205R

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

AT THE PEACE PALACE,
THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS

THE 2024 PHILIP C JESSUP INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT COURT

COMPETITION

CASE CONCERNING THE STERREN FORTY

THE REPUBLIC OF ANTRANO

APPLICANT
v.
THE KINGDOM OF REMISIA
RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL FOR RESPONENT.

Contents
INDEX OF AUTHORITY..............................................................................................................iii
STATEMENT OF JURSIDICTION..............................................................................................vii
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED........................................................................................................viii
STATEMENT OF FACTS..............................................................................................................ix
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS....................................................................................................xiii
PLEADINGS...................................................................................................................................1
ISSUE 1...........................................................................................................................................1
WHETHER ANTRANO LACKS STANDING TO BRING THE MATTER OF THE
DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY OF THE “STERREN FORTY” TO THIS COURT............1
ISSUE 2...........................................................................................................................................7
REMISA DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT DEPRIVED THE
“STERREN FORTY” OF THEIR REMISIAN CITIZENSHIP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
DCA.................................................................................................................................................7
ISSUE 3.........................................................................................................................................10
WHETHER ANTRANO VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT DENIED SAKI
SHAW, A REMISIAN CITIZEN, ACCESS TO REMISIAN CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVES
WHILE SHE WAS HELD PRISONER IN ANTRANO...............................................................10
ISSUE 4.........................................................................................................................................12
WHETHER REMISIA DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW BY REFUSING TO
ALLOW DR. MALEX TO ENTER REMISIA.............................................................................12
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF...............................................................................................................17

ii
 INDEX OF AUTHORITY.

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 1954 ……………………………. …..1

League of Nations Treaty Series 89, 99. …………………………………………………...……..7

Statute of the International Court of Justice. ……………………………. ……………………....8

Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED),……..……..8

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)……………………………………....9

Universal Declaration of Human Right …………………………………………………………10

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. ………………………...…………………….…10, 11

U.N. Charter…...…...…………………………………...……………………………11, 12, 13, 14

Convention On The Privileges And Immunities Of The United Nations………………………..13

UN DOCUMENTS

Breach of an International Obligation.” United Nations Legislative Series, 22 Oct. 2013, pp. 97–
124, https://doi.org/10.18356/fc4a4c1c-en. Accessed 8 Jan.
2024…………………………….......3

United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect.” Www.un.org,
www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml#:~:text=The%20ICJ%20has%20also
%20stated.
………………………………………………………………………………………………...6

DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS

iii
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion)
[1971] ICJ Rep 16, [131]
………………………………………………………………………………3, 12, 13

Belgium v. Spain 1962 I.C.J. 50, [“Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited
(Belgium v. Spain) (New Application: 1962)..………………………………………………….2,
5

South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa): Preliminary
Objections, [1962]…………………………………………………………………………………6

Paraguay v. United States of America[1998] ICJ Rep 2 ………………………………………...10

United States of American v Tehran ICJ GL No 64 ………………………………………….10

India v. Pakistan ICGJ 515 (ICJ 2017) ………………………………………………………….11

Emin Huseynov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2) ……………………………. ……………………………...9

Questions Relating to Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium. V. Senegal.), Judgment,

2012 I.C.J. 422, (July 20)…..………………………………. ……………………………………6

Germany v. United States of America [2001] ICJ Rep 466 ……………………………………..10

ARTICLES AND WRITINGS

Standing and Involvement in Legal Proceedings – LawRight. www.lawright.org.au/legal-

information/going-to-court/standing-and-involvement-in-legal-proceedings. Accessed 8 Jan.
2024. ……………………………………………………………………………………………...2

Wikipedia Contributors. “Standing (Law).” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 27 Jan. 2020,

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standing_(law). Accessed 8 Jan. 2023. ……………………………………
3

Locus Standi: Meaning and Essential Ingredients of Locus Standi.” Legal Study Material, 6 Dec.
2021,legalstudymaterial.com/locus-standi-meaning-and-essential-ingredients-of-locus-standi.

iv
Accessed 8 Jan. 2023.
…………………………………………………………………………….3

Chow, Pok Yin S. “On Obligations Erga Omnes Partes.

“https://www.law.georgetown.edu/international-law-journal/wp-content/uploads/sites/
21/2021/06/GT-GJIL210018.pdf. .................................................................7

The New UNSCR on Iran: Does It Bind the United States (and Future Presidents)? John
Bellinger, Lawfare, July 18, 2015
…………………………………………………………………………...14

Jochen Abr. Frowein, Unilateral Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions – A Threat to

Collective Security?, in Volkmar Götz, Peter Selmer, & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., Liber Amicorum
Günther Jaenicke—Zum 85. Geburtstag 99 (Berlin: Springer, 1998)
……………………………………………………………………………………………………14

Michael Byers, Agreeing to Disagree: Security Council Resolution 1441 and Intentional
Ambiguity, 10 Global Governance 165–186 (2004).
…………………………………………….14

BOOKS AND TREATISES

Hillier, T. (1998). Sourcebook on Public International Law (1 st ed.). Routledge-Cavendish.

