79. Guerrero v. Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte, et al.

G.R. No. 109068 | January 10, 1994 | Justice Bellosillo, J.

Facts

1. Gaudencio Guerrero filed an accion publiciana (recovery of possession) against

Pedro G. Hernando in the RTC of Ilocos Norte.
2. During the pre-trial conference, Judge Luis Bello noted that Guerrero and
Hernando were brothers-in-law (their wives were half-sisters) and ordered Guerrero
to amend his complaint to allege that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been
made, as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code.
3. Guerrero argued that brothers-in-law are not considered “members of the same
family” under Art. 151, and therefore no compromise was necessary.
4. Judge Bello dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction due to Guerrero’s failure to
amend the complaint. Guerrero appealed.

Issues

1. Whether brothers-in-law are considered “members of the same family”

under Art. 151 of the Family Code, requiring earnest efforts toward a
compromise before filing a suit.
2. Whether the absence of an allegation of earnest efforts to compromise is a
jurisdictional defect warranting dismissal.

Ruling

1. Brothers-in-law are not considered “members of the same family” under

Art. 151 of the Family Code.
• The Court held that Art. 150 and 151 of the Family Code define “members of the
same family” as including spouses, parents, children, and collateral relatives within
the fourth degree of consanguinity.
• Relying on Gayon v. Gayon, the Court reiterated that brothers-in-law and sisters-
in-law are not included in the definition.
• Therefore, Guerrero was not required to exert earnest efforts toward a
compromise.
2. The absence of an allegation regarding compromise is not a jurisdictional
defect in this case.
 • The Court clarified that Art. 151 applies only to suits between members of the
same family.
• Since Guerrero and Hernando were not members of the same family under the
law, there was no requirement to amend the complaint.

Disposition

The petition was granted, and the orders dismissing the case were set aside. The RTC
was directed to continue the proceedings without requiring amendment.

80. ALBINO JOSEF VS OTELIO SANTOS, G.R. 165060

Facts:

Albino Josef, the petitioner, was the defendant in a case for collection of a sum of
money filed by Otelio Santos, the respondent, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Marikina City, Branch 272. The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of Santos, ordering
Josef to pay the amount of ₱404,836.50 with 12% interest per annum. This decision
became final and executory.

Upon Santos’ motion, the RTC issued a writ of execution to satisfy the judgment. The
sheriff levied certain personal properties and a piece of real property covered by TCT
No. N-105280, which Josef claimed to be his family home. Josef opposed the
execution, asserting that:
1. The real property was exempt as it constituted a family home under the Family
Code.
2. The personal properties belonged to his children and were also exempt from
execution.

Despite Josef’s opposition, the RTC granted the writ of execution. The levied properties
were auctioned, and Santos emerged as the winning bidder. Josef filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed the petition for failure to file
a prior motion for reconsideration and for procedural deficiencies. His motion for
reconsideration was also denied, prompting this petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Substantive Issue:
Whether the levy and sale of the real property (alleged family home) and personal
belongings of Josef’s children were valid and legal under the circumstances.
 2. Procedural Issue:
Whether the dismissal of Josef’s petition by the Court of Appeals based on procedural
grounds (failure to file a motion for reconsideration) was justified

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Albino Josef. It declared the RTC’s order
granting the writ of execution and all subsequent proceedings void.

1. Levy and Sale of Family Home:

The Court reiterated that the family home is exempt from execution except in cases
specified under Article 155 of the Family Code, which include obligations incurred
before the family home was constituted or for debts secured by mortgages on the family
home. Since the trial court failed to determine if the property qualified as a family home,
the writ of execution was issued in error.

The Court outlined the trial court’s duty to:

• Determine whether the obligation falls under any exceptions under Article 155.
• Establish if the real property constituted a family home through an inquiry into the
petitioner’s actual residence and supporting evidence.

The Court emphasized that procedural safeguards must be observed to protect the
sanctity of the family home, which serves as a fundamental social institution under
Article 149 of the Family Code.

2. Procedural Dismissal by the Court of Appeals:

Although Josef did not file a motion for reconsideration before seeking certiorari, the
Court held that the procedural lapse was excusable in light of the serious substantive
issue concerning the protection of the family home. Citing De los Santos v. Reyes
(G.R. No. 152281, August 16, 2005), the Court underscored that procedural rules
should not prevail over substantial rights, especially when constitutional rights such as
the right to abode are at stake.

Disposition:

The Court granted the petition, declaring the RTC’s July 16, 2003 Order and the writs of
execution null and void. The RTC was directed to:
1. Conduct an inquiry into whether the real property constituted a family home.
 2. Determine the ownership of the levied personal properties and whether they are
exempt from execution.

The case underscores the importance of upholding substantive rights, particularly those
protecting the family home, over rigid adherence to procedural technicalities.

81.Cabang v. Basay (G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009)

FACTS:
1. Ownership of Lot No. 7777:
• Felix Odong, the original registered owner of Lot No. 7777 in Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, never occupied the lot.
• In 1987, the heirs of Felix Odong sold Lot No. 7777 to Guillermo Basay and his
spouse (respondents), who registered it under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
22,048 but did not take possession of it.
2. Possession by Cabang Family:
• The Cabang family (petitioners) had been in continuous, open, and adverse
possession of Lot No. 7777 since 1956, mistakenly believing it was part of Lot No.
7778.
• In 1992, a relocation survey revealed that the Cabangs occupied Lot No. 7777,
prompting the Basays to file a complaint for recovery of possession (Civil Case No.
92-20-127).
3. Trial Court and Appellate Court Proceedings:
• The trial court dismissed the case based on laches, but the Court of Appeals
reversed, declaring Basay entitled to possession under Articles 448, 546, 547, and
548 of the Civil Code.
• The Supreme Court denied the Cabangs’ petition for late filing, making the Court
of Appeals’ decision final and executory.
• The trial court later denied execution on the grounds that the property was
allegedly a family home and exempt from execution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the improvements introduced by the Cabangs on Lot No. 7777
constituted a valid family home exempt from execution.
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for execution despite
the finality of the Court of Appeals’ decision.
RULING:
1. Family Home Not Validly Constituted:
• The Supreme Court held that the family home must be established on property
owned by the person constituting it.
• Since the Basays were the registered owners of Lot No. 7777 and the Cabangs
were mere possessors by tolerance, the Cabangs could not claim the property as a
family home.
2. Ministerial Duty to Enforce Execution:
• The judgment declaring Basay’s right to possession had become final and
executory, and the trial court had a ministerial duty to enforce it.
• The claim that the improvements were family homes was raised too late and was
a clear attempt to delay execution.
• The Supreme Court emphasized that the purpose of a final judgment is to
provide closure and justice to the prevailing party, and execution is a matter of right
once judgment becomes final.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The petition was DENIED, and the Court of Appeals’ decision to grant execution and
order the Cabangs to vacate the property was AFFIRMED.
82. Manacop vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97898, August 11, 1997

Facts:
• Florante Manacop and his wife purchased a residential property in Quezon City
in 1972.
• In 1986, E & L Mercantile, Inc. sued Manacop and his company, F.F. Manacop
Construction Co., Inc., for a debt of over P3 million. They entered into a compromise
agreement to pay P2 million.
• The trial court approved the compromise, but Manacop failed to comply.
Execution was delayed, but eventually, the sheriff levied personal property.
• In 1989, Manacop moved to quash the writ of execution, arguing the property
was a family home exempt from execution under the Family Code, which took effect in
1988.
• The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals upheld the denial,
ruling that the debt preceded the Family Code and that the property was not a family
home under the Civil Code.

Issue:
Can a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be enforced on
a property claimed to be a family home under the Family Code?

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the property could be executed to satisfy the debt.

Reasoning:
1. Non-retroactivity of the Family Code:
• The Family Code, which provides that a family home is automatically constituted
by actual occupancy, does not apply retroactively.
• Debts incurred before August 3, 1988 (effectivity of the Family Code) are not
subject to the protections under the new rules regarding family homes.
• Since the debt was incurred and the writ of execution was issued before this
date, the Family Code’s provisions on family homes do not apply.
2. Requirements under the Civil Code:
• Under the Civil Code (prior to the Family Code), a family home must be judicially
or extrajudicially constituted to be exempt from execution.
• Manacop failed to prove that the property was duly constituted as a family home
under the Civil Code.
3. Actual Occupancy Requirement:
 • The Family Code requires actual occupancy by the owner or beneficiaries for a
family home to be protected.
• Manacop was residing abroad, and the overseer residing in the property was not
a “beneficiary” under the law.
• Beneficiaries are limited to the immediate family, ascendants, descendants, or
dependents, excluding employees like overseers.

