Smart Technologies and Innovations in Design for Control of Technological Processes and Objects: Economy and Production: Proceeding of the International Science and Technology Conference "FarEastСon-2018" Volume 1 Denis B. Solovev 2024 scribd download
Smart Technologies and Innovations in Design for Control of Technological Processes and Objects: Economy and Production: Proceeding of the International Science and Technology Conference "FarEastСon-2018" Volume 1 Denis B. Solovev 2024 scribd download
com
OR CLICK BUTTON
DOWNLOAD NOW
https://textbookfull.com/product/smart-innovations-in-engineering-and-
technology-ryszard-klempous/
textboxfull.com
https://textbookfull.com/product/proceedings-of-the-future-
technologies-conference-ftc-2018-volume-1-kohei-arai/
textboxfull.com
Volume 138
Series Editors
Robert James Howlett, Bournemouth University and KES International,
Shoreham-by-sea, UK
Smart Technologies
and Innovations in Design
for Control of Technological
Processes and Objects:
Economy and Production
Proceeding of the International Science
and Technology Conference
“FarEastСon-2018” Volume 1
123
Editor
Denis B. Solovev
Department of Innovatics,
Engineering School
Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU)
Vladivostok, Russia
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Editorial
v
vi Editorial
The main criterion is a judgment of the degree to which the submitted paper
contributes to substantial new research.
Reviewers rate the paper using a 10-point ranking scale and provide a written
evaluation. The written evaluation needs to support the reasoning behind the
numeric ranking.
After the review period, there is a discussion period, where all reviewers can see
the other reviews.
Organizing committee would like to express our sincere appreciation to every-
body who has contributed to the conference. Heartfelt thanks are due to authors,
reviewers, and participants and to all the team of organizers for their support and
enthusiasm which granted success to the conference.
Denis B. Solovev
Conference Chair
Organization
Chairperson
Co-chairpersons
vii
viii Organization
xi
xii Contents
E. Gorian(&)
1 Introduction
Communication networks are a significant element of the modern life. The vast
majority of liaisons within the communities, the business environment, the state or the
international community are allocated exclusively in such networks. They are the
pillars of the information society and an essential part of the single digital market.
Some of them are critically important for the national security reasons as they provide
vitally important resources or support their movement. Such information infrastructures
are critical for the people’s convenience and even existence [1] and therefore they are
considered as critical information infrastructures (CIIs). CIIs are the frequent targets for
cyber-attacks so the states try to cope with these threats and to search for the adequate
structures and processes that could optimally tackle the new cyber risk while protecting
core civil rights [2]. In general the situation with CIIs protection on the national level
sounds like satisfying. The main trend of delegating responsibility to cyber security
authorities, emergency agencies or national regulators which are responsible for
operational tasks is being observed. Many of those authorities are responsible for
additional tasks on the strategic or political level, such as the development of strategy
papers, supervision of the national computer security incident response team or the
proposing legislation. Still the half of the national mechanisms have established
institutionalized forms of cooperation in forms of public-private partnerships in spite of
the fact that the private sector bears responsibility for ensuring network resilience and
moreover it participates in the regulation of national information security by providing
technical expertise [3]. For all states the critical sectors with the strongest regulations
are the telecommunications, finance and energy sectors. Not all the states conduct a risk
assessment on a national level. They imply the policy of imposing the responsibility for
the risk assessment on sector-specific agencies or on the individual operators [4].
Therefore national standards of CIIs protection differ from the simplest to the advanced
ones. It is a fact that states that play a leading role in international economic relations
and digital markets are constantly developing their national standards of CIIs protection
in order to ensure not only the interior business and community liaisons but also a
global supply chain.
Being a most connected nation in a world, Singapore is also an international centre
of exchange and commerce. That makes it a perfect target to cyber threats and attacks
with more severe consequences for the public order and economics of Singapore then
for any other state. Therefore Singapore legislature presented a Cybersecurity Act
(CSA) in 2018 following the harsh and productive public debates with private sector
involved. It is considered as a new generation standard for protection of CIIs that
makes it an object of close attention of professionals from different spheres.
Please note that the first paragraph of a section or subsection is not indented. The first
The methodology for this study comprises of two groups of methods: the general
scientific ones (system-structural, formal-logical and hermeneutical methods) and the
special legal methods of cognition (comparative legal analyses and formal-legal
method). In order to obtain the most reliable scientific results they were used in complex.
