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 Introduction to Logic
ird Edition

Michael Genesereth
Stanford University

Eric J. Kao
VMware, Inc.

SYNTHESIS LECTURES ON COMPUTER SCIENCE #8

M
&C Morgan & cLaypool publishers
 Copyright © 2017 by Morgan & Claypool

Introduction to Logic, ird Edition

Michael Genesereth and Eric J. Kao
www.morganclaypool.com

ISBN: 9781627056366 paperback

ISBN: 9781627059992 ebook

DOI 10.2200/S00734ED2V01Y201609CSL008

A Publication in the Morgan & Claypool Publishers series

SYNTHESIS LECTURES ON COMPUTER SCIENCE

Lecture #8
Series ISSN
Synthesis Lectures on Computer Science
Print 1932-1228 Electronic 1932-1686
ABSTRACT
is book is a gentle but rigorous introduction to Formal Logic. It is intended primarily for use
at the college level. However, it can also be used for advanced secondary school students, and it
can be used at the start of graduate school for those who have not yet seen the material.
e approach to teaching logic used here emerged from more than 20 years of teaching
logic to students at Stanford University and from teaching logic to tens of thousands of others
via online courses on the World Wide Web. e approach differs from that taken by other books
in logic in two essential ways, one having to do with content, the other with form.
Like many other books on logic, this one covers logical syntax and semantics and proof
theory plus induction. However, unlike other books, this book begins with Herbrand semantics
rather than the more traditional Tarskian semantics. is approach makes the material consider-
ably easier for students to understand and leaves them with a deeper understanding of what logic
is all about.
In addition to this text, there are online exercises (with automated grading), online logic
tools and applications, online videos of lectures, and an online forum for discussion. ey are
available at
http://intrologic.stanford.edu//.

KEYWORDS
Formal Logic, Symbolic Logic, Propositional Logic, Herbrand Logic, Relational
Logic, deduction, reasoning, Artificial Intelligence
 Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Possible Worlds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.3 Logical Sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Logical Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Logical Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.6 Formalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.7 Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.8 Reading Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.9 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2 Propositional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5 Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6 Example–Natural Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.7 Example–Digital Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.8 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3 Logical Properties and Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Logical Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 Logical Equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 Logical Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.5 Logical Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.6 Connections Between Properties and Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.7 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4 Propositional Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2 Linear Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.3 Hypothetical Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.4 Fitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.5 Reasoning Tips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.6 Soundness And Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.7 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

5 Propositional Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2 Clausal Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3 Resolution Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.4 Resolution Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.5 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

6 Relational Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.2 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.3 Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.5 Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.6 Example–Sorority World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.7 Example–Blocks World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.8 Example–Modular Arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.9 Logical Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6.10 Logical Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.11 Relational Logic and Propositional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.12 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

7 Relational Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.2 Truth Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.3 Semantic Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.4 Boolean Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.5 Non-Boolean Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.6 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
8 Relational Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.2 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.3 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
8.4 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
8.5 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
8.6 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

9 Herbrand Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
9.2 Syntax and Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
9.3 Evaluation and Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
9.4 Example–Peano Arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
9.5 Example–Linked Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
9.6 Example–Pseudo English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
9.7 Example–Metalevel Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
9.8 Undecidability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
9.9 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

10 Herbrand Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
10.2 Non-Compactness and Incompleteness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

11 Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
11.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
11.2 Domain Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
11.3 Linear Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
11.4 Tree Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
11.5 Structural Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
11.6 Multidimensional Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
11.7 Embedded Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
11.8 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

12 Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
12.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
12.2 Clausal Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
12.3 Unification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
12.4 Resolution Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
12.5 Resolution Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
12.6 Unsatisfiability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
12.7 Logical Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
12.8 Answer Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
12.9 Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
12.10 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
 Preface
is book is a first course in Formal Logic. It is intended primarily for use at the college level.
However, it can also be used for advanced secondary school students, and it can be used at the
start of graduate school for those who have not yet seen the material.
ere are just two prerequisites. e book presumes that the student understands sets and
set operations, such as union, intersection, and so forth. It also presumes that the student is
comfortable with symbolic manipulation, as used, for example, in solving high-school algebra
problems. Nothing else is required.
e approach to teaching Logic used here emerged from more than 10 years of experience
in teaching the logical foundations of Artificial Intelligence and more than 20 years of experience
in teaching Logic for Computer Scientists. e result of this experience is an approach that differs
from that taken by other books in Logic in two essential ways, one having to do with content,
the other with form.
e primary difference in content concerns that semantics of the logic that is taught. Like
many other books on Logic, this one covers first-order syntax and first-order proof theory plus
induction. However, unlike other books, this book starts with Herbrand semantics rather than
the more traditional Tarskian semantics.
In Tarskian semantics, we define an interpretation as a universe of discourse together with
a function (1) that maps the object constants of our language to objects in a universe of discourse
and (2) that maps relation constants to relations on that universe. We define variable assignments
as assignments to variables. We define the semantics of quantified expressions as variations on
variable assignments, saying, for example, that a universally quantified sentence is true for a given
interpretation if and only if it is true for every variation of the given variable assignment. It is a
mouthful to say and even harder for students to understand.
In Herbrand semantics, we start with the object constants, function constants, and relation
constants of our language; we define the Herbrand base (i.e. the set of all ground atoms that can be
formed from these components); and we define a model to be an arbitrary subset of the Herbrand
base. at is all. In Herbrand semantics, an arbitrary logical sentence is logically equivalent to the
set of all of its instances. A universally quantified sentence is true if and only if all of its instances
are true. ere are no interpretations and no variable assignments and no variations of variable
assignments.
Although both approaches ultimately end up with the same deductive mechanism, we get
there in two different ways. Deciding to use Herbrand semantics was not an easy to choice to
make. It took years to get the material right and, even then, it took years to use it in teaching
Logic. Although there are some slight disadvantages to this approach, experience suggests that
the advantages significantly outweigh those disadvantages. is approach is considerably easier
for students to understand and leaves them with a deeper understanding of what Logic is all
about. at said, there are some differences between Herbrand semantics and Tarskian semantics
that some educators and theoreticians may find worrisome.
First of all, Herbrand semantics is not compact—there are infinite sets of sentences that
are inconsistent while every finite subset is consistent. e upshot of this is that there are infi-
nite sets of sentences where we cannot demonstrate unsatisfiability with a finite argument within
the language itself. Fortunately, this does not cause any practical difficulties, since in all cases of
practical interest we are working with finite sets of premises.
One significant deficiency of Herbrand semantics vis a vis Tarskian semantics is that with
Herbrand semantics there are restrictions on the cardinality of the worlds that can be axioma-
tized. Since there is no external universe, the cardinality of the structures that can be axiomatized
is equal to the number of ground terms in the language. (To make things easy, we can always
choose a countable language. We can even choose an uncountable language, though doing so
would ruin some of the nice properties of the logic. On the positive side, it is worth noting that in
many practical applications we do not care about uncountable sets. Although there are uncount-
ably many real numbers, remember that there are only countably many floating point numbers.)
More significantly, recall that the Lowenheim-Skolem eorem for Tarskian semantics assures
us that even with Tarskian semantics we cannot write sentences that distinguish models of dif-
ferent infinite cardinalities. So, it is unclear whether this restriction has any real significance for
the vast majority of students.
Herbrand semantics shares most important properties with Tarskian semantics. In the ab-
sence of function constants, the deductive calculus is complete for all finite axiomatizations. In
fact, the calculus derives the exact same set of sentences. When we add functions, we lose this
nice property. However, we get some interesting benefits in return. For one, it is possible with
Herbrand semantics (with functions) to finitely axiomatize arithmetic. As we know from Godel,
this is not possible in a first-order language with Tarskian semantics. e downside is that we
lose completeness. However, it is nice to know that we can at least define things, even though
we cannot prove them. Moreover, as mentioned above, we do not actually lose any consequences
that we are able to deduce with Tarskian semantics.
at’s all for what makes the content of this book different from other books. ere is also
a difference in form. In addition to the text of the book in print and online, there are also online
exercises (with automated grading), some online Logic tools and applications, online videos of
lectures, and an online forum for discussion.
e online offering of the course began with an experimental version early in the 2000s.
While it was moderately successful, we were at that time unable to combine the online mate-
rials and tools and grading program with videos and an online forum, and so we discontinued
the experiment. Recently, it was revived when Sebastian run, Daphne Koller, and Andrew Ng
created technologies for comprehensive offering online courses and began offering highly suc-
cessful online courses of their own. With their technology and the previous materials, it was easy
to create a comprehensive online course in Logic. And this led to completion of this book.
anks also to Pat Suppes, Jon Barwise, John Etchemendy, David-Barker Plummer, and
others at the Stanford Center for the Study of Language and Information for their pioneering
work on online education in Logic. Language, Proof, and Logic (LPL) in particular is a wonder-
ful introduction to Logic and is widely used around the world. Although there are differences
between that volume and this one in theory (especially semantics) and implementation (notably
the use here of browser-based exercises and applications), this volume is in many ways similar to
LPL. In particular, this volume shamelessly copies the LPL tactic of using online worlds (like
Tarski’s World) as a teaching tool for Logic.
And thanks as well to the thousands of students who over the years have had to endure early
versions of this material, in many cases helping to get it right by suffering through experiments
that were not always successful. It is a testament to the intelligence of these students that they
seem to have learned the material despite multiple bumbling mistakes on our part. eir patience
and constructive comments were invaluable in helping us to understand what works and what
does not.
Finally, we need to acknowledge the enormous contributions of a former graduate
student—Tim Hinrichs. He is a co-discoverer of many of the results about Herbrand seman-
tics, without which this book would not have been written.

