined Washington and Tokyo in recognizing the
PRC
government ‘as the sole legal government of China’. But it also joined them in not
recognizing
Beijing’s ‘One China principle’ as it applies to Taiwan. (See the section titled
Korea-Taiwan Relations in
Comparative Perspective for more extensive and quadrilingual comparative analysis)
Rather, the 1992
communique stated only ‘The government of the Republic of Korea recognizes the
government of
the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China . . . ’ [and]
‘The government of
the Republic of Korea [. . .] respects the position of the Chinese side that there
is but one China and
Taiwan is part of China’.41
Indeed, there is an underappreciated but crucially important distinction between
what
Seoul agreed to in the 1992 normalization communique and Beijing’s own self-defined
‘One
China principle’. The latter basically has two essential claims: (1) ‘that the PRC
[is] the sole
legal Government of China’ and (2) that ‘Taiwan is an inalienable part of the
territory of the
PRC’.42 Contrary to what many scholars have asserted (or implied by omission or
commission)
over the years, in 1992 Seoul did not recognize Beijing’s ‘One China principle’.
Rather, the
communique’s actual text shows that Seoul accepted the first essential claim, but
regarding
the second merely stated that the ROK “respects (zunzhong/jon-jung) the position of
the
Chinese side—without saying whether Seoul agrees with it.43 This carefully-worded
but clear
lack of consensus was no accident. In his 2003 memoir Lee Sang-ock, ROK foreign
minister
during the 1992 normalization negotiations, makes clear that the PRC originally
demanded
that Seoul explicitly recognize Taiwan as part of the PRC.44 Critically, no such
language ended
up in the final communique.
Seoul’s vague official 1992 position on the sovereignty question is but one
essential aspect
of its ‘One China’ policy in principle and in practice. How ROK political leaders
have chosen to
operationalize that position in terms of Seoul’s concrete policies toward and
degree of
engagement with/support for Taiwan over the past thirty years is the other. In
August 1992, ROK President Roh set a high bar when he called for Seoul and Taipei
to
establish ‘the highest level of unofficial relations’ (zuigao shuiping de
feizhengshi guanxi) that
would be both ‘substantive’ and the ‘best’ possible.45 What that would mean in
practice,
however, was to be determined by Korea’s democratically-elected leaders in the
years that
followed. Despite Roh’s ambitious 1992 call, the newly ‘unofficial’ Korea-Taiwan
relationship
began inauspiciously.

39
Jaeho Hwang, ‘The Continuous but Rocky Developments of Sino-South Korean Relations:
Examined by the Four Factor Model’
[2021] 10(2) Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 1–12.
Dong (n 23).
41
’Han-Jung Oegyogwangye Suribe Gwanhan Gongdongseongmyeong’ (Oegyobu Oegyo
Saryogwan, 24 August 1992) <http://
diplomaticarchives.mofa.go.kr/new/show/age_view.jsp?
pagenum=2&idx=115&board_id=picture2&divine=&tagoption=5&sta
tus=all&str=&gt> accessed 19 August 2021. Emphasis Added. English translation are
authors’ own.
42
Adam P. Liff and Dalton Lin. ‘The ‘One China’ Framework at Fifty (1972–2022): The
Myth of ‘Consensus’ and its Evolving Policy
Significance’ [forthcoming] The China Quarterly.
43
’Han-Jung Oegyogwangye’ (n 41).
44
Lee Sang-ock, Jeonhwangiui Hanguk Oegyo: Yi Sang-Ock Jeonoemujanggwan Oegyohoegorok
(Samgwakkum 2003) 213–214.
45
Quoted in Wenshou Chen, ‘‘Zhengjing fenli’ yu taihan guanxi—— ‘sanying guanxi’ zhi
mosuo’ Aisixiang (10 January 2008)
<https://www.aisixiang.com/data/17299.html&gt> accessed 23 October 2021.
40
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA
9
The 1993 Korea-Taiwan Framework: Setting the (Strict) Bounds of Roh’s “Highest
Level of
Unofficial Relations”
In response to the 1992 ROK-PRC normalization communique, Taipei severed diplomatic
ties with Seoul
and protested its unilateral abrogation of what scholars had called their ‘anti-
communist alliance’.46
Ironically, the rapidly democratizing but still Kuomintang (KMT; or Nationalist
Party)-led ROC govern
ment even threatened to punish Seoul by improving relations with the communist
DPRK.47 In moves
with significant consequences for the cultural and economic exchange that was
supposed to be the
foundation of ‘unofficial’ ties after 1992, the ROC also abrogated a bilateral
aviation agreement, ended
preferential treatment for ROK goods, issued anti-dumping lawsuits against the ROK,
and expressed its
‘deep sense of betrayal’.48 Taipei even terminated direct commercial flights
between Korea and Taiwan,
creating challenges for businesses and causing a sharp drop-off in tourism. Not
until 2004 did the two
sides conclude a new aviation agreement allowing aircraft to enter each other’s
airspace. Tourism,
however, still had not fully recovered to pre-1992 levels.49
After the initial shock had worn off, and adopting a well-worn playbook written by
the U.S. and
other democratic allies after their own respective normalization communiques with
Beijing, Seoul
and Taipei eventually moved toward operationalizing a functional, if ‘unofficial’,
relationship. The
foundation was the July 1993 Korea-Taiwan ‘New Relations Framework’ (xin guanxi
jiagou).50 By
January 1994, the nominally ‘non-governmental’ Korean Mission in Taipei (zhu taibei
hanguo dai
biaobu) and the Taipei Mission in Korea’s (zhu hanguo taibei daibiaobu) Seoul and
Busan offices were
all operational.51 Absent official diplomatic ties, these offices have served as de
facto embassies and
facilitated cultural, academic, and other ‘unofficial’ bilateral exchanges.
Notably, none contained
‘Taiwan’ or ‘ROC’ in their name.
Whereas the aforementioned were negotiated bilaterally, other aspects of Seoul’s
effective
policies related to, and desired level of engagement with, Taipei since 1992 have
been up to ROK
leaders to determine unilaterally. For example, in 1994 the ROK promulgated its
internal ‘Principles
for Allowing Contacts with Taiwan’ and ‘Basic Guidelines for Exchange and
Cooperation with
Taiwan’. These documents outlined, inter alia, which Korean officials could visit
Taiwan and/or
communicate directly with their Taiwanese counterparts. For example, Blue House and
Prime
Minister’s office personnel were forbidden from having direct contacts. And while
officials below
the vice-ministerial level from the ministries of foreign affairs, unification, or
defense could have
unofficial contacts with their Taiwanese counterparts, officials of vice-
ministerial rank or higher could
not. Contact was allowed at international organizations of which Taiwan is a member
(e.g. the World
Trade Organization (WTO) or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, as
long as the
communications concerned issues within the organization’s mandate. Importantly,
Seoul’s policy
placed no restrictions on exchanges by rank-and-file ROK and Taiwanese
politicians.52
As demonstrated in the following two sections and comparatively in the penultimate
one, how
these unilaterally-determined rules of engagement would be operationalized (and
modified) over
time—i.e. what Korea’s ‘One China’ policy in practice would mean for the extent and
nature of its
engagement with Taiwan—was largely left to political leaders in Seoul to decide.