Disposition:
The petition was denied, and the writ of execution was upheld. The debt was incurred
before the Family Code, and the property was not protected as a family home under the
Civil Code. Double costs were imposed on the petitioner.
83. Ramos v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 185920, July 20, 2010

Facts:

1. In 2003, respondents Danilo Pangilinan and others filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., owned by Ernesto Ramos.
2. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondents on April 15, 2005, awarding
₱1,661,490.30 in back wages, separation pay, 13th-month pay, and other benefits.
3. A writ of execution was issued on September 8, 2005, and the sheriff levied a
property in Ramos’ name, covered by TCT No. 38978, located in Pandacan, Manila.
4. Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ, arguing that the property was
the family home and thus exempt from execution under the law. The respondents
countered that Ramos had another home in Antipolo and that the Pandacan property
served as the company’s business address.
5. The Labor Arbiter denied the motion to quash, and both the NLRC and the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Issue:

Whether the Pandacan property, allegedly the Ramos family home, is exempt from
execution.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition.

1. Exemption of Family Home from Execution:
• The Court reiterated that under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), family homes
constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) must be
judicially or extrajudicially constituted to be exempt from execution.
 • Since the Pandacan property was allegedly constituted as a family home in 1944,
petitioners had to show proof that it was properly constituted under the Civil Code’s
provisions.
• Petitioners failed to prove that the Pandacan property was ever constituted as a
family home through judicial or extrajudicial means.
2. Applicability of the Family Code:
• The Family Code (which became effective on August 3, 1988) automatically
deems all family homes constituted by operation of law. However, this rule applies
only to family homes constructed after August 3, 1988, or to debts incurred after
that date.
• In this case, since the debt and the home’s constitution occurred before 1988,
the Family Code provisions did not apply.
3. Failure to Redeem the Property:
• Petitioners did not redeem the property within the one-year redemption period, as
required by law.
4. Conjugal Property Argument:
• The Court also ruled that the claim that the property was conjugal was
unsubstantiated. The notation on the title indicating “married to Juanita Trinidad”
was merely descriptive and did not establish that the property was conjugal.

Conclusion:

The Pandacan property could not be exempted from execution since it was not properly
constituted as a family home under the Civil Code. The petition was dismissed, and the
levy on the property was upheld.
84. SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA, Petitioner,
VS.
SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, SHERIFF
FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS, Respondent s,
G.R. No. 185064

FACTS:

Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa. They purcahsed a parcel of land

located in Meycauayan, Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which
became their family home. A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of
P100,000 from Claudio Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of
land and house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan. When Acero
presented the check to the bank it was dishonored because the checking account was
already closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses De Mesa still failed to
pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the
Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of
execution was issued to levy on the said property.
The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder.
Acero leased the property to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for several years.
Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.

The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero's complaint and
ordering the Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De
Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the property. The MTC also stated
that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudio's name
up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the
validity of the levy made by the Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale that was
conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Acero's Torrens title that was resultantly
issued.

Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa
contend that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution
under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes
of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC's
decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in
this case.

HELD:
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what
law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied
with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from
execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before
August 3, 1988, must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from
execution.

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution
from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein.

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a

family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are
considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when
Spouses De Mesa got married. There was no showing, however, that the same was
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988,
the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that
the subject property was a family home.

Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been
exempt from execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property
being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or
within a reasonable time thereafter. They are stopped from claiming the exemption of
the property from execution.
85. Perla G. Patricio vs. Marcelino G. Dario III and Court of Appeals

Facts
• Marcelino V. Dario died intestate in 1987, survived by his wife Perla Patricio and
their two sons, Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III.
• The decedent left a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school
building, which was extrajudicially settled among the heirs, resulting in co-ownership.
• Perla and Marcelino Marc sought to partition the property, but Marcelino III
refused, claiming the family home status continued as his minor son resided there.
• The trial court ordered partition with respective shares: Perla (4/6), Marcelino
Marc (1/6), Marcelino III (1/6).
• The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, ruling that the property remained a
family home while a minor beneficiary resided there.

Issues
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s decision
granting partition of the property.
2. Whether the property’s status as a family home precluded partition due to
the presence of a minor beneficiary.

Ruling

The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition and ordered the partition of the property.
The CA’s decision was reversed based on the following:
1. Applicability of Family Home Laws
• Article 159 of the Family Code allows a family home to continue for 10 years
after the death of the constituting spouse(s), or as long as there is a minor
beneficiary living there.
• Marcelino III’s son did not qualify as a minor beneficiary because he was not
dependent on the grandmother (Perla) for legal support, but on his father
(Marcelino III).
• Legal support follows the order in Article 199 of the Family Code, prioritizing
parents over grandparents.
2. Co-ownership and Right to Partition
 • Co-ownership laws under Articles 494, 495, and 498 of the Civil Code provide
co-owners the right to demand partition at any time.
• The property ceased to be a family home after 10 years from the decedent’s
death in 1997, as there was no qualified minor beneficiary.
3. Partition Process
• The court ordered partition through commissioners under Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court, with shares distributed as follows:
• Perla: 4/6
• Marcelino Marc: 1/6
• Marcelino III: 1/6
86. Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad V. Eulogio vs. Paterno C. Bell, Sr., et al.

Facts
• The Bell siblings and their parents filed a case to annul a sale of their family
home to the Eulogios, claiming it violated the Family Code’s provisions on the family
home.
• The Regional Trial Court (RTC) nullified the sale, declaring it an equitable
mortgage. It ordered Spouses Bell to pay the Eulogios PHP 1 million with 12% annual
interest but recognized the property as a family home exempt from execution.
• The Eulogios sought to enforce the money judgment via a writ of execution,
claiming the property’s market value exceeded PHP 300,000, making it subject to
execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
• The RTC set hearings and ordered the sale of the property on execution. The
Bells filed a petition for certiorari, and the Court of Appeals (CA) enjoined the sale,
ruling that the family home’s value must be determined at the time of its constitution,
not based on subsequent market changes.

Issues
1. Whether the family home could be sold on execution under Article 160 of the
Family Code.
2. Whether the Eulogios’ actions constituted forum-shopping.
3. Whether the execution proceedings were barred by res judicata.

Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA’s decision, enjoining
the execution sale of the family home.
1. Family Home Exemption
• The family home is exempt from execution under Article 153 of the Family
Code, except under specific conditions (e.g., debts incurred before its constitution
or exceeding the statutory value).
• The property’s value for exemption purposes must be determined at the time of
its constitution, not its current market value. The RTC already determined that the
property’s value was within the statutory PHP 300,000 limit.
• The Eulogios failed to prove that any increase in the property’s value was due to
voluntary improvements made by the Bells, as required under Article 160 for
execution.
 2. Forum Shopping
• The Court ruled that the Eulogios were not guilty of forum shopping, as the
execution proceedings were a continuation of the original case. Appeals and
petitions arising from these proceedings do not constitute multiple cases with the
same cause of action.
3. Res Judicata
• The Court applied the principle of res judicata. The RTC’s prior decision that the
property was a family home valued within the statutory limit precluded re-litigating
this issue in execution proceedings.
• Any attempt to levy the property on execution was inconsistent with the RTC’s
final determination.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the CA’s decision enjoining the execution sale of the
family home was affirmed. The family home remained exempt from execution, and the
RTC’s actions were declared as grave abuse of discretion.
87. Jose E. Honrado vs. Court of Appeals, et al.- G.R. No. 166333

Facts
• Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. filed a collection case against Jose Honrado for
unpaid debts amounting to ₱240,765 for veterinary products. Honrado was declared
in default for failing to appear at the pre-trial, and judgment was rendered against him.
• The judgment ordered Honrado to pay Premium the principal amount, 28%
annual interest, attorney’s fees, and costs.
• A writ of execution was issued in 2001, leading to the levy and public auction of
Honrado’s property in Calamba, Laguna. Premium was the highest bidder.
• Subsequently, the RTC of Calamba declared the same property as a family
home in a separate case filed by Honrado and his wife. Honrado then claimed that
the property was exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code.
• The RTC of Quezon City denied Honrado’s motion to exempt the property from
execution, reasoning that he failed to claim the exemption during the levy or within a
reasonable period. The Court of Appeals upheld this decision.

Issues
1. Whether the property, as a family home, is exempt from execution under
Article 155 of the Family Code.
2. Whether Honrado’s failure to assert the exemption during the levy
constitutes a waiver of his right.
3. Whether the exemption of a family home can be waived due to public policy
considerations.

Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the rulings of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals.