Michael Genesereth and Eric J. Kao

October 2016
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Logic is one of the oldest intellectual disciplines in human history. It dates back to Aristotle. It
has been studied through the centuries by people like Leibniz, Boole, Russell, Turing, and many
others. And it is still a subject of active investigation today.
We use Logic in just about everything we do. We use the language of Logic to state observa-
tions, to define concepts, and to formalize theories. We use logical reasoning to derive conclusions
from these bits of information. We use logical proofs to convince others of our conclusions.
And we are not alone! Logic is increasingly being used by computers—to prove mathemat-
ical theorems, to validate engineering designs, to diagnose failures, to encode and analyze laws
and regulations and business rules.
Logic is also becoming more common at the interface between man and machine, in “logic-
enabled” computer systems, where users can view and edit logical sentences. ink, for example,
about email readers that allow users to write rules to manage incoming mail messages—deleting
some, moving others to various mailboxes, and so forth based on properties of those messages.
In the business world, eCommerce systems allow companies to encode price rules based on the
product, the customer, the date, and so forth.
Moreover, Logic is sometimes used not just by users in communicating with computer
systems but by software engineers in building those systems (using a programming methodology
known as logic programming ).
is chapter is an overview of Logic as presented in this book. We start with a discussion of
possible worlds and illustrate the notion in an application area known as Sorority World. We then
give an informal introduction to the key elements of Logic—logical sentences, logical entailment,
and logical proofs. We then talk about the value of using a formal language for expressing logical
information instead of natural language. Finally, we discuss the automation of logical reasoning
and some of the computer applications that this makes possible.

1.2 POSSIBLE WORLDS

Consider the interpersonal relations of a small sorority. ere are just four members—Abby, Bess,
Cody, and Dana. Some of the girls like each other, but some do not.
Figure 1.1 shows one set of possibilities. e checkmark in the first row here means that
Abby likes Cody, while the absence of a checkmark means that Abby does not like the other girls
(including herself ). Bess likes Cody too. Cody likes everyone but herself. And Dana also likes the
popular Cody.

Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü

Bess ü

Cody ü ü ü

Dana ü

Figure 1.1: One state of Sorority World.

Of course, this is not the only possible state of affairs. Figure 1.2 shows another possible
world. In this world, every girl likes exactly two other girls, and every girl is liked by just two girls.

Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü ü

Bess ü ü

Cody ü ü

Dana ü ü

Figure 1.2: Another state of Sorority World.

 As it turns out, there are quite a few possibilities. Given four girls, there are sixteen possible
instances of the likes relation—Abby likes Abby, Abby likes Bess, Abby likes Cody, Abby likes
Dana, Bess likes Abby, and so forth. Each of these sixteen can be either true or false. ere are
216 (65,536) possible combinations of these true-false possibilities, and so there are 216 possible
worlds.

1.3 LOGICAL SENTENCES

Let’s assume that we do not know the likes and dislikes of the girls ourselves but we have infor-
mants who are willing to tell us about them. Each informant knows a little about the likes and
dislikes of the girls, but no one knows everything.
Here is where Logic comes in. By writing logical sentences, each informant can express
exactly what he or she knows—no more, no less. For our part, we can use the sentences we have
been told to draw conclusions that are logically entailed by those sentences. And we can use logical
proofs to explain our conclusions to others.
Figure 1.1 shows some logical sentences pertaining to our sorority world. e first sentence
is straightforward; it tells us directly that Dana likes Cody. e second and third sentences tell us
what is not true without saying what is true. e fourth sentence says that one condition holds or
another but does not say which. e fifth sentence gives a general fact about the girls Abby likes.
e sixth sentence expresses a general fact about Cody’s likes. e last sentence says something
about everyone.

Dana likes Cody.

Abby does not like Dana.
Dana does not like Abby.
Bess likes Cody and Dana.
Abby likes everyone that Bess likes.
Cody likes everyone who likes her.
Nobody likes herself.

Figure 1.3: Logical sentences describing Sorority World.

