No.

of Printed Pages : 12 MEC-101

MASTER OF ARTS (ECONOMICS)

(MEC)
Term-End Examination
December, 2022
MEC-101 : MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Time : 3 Hours Maximum Marks : 100

Note : Answer questions from each Section as per

instructions given.

Section—A

Note : Answer any two questions from this Section.

2×20=40

1. (A) A consumer has the utility function over

goods x and y, u ( x , y ) = 12x 2 y4 . Let the
price of goods x be given by px . Let the
price of goods y be given by py and let
income be given by M.
(a) What is the slope of the consumer’s
indifference curve at the consumption
bundle (1, 1) ? 5

P. T. O.
 [2] MEC-101

(b) Derive the consumer’s ordinary

demand function for goods x and y. 5

(c) If we have=
px 2,
= py 2 and M = 24,

compute the utility maximising

consumption bundle. 5

(B) Suppose the demand curve is given by

Q = 10 – P. What is the total consumer’s
surplus from consuming 6 units of the
goods ? 5

2. (a) Explain that perfectly competitive markets

satisfy the conditions for Pareto efficiency ?

10

(b) How does the utility-possibility frontier

relate to the contract curve ? 6

(c) State and discuss the first fundamental

welfare theorem. 4

3. (a) Differentiate between static and dynamic

game. 8

(b) What is an efficiency wage ? Explain the

concept of efficiency wage model. 12
 [3] MEC-101

4. Consider the production function and the cost

function :

q0 : q = 500 L1/ 4 K 3/ 4 , C = WL + r K,

where q is the output, C is the cost, L is the

labour, K is the capital and W and r are the
wages and rental respectively.
(a) Device the profit maximizing level of factor
inputs (K & L). 6
(b) Derive the cost minimizing level of factor
inputs (K & L). 6
(c) Do the 2 sets of factor inputs (K & L) in
parts (a) and (b) same ? Explain. 3
(d) Verify Shephard’s lemma from the cost
function. 5
Section—B
Note : Attempt any five questions from this Section.

5×12=60

5. (a) What is the difference between a

homogeneous and a differentiated
oligopoly ? 6
(b) A monopolist is able to separate two
markets. In one market the demand can be
expressed as Q 1 = 14 – P 1 . In the second
P. T. O.
 [4] MEC-101

market, the demand is Q 2 = 20 – 2P 2 . Let

the monopolists’ marginal cost (MC) be ` 4.
Derive the equilibrium output level and
profit of both the markets under price
discrimination. 6

6. (a) “The excess capacity is inversely related to

the price elasticity of demand faced by
a monopolistically competitive firm.
Explain. 6

(b) Which characteristic of the perfectly

competitive market is responsible for the
long-run equilibrium condition of P = min.
LAC ? 6

7. (a) A duopoly faces an inverse demand curve

P = 160 – 2Q. Both the firms in the
industry have constant cost of ` 10 per unit
of output. In Cournot equilibrium how
much output will each duopolist sell ? 6

(b) Discuss the important features of the

Shapiro-Stiglitz efficiency wage model. 6
 [5] MEC-101

8. (a) When can you have efficiency in production

and in consumption and yet there is still
room for a Pareto improvement ? 6

(b) Explain the concept of moral hazard

through suitable example. 6

9. (a) In games of imperfect and complete

information when would you consider
backward induction procedure ? 4

(b) You have assets of ` 10,000 and are facing a

loss of ` 3,600 with a probability of 0.002.

You are indifferent between paying ` G for

insurance protection and assuming the risk
of loss personally. You value total
assets of amount w ≥0 according to

the utility function u (w ) = w.