Key Points
1. Exemption of Family Home under the Family Code
• Article 153 of the Family Code states that a family home is exempt from
execution, forced sale, or attachment except in specific cases (e.g., debts predating
its constitution).
• Honrado argued that the property was his family home, constituted before the
debt was incurred, and therefore exempt from execution.
 2. Waiver of Exemption
• While a family home is generally protected, failure to assert the exemption at
the time of levy or within a reasonable period after the levy constitutes
waiver.
• Honrado allowed the public auction to proceed without objection and raised the
exemption claim only a year later, after the redemption period expired. This delay
estopped him from asserting the exemption.
3. Public Policy and Waiver
• Although the exemption of the family home is rooted in public policy, failure to
claim the exemption within a reasonable time defeats its purpose. The law
does not permit prolonged inaction that disrupts the execution process and denies
the winning party the fruits of litigation.
• Litigation must end to achieve finality in judicial processes.

Reasoning
• The RTC and CA properly applied jurisprudence, which holds that claims of
exemption must be raised promptly. In Gomez v. Gealone, the Court ruled that such
claims must be made at the time of the levy or before the sale, not afterward.
• The Court noted Honrado’s dilatory actions, including failing to assert the
exemption during the execution process and vacating the property after the auction.
These acts demonstrated a waiver of the exemption claim.
• The family home exemption under Article 155 of the Family Code is not absolute;
it requires timely assertion and proof. Honrado failed to prove that the property was
within the statutory value limits (₱300,000 for urban areas) or met other conditions for
exemption.

Disposition

The Supreme Court held that Honrado’s belated assertion of the family home exemption
was barred by estoppel and his failure to act within a reasonable time. The petition was
denied, and the RTC and CA rulings were affirmed.
88. Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola vs. John Nabor C. Arriola, G.R.
No. 177703

Facts
• The case involves the partition of the estate of Fidel Arriola, who had two sons:
John Nabor Arriola (respondent) with his first wife and Anthony Ronald Arriola
(petitioner) with his second wife, Vilma Arriola (co-petitioner).
• The RTC ordered the partition of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 383714
into three equal shares for John, Vilma, and Anthony.
• Respondent John sought to include the house standing on the land in the public
auction of the property, while petitioners opposed, arguing that the house was not part
of the partition case and was their residence for over 20 years.
• The RTC excluded the house from the auction, but the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed, holding that the house and land should be included because the house was
accessory to the land and formed part of the decedent’s estate.

Issues
1. Whether the house on the land is part of the co-owned property subject to
partition.
2. Whether the house and the portion of the land it occupies are exempt from
partition due to their status as a family home under the Family Code.
3. Whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC’s exclusion of the house from
the public auction.

Ruling

The Supreme Court PARTLY GRANTED the petition and modified the CA’s decision.
1. Inclusion of the House in the Partition
• The house is deemed part of the co-owned property by accession under Articles
440, 445, and 446 of the Civil Code.
• The deceased constructed the house on the land he owned, making it part of his
estate and thus subject to co-ownership among the heirs.
2. Exemption as a Family Home
• Under Articles 152, 153, and 159 of the Family Code, the house and the portion
of the land it occupies are considered a family home automatically constituted
upon occupation as a residence.
 • A family home is exempt from partition for 10 years from the death of the head of
the family (March 10, 2003, in this case) or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary residing in it unless compelling reasons are shown.
• The Court declared the house and the portion of the land it occupies exempt from
partition until March 10, 2013.
3. Immediate Partition of Remaining Land
• The Court allowed the immediate public auction of the portion of the land outside
the area designated as the family home, as it is not subject to the same exemption.

Disposition
• The house and the portion of the land it occupies are declared part of the
co-ownership but exempt from partition or sale until March 10, 2013.
• The remaining portions of the land can be immediately sold at public
auction.
89. Corazon Dezoller Tison and Rene R. Dezoller vs. Court of Appeals and
Teodora Domingo

Facts
• Petitioners Corazon Dezoller Tison and Rene R. Dezoller are the niece and
nephew of the late Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, who died intestate in 1983, leaving a
parcel of land with improvements.
• Upon Teodora’s death, her husband, Martin Guerrero, executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement claiming sole ownership of the property. He later sold it to
respondent Teodora Domingo.
• Petitioners claimed they were entitled to half of Teodora’s estate by right of
representation under the Civil Code and filed a case for reconveyance of the
property after Martin’s death.
• The RTC dismissed the case via a demurrer to evidence, holding that
petitioners failed to prove their filiation with Teodora in accordance with the Family
Code. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed.

Issues
1. Whether petitioners are entitled to inherit by right of representation from
Teodora’s estate.
2. Whether the documentary evidence presented by petitioners sufficiently
proved their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
3. Whether Martin Guerrero validly transferred the entire property to
respondent Teodora Domingo.

Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the CA decision and ruled in favor of petitioners,
declaring them co-owners of the property with respondent.

Key Points
1. Presumption of Legitimacy
• Petitioners, as the children of Hermogenes Dezoller (Teodora’s brother), are
presumed legitimate under the Family Code. The presumption of legitimacy
cannot be attacked collaterally in a reconveyance action, and only a proper party
can directly contest it.
• Respondent Domingo, as a third party, cannot impugn petitioners’ legitimacy.
Thus, the presumption of legitimacy remains unrebutted.
2. Proof of Filiation
 • Petitioners presented evidence such as baptismal certificates, marriage
certificates, affidavits, and testimonies to establish their relationship with Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero.
• The Court held that the declaration of pedigree made by Teodora during her
lifetime, stating that petitioners were her niece and nephew, is admissible under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as an exception to the hearsay rule.
• Documentary evidence, although imperfect, was admitted because respondent
failed to object during its presentation in court.
3. Division of the Property
• The property is deemed conjugal; upon Teodora’s death, half of it was reserved
to her husband, Martin Guerrero.
• The other half formed part of Teodora’s estate, to be divided equally between
Martin Guerrero and petitioners as co-heirs under Articles 995 and 1001 of the
Civil Code.
• Thus, Martin Guerrero could only transfer ¾ of the property (his ½ conjugal
share plus his ¼ inherited share) to respondent Domingo. Petitioners retained
ownership of the remaining ¼.
4. Effect of Demurrer to Evidence
• Since the demurrer was granted in error, the respondent waived the right to
present evidence. The case is decided solely on petitioners’ evidence.

Disposition
• The CA decision was reversed.
• Petitioners were declared co-owners of the property with respondent Domingo,
holding an undivided ¼ share, while respondent owns ¾ of the property.
90. Camelo Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals and Camelo Regodos, G.R. No. 124814

Facts
• Florencia Regodos, on behalf of her minor son Camelo Regodos, filed a
petition for recognition and support against Camelo Cabatania.
• Florencia alleged that:
• She worked as Cabatania’s household helper in 1981.
• They had sexual intercourse on January 2, 1982, and again in March 1982.
• She gave birth to Camelo Regodos on September 9, 1982, and claimed
Cabatania was the father.
• Cabatania denied paternity, asserting:
• Florencia was already pregnant when they had intercourse.
• He never rented a house for her or took her to Bacolod City.
• The RTC ruled in favor of Camelo Regodos, ordering Cabatania to recognize
him as his illegitimate son and provide ₱500/month in support. The Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed.

Issues
1. Whether the evidence presented sufficiently proved the illegitimate filiation
of Camelo Regodos to Cabatania.
2. Whether the courts erred in compelling Cabatania to provide recognition
and support.

Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the CA decision, ruling in favor of Camelo Cabatania.

Key Points
1. High Standard of Proof for Paternity and Filiation
• Filiation of illegitimate children must be established through clear and
convincing evidence (Art. 175 of the Civil Code).
• This includes:
• Birth certificates prepared with the putative father’s participation.
• Voluntary recognition by the father in a public or private document.
• Open and continuous possession of the status of a child.
 2. Inadmissibility of Evidence Presented by Florencia
• Birth Certificate: Prepared without Cabatania’s knowledge or consent, making it
inadmissible as proof of paternity.
• Baptismal Certificate: Proved only the administration of the sacrament, not the
veracity of the entries regarding the child’s father.
• Self-Serving Testimony: Florencia’s claim that Cabatania rented a house for
her was uncorroborated.
3. Impact of Florencia’s Misrepresentation
• Florencia falsely claimed in the petition that she was a widow, despite being
married at the time of conception.
• The presumption of legitimacy applies under the law (Art. 167 of the Family
Code), favoring the husband of a married woman. This presumption can only be
rebutted by clear evidence, which was absent in this case.
4. Physical Resemblance is Insufficient Proof
• The trial court relied on the child’s physical appearance as evidence of paternity.
• The Supreme Court rejected this, emphasizing the availability of scientific
methods like DNA testing to determine paternity.
5. Protection of Legal Presumptions
• The presumption of a child’s legitimacy under the Family Code seeks to protect
innocent offspring from the stigma of illegitimacy.
• Florencia’s declarations could not overcome this presumption without substantial
proof.