CII protection system demands including stakeholders from the public and the
private sectors. In many states CII is operated by private entities which are connected
internationally through the participation in the entire supply chain. Häyhtiö and Zaerens
(Häyhtiö and Zaerens 2017) introduce a management model which enables a network
wide protection for critical infrastructure in a contractual environment between the
actors with different business domains and functions in a supply chain [5]. Such
management model can be used to assess financial differences between centralized and
decentralized protection of critical infrastructure.
Singapore’s Cybersecurity Act 2018 3
Because of its operative capacity, the private sector has come to be understood as
the expert in network and information systems security, whose knowledge is crucial for
the regulation of the field. Farrand and Carrapico (Farrand and Carrapico 2018) identify
the shifting role of the private sector in the CII from one of a victim in need of
protection in the first phase, to a commercial actor bearing responsibility for ensuring
network resilience in the second, to an active policy shaper in the third, participating in
the regulation of NIS by providing technical expertise [3].
Every state develops its own model for CII protection (the physical one primarily)
and it requires the methodological approaches to be used. It helps to estimate hazards
and threats to the infrastructure objects. Bobro (Bobro 2018) emphasizes the necessity
of all hazards approach (considering the threats of any origin and directionality). The
threats model must use not only the violator’s model, but also the object’s model and
the model of socio-political situation [6].
The nature of cyberspace and its constant evolution are the key factors of devel-
opment the adequate structures and mechanisms within the state machine. Matania,
Yoffe and Goldstein (Matania et al. 2017) outline the necessity in the next phase of
evolution of governmental structures – the formation of a single civilian entity with
concrete operational capabilities, responsible for defending the national cyberspace and
leading national cybersecurity efforts [2].
3 Hypothesis
Singapore is a first jurisdiction in South-East region that has developed its cyberse-
curity legislation to impose requirements on certain businesses to implement protec-
tions against cybersecurity risks into their computer systems. Taking into account its
leading role in regional and international economic relations and digitalization pro-
cesses the CSA clauses should be thoroughly considered and positive experience in
regulation of the mentioned sphere applied.
Therefore every state sets the criteria for the declaration of any data, database,
network, communications infrastructure, (or part thereof), or anything associated with
them as the CII. National authorities have to identify the CII and in this process of
identification they have launched different initiatives regarding this topic while others
are starting now to develop their own approaches [9]. That leads to the difference in the
national mechanisms of CII protection depending on the information assets, authorities’
powers, methods of regulation, etc. Within the EU Member States have highlighted
their own list of critical sectors based on the special characteristics and peculiarities of
each country, adding with some new: e.g. Austria excluded Chemical and Nuclear
Industry, France excluded Chemical and Nuclear Industry but included Industry; Italy
and Greece excluded almost all sectors except Energy and Transport; UK excluded
Public & Legal Order, Chemical and Nuclear Industry, Space and Research but
included Emergency services [9].
Analysts observe four different maturity levels with regards to CII activities across
the states. Level 1 is being characterized with the absence of activities related to the
protection of CII; states have identified only transport and energy as critical sectors. At
maturity level 2 the state identifies the information and communications technology
sector as one of critical sectors that should be addressed. At the level 3 states develop a
general methodological framework for the identification of critical information assets
with specific steps and responsibilities assigned to involved stakeholders. And the
highest maturity level 4 outlines the development of a definition for CII and estab-
lishment of specific criteria for the identification of CII assets. At this level states are
being considered as the mostly advanced in the area of the CII protection and have
taken specific measures for the identification and protection of CII assets [9].
The crucial factor for the CII protection is the effective collaboration between
public sector (Government & mandated Agencies) and the private sector, which often
controls numerous critical infrastructures. It is a common practice that the service
providers are defined by the mandated agency as operators of CIIs: they offer certain
critical services to public, support the large scope of the population and the territory,
their risks may become the national ones. They are responsible for determining the core
processes, the respective applications and, as a last step, the network assets and services
(connectivity solutions) which are used to operate the respective applications. An asset
can be critical related to (a) the business value, (b) the scope of the population served or
(c) the technical dependence of critical applications and this classification depends on
the sector and the role of the CII [9].
There are two different approaches for an identification of critical services
depending on the leading role for such identification. The state-driven approach
assumes the leading role of the government agencies that have the mandate to identify
and protect CII and the operator-driven approach assumes the leading role of the CII
operators. The latter is performed in France, where the state identifies a list of operators
(called also ‘vital operators’), who are responsible to identify the individual critical
services and assets that comply with a number of risk analyses and risk management
directives. Then, the responsible ministries review the selected services and assets
along with the drafted CII protection plans. This is a pragmatic approach given the
current state of the art of CII identification since operators have a better knowledge of
Singapore’s Cybersecurity Act 2018 5
their infrastructures. It also represents a shift of the effort needed to the operator to
which is delegated the accountability [9].
The essence of standards for the CII protection implemented by the CSA in Sin-
gapore emphasizes cybersecurity as a default consideration, which means that devel-
opers of Smart City eco-systems will need to provide the reassurance and security
required within interconnected networks and devices in order for such eco-systems to
flourish. The Singapore’s emphasis of protecting CII mirrors the position taken in other
countries and regions, notably in European Union and in China, emphasizing the need
for parties who are interconnected within the eco-system in which CII owners and
operators operate to adopt a harmonized approach [10].
Singapore’s Cybersecurity Strategy distinguishes four core pillars. The first one is
to strengthen the resilience of CIIs by mobilizing businesses and the community. The
second pillar is the safety of cyberspace, where all cyber threats are countered;
cybercrime is combated and personal data are protected. The third pillar is a developed
vibrant cybersecurity ecosystem comprising a skilled workforce, technologically-
advanced companies and strong research collaborations, so that it can support Singa-
pore’s cybersecurity needs and be a source of new economic growth. And the last but
not the least pillar is the forging of strong international partnerships [11].
In 2016 Singapore has identified a list of CII sectors which are services (govern-
ment and emergency services, healthcare, media, and banking and financial services),
utilities (power, water and telecommunications), and transport (land transport, maritime
and port, civil aviation) [11]. In 2018 the CSA scoped the CII sectors within a term
“essential service”, which means any service essential to the national security, defense,
foreign relations, economy, public health, public safety or public order of Singapore,
and specified them in the First Schedule (46 in a list): services relating to energy, info-
communications, water, healthcare, banking and finance, security and emergency
services, aviation, land transport, maritime, media, and services relating to functioning
of Government [12].
The CSA defines “critical information infrastructure” as a computer or a computer
system that is necessary for the continuous delivery of an essential service, and the loss
or compromise of the computer or computer system will have a debilitating effect on
the availability of the essential service in Singapore; and is located wholly or partly in
Singapore (section 2, section 7(1)).
The designed framework for the CII protection is being headed by Commissioner
of Cybersecurity (Commissioner). Deputy Commissioner and one or more Assistant
Commissioners of Cybersecurity assist the Commissioner in the discharge of the
Commissioner’s duties and functions (section 4). Duties and functions of Commis-
sioner are stated in a Clause 5 of the CSA. They comprise among many others such
duties as identification and designation of CII, regulation of owners of CII with regard
to the cybersecurity of the CII (section 5(e)); establishment of cybersecurity codes of
practice and standards of performance for implementation by owners of CII (section 5
(f)); licensing and establishment of standards in relation to cybersecurity service pro-
viders (section 5(j)); establishment of standards within Singapore in relation to
cybersecurity products or services, and the recommended level of cybersecurity of
computer hardware or software, including certification or accreditation schemes (sec-
tion 5(k)).
6 E. Gorian
The most sufficient parts of the CSA are parts 3, 4 and 5. Part 3 provides for the
designation of CII and the regulation of owners of CII with regard to the cybersecurity
of the CII. Part 4 provides for the taking of measures to prevent, manage and respond to
cybersecurity threats and incidents in Singapore. Part 5 provides for the licensing of
providers of licensable cybersecurity services. The Commissioner of Cybersecurity
office is responsible for implementing the provisions of above-mentioned parts.
As for the designation of CII the Commissioner may, by written notice to the owner
of a computer or computer system, designate the computer or computer system as a
CII. To ascertain if computer or computer system fulfils criteria of CII the Commis-
sioner has a power to obtain the necessary information from the owner of such com-
puter or computer system and to require the owner of a CII to furnish information
relating to CII. The CSA grants a right to withhold such information in a case it is
protected by law, contract, or the rules of professional conduct (section 8(5)). How-
ever, a contractual obligation remains an invalid excuse for refusing to disclose
information in the context of (i) an information request pertaining to a known CII or
(ii) investigations of cybersecurity incidents (section 19(6)). Under the CSA, the CII
owner will not be treated as being in breach of any such contractual obligation if the
disclosure was done with reasonable care and in good faith for the purpose of com-
plying with such an information request. However, these provisions still risk raising
concerns with businesses about protection of their commercially sensitive information.
The CSA requires owners of CII to report “prescribed” cybersecurity incidents or any
other incidents specified by the Commissioner. Previously, the Draft Bill required the
reporting of all “significant” cybersecurity incidents. Prescribed cybersecurity incidents
requiring notification will be set by the Commissioner [13].
The Commissioner is also empowered to issue written directions which may relate
to (a) the action to be taken by the owner or owners in relation to a cybersecurity threat;
(b) compliance with any code of practice or standard of performance applicable to the
owner; (c) the appointment of an auditor approved by the Commissioner to audit the
owner or owners on their compliance with this Act or any code of practice or standard
of performance applicable to the owner or owners; (d) such other matters as the
Commissioner may consider necessary or expedient to ensure the cybersecurity of the
critical information infrastructure (section 12).
The CSA requires audits at least once every two years and risk assessments once a
year for the affirmation of compliance of the CII with this Act and the applicable codes
of practice and standards of performance, to be carried out by an auditor approved or
appointed by the Commissioner (section 15). Clause 15 implies severe consequences in
a case of violation of this provision – the owner of the CII shall be guilty of an offence
and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding 2 years or to both and, in the case of a continuing offence, to a
further fine not exceeding $5,000 for every day or part of a day during which the
offence continues after conviction.
The prevention of cybersecurity incidents is fulfilled by conducting compulsory
cybersecurity exercises for the purpose of testing the state of readiness of owners of
different CII in responding to significant cybersecurity incidents. The Commissioner
writes a direction and any person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply it
Singapore’s Cybersecurity Act 2018 7
shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding
$100,000 (section 16).
On respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents the Commissioner empowered to
investigate and prevent cybersecurity incidents including the serious ones by (1) re-
ceiving signed statements, physical or electronic records and documents; (2) examining
orally any person who appears to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances
relating to the cybersecurity threat or incident; (3) appointing cybersecurity technical
experts etc. (sections 19, 20, 22).
Clause 23 empowers the Minister to authorize or direct any person or organization
to take emergency cybersecurity measures and comply with necessary requirements,
for the purposes of preventing, detecting or countering any serious and imminent threat
to the CII. Those measures or requirements (a) do not confer any right to the production
of, or of access to, information subject to legal privilege; and (b) have effect despite any
obligation or limitation imposed or right, privilege or immunity conferred by or under
any law, contract or rules of professional conduct, including any restriction on the
disclosure of information imposed by law, contract or rules of professional conduct.
The CSA obliges any person to meet the requirements of the specified person otherwise
he or she shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not
exceeding $50,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or to both.
Clause 23 comprises detailed specifications on different aspects of meeting the emer-
gency measures and requirements.
Another specific feature of the CSA that makes it a new generation standard is a
licensing framework for cybersecurity service providers. It is aimed to assure a safety
and security to consumers of cybersecurity services, to address information asymmetry
in the industry and to provide the improvement of the standards of cybersecurity
service providers and professionals. Section 24 details the main principle of the CSA -
no person to provide licensable cybersecurity service without license. Licensing
functions are assigned to the Commissioner who is responsible for the administration of
that framework. The licensable cybersecurity services are (a) managed security oper-
ations centre (SOC) monitoring service; and (b) penetration testing service.
Managed security operations centre (SOC) monitoring service is a service for the
monitoring of the level of cybersecurity of a computer or computer system of another
person by acquiring, identifying and scanning information that is stored in, processed
by, or transmitted through the computer or computer system for the purpose of iden-
tifying cybersecurity threats to the computer or computer system.
Penetration testing service is a service for assessing, testing or evaluating the level
of cybersecurity of a computer or computer system, by searching for vulnerabilities in,
and compromising, the cybersecurity defenses of the computer or computer system,
and includes any of the following activities: (a) determining the cybersecurity vul-
nerabilities of a computer or computer system, and demonstrating how such vulnera-
bilities may be exploited and taken advantage of; (b) determining or testing the
organization’s ability to identify and respond to cybersecurity incidents through sim-
ulation of attempts to penetrate the cybersecurity defenses of the computer or computer
system; (c) identifying and quantifying the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of a computer
or computer system, indicating vulnerabilities and providing appropriate mitigation
procedures required to eliminate vulnerabilities or to reduce vulnerabilities to an
8 E. Gorian
acceptable level of risk; (d) utilizing social engineering to assess the level of vulner-
ability of an organization to cybersecurity threats (Second Schedule).
The CSA envisages three types of licenses depending on their conditions specified:
(a) general (conditions are applicable to all licensees); (b) specific (conditions are
applicable to a specified class of licensees); and (c) individual (conditions are appli-
cable to a specified licensee only). A license is in force for such period (not exceeding 5
years) as the licensing officer may specify in the license, starting from the date of its
issue. Such a discretionary authority of the Commissioner provides for the optimal
protection of the CII. A licensee is obliged to fulfill the requirements imposed by the
CSA (first of all it’s a duty to keep records of the information necessary for the CII
protection for three years) and is a subject of financial penalty if fails to comply with it
(a fine not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or
both).
The appeal authority in a licensing framework is a Minister and the Clause 35
provides for an avenue of appeal to the Minister against decisions made by the
licensing officer. The decision of the Minister on an appeal is final (section 35(7)).
5 Conclusions
Singapore implements the state-driven approach for the CII protection. At the same
time this approach is well-balanced and calibrated. The legislature has tried to har-
monize the efficient powers of authorities with the burdens imposed on companies and
private individuals in the IT industry. The CSA establishes a solid and precise
framework for the CII protection specifying three core aspects: (1) constant cooperation
of public authorities and private sector in envisaging the CII system; (2) broad
authorities for prevention, management and response to cybersecurity threats and
incidents in Singapore, and (3) compulsory licensing of cybersecurity services. It
emphasizes on compliance with promulgated codes of practice and expresses desig-
nation of CII and cybersecurity threats. The distinctive feature of the CSA is its
significant reduction of the compliance burden on cybersecurity professionals and CII
owners. As for the CII protection it’s important that computer systems in the supply
chain supporting the operation of a CII (i.e. data centre owners and cloud services
operators) will not be designated as CIIs. Thus the CSA illustrates the narrow approach
of law makers in envisaging the CSA jurisdiction – it implies just CII owners and not
any network operators. At the same time the CSA has created some temporary
uncertainties, for example, it contains a term “debilitating effect” (section 7(1)) refer-
ring to availability of an essential service. It is expected to be fixed in the upcoming
Cybersecurity Act’s Regulations containing detailed prescriptions relating to the
practical operation of the CSA: the process for the designation of CII, the standards to
be maintained by an owner of CII, the responsibilities and duties of an owner of a CII
and the type of changes that are considered material changes to the design, configu-
ration, security or operations of CII to be reported by an owner of CII [13, 14]. All
above-mentioned characterizes the CSA as a new generation standard for the CII
protection in a modern high-risk digital world.
Singapore’s Cybersecurity Act 2018 9
References
1. Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E., Havlin, S.: Catastrophic cascade of
failures in interdependent networks. Nature 464(7291), 1025–1028 (2010)
2. Matania, E., Yoffe, L., Goldstein, T.: Structuring the national cyber defence: in evolution
towards a Central Cyber Authority. J. Cyber Policy 2(1), 16–25 (2017)
3. Farrand, B., Carrapico, H.: Blurring public and private: cybersecurity in the age of regulatory
capitalism. In: Security Privatization: How Non-Security-Related Private Businesses Shape
Security Governance, pp. 197–217. Springer International Publishing AG, Basel (2018)
4. Sarri, A., Moulinos, K.: Stocktaking, Analysis and Recommendations on the Protection of
CIIs. European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), Heraklion
(2015)
5. Häyhtiö, M., Zaerens, K.: A comprehensive assessment model for critical infrastructure
protection. Manag. Prod. Eng. Rev. 8(4), 42–53 (2017)
6. Bobro, D.: Methodological aspects of critical infrastructure protection (2018). Research Gate
Homepage. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322715607_The_National_Institute_
for_Strategic_Studies_methodological_aspects_of_critical_infrastructure_protection. Acces-
sed 21 May 2018
7. Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of
European Critical Infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection.
Official J. L, 345(23), 12 (2008)
8. Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. COM 576 final
(2005)
9. Mattioli, R., Levy-Bencheton, C.: Methodologies for the identification of critical information
infrastructure assets and services: guidelines for charting electronic data communication
networks. European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA),
Heraklion (2014)
10. Wun, R., Tan, M.: Cybersecurity in Singapore and China (2018). Lexology Homepage.
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cae1ecf3-8228-4f89-a30e-6587fd592da4.
Accessed 21 May 2018
11. Singapore’s Cybersecurity Strategy. Cyber Security Agency of Singapore, Singapore (2016)
12. Cybersecurity Act: Cyber Security Agency of Singapore, Singapore (2018)
13. Singapore’s New Cybersecurity Act - A Relief and Leading the Way for Others?
BakerMcKenzie Homepage. https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2018/
02/singapores-new-cybersecurity-act. Accessed 21 May 2018
14. Hashim, H.M., Sokolova, E., Derevianko, O., Solovev, D.B.: Cooling load calculations. In:
IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering, vol. 463, Part 2, Paper №
032030 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1088/1757-899X/463/3/032030
Modern Developments in Behavioral
Economics
1 Introduction
There is consensus existing in the behavioural sciences that three types of questions
need theoretical explanation. The first is the normative question “How should people
act”. The second type of questions are directed towards three problems: the descriptive
“How do people actually act”, the diagnostic “Why they act this way” and the prog-
nosis “What results their behaviour would lead to”. The third type of questions is the
perspective question “How to achieve that the people act the way they should act”.
Although desirable, a theoretical construction is not able to give answer to all three
types of questions.
Undoubtedly, the neoclassical idea for “Homo Economicus” is successful in finding
normative answers for the ideal we should strive for. “Homo Economicus” is rational,
possesses unlimited possibilities to acquire and process necessary information, reacts in
a predictable way to the stimuli created by the market and public institutions, pursues
his own interest and has the will to realize his goals. The assumption for rationality is
altogether simplified, powerful and precise enough tool, with which one can quest for
descriptive answers and prognosticate wide range of economical phenomena. However,
there are phenomena and facts that are in contradiction with the fundamental
assumptions for rationality.
We difficultly estimate the possible outcomes and the probability of their occur-
rence. We overestimate ourselves and act with prejudice towards the others. Our
optimism is unduly high and at the same time, we exaggerate the damage of possible
losses. We use mental models that frame information the way we often interpret it
incompletely and wrongly. Our choices depend on the context and we show tendency
for anchoring to useless and unspecified information. We stick to the status quo, follow
our previous behaviour or the others, show conservatism and avoid changes, even
when they are urgent. We are led by reciprocity and often turn our back to our own
interests: we are ready to allocate resources and efforts to encourage those, who
behaved fairly, and to penalize injustice.
In general, most of the people do not succeed in maximizing the expected use-
fulness and apply simplified but wrong strategies for decision-making and make better
choices when having limited number of alternatives. They often act against their own
interest: they postpone important things such as prophylactic examinations, qualifica-
tion and saving for retirement, they stick to the option implicitly even if it is not the best
choice of theirs, invest unreasonably, tend to accept tricky advices and to vote for
unreasonable political projects, etc.
All these are examples of behavioural failures, which cannot be integrated in the
picture of neoclassical economics. They are manifested particularly strongly at: time
discrepancy between decisions’ benefits and losses (savings and insurances, con-
sumption of alcohol or other problems of self-control); need of expert knowledge
(choosing a leasing plan or another financial product); low repetition of decisions and
impossibility to learn from experience (family binding, purchase of home and car, how
many children to have and the choice of a career); bad feedback (healthcare, education
and savings); choosing among unknown alternatives (working place, medical proce-
dure, school or vacation package); experience accumulation is damaging (the negative
dependences). The list practically means that there are behavioural failures in almost all
situations and activities, except the repeating simple deals. Besides, they are universal.
Despite his intelligence, education, experience, wealth or influence, at certain cