8 Post-Rana Plaza responses

Changing role of the

Bangladeshi government
Shahidur Rahman

Introduction
On December 14, 2010, dozens of workers jumped to their deaths and more
than 100 were injured when a fire swept through a Bangladeshi garment
­factory. On another occasion, a nine-storey factory building owned by
­Spectrum garments collapsed on April 11, 2005, resulting in death of 64
employees and injuring 84; hundreds of workers were left jobless as a con-
sequence. These two events are not exceptions: about 686 garment work-
ers died and hundreds injured between 2000 and 2009 (Rahman 2014).
Although these incidents have been widely reported in national and inter-
national press, no major steps have been taken to prevent the recurrence
of such events. The workers of the readymade garment (RMG) industry,
mostly young women who migrated from the rural areas of Bangladesh to
escape abject poverty and social exclusion, remained vulnerable to acci-
dents like these and to uncertainty of their job. The demands of the workers
to protect them from such uncertainties and adversity through reforming
legislation and strengthening capacity building have rarely addressed by the
key stakeholders. No effective action had been taken by the government
until the building collapse of the Rana Plaza on April 24, 2013, where 1,136
workers were killed, and many more suffered grave injuries. The deadliest
tragedy sent shockwaves around the world and pushed the government to
come up with some constructive and effective ways to ensure labor safety at
workplace, beginning a new regime extending from mid-2013 to the present.
Against this backdrop, this chapter responds to two questions: (a) what
kind of changes have been initiated by the government after that disaster?
(b) Has the government taken adequate steps to prevent another industrial
accident? The objective of this study is to critically evaluate the responses
of the government on two areas – labor legislations and capacity building
of the government. The research questions have been examined by assess-
ing the government’s actions on: amendments to the Bangladesh Labor
Act 2006 and capacity building of DIFE (Department of Inspection for
­Factories and Establishment), a key government department responsible for
the safety of factory building. The study argues that the government has
132 Shahidur Rahman
made some important changes immediately after the tragedy by ­introducing
amendments to Bangladesh Labour Law 2006 and by strengthening the
­capacity of institution responsible to inspect factories. In spite of these pos-
itive changes, there has been a continuity of labor-related problems evident
in five institutional features: union’s role, minimum wages, compensation
for accident, participation committee, and DIFE’s inspection process.
Kingdon’s (2003) theory of focusing event and Anner’s (2015) despotic
­market form have shaped the theoretical framework of this chapter. The
first explains why the government has taken the initiative to change its
role towards industrial policy and the latter explains the continuation of
­previous culture. To examine this argument, two methods which have been
used in this study are documentary research and Key Person Interviews. Six
garment owners, one union leader, one NGO staff involved in labor rights,
and two from government labor-related department participated in face–to-
face interview with the author. They were selected considering their history
of working in this industry for a long time and diverse experiences. Inter-
views of around 1.5-hour duration were conducted in Bangla, usually by two
researchers and occasionally by trained research assistants. The interview
schedule contains open-ended questions, which were translated into English
and examined for consistency by at least one other researcher fluent in both
Bangla and English.
This chapter is organised as follows. After introducing the theoretical
framework, the responses of the government to this accident have been dis-
cussed shedding light on two areas: labor law and capacity building. The
succeeding section critically analyses the role of the government, followed
by the concluding remarks.

Theoretical framework
The proposal of insertion of a social clause in trade agreements in the 1990s
and early 2000s has pressurised the exporting countries to comply with the
­minimum international labor standards (Berik 2017). The social clause did not
work out because of the opposition of advocacy of neo-liberal policy, suppli-
ers, most southern trade unions and civil society. Lead buyers have exercised
influence over the suppliers through the requirement that they follow a code of
conduct specifying international labor standards and agree to regular auditing
by the lead firm and/or a third party. Yet evidence suggests that buyers’ code
of conduct produces limited results (Locke 2013; Locke and Romis 2006 Vogel
2008). This can be attributed to several reasons: codes of conduct are designed
to limit legal liability (Rodríguez-Garavito 2005), audits may be conducted
by an agent of the buyer exhibiting an inherent conflict of interest (O’Rourke
1997), and auditors sometimes lack skills required to conduct a thorough audit
(Pruett et al. 2005). The absence of effective compliance at workplaces has con-
tinued because of the limitations of these institutional approaches and in public
policy, workers’ safety has not been considered as a key agenda.
 The changing role of the Bangladeshi government 133
Agenda setting in public policy is concerned with finding the problems
deemed more important to the public, and determining the causes and
­solutions to that problem (Hilgartner & Bosk 1988). The agenda-setting
process is therefore a system of exploring problems and implicitly assign-
ing ­priorities to these problems (Birkland 2013). Two phenomena shape
this process: changes in indicators of underlying problems and focusing
events (Kingdon 2003). Kingdon (2003) portrays focusing event as the emer-
gence of a powerful symbol involving sudden crises and shocks affecting
­policymakers on a personal level that promote policy change. Owing to the
fact that Kingdon’s definition was too broad to be fit in empirical research,
Birkland came up with another approach. Birkland (1997: 22) defines a
­focusing event as one that is