Disposition
• The petition was granted.
• The decisions of the RTC and CA were reversed and set aside.
• The petition for recognition and support was dismissed.
91. Belen Sagad Angeles vs. Aleli “Corazon” Angeles Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798

Facts

1. Francisco M. Angeles died intestate, leaving behind valuable properties.

2. Respondent Aleli “Corazon” Angeles-Maglaya filed a petition for letters of
administration, claiming to be Francisco’s sole legitimate child with Genoveva
Mercado and seeking appointment as administratrix of his estate.
3. Petitioner Belen Sagad Angeles, Francisco’s second wife, opposed the petition,
asserting that:
• She was Francisco’s surviving spouse.
• Aleli was not Francisco’s legitimate daughter, as her birth certificate was
unsigned by him.
• There was no proof of a marriage between Francisco and Genoveva Mercado.
4. The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that Aleli failed to establish her
legitimate filiation to Francisco.
5. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the dismissal, ruling that:
• Aleli had sufficiently proven her legitimate filiation.
• Petitioner waived her right to present evidence by treating her motion to dismiss
as a demurrer to evidence.
6. Petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that Aleli failed to
establish her legitimate filiation and that the CA erred in its ruling.

Issues
1. Whether Aleli sufficiently established her legitimate filiation to Francisco
Angeles.
2. Whether the CA erred in treating petitioner’s motion to dismiss as a
demurrer to evidence.
3. Who is entitled to the appointment as administrator of Francisco’s estate?

Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the CA decision and reinstated the trial court’s
dismissal of Aleli’s petition.

Key Points
1. Proof of Legitimate Filiation
 • Legal Basis: Article 164 of the Family Code states that legitimate children are
those conceived or born during the marriage of their parents.
• Aleli failed to present proof of a valid marriage between Francisco and
Genoveva, which is a prerequisite for claiming legitimacy.
• Aleli’s evidence, including her birth certificate, school records, and wedding
photos, was insufficient:
• Her birth certificate was unsigned by Francisco or Genoveva and could
only prove the fact of her birth, not her legitimacy.
• The marriage contract and photos did not establish a lawful marriage
between Francisco and Genoveva.
2. Res Judicata and Filiation
• The issue of Aleli’s legitimate filiation to Francisco had been previously resolved
in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, where the appellate court found no evidence of a lawful
marriage between Francisco and Genoveva.
• The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling in G.R. No. 163124, making the matter
final and binding (rule on conclusiveness of judgment).
3. Appointment of Administrator
• The law prioritizes the surviving spouse over next of kin for appointment as an
estate administrator.
• Aleli’s failure to prove her legitimacy disqualified her as a next of kin or heir,
strengthening petitioner’s right as Francisco’s surviving spouse.
4. Motion to Dismiss as Demurrer to Evidence
• While the CA treated the motion to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence, the issue
became moot since Aleli failed to establish her legitimacy regardless of procedural
technicalities.

Disposition
• The CA decision was reversed.
• The trial court’s dismissal of Aleli’s petition for letters of administration was
reinstated.
92. William Liyao, Jr. vs. Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, et al., G.R. No. 138961

Facts
1. Petitioner William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother, Corazon Garcia, filed
a case for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased William
Liyao and sought recognition as a compulsory heir entitled to successional rights.
2. Corazon was legally married to Ramon Yulo but had been separated from him for
over 10 years when she cohabited with William Liyao.
3. Petitioner alleged that William Liyao openly acknowledged him as his son by:
• Paying for his hospital and medical expenses.
• Introducing him to others as his son.
• Supporting him financially.
4. Respondents (William Liyao’s legal heirs) denied petitioner’s claim, asserting
that:
• William Liyao never acknowledged petitioner as his son.
• Corazon was still legally married to Ramon Yulo at the time petitioner was
conceived and born.
• The presumption of legitimacy applied since petitioner was born within a valid
and subsisting marriage.
5. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, declaring him the illegitimate
son of William Liyao.
6. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that petitioner
failed to overcome the presumption of legitimacy.

Issues
1. Can the petitioner, as a child born during a valid marriage, impugn his own
legitimacy to claim filiation with William Liyao?
2. Did petitioner provide sufficient evidence to prove his alleged filiation with
William Liyao?

Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision.

Key Points
1. Presumption of Legitimacy
 • Under Article 255 of the Civil Code, children conceived or born during a valid
marriage are presumed legitimate.
• This presumption is intended to protect the child’s status and can only be
rebutted in limited circumstances, such as proof of the husband’s physical
impossibility to have had access to the wife.
2. Right to Impugn Legitimacy
• The right to contest the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right
belonging only to the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.
• A child cannot impugn their own legitimacy to claim filiation with another person,
as this would undermine the protection given to children born in lawful wedlock.
3. Petitioner’s Standing
• Petitioner’s claim was barred because he was attempting to choose his own
filiation, which the law does not allow.
• The testimony of Corazon’s legitimate children (Enrique and Bernadette Yulo) did
not amount to a valid impugnation of legitimacy because the proper party, Ramon
Yulo, was still alive and did not contest the child’s legitimacy.
4. Evidence of Filiation
• Even if the claim was legally permissible, the Court found that the evidence
presented by petitioner (e.g., birth certificate, family photos, financial support) was
insufficient to establish filiation with William Liyao.
• The birth certificate and baptismal certificate were unsigned by William Liyao,
and there was no clear proof of acknowledgment.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the Court of Appeals’ ruling was affirmed.
93. Gerardo B. Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals and Ma. Theresa Almonte, G.R.
No. 123450

Facts
1. Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion married respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte on
December 29, 1989.
2. On December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo, whom both
parties initially claimed as their child.
3. Gerardo later discovered that Ma. Theresa was still married to Mario Gopiao,
making their marriage void for bigamy. The trial court annulled their marriage,
declared Jose Gerardo illegitimate, and awarded custody to Ma. Theresa with
Gerardo granted visitation rights.
4. Ma. Theresa sought to remove Gerardo’s visitation rights and requested that
Jose Gerardo’s surname be changed to Almonte, following the rule that illegitimate
children bear their mother’s surname.

Procedural History
1. The trial court denied Ma. Theresa’s motion, emphasizing the best interest of
the child and allowing Gerardo visitation rights.
2. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, ruling that Jose Gerardo was the
legitimate child of Mario Gopiao, Ma. Theresa’s first husband, under the
presumption of legitimacy provided by law.
3. Gerardo’s petition for reconsideration was denied, leading him to appeal to the
Supreme Court.

Issues
1. Can Gerardo contest Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy?
2. Should Gerardo be granted visitation rights?
3. Is Jose Gerardo entitled to use Gerardo’s surname?

Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision.

Key Points
1. Presumption of Legitimacy
• Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child born during the marriage of his
mother is presumed legitimate, even if the mother declares against it or is
sentenced as an adulteress (Article 167).
 • Since Ma. Theresa was legally married to Mario Gopiao, Jose Gerardo is
presumed the legitimate child of Mario unless proven otherwise.
2. Right to Impugn Legitimacy
• The right to contest a child’s legitimacy is a personal right reserved for the
husband or, in some cases, his heirs.
• Gerardo, having never been Ma. Theresa’s lawful husband, has no standing to
challenge Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.
3. No Evidence of Physical Impossibility
• For the presumption of legitimacy to be overturned, there must be proof of
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the period of
conception (Article 166).
• Both Ma. Theresa and Mario resided in Quezon City during the relevant period,
and no evidence was presented to disprove marital intimacy.
4. Use of Surname
• A legitimate child like Jose Gerardo is entitled to bear the surnames of both his
biological father (Mario) and mother (Ma. Theresa).
• Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo, as the child has no legal
relationship with him.
5. Visitation Rights
• Visitation rights are premised on a parent-child relationship. Since Gerardo is
not Jose Gerardo’s father, he has no legal right to visitation.

Legal Principles
• The presumption of legitimacy aims to protect the child’s status and cannot be
defeated by a mother’s declaration or the actions of a third party.
• The best interest of the child is the paramount consideration in determining
issues of custody, visitation, and status.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision, holding that Jose
Gerardo is the legitimate son of Mario Gopiao and Ma. Theresa Almonte. Gerardo has
no visitation rights or claim to impose his surname on the child.
94. Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus and Jacqueline A. de Jesus vs. Estate of Decedent
Juan Gamboa Dizon et al., G.R. No. 142877

Facts
1. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus were married on August 23,
1964. During their marriage, Jacqueline A. de Jesus (born March 1, 1979) and
Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus (born July 6, 1982) were born.
2. In a notarized document dated June 7, 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie as his illegitimate children with Carolina.
3. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on March 12, 1992, leaving substantial assets.
4. Jacqueline and Jinkie, through their mother, filed a complaint for partition of
Dizon’s estate, relying on his notarized acknowledgment of their alleged illegitimacy.
5. Respondents (the surviving spouse and legitimate children of Dizon) argued that
the complaint effectively questioned the petitioners’ legitimate status as children of
Danilo and Carolina, which cannot be done in a partition case.