https://doi.org/10.4324/9781843143802. ……………………………............................................3

The International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally

Wrongful Acts (2001)
……………………………………………………………………………..4

Andrea, Gattini. “Actio Popularis.” Max Planck Encylopedia of International Procedural Law, 1
Feb. 2019, doi:10.1093/law-mpeipro/e1167.013.1167……………………………………………6

Louis Sohn and Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The Movement of Persons Across Borders’ (1992) 23
Studies in Transnational Legal Policy ……………………………………………………………
12

v
Daniel H. Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, ch. 4
(2009); The Security Council as a Legal Hegemon, 43 Geo. J. Int’l L. 225 (2012)……………….
……………………………………………………………………………17Justin Gruenberg, An
Analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions: Are All Countries Treated Equally? 41
Case Western Reserve J. Int’l L. 469 (2009) …………………………….... 14

Paul Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 901, 902 (2002)
………………………………………………………………………………………….…14

vi
 STATEMENT OF JURSIDICTION

The Republic of Antrano (“Antrano”) and the Kingdom of Remisia (“Remisia”) respectfully
submit the present dispute to the International Court of Justice, pursuant to article 40, paragraph
1 of the Statute of the Court and by virtue of a Statement of Agreed Facts (Compromis) jointly
communicated to the Court on the September 15, 2023. The Parties agree to accept as final and
binding the Judgment of this Court and shall execute it in its entirety and in good faith.

vii
 QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Antrano lacks standing to bring the matter of the deprivation of nationality
of the “Sterren Forty” to this Court
2. Whether Remisia did not violate international law when it deprived the “Sterren
Forty” of their Remisian citizenship in accordance with the DCA.
3. Whether Antrano violated international law when it denied Saki Shaw, a Remisian
citizen, access to Remisian consular representatives while she was held prisoner in
Antrano.
4. Whether Remisia did not violate international law by refusing to allow Dr. Malex to
enter Remisia.

viii
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

Background

The Republic of Antrano consists of one large and 16 smaller islands within the Mahali
Archipelago. Elected in 1951, Muna Songida was the first president of Antrano. The
Kingdom of Remisia is a constitutional monarchy approximately 11,000 kilometers from the
Mahali Archipelago. The monarchy is deeply venerated by the two million citizens of
Remisia, and its current head of state, Queen Khasat. Remisia’s Constitution of 1923
empowers the Queen to appoint the Prime Minister. The current Prime Minister is Prime
Minister Sezan.

Disrespect to the Crown Act

The Disrespect to the Crown Act (DCA) of 1955 exists in line with the provision of the
Constitution of Remisia for the preservation of respect for the monarch. It provides that
anyone who defames, insults, or threatens the reigning monarch shall be punished with
imprisonment of up to five years. And if the court is satisfied that the subject has shown
himself by that act or speech to be disloyal to the Crown, it may deprive the guilty party of
his Remisian citizenship.

“Naturalization by Investment Program” (NIP)

The Naturalization by Investment Program (NIP) is based on the Naturalization by

Investment Act (NIA) which authorized the government to grant citizenship to any applicant
“who purchases real property, contributes to the National Infrastructure Development Fund,
or otherwise makes a direct investment in the Remisian economy, of [€500,000] or more.”
Enjoying the benefits under the NIA does not require that the applicant maintain a residence
in Remisia. These benefits include getting Remisian citizenship as well as obtaining consular
and diplomatic assistance in any of the 140 countries where Remisia has an embassy or
consulate.

Copper and emerald mining

In 1989, geologists discovered substantial primary deposits of cobalt in the northern

provinces of Remisia and the government began mining small amounts of ore for processing
ix
and export. This was, however, limited, pending further investigation into the environmental
consequences. Shaw Corporation (“ShawCorp”), is a multinational minerals and mining
conglomerate. In 2015, Ms. Saki Shaw, the head of Lithos Limited, a wholly owned
subsidiary of ShawCorp, signed an agreement with the Prime Minister of Remisia creating a
joint venture, styled Lithos-Remisia Cooperative (LRC). In July 2016, LRC applied to the
Ministry of Mines for permits to begin cobalt mining at three sites in northern Remisia. After
a standard due diligence was conducted, finding no substantial negative environmental
consequences, approval was given for all three locations to begin operations. Again, in
October 2019, LRC sought licenses to open five new mines in Remisia. Again, following a
due diligence review by the Ministry of Mines, four out of the five applications were
approved.