sudden, relatively rare, can be reasonably defined as harmful or r­ evealing

the possibility of potentially greater future harms, inflicts harms or sug-
gests potential harms that are or could be concentrated on a definable
geographical area or community of interest, and that is known to policy
makers and the public virtually simultaneously.

By raising awareness about a specific problem or an issue leading to harm,

a focusing event opens an opportunity for the policymakers to deal with
the problem in an efficient way. However, it is often debatable if a major
event can be deemed a focusing event; while some might attach adequate
importance thereto, others might not. Even if an event gets the attention,
contestation over goals or means may prevent a workable policy option
(Farley et al. 2007). Following a focusing event, political institutions play
a key role in both providing opportunities and creating constraints for
policy change (Hacker 1998). Birkland (2006) argues that an event-driven
policy change may be rare because organisations are oftentimes unwilling
to adapt to changing situations. Furthermore, it is a triage process where
pressing matters compete for elite and public attention (Jones 2001). How-
ever, in most focusing events, there is a pressure from key stakeholders
powerful enough to identify the current condition as policy failure and
demand for policy change where an attentive public exists (Baumgartner
& Bryan 1993; Birkland 2006). It increases attention towards a public issue
or problem leading to harm, referred by Slovic as “dread risk.” Key poli-
cymakers play a role as proactive problem-solvers by focusing on changes
in national policy. In particular, Birkland argues that focusing events have
profound influence on legislative change as they, coupled with actions
taken by the government, influence the salience of a focusing event for
firms (Schuessler et al. 2018). Firms in a country with weak norms around
CSR face strong pressure from the national-level government policies
(Fransen & Burgoon 2012).
However, the changes brought by the focusing event would face chal-
lenges and some degree of non-standard labor relation would continue.
134 Shahidur Rahman
The reason of such continuation would be explained by using Anner’s
thoughts on despotic market labor control. Anner (2015) mainly offers
three models of labor control comprising the state, market, and employer
as separate regimes. The author argues that in the case of state labor con-
trol such as in China, labor is controlled by an arrangement of legal and
extralegal ­mechanisms while employer labor-control regimes use highly
oppressive employer actions against workers as can be seen in Colombia.
In market ­labor control regimes, “unfavourable labour market conditions
discipline labour; strong worker-organising is curtailed because workers
are afraid that active participation in a union may result in job loss and
prolonged unemployment or underemployment” (Anner 2015). Low-income
­countries with very weak labor rights exemplify despotic versions of market
labor-control regimes. In such a case, the intensity of labor control depends
on the flexibility of labor market. Since there are very limited alternative job
opportunities available, workers embrace the unsafe working conditions,
faced with poverty and finding underemployment a nonviable option. The
employer takes advantage of the situation. However, these three models are
not mutually exclusive, and countries do typically exhibit a combination of
various types of labor control.

Government responses post-Rana Plaza

Ineffectiveness on the government’s part can be traced to the presence of
very outdated and convoluted legislations concerning labor standards.
­Before the major revamp on the labor laws during 2006, there were as many
as 50 separate, and often inconsistent, legislations passed in various times
(BEF 2009). From these 50 different legislations, 15 were passed during the
colonial rule, 23 during the Pakistan period, and only 12 after the inde-
pendence of Bangladesh. A large majority of the laws were in fact framed
in the British context during the colonial era, and thus were unable to meet
with the demands of a new country struck with very different challenges.
To ensure a solid framework for labor laws by making revisions to prior
laws and consolidating them into a single comprehensive code, a 38-­member
National Law Commission was set up in 1992. The commission was led by
a former judge of Supreme Court of Bangladesh, its members, and eight
labour leaders representing various unions and organisations (BEF 2009).
Laws of neighbouring countries were considered as a framework during
this process and opinions of stakeholders as well as public were also in-
cluded into this new legislative process. In 1994, the Commission submitted
to the government as a unified and comprehensive labor code by repealing
and consolidating 25 existing legislations. Four years later, the Tripartite
Labour Law Reform Committee (LLRC) was formed and comprised rep-
resentatives from the government, workers as well as employers. This com-
mittee reviewed the draft labour code and recommended changes wherever
necessary. In 2006, the Labour Act was finally passed by the parliament in
 The changing role of the Bangladeshi government 135
effect from October 11, 2006. While the Labour Act 2006 was an ambitious
project, the Rana Plaza tragedy proves the ineffectiveness of the act.