Sentences like these constrain the possible ways the world could be. Each sentence divides
the set of possible worlds into two subsets, those in which the sentence is true and those in which
the sentence is false. Believing a sentence is tantamount to believing that the world is in the first
set. Given two sentences, we know the world must be in the intersection of the set of worlds in
which the first sentence is true and the set of worlds in which the second sentence is true. Ideally,
when we have enough sentences, we know exactly how things stand.
Effective communication requires a language that allows us to express what we know, no
more and no less. If we know the state of the world, then we should write enough sentences to
communicate this to others. If we do not know which of various ways the world could be, we
need a language that allows us to express only what we know. e beauty of Logic is that it gives
us a means to express incomplete information when that is all we have and to express complete
information when full information is available.

1.4 LOGICAL ENTAILMENT

Logical sentences can sometimes pinpoint a specific world from among many possible worlds.
However, this is not always the case. Sometimes, a collection of sentences only partially constrains
the world. For example, there are four different worlds that satisfy the sentences in Figure 1.3,
viz. the ones shown in Figure 1.4.

Abby Bess Cody Dana Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü Abby ü ü

Bess ü Bess ü

Cody ü ü ü Cody ü ü ü

Dana ü Dana ü

Abby Bess Cody Dana Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü Abby ü ü

Bess ü Bess ü

Cody ü ü ü Cody ü ü ü

Dana ü ü Dana ü ü

Figure 1.4: Four states of Sorority World.

 Even though a set of sentences does not determine a unique world, it is often the case that
some sentences are true in every world that satisfies the given sentences. A sentence of this sort
is said to be a logical conclusion from the given sentences. Said the other way around, a set of
sentences logically entails a conclusion if and only if every world that satisfies the sentences also
satisfies the conclusion.
What can we conclude from the bits of information in Figure 1.3? Quite a bit, as it turns
out. For example, it must be the case that Bess likes Cody. Also, Bess does not like Dana. ere
are also some general conclusions that must be true. For example, in this world with just four
girls, we can conclude that everybody likes somebody. Also, everyone is liked by somebody.

Bess likes Cody.

Bess does not like Dana.
Everybody likes somebody.
Everybody is liked by somebody.

Figure 1.5: Conclusions about Sorority World.

One way to check whether a set of sentences logically entails a conclusion is to examine the
set of all worlds in which the given sentences are true. For example, in our case, we notice that,
in every world that satisfies our sentences, Bess likes Cody, so the statement that Bess likes Cody
is a logical conclusion from our set of sentences.

1.5 LOGICAL PROOFS

Unfortunately, determining logical entailment by checking all possible worlds is impractical in
general. ere are usually many, many possible worlds; and in some cases there can be infinitely
many.
e alternative is logical reasoning, viz. the application of reasoning rules to derive logical
conclusions and produce logical proofs, i.e., sequences of reasoning steps that leads from premises
to conclusions.
e concept of proof, in order to be meaningful, requires that we be able to recognize certain
reasoning steps as immediately obvious. In other words, we need to be familiar with the reasoning
“atoms” out of which complex proof “molecules” are built.
One of Aristotle’s great contributions to philosophy was his recognition that what makes a
step of a proof immediately obvious is its form rather than its content. It does not matter whether
you are talking about blocks or stocks or sorority girls. What matters is the structure of the facts
with which you are working. Such patterns are called rules of inference.
As an example, consider the reasoning step shown below. We know that all Accords are
Hondas, and we know that all Hondas are Japanese cars. Consequently, we can conclude that all
Accords are Japanese cars.
 All Accords are Hondas.
All Hondas are Japanese.
erefore, all Accords are Japanese.
Now consider another example. We know that all borogoves are slithy toves, and we know
that all slithy toves are mimsy. Consequently, we can conclude that all borogoves are mimsy.
What’s more, in order to reach this conclusion, we do not need to know anything about borogoves
or slithy toves or what it means to be mimsy.
All borogoves are slithy toves.
All slithy toves are mimsy.
erefore, all borogoves are mimsy.
What is interesting about these examples is that they share the same reasoning structure,
viz. the pattern shown below.
All x are y .
All y are z .
erefore, all x are z .
e existence of such reasoning patterns is fundamental in Logic but raises important ques-
tions. Which patterns are correct? Are there many such patterns or just a few?
Let us consider the first of these questions. Obviously, there are patterns that are just plain
wrong in the sense that they can lead to incorrect conclusions. Consider, as an example, the (faulty)
reasoning pattern shown below.
All x are y .
Some y are z .
erefore, some x are z .
Now let us take a look at an instance of this pattern. If we replace x by Toyotas and y by
cars and z by made in America, we get the following line of argument, leading to a conclusion that
happens to be correct.
All Toyotas are cars.
Some cars are made in America.
erefore, some Toyotas are made in America.
On the other hand, if we replace x by Toyotas and y by cars and z by Porsches, we get a line
of argument leading to a conclusion that is questionable.
All Toyotas are cars.
Some cars are Porsches.
erefore, some Toyotas are Porsches.
 What distinguishes a correct pattern from one that is incorrect is that it must *always* lead
to correct conclusions, i.e., they must be correct so long as the premises on which they are based
are correct. As we will see, this is the defining criterion for what we call deduction.
Now, it is noteworthy that there are patterns of reasoning that are sometimes useful but
do not satisfy this strict criterion. ere is inductive reasoning, abductive reasoning, reasoning by
analogy, and so forth.
Induction is reasoning from the particular to the general. e example shown below illus-
trates this. If we see enough cases in which something is true and we never see a case in which it
is false, we tend to conclude that it is always true.
I have seen 1000 black ravens.
I have never seen a raven that is not black.
erefore, every raven is black.
Now try red Hondas.
Abduction is reasoning from effects to possible causes. Many things can cause an observed
result. We often tend to infer a cause even when our enumeration of possible causes is incomplete.
If there is no fuel, the car will not start.
If there is no spark, the car will not start.
ere is spark.
e car will not start.
erefore, there is no fuel.
What if the car is in a vacuum chamber?
Reasoning by analogy is reasoning in which we infer a conclusion based on similarity of
two situations, as in the following example.
e flow in a pipe is proportional to its diameter.
Wires are like pipes.
erefore, the current in a wire is proportional to diameter.
Now try price.
Of all types of reasoning, deduction is the only one that guarantees its conclusions in all
cases. It has some very special properties and holds a unique place in Logic. In this book, we
concentrate entirely on deduction and leave these other forms of reasoning to others.

1.6 FORMALIZATION
So far, we have illustrated everything with sentences in English. While natural language works
well in many circumstances, it is not without its problems. Natural language sentences can be
complex; they can be ambiguous; and failing to understand the meaning of a sentence can lead
to errors in reasoning.
 Even very simple sentences can be troublesome. Here we see two grammatically legal sen-
tences. ey are the same in all but the last word, but their structure is entirely different. In the
first, the main verb is blossoms, while in the second blossoms is a noun and the main verb is sank.
e cherry blossoms in the Spring.
e cherry blossoms in the Spring sank.
As another example of grammatical complexity, consider the following excerpt taken from
the University of Michigan lease agreement. e sentence in this case is sufficiently long and
the grammatical structure sufficiently complex that people must often read it several times to
understand precisely what it says.

e University may terminate this lease when the Lessee, having made application and
executed this lease in advance of enrollment, is not eligible to enroll or fails to enroll in the
University or leaves the University at any time prior to the expiration of this lease, or for
violation of any provisions of this lease, or for violation of any University regulation rela-
tive to resident Halls, or for health reasons, by providing the student with written notice of
this termination 30 days prior to the effective date of termination, unless life, limb, or prop-
erty would be jeopardized, the Lessee engages in the sales of purchase of controlled substances
in violation of federal, state or local law, or the Lessee is no longer enrolled as a student,
or the Lessee engages in the use or possession of firearms, explosives, inflammable liquids,
fireworks, or other dangerous weapons within the building, or turns in a false alarm, in
which cases a maximum of 24 hours notice would be sufficient.

As an example of ambiguity, suppose I were to write the sentence ere’s a girl in the room
with a telescope. See Figure 1.6 for two possible meanings of this sentence. Am I saying that there
is a girl in a room containing a telescope? Or am I saying that there is a girl in the room and she
is holding a telescope?

Figure 1.6: ere’s a girl in the room with a telescope.

 Such complexities and ambiguities can sometimes be humorous if they lead to interpreta-
tions the author did not intend. See the examples below for some infamous newspaper headlines
with multiple interpretations. Using a formal language eliminates such unintentional ambiguities
(and, for better or worse, avoids any unintentional humor as well).

Crowds Rushing to See Pope Trample 6 to Death

Journal Star, Peoria, 1980

Scientists Grow Frog Eyes and Ears British Left Waffles On Falkland Islands
e Daily Camera, Boulder, 2000

Food Stamp Recipients Turn to Plastic Indian Ocean Talks

e Miami Herald, 1991 e Plain Dealer, 1977

Fried Chicken Cooked in Microwave Wins Trip

e Oregonian, Portland, 1981

Figure 1.7: Various newspaper headlines.

As an illustration of errors that arise in reasoning with sentences in natural language, con-
sider the following examples. In the first, we use the transitivity of the better relation to derive a
conclusion about the relative quality of champagne and soda from the relative quality of cham-
pagne and beer and the relative quality or beer and soda. So far so good.
Champagne is better than beer.
Beer is better than soda.
erefore, champagne is better than soda.
Now, consider what happens when we apply the same transitivity rule in the case illustrated
below. e form of the argument is the same as before, but the conclusion is somewhat less
believable. e problem in this case is that the use of nothing here is syntactically similar to the
use of beer in the preceding example, but in English it means something entirely different.
Bad sex is better than nothing.
Nothing is better than good sex.
erefore, bad sex is better than good sex.
Logic eliminates these difficulties through the use of a formal language for encoding infor-
mation. Given the syntax and semantics of this formal language, we can give a precise definition
for the notion of logical conclusion. Moreover, we can establish precise reasoning rules that pro-
duce all and only logical conclusions.
 In this regard, there is a strong analogy between the methods of Formal Logic and those
of high school algebra. To illustrate this analogy, consider the following algebra problem.

Xavier is three times as old as Yolanda. Xavier’s age and Yolanda’s age add up to twelve.
How old are Xavier and Yolanda?

Typically, the first step in solving such a problem is to express the information in the form
of equations. If we let x represent the age of Xavier and y represent the age of Yolanda, we can
capture the essential information of the problem as shown below.

x 3y D 0
x C y D 12

Using the methods of algebra, we can then manipulate these expressions to solve the prob-
lem. First we subtract the second equation from the first.

x 3y D 0
x C y D 12
4y D 12

Next, we divide each side of the resulting equation by 4 to get a value for y . en substi-
tuting back into one of the preceding equations, we get a value for x .

xD9
yD3

Now, consider the following logic problem.

If Mary loves Pat, then Mary loves Quincy. If it is Monday and raining, then Mary loves
Pat or Quincy. If it is Monday and raining, does Mary love Quincy?

As with the algebra problem, the first step is formalization. Let p represent the possibility
that Mary loves Pat; let q represent the possibility that Mary loves Quincy; let m represent the
possibility that it is Monday; and let r represent the possibility that it is raining.
With these abbreviations, we can represent the essential information of this problem with
the following logical sentences. e first says that p implies q , i.e., if Mary loves Pat, then Mary
loves Quincy. e second says that m and r implies p or q , i.e., if it is Monday and raining, then
Mary loves Pat or Mary loves Quincy.
 p ) q
m^r ) p_q

As with Algebra, Formal Logic defines certain operations that we can use to manipulate
expressions. e operation shown below is a variant of what is called Propositional Resolution. e
expressions above the line are the premises of the rule, and the expression below is the conclusion.
p1 ^ ... ^ pk ) q1 _ .. _ ql
r1 ^ ... ^ rm ) s1 _ ... _ sn
p1 ^ ... ^ pk ^ r1 ^ ... ^ rm ) q1 _ ... _ ql _ s1 _ ... _ sn
ere are two elaborations of this operation. (1) If a proposition on the left hand side of
one sentence is the same as a proposition on the right hand side of the other sentence, it is okay to
drop the two symbols, with the proviso that only one such pair may be dropped. (2) If a constant
is repeated on the same side of a single sentence, all but one of the occurrences can be deleted.
We can use this operation to solve the problem of Mary’s love life. Looking at the two
premises above, we notice that p occurs on the left-hand side of one sentence and the right-hand
side of the other. Consequently, we can cancel the p and thereby derive the conclusion that, if is
Monday and raining, then Mary loves Quincy or Mary loves Quincy.
p ) q
m^r ) p_q
m^r ) q_q
Dropping the repeated symbol on the right hand side, we arrive at the conclusion that, if
it is Monday and raining, then Mary loves Quincy.
m^r ) q_q
m^r ) q
is example is interesting in that it showcases our formal language for encoding logical
information. As with algebra, we use symbols to represent relevant aspects of the world in ques-
tion, and we use operators to connect these symbols in order to express information about the
things those symbols represent.
e example also introduces one of the most important operations in Formal Logic, viz.
Resolution (in this case a restricted form of Resolution). Resolution has the property of being
complete for an important class of logic problems, i.e., it is the only operation necessary to solve
any problem in the class.

1.7 AUTOMATION
e existence of a formal language for representing information and the existence of a corre-
sponding set of mechanical manipulation rules together have an important consequence, viz. the
possibility of automated reasoning using digital computers.
 e idea is simple. We use our formal representation to encode the premises of a problem
as data structures in a computer, and we program the computer to apply our mechanical rules
in a systematic way. e rules are applied until the desired conclusion is attained or until it is
determined that the desired conclusion cannot be attained. (Unfortunately, in some cases, this
determination cannot be made; and the procedure never halts. Nevertheless, as discussed in later
chapters, the idea is basically sound.)
Although the prospect of automated reasoning has achieved practical realization only in
the last few decades, it is interesting to note that the concept itself is not new. In fact, the idea of
building machines capable of logical reasoning has a long tradition.
One of the first individuals to give voice to this idea was Leibnitz. He conceived of “a
universal algebra by which all knowledge, including moral and metaphysical truths, can some day
be brought within a single deductive system.” Having already perfected a mechanical calculator
for arithmetic, he argued that, with this universal algebra, it would be possible to build a machine
capable of rendering the consequences of such a system mechanically.
Boole gave substance to this dream in the 1800s with the invention of Boolean algebra and
with the creation of a machine capable of computing accordingly.
e early twentieth century brought additional advances in Logic, notably the invention of
the predicate calculus by Russell and Whitehead and the proof of the corresponding completeness
and incompleteness theorems by Godel in the 1930s.
e advent of the digital computer in the 1940s gave increased attention to the prospects for
automated reasoning. Research in artificial intelligence led to the development of efficient algo-
rithms for logical reasoning, highlighted by Robinson’s invention of resolution theorem proving
in the 1960s.
Today, the prospect of automated reasoning has moved from the realm of possibility to that
of practicality, with the creation of logic technology in the form of automated reasoning systems,
such as Vampire, Prover9, the Prolog Technology eorem Prover, Epilog, and others.
e emergence of this technology has led to the application of logic technology in a wide
variety of areas. e following paragraphs outline some of these uses.
Mathematics. Automated reasoning programs can be used to check proofs and, in some
cases, to produce proofs or portions of proofs.
Engineering. Engineers can use the language of Logic to write specifications for their prod-
ucts and to encode their designs. Automated reasoning tools can be used to simulate designs and
in some cases validate that these designs meet their specification. Such tools can also be used to
diagnose failures and to develop testing programs.
Database Systems. By conceptualizing database tables as sets of simple sentences, it is pos-
sible to use Logic in support of database systems. For example, the language of Logic can be used
to define virtual views of data in terms of explicitly stored tables, and it can be used to encode
constraints on databases. Automated reasoning techniques can be used to compute new tables, to
detect problems, and to optimize queries.
 Data Integration e language of Logic can be used to relate the vocabulary and structure
of disparate data sources, and automated reasoning techniques can be used to integrate the data
in these sources.
Logical Spreadsheets. Logical spreadsheets generalize traditional spreadsheets to include log-
ical constraints as well as traditional arithmetic formulas. Examples of such constraints abound.
For example, in scheduling applications, we might have timing constraints or restrictions on who
can reserve which rooms. In the domain of travel reservations, we might have constraints on
adults and infants. In academic program sheets, we might have constraints on how many courses
of varying types that students must take.
Law and Business. e language of Logic can be used to encode regulations and business
rules, and automated reasoning techniques can be used to analyze such regulations for inconsis-
tency and overlap.

1.8 READING GUIDE

Although Logic is a single field of study, there is more than one logic in this field. In the three
main units of this book, we look at three different types of logic, each more sophisticated than
the one before.
Propositional Logic is the logic of propositions. Symbols in the language represent “condi-
tions” in the world, and complex sentences in the language express interrelationships among these
conditions. e primary operators are Boolean connectives, such as and, or, and not.
Relational Logic expands upon Propositional Logic by providing a means for explicitly talk-
ing about individual objects and their interrelationships (not just monolithic conditions). In order
to do so, we expand our language to include object constants and relation constants, variables and
quantifiers.
Herbrand Logic takes us one step further by providing a means for describing worlds with
infinitely many objects. e resulting logic is much more powerful than Propositional Logic and
Relational Logic. Unfortunately, as we shall see, many of the nice computational properties of
the first two logics are lost as a result.
Despite their differences, there are many commonalities among these logics. In particular,
in each case, there is a language with a formal syntax and a precise semantics; there is a notion of
logical entailment; and there are legal rules for manipulating expressions in the language.
ese similarities allow us to compare the logics and to gain an appreciation of the fun-
damental tradeoff between expressiveness and computational complexity. On the one hand, the
introduction of additional linguistic complexity makes it possible to say things that cannot be
said in more restricted languages. On the other hand, the introduction of additional linguistic
flexibility has adverse effects on computability. As we proceed though the material, our attention
will range from the completely computable case of Propositional Logic to a variant that is not at
all computable.
 One final comment. In the hopes of preventing difficulties, it is worth pointing out a poten-
tial source of confusion. is book exists in the meta world. It contains sentences about sentences;
it contains proofs about proofs. In some places, we use similar mathematical symbology both for
sentences in Logic and sentences about Logic. Wherever possible, we try to be clear about this
distinction, but the potential for confusion remains. Unfortunately, this comes with the territory.
We are using Logic to study Logic. It is our most powerful intellectual tool.

RECAP
Logic is the study of information encoded in the form of logical sentences. Each logical sentence
divides the set of all possible world into two subsets—the set of worlds in which the sentence
is true and the set of worlds in which the set of sentences is false. A set of premises logically
entails a conclusion if and only if the conclusion is true in every world in which all of the premises
are true. Deduction is a form of symbolic reasoning that produces conclusions that are logically
entailed by premises (distinguishing it from other forms of reasoning, such as induction, abduction,
and analogical reasoning ). A proof is a sequence of simple, more-or-less obvious deductive steps
that justifies a conclusion that may not be immediately obvious from given premises. In Logic, we
usually encode logical information as sentences in formal languages; and we use rules of inference
appropriate to these languages. Such formal representations and methods are useful for us to use
ourselves. Moreover, they allow us to automate the process of deduction, though the computability
of such implementations varies with the complexity of the sentences involved.

1.9 EXERCISES
1.1. Consider the state of the Sorority World depicted below.

Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü ü

Bess ü

Cody ü ü ü

Dana ü ü
 For each of the following sentences, say whether or not it is true in this state of the world.
(a) Abby likes Dana.
(b) Dana does not like Abby.
(c) Abby likes Cody or Dana.
(d ) Abby likes someone who likes her.
(e) Somebody likes everybody.
1.2. Come up with a table of likes and dislikes for the Sorority World that makes all of the
following sentences true. Note that there is more than one such table.
Dana likes Cody.
Abby does not like Dana.
Bess likes Cody or Dana.
Abby likes everyone whom Bess likes.
Cody likes everyone who likes her.
Nobody likes herself.
1.3. Consider a set of Sorority World premises that are true in the four states of Sorority
World shown in Figure 1.4. For each of the following sentences, say whether or not it is
logically entailed by these premises.
(a) Abby likes Bess or Bess likes Abby.
(b) Somebody likes herself.
(c) Everybody likes somebody.
1.4. Say whether or not the following reasoning patterns are logically correct.
(a) All x are z . All y are z . erefore, some x are y .
(b) Some x are y . All y are z . erefore, some x are z .
(c) All x are y . Some y are z . erefore, some x are z .
 CHAPTER 2

Propositional Logic
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Propositional Logic is concerned with propositions and their interrelationships. e notion of a
proposition here cannot be defined precisely. Roughly speaking, a proposition is a possible condi-
tion of the world that is either true or false, e.g., the possibility that it is raining, the possibility
that it is cloudy, and so forth. e condition need not be true in order for it to be a proposition.
In fact, we might want to say that it is false or that it is true if some other proposition is true.
In this chapter, we first look at the syntactic rules that define the language of Propositional
Logic. We then introduce the notion of a truth assignment and use it to define the meaning
of Propositional Logic sentences. After that, we present a mechanical method for evaluating
sentences for a given truth assignment, and we present a mechanical method for finding truth
assignments that satisfy sentences. We conclude with some examples of Propositional Logic in
formalizing Natural Language and Digital Circuits.

2.2 SYNTAX
In Propositional Logic, there are two types of sentences—simple sentences and compound sen-
tences. Simple sentences express simple facts about the world. Compound sentences express log-
ical relationships between the simpler sentences of which they are composed.
Simple sentences in Propositional Logic are often called proposition constants or, sometimes,
logical constants. In what follows, we write proposition constants as strings of letters, digits, and
underscores (“_”), where the first character is a lower case letter. For example, raining is a propo-
sition constant, as are rAiNiNg, r32aining, and raining_or_snowing. Raining is not a proposition
constant because it begins with an upper case character. 324567 fails because it begins with a
number. raining-or-snowing fails because it contains hyphens (instead of underscores).
Compound sentences are formed from simpler sentences and express relationships among the
constituent sentences. ere are five types of compound sentences, viz. negations, conjunctions,
disjunctions, implications, and biconditionals.
A negation consists of the negation operator : and an arbitrary sentence, called the target.
For example, given the sentence p , we can form the negation of p as shown below.

(:p )
 A conjunction is a sequence of sentences separated by occurrences of the ^ operator and
enclosed in parentheses, as shown below. e constituent sentences are called conjuncts. For ex-
ample, we can form the conjunction of p and q as follows.

(p ^ q )

A disjunction is a sequence of sentences separated by occurrences of the _ operator and

enclosed in parentheses. e constituent sentences are called disjuncts. For example, we can form
the disjunction of p and q as follows.

(p _ q )

An implication consists of a pair of sentences separated by the ) operator and enclosed in

parentheses. e sentence to the left of the operator is called the antecedent, and the sentence to
the right is called the consequent. e implication of p and q is shown below.

(p ) q )

A biconditional is a combination of an implication and a reverse implication. For example,

we can express the biconditional of p and q as shown below.

(p , q )

Note that the constituent sentences within any compound sentence can be either simple
sentences or compound sentences or a mixture of the two. For example, the following is a legal
compound sentence.

((p _ q ) ) r )

One disadvantage of our notation, as written, is that the parentheses tend to build up and
need to be matched correctly. It would be nice if we could dispense with parentheses, e.g., sim-
plifying the preceding sentence to the one shown below.

p_q)r

Unfortunately, we cannot do without parentheses entirely, since then we would be unable

to render certain sentences unambiguously. For example, the sentence shown above could have
resulted from dropping parentheses from either of the following sentences.

((p _ q ) ) r )
(p _ (q ) r ))

e solution to this problem is the use of operator precedence. e following table gives a
hierarchy of precedences for our operators. e : operator has higher precedence than ^; ^ has
higher precedence than _; and _ has higher precedence than ) and ,.
 :
^
_
),
In sentences without parentheses, it is often the case that an expression is flanked by op-
erators, one on either side. In interpreting such sentences, the question is whether the expression
associates with the operator on its left or the one on its right. We can use precedence to make this
determination. In particular, we agree that an operand in such a situation always associates with
the operator of higher precedence. When an operand is surrounded by operators of equal prece-
dence, the operand associates to the right. e following examples show how these rules work in
various cases. e expressions on the right are the fully parenthesized versions of the expressions
on the left.
:p^q ((: p ) ^ q )
p ^ :q (p ^ (: q ))
p^q_r ((p ^ q ) _ r )
p_q^r (p _ (q ^ r ))
p)q)r (p )(q ) r ))
p)q,r (p ) (q , r ))
Note that just because precedence allows us to delete parentheses in some cases does not
mean that we can dispense with parentheses entirely. Consider the example shown earlier. Prece-
dence eliminates the ambiguity by dictating that the sentence without parentheses is an implica-
tion with a disjunction as antecedent. However, this makes for a problem for those cases when
we want to express a disjunction with an implication as a disjunct. In such cases, we must retain
at least one pair of parentheses.
We end the section with two simple definitions that are useful in discussing Propositional
Logic. A propositional vocabulary is a set of proposition constants. A propositional language is the
set of all propositional sentences that can be formed from a propositional vocabulary.

2.3 SEMANTICS
e treatment of semantics in Logic is similar to its treatment in Algebra. Algebra is unconcerned
with the real-world significance of variables. What is interesting are the relationships among the
values of the variables expressed in the equations we write. Algebraic methods are designed to
respect these relationships, independent of what the variables represent.
In a similar way, Logic is unconcerned with the real world significance of proposition con-
stants. What is interesting is the relationship among the truth values of simple sentences and the
truth values of compound sentences within which the simple sentences are contained. As with
Algebra, logical reasoning methods are independent of the significance of proposition constants;
all that matter is the form of sentences.
 Although the values assigned to proposition constants are not crucial in the sense just de-
scribed, in talking about Logic, it is sometimes useful to make truth assignments explicit and to
consider various assignments or all assignments and so forth. Such an assignment is called a truth
assignment.
Formally, a truth assignment for a propositional vocabulary is a function assigning a truth
value to each of the proposition constants of the vocabulary. In what follows, we use the digit
1 as a synonym for true and 0 as a synonym for false; and we refer to the value of a constant or
expression under a truth assignment i by superscripting the constant or expression with i as the
superscript.
e assignment shown below is an example for the case of a propositional vocabulary with
just three proposition constants, viz. p , q , and r .
pi D 1
qi D 0
ri D 1
e following assignment is another truth assignment for the same vocabulary.
pi D 0
qi D 0
ri D 1
Note that the formulas above are not themselves sentences in Propositional Logic. Proposi-
tional Logic does not allow superscripts and does not use the = symbol. Rather, these are informal,
metalevel statements about particular truth assignments. Although talking about Propositional
Logic using a notation similar to that of Propositional Logic can sometimes be confusing, it al-
lows us to convey meta-information precisely and efficiently. To minimize problems, in this book
we use such meta-notation infrequently and only when there is little chance of confusion.
Looking at the preceding truth assignments, it is important to bear in mind that, as far as
logic is concerned, any truth assignment is as good as any other. Logic itself does not fix the truth
assignment of individual proposition constants.
On the other hand, given a truth assignment for the proposition constants of a language,
logic does fix the truth assignment for all compound sentences in that language. In fact, it is
possible to determine the truth value of a compound sentence by repeatedly applying the following
rules.
If the truth value of a sentence is true, the truth value of its negation is false. If the truth
value of a sentence is false, the truth value of its negation is true.
' :'
1 0
0 1
e truth value of a conjunction is true if and only if the truth values of its conjuncts are
both true; otherwise, the truth value is false.
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Title: Uit de dierenwereld van het water

Author: A. J. C. Snijders

Release date: June 14, 2022 [eBook #68311]

Language: Dutch

Original publication: Netherlands: W. Hilarius Wzn, 1916

Credits: Frank van Drogen, Harry Lamé and the Online Distributed
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK UIT DE

DIERENWERELD VAN HET WATER ***
 Zie de Opmerkingen aan het einde
van deze e-tekst.

Uit de Dierenwereld van het Water

 I.

Dr. A. J. C SNIJDERS

UIT DE DIERENWERELD
:-: VAN HET WATER :-:

SCHETSEN IN WOORD EN BEELD VAN

HET LEVEN DER LAGERE DIERSOORTEN
 TWEEDE GOEDKOOPE DRUK

UITGEGEVEN EN GEDRUKT DOOR W. HILARIUS Wzn.

TE ALMELO (IN HET JAAR 1916.)
 INHOUD.

Volgorde der platen. Bladzijden.

Inleiding 1
I. Eenige zoetwaterbewoners 3
II. Het leven in slooten en beekjes 20
III. In den stillen waterplas 35
IV. Leven en bedrijf in vijvers en zacht
vlietende wateren 43
V. Een merkwaardig driemanschap van den
zeebodem 53
VI. De gepantserde roofridders der zee 59
VII. Een excentriek gezelschap 68
VIII. Krabbelende strandvonders en
huppelende gymnasten 73
IX. Kleurenweelde in den oceaan 85
X. Het sprookje van den kraken 101
XI. Allerlei merkwaardige zeeslakken 109
XII. Een bonte verzameling 119
XIII. Uit het rijk der schelpdieren 131
XIV. Een stekelige familie 149
 XV. De sterrenwereld van den zeebodem 160
XVI. Drijvende wonderen der zee 165
XVII. Een onderzeesche bloementuin 173
XVIII. Sierlijke zeebewoners 183
XIX. De kleine bouwmeesters van den oceaan 189
XX. Sponsen 197
 ALFABETISCH REGISTER
DER NEDERLANDSCHE EN LATIJNSCHE NAMEN.

Bladz.
Achtarm, gewone 107
Achterkieuwigen 109, 112
Actinia equina 176
Actiniën 176
Actinoloba dianthus 176
Adamsia palliata 178
Adamsia Rondeletti 178
Aeolis 114
Aequorea forscalea 183
Alciope 92
Alcyonium digitatum 193
Alcyonium palmatum 193
Alikruik 120
Amber-horenslak 40
Ancylus fluviatilis 17
Anemonia sulcata 175
Antedon rosacea 158
Antipathes larix 194
Aphrodite aculeata 89
Aplysia depilans 112
Aporrhaïs 122
Apus productus 39
Arca barbata 139
Arenia, broze 92
Arenia, fragilis 92
Arenicola piscatorum 90
Argonauta argo 108
Argyroneta aquatica 45
Arkschelpen 139
Armpoliep, bruine 23
Armpoliep, groene 23
Armpootige weekdieren 99
Ascidiën 96
Asellus aquaticus 44
Astacus fluviatilis 27
Astarta 137
Asterias glacialis 162
Asterias rubens 162
Astraea radians 195
Astroïdes calycularis 195
Astropecten aurantiacus 162
Aulacostomum gulo 37
Avicula 135
Badspons, gewone 199
Balanus tintinnabulum 55
Bandtongigen 120
Barnsteenslak 40
Bekerkwal 171
Bekerpoliep 171
Berenkreeft 67
Beroë Forskaliï 170
Bisschopsmuts 127
Blaasdrager, in ’t water zwevende 180
Blaashorenslak 42
Blaaskwallen 180
Blaasslak, gespikkelde 113
Bladkreeften 64
Bladpootigen 39
Blauwslak 125
Bloedegel, gewone 9
Bloedkoraal 192
Bloedzuiger, medicinale 48, 58
Bloedzuiger, zwarte 37
Bloempoliepen 171, 173, 189
Bonellia viridis 94
Boogkrabben 75
Boomblad, vertakte 188
Boorpissebed 82
Boorschelpen 144
Boorspons 200
Boorworm 145
Borstelwormen 39, 85
Botryllus violaceus 97
Branchipus 43
Bron-blaashoren 42
Bryozoa 7
Buccinum 128
Buikpootigen 19
Buiskwallen 180
Buispoliepen 186
Bulla ampulla 113
Bythinia tentaculata 52
Calappa granulata 68
Callianira bialata 170
Callianira, tweevleugelige 170
Cancer pagurus 75, 76
Carcinas moenas 75
Cardium edule 141
Carmarina hastata 184
Cassis testiculum 124
Cerianthus membranaceus 176
Cerithium 122
Cestum Veneris 171
Charybdea grandis 169
Chiton elegans 111
Cidaris papillata 151
Ciona intestinalis 97
Clavellina lepadiformis 97
Clepsine bioculata 10
Clione borealis 116
Columbella mercatoria 128
Comatula rosacea 158
Conus marmoratus 128
Corallium rubrum 192
Cordylophora lacustris 184
Crangon vulgaris 64
Crania anomala 100
Crinoïeden 157
Cucumaria doliolum 156
Cyclas rivicola 32
Cynthia microcosmos 97
Cypraea mauritiana 123
Cypraea moneta 123
Cypraea tigris 123
Cytherea dione 143
Dadelslak 127
Darmholtedieren 20, 165, 183
Dendrophyllia ramea 188
Dentalium elephantinum 117
Diepslak 52
Doliolum tritonis 99
Dolium galea 124
Dolium perdix 124
Doodshoofdschelp, ongelijke 100
Doômansduim 193
Dorippe lanata 69
Doris tuberculata 114
Draadslak 114
Draadwormen 49
Dreissena polymorpha 15
Driehoekkrabben 77
Dromia vulgaris 70
Duifje 128
Dunschaal 142
Echinocardium cordatum 153
Echinus esculentus 152
Edelkoraal, roode 192
Edelkoraal, zwarte 194
Eendenmossel 53
Eenspierigen 133
Elysia viridis 115
Emarginula 130
Ephydatia fluviatilis 26
Eremietkreeft 177
Erwtenschelp 15
Euplectella aspergillum 201
Euspongia officinalis 199
Fissurella graeca 129
Flustra foliacea 99
Fluweelslak, groene 115
Fuikhorenslak 127
Fungia patella 195
Galatea strigosa 72
Gammarus pulex 3
Gaper, stompe 143
Gaperschelpen 143
Garnaal 64
Gatschelp 100
Geleikorst, stervormige 97
Geleikorst, vioolblauwe 97
Geodia gigas 201
Geweikoraal 194
Glasbuisspons 201
Glassponsen 199, 201
Glasspons van Siebold 202
Gordius aquaticus 49
Gorgonia verrusca 192
Goudkam 88
Haarster, rozeroode 158
Haarsterren 157
Haliotis tuberculata 111
Hamerschelpen 134
Hartschelpen 141
Heliactis bellis 177
Helmslak 124
Hermione hystrix 89
Hermione, stekelvarken 89
Hippopodius luteus 182
Hirudo medicinalis 48
Holothuria tubulosa 154
Holothuriën 153
Holtedieren 20, 165, 183
Homarus vulgaris 59
Hoornkoraal, lariksvormig 194
Hoornkoraal, wrattig 192
Hoornslakken 122
Hoornsponsen 199
Hoornwier, bladerig 99
Hyalea tridentata 117
Hyalonema Sieboldiï 202
Hydra fusca 23
Hydra viridis 23
Hydractinia echinata 178
Hydractinia, gestekelde 178
 68
Ilea nucleus
Ilea, pitvormige 68
Inachus chiragra 79
Inachus Kämpferi 80
Infusiediertjes 35
Inktvisch, gewone 106
Inktvisschen 101, 102
Isocardia 137
Jacobsmantel 135
Janthina communis 125
Kalkkokerwormen 87
Kalksponsen 199
Kamkieuwigen 119
Kamkieuwwormen 88
Kamschelp, gemarmerde 140
Kamschelpen 135
Kamster, oranjekleurige 162
Kaphorenslak 17
Kauri’s 123
Kegelslak, gemarmerde 128
Kelk-sterkoraal 195
Keverslak, sierlijke 111
Kielpootigen 115
Kieuwloozen 113
Kieuwpoot 39, 43
Kiezelsponsen 199, 200
Kinkhoren 128
Klapschelp 136
Klitkomkommer, klevende 156
Klokdiertje 36
Kluizenaarskreeft 177
Knotspoliepen 186
Kogelegel, gekorrelde 152
Kokerworm, goudharige 88
Kokerworm, spiraalvormige 86
Kokhanen, Kokkels 141
Koordworm 49
Koppootigen 101, 102
Koraaldieren 189
Krabben 73
Kraken, gewone 101, 107
Kreeften 3, 27, 59
Kreeften, kortstaartige 74
Kreeften, tienpootige 59
Kristalslak 117
Kruisdraagster 93
Kuifcelpoliep 5
Kurkspons 200
Kwallen 165
Kwalpoliepen 167, 183, 184
Lambrus mediterraneus 80
Langoeste 63
Langworm 93
Lans-tulband, wrattige 151
Lazarusklep 136
Lederkoraal 193
Lepas anatifera 53
Limnaea auricularia 51
Limnaea palustris 51
Limnaea peragra 51
Limnaea stagnalis 41
Limnoria terebrans 82
Limulus moluccensis 56
Limulus polyphemus 56
Lineus gesserensis 93
Lineus longissimus 93
Lithodomus dactylus 140
Littorina littorea 120
Loligo vulgaris 107
Lucernaria Leuckarti 171
Lucina jamaicensis 142
Lumbriculus variegatus 38
Mactra solida 142
Madrepora corymbosa 194
Maja squinado 77
Mantel-aktinie 178
Manteldieren 95
Mantelschelpen 135
Medusahoofd 164
Meduse, spiesvormige 184
Medusen 165
Meerknotspoliep 186
Meleagrina margaritifera 135
Meloenkwal 170
Mesheft 144
Messcheede 144
Millepora nodosa 187
Milleporidae 187
Mitra episcopalis 127
Modiola 139
Moerashorenslak, levendbarende 18
Moeraspoelslak 51
Mosdiertjes 5, 99
Mossel, gewone 138
Mossels 10, 131
Muntslakken 123
Murex brandaris 110
Murex erinaceus 110
Murex tenuïspina 110
Muts-meduse 184
Muts, Poolsche 124
Mya arenaria 143
Mya truncata 143
Mytilus edulis 138
Naaktkieuwigen 113
Narrenkap 137
Nassa reticulata 127
Natica 121
Nautilus pompilius 108
Nemertes gracilis 93
Nemertinen 93
Nephelis vulgaris 9
Nephrops 67
Neptunuskrab 80
Neptunus Sayi 80
Nereïs pelagica 90
Neteldieren 27, 165
Netelkwallen 168
Netelkoraal, celvormig 99
Nootje 140
Notenslak 127
Nucula rostrata 140
Obliehorens 113
Octopus maximus 107
Octopus vulgaris 107
Oculina diffusa 195
Oerdieren 35
Oester 11, 133
Olifantstand 117
Olijfslak 127
Oliva 127
Oogkoraal 195
Ophiotrix fragilis 163
Ophiura albida 163
Orchestia littorea 82
Ossenhart 137
Ostrea edulis 133
Paalworm 145
Paardevoet, gele 182
Paarlemoer-nautilus 108
Paarlemoerneut 140
Paarlemoerschelp 135
Paddestoelkoraal, schotelvormig 195
Pagurus bernhardus 177
Palaemon squilla 66
Palinurus vulgaris 63
Palmipes pentagonaster 162
Paludina vivipara 18
Papiernautilus, gewone 108
Parelmossel 135
Parelschelp 135
Patella vulgata 109
Patrijs 124
Pecten jacobaeus 135
Pecten maximus 136
Pectinaria auricoma 88
Pectunculus glycymeris 140
Pelagia noctiluca 168
Pelgrimsschelp 136
Pelikaansvoet 122
Penaeus 66
Pennatula phosphorea 192
Pentacrinus caput Medusae 164
Peperschelp 142
Perspectiefslakken 126
Phallusia, bultige 97
Phallusia, doorzichtige 97
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