Procedural History
1. The trial court initially denied respondents’ motion to dismiss the complaint, ruling
that the question of filiation should be resolved in the partition case.
2. The Court of Appeals upheld this ruling and remanded the case to the trial
court.
3. Later, the trial court granted a second motion to dismiss, holding that the issue of
filiation required a separate and direct action to impugn the petitioners’ legitimacy
as children of Danilo and Carolina.

Issues
1. Can Jacqueline and Jinkie claim illegitimacy to establish their right to
Dizon’s estate without impugning their legitimacy as children of Danilo and
Carolina?
2. Can their alleged status as illegitimate children of Dizon be adjudicated in a
partition case?

Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the dismissal of the case.

Key Points
1. Presumption of Legitimacy
 • Children born within a valid marriage are presumed legitimate (Article 164,
Family Code).
• The presumption of legitimacy becomes conclusive unless proven otherwise in
a direct action by the father or his heirs, within specific time limits (Articles 170-
171, Family Code).
• Jacqueline and Jinkie were born during the marriage of Danilo and Carolina, as
reflected in their birth certificates, making them presumed legitimate.
2. Impugning Legitimacy
• Only the father (Danilo) or, in exceptional cases, his heirs, can contest the
legitimacy of a child.
• Petitioners cannot self-declare their illegitimacy to claim inheritance rights from
Dizon.
3. Acknowledgment of Illegitimate Filiation
• A notarized acknowledgment by Dizon, even if valid, does not automatically
establish the petitioners’ illegitimacy while their legitimacy remains unchallenged.
• Filiation established through acknowledgment does not override the paramount
presumption of legitimacy unless legitimacy has been successfully impugned.
4. Improper Collateral Attack
• Petitioners’ claim of illegitimacy in a partition case is a collateral attack on their
legitimacy, which is not allowed under Philippine law.
• Legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct and specific action filed for that
purpose.
5. Relevance of Divinagracia Case
• The case of Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo does not apply here because it involved
an illegitimate child seeking inheritance based on valid acknowledgment, without
the issue of legitimacy being contested.
• In contrast, Jacqueline and Jinkie’s claim implicitly challenges their legitimate
status.

Disposition
• The petition was denied, and the dismissal of the partition case was upheld.
Jacqueline and Jinkie must first establish their illegitimacy through a direct action
impugning their legitimacy as children of Danilo and Carolina before claiming rights as
Dizon’s illegitimate children.
95. Antonio Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals and Elizabeth Mejias, G.R. No. L-
49542

Facts
1. Elizabeth Mejias, a married woman, had an affair with Antonio Macadangdang
in March 1967, during which time she claimed her marriage to her husband, Crispin
Anahaw, was already strained. She alleged that this affair resulted in the conception
of her son, Rolando, born on October 30, 1967.
2. Mejias and Anahaw allegedly separated in 1967, although evidence suggested
they lived in proximity and continued to have access to one another.
3. Mejias filed a complaint in 1972 seeking the recognition and support of
Rolando as Macadangdang’s illegitimate child. The child had been baptized as
“Rolando Macadangdang.”
4. The trial court dismissed Mejias’ complaint, citing the presumption of legitimacy
under the Civil Code, which declared that Rolando, born in lawful wedlock, was
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate child of Mejias and her husband, Crispin.
5. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, declaring Rolando
illegitimate and ordering Macadangdang to provide monthly support.

Issues
1. Whether Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate child of Mejias
and her husband, Crispin.
2. Whether Mejias can unilaterally bastardize her child without involving her legal
husband.

Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, upholding the presumption of
Rolando’s legitimacy and denying the claim that Macadangdang was the father.

Key Points
1. Presumption of Legitimacy
• Article 255 of the Civil Code presumes children born within 180 days after
marriage and before 300 days following its dissolution or separation to be
legitimate.
 • Rolando was born 210 days after the alleged affair but during the marriage of
Mejias and Crispin. No substantial evidence of physical impossibility of access
between Mejias and Crispin was presented.
• The presumption of legitimacy stands unless proven otherwise by clear evidence,
such as:
1. Impotence of the husband,
2. Separation rendering access impossible, or
3. Serious illness of the husband preventing intercourse.
2. Mother’s Lack of Right to Contest Legitimacy
• Mejias cannot impugn the legitimacy of Rolando because maternity is never in
question. Only the husband (or his heirs in exceptional cases) may contest the
child’s legitimacy, and this must be done through a direct action.
• The law seeks to protect the legitimacy of children, ensuring their status is not
compromised by the declarations of either parent.
3. Evidence Against Illegitimacy Claim
• Mejias and Crispin lived near each other and shared a residence at times,
indicating the possibility of access.
• Rolando was a full-term, healthy baby, suggesting conception occurred before
the alleged affair in March 1967.
• Baptismal certificates and similar documents are not conclusive evidence of
paternity; they only establish the administration of sacraments.
4. Moral and Policy Considerations
• Allowing Mejias to bastardize her son to claim support from Macadangdang
would undermine family solidarity and morality.
• The court emphasized the need to prioritize the welfare of the child and the
stability of family relations over the mother’s claims, especially when her motives
appeared self-serving.

Disposition
• The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the trial court’s
dismissal of the complaint was reinstated.
• Rolando remained presumed to be the legitimate son of Crispin Anahaw under
the law.
96. Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing vs. Court of Appeals and Angelita
Diamante, G.R. No. 125901

Facts
1. Petitioners, Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing, alleged that their son, Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., born on April 27, 1989, was taken by Angelita Diamante under the
pretense of babysitting. When Bienvenida returned from the market, both Angelita
and the child were gone.
2. Despite efforts to locate her son, Bienvenida only discovered the boy’s
whereabouts in 1993 when she read about the death of Tomas Lopez, Angelita’s
common-law husband, in a newspaper.
3. Bienvenida filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
claiming that John Thomas Lopez, the boy Angelita had in her custody, was
actually her son, Edgardo, Jr.
4. Angelita denied the claim, asserting that she was the biological mother of John
Thomas Lopez, who was also born on April 27, 1989, at a clinic in Singalong,
Manila.
5. The RTC ruled in favor of the Tijings, ordering Angelita to surrender custody of
the child. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed this decision, doubting the
sufficiency of evidence presented by the Tijings.

Issues
1. Whether habeas corpus is the proper remedy to resolve custody of the
child.
2. Whether Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same
person.

Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the CA and reinstated the RTC decision in favor of the
Tijings.

Key Points
1. Habeas Corpus as a Remedy
• Habeas corpus is appropriate in cases where the custody of a minor is unlawfully
withheld. In such cases, the question is not just illegal restraint but also the right to
custody.
2. Evidence Establishing Identity of the Minor
 • Angelita’s Inability to Conceive: Angelita underwent ligation in 1970 and failed
to provide credible evidence of its reversal or subsequent pregnancies.
• Sterility of Tomas Lopez: Testimony from Tomas Lopez’s brother, Benjamin,
stated that Tomas was sterile due to an accident. Tomas had no biological children
with Angelita or his legal wife.
• Irregular Birth Registration: The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was
filed four months late and falsely stated that Angelita and Tomas were legally
married.
• Physical Resemblance: The trial court noted a strong resemblance between
Bienvenida and the child. Resemblance is considered competent evidence in
proving parentage.
• Midwife’s Testimony: Midwife Lourdes Vasquez testified that she delivered
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and presented clinical records as evidence. In contrast,
Angelita failed to present her alleged midwife or similar documentation.
3. SC’s Conclusion
• The evidence presented by the Tijings sufficiently proved that John Thomas
Lopez and Edgardo Tijing, Jr., were the same person. Habeas corpus was the
proper remedy, and custody was rightfully awarded to the Tijings.
4. DNA Testing
• The Court emphasized the potential utility of DNA testing for resolving
parentage disputes but noted it was unnecessary in this case due to the sufficiency
of other evidence.