Reforming labor laws

After the building collapse at Rana Plaza, the Bangladesh Labour Act
2006 was amended on July 15, 2013, focusing on the obligations of rights
to freedom of association and most importantly occupational health and
safety. Hence, training and provisions of safety equipment, mandatory fire
drills, reports of accidents to authority, finance to treat sick employees,
compensation for worker death, labor inspection programmes, etc., were
stressed in the amendments. Further, labor inspectorates were developed
with ­several organisations in order to boost working conditions and worker
safety. ­Realising the obligation and potentials, the Government of Bangla-
desh developed the National Occupational Safety and Health Policy 2013.
While minor amendments were made after the Labour Act 2006, interna-
tional scrutiny as well as suspension of trade privileges by the USA was a
catalyst in the Bangladesh government’s officially adopting 87 amendments
to the original Labour Act of 2006 after Rana Plaza disaster. These changes
are significant because they have a better insight on what workplace safety
measures are necessary and on the desired measures to eradicate the issues.
The most significant ones raised were concerned with the need of amend-
ments directly related to workplace safety, trade unions, and collective
bargaining.
The amended Act calls for better regulation of stairs and gangways, which
are to be monitored under CCTV and to be open during business hours. A
clause has also been added to Section 78 of the original Act, which requires
employers to provide personal safety equipment and offer trainings for the
use of such equipment. In factories with 50 or more employees, fire drills
are mandatory every six months, as opposed to as it had been once a year.
Section 80 urges factory inspectors to report serious accidents to authori-
ties such as the government, police stations, fire service, etc. (Rubya 2015).
Section 89 includes a new mandate for the establishment of health centres
for factories with 5,000 or more employees (ILO 2013), and if an employee
develops occupational sickness, employers must finance employee’s treat-
ment until he or she has fully recovered if said employee had worked for two
years. Prior to this, compensation for work-related deaths was given after
three years of service. Additionally, the maximum amount of compensation
awarded in the case of workplace deaths to the dependants of the deceased
would be 100,000 taka which must be deposited in the labor court by the em-
ployer. If a worker suffers permanent disablement because of a w ­ orkplace
injury, the compensation would be 125,000 taka. This would be assessed for
the period of their disablement for one year or less (BLAST 2014).
The new amendments have also addressed collective bargaining by
­allowing for workers to call on external experts to advise them on collective
136 Shahidur Rahman
bargaining. In the public industrial sector, workers will be allowed to elect
10% of their enterprise officers from outside the workplace. This however
does not apply to the private sector (ILO 2013). The right to strike has also
been revised by the Bangladeshi government, now requiring two-thirds vote
by a union’s leadership, previously requiring three-fourths (Rubya 2015).
As for the trade union, notable changes made to union formation include
eliminating the condition that required the Director of Labour to submit
the names of union officers to employers. The workers no longer need ap-
proval from factory owners in order to create unions. Furthermore, under
the amended laws, five unions could be formed within the same factory,
an increase from the previous stipulation of two. Workers are also able to
appoint external experts to assist in their collective bargaining. Section 205
of the BLA 2006 requires employers hiring more than 50 workers in any
establishments to set up a “participation committee.”
Because of the new amendments, there has been a sharp rise in trade un-
ions after the Rana Plaza collapse due to international pressures. According
to the Labour Ministry, a total of 326 trade unions have been registered
with the Directorate of Labour since 2013, putting the total number of trade
unions at 464. In comparison, there were 138 trade unions in 2012, and the
number rose sharply with registrations every year, with 185 trade unions
forming in 2014 alone. Syeda Sultan Uddin Ahmed from Bangladesh Insti-
tute of Labour Studies noted that the number of trade unions “increased
due to international pressure including human rights organisations, global
trade unions, consumer groups as well as retailers” (ILO 2015).