The Sterren Forty

Grieved by an alleged risk to the health of Remisians, as well as posterity, the “Isidre League
of Student Activists” (ILSA), called for a nationwide one-day strike on high school and
university campuses. More than 30,000 students walked out of classes and students marched
outside their school buildings carrying signs denouncing the licenses and demanding that all
LRC operations be halted. However, these did not put a halt to the activities of the LRC. On
February 8, 2020, protests resumed throughout Remisia, with students alleging the Queen of
backing a threat to the health of Remisians for her ‘friendship’ with Saki Shaw. When the
demonstrations were protracted, Prime Minister Sezan asked the police to restore calm.
Initial requests to the students to disperse peacefully from mine sites were made and ignored.
Then, the police resorted to more definite interventions for the preservation of national order.
Some of the protesters, labelled “Sterren Forty” by the press formed a human chain at the
gates of Sterren Palace, blocking entrances and exits, and were arrested. However, Queen
Khasat was not in residence at the time of these arrests. The protesters, including the Sterren
Forty, were arrested and charged to court under the DCA. Most protesters convicted were
sentenced to between one and three years of imprisonment; however, the trial court imposed
five-year sentences on each of the Sterren Forty and ordered revocation of their citizenship.
On appeal, the appeals were rejected in a unanimous opinion by the Supreme Court, which

x
concluded that the evidence of their disloyalty was manifest and that the sentences were fully
consistent with domestic and international law. Also, a video with the hashtag
#FreeTheSterrenForty, went viral on multiple global social media platforms.

Resolution against Statelessness

Marking the 40th anniversary of the death of Muna Songida, President Iyali of Antrano gave
a speech, denouncing statelessness and particularly with respect to the Sterren Forty. This
remark, as well as contacts from Antrano to resolve differences, was punctually protested as
meddling in the internal affairs of Remisia by Remisia’s Foreign Minister. While Antrano
served as President of the United Nations Security Council, the Antranan Ambassador to the
UN submitted a memorandum claiming that application of the DCA to the ILSA protesters in
Remisia gave rise to a “dispute … which might lead to international friction”. On 11 April,
the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 99997, which established the UN
Inspection Mission to Remisia (UNIMR).

Ms Saki Shaw and Naturalized Citizenship

Ms. Saki Shaw is a citizen of Molvania. Her grandmother, Pevara Shaw, founded the Shaw
Corporation (“ShawCorp”), a multinational minerals and mining conglomerate. In April
2014, the Molvanian national newspaper Alitheia published a series of investigative reports
into ShawCorp and its subsidiaries which alleged that the company and its principals had
engaged in money-laundering and tax evasion. The Minister of Justice therefore subpoenaed
Saki Shaw, among others, for documents and testimony. However, Authorities were unable to
serve the subpoena on Ms. Shaw who was staying in Italy at the time. On 7 March 2022, the
Attorney-General of Molvania annulled the 2014 subpoena for Saki Shaw, and in its place
issued an arrest warrant charging her with bank fraud, money laundering, and obstructing the
course of justice. On 15 March, Saki Shaw was detained in Duniya, the capital of Antrano, by
Antranan police on the authority of the extradition request from Molvania. As a Remisian
citizen, she demanded to see the Remisian consul, but was denied of the request. Antrano
stated, in unfulfillment of their international obligation, that Antrano does not recognise

xi
“purchased citizenship’’. Notwithstanding Remisian intervention, Antrano kept Saki Shaw in
custody until she collapsed, dying of a heart attack.

The UN Inspection Mission to Remisia (UNIMR)

The UNIMR is based on Resolution 99997. Dr. Tulous Malex was selected to lead the
mission. Remisia however denounced willingness to entertain such inspection, noting it as
unnecessary meddling in its internal affairs. When on 9 August 2022, Dr. Malex boarded a
flight to Remisia and arrived at the Kamil International Airport, he was denied entry and
placed on the next plane back to New York.

Conclusion

On 15 August, the Remisian foreign minister contacted his Antranan counterpart by phone.
And following a two-hour conversation, they issued a joint announcement to submit all legal
disputes to the International Court of Justice. Both states are parties to the relevant
conventions and treaties. The terms of the Special Agreement to be submitted to the Registrar
of the Court were successfully negotiated.

xii
 SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS.

The respondent’s argument against the legal standing of the applicant to institute this matter is
based on the nonexistence of the basic requirement of sufficient connection between the wrong
and the applicant, as well as the absence of the breach of any international obligation. The
respondent humbly submits that legal standing requires the establishment of sufficient nexus
between the injury and the applicant, and that such nexus is not present in the instant case. We
submit further that there is no breach of any international obligation for which the respondent is
responsible. And, thus, that an application of the principle of actio popularis for the proof of
locus standi will not avail the applicant.

II
The respondent’s argument is premised on the grounds that the deprival of the Nationality
followed the express provision of international law. The Sterren forty were afforded the liberty to
contest the deprivation before the court of law, up to the supreme court for appeals. Additionally,
respondent submits that the actions of the Sterren Forty contravenes their duty of loyalty towards
the crown as provided for in the constitution, and the DCA. Lastly, their actions are categorized
as a threat to state interest, that is, economic interest of the state, since the mines generates
revenue to the Kingdom of Remisia, and the actions of the prosecuted citizen potentially disrupts
the activities at the mines.

