International Business Research; Vol. 11, No.

6; 2018
ISSN 1913-9004 E-ISSN 1913-9012
Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education

Effect of Board Size, Board Composition and Board Meetings on

Financial Performance of Listed Consumer Goods in Nigeria
EL-Maude, Jibreel Gambo1, Bawa, Ahmed Bello1, Shamaki Aranpu Rimamshung2
1
PhD., Department of Accountancy, MAUTECH Yola, Nigeria
2
Nigeria Civil Service Union, National Headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria
Correspondence: EL-Maude, Jibreel Gambo, PhD., Department of Accountancy, MAUTECH Yola, Nigeria.

Received: February 20, 2018 Accepted: March 12, 2018 Online Published: May 9, 2018
doi:10.5539/ibr.v11n6p1 URL: https://doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v11n6p1

Abstract
The central thrust of this study is to examine the effect of board size, board composition and board Meetings on
the financial performance of listed consumer goods in Nigeria over the period of ten years from 2006 to 2015.
The study uses expo factor research design and purposive sampling technique (filter) as research design and
sampling technique. The population of the study is twenty (20) listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria and
a sample size of ten (10) companies were studied. The data was analysed by means of descriptive statistics,
Correlation and Regression analysis using STATA (version 11). The descriptive result reveals that return on
assets has minimum and maximum values of -0.0400 and 0.4700 respectively and the mean and standard
deviation of 0.1199 and 0.1038 respectively. The study made use of secondary data generated from annual report
and account of the sampled companies through Nigeria Stock Exchange fact book. The findings include the
following: Board size is negatively significant at 1% with T. Value of _2.70, Board composition is positively
significant at 1% with T- Value of 2.15 and finally, Board meeting is negatively insignificant with T- Value of
_1.45. This study concluded that smaller board size are more effective than larger board size, good proportion of
board composition is a good factor to enhance ROA of listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria and frequent
board meeting will have negative effect on the ROA of listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria because it
will limits the chances for external directors to conduct a meaningful oversight over management. Hence the
study recommends among others; That smaller board size should be used in listed consumer goods companies in
Nigeria to enhance their ROA, the listed consumer goods companies should continue to maintain good
proportion of independence directors. The listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria should discourage
unnecessary board meetings to allow board of directors perform other oversight function on the management so
as to enhance the ROA of listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria.
Keywords: board size, board composition, board meetings, ROA, consumer goods
1. Introduction
Board structure of an organisation is the organisation‟s core layer which is critical to the corporate survival and
or otherwise of an organization. It is often referred to as board of directors - a body of elected and or appointed
members who have the mandate of jointly overseeing the attainment of the predetermine goal(s) of a company
via the establishment of suitable policies and programmes which are effective and efficient. The legal
responsibilities of boards and board members vary with the nature of the organisation and with the jurisdiction
within which it operates (Mousa & Al-manaseer, 2012). This by implication means the size and the composition
of the board plays a pivotal role towards the achievement of the mandate of the board. Board size of an
organisation is about the number of directors both the executive and the non executive. On the other hand, board
composition is the proportion of non executive directors (independence) to total number of directors in an
organisation (Adekunle & Aghedo, 2014).
Return on assets (ROA) as the researcher‟s proxy is determined by taking net income and dividing it by total
assets. The metric is used to understand how effectively a company is using their assets to generate earnings.
Managers are directly responsible for the operations of the business and therefore the utilization of the firms‟
assets. Thus ROA allows users to assess how well a firms‟ corporate governance system is with particular
reference to board characteristics in securing and motivating efficient management of the firm.