Capacity building
The activities of factory building safety and fire prevention largely took place
within the context of the National Tripartite Plan of Action (NTPA) on Fire
Safety for the RMG sector in Bangladesh. This was in fact developed in the
aftermath of the devastating fire at Tazreen Fashions by the Government of
Bangladesh in collaboration with ILO. The plan was devised with a view to
taking comprehensive actions to prevent further loss of life from fire-related
accidents. It identifies activities on three levels: legislation and policy, ad-
ministrative, and practical activities. Formally adopted on March 24, 2013,
the Rana Plaza collapse led to an urgent need to reassess the Plan of Action
so that it also addressed structural issues. This revised document, now enti-
tled the NTPA on Fire Safety and Structural Integrity for the RMG sector
in Bangladesh, was subsequently adopted on July 25, 2013. As per NTPA,
the DIFE is inspecting factories not covered by Accord and Alliance which
is known as National Initiative (NI). The NI, with the programme support
of the ILO and Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology
(BUET), has set a target to inspect 1,827 factories and until August 24, 2017
completed assessment of 1,549 factories. A Remediation Coordination Cell
(RCC) has been formed to manage the remediation work of the factories
 The changing role of the Bangladeshi government 137
inspected by the NI. The RCC is supported by ILO with funding from three
countries, namely Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. This
unit is staffed by seconded members of regulatory bodies including the
Department of Inspections for Factories and Establishments, Fire Service
and Civil Defence, RAJUK (Rajdhani Unnayan Kartipakkha, government
department of capital city development), Chief Electrical Inspector, Public
Works Department, and Chittagong Development Authority. The chang-
ing structure of DIFE is appreciated by respondents as one entrepreneur
mentioned in fieldwork saying: “The DIFE is becoming a stronger authority
than before. I think DIFE can play a vital role to inspect factories since they
have already recruited graduated engineers.”
The collapse of Rana Plaza also brought about the weak capacity of the
authorities involved in factories to ensure safety and acceptable working
conditions. The government did not have the capacity to deal with factory
building safety and occupational and health safety of the workers. It was in
this context that the labor inspectorate needed a complete overhaul to be
effective. The Government of Bangladesh has made several major commit-
ments to revamp DIFE. The number of inspector has been increased from
183 pre-Rana Plaza to 575 post-Rana Plaza, and the budget was increased
from US$0.97 million before 2013 to US$4.1 million in 2015–2016 (Shipar
2017). Different national and international organisations along with the de-
velopment partners have extended their support to build up the capacity of
the government. As part of its activities, the ILO is conducting a series of
training courses for newly recruited labor inspectors on the national labor
law, fire and building safety, and inspection techniques. A labor inspection
programme was initiated on August 16, 2015 to enrich the skills of inspec-
tors needed to boost working conditions and worker safety. The course was
developed by DIFE and BIAM (Bangladesh Institute of Administration
and Development), with the support of ILO. The programme seeks to instil
labor policies, programmes, OSH (Occupational Safety and Health), and
Bangladesh labor laws in its participants. Meanwhile, for the reform pro-
cess, the Ministry of Labour, Government of Bangladesh and ILO are col-
laborating for wider implications of the inspectorate. The road map includes
effective information management systems, basic equipment, and transport
for inspectors, accountability units as well as a public database for inspec-
tion to promote transparency. Previously there was no comprehensive and
uniform inspection checklist in use. After the Rana Plaza collapse in 2013,
a new checklist was developed by the DIFE with the support of ILO’s RMG
programme funded by Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
(ILO 2017). The US Department of Labor funded a project on “Promoting
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work” for capacity building of trade
union representatives and employers’ organisations and promoting effective
labor-management relations (Shipar 2017) (Figure 8.1).
In this chapter, from a theoretical context, the above-mentioned initia-
tives installed in after the Rana Plaza can be seen as the positive impact of
138 Shahidur Rahman

Major Programme
Achievements

Building a Culture of
Strengthening the Labor Enhancing Building and
Occupational Safety and
Inspection System: Fire Safety
Health (OSH)

•Improved legislative and policy •A more efficient, accountable and •Harmonisation of inspection and
environment. And OSH units gender sensitive labor reporting standards.
formed. inspectorate.
•1,549 factories inspected for
•OSH information kits for 4,000 •Labor inspection strategy. structural, fire and electrical safety.
RMG factories.
•Inspection checklist. •Enhanced collaboration between
•210 Safety Committees. regulators.
•Inspection standard operating
•811,100 workers (55% women) procedures. •Launch of Remediation
trained on essential OSH. Coordination Cell.
•Labor inspection management
•2,700 trade union members app. •Strengthened regulatory capacity
trained. to follow up safety inspections.
•239 trained inspectors (53
women).

Figure 8.1 Government programs since Rana Plaza disaster.