III
Antrano violated international law by denying Saki Shaw, a Remisian citizen, access to Remisian
consular representatives while she was held prisoner. This contravenes Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, as she had the right to communicate with and be visited by
consular officers. Despite Saki Shaw’s request for consul access, Antrano’s denial goes against
established legal principles, risking international friction. The obligation for consular access,
affirmed by various legal cases, ensures a fair trial for foreign nationals, and Antrano’s actions
are deemed a violation of international law.

xiii
 IV

Remisia is a sovereign State and it has the power to regulate the movement of persons within and
across its borders. Thus, it is the prerogative of Remisia to admit or deny anyone entry into it
territory. This inherent right is not affected by resolution of the Security Council because the
wordings Resolution 99997 does not show an intention of the Security Council to create a
binding legal obligation on the Kingdom of Remisia to allow Dr Malex into its territory.

Alternatively, the Disrespect to the Crown Act (DCA) compiles with International Law and this
makes the deprivation of the citizenship of the Sterren Forty a matter within the domestic
jurisdiction of Remesia which means it cannot be submitted for settlement underr he UN Charter
because the UN lacks such authorities.

xiv
 PLEADINGS

ISSUE 1

WHETHER ANTRANO LACKS STANDING TO BRING THE MATTER OF THE

DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY OF THE “STERREN FORTY” TO THIS COURT

Gleaning from the principles of law relating to the requirements for legal standing, the provisions
of the relevant conventions in light of the possibility of deprivation of citizenship afforded
parties to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of 1961, 1 and the inapplicability of
the principle of actio popularis, we submit that the applicant has no standing to bring the dispute
concerning the respondent’s deprivation of nationality of its citizen before this court. The
respondent’s argument has been stratified into three major standpoints for ease of assessment, as
follows:

I. That Legal standing requires the establishment of sufficient nexus between the
injury and the applicant.

II. That there is no breach of any international obligation of which the respondent is
responsible.

III. That the principle of actio popularis for the proof of locus standi will not avail the
applicant.

Legal standing, or locus standi, refers to the right or capacity to bring an action or to appear in a
court.2 It is a common thread of judicial requirement in both national and international law
spanning across the legal practice of multiple jurisdictions. It is the legal basis for individuals,
entities, or states to bring a claim or seek redress before international courts or tribunals. Legal
standing refers to the legal interest or capacity that a party must have in order to initiate legal

1
Hereinafter referred to as “CRS”.
2
What Is Legal Standing? | UNCAC Coalition. uncaccoalition.org/get-involved/working-
groups/victims-of-corruption-working-group/database-on-legal-standing/what-is-legal-standing/.
Accessed 6 Jan. 2024.
1
proceedings and be heard on a particular matter. 3 Specifically, it helps to ensure that only those
with legal interest can institute an action before the court. Without a proof of standing, the case is
stranded and prayers cannot be granted.4 In order to appear in court or to take part in a
proceeding, therefore, the applicant must have standing.5

I. That Legal standing requires the establishment of sufficient nexus between

the injury and the applicant.

Locus standi depends on the relationship between the applicant seeking redress and the right that
has been violated. The general rule is that it is only injured states which are able to bring
international claims against other states for a breach of some international obligation. 6 A party
seeking a legal remedy must demonstrate to the court, sufficient connection to and harm from the
law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. 7 In other words, there
shall be a sufficient nexus between the injury caused and the person approaching the court.8

3
“Standing in International Law.” UOLLB First Class Law Notes, uollb.com/blog/law/standing-
in-international-law. Accessed 6 Jan. 2024.
4
In Belgium v. Spain 1962 I.C.J. 50, [“Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited
(Belgium v. Spain) (New Application: 1962).” www.icj-Cij.org, www.icj-cij.org/case/50.
Accessed 6 Jan. 2024], in a judgment delivered on 5 February 1970, the Court found, among
others, that Belgium had no legal standing to exercise diplomatic protection of shareholders in a
Canadian company in respect of measures taken against that company in Spain. The Court
accordingly rejected Belgium’s claim.
5
Standing and Involvement in Legal Proceedings – LawRight. www.lawright.org.au/legal-
information/going-to-court/standing-and-involvement-in-legal-proceedings. Accessed 8 Jan.
2024.
6
Hillier, T. (1998). Sourcebook on Public International Law (1st ed.). Routledge-Cavendish.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781843143802. 7 Locus standi and the right to bring claims, p. 1
7
Wikipedia Contributors. “Standing (Law).” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 27 Jan. 2020,
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standing_(law). Accessed 8 Jan. 2023.
8
“Locus Standi: Meaning and Essential Ingredients of Locus Standi.” Legal Study Material, 6
Dec. 2021, legalstudymaterial.com/locus-standi-meaning-and-essential-ingredients-of-locus-
standi. Accessed 8 Jan. 2023.
2
This fundamental principle was strictly applied in the second phase of the South West Africa case
(1966)9 when the International Court of Justice 10 held that Liberia and Ethiopia had no legal
interest in South Africa’s treatment of the inhabitants of Namibia.

The ‘injury’ inferred in the instant case is in relation to the judgment of the respondent on the
unlawful conduct of some of its citizens in respect of its local legislation 11, challenged and
justified in a court of competent jurisdiction within the nation. 12 We humbly submit on this
standpoint that the Republic of Antrano has not suffered any personal injury in relation to the
Sterren Forty, neither has any of its citizens.