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In the past so many corporate organisations have been caught on getting involved in unethical practices for
instance the discovery of financial scam by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) after the consolidation exercise
involving seven top bank executives in Nigeria which put the credibility of their corporate image under doubt
which further deteriorates investors‟ confidence (Sanusi, 2012). It is against this background that the researcher
considers the subject matter effect of board characteristics on the financial performance of listed companies in
consumer goods industry as an issue worthy of study.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Conceptual Review
Board Size
Board size of an organisation is the number of directors on board of the organisation which includes executive
and non-executive directors. Board size has highlighted in chapter one of this study influences the performance
of an organisation. Lipton and Lorseh (1992) viewed it that small board size can improve the performance of an
organisation because the benefits by larger boards of increased monitoring are outweighed by the poorer
communication and decision making of larger groups and suggested an optimal board size between seven and
nine directors. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) reported that small size boards are positively related to high firm value.
In a Nigeria study, Sanda, Mikalu & Garba (2010) reported that value is positively correlated with small, as
opposed to large boards. The argument is that large boards are less effective and are easier for a CEO to be
control. The cost of coordination and processing problems is also high in large boards and this makes decision
taking difficult. On the other hand, smaller boards reduce the possibility of free-riding and therefore have the
tendency of enhancing value of the firm. They measured the size of the board by the number of directors serving
on such boards and expect this to have a negative relationship with the value of the firm.
Board Composition
Section 359 (4) of Companies and Allied Matter Acts (2004) provides for board composition to be on equal
proportion. The new Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) guideline was silent on the number. However
the best international practice is having a board with more non-executive than executive directors for ensuring
independence of the board. Board composition normally concerns issues related to board independence
(including independence of board committees) and diversity (firm and industry experience, functional
backgrounds, etc.) of board members. Board independence refers to a corporate board that has a majority of
independent outside directors. Compared to an insider-dominated board, an outsider-dominated board is believed
to be more vigilant in monitoring managerial behaviours and decision-making of the firm. A board that consists
of directors with a diverse set of functional expertise (marketing, engineering, finance, etc.) industry experiences,
educational qualifications, ethnic and gender mix might be better equipped to deal with a wide range of issues
facing the firm and provide executives with advice and consultation from multiple perspectives.
2.2 Return on Assets (ROA)
An indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets. ROA gives an idea as to how efficient
management is at using its assets to generate earnings. Calculated by dividing a company's annual earnings by its
total assets, ROA is displayed as a percentage. Sometimes this is referred to as "return on investment". Return on
assets (ROA) is also a measure of performance widely used in the governance literature for accounting-based
measures (Finkelstein & D'Aveni 1994; Kiel & Nicholson 2003; Weir & Laing 2001). It is a measure which
assesses the efficiency of assets employed (Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan 2004) and shows investors the earnings the
firm has generated from its investment in capital assets. Efficient use of a firm‟s assets is best reflected by its rate
of return on its assets. ROA is an indicator of short-term performance which is calculated as net income divided
by total assets (Finkelstein & D'Aveni 1994). Since managers are responsible for the operation of the business
and utilization of the firm‟s assets, ROA is a measure that allows users to assess how well a firm‟s corporate
governance system is working in securing and motivating efficiency of the firm‟s management (Epps & Cereola ,
2008).
2.3 Board Size and Financial Performance
Studies on board size and firm performance have generated conflicting results, for example (Yermack, 1996;
Kiel & Nicolson, 2003; Guest, 2009; Adams & Mehran, 2012; Wintoki, Linck & Netter, 2012). Moreover,
Yermack (1996) was one of the first researcher that investigated board size and firm performance. Using a
sample 452 large US firms between 1984 and 1991, found a negative relationship between board size and firm
performance measured by Tobin‟s Q. This finding is robust with specific characteristics of a firm such as firm
size, growth opportunities, board structure, director ownership and industry sector.