Source: BGMEA, 2017.

a “focusing event” to explain the shifting role of the government to ensure

compliance with labor standards. Given its scale, the Rana Plaza provided
unforeseen leverage for workers and their allies to ensure building safety
in garment supply chains (Berliner et al. 2015). Three mutually reinforcing
preconditions of a focusing event are acknowledgement of a problem that
needs resolution, offering a policy as a solution to the problem, and political
pressure compelling policymakers to act (Kingdon 2003). In the Rana Plaza
case, the government acknowledged lack of factory building safety in Bang-
ladesh, which led them to reform the existing legislations and other policies
to ensure workers safety. Most importantly, there was a political pressure
from the global unions, NGOs, consumers, buyers, and other national and
international organisations. The USA withdrew GSP facility and it created a
panic amongst the Government of Bangladesh and the garment owners. The
government did not have any choice but to accept the decision of the transna-
tional partners to install a mechanism to inspect the factories in a transpar-
ent way. As a focusing event, the Rana Plaza tragedy was considered as dread
risk that has placed immense pressure on regulators to fix the problems in-
volved in the event. Government institutions came forward with intervention
plans to change policies from constitutional to regulatory in legislature.

Critical evaluation
The Rana Plaza tragedy has placed the government to a position of ­obligation,
at least vocally or upfront, to raise their concern for labor standards. Since
 The changing role of the Bangladeshi government 139
then, workers’ safety has gained more importance; although in reality, some
aspects remain unchanged. It is argued in the introduction section of this
chapter that there has been a continuity of labor-related problems and it is
examined in this section by presenting a critical evaluation of union’s posi-
tion after the Rana Plaza, minimum wages, amendment on compensation
for accident, participation committee, and DIFE’s inspection process.
There was pressure from various organisations on an international level
as well to address on the establishment of trade unions, and as a result, there
are a lot of trade unions in place. However, it is still questionable as to how
much these unions can work for the workers’ rights and related matters.
Despite an initial rise in the number of registered unions, union density con-
tinued at around 3% and remained divided along political lines (Moazzem
2017; Zajak 2017) and collective bargaining was rare (The Financial Ex-
press 2017). For instance, as per the amendment proposed in 2013, union
leaders will only be allowed to select their leaders from their own estab-
lishments. This enables employers to fire union leaders under the pretence
of work-related issues, and not related to the union. According to Human
Rights Watch, this is a common issue globally, but has been common prac-
tice in Bangladesh (Human Rights Watch 2013). Furthermore, there are a
number of organisations playing a double role of garment workers’ organ-
isations and non-registered trade unions because the amendments do not
make union registrations easier. The government offices still have power
over registration and continue to accept or reject these applications at their
will (Human Rights Watch 2016). According to a labor activist,

If you do a research on those who have formed trade unions so far,

you’ll see that most of them are those with maintain a good link with
either owner groups or political affiliations with the ruling party. The
real proponents of labour rights have faced unnecessary bureaucratic
problems from the Director of Labour to register union.

However, while the numbers are significant, the disparity between the
­ umber of factories and the total number of unions is still to be noted. While
n
there are 464 and increasing trade unions, there are more than 3,500–4,000
factories in Bangladesh, exhibiting stark lack of representation. At the same
time, unions are still seen in a negative light from the owners, who view them
as disruptive forces in the industry. The President of Bangladesh Garment
Workers’ Employee League mentions how unions cannot be made effective
due to workers’ leaders being harassed for being involved in a union, which
makes fewer unions effective in factories. On a similar vein, Babul Akhter,
president of Bangladesh Garment and Industrial Workers Federation, said
that “in a true sense, there are only 33 readymade garments factories in which
unions can meet their demands through collective bargaining” (ILO 2015).
The new law has kept the previous provision of 30% membership in a com-
pany for forming trade unions, which negates the idea of free trade unionism
140 Shahidur Rahman
(The Daily Star 2016). Labor leaders urged the Bangladeshi ­legislators to
accept a 10% threshold for union formation and from one factory instead
of entire company (Rubya 2015). After the pressure of the ILO, EU and US,
the government has recently approved a draft of Bangladesh Labor (Amend-
ment) Act, 2018 and under the proposed law workers’ participation required
to form trade unions at factories will be reduced to 20% from the existing 30%
(The Daily Star 2018a). The right to strike is still a cumbersome process be-
cause it requires two-thirds of union’s members to vote for the strike (Human
Rights Watch 2013). Again, the government has the right to end a strike if it
causes adverse effects to the community and is detrimental to the national in-
terest. Such provision encourages the garment owners to showcase how l­abor
protest can disrupt the economic growth from the main ­export-earning in-
dustry of the country and take advantage of this situation. In addition, an-
other weakness of the Labour Act amendment (2013) is the failure to modify
the penalties of factory owners and other individuals associated with acci-
dents and disasters. The failure to notify authorities of accidents is a fine
of only 1,000 taka, while the loss of life or failure to report it is an imprison
up to six months or a fine of up to 3,000 taka (Labour Act 2006) which is
seen as grossly inadequate given the serious nature of the crimes. Less effort
has been channelled to produce an effective compensation. Because of the
­pressure from labors all around the world and international consumers, buy-
ers have sometimes come forward with financial assistance to workers who
suffer any accidents in order to protect their image. Lack of support from
legislation on compensation is shared by a union leader (Table 8.1):