II. That there is no breach of any international obligation of which the

respondent is responsible.

There is a breach of an international obligation when conduct attributed to a State as a subject of

international law amounts to a failure by that State to comply with an international obligation
incumbent upon it.13 According to The International Law Commission’s Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), 14 there is a breach of an
international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is
required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.15 The ILC draft Articles goes

9
[1966] ICJ Rep at p 6. [Although both states had been original members of the League of
Nations and therefore had certain rights under the Mandate agreement between the League and
South Africa, the Court held that enforcement of the Mandate was a matter for the League alone
and individual members suffered no injury and therefore had no independent right to bring
claims arising out of breaches of its provisions.]
10
Hereinafter referred to as the “ICJ”.
11
Disrespect to the Crown Act - Compromis, ¶7.
12
Compromis, ¶34.
13
“Breach of an International Obligation.” United Nations Legislative Series, 22 Oct. 2013, pp.
97–124, https://doi.org/10.18356/fc4a4c1c-en. Accessed 8 Jan. 2024.
14
Hereinafter referred to as “ILC Articles.”
15
Article 12 – (Existence of a breach of an international obligation).
3
further to state the possibility of an invocation of responsibility by an injured State, subject to the
breach of an obligation.16

a. Conceding that there are obligation(s) created by the provisions of the Convention
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 1954 17 and the Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness of 1961.

The Respondent concedes that the CRS tasks the parties with an obligation, primarily concerning
the reduction of statelessness in the international community. 18 Particularly, Article 8 of the CRS
provides that a contracting State shall not deprive a person of its nationality if such deprivation
would render him stateless.19

b. Acknowledging, however, that the CRS provides for the possibility of derogating
from such obligation.

The same Article 8 of the CRS providing that Contracting States shall not deprive a person of its
nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless, further provides within the same
article for instances when such deprivation might occur. Particularly, Article 8.3 provides that a
Contracting State may retain the right to deprive a person of his nationality, if at the time of
signature, ratification or accession it specifies its retention of such right on one or more grounds,
being grounds existing in its national law at that time.

c. That the ground provided in Article 8.3(a)(ii) is fulfilled in this instant case.

As part of the grounds on which a state might derogate from its obligation under the CRS, Article
8.3(a)(ii) justifies the deprivation of nationality when the person has conducted himself in a
manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State, and that this ground must exist in
16
Article 42.
17
Hereinafter referred to as “CSP”.
18
CSP - Convention preamble – (“Considering that it is desirable to regulate and improve the
status of stateless persons by an international agreement.”) CRS – Convention preamble –
(“Considering it desirable to reduce statelessness by international agreement”).
19
In same vein, Article 9 of the Convention further provides that a Contracting State may not
deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political
grounds.
4
the national law of the depriving State party, and specified at the time of signature, ratification or
accession to the convention. These requirements have been well fulfilled by the respondent
through the declaration submitted with its instrument of ratification of the CRS. 20 Remisia has
also declared the legitimacy of the Disrespect to the Crown Act 21 as consistent with international
law.22 It is further submitted that the DCA existed in Remisia at the time the CRS was ratified by
the state.

It is pursuant to the DCA, and in line with the declaration made in its ratification of the CRS, that
the respondent deprived the Sterren Forty of their citizenship. We humbly submit on this
standpoint, thus, that there is no violation of any international obligation on the path of the
respondent.

III. That the principle of actio popularis for the proof of locus standi will not avail the
applicant.

Actio popularis may be defined as a ‘right resident in any member of a community to take legal
action in vindication of a public interest. 23 It was injected into proceedings and discussions of
questions of international law in the course of the South West Africa cases.24 In the South West
Africa (Second Phase) case, the observation of the ICJ was that “an action popularis, or right
resident in any member of a community to take legal action in vindication of a public interest . . .
is not known to international law as it stands at present.” 25 However, in its classic dictum of the
Barcelona Traction case,26 the ICJ affirmed that all States can be held to have a legal interest in

20
Compromis, ¶62.
21
Hereinafter referred to as “DCA”.
22
Compromis, ¶49.
23
Andrea, Gattini. “Actio Popularis.” Max Planck Encylopedia of International Procedural Law,
1 Feb. 2019, doi:10.1093/law-mpeipro/e1167.013.1167.
24
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa): Preliminary
Objections, [1962].
25
Id., Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6, ¶41–59 (July 18).
26
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain), Judgment of 5
February 1970, ICJ Reports 1970 3 para 33.
5
the observance of obligations erga omnes,27 giving a space for legal standing through action
popularis.