Disposition
• Petition GRANTED.
• The CA decision was reversed, and the RTC decision ordering Angelita to
surrender the child to the Tijings was reinstated.
97. Arnel L. Agustin vs. Court of Appeals and Minor Martin Jose Prollamante -
G.R. No. 162571

Facts
1. Complaint for Support:
• Respondents, Fe Angela Prollamante and her son, Martin Jose Prollamante,
filed a complaint for support and support pendente lite against petitioner, Arnel
Agustin.
• Fe alleged that she and Arnel had a relationship that resulted in the birth of
Martin on August 11, 2000.
• She claimed that Arnel signed Martin’s birth certificate and initially supported her
prenatal expenses but later denied paternity and refused to provide financial
support.
2. Petitioner’s Defense:
• Arnel denied paternity, claiming his relationship with Fe ended in 1998, prior to
Martin’s conception.
• He also alleged that Fe falsified his signature on Martin’s birth certificate and filed
criminal charges for falsification.
• He argued that Martin, being unrecognized, must first establish filiation in a
separate suit under Articles 283 and 265 of the Civil Code and Section 1, Rule
105 of the Rules of Court.
3. Motion for DNA Testing:
• Respondents moved for DNA testing to determine Martin’s paternity, but Arnel
opposed it, invoking his constitutional rights to privacy and against self-
incrimination.
4. Trial Court Ruling:
• The RTC denied Arnel’s motion to dismiss and ordered DNA testing, holding that
resolving Martin’s filiation was necessary to determine his right to support.
5. Court of Appeals Ruling:
• The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, stating that DNA testing was valid, did not
violate constitutional rights, and was necessary to resolve the support case.

Issues
1. Can a complaint for support include a determination of paternity?
 2. Does ordering DNA testing violate the petitioner’s constitutional rights to
privacy and against self-incrimination?

Ruling

Petition DENIED.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision.

Reasoning
1. Integration of Paternity and Support Actions
• The Court held that an action for support may include a determination of paternity
when the child’s filiation is disputed.
• Allowing these issues to be resolved within a single proceeding prevents
multiplicity of suits and promotes judicial economy.
• Legal Basis:
• Tayag v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 46258) held that actions for
recognition and inheritance can be integrated, provided the conditions for joinder
of causes of action are met. The same principle applies to support cases
involving paternity disputes.
• The Rules of Court, particularly Rule 28, also allow the use of physical
and genetic evidence in resolving legal disputes.
2. Right Against Self-Incrimination
• The Court ruled that the right against self-incrimination applies only to
testimonial compulsion, not to physical evidence like DNA samples.
• DNA testing involves the collection and analysis of bodily substances, which falls
under the category of object evidence.
• Legal Basis:
• People v. Yatar (G.R. No. 150224) affirmed that the extraction of bodily
substances for DNA testing is not testimonial in nature and does not violate the
right against self-incrimination.
• Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution limits protection to
testimonial evidence.
3. Right to Privacy
• The right to privacy is not absolute and may be limited by a compelling state
interest, such as ensuring the child’s right to support and determining the truth in
legal disputes.
Disposition
• Petition DENIED.
• RTC and CA rulings AFFIRMED.
98. Marissa Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals, Victoria Benitez Lirio, and
Feodor Benitez Aguilar, G.R. No. 105625

Facts
1. Background:
• Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, a married couple, owned several
properties in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982, followed by Vicente in 1989.
• Vicente died intestate, and private respondents (Vicente’s sister, Victoria Benitez
Lirio, and his nephew, Feodor Benitez Aguilar) filed a petition for letters of
administration, claiming that Vicente and Isabel had no descendants.
2. Petitioner’s Claim:
• Petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua claimed to be the legitimate and only child of
Vicente and Isabel, asserting her right to inherit their estate. She presented
evidence, including:
• A Certificate of Live Birth listing Vicente and Isabel as her parents.
• Baptismal records and school documents.
• Other documents showing that Vicente referred to her as his daughter
(e.g., GSIS information sheet).
3. Respondents’ Argument:
• Private respondents contested Marissa’s claim, alleging she was not biologically
related to Vicente and Isabel.
• They presented testimonial evidence, including testimonies from Vicente’s sister,
neighbors, and Isabel’s beautician, all asserting that Isabel was never pregnant or
gave birth to a child.
• Respondents alleged that Marissa was brought into Vicente and Isabel’s
household as a baby and raised as their child without formal adoption.

Procedural History
1. RTC Decision:
• The trial court ruled in favor of Marissa, declaring her the legitimate child of
Vicente and Isabel based on Articles 164, 166, and 170 of the Family Code.
2. Court of Appeals Decision:
• Reversed the RTC decision. The appellate court held that Marissa was not the
biological child of Vicente and Isabel, citing strong evidence against her claim.
3. Petition for Review:
 • Marissa appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting errors in the appellate court’s
findings and reliance on testimonial evidence over her documentary evidence.

Issues
1. **Whether Marissa is the legitimate or biological child of Vicente and Isabel.
2. Whether Articles 164, 166, and 170 of the Family Code apply in this case.

Ruling

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision.

Ratio Decidendi
1. Applicability of Family Code Provisions:
• Articles 164, 166, and 170 govern situations where a husband or his heirs
impugn the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
• These provisions do not apply when the issue is whether a child is biologically
related to a couple.
• This case is not about impugning the legitimacy of a child but determining if
Marissa was biologically born to Vicente and Isabel.
2. Strong Evidence Against Marissa’s Claim:
• Testimonial evidence:
• Isabel’s brother testified that she was treated for infertility but never
became pregnant or gave birth.
• Vicente’s sister testified that Marissa was brought into the household as a
baby and registered as their child without formal adoption.
• Neighbors and Isabel’s beautician confirmed that Isabel was never seen
pregnant.
• Documentary evidence:
• The Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement (1982), signed by Vicente, stated
that Isabel had “no descendants or ascendants.”
• Vicente’s act of signing the Deed contradicted Marissa’s birth certificate,
effectively repudiating it.
3. Certificate of Live Birth as Prima Facie Evidence:
• A birth certificate is considered prima facie evidence, but its truth may be
rebutted.
 • Respondents provided sufficient evidence to disprove the authenticity of
Marissa’s birth certificate.
4. No Legal Adoption:
• Even if Vicente and Isabel raised Marissa as their child, the absence of formal
adoption meant she could not inherit as a legal heir.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed. The Court of Appeals’ decision declaring Marissa not the
biological or legitimate child of Vicente and Isabel was upheld.

Costs against the petitioner.

99. Jose Rivero, Jessie Rivero, and Amalia Rivero vs. Court of Appeals, Mary
Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman, and Benito Dy Chiao, Jr.,G.R. No. 141273

Facts
1. Background of the Case:
• On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo, represented by his mother Shirley
Arevalo, filed a complaint against Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman and her
brothers, Benito Jr. and Benson Dy Chiao, for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao Sr., and for the partition of the
latter’s estate.
• The estate consisted of residential and commercial properties worth
approximately ₱100,000,000.
2. Allegations in the Complaint:
• Benedick claimed he was the illegitimate son of Benito Sr., a product of the
latter’s relationship with Shirley.
• Benedick alleged that Benito Sr. acknowledged him as his child and provided
financial support until his death in 1995.
3. Defendants’ Denial:
• Mary Jane and her brothers denied recognizing Benedick as their father’s
illegitimate son.
• They argued that Benedick’s claim should have been filed through the proper
estate settlement proceedings.
4. Compromise Agreement:
• On November 24, 1996, Mary Jane executed a compromise agreement
acknowledging Benedick as her father’s illegitimate son and agreeing to pay him
₱6,000,000 from the estate in exchange for the waiver of other claims.
• The RTC approved the agreement and rendered a decision based on its terms.
5. Petition for Annulment of Judgment:
• Benito Jr. and Benson, represented by their uncle Henry Dy Chiao, filed a
petition with the Court of Appeals (CA) to annul the RTC decision.
• They argued that Mary Jane had no authority to enter into the compromise
agreement on their behalf and that it was procured through extrinsic fraud.
6. CA Decision:
• The CA annulled the RTC decision, holding that:
 • The filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise
agreement.
• The compromise agreement and the judgment based on it were void for
lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud.
• The subsequent public auction of the estate properties was null and void.

Issues
1. Did Henry Dy Chiao have the authority to file the petition for annulment on
behalf of the Dy Chiao brothers?
2. Did the RTC have jurisdiction over Benedick’s action for recognition and
partition of the estate?
3. Was the compromise agreement and the RTC judgment based on it valid?

Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the CA.