The only thing that would have been helpful after Rana plaza is to fix
a compensation, around 10–15 lakh with the advice of economists and
others. This was presented in high court but nothing changed. Compen-
sation remained 1,00,000–1,25,000 Taka.

At the same time, the Building Construction Act, which prevents the
­construction of hazardous structures, penalises anyone who does so. While

Table 8.1 C
 hanges of workers’ wages

Grade 2006 2010 Increase 2013 Increase 2018 Increase

(taka) (taka) over 2006 (taka) over 2010 (taka) over 2013
(%) (%) (%)

Grade 1 5,140 9,300 80.93 13,000 39.87 18,257 40.44

Grade 2 3,840 7,200 87.50 10,900 51.38 15,416 41.43
Grade 3 2,449 4,120 68.23 6,805 65.16 9,875 44.67
Grade 4 2,250 3,763 67.24 6,420 70.60 9,347 45.59
Grade 5 2,046 3,455 68.87 6,042 74.87 8,875 46.89
Grade 6 1,851 3,210 73.42 5,678 76.88 8,420 48.29
Grade 7 1,662 3,000 80.45 5,300 76.66 8,000 50.49

Source: Fair Wear Foundation (2015), The Daily Star (2019).

 The changing role of the Bangladeshi government 141
this also applies to the garments industry, there are no direct labor laws
within the Act or its amendments, which discuss alternative grounds for
punishment (Rubya 2015). Frustration appears from labor leader saying

Nothing changed in the amendment about the labour law. There are
many cases against the Rana Plaza owners - accident case, murder case,
building law case. Some owners got bail. But even in four years, Sohel
Rana didn’t get a sentence. This gives a message to others that nothing
will happen to them as well.