Determine G. 6

(c) Explain the concept of Independence

Axiom of choice under uncertainty. 2

10. (a) Explain Prisoner’s dilemma game with the

help of an example. 5

(b) Explain the mixed strategy of the game. 7

P. T. O.
 [6] MEC-101

11. (a) Interpret the “Single-crossing” assumption

in the context of education and cost of low
ability workers. 6

(b) Explain the concept of perfect Bayesian

equilibrium. 6

12. Write short notes on any three of the following :

4 each

(i) Different types of price discrimination

(ii) Cobweb model

(iii) Pooling and separating equilibrium

(iv) Bilateral monopoly

 [7] MEC-101

MEC-101

dyk fu".kkr (vFkZ'kkÏ)

(,e- bZ- lh-)

l=kkar ijh{kk

fnlEcj] 2022

,e-bZ-lh--101 % O;f"V vkfFkZd fo'ys"k.k

le; % 3 ?k.Vs vf/dre vad % 100

uksV % izR;sd Hkkx esas fn;s x;s funsZ'kkuqlkj iz'uksa ds mÙkj

nhft,A

Hkkxµd

uksV % bl Hkkx ls fdUgha nks iz'uksa ds mÙkj nhft,A

2×20=40

1- (d) OkLrqvksa x vkSj y ij ,d miHkksDrk dk

mi;ksfxrk iQyu u ( x , y ) = 12x 2 y4 gSA ekuk
P. T. O.
 [8] MEC-101

fd oLrq x dk ewY; px }kjk] oLrq y dk

ewY; py }kjk vkSj vk; dks M }kjk n'kkZ;k
tkrk gSA

(v) miHkksx lewg (1] 1) ij miHkksDrk dk

vf/eku oØ D;k <ky n'kkZ;sxk \ 5
(c) oLrqvksa x rFkk y gsrq miHkksDrk dk
lkekU; ek¡x iQyu O;qRiUu dhft,A 5
(l) ;fn ges=a px 2,= py 2 vkSj M = 24
Kkr gks] rks miHkksx lewg dks vf/dre
djrh mi;ksfxrk dh x.kuk dhft,A 5
([k) ekuk fd ek¡x oØ Q = 10 − P fn;k x;k gSA
oLrq dh 6 bdkb;ksa ds miHkksx ls dqy
miHkksDrk cpr D;k gS \ 5

2- (d) iSjsVks izHkko gsrq 'krs± iw.kZr% izfrLi/hZ cktkjksa dks

larq"V djrh gSa] O;k[;k dhft,A 10
([k) mi;ksfxrk&'kD; lhekjs[kk fdl izdkj ladqpu
oØ ls lEcfU/r gS \ 6
(x) izFke vk/kjHkwr dY;k.k izes; dks crkb, rFkk
bl ij ppkZ dhft,A 4
 [9] MEC-101

3- (d) LFkSfrd rFkk izkoSfxd [ksy ds chp foHksn

dhft,A 8
([k) n{krk etnwjh D;k gS \ n{krk etnwjh izfreku
dh vo/kj.kk dk o.kZu dhft,A 12
4- fuEufyf[kr mRiknu iQyu ,oa ykxr iQyu ij fopkj
dhft, %
q = 500L1/ 4 K 3/ 4 C = wL + rK

tgk¡ q mRiknu dks] C ykxr dks] L Je dks] K

iw¡th dks ,oa W rFkk r Øe'k% etnwjh rFkk yxku

dks O;Dr djrs gSaA
(d) lk/u vknkvksa ds vf/dre ykHk Lrj
(K rFkk L) dks O;qRiUu dhft,A 6
([k) lk/u vknkvksa ds ykxr U;wurehdj.k Lrj
(K rFkk L) dks O;qRiUu dhft,A 6
(x) D;k lk/u vknkvksa ds 2 leqPp; (K rFkk L)

Hkkx (d) ,oa ([k) esa leku gSa \ le>kb,A

3
(?k) ykxr iQyu ls 'kSiQkMZ ySek dks lR;kfir
dhft,A 5
P. T. O.
 [ 10 ] MEC-101

Hkkx&[k
uksV % bl Hkkx ls fdUgha ik¡p iz'uksa ds mÙkj nhft,A
5×12=60

5- (d) fdlh le:i vkSj ,d foHksnhd`r vYikf/dkj

ds chp D;k vUrj gS \ 6
([k) ,d ,dkf/dkjh nks cktkjksa dks i`Fkd~ djus esa
;ksX; gSA izFke cktkj esa ek¡x Q=
1 14 − P1 ls
iznf'kZr dh tk ldrh gSA f}rh; cktkj esa ek¡x
Q=
2 20 − 2P2 gSA ,dkf/dkjh dh lhekUr
ykxr ` 4 gSA dher foHksn ds vUrxZr nksuksa
cktkjksa ds larqyu mRiknu Lrj rFkk ykHk dk
vkdyu dhft,A 6

6- (d) ¶,d ,dkf/dkjh izfr;ksxh iQeZ }kjk lkeuk dh

xbZ ek¡x dh dher yksp vfrfjDr {kerk ls
O;qRØe :i ls lEcfU/r gksrh gSA¸ Li"V
dhft,A 6
([k) iw.kZr% izfrLi/kZRed cktkj dk dkSu&lk
vfHky{k.k P = U;wure LAC dh nh?kZdkyhu
larqyu 'krZ ds fy, mÙkjnk;h gS \ 6
 [ 11 ] MEC-101

7- (d) ,d };kf/dkjh myVs ek¡x oØ

=P 160 − 2 Q dk lkeuk djrk gSA nksuksa iQeks±
dh m|ksx esa fLFkj ykxr ` 10 izfr bdkbZ
mRiknu gSA dwuksZ larqyu esa izR;sd };kf/dkjh
fdruk mRiknu cspsxh \ 6
([k) 'kSfijks&fLVfXyt n{krk osru fun'kZ ds egRoiw.kZ
vfHky{k.kksa dh ppkZ dhft,A 6
8- (d) ,slk dc gksxk fd mRiknu ,oa miHkksx esa izHkko
gks vkSj fiQj Hkh fdlh iSjsVks lq/kj dh xqatkb'k
gks \ 6
([k) ,d mi;qDr mnkgj.k dk iz;ksx dj uSfrd }U}
dh ladYiuk dks le>kb,A 6
9- (d) viw.kZ tkudkjh;qDr rFkk iw.kZ lwpukvksa okys
[ksyksa esa i`"B&izos'k izfØ;k ij vki dc fopkj
djsaxs \ 4
([k) vkids ikl ` 10]000 dh lEifÙk;k¡ gSa vkSj
vki ` 3]600 ds uqdlku dk lkeuk dj jgs gSa
ftldh izkf;drk (probability) 0.002 gSA vki
chek laj{k.k gsrq izhfe;e jkf'k G dk Hkqxrku
djus rFkk tksf[ke ogu djus ds chp rVLFk gSaA
mi;ksfxrk iQyu u ( w ) = w ds vuqlkj vki
dqy lEifÙk;ksa dh jkf'k dk ewY; w ≥ 0
yxkrs gSaA G dk vkdyu dhft,A 6
P. T. O.
 [ 12 ] MEC-101

(x) vfuf'prrk ds vUrxZr p;u ds Lor% fl¼

fl¼kUr dh vo/kj.kk dh O;k[;k dhft,A 2
10- (d) canh dh nqfo/k [ksy dks mnkgj.k dh lgk;rk
ls Li"V dhft,A 5
([k) [ksy dh fefJr ;qfDr dh O;k[;k dhft,A 7
11- (d) fuEu ;ksX;rk Jfedksa dh f'k{kk ,oa ykxr ds
lUnHkZ esa ¶,dy&dj.k¸ vo/kj.kk dh O;k[;k
dhft,A 6
([k) iw.kZ cs;fl;u larqyu dh vo/kj.kk dks Li"V
dhft,A 6
12- fuEufyf[kr esa ls fdUgha rhu ij laf{kIr fVIif.k;k¡
fyf[k, % izR;sd 4
(i) dher foHksn ds fofHkUu izdkj
(ii) edM+tky (rarqtky) izfr:i
(iii) la;kstudkjh ,oa fo;kstudkjh larqyu
(iv) f}i{kh; ,dkf/dkj

MEC–101