However, we humbly submit that there is no erga omnes obligation from which the respondent
has derogated. The notion of obligations erga omnes partes was first expressly endorsed by the
ICJ in the case of Belgium v. Senegal.28 The ICJ then drew parallels between the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the
Genocide Convention and concluded that they are similar in nature; for example, for both
Conventions, state parties do not have an “interest of their own; they merely have . . . a common
interest.29

27
The Dictum - ‘an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State [...]
By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are
obligations erga omnes.’ [Barcelona Traction (n 26) para 33.]
28
Questions Relating to Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment, 2012
I.C.J. 422, ¶ 68 (July 20) At issue was whether Belgium’s status as a party to the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“UNCAT”)
was sufficient in itself to justify legal standing before the ICJ in the absence of a special interest.
The majority in the judgment concluded in the affirmative on the basis that the object and
purpose of the Convention requires state parties to the UNCAT to comply with certain, core
obligations. In turn, all state parties have a common interest to achieve the objective of the
convention.
29
Chow, Pok Yin S. " On Obligations Erga Omnes Partes.
"https://www.law.georgetown.edu/international-law-journal/wp-content/uploads/sites/
21/2021/06/GT-GJIL210018.pdf. Accessed 7 Jan. 2024.
6
Unlike the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, however,
we submit that the CRS is not a peremptory norm of international law (or ius cogens),30 since
derogations are allowed from it pursuant to Article 8.2 and Article 8.3 of the convention.

Flowing from the foregoing, we submit that there is no strict common interest given the
provisions of the CRS that may warrant the existence of an erga omnes obligation. And in the
absence of erga omnes partes obligation, the principle of action popularis shall not avail the
applicant.

We thus submit holistically on this issue that Antrano lacks standing to bring the matter of the
deprivation of nationality of the “Sterren Forty” to this Court.

ISSUE 2

REMISA DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT DEPRIVED THE

“STERREN FORTY” OF THEIR REMISIAN CITIZENSHIP IN ACCORDANCE WITH

THE DCA

Respondent answers in the affirmative, that the kingdom of Remisia did not violate international
law by depriving the citizenship of the Sterren forty in accordance with the DCA.

Arguments will be stratified into two parts;

i. That the deprivation has firm legal standing basis in National legislation.

ii. That the deprivation followed due process

a. That the deprivation has firm legal standing basis in National Legislation:

30
“United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect.”
Www.un.org, www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml#:~:text=The%20ICJ%20has
%20also%20stated. Accessed 9 Jan. 2024.
7
In principle, the issue of nationality is within the ambit of national laws and domestic
jurisdiction. However, it must be consistent with international conventions, international
customs, and principles of law which is generally recognized with regard to nationality. 31
Respondent contends that the DCA is consistent with the provisions of international
conventions32 and customs, hence making the deprivation of the Sterren Forty initiated under it
legitimate.

Art 8 (2&3) of the 1961 convention made provisions for the exception to the prohibition against
deprivation of nationality. Art. 8(3) of the 1961 convention states that a contracting state may
retain the right to deprive a person of his nationality, if at the time of signature, ratification or
accession it specifies its retention of such right on the grounds that, that person is inconsistent in
his duty of loyalty to the state33 that he has conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to
the interests of the state.34 Insult against the monarch is a crime under the Remisain constitution,
and it was further codified in the DCA.35 In compliance with Art 8(3) of the 1961 convention,
Remisia made a declaration to retain the right to deprive a person of his nationality in accordance
with the convention if such person has been convicted of an offense under the Disrespect to the
Crown Act of 1955 and satisfies other criteria laid out in that statute. 36 Respondent submits that
the actions of the Sterren Forty is prejudicial to the state. 37 These actions are prejudicial to the
economic interest of the state as roads leading to the mines to which Remisia has economic
interest were blocked by the protesters and the Sterren Forty. 38 Also, insult against the Monarch39
was made contrary to the provisions of the constitution on their duty of loyalty to the state.

31
179 League of Nations Treaty Series 89, 99. Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.
32
Article 8.3(a)(ii)
33
Art (8)(3)(a) of the 1961 convention.
34
Art. 8(3)(a)(ii) of the 1961 convention.
35
Compromis 7.
36
Compromis 62.
37
Compromis 29, 32.
38
Art. 8(3)(a)(ii) of the 1961 convention.
39
Comprmis 28
8
Applicant submits on this argument that the deprivation has a legitimate standing.

b. The deprivation of Nationality followed due process.

Art. 8(4) of the 1961 convention provides that in exercising the power of deprivation of
nationality permitted under para. 3 and 5 this section, it must be in accordance with law, which
shall grant for the concerned person the right to a fair hearing by a court or other independent
body. The right to a fair trial, or its constituent elements, is a fundamental principle of
international law, and is reflected in human rights instruments. 40 This is further supported by the
provisions of Art 14 (1) of the ICCPR which provides that “…everyone shall be entitled to a fair
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” 41
Respondent contends that the state of Remisia complied with this obligation by granting the
Sterren Forty right to fair hearing, not just before the trial court but also before the supreme
court.42 The court in Emin Huseynov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2)43 held that the national authorities had
given no heed to the fact that the termination of the applicant’s citizenship, rendering him
stateless, would be in breach of Azerbaijan’s international law obligations, in that since the
applicant had not been able to contest the decision to terminate his citizenship before the national
courts, he had not benefited from the necessary procedural safeguards. Therefore, the Court
found in that case that the decision to terminate the applicant’s citizenship had been arbitrary and
had violated Article 8 of the ECHR.