46
Kang (n 15) 3.
Hakjoon Kim, ‘The Establishment of South Korean-Chinese Diplomatic Relations: A
South Korean Perspective’ [1994] 13(2)
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 42.
48
Youngsu Kim, ‘‘50nyeon Chingu Beoridani . . . ’ Banhan Geukdoe’ Chosun News Library
100 (Seoul, 23 August 1992) <https://
newslibrary.chosun.com&gt> accessed 24 July 2021; Uk Heo and Hayam Kim, ‘Private-
Sector Networks, Democracy, and
Interstate Relations: A Case Study of South Korea and Taiwan’ [2012] 36(1) Asian
Perspective 72.
49
Andrew Petty, ‘Korea-Taiwan Flying Close to the Wind’ Asia Times (Seoul, 15
September 2004) <https://web.archive.org/web/
20040916023257/http://atimes.com/atimes/Korea/FI15Dg01.html&gt> accessed 6 August
2021.
50
’Zhonghua minguo waijiaobu yu ben (27)ri xuanbu’ (Zhonghua minguo waijiaobu quanqiu
zixun wang, 27 July 1993) <https://
www.mofa.gov.tw/https%3a%2f%2fptop.only.wip.la%3a443%2fhttps%2fwww.mofa.gov.tw%2fNews_Content.aspx%3fn%3d96%26s
%3d73231%26Create%
3d1>accessed 9 October 2021.
51
’Zhonghua Minguo 108nian Waijiao Nianjian’ (Waijiaobu (ROC), 2019) 85 accessed 24
October 2021.
52
In Hee Han, ‘Han-Daeman Gwangye 26junyeon Hoegowa Jeonmang’ [2018] 13 Daeman Yeongu
69.
47
10
C. LEE AND A. P. LIFF
ROK-PRC and Korea-Taiwan Relations Over the Past 30 Years
Overview of ROK-PRC Official Relations, 1992–2021
As discussed above, even before diplomatic normalization in 1992 eliminated
official constraints on
most forms of bilateral engagement by the 1980s economic and other unofficial links
between China
and Korea were already extensive. Post-normalization, extant ties deepened, and new
forms of
cooperation—including official inter-governmental links—became possible. Over the
past three
decades the net effect has been that in many fields the gap in the breadth, depth,
and practical
significance of exchange between Korea-China and Korea-Taiwan has expanded greatly.
Nevertheless, normalization was hardly a panacea for longstanding ROK-PRC tensions
over the
DPRK. And other sources of friction have also emerged more recently.
The rapid expansion over the past thirty years of Korea-China economic, trade, and
cultural ties is
most conspicuous, and something scholars frequently suggest as the reason why Seoul
—arguably
more so than some other major U.S. allies—generally seeks to avoid policies that
risk angering
Beijing, including vis-à-vis Taiwan. Some basic economic trends illustrate Seoul’s
interest in stable
ties: bilateral trade increased 60-fold between 1991 ($4.4 billion) and 2018 ($269
billion); China is the
destination of roughly one-fourth of South Korean exports; and since 2009 China’s
share of Korea’s
overall trade has exceeded the combined U.S. plus Japan total.53 In 2015, Seoul and
Beijing signed
a free trade agreement and launched won-yuan direct exchange markets. Today, both
are members
of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Nevertheless, as China’s
massive
corporations have rapidly moved up the value chain concerns about Korean firms’
competitiveness
have grown.54 Economic issues are increasingly a source of friction.
Since normalization, Korea-China people-to-people exchanges have also expanded
rapidly: from
130,000 in 1992 to nine-million by 2018. Though the positive impact on ROK-PRC
relations appears
significant, cultural exchanges have not prevented the worsening of negative
sentiment toward
China in the ROK over various issues including food, culture, history, territorial
disputes, and
geopolitics, including China’s perceived support of now nuclear-armed DPRK. Whereas
the first
decade post-normalization was considered ‘a honeymoon period’, between 2014 and
2020 the
percentage of Koreans expressing an ‘unfavorable’ opinion of China more than
doubled: from 37%
to 77%.55 Nevertheless, business and popular exchanges remained robust. For
example, Korea
remains the number one source of foreign students studying in China, and Chinese
students are
the largest group of foreign nationals studying in Korea. 56
Despite these positive trends, efforts to deepen ROK-PRC cooperation beyond
economics and
cultural exchange have repeatedly confronted stiff political headwinds. As Ji-Young
Lee summarizes,
although “the two sides have continued upgrading their official relations—from
‘Friendly
Cooperative Relations’ at the time of normalization to[. . .]2014’s ‘Enriched
Strategic Cooperative
Partnership’[. . .]the primary foundation of Beijing-Seoul ties is commercial and
economic”.57 Seewon Byun sums up the state of affairs as emblematic of ‘post-Cold
War Asia’s paradox’ of ‘strong
trade ties and weak political ties’ between Beijing and its Northeast Asian
neighbors, arguing that
‘China-South Korea political interactions have increased in quantity’, but
paradoxically, ‘the quality of
53
See-Won Byun, ‘Interdependence, Identity, and China—South Korea Political
Relations: Asia’s Paradox’ [2021] 61(3) Asian
Survey 481–82; ‘K-Statistic: Specific Country (Pr. China)’ (n 34).
Hwang (n 39) 4.
55
Hwang (n 39) 5–6; Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, ‘Majorities Say
China Does Not Respect the Personal Freedoms
of Its People’ (Pew Research Center, 30 June 2022)
<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/06/30/large-majorities-saychina-does-not-
respect-the-personal-freedoms-of-its-people/&gt> accessed 6 October 2021.
56
’2019nyeon Gungnae Godeunggyoyukgigwan Nae Oegugin Yuhaksaeng Tonggye’ (Gyoyukbu
(MOE), 18 November 2019)
<https://www.moe.go.kr/boardCnts/view.do?
boardID=350&lev=0&statusYN=W&s=moe&m=0309&opType=N&boardSeq=
79011&gt> accessed 22 October 2021; ‘Jiaoyu shuju: 2019nian quanguo lai hua
liuxuesheng shuju fabu’ Shandong jiaoyu (n.d.)