In order to fix minimum wages, the Minimum Wages Board was formed in
Bangladesh under the Minimum Wages Ordinance in 1961. The responsibil-
ity of the Board is to set minimum wages for different sectors. The minimum
wage was fixed at Tk 3,000 in 2010, Tk 1,662.50 in 2006, Tk 940 in 1994, and
Tk 627 in 1985 (The Daily Star 2018b).
It means that the minimum wage increased by Tk. 2,373 from 1985 to
2010 in 25 years.. Although the minimum wage has increased, in dollar
terms, from USD$13 to USD$43 per month, thousands of workers took to
the streets on July 2010 burning cars and blocking traffic to protest against
this decision on wage hike which fell far short of their demands. Follow-
ing the Rana Plaza incident, the minimum wage once again increased to
Tk.5300, amounting to a 76.66% increase of that of 2010. The workers were
still unhappy as they found it very difficult to make ends meet with this
salary. According to Living Wage Benchmark Report (2015), the estimated
living wage ranges from 13,630 taka (Dhaka satellite town) to 16,460 taka
(Dhaka city). It shows a 9,000-taka gap between minimum wage and living
wage, and because of such disparity, labor movement erupted in 2016 in
Ashulia. However, the way the government handled this labor unrest exem-
plified the problem of execution of legislation and the continuity of unjus-
tified labor control. In 2016, labor unrest erupted with demands for wage
increases leading to the dismissal of 1,600 garment workers and arrests of
34 trade unionists (Anner 2018). The movement primarily started in a fac-
tory when land owners had increased the house/room rents of the workers.
Other problems included no increase of basic facility and laying off workers
in a particular factory. It pushed them to raise their voices to revise the
minimum wage. As per the labor law, the government is supposed to ensure
a wage rate analysis and check the status of the market to revise the wage
structure every five years but it could be done earlier in case of special cases
such as done in 2010 and later in 2013. In response to continuous labor un-
rest, the government finally declared a new pay structure in 2018 and the
minimum wage is set at Tk. 8,000 (The Daily Star 2018b). Although the
minimum wage has been increased by 51% from the previous wage declared
in 2013, it has been criticized by global unions and activists. Clean Clothes
Campaign (2018) argued: “The announced minimum wage of 8,000 taka is
problematic in a number of ways. Not only is the total amount far below
142 Shahidur Rahman
any credible living wage estimate, it is hardly even an increase (from the
current minimum wage of 5,300 taka) given inflation in the country over
the past five years, and given the increases that should have already been
implemented based on legal requirements”.
The Bangladesh Labour Act (2006) has also favoured the garment
­entrepreneurs by opening up a space to opt for Participatory Committee
(PC) consisting of elected workers. Legally, it may be possible for a PC and
trade union to work simultaneously; however, in reality they are not seen as
operating together. In most cases, the factories have a PC in place, as PC
members act as insiders for the owner party, making it easier for the factory
owners to operate under this system. Generally, a PC is to be formed only
when a trade union is not possible for particular issues. The transparency
of the election process of the PC is also highly questionable. According to
a labor activist (2018): “Though established in the labour law as an alterna-
tive, it is most definitely not as effective as a trade union and it really allows
owners to use this as loophole to get away without a trade union.” Again, a
positive approach of the Labour Act (2006) and consequent amendments is
the inclusion of safety committee in each factory. However, questions could
be raised about the effectiveness of this committee since workers would be
undermined by the management. Some safety measures such as fire exits are
still vague, and not much has been added in terms of detail of the standard
of fire doors. The Labour Act of 2006 mentioned worker PCs in factories
employing more than 50 workers. This workers’ platform has been strength-
ened after Rana Plaza by a 2013 amendment required worker representatives
in PCs to be elected by secret ballot (Manzur et al. 2017). The survey con-
ducted by the researcher of this paper finds that 78% of senior management
reported the presence of a PC in their factory and 70% of these PCs included
elected workers’ representatives. Obviously this initiative has ­engaged work-
ers of each factory to discuss their issues directly with the management with-
out any interference from the outsiders. However, the presence of PC has
challenged trade unions since very few factories have unions. However, all
garment owners who participated in interview with the author claimed to be
“very satisfied” with the management-PC relationship. To the management,
it seems the overwhelming presence of PC in factory has overshadowed the
justification of having a union at workplace. The common issue raised by
PC in their factories was non-economical such as annual leave; economic
concern such as living wage was not a common agenda in the committee.
It appears that unions are more effective than non-union representation in
dealing with economic issues such as wages and lay-offs since they are not
controlled by management (Kaufman & Kleiner 1993).
Following the Rana Plaza incident in 2013, the EU took action through
a “sustainability compact” jointly with Bangladesh, the ILO, and the USA.
The compact aimed at improving labor, health, and safety conditions for
workers, as well as responsible behaviour by businesses within the industry.
The EU expects the Government of Bangladesh to comply with 17 points.
 The changing role of the Bangladeshi government 143
The compact came right after the USA announced it would be removing
its trade preferences from Bangladesh, and it was since feared that the EU
would soon follow suit. As a large portion of EU’s garment imports comes
from Bangladesh, there has been a degree in leniency in policies related to
trade. Not only did the GSP privileges remain intact, but in a meeting on 20
October, 2014 in Brussels, representatives from the EU also indicated that
the EU will continue to provide GSP facilities for Bangladesh even after it
progresses to a middle-income country (Bdnews24 2014). Like sustainabil-
ity compact, the US Trade Representative (USTR), responsible for recom-
mending and developing the US trade policies, also came with another set
of labor right issues (USTR 2016). Although significant progress has been
made by the government, the EU and the USTR believe that more efforts
need to be invested in the following issues: (a) regulations implementing the
amendments of Bangladesh Labour Act, (b) government delays in complet-
ing inspections and hiring additional inspectors, (c) slow response to unfair
labor practices, and (d) labor reforms for EPZ (The Daily Star 2017).
In context of inspection and remediation, factory remediation under
the Accord and the Alliance made significant progress compared with
NI. The garment owners who took part in interviews with the author be-
lieve that the remediation progress of the factories under NI was highly
­disappointing. Upon completion of the inspections, remediation works are
underway in the factories, and 77% of the findings in Accord factories, 79%
of the findings in Alliance-affiliated factories, and 20% NI have already
been fixed (BGMEA 2017). The DIFE could also be criticised for not hav-
ing a sufficient number of qualified engineers to inspect the factories. For
instance, one of the respondents said: “I don’t have any space to challenge
what the NI is doing. The inspectors lack technical coordination and lack of
­expertise in dealing with building safety.” The DIFE appoints a third-party
engineering firm to inspect the factory and to suggest how to fix the struc-
tural, fire, and electrical problems. However, there has been no follow-up
information about remediation work after the inspection. On the contrary,
the inspection teams of the Accord and Alliance have been visiting the fac-
tories, thoroughly examining the fire, electrical, and structural condition
of the building, providing corrective action plans to the management with
time frame and also maintaining follow-up of the process. Such a rigorous
action plan is missing in the NI. Again, the Bangladeshi suppliers within
NI are not under any pressure from the buyers since DIFE is working with
the leading buyer countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the UK,
not with the specific buyers, unlike the other two transnational institutions.
The absence of a compelling pressure from buyers has created an opportu-
nity for the factories to ignore the remediation. Furthermore, whereas the
Accord and the Alliance have sent their own engineers to do the inspection,
the NI has appointed external organisations to do the inspection and DIFE
staffs supervise the works of those organisations. According to a senior
staff of DIFE,
144 Shahidur Rahman
there was no inspector from National Initiative who went to inspect…
What we have done is that we have appointed 26 structural firms to do
inspections. We haven’t appointed people like Accord has. So I will not
be able to do inspection on par with Accord.