The above case proves that fair hearing is material to the deprivation of Nationality, and
respondent submits that the Sterren forty were given fair hearing in the determination of the
nationality deprivation.

Respondent submits that Remisa did not violate international law when it deprived the “Sterren
Forty” of their Remisian citizenship in accordance with the DCA.

40
Art. 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). Art. 11(3) of the
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED), etc.
41
UDHR, Art. 10
42
Compromis 34
43
Application no. 59135/09
9
ISSUE 3

WHETHER ANTRANO VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT DENIED SAKI

SHAW, A REMISIAN CITIZEN, ACCESS TO REMISIAN CONSULAR

REPRESENTATIVES WHILE SHE WAS HELD PRISONER IN ANTRANO.

In line with the clear principles of international law, it is our submission that Antrano violated
international law when it failed to provide Remisia consular representatives for Saki shaw while
she was in prison.

Flowing from paragraph 19 of the compromis, Saki shaw had become naturalized as a Remisian
citizen.This is further confirmed by paragraph 45 of the fact where the Remisian ambassador
notified Antrano's ministry of foreign affairs of their intent to fulfill their duties to Saki shaw.
However, this access was denied. Thus it is a violation of article 36(1)(a-c) of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations which provides that:

a. consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have
access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to
communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State;

b. if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform
the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is
arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.
Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or
detention shall be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph

c. consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison,
custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal
representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in
prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgement. Nevertheless, consular
officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or
detention if he expressly opposes such action."

10
This establishes rights not only for the consular officer but, perhaps even more importantly, for
the nationals of the sending State who are assured access to consular officers and through them
to others.
This position has been judicially affirmed in Paraguay v. United States of America44, United
States of American v Tehran45.

Applying this to the fact of this case, paragraph 43 of the that Saki Shaw requested to speak with
the Remisian consul upon her arrest at Antrano but this request was denied despite the clear
provisions of the Vienna convention on Consular Relations.

Furthermore, the provision of article 36 of the Vienna convention on consular relations is valid
irrespective of any dispute over citizenship and according to the principles of good faith as stated
in the United Nations charter, Antrano has an obligation to collaborate with international bodies
especially in matters of potential international friction.

Applying this to the fact of this case, Remisia validly recognise and accepts Saki shaw as their
national. Therefore, they should be allowed to fulfill their consular obligations to her while she
was held hostage in Antrano. However, Antrano's denial of access towards this obligation could
lead to a major friction between both countries and this will defeat to obligation to act in good
faith.

According to the court in India v. Pakistan46, the court established that

“Consular access is essential to ensure a fair trial for foreign nationals and this human right must
not in any way be made contingent upon the offence foreign nationals are charged with.” This
was further affirmed by the erudute scholar: Ian Seirderman; legal and policy director of
International Court of Justice when he said:

"...there can be no curtailment of the right to consular access by foreign nationals by States that
are Party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. ”

44
[1998] ICJ Rep 248
45
ICJ GL No 64
46
ICGJ 515 (ICJ 2017)
11
In the case of Germany v. United States of America 47, it was held that Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relation grants an inalienable right to consular access to an individual
who has been arrested in a foreign country.

All of these decisions validates that Antrano has no right to deny Saki shaw access to Remisian
consul while.in detention.

We thus submit that Antrano violated international law when it failed to grant Saki Shaw access
to Remisian Consular representatives.

ISSUE 4

WHETHER REMISIA DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW BY REFUSING TO

ALLOW DR. MALEX TO ENTER REMISIA.

1. Remisia is a sovereign state with the power to allow or deny anyone entry into its
territory

Remisia is a sovereign State with the power to regulate the movement of persons within and
across its borders. Thus, it is the prerogative of Remisia as a sovereign state to admit or deny
entry to anyone based on its immigration law and regulations. Without any doubt, the conditions
and procedures for entry must conform with generally accepted principles of international law
and applicable international agreements48, in that the condition for entry must not limit or restrict
anyone based on their race, skin colour, descent or national or ethnic origin as this constitute a
denial of fundamental human rights 49. It must also not violate the obligations of the State under
international Law. Therefore, Article 104 of the UN Charter provides that the UN shall enjoy in

47
[2001] ICJ Rep 466
48
Louis Sohn and Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The Movement of Persons Across Borders’ (1992) 23
Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, pg 49–64; International Migrants Bill of Rights (draft),
(2010) 24(3) Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 423
49
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa)
12
the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of
its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.

Similarly, Article 105 (1) provides that the United Nations shall enjoy in the territory of each of
its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.
Article 105 (2) also states that representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials
of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the
independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization. By virtue of these
provisions, a member state is under an obligation to give the UN and its representatives access to
its territory for the fulfillment of the function and purpose of the UN. Therefore, persons on UN
mission may be issued certificate which show that they are travelling on the business of the
United Nations50. However, a member state still has the right to demand for a visa before
granting access into its territory51. Thus, the Remisian Ambassador to the UN clearly stated that
should Dr. Malex arrive at the airport, he will be asked to display a proper visa, and if he does
not, he will be denied entry 52. It is our submission that the right to allow or deny entry into its
territory is a sovereign prerogative of the Kingdom of Remisia and denying entry to Dr Malex
due to the lack of a proper visa is not a violation of international law.