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In particular, he indicates that corporate performance declines steadily if the board size is between four and ten
directors. Beyond this limit, there is no impact between board size and corporate performance. Nigerian studies
(Ujunwa, 2012; Adebayo et al., 2013; Dabor, Isiavive, Ajagbe & Oke., 2015) and non-Nigerian studies (Guest,
2009; O‟Connell & Cramer, 2010; Guo & Kga, 2012) have mostly found consistent results with those of
Yermack (1996) that board size is negatively related to firm performance. Using a sample of 30 listed firms in
Nigeria, Adebayo et al., (2013), measured by ROE and EPS found a significant negative relationship between
board size and organizational performance.
In contrast, other Nigerian studies (Kajola, 2008; Sanda et al., 2010; Akpan & Amran, 2014; Ironkwe & Adee,
2014; Ilaboya & Obaretin, 2015) and non-Nigerian studies (Adams & Mehran, 2012; Owusu, 2012) have found a
positive relationship between board size and firm performance. Using a sample of 20 Nigerian listed firms from
2000 to 2006 measured by ROE, Kajola (2008) found a positive and statistically significant relationship. Also,
Ironkwe and Adee (2014) found a positive and statistically significant relationship between board size and firm
performance, in sample of 40 financial firms in Nigeria. Using Time series data from 166 firms quoted on the
Nigerian Stock Exchange market from 2005 to 2012 in the Food and Beverages sector, Ilaboya and Obaretin
(2015) found a similar result which showed a positive relationship between board size and corporate financial
performance measured by PAT. The study reports a mean board size of 9 which is consistent with (Jensen, 1993).
2.4 Board Composition and Financial Performance
Evidence on the relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and firm
performance is mixed (Connelly & Limpaphayom, 2004); (Shakir, 2004); (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006); (Ghosh,
2006); (Jacking & Johl, 2009); (Rashid et al., 2010); (Uwuigbe, 2011); (Al-Matari, 2013); (Ogbulu & Emeni,
2012); (Satirenjit & Oladipupo, 2014); (Adekunle & Aghedo, 2014). They are mixed in the sense that some of
the study reviewed show positive relationship between board characteristics and financial performance while
some shows negative relationship between the variables.
Prior Nigerian studies (Olayinka, 2010); ( Ironkwe & Adee, 2014); (Shehu & Musa, 2014) and Non-Nigerian
studies (El Mehdi, 2007); (Jacking & Johl, 2009); (Al-Matari, 2013) have reported a positive relationship
between board composition and firm performance. In particular, El Mehdi (2007) in a sample of 24 listed
companies in Tunisia from 2000 – 2005 found that the proportion of outside directors is positively associated
with firm performance measured by Marginal Q. Similarly, Al-Matari (2013) also found that the proportion of
non-executive directors is positively related to ROA. In Nigeria, some studies also support these empirical
evidences. For example Olayinka (2010) found a positive relationship between board composition and corporate
financial performance (ROE and ROCE) in sample of 30 companies for year 2007. Also, using a sample 13
listed deposit money banks for the period 2007 to 2011, Shehu and Musa (2014) found that board composition
positively, strongly and significantly influence firm performance measured by ROA. These similar findings
suggest that boards with higher proportion of outside directors offer higher performance.
In contrast, other Nigerian Studies (Uwuigbe, 2011; Ogbulu & Emeni, 2012; Garba &
Abubakar, 2014) and non-Nigerian study (Guest, 2009) have reported that the proportion of independent
non-executive directors representation on the board is negatively related to firm performance. Using a sample of
157 Zimbabwean listed firms from 2000 to 2005, Mangena et al.(2012) found that the proportion non-executive
directors is significant and negatively related to firm performance measured by Tobin‟s Q. Similarly, Mahrous
(2014) reported a statistically negative relationship between non-executive board members and ROE, in a sample
of 50 Egyptian listed non-financial companies from 2006 – 2010. This evidence is also the same with those
found in Nigeria. For instance Ogbulu and Emeni (2012) found a negative association between board
composition and firm performance in a sample of 14 Nigerian listed banks as at December 2008. Also, Garba
and Abubakar (2014), using 12 listed insurance companies for the period 2004 to 2009 found a negative and
significant relationship between board composition and firm performance measured by Tobin‟s Q and ROE. This
indicates that the benefit of board independence, objectivity and experience expected from the representation of
outside directors to influence board strategic decisions appears to hold back managerial initiative through too
much monitoring.
A third group of studies suggest that board composition has no effect on firm performance (Ghosh, 2006; Rashid
et al., 2010). For example, Ghosh (2006) found out that the proportion of outside directors has no significant
impact on firm performance measured by ROA and adjusted Tobin‟s Q in 127 Indian listed manufacturing firms.
Similarly, Using a sample of 274 Bangladeshi firm-years from 2005 – 2009, Rashid et al. (2010) found that
outside (independent) directors cannot add value to the firm‟s economic performance measured by ROA and
Tobin‟s Q in Bangladesh.