<http://www.jxdx.org.cn/gnjy/14176.html&gt> accessed 28 September 2021.
57
Ji-young Lee, “The Geopolitics of South Korea-China Relations” (RAND Corporation,
November 2020) <https://www.rand.org/
pubs/perspectives/PEA524–1.html&gt> accessed 27 September 2021.
54
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA
11
relations [has] deteriorated over 25 years of diplomatic ties’.58 In Seoul,
differing perspectives across
progressive and conservative administrations about how best to manage the ROK’s
relations with
Pyongyang, Beijing, Tokyo, and even its U.S. ally have been key variables. There
have also been
intermittent but major bilateral political disputes between Seoul and Beijing:
including over histor
ical and territorial issues and U.S.-ROK military exercises aimed at bolstering
deterrence against
Pyongyang. Indeed, the DPRK looms particularly large.
Importantly, however, and distinct from other key cases (e.g. U.S.-PRC relations),
after normalizing
diplomatic relations with Beijing, Seoul’s policies toward Taiwan have not emerged
as a major source
of bilateral friction. The ROK government has generally sought to avoid upsetting
China on related
issues. This continues today. For example, when asked to comment on cross-Strait
relations or
matters such as Taiwan’s request to attain observer status in the World Health
Assembly (WHA),
the Korean Foreign Ministry is typically evasive, stating that ‘they cannot
answer’, or that ‘the ROK
government supports international unity and respects the decision of the World
Health Organization
(WHO)’ (to exclude Taipei per Beijing’s wishes).59
Operationalizing “Unofficial” Korea-Taiwan Relations, 1992–2021
Despite the immediate fallout after 1992, over the past thirty years the ROK and
Taiwan have
nevertheless maintained extensive, if ‘unofficial’, ties. As discussed in the next
section, however,
relative to the U.S., Japan, and other key players’ increasingly vocal support for
and expanded
practical cooperation with (now democratic) Taiwan over the same time period, it is
difficult to
argue that Roh and his successors have in practice sought to realize the ‘highest
level of [KoreaTaiwan] unofficial relations’ possible. This is especially the case
beyond the relatively narrow bounds
of trade and cultural exchanges.
Although Korea-China trade has dwarfed Korea-Taiwan trade the past three decades,
KoreaTaiwan trade volume has expanded significantly in absolute terms: ten-fold
between 1992
($3.5 billion) and 2018 ($37.5 billion).60 Today, the ROK and Taiwan are each
other’s fifth- and sixthlargest trading partners, respectively.61 In contrast,
bilateral investment has been limited and
imbalanced. In 2019, Taiwan invested US$220 million in Korea, while the Korea
invested merely US
$37 million in Taiwan.62
In terms of cultural exchanges, since the 2004 Civil Aviation Agreement Korea-
Taiwan people-topeople exchanges have expanded—though they, too, pale in comparison
to the corresponding
figures for exchanges with the PRC. For example, in 2019 4,153 Korean students
studied in Taiwanbased institutions of higher education while over ten-times as
many (50,600) studied in the PRC.63
Though tourism is a major driver of grassroots exchange—in 2019 roughly 1.24-
million Koreans
visited Taiwan and 1.21-million Taiwanese visited Korea—Korean scholars note
significant declines
since 1992 in public and academic interest in Taiwan’s history, foreign policy and
Korea-Taiwan
58
Byun (n 53) 484–85, 491.
’Daebyeonin Jeongnyebeuriping (5.25)’ (Oegyobu, 25 May 2021)
<https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4078/view.do/?seq=
368328&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=%EB%8C%80%EB
%A7%8C&srchTp=1&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=
0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=1> accessed 21 October 2021; ‘Daebyeonin Jeongnye
Beuriping (11. 10)’ (Oegyobu,
10 November 2015) <https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4078/view.do?
seq=357023&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=%EB%
8C%80%EB
%A7%8C&srchTp=1&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&pag
e=1>
accessed 21 October 2021.
60
’K-Statistic: Specific Country (Taiwan)’ (Korea International Trade
Association)<http://kita.org/kStat/byCount_SpeCount.do&gt>
accessed 29 September 2021.
61
’Zhonghua Minguo 108nian Waijiao Nianjian’ (n 51) 85.
62
’Taiwan-South Korea Economic Relations’ (Bureau of Foreign Trade (MOEA), 18 May
2020) <https://www.trade.gov.tw/English/
Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=2910&pid=652204&gt> accessed 22 July 2021.
63
’2019nyeon Gugoe Godeunggyoyukgigwan Hangugin Yuhaksaeng Tonggye’ (Gyoyukbu (MOE),
18 November 2019) <https://
www.moe.go.kr/boardCnts/view.do?
boardID=350&lev=0&statusYN=W&s=moe&m=0309&opType=N&boardSeq=79010&gt>
accessed 23 October 2021.
59
12
C. LEE AND A. P. LIFF
relations.64Leading expert Taeho Kim, for example, bemoans limited support in Korea
for Taiwanrelated research and a paucity of research jobs and promotions for
Taiwan-focused scholars.65
Given Seoul’s self-imposed constraints on even ROK government officials’
‘unofficial’ engagement
with their Taiwanese counterparts, one primary means of political interaction the
past thirty years
has been exchanges between the National Assembly’s Korea-Taiwan Parliamentary
Friendship Group
[han tai guohui yiyuan qinshan xiehui] and its Taiwanese counterpart, the ROC-Korea
Parliamentary
Friendship Association (zhonghua minguo yu hanguo guohui yiyuan youhao xiehui).
Another is visits
by former officials and leaders from the business and think tank worlds. For
example, in 2007
Taiwan’s former vice president Lien Chan and former National Security Council
Secretary General
Mark Chen reportedly visited Korea.66 The most prominent high-level visits from
Korea to Taiwan
were trips between 2001 and 2008 by former president Kim Young Sam (1993–1998),
during which
he met with then sitting President Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008). During the first
visit, they discussed
principles for restoring the aviation agreement Taipei severed in 1992.67 Taiwan’s
last pre-COVID
(2019) diplomatic yearbook notes visits by Taiwan’s former vice president Annette
Lu and current
members of the Control Yuan, the chairmen of and legislators from both sides’
parliamentary
friendship groups, and leaders from tourism, business, and think tanks.68
Nevertheless, publicly-reported visits by former political leaders or high-ranking
government officials
are rare.69 Additionally, the level of interest appears imbalanced. For example,
since 1992 Taiwan has
sent special envoys to attend ROK presidential inaugurations, but the ROK
government appears not to
have reciprocated for the inauguration of a democratically-elected Taiwanese
president or commem
oration of a peaceful transition of power.70 Furthermore, supportive of the idea
that Korea does not
consider Taiwan a major partner, or the Taiwan Strait a front-burner foreign policy
concern, recent ROK
diplomatic white papers do not even substantively discuss Korea-Taiwan relations.71
Korea-Taiwan Relations in Comparative Perspective: The Critical and Practically
Significant Distinction Between Beijing’s “One China Principle” and Others’ “One
China” Policies
For both understanding why Korea-Taiwan relations have been so narrowly bounded
after 1992 and
assessing the possibility of future change, it is first critically important to
highlight a factor that is not as
determinative as is often assumed: Korea’s official position on ‘One China’. As
described above, the
distinction between what the PRC unilaterally claims regarding Taiwan’s status and
the language Seoul
actually agreed to in the 1992 Normalization Communique is subtle, but fundamental.
A brief comparative
analysis of official positions and the degree and nature of subsequent engagement
with Taiwan between
Korea and the U.S. and Japan, Taiwan’s two most important international partners
after 1949, is revealing.
As Table 1 highlights, Tokyo’s, Washington’s, and Seoul’s normalization communiques
with
Beijing all share one essential feature: they adopt an ambiguous position that does
not recognize
Beijing’s claim of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. Instead, they merely acknowledge
Beijing’s position
64
“Chang-geun Choi, ‘Hanguk-Daeman Dangyo ihu Daemangwallyeon Jeojangmul Yeongu:1992
2015’ [2015] 7 Daeman Yeongu
113, 126; Zhonghua Minguo 108nian Waijiao Nianjian (n 51) 85–86.
65
Taeho Kim, ‘Daemanui Jeollyakjeok Jungyoseong Hangugui Sigak’ [2018] 13 Daeman
Yeongu 30.
66
’Zhonghua Minguo 96nian Waijiao Nianjian’ (Waijiaobu (ROC), 2007)
<https://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/
almanac/almanac2007/html/01.html&gt> accessed 24 October 2021.
67
’Zhongtong huijian Hanguo qian Datongling Jin Yongsan’ (Zhonghua minguo zontongfu,
26 July 2001) <https://www.
president.gov.tw/NEWS/2387&gt> accessed 6 October 2021.
68
’Zhonghua Minguo 108nian Waijiao Nianjian’ (n 51) 85–86.
69
Past VIP visits are listed in Taiwan’s annual diplomatic yearbooks, available at
https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News.aspx?n=
245&sms=109. The lack of description of the business conducted or with whom
individuals met makes it difficult to assess
these visits’ practical significance.
70
Han (n 52) 70.
71
’2019 Oegyobaekseo’ (Oegyobu, 29 November 2019)
<https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do>> accessed
21 October 2021; ‘2020 Oegyobaekseo’ (Oegyobu, 5 February 2021)
<https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do>
accessed 21 October 2021.
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA
13
Table 1. Japan, USA, and ROK positions on “One China” (as expressed in their
normalization communiques with the PRC).
The PRC’s “One China
principle”
(baselined upon 1972
Japan-PRC
Communique)
“the People’s
Republic of China
[is] the sole legal
Government of
China.”
“中華人民共和国
政府が中国の唯
一の合法政府で
ある”
“中华人民共和国
政府是中国的唯
一合法政府”
“Taiwan is an
inalienable part of
the territory of the
People’s Republic
of China.”
“台湾が中華人民
共和国の領土の
不可分の一部で
ある”
“台湾是中华人民
共和国领土不可
分割的一部分”
Japan
(9/29/1972)
“The Government of Japan
recognizes the Government of
the People’s Republic of China as
the sole legal Government of
China.”
USA
ROK
(1/1/1979)
(8/24/1992)
“The United States of America “The Government of the Republic
recognizes the Government
of Korea recognizes the
of the People’s Republic of
Government of the People’s
China as the sole legal
Republic of China as the sole
Government of China.”
legal government of China. . .”
“日本国政府は、
中華人民共和国政府が
中国の唯一の合法政府
であることを承認する。”
———————
“대한민국정부는
중화인민공화국정부를 중
국의 유일
합법정부로 승인하며. . .”
“日本国政府承认
中华人民共和国政府是中国
的唯一
合法政府。”
“美利坚合众国承认
中华人民共和国政府是
中国的唯一合法政府。”
“⼤韩民国政府承认
中华⼈民共和国政府为
中国的唯⼀合法政府. . .”
“The Government of Japan fully “The Government of the United “The Government of the
Republic
understands and respects this
States of America
of Korea [. . .] respects the
stand of the Government of
acknowledges the Chinese
position of the Chinese side
the People’s Republic of
position that there is but
that there is but one China and
China, and it firmly maintains its
one China and Taiwan is part
Taiwan is part of
stand under Article 8 of the
of China.”
China.”
Potsdam
Proclamation.”
———————
“대한민국 정부는 [. . .] 오직
“日本国政府は、この
하나의
中華人民共和国政府の立場
중국만이 있고 대만은 중
を十分理解し、尊重し、
AD6D 의
ポツダム宣言第八項に基づ
일부분 이라는 중국의 입장
く立場を堅持する。”
을
존중한다.”
“日本国政府充分理解和尊重
中国政府的这一立场并坚持
遵循波茨坦公告第八条的立
场。”
“美利坚合众国政府承认*
中国的立
场即只有一个中国台湾是
中
国的一部分。”
(Note: The English version is
authoritative on the U.S.’
position;
PRC (mis-)translated
“acknowledges” as “承认,”
instead of as 认识到 (as it
did in 1972);
see Romberg 2003, 99-100)
“⼤韩民国政府 [. . .] 尊重
中⽅只有⼀个中国、台湾
是中国的⼀部分之⽴场.”
The Japan-PRC and U.S.-PRC normalization communiques are available in Japanese,
Chinese, and English at “The World and Japan”
Database, https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/indices/JPCH/index.html and
https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/indices/
USC/index-ENG.html, respectively. The ROK-PRC normalization communique excerpts are
sourced from “Zhong Han jianjiao
lianhe gongbao” (Zhongguowang, August 24, 1992),
http://43.250.236.5/GB/shizheng/8761/8754/8759/20020812/797689.html,
and ‘Han-Jung Oegyogwangye’ (n 41), respectively. The English translations of the
latter are the authors’ own.
14
C. LEE AND A. P. LIFF
that Taiwan is part of the PRC (in Korea’s case, ‘the position of the Chinese
side’).72 Though Beijing
today actively seeks to distort global discourse by promoting a myth of
‘consensus’—namely, that its
self-defined ‘One China principle’ is a ‘basic norm of international relations and
universal consensus
in international society’ (guoji guanxi jiben zhunze he guoji shehui pubian
gongshi) and implies
strongly that all countries that have normalized relations with the PRC have agreed
to it—this is
best understood as propaganda, not empirical fact. Neither Washington, Tokyo, nor
Seoul (or many
other U.S. allies) recognize Beijing’s claim of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan.73
As noted earlier, at least as important as a foreign government’s official position
on the abstract notion
of ‘One China’ are its leaders’ subsequent political decisions about how to
operationalize it through
practical policies toward and extent of engagement with/support of Taiwan. The
empirical record since
the PRC’s establishment in 1949 shows that the combination—often referred to as a
government’s ‘One
China’ policy—not only vary widely among countries (i.e. across cases), but can
also vary over time (i.e.
within cases). Thus, a foreign government’s effective ‘One China’ policy can be—but
is not necessarily—
dynamic, changing in response to the vagaries of PRC policies toward Taiwan or its
leaders’ evolving
assessments of national interests and domestic and international political
vicissitudes.74
Though space constraints prevent a lengthy discussion of the U.S. and Japan cases,
existing
scholarship demonstrates both (1) the distinctions between Beijing’s ‘One China
principle’ and
Washington’s and Tokyo’s official positions regarding Taiwan; and (2) the
remarkable political
flexibility in how those decades-old positions have bounded (or not) subsequent
practical engage
ment with Taiwan.75 Far from disengaging after official diplomatic ties with Taipei
ended in the
1970s, both Tokyo and Washington—the latter most famously and assertively—have
pursued
extensive, if nominally ‘unofficial’, political, economic, and de facto diplomatic
engagement with
Taiwan. Much to Beijing’s chagrin, Washington even has a robust military and arms
sales relationship
with Taiwan. And in recent years, key U.S. treaty allies in Europe and beyond—who
also have official
diplomatic relations with Beijing—are expanding symbolic support for and practical
engagement
with Taipei, all without modifying their official positions on ‘One China’.76
The U.S., Japan, and Others’ Evolving Policies Toward Taiwan
As briefly summarized below, the U.S. and Japanese cases in particular demonstrate
governments’
considerable flexibility and the political conditionality in how they choose to
operationalize the vagueby-design ‘One China’ framework in terms of effective
policy toward Taiwan, even after recognizing
Beijing. These and other cases also reveal the spectrum of possible pathways Seoul
conceivably could
have pursued—or could in the future choose to pursue—given sufficient political
will and judgments
about Korea’s national interest.
72
The differences in nuance between Washington’s “acknowledge”, Seoul’s “respect”,
and Tokyo’s “fully understand and respect”
are subtle and inherently subjective. There is, to the authors’ knowledge, no
public PRC judgment on their respective meanings.
However, what is of greatest relevance here is that all three governments stopped
short of the language Beijing demanded –
“recognize” – while also not openly challenging Beijing’s position.
73
Liff and Lin (n 42). For example PRC assertions, see ‘Waijiaobu Fayanren Geng
Shuang Jiu Youguan Guojia Gaoguan Zhuhe Taiwan
Diqu Xuanjushi Da Jizhe Wen’ (Waijiaobu (PRC), 12 January 2020)
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/dhdw_673027/
t1731294.shtml&gt> accessed 24 October 2021; ‘Zhongfang zenyang kandai Meiguo
duitai zhengce? Wang Yi qiangdiao sandian’
(Huanqiuwang, 7 March 2021) <https://lianghui.huanqiu.com/article/42D2zpy7SfH.&gt>
accessed 24 October 2021.
74
Liff and Lin (n 42). Drun sorts foreign governments’ official positions on “One
China” in normalization communiques with
Beijing into three categories: those which adopt Beijing’s position; those which
make no mention of Taiwan; and those which
acknowledge the PRC position but do not take a clear position on it. Jessica Drun,
‘One China, Multiple Interpretations’
(ccpwatch, 28 December 2017) <https://www.ccpwatch.org/single-post/2017/12/29/one-
china-multiple-interpretations>
accessed 3 August 2021.
75
The U.S. case is most famous, but the same basic logic applies in other important
cases, as well. On the U.S. case, see Romberg
(n 6); Bush (n 6). For a more general and recent overview beyond the U.S. case, see
Liff and Lin (n 42). For the Japanese case, see
Shin Kawashima, et al. (eds.), NitTai Kankeishi: 1945–2020 (Tokyo Daigaku
Shuppansha 2020); Adam P. Liff, ‘Japan, Taiwan, and
the ‘One China’ Framework After 50 Years’ [forthcoming] The China Quarterly.
76
On Europe, see Scott Brown, ‘Fraying at the Edges? An Analysis of the EU’s One
China Policy/Policies’ [forthcoming] The China
Quarterly.
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA
15
The practical flexibility of U.S. ‘One China’ policy became apparent immediately
after the Carter
Administration ‘acknowledged’—but did not recognize—the PRC’s claim to Taiwan in
the 1979 U.S.-PRC
Normalization Communique.77 Congress passed the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA),
which stipulates,
inter alia, that the U.S. will ‘provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;
and[. . .]maintain the
capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of
coercion that would
jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on
Taiwan’.78 Over the fortythree years since, successive U.S. administrations have
cited the TRA and subsequent documents, policy
statements, and legislation as a basis for the U.S’. ‘longstanding commitments’ and
effectively evolving
policy toward Taiwan. Simply put, U.S.-PRC normalization and Washington’s
acknowledgment of
Beijing’s claim did not translate into a U.S. commitment to silence or disinterest
about a peaceful
resolution of the cross-Strait dispute; nor did it lock in a particular level or
type of engagement with
Taipei. Rather, over time successive U.S. administrations—to say nothing of
Congress—have sought
deeper cooperation, including defensive arms sales and higher-level engagements.
U.S. officials also
repeatedly express opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo by either
side and call on
differences to be resolved peacefully and, with Taiwan now a mature democracy, in a
manner accep
table to the people in Taiwan. Furthermore, recent administrations openly criticize
PRC behavior
perceived as destabilizing, and adjust effective policy as circumstances change,
all-the-while stating
that the approach ‘remains consistent with [U.S.] One China policy . . . and our
longstanding commit
ments under . . . the Three Joint Communiques’ with Beijing.79 Yet in the 1979
U.S.-PRC Normalization
Communique Washington, like Seoul 13 years later, also recognized the PRC ‘as the
sole legal govern
ment in China’.