2. Resolution 99997 did not create a binding obligation on Remisia.

The Kingdom of Remesia is not obligated to follow resolution 99997 as it did not create a
binding obligation. Member States of the UN are under an obligation to carry out the decisions
of the Security Council53. This is in conformity with the power of the Security Council to adopt
legally binding decisions pursuant to the authority granted by the states parties to the U.N.
Charter in Articles 25, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the Charter. However, not all resolutions adopted by
the Security Council creates a binding legal obligation on Member states54.

Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16,
[131]
50
Convention On The Privileges And Immunities Of The United Nations, article 25
51
Id at 3
52
Compromis ¶ 56
53
UN Charter article 24(1) & 25
13
 Resultantly, the ICJ noted in the Namibia Advisory that the language of a resolution of the
Security Council should be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding
effect. In view of the nature of the powers under Article 25, the question whether they have been
in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to
be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all
circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution of the
Security Council55. Therefore, a number of principles should guide our understanding of how to
interpret Security Council resolutions in order to determine if the Security Council is in fact
invoking its authority to make decisions that create a binding obligation on Member states.

Typically, the Council chooses leading words which are usually verbs occurring at the beginning
of each operative paragraph. These include words such as 'reaffirms’, 'decides’, 'recommends’,
'requests’ and 'calls upon’ which expresses the will and intent of the security Council regarding
the content of each respective paragraph, or sometimes of different sentences within the same
paragraph56. Therefore, the question of whether a resolution of the Security Council is binding is
a matter of interpretation of these words. Each of these words have a meaning in the ordinary
English usage and that meaning must be properly understood and properly considered when
interpreting the paragraphs of a Security Council resolution. This will determine whether it is the
intention of the Security Council to invoke its authority to make a binding decision and to create
legal obligations in the relevant operative paragraph57. Moving on, based on article 25 of the
Charter member states of the United Nations are obliged to accept and carry out the “decisions”
of the Security Council. This provision forms the basis of member states’ obligation to comply
and accept as legally binding the decision of the Security Council which usually comes in form
of adopted resolution. Therefore, when interpreting Security Council resolutions, therefore, the

54
Daniel H. Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, ch.
4 (2009); The Security Council as a Legal Hegemon, 43 Geo. J. Int’l L. 225 (2012)
55
Namibia Advisory
56
Justin Gruenberg, An Analysis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions: Are All
Countries Treated Equally? 41 Case Western Reserve J. Int’l L. 469 (2009).
57
Paul Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 901, 902 (2002)
14
term “decision” should be understood to be the standard language of expression by the Security
Council, signifying the Council’s intent to create a binding obligation58.

Furthermore, it is our submission that States should not be presumed to have given up their
sovereign rights and be bound by every resolution of the security Council unless the resolution is
adopted as a decision in accordance with article 25 of the UN Charter. 59 A careful review of the
language employed by the Council in the text of operative paragraph 2 of Resolution 99997 60.
Paragraph 2 of Resolution 99997 Calls upon the Kingdom of Remisia to cooperate fully with the
Mission. It is our submission based on the principles of interpretation outlined above that the
word Calls upon do not appear to indicate an intention of Security Council to create binding legal
obligations on Remisia in a manner that is sufficiently clear, explicit and definitive to overcome
the presumption of Remisia’s sovereign independence. Therefore, we submit that Remisia did
not violate international law by refusing to allow Dr. Malex to enter it territory as provided by
Resolution 99997.

58
The New UNSCR on Iran: Does It Bind the United States (and Future Presidents)? John
Bellinger, Lawfare, July 18, 2015.
59
Jochen Abr. Frowein, Unilateral Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions - A Threat to
Collective Security?, in Volkmar Götz, Peter Selmer, & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., Liber Amicorum
Günther Jaenicke—Zum 85. Geburtstag 99 (Berlin: Springer, 1998) (as reprinted in Michael
Byers, Agreeing to Disagree: Security Council Resolution 1441 and Intentional Ambiguity, 10
Global Governance 165–186 (2004).
60
Annex A. Security Council Resolution 99997 (2022)
15
 PRAYERS FOR RELIEF.

For the aforementioned reasons, the State of Ragnell, the Respondent, respectfully prays that this
Honourable Court adjudge and declare that:

I. Antrano lacks standing to bring the matter of the deprivation of nationality of the
“Sterren Forty” to this Court; and

II. Remisia did not violate international law when it deprived the “Sterren Forty” of their
Remisian citizenship in accordance with the DCA; and

III. Antrano violated international law when it denied Saki Shaw, a Remisian citizen,
access to Remisian consular representatives while she was held prisoner in Antrano;
and

IV. Remisia did not violate international law by refusing to allow Dr. Malex to enter
Remisia.

Respectfully Submitted,

Agents for the Respondent.

16