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In Nigeria where this study is based, evidence has also shown that board composition has no relationship with
firm performance (Kajola, 2008; Sanda et al., 2010; Paul, Friday & Godwin, 2011; Mansur & Ahmad, 2013).
Using a sample of 20 listed firms, Kajola (2008) found no relationship between board composition and firm
performance measured by ROE and Profit Margin (PM) from 2000 – 2006. Also, Sanda et al. (2010) reported
that larger proportion of outside directors has no impact on firm performance measured by ROA, ROE, Tobin‟s
Q and P/E ratio from 1996 – 1999.
2.5 Summary
From the above mentioned, one can maintain that the effect of board characteristics on the financial performance
of firms cannot be ignored because the increase in the financial performance is necessary for any firm in order to
survive in the long run. Because Board of directors play a crucial role in the company and their characteristics
affect how corporate governance standards are applied and enacted. Therefore, it is important to test the effect of
board characteristics on firm financial performance.
In summary, previous studies regarding the relationship between board characteristics and firm‟s performance
across Nigeria has been conducted in the various sectors of the Nigerian economy (e.g. Ilaboya & Obaretin
(2015) in the consumer goods sector between 2005 and 2012; Shehu & Musa (2014) in the banking sector
between 2007 and 2011; Garba & Abubakar (2014) in the insurance sector between 2004 and 2009). However,
there are none of these studies empirically examine the board characteristics in the consumer goods in Nigeria to
year 2015. Empirically, this study aims to fill the gap by focusing on the listed consumer goods companies in
Nigeria during the period of 2006-2015 (10years) by analyzing whether different board characteristics of
different firms have an effect on the return on assets of these companies.
Also, review of different perspectives clarifies that there is need to take an integrated approach rather than a
single perspective to understand the effect of corporate governance on firm performance. While agency theory
places primary emphasis on shareholders‟ interests, stakeholder theory places emphasis on taking care of
interests of all stakeholders, and not just the shareholders. In line with this, Jensen (2001) suggests enlightened
value maximisation, which utilises much of enlightened stakeholder theory but accepts maximisation of the
long-run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite trade-offs among stakeholders and therefore
solves the problems that arise from multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory. Also,
stewardship theory suggests that due to their information and knowledge advantages, better financial
performance is likely to be associated with greater managerial trust and powers. Finally, resource dependence
theory indicates that internal corporate governance structures like the board of directors help to link the firm to
critical business inputs needed for higher financial performance.
Having reviewed the above theory the researchers adopted agency theory as the underpinning theory for this
study as it aided the study as far as principal agent relationship is concern, supported by stakeholder theory
which take into consideration all stakeholders in the business such as investors, creditors, suppliers and
employees and resource dependence theory, the company uses the experience and connections of the board of
directors to raise fund for the business from outside and within the environment. This is in line with Stiles (2001)
who calls for multiple theoretical perspectives and Roberts et al (2005) who suggests theoretical pluralism. The
gap here is that despite the call for multiple theoretical perspective most prior studies on board characteristics
and firm performance used only agency theory. In this study we adopted agency theory as the underpinning
theory for this study supported by stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory.
3. Methodology
This study uses ex-post facto research design; this is because it is quantitative research based on a positivist
paradigm and used deductive reasoning. The study adopted a positivist approach, because a positivist approach
seeks facts or causes of social phenomena. The reasoning is deductive because the hypotheses were derived first
and the data were collected later to confirm or negate the propositions. This study covered a period of 10 years
i.e. from 2006 to 2015 (10 years). Data was elicited from annual financial reports and accounts of the selected
listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria. The population for this study consists of all the 20 listed consumer
goods companies in Nigeria as at 31st December, 2015 out of which only 10 companies who had 31st December
as their financial year were selected. In analysing the data collected, regression analysis was used using STATA
11.0
Model Specification
In order to test the hypotheses developed in the first chapter of this study, the following regression model was
used:

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ROA it= β0 + β1BSIZEit+ β2BCOMPit + β3FSit + μit (1)

Where:
BSIZE: Board Size; BCOMP: Board Composition; FS: Firm Size; μ: Error Term
4. Data Presentation, Analysis and Interprentation
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Obs
ROA -0.0400 0.4700 0.1199 0.1038 0.7961 3.7525 100