In the 1972 Japan-PRC Normalization Communique, Tokyo noted that it ‘fully
understands and
respects’ Beijing’s ‘stand’ that Taiwan is part of the PRC.80 But Japan’s official
position on the sovereignty
question ever since has been that it has no position.81 Since 1972 it, too, has
repeatedly called for ‘peaceful
resolution of cross-Strait differences’ (heiwateki kaiketsu).82 Especially in
recent years, the ambiguity of
Japan’s stance has facilitated considerable mutually-beneficial cooperation, and
significant flexibility in
the degree of effective engagement vis-à-vis Taiwan. The past decade of deepening,
if nominally
‘unofficial’, Japan-Taiwan relations is a case-in-point.83 The two sides have
signed numerous bilateral
agreements and even launched annual maritime cooperation dialogues involving
representatives from
the two sides’ de facto embassies and government agencies.84 Over the past decade
the Japanese
government has subtly stopped referring to Taiwan as merely an ‘economic region’;
instead, it now
officially identifies Taiwan’s importance to Japan as an ‘extremely crucial partner
and an important friend’
with whom Japan shares ‘fundamental values’—a phrase that had until that point
referred almost
exclusively to Washington and other U.S. democratic allies.85 In 2017, Tokyo even
changed the decadesold name of Japan’s de facto embassy in Taiwan from the
ambiguous ‘Interchange Association’ to the
‘Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association’, which one expert called ‘the most significant
breakthrough’ in
77
See Table 1.
’Taiwan Relations Act’ (American Institute in Taiwan, 1 January 1979)
<https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history
/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/&gt> accessed 24
October 2021.
79
e.g. ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ (The White House, 13 February 2022)
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/
U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf&gt>.
80
’Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu he Ribenguo zhengfu lianhe shengming’ (Waijiaobu
(PRC), 29 September 1972)
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/
yz_676205/1206_676836/1207_676848/t163708.shtml&gt>
accessed 23 October 2021.
81
Yasuhiro Matsuda, ‘Anteika suru ChuTai Kankei shita de tenkai suru NitTai Kankei:
2008-16nen’ in Shin Kawashima, Urara
Shimizu, Yasuhiro Matsuda, and Yongming Yang (eds), NitTai Kankeishi: 1945–2020
(Tokyo Daigaku Shuppansha 2020) 247.
82
Naotaka Fujita, ‘Taiwan mondai no ‘heiwateki kaiketsu’’ Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo, 24
May 2021) <https://www.asahi.com/articles/
DA3S14913969.html&gt> accessed 24 October 2021.
83
Liff (n 75).
84
Urara Shimizu, ‘‘Ushinawareta koki’ to shinka suru tsumiageshiki jitsumu kankei’ in
Shin Kawashima, Urara Shimizu, Yasuhiro
Matsuda, and Yongming Yang (eds), NitTai Kankeishi: 1945–2020 (Tokyo Daigaku
Shuppansha 2020).
85
Liff (n 75).
78
16
C. LEE AND A. P. LIFF
Japan-Taiwan relations since Tokyo recognized Beijing in 1972.86 As with the U.S.,
recent years have also
witnessed unprecedentedly high-level Japanese government representatives visiting
Taipei—albeit
within limits.87
In response to Beijing’s increasingly assertive efforts to isolate Taiwan
internationally, Tokyo and
Washington are also expanding coordination to jointly show support for and expand
practical
cooperation with Taiwan. For example, both governments have repeatedly called for
Taiwan’s
participation in the WHA as an observer and in 2019 Japan formally joined the U.S.-
Taiwan Global
Cooperation and Training Framework.88 Most recently, the uptick in Chinese military
operations near
Taiwan has prompted unprecedentedly mainstream and high-level discussions about
U.S.-Japan
security cooperation to bolster cross-Strait deterrence.89 Several weeks before the
Biden-Moon
meeting, the April 2021 Biden-Suga summit statement also ‘underscore[d] the
importance of
peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait’ and additionally ‘encouraged the
peaceful resolution
of cross-Strait issues’. Significantly, and distinct from the Biden-Moon statement,
it referred to China
by name, including expressing ‘concerns over Chinese activities that are
inconsistent with the
international rules-based order’.90 That June, Japan and Australia adopted
identical language in
their own bilateral 2 + 2 joint statement (notably, the U.S. was not a party).91
The following month,
Japan’s 2021 defense white paper stressed that ‘stability of Taiwan’s situation is
important for both
Japan’s security and the stability of the international community’.92 Again, all
these developments
have occurred despite the fact that neither the U.S’. nor Japan’s vague official
1970s-era positions on
‘One China’ and Taiwan’s status have changed.
Beyond the U.S. and Japan cases, one additionally noteworthy recent development is
that
Australia and key U.S. allies in Europe have also become more forward-leaning with
state
ments of concern and concrete efforts to bolster unofficial ties with Taiwan and
support its
international engagement. Examples abound. The 2021 Japan-EU (May), U.S.-EU (June),
G7
(June), and Australia-France (August) statements all expressed concern about peace
and
stability across the Taiwan Strait. Some governments also explicitly called for
Taiwan’s
involvement in international organizations for which statehood is not a
requirement.93 That
September, a European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee report on EU-Taiwan
relations
called for closer partnership with Taiwan, exploring a bilateral investment treaty,
and renam
ing the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan. By a vote of 580–66, in
October the
full European Parliament called for ‘upgrading’ relations with ‘Taiwan as a key EU
partner and
democratic ally’.94 Lithuania discounted Beijing’s protests when it established a
representative
office (de facto embassy) that includes ‘Taiwan’ (as opposed to ‘Taipei’) in its
official name.
86
’Waijiao zhongda tupo! jiaoliu xiehui gengming ‘Ri Tai jiaoliu xiehui’’ (Ziyou
shibao dianzibao, 28 December 2016) <https://
news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1930324&gt> accessed 8 October 2021;
Madoka Fukuda, ‘Japan-Taiwan
Relations in the Second Term of the Tsai Presidency’ Public Jurist (September 2020)
27 accessed 8 October 2021.
87
Shimizu (n 84) 271–72.
88
’Global Cooperation and Training Framework Programs’ (American Institute in Taiwan,
n.d.) <https://www.ait.org.tw/ourrelationship/global-cooperation-and-training-
framework-programs-gctf/&gt> accessed 11 October 2021.
89
Adam P. Liff, ‘The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Taiwan’ [2022] 17(3) Asia Policy
<https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-u-s-japanalliance-and-taiwan/&gt> accessed 27
July 2022.
90
’U.S.- Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement’ (The White House, 17 April 2021)
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/state
ments-releases/2021/04/16/u-s-japan-joint-leaders-statement-u-s-japan-global-
partnership-for-a-new-era/&gt> accessed
13 May 2021.
91
’Ninth Japan-Auhe White Housestralia 2 + 2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial
Consultations’ (Australian Government
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 9 June 2021)
<https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/mediarelease/ninth-japan-
australia-22-foreign-and-defence-ministerial-consultations&gt> accessed 9 June
2021.
92
Boei Hakusho (Boeisho 2021)
<https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2021/pdf/wp2021_JP_Full.pdf&gt>.
93
Australia and France called for ‘Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international
organizations . . . to strengthen global
cooperation. “Inaugural Australia-France 2 + 2 Ministerial Consultations”’
(Australian Government Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, 30 August 2021)
<https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/
inauguralaustralia-france-22-ministerial-consultations&gt> accessed 31 August 2021.
94
’EU-Taiwan Relations: MEPs Push for Stronger Partnership’ (European Parliament, 21
October 2021) <https://www.europarl.
europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20211014IPR14926/eu-taiwan-relations-meps-push-for-
stronger-partnership&gt> accessed
22 October 2021.
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA
17
Amid an alleged effort by Beijing to frustrate Taiwan’s efforts to purchase COVID-
19 vaccines,
Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland all joined the U.S. and Japan in
sending
massive shipments to Taiwan.95 In early October, a former Australian prime
minister, former
French defense minister, and a group of French senators all met with Taiwan’s
President Tsai
Ing-wen (2016-) in Taipei.96 Many countries have also expressed support for Taiwan
joining
the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
and
attaining observer status at the WHA (Beijing opposes Taiwan’s involvement in
either).97
Yet, as with the U.S. and Japan, none of these moves required the aforementioned
parties
to make any change to their (vague) official positions on ‘One China’.
In sum, even as Beijing’s power, influence, and market grow, unilateral, bilateral
and multilateral
engagement (across various policy domains) with and in support of democratic Taiwan
—though
nominally ‘unofficial’—appears stronger today in Washington, Tokyo, Canberra and
many other
U.S. democratic allies than ever before—despite these countries’ decades-old and
officially unchan
ging official positions on ‘One China’ and Taiwan’s status. A major takeaway from
the aforemen
tioned examination of other cases is clear: the similar ambiguity at the heart of
Seoul’s 1992 official
position on ‘One China’ left significant space for Korea’s political leaders to
more actively engage
Taiwan over the past three decades, independently and/or in concert with the U.S.
and other
democratic allies and partners. In theory at least, it continues to today, if
Korean leaders wished to
do so.

The Biden-Moon Summit: An Inflection Point for Korea-Taiwan Relations?

As noted above, against the backdrop of widespread concerns about cross-Strait
stability and
Beijing’s efforts to militarily intimidate and isolate democratic Taiwan
internationally, 2021 witnessed
an unprecedented cascade of statements of concern about peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait
and varied expressions of support for Taiwan from U.S. allies. As influential
scholar Lai I-chung argued
at the time, the May 2021 Biden-Moon statement was considered particularly
noteworthy—espe
cially since many did not expect Moon to take this step. A progressive ROK
president jointly agreeing
with his U.S. counterpart to ‘emphasize the importance of preserving peace and
stability in the
Taiwan Strait’ seemed to herald a new era. It implied a Korean commitment to
support the U.S.-led
effort to ‘internationalize and multilateralize’ concerns about cross-Strait
stability—especially with
fellow democracies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.98 It also raised intriguing
questions about
prospects for a meaningful shift in Korea’s effective Taiwan policy, even if its
official 1992 position
on ‘One China’ was extremely unlikely to change.
Nevertheless, with both a year of hindsight and viewed across a longer three-decade
time horizon, the
‘unofficial’ Korea-Taiwan relationship appears remarkably static. The Moon
Administration’s engagement
of Taipei after the 2021 Biden-Moon summit remained limited in its ambition and
scope—especially when
measured against the more dynamic U.S. or Japanese responses and forward-leaning
statements and
political discourse in Tokyo and Washington, or even in Brussels, Canberra, and
Vilnius. Though the future
is unknowable, the practical significance of the Biden-Moon summit must be measured
against Korea’s
observable official rhetoric and policies before and since.
In short, though the May 2021 presidential statement was undoubtedly historic and
symbolically
significant, developments since then do not yet indicate a major change in
perspectives or policies in
95
’Taiwan + Indo-Pacific + EU China Policy’ (Merics, 16 September 2021)
<https://merics.org/en/merics-briefs/taiwan-indo-pacific
-eu-china-policy&gt> accessed 8 October 2021.
’French Senators’ Visit to Taiwan, a Challenge to China’ AsiaNews.it (Taipei, 21
September 2021) <http://www.asianews.it/news-en
/French-senators’-visit-to-Taiwan,-a-challenge-to-China-54106.html.AsiaNews.it.&gt>
accessed 28 September 2021.
97
Longhong Shi, Shu Chen, and Chenghao Wang, ‘Guotaiban: fandui Taiwan diqu canyu
renhe you guanfang xingzhi de zimao
anpai’ Xinhuawang (Beijing, 29 September 2021)
<http://www.news.cn/2021-09/29/c_1127916874.htm.&gt> accessed
23 October 2021.
98
Lai (n 2).
96
18
C. LEE AND A. P. LIFF
Seoul. In contrast to the U.S., Japan, Australia, and many other U.S. allies during
that period, in its final year
the Moon administration remained conspicuously taciturn concerning major issues
related to Taiwan’s
international space, such as Taipei’s quest for WHA observer status—even in a
pandemic. Early in 2021,
more than 50 countries, including Japan, Australia, the United States, and the
entire G7, all expressed their
support for Taiwan to participate in the WHA.99 The U.S. Congress even called on
Korea to support Taiwan.
But Seoul declined to make any specific reference to Taiwan and the WHA.100 Even
the Biden-Moon
statement reference to the ‘importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait’
was rather anodyne;
a single-sentence in a statement that did not even mention ‘China’ (or ‘Taiwan’)
explicitly. The Moon
administration later repeated it twice at the ministerial level, but only in the
context of meetings involving
the United States—again suggesting U.S. pressure as the cause.101 Unlike its
Japanese or Australian
counterparts, for example, Moon’s government did not subsequently mention the
Taiwan Strait publicly
in high-level meetings where the U.S. was absent.

Conclusion
Against the backdrop of unprecedentedly widespread global concerns about cross-
Strait frictions,
the U.S.-led effort to internationalize and multilateralize concerns about peace
and stability and
deepen international support for Taiwan, and worsening frictions between the U.S.,
major demo
cratic allies in Asia and Europe, and Beijing, this article analyzed Korea-Taiwan
relations in historical
and comparative perspective. It sought to address important gaps in the existing
literature and
connect the Korea case to wider academic conversations on the ‘One China’ framework
in interna
tional politics. Prompted by the historic May 2021 Biden-Moon statement and the
30th anniversary of
ROK-PRC normalization, its analysis focused on descrying Seoul’s official 1992
position on ‘One
China,’ assessing how ROK leaders have operationalized it in terms of Korea’s
effective policies
toward Taiwan over the three decades since, and explaining why.
In 1992, Korea’s first democratically-elected government was clearly eager to
normalize relations
with Beijing. Nevertheless, it did not give in to pressure to recognize Beijing’s
‘One China principle’ as it
concerns the essential claim that Taiwan is part of the PRC. Coupled with this
study’s historicallygrounded case study and comparative analysis with the similarly
vague U.S. and Japanese official
positions and other countries’ ever-evolving ‘One China’ policies, this reality
demonstrates that Seoul’s
relative reluctance to publicly express support for or significantly expand
practical cooperation with
Taiwan is best understood as due to a succession of ROK leaders’ subjective
political judgments about
what is in Korea’s national interest—not any putative commitment made to Beijing
thirty years ago.
This study’s analysis thus also supports a larger point: that precise diplomatic
phrasing in political
communiques is hardly determinative of foreign policies. Much is left to political
leaders to interpret
and operationalize. Accordingly, it is critically important for scholars to both
carefully analyze the
wording of official statements, but not necessarily to take their significance at
face value. Seoul’s
effective operationalization of Roh’s call for the ‘highest level of unofficial
relations’ with Taiwan over
the past thirty years appears far closer to PRC preferences than Tokyo’s and,
especially, Washington’s
respective approaches. But that trajectory was not locked in by the ROK-PRC
normalization
99
’Japan Supports Taiwan’s Bid to Attend World Health Assembly’ Japan Times (Taipei,
9 May 2019) <https://www.japantimes.co.
jp/news/2019/05/09/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-supports-taiwans-world-health-
assembly-bid/&gt>
accessed
8 October 2021; Nike Ching, ‘G-7 Countries Back Taiwan’s Observer Status in World
Health Assembly’ VOA (5 May 2021)
<https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_g-7-countries-back-taiwans-observer-
status-world-health-assembly/6205478.
html.&gt> accessed 29 September 2021.
100
Jae-cheol Lee, Jeong-hoon Ahn and Eun-joo Lee, ‘U.S. Congress calls on S. Korea to
vote for Taiwan’s WHO observer status’
Maeil Business News Korea (Seoul, 15 May 2020).
101
’53rd Consultative Meeting Joint Communique’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 2
December 2021) <https://www.defense.gov/
News/Releases/Release/Article/2858814/53rd-security-consultative-meeting-joint-
communique/&gt; accessed 3 March 2022;
‘Joint Statement on the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial
Meeting’ (Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA), 15 February 2022) <https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?
seq=320710&page=1&gt> accessed
3 March 2022.
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA
19
communique. Rather, the contemporary distance between these erstwhile ‘blood
allies’ is best
understood as the result of political preferences and vicissitudes.
Indeed, the comparative analysis in the section titled Korea-Taiwan Relations in
Comparative
Perspective demonstrates that, at least in theory, Seoul’s effective policies
toward Taiwan could
have been very different. And they could still evolve in the years ahead—even if
Seoul’s 1992
position on ‘One China’ does not change and the Korea-Taiwan relationship remains
officially
‘unofficial’.
The first three decades of Korea-Taiwan ‘unofficial relations’ and developments
since the BidenMoon summit do not suggest that is likely anytime soon, however. On
this and other matters—e.g.
Beijing’s continued blocking of Taiwan’s participation in the WHA during a global
pandemic—Korea
has stood out primarily for its taciturn, passive stance. Taipei seems to have
noticed. In her
October 2021 National Day Address, just days after an unprecedented 149 Chinese
military aircraft
provocatively entered Taiwan’s air-defense identification zone over a four-day
period, President Tsai
lauded Taiwan’s enhanced cooperation with democracies, mentioning Washington,
Tokyo,
Canberra, Brussels, the G7, NATO, and EU and thanking ‘democratic friends willing
to stand up for
us’. She did not mention Seoul.102
Though over the past few years Korea appears to be something of an outlier among
major
democratic U.S. treaty allies in its reluctance to publicly express support for and
significantly deepen
its ‘unofficial’ relations with democratic Taiwan, or to even have major public
policy debates about
cross-Strait issues, what apparently is today is not necessarily what shall forever
be. Only a few years
ago, few would have anticipated the Biden-Moon statement, the sharp deterioration
of Korean
sentiment vis-à-vis Beijing, cross-Strait peace and stability becoming a front-
burner policy issue in
Japan, the European Parliament referring to Taiwan as a ‘key partner and democratic
ally’ and calling
for ‘upgrad[ing]’ relations, or the broad multilateralization and
internationalization of concerns about
‘peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait’ and/or Taiwan’s international space.
Nevertheless, in the
Korean case, concerns about the DPRK—and Seoul’s apparent judgment that Beijing is
a necessary
partner in addressing the multi-faceted threat posed by Pyongyang that it cannot
afford to antag
onize—appears as a relative constant.
However, the region is fast evolving. So, too, is Korean popular sentiment and the
domestic politics of China policy. Korea’s newly-inaugurated conservative president
(Yoon
Suk Yeol) has emphasized stronger cooperation with the United States and its
democratic
allies—especially Japan and Australia. In the first joint statement between Biden
and Yoon
(May 2022), the two leaders ‘reiterate[d] the importance of preserving peace and
stability in
the Taiwan Strait’, adding that it is ‘an essential element in security and
prosperity in the
Indo-Pacific region’.103 It is too early in Yoon’s term to assess whether his new
administration
will join the U.S., Japan, Australia, and other major democracies in Europe in
becoming more
outspoken and substantively supportive of Taiwan in the face of increased pressure
from
Beijing. Thus, it will be important to soberly observe future statements and
actions as Korea’s
foreign policy under Yoon and future leaders takes form. Developments related to
the DPRK,
and changes in Seoul’s threat perceptions vis-a-vis Pyongyang and/or Beijing could
also alter
Seoul’s calculus. Finally, a major crisis in the Taiwan Strait could refocus
Seoul’s (and the
region’s) attention. One thing is certain on the 30th anniversary of ROK-PRC
normalization:
this is an important space for scholars to watch, and this study’s analysis should
be updated
as new evidence emerges.

102
Ing-wen Tsai, ‘2021 National Day Address’ (TECO Australia, 10 October 2021)
<https://www.roc-taiwan.org/au_en/post/11919.
html&gt> accessed 14 October 2021.
’United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement’ (The White House, 21 May
2022) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-
leaders-joint-statement/&gt>
accessed
24 May 2022.

103
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C. LEE AND A. P. LIFF
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very helpful
comments.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributors
Chaewon Lee is a graduate student in the East Asian Languages and Cultures (EALC)
Department at Indiana University’s
Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies.
Adam P. Liff is associate professor of East Asian international relations at
Indiana University’s Hamilton Lugar School of
Global and International Studies (EALC Department). His research website is
https://adampliff.com/.