Ratio Decidendi
1. Authority of Henry Dy Chiao:
• The CA properly recognized Henry as the guardian ad litem of the Dy Chiao
brothers, who were of unsound mind.
• The appointment was based on clear evidence of their incompetence and was
not prejudiced by the pending guardianship proceedings in the RTC.
2. Jurisdiction of the RTC:
• The RTC lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment based on the compromise
agreement because filiation cannot be the subject of compromise.
• The Family Code (Article 2035) prohibits compromises involving the civil status
of persons, including paternity and filiation.
3. Invalidity of the Compromise Agreement:
• The recognition of Benedick as an illegitimate child required judicial
determination, not mere admission in a compromise.
• Mary Jane had no authority to execute the agreement on behalf of her brothers.
The Special Power of Attorney (SPA) presented did not specifically authorize her
to compromise the issue of filiation.
4. Extrinsic Fraud and Lack of Consent:
 • The compromise agreement was executed despite allegations that Mary Jane
was a drug addict and her brothers were mentally incompetent.
• The compromise was facilitated by collusion between Mary Jane and
Benedick’s counsel, rendering it tainted by fraud.
5. Nullity of Public Auction:
• Since the RTC decision was null and void, the writ of execution and the
subsequent auction sale of estate properties were likewise void.

Disposition

The Supreme Court upheld the CA’s annulment of the RTC judgment, declaring the
compromise agreement null and void. The public auction of the estate properties was
also invalidated.

Costs against petitioners.

100. Joanie Surposa Uy vs. Jose Ngo Chua, G.R. No. 183965

Facts
1. Initial Petition for Illegitimate Filiation:
• Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB in the
RTC of Cebu City, seeking a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent Jose
Ngo Chua. She alleged that:
• Respondent had an illicit relationship with her mother, Irene Surposa, and
financially supported Joanie and her brother Allan.
• Respondent introduced them as his illegitimate children in the Chinese
community and was involved in their lives.
2. Compromise Agreement in Prior Case:
• Before this proceeding, Joanie filed a similar case (Special Proceeding No.
8830-CEB) in the RTC-Branch 9.
• The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement, in which Joanie and her
brother Allan acknowledged that there was no filiation between them and the
respondent. In return, the respondent agreed to pay ₱2,000,000 to each sibling.
• The RTC approved the compromise agreement in a final and executory
decision dated February 21, 2000.
3. Demurrer to Evidence:
• In the subsequent case (Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB), the respondent
filed a Demurrer to Evidence, arguing that the doctrine of res judicata barred the
case because the issue of filiation had already been resolved by the compromise
agreement.
• The RTC-Branch 24 granted the demurrer and dismissed the case based on res
judicata, emphasizing judicial stability.

Issues
1. **Is the principle of res judicata applicable to judgments based on compromise
agreements involving the civil status of persons?
2. **Did the Compromise Agreement in the earlier case bar the filing of the
subsequent case for filiation?

Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the RTC’s dismissal and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
1. No Res Judicata in Civil Status Cases:
• Res judicata applies when there is a final judgment on the merits by a court with
jurisdiction, and there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
• While there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action in this
case, Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB did not result in a valid judgment
because the compromise agreement it was based on was void.
2. Invalidity of the Compromise Agreement:
• Article 2035 of the Civil Code prohibits compromises on certain matters,
including the civil status of persons, future support, and future legitime.
• The compromise agreement, which stated that Joanie and Allan were not the
children of Jose Ngo Chua, sought to settle the issue of filiation, a matter that
cannot be subject to compromise.
• The agreement also effectively waived Joanie’s rights to future support and
legitime, further violating the law.
3. No Finality of Void Judgments:
• A judgment based on a void agreement is null and void for lack of jurisdiction and
cannot attain finality.
• Courts have no authority to approve agreements that violate the law or public
policy, even if submitted by the parties themselves.
4. Judicial Stability and Substantive Justice:
• While the RTC-Branch 24 emphasized judicial stability, it erred in dismissing the
case solely on the ground of res judicata.
• Substantive justice dictates that Joanie be given the opportunity to present her
case.
5. Evidentiary Value of Admissions in the Compromise Agreement:
• Although the compromise agreement is void, the admission by Joanie in the
earlier agreement (stating there was no filiation) may still be used as evidence in
the subsequent case.
• However, such admission does not conclusively negate her claim and must be
weighed with other evidence.

Disposition
• The RTC-Branch 24’s resolution dismissing the case based on res judicata
was reversed and set aside.
• The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, allowing the
respondent to present evidence.
101. Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia v. Dra. Fely S. Pizarro and Henry Rossi,
G.R. No. 187273

Facts
1. Background
• The case involves a dispute over the partition of the estate of the late Josefa A.
Ara, who died on November 18, 2002.
• Petitioners Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia, along with Ramon A. Garcia
and Henry A. Rossi (plaintiffs a quo), sought to partition Josefa’s properties,
claiming to be her children.
2. Petitioners’ Claim
• Petitioners asserted that Josefa had relationships with different men and bore the
following children:
• Fely S. Pizarro: From Josefa’s first husband, Vicente Salgado.
• Romeo F. Ara: From her relationship with Darwin Gray.
• Ramon and William Garcia: From her marriage to Alfredo Garcia.
• Henry Rossi: From her relationship with Frank Rossi.
• Petitioners alleged that Josefa supported them financially, raised them as her
children, and that they enjoyed the status of her recognized illegitimate children.
3. Respondents’ Position
• Respondent Fely S. Pizarro denied that the petitioners were Josefa’s children,
claiming she was the only legitimate child of Josefa.
• She submitted evidence that William Garcia and Romeo Ara had birth certificates
naming different parents:
• Garcia’s parents were listed as Pedro Garcia and Carmen Bugarin.
• Ara’s parents were listed as Jose Ara and Maria Flores.
4. Properties for Partition
• The properties sought to be partitioned included:
• A lot in Valencia City, Bukidnon, covered by OCT No. T-30333.
• A Tamaraw FX vehicle.
• A bank deposit of ₱108,000.
5. Trial Court Decision (2006)
 • The trial court ruled in favor of all plaintiffs, finding them to be children of Josefa
based on their “open and continuous possession of the status of recognized
illegitimate children.”
• It awarded portions of the estate to each party.
6. Court of Appeals Decision (2008)
• The appellate court reversed the trial court’s finding of filiation for petitioners Ara
and Garcia.
• It ruled that Ara and Garcia failed to provide admissible evidence of their filiation
to Josefa, as required under the Family Code.
• The court upheld the legitimate filiation of Pizarro and the illegitimate filiation of
Rossi, along with Ramon Garcia.

Issues
1. **Can petitioners Ara and Garcia prove their filiation to Josefa through open and
continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children after Josefa’s death?
2. **Was the Court of Appeals correct in sustaining the filiation of respondents
Pizarro and Rossi to Josefa?

Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision.

Ratio Decidendi
1. Proving Filiation Under the Family Code (Articles 172 and 175)
• Illegitimate filiation may be established only through the following:
1. Record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
2. Admission of filiation in a public document or a handwritten private
document signed by the parent.
• Open and continuous possession of status as a child may also be used, but only
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
• Petitioners attempted to prove their filiation after Josefa’s death, which is not
allowed under the Family Code. Their claim was barred by law.
2. Delayed Registration of Birth Certificates
• Petitioners presented delayed birth registrations listing Josefa as their mother.
• The Court gave these documents little weight, as they were issued after Josefa’s
death and after the partition case was filed.
 • The Court relied instead on the original birth certificates submitted by Pizarro,
which named different parents for Ara and Garcia.
3. Insufficient Evidence of Filiation
• Petitioners failed to present valid evidence under Articles 172 and 175 of the
Family Code:
• No public or private document signed by Josefa was submitted.
• Group photographs and testimonies from relatives did not conclusively
establish Josefa’s acknowledgment of the petitioners as her children.
4. Filiation of Respondents Pizarro and Rossi
• The filiation of Pizarro and Rossi was never questioned during the trial and was
supported by evidence, including their birth certificates.
• The Court found no error in the appellate court’s recognition of their status as
Josefa’s children.
5. Finality of the Court of Appeals’ Findings
• The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s decision, emphasizing that
claims of filiation must be supported by specific and admissible evidence,
especially when the parent is already deceased.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the Court of Appeals’ decision was affirmed, declaring
that petitioners Ara and Garcia failed to prove their filiation to Josefa. Only respondents
Pizarro, Rossi, and Ramon Garcia were declared Josefa’s children and entitled to
shares of her estate.
102. Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, represented by Anna Lisa Wang, Petitioner vs.
Cebu City Civil Registrar, Respondent - G.R. No. 159966

Facts

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor represented by his mother, Anna Lisa Wang, filed a
petition seeking to change his name in the civil registry from “Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang” to “Julian Lin Wang.” The petitioner sought to drop “Carulasan,” the maiden
surname of his mother, as his middle name. The petition claimed that the middle name
would cause inconvenience and potential discrimination as the family intended to live in
Singapore, where middle names are not used, and the presence of “Carulasan” might
create confusion and difficulty for Julian and his sibling.

