G.R. No.

187587

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 187654

WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented

by its Board of Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 promulgated on 29 April 2009 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.
THE FACTS

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P.

Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The
military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).

On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos)

issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which
excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national
shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani,
which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine
Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.

2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded
barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition
under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a

handwritten addendum, which reads:

"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was
published in the Official Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-
quoted addendum.

Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President

Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated
Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2
of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A.
274 and 730.

Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was

issued on the same day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas
of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus,
Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323
creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further
unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures
at Fort Bonifacio.

On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio

Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as
COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the
reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-
000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable
land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject
lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s
facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide
occupants.4

On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners

Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially
praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to
the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in
Western Bicutan.5

Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the

Petition and declaring the portions of land in question alienable and
disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General
dissenting.7

The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos

was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore,
controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the
negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that
Proclamation

No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative
powers, it could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere
executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have
superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was
issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power
had ceased.

In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral

stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is
indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of
the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the
court to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid
of judicial addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the
Commission had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted
in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be
tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.

Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which

was denied by the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse

the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.

Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered
the assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby

GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24,
2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in
COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are
DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent
motions filed by respondents are likewise

DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)

Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their
respective Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.

THE ISSUES

Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID
NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE
HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID
PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172
LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY
MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
 III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS
TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO
RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES.14

On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO.
2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT
FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE
PUBLICATION.15

Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the
publication of the said law.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.

Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western

Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were anchored on the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege
that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land
when he made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation
No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not
included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette.

The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified

and disposable lies in the determination of whether the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In relation
thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is

indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise
provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different
effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of
the law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the
requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the
requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case
Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its

discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his
separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did
not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not
apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend
due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws
that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly
provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short
period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it
would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a
failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its
existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.

xxxx

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a
law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot
be said that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body
politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even
in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an
ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders

promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

xxxx

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding

that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects
only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be
published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be
published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

xxxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all

since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number
of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g.,
"with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement.1âwphi1none This is not even substantial compliance. This
was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for
FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and
interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

xxxx

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on
a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and
effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative

Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in
the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus,
whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is
not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the
law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon.
Trajano,18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however,
that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for
enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of
separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to
apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or
where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the
task of legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial
interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to
include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby

DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby
LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is
DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Penned by Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with

Associate Justices Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court)
and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring, rollo (G.R. No. 187587). pp. 62-
82.

2 CA rollo, p. 664.

3
Vol. 82, No. 5, pp. 801-805.

4
Supra note 2, at 68-69.

5
Id. at 72-76.

6
Id. at 205-212.

7
Id. at 213-218.

8
Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 192 Phil. 221, 231
(1981).

9
CA rollo, pp. 112-113.

10 Id. at pp. 219-222.

11
Id. at 1285.

12
Rollo (G.R. No. 187587), pp. 39-61.

13
Rollo (G.R. No. 187654), pp. 3-26.

14
Rollo (G.R. No. 187587), p. 47.

15
Rollo (G.R. No. 187654 ), pp. 15-16.

16
230 Phil. 528, 533-538 (1986).

17
Aparri v. CA, 212 Phil. 215.224 (1984).

18 369 Phil. 617. 626 ( 1999).

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