FS 10.1365 26.2557 21.5167 3.6418 -1.2361 4.5868 100

BSIZE 7.0000 16.0000 9.9800 2.2247 .8164 2.3576 100

Bcomp 0.7000 0.9000 0.5805 0.2348 -.6759 2.3960 100

BM 4.0000 0.9000 5.2800 1.3639 1.0688 3.6727 100

Source: Researcher‟s Analysis (2016) using STATA version 11
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive analysis of the study. The descriptive result reveals that return on assets has
minimum and maximum values of -0.0400 and 0.4700 respectively and the mean and standard deviation of
0.1199 and 0.1038 respectively. Meaning within the study period the performance is low since it recorded a
minimum value and a relatively higher standard deviation. The table also shows that the minimum and maximum
values of firm size are 10.1365 and 26.2557 respectively and has a mean and standard deviation of 21.5167 and
3.6418 respectively which demonstrate a better performance since the standard deviation is relatively low.
Similarly, board size has a minimum of 7.0000 and a maximum of 16.0000 with an average of 9.9800 and
standard deviation of 2.2247. The size of the board varies widely across the sample companies and the minimum
is 7 and the maximum is 16. The important factor that explains the large disparity of the size could be as a result
of wide difference of the sample companies‟ size as represented by their total assets. Larger firms tend to have
more directors on their board, which is a reflection of the company‟s vast equity shareholding structure.
Finally, the skewness and kurtosis statistics revealed that the data obtained for the variables including dependent
and independent variables are normally distributed. Therefore, the study is considered valid which substantiates
the validity of the regression result.
4.2 Correlation Matrix
In order to establish the nature of relationship between dependent and independent variables and to determine
whether multicolinearity exists among the variables of the study, the Pearson correlation analysis was used.
Table 4.2. Correlation Matrix
VAR ROA F size B size Bcomp Bm
ROA 1.0000
Fsize 0.0623 1.0000

Bsize -0.2095 0.4264 1.0000

Bcomp 0.1093 0.4630 0.2429 1.0000

Bm 0.0476 0.1765 -0.1346 0.1955 1.0000

Source: Researchers‟ Analysis (2016) using STATA version 11
=Significant at 1% (0.01) = significant at 5% (0.05) =Significant at 10% (0.10).
Table 4.2 shows the correlation between the variables. The table shows a positive significant relationship
between ROA and Fsize from the co-efficient of 0.0623 which is significant at 1%. This implies that as the Fsize
increase the firm performance (ROA) will also increases.
Bsize has a significant negative relationship with ROA as shown by coefficient of -0.2095 which is significant at
1%. This implies that larger board size will lead to lower return on Assets of consumer goods companies listed in
Nigeria. Bcomp shows a significant positive relationship with ROA based on the correlation matrix result that
has a coefficient of 0.1093 which is significant at 10%. This means that more independent directors on board will
enhance firm performance.

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However, the relationship between the variables themselves is not found to be significant to the extent that one
can conclude that there is multicollinearity unless the variance inflation factor and tolerance values are
comparatively beyond the established rule of thumb. Thus, the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance
value are advanced measures for assessing multicollinearity among the regressors. The variance inflation factor
(VIF) and the tolerance values were determined with the use of STATA and were found to be concurrently less
than ten and one respectively.
4.3 Regression Analysis (OLS)
Table 4.3. Regression Result
Variables Coefficients T-statistics T-significant VIF/Tolerance
Constant .5001 3.61 0.000