The petition was denied by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57,
which ruled that the reasons cited did not fall under legally recognized grounds for a
change of name. The RTC emphasized that under Article 174 of the Family Code, a
legitimate child has the right to bear the surnames of both parents, and this right cannot
be waived merely for convenience. The trial court advised that the petitioner could
decide to drop his middle name upon reaching the age of majority.

Issue

Can the petitioner drop his middle name (“Carulasan”) for the sake of
convenience and conformity with Singaporean naming practices?

Ruling

No. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the RTC’s decision.

Ratio Decidendi
1. The State’s Interest in Names
The Court reiterated that the State has an inherent interest in the names of its citizens
for purposes of legal identification. While an individual may petition to change their
name, such a change is not a right but a privilege, requiring proper and reasonable
cause.
2. Middle Names and Legal Filiation
Middle names in Philippine law indicate maternal lineage and help distinguish
individuals with similar first and last names. Dropping the middle name could undermine
its legal purpose and create confusion. The middle name “Carulasan” signifies Julian’s
legitimate maternal connection, and its removal would contradict the principles of
Article 174 of the Family Code.
3. Proper Grounds for Name Change
The Court explained that to justify a name change, the petitioner must show compelling
reasons such as:
 • The name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or difficult to pronounce.
• The change is necessary due to legitimation or recognition.
• The change would avoid confusion or social stigma.
The petitioner’s reason—convenience and ease of integration into Singaporean society
—was deemed insufficient.
4. Precedent Cases Distinguished
The Court rejected the petitioner’s reliance on Oshita v. Republic and Calderon v.
Republic, as these cases involved clear and compelling justifications for name
changes:
• In Oshita, the petitioner sought to change her name to avoid anti-Japanese
prejudice after World War II.
• In Calderon, the change was granted to an illegitimate child to eliminate the
stigma of illegitimacy.
In contrast, the petitioner’s justification in this case was neither compelling nor
supported by substantial evidence.
5. Best Interest of the Child
As a minor, Julian might not fully comprehend the implications of changing his name.
The Court ruled that it would be more appropriate for him to make such a decision upon
reaching the age of majority.

Disposition

The petition was denied. The Court held that the petitioner failed to establish
compelling reasons for dropping his middle name and that doing so was inconsistent
with Philippine naming conventions and laws.

SO ORDERED.
103. Grace M. Grande, Petitioner vs. Patricio T. Antonio, Respondent - G.R. No.
206248, February 18, 2014

Facts

Grace M. Grande (petitioner) and Patricio T. Antonio (respondent) were in a relationship

despite Antonio being married. The relationship resulted in the birth of two illegitimate
children: Andre Lewis (born February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (born October 13,
1999). The children’s birth certificates did not name Antonio as their father.

When the relationship ended, Grande left for the United States with the children. In
response, Antonio filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8,
Aparri, Cagayan, for the judicial recognition of the children and other related reliefs.
Antonio appended a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity.

The RTC ruled in Antonio’s favor, recognizing him as the father and granting him joint
parental authority and shared custody of the children. The court also ordered the
children’s surname changed to “Antonio.” Grande was ordered to share in their financial
support (30%) while Antonio shouldered 70%.

Grande appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), asserting that as an illegitimate

children’s mother, she alone had parental authority under the law. The CA modified the
RTC ruling, granting Grande sole custody but upheld the use of Antonio’s surname for
the children.

Grande brought the case to the Supreme Court (SC), questioning whether Antonio
could compel the use of his surname for their illegitimate children without her consent.

Issues
1. Can an illegitimate father compel his children to use his surname upon
recognition of their filiation?
2. Does Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, allow for
mandatory use of the father’s surname for illegitimate children?

Ruling

1. No. The father cannot compel the use of his surname by illegitimate children without
their consent.
2. No. Article 176, as amended, provides that illegitimate children may (but are not
obligated to) use their father’s surname upon recognition of paternity.

Ratio Decidendi
1. Parental Authority and Custody
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, parental authority over illegitimate children is
vested solely in the mother unless she is proven unfit. Since Antonio failed to prove
Grande’s unfitness, the CA was correct in awarding her sole custody.
2. Surname of Illegitimate Children
The Court clarified that the use of the father’s surname by illegitimate children is
permissive, not mandatory. The law uses the word “may,” signifying that the child has
the discretion to decide. Thus, neither the father nor the mother has the authority to
dictate this choice.
3. Best Interest of the Child
The Court emphasized that policies affecting children must prioritize their best interests.
In previous cases, such as Republic v. Capote, the SC ruled that an illegitimate child’s
use of the mother’s surname best served the child’s welfare and identity.
4. Administrative Rules vs. Statutory Law
The Court struck down portions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9255, which mandated the use of the father’s surname upon recognition. These
provisions were deemed inconsistent with the permissive language of Article 176. An
administrative issuance cannot amend or supersede a legislative act.
5. Remand for Children’s Surname Choice
Considering the children’s ages (13 and 15), the Court remanded the case to the RTC
for proper inquiry into their preference for their surname, which should be respected.

Disposition

The petition was partially granted. The CA decision was modified as follows:
1. Sole custody of the children was awarded to Grande.
2. Antonio retained visitation rights twice a week.
3. Both parents were directed to share financial support for the children (70%
Antonio, 30% Grande).
4. The case was remanded to the RTC for the determination of the children’s choice
of surname.
5. Rules 7 and 8 of the IRR of RA 9255, which mandated the use of the father’s
surname, were declared null and void.

SO ORDERED.
104. Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz and Minor Christian Dela Cruz “Aquino,”
Petitioners vs. Ronald Paul S. Gracia, in his Capacity as City Civil Registrar of
Antipolo City, Respondent - G.R. No. 177728 | July 31, 2009

Facts

Petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz and Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino
cohabited as common-law spouses in 2005. During their relationship, Jenie became
pregnant. Dominique, however, passed away on September 4, 2005, two months before
their child, Christian Dela Cruz “Aquino”, was born.

Jenie sought to register the child’s birth using Dominique’s surname, submitting the
child’s Certificate of Live Birth, an Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father
(AUSF), an Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father, and
Dominique’s handwritten Autobiography, which acknowledged Jenie as his wife and
mentioned her pregnancy.

The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, however, denied the application, citing that
Dominique’s paternity could not be acknowledged since he had passed away before the
child’s birth. The registrar relied on Rule 7 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9255, which required a signed public or private
handwritten instrument from the father for the child to use his surname.

Jenie and the child filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), which dismissed the complaint, ruling that the
Autobiography, being unsigned, could not serve as valid recognition of paternity.

Issues
1. Does an unsigned handwritten statement by the deceased father qualify as a
private handwritten instrument under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended
by RA 9255?
2. Can the child use the surname of the deceased father based on the evidence
presented?

Ruling

1. Yes. While the law requires a private handwritten instrument to be signed by the
father, the Court found that Dominique’s unsigned Autobiography, when corroborated
by additional evidence, substantially complies with the requirements of Article 176 of
the Family Code.

2. Yes. The totality of the evidence—including the Autobiography, affidavits, and

testimonial evidence—sufficiently established Dominique’s paternity, entitling the child
to use his surname.
Ratio Decidendi
1. Legal Basis for Recognition
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, allows an illegitimate child to
use the surname of the father if paternity is expressly recognized through:
• The record of birth,
• A public document, or
• A private handwritten instrument.
The law does not explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument must be signed.
However, related provisions (e.g., Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code) imply that
such acknowledgment must bear the father’s signature.
2. Special Circumstances in This Case
The Court held that Dominique’s unsigned Autobiography, corroborated by other
evidence, satisfied the intent of the law. These circumstances include:
• Dominique’s death before the child’s birth, preventing him from signing the
Autobiography.
• The content of the Autobiography, which was handwritten by Dominique,
explicitly recognized his relationship with Jenie and her pregnancy.
• Testimonies and affidavits from Dominique’s family members, including his father
and brother, corroborating his acknowledgment of the child.
3. Best Interest of the Child
The Court underscored the best interest of the child as paramount, emphasizing that
it is in the child’s welfare to bear the surname of his biological father. Denying this right
could perpetuate stigma and dishonor.
4. Rule on Handwritten Instruments
The Court established the following rule regarding the signature requirement:
• If the private handwritten instrument is the sole evidence of paternity, strict
compliance with the signature requirement is necessary.
• If corroborated by other competent evidence, the handwritten instrument need
not be signed, provided it was clearly written by the father.

Disposition

The petition was granted, and the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City was directed
to:
• Enter Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of the child in
his Certificate of Live Birth and
• Record this change in the Register of Births.
SO ORDERED.