A better understanding of process could be achieved if the DIFE would

send their own inspections who have the credible qualification to do the job.
From the theoretical point of view, Anner’s (2015) despotic version of
market labor-control regime explains the continuity of some labor-­related
problems discussed above. Outside of the garment sector, it is very diffi-
cult to secure employment as the job market for women is very limited in
­Bangladesh and as a result they adjust with the wages that is below the living
wage. The only “solution” is for these employees to continue with their jobs
accepting the existing labor act and sharing their problems with PC whose
role is questionable for management control. Garment workers are vulner-
able because of the ineffective role of union. Although the number of union
has increased significantly the culture of intimidation of union member has
continued. An immense change has been produced by the EU’s “Sustain-
ability Compact,” yet labor unrest has not been handled in efficient way.
The issue of compensation for workers affected by industrial accident is not
compatible with the current global standard. Workers’ vulnerability is not
only limited to working conditions; they are concerned of factory building
safety since the inspection process governed by the DIFE is not promising.

Conclusion
This chapter draws attention to the role of the government after the building
collapse of Rana Plaza. The study finds that the government has played a
comparatively proactive role to ensure safety of workers compared to its pre-
vious efforts. The changes have brought 87 amendments to the Labour Act
2006, which have addressed the weaknesses of labor law and tried to mini-
mise the gap between policy and practice. The changes include the presence
of a significant number of trade unions, formation of participation and safety
committee at workplaces, use of safety equipment, access to external resource
to advise on collective bargaining, and so on. A noticeable change is also ev-
ident in capacity building by reviving the government administration and
monitoring system to prevent another Rana Plaza. The number of inspectors
has been increased; the structural, fire, and electrical conditions of the facto-
ries are being checked; an RCC has been formed; and a number of training
have been offered to different stakeholders on different areas in collaboration
with the ILO and other partners. While important progress has been made
within the last five years, this chapter also finds some labor issues continue
to be ignored. Although there are more trade unions than there were before
2013, questions could still be raised about their effectiveness which is evident
in the way the government handled labor unrest in Ashulia in 2016. There is
no way to deny that participation and safety ­committee are far from evading
 The changing role of the Bangladeshi government 145
the control of the owners. Workers are still not satisfied with the amount of
compensation and legal punishment set for the management in the case of
violation of labor law.
However, what is positive is that until the Rana Plaza tragedy, social compli-
ance was the main concern for stakeholders. The structural, fire, and electri-
cal safety of the factory building did not garner much attention. The majority
of the factory owners were not concerned about the building safety mecha-
nisms at all. Now, social and physical compliance are the key indicators of
sustainability in the global apparel industry, at least for doing business with
lead buyers. The government has acknowledged the problem and has been
working together with other stakeholders, although it is hard to say whether
a culture of safety has been installed into the entire industry regardless of
the size of factories. There is however a possibility that the distance between
workers and owners will reduce and social dialogue will function as an initial
step towards finding a common ground on different issues. The momentum
that started five years ago should continue and the government needs to play
an exemplary role by addressing the drawbacks of the entire process in a sys-
tematic way, and utilise the resources available from different stakeholders
to prevent another incident similar to the one at Rana Plaza. There is no
way to deny that the capacity of the government needs to be strengthened so
that dependence on transnational or private governance approach would be
reduced and a self-reliant independent body would lead effectively. To make
it happen, the cooperation of and collaboration with different stakeholders is
essential which has already initiated and should be continued.

Acknowledgement
I would like to thank the Volkswagen Foundation in cooperation with the
Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and the Wellcome Trust for funding the project
on which this chapter is based.

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