Fsize 0.0041 1.24 0.218 1.45/0.688

Bsize -0.1490 -2.70 0.006 1.28/0.780

Bcomp 0.0364 2.15 0.034 1.14/0.876

Bm -.0634 -1.45 0.1500 1.11/0.899

R2 0.1320
Wald Chi2 3.61
Wald – sig 0.0087
Source: Researchers‟ Analysis (2016) using STATA version 11
The result from table 4:3 shows that Bsize has a coefficient value of -0.1490 and T-statistics value of -2.70 while
T-sig as 0.006 which is not significant at any level. The negative value of the coefficient -0.1490 signifies that
Bsize and ROA are negatively related which implies that for every 1% increase in Bsize of consumer goods
companies will lead to decrease in the ROA by 1.5%. This provides an evidence for accepting the Null
Hypothesis one which states that Bsize has no significant impact on performance of listed consumer goods
companies in Nigeria. This finding is in line with Yermack (1996) he was one of the first researcher that
investigated board size and firm performance. Using a sample 452 large US firms between 1984 and 1991, found
a negative relationship between board size and firm performance measured by Tobin‟s Q. The finding is robust
with specific characteristics of a firm such as firm size, growth opportunities, board structure, director ownership
and industry sector. In particular, Yermack indicates that corporate performance declines steadily if the board
size is between four and ten directors. Beyond this limit, there is no impact between board size and corporate
performance. The findings is also consistent with the (Ujunwa, 2012; Adebayo et al., 2013; Dabor, Isiavive,
Ajagbe & Oke., 2015).
Table 4.3 also revealed that Bcomp has a coefficient value of 0.0364, T-statistics of 2.15 and revealed a T-sig of
0.034 which is significant at 10% level of significance. From the coefficient value of 0.0364 one can say that
there is a positive relationship between Bcomp and ROA of consumer goods companies listed in Nigeria .This
signifies that when Bcomp increase by 1% return on assets will increase by 3.6%.The result shows that the Null
Hypothesis two that state that bcomp does not has significant impact on ROA does not hold water and must be
rejected. This findings is in line with the findings of El mehdi (2007), Al-matari (2013) and Olayinka
(2010).That means board with higher proportion of outside directors offer higher performance.
Finally, on the contrary, Bm shows a coefficient of -0.634,T-statistics of -1.45 and T-sig 0.15 which is not
significant at all level of significance. The negative coefficient signifies that board meeting and firm performance
of listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria are inversely related meaning that whenever Bm increase by 1%
the firm performance will decrease by 63% .The result provide an evidence to accept the Null Hypothesis that
state Bm has no significant impact on ROA of consumer goods companies listed in Nigeria. This finding is
consistent with Jensen (1993) opines that: “daily tasks those continue most of the board‟s meeting time and
hence this limits the chances for external directors to conduct a meaningful oversight over management”. Jensen
further stressed that board should not be over active as activity of board represents a reaction to adverse
performance. It is also consistent to some empirical studies that found a negative impact of board meeting on the
financial performance such as Danoshana and Ravivathani (2014), Garcia-Sanchez (2010), and Kamardin
(2009).
The cumulative R2 (0.1320) which is the multiple coefficient of the determination gives the proportion of the
total variation in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables jointly. Hence, it signifies that 13%

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of the total variation in ROA of consumer goods companies listed in Nigeria is caused by board size, board
composition and board meeting. This indicates that the model is fit and the regressors are properly selected,
combined and used. This further implies that for any changes in the attributes of listed consumer goods
companies in Nigeria, their ROA will be directly affected.
The F-statistics or Wald chi-squared statistics are really the same thing in that, after normalization chi-squared is
the limiting distribution of the F as the denominator degrees of freedom goes to infinity. Therefore, the Wald chi
square of 3.61 which is significant at 1% indicates that the corporate attributes and ROA model is fit.
5. Conclusion and Recommendations
The study concludes that smaller board size are more effective than larger board size because smaller good board
size with upright personal traits relevant core competences and entrepreneurial spirit knowledgeable in board
matters will enhance ROA listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria. Therefore larger board size should be
discouraged. Similarly, the study concludes that board composition is an important factor that can enhance
Return on Assets of listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria. Therefore, number of independent
(non-executive) directors on the Board is an important monitoring and control device. The non- executive
directors have the ability to monitor and control the extremes of the executive directors, thereby protecting the
interest of the share holders and other stake holders. They are also free from managerial influence and capable of
monitoring them effectively which will enhance the Return on Assets of listed consumer goods companies in
Nigeria. Finally, frequent board meeting will have negative effect on the ROA of listed consumer goods
companies in Nigeria because it will limits the chances for external directors to conduct a meaningful oversight
over management.
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