1)

Yes. Senator 567 is correct to question the constitutionality of the executive

agreements and demand Senate ratification. Under Article II, Section 2 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, the President can enter into treaties and agreements, but these
require Senate ratification. Article XVIII, Section 25 also mandates that foreign military bases
and troops must be covered by a treaty ratified by the Senate. While the embassy
agreement may fall within executive powers, the military agreement significantly impacts
national sovereignty and requires legislative oversight. The exemption from jurisdiction for
foreign personnel further emphasizes the need for Senate approval. Hence, both
agreements should be submitted to the Senate for ratification, ensuring adherence to
constitutional protocols regarding foreign relations and military presence.

2)

No, the Republic of the Philippines' motion to dismiss should not be granted. State
immunity generally protects the government from being sued without consent, but this
immunity can be waived in cases involving contractual obligations. Citizen Juan's claim
arises from a breach of the donation contract by the Bureau of Plant Industry, which includes
specific obligations. Since this involves contractual terms, it can be argued that the Republic
has implicitly waived its immunity. Therefore, the case should proceed to address the alleged
breach of contract, and the motion to dismiss should be denied.

3)

The Philippine Tobacco Administration (PTA) cannot successfully resist the overtime
pay claim solely based on its assertion of performing governmental functions, as the non-
suability clause does not apply in this case. Article XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution states that "the State may not be sued without its consent." This non-suability
clause protects the government from lawsuits; however, exceptions exist, particularly when
the government operates in a commercial capacity or when specific statutes allow for suits
against government entities. Additionally, the Labor Code entitles employees to overtime
pay, irrespective of whether their employer is a government agency or a private entity. The
PTA, while a government agency, operates in a manner similar to private entities in terms of
labor relations. The employees' claim for overtime pay falls under the Labor Code, which
applies to all employers, including government agencies, unless expressly exempted. The
non-suability clause is typically invoked to shield the government from liability in torts or
contracts, but it does not negate the employees' rights under labor laws to receive due
compensation. The PTA’s argument that it performs governmental functions does not provide
a valid defense against the claim for overtime pay, as it does not exempt the agency from
compliance with labor standards. Therefore, the employees of the PTA are entitled to
recover their overtime pay. The PTA's resistance based on the claim of performing
governmental functions does not exempt it from the obligations set forth in the Labor Code,
and the non-suability clause does not apply to labor disputes of this nature. Therefore, the
claim for overtime pay is valid and should be upheld.

4)
 The exception to the requirement for three readings on separate days, as outlined in
Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution, is the provision for "urgent" bills, specifically in
cases of national emergency or public necessity. For example, during times of crisis—such
as natural disasters or significant security threats—Congress may expedite the passage of
legislation that addresses these urgent matters without adhering to the standard procedural
requirements. This is often done through a motion to suspend the rules, which can allow for
a quicker legislative process. Hence, while the Constitution mandates three readings on
separate days for the passage of bills, exceptions exist for urgent bills, enabling Congress to
act promptly in critical situations. This ensures that legislative processes remain both
effective and responsive to the needs of the nation.

5)

a)

A bill becomes a law without the President's signature if the President does not act
on it within 30 days of receipt or when the Congress overrides the President’s veto. Article
VI, Section 27(1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: “Every bill passed by the
Congress shall be presented to the President. If the President approves the bill, he shall sign
it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it
originated. If he does not act on it within thirty days, it shall become a law as if he had signed
it.” When the President vetoes a bill, he must return it to the Congress, along with his
objections. Congress may then override the veto with a two-thirds vote in both houses,
allowing the bill to become law despite the President's disapproval. For Mr. Kwok, if
Congress passes a bill and the President either signs it or vetoes it (returning it with
objections), the bill will not become law if vetoed unless Congress successfully overrides the
veto. If the President takes no action for 30 days, the bill automatically becomes law without
his signature. A bill can become law without the President's signature if he neither approves
nor vetoes it within 30 days of receipt, and it may also become law if Congress overrides a
veto.

b)

A law takes effect 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation unless otherwise provided. Article II, Section 26 of the
1987 Philippine Constitution states: “The law shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided in the
law.” Application to Present Case: After a bill becomes law (either through the President’s
signature, lapse of time, or Congress overriding a veto), it must be published to take effect.
The 15-day countdown starts from the date of publication. A newly enacted law takes effect
15 days after its publication unless specified otherwise, according to the 1987 Constitution.

6)

a)

Yes, BV may be compelled to appear and testify. Under legislative inquiry powers,
congressional committees have the authority to summon witnesses and require testimony.
The refusal to comply can lead to sanctions under congressional rules and the inherent
contempt power of Congress. BV, as a government official, is expected to cooperate with
legislative inquiries, especially when the inquiry involves potential misconduct involving
public funds. If he continues to refuse, Congress could hold him in contempt, which may
result in fines or imprisonment. BV can be compelled to testify, and sanctions such as
contempt of Congress could be imposed if he refuses to comply.

b)

Executive privilege generally protects presidential communications and sensitive

national security information. However, it does not provide blanket immunity for all
testimonies or information related to public accountability. In this case, since the inquiry
involves alleged irregularities in the disbursement of public funds, the need for transparency
and accountability outweighs the claim of executive privilege. The Secretary should respond
to questions related to the disbursement of public funds unless there are specific confidential
communications directly tied to presidential advice. The DBM Secretary is not fully shielded
by executive privilege, and if he continues to refuse to testify without a valid legal basis, he
could face sanctions such as contempt of Congress.

7)

The President does not have the authority to withhold the release of funds authorized
by a Special Appropriations Act. According to Article VI, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." This means that once Congress has passed a Special
Appropriations Act, the funds are legally appropriated for the specific purpose outlined in the
Act, and it is the responsibility of the Executive to release those funds unless there is a valid
legal reason to withhold them. In this case, the President's concerns about ghost projects
and the necessity of the bridge do not constitute a legal justification for withholding funds
that have already been appropriated by Congress. The executive branch is bound to follow
the law as enacted by the legislature. While the President can recommend the scrapping of
unnecessary projects, any actual action to withhold funds must be grounded in law, not
merely executive discretion. Therefore, the President cannot unilaterally decide to withhold
funds authorized under a Special Appropriations Act. Such actions would undermine the
legislative intent and the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Any decision to
cancel or suspend the project should go through the proper legislative process.

8)

Yes, ASD can re-assume her position as a career Ambassador after her ad interim
appointment was bypassed by the Commission on Appointments. Article IV, Section 2 of the
1987 Philippine Constitution states that "no person shall be appointed to a position in the
Career Service without undergoing the process of selection." Additionally, under the same
article, Section 16, it is provided that the appointments of officials in the Career Service, like
career Ambassadors, do not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
ASD's bypassing by the Commission on Appointments affects her ad interim position as a
cabinet member, not her status as a career Ambassador. The Constitution allows for career
officials to retain their positions regardless of political appointments. Since her career
position as an Ambassador is part of the Career Service, she can resume her duties in that
role without needing to undergo a new appointment process. Therefore, ASD can re-assume
her position as a career Ambassador despite the bypassing of her ad interim appointment,
as her career status is separate from her temporary cabinet role.
 9)

The power of the President to declare a state of rebellion is based on the power of
the President as chief executive and commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to suppress it. It is not necessary for the President to declare a state of rebellion
before calling out the Armed forces of the Philippines to suppress it. The proclamation only
gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines may be called upon to suppress it (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA
656 [2004]). On the other hand, a proclamation of a state of national emergency, the
President is already calling out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to suppress not only
rebellion but also lawless violence (David v. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 162[2006]).

10)

The President's pardoning power have three (3) forms: reprieve, commutation, and
pardon. A reprieve is a temporary delay in executing a sentence, often used in death penalty
cases, allowing time for further review without altering the conviction. Commutation reduces
a criminal sentence to a lesser one while maintaining the underlying conviction; for example,
a life sentence may be changed to a fixed term. Lastly, a pardon, have two kinds: absolute
and conditional. A full pardon absolves the convicted individual of all legal consequences of
the crime, effectively restoring their civil and political rights, including the right to vote and
hold public office. A conditional pardon, on the other hand, is subject to certain requirements
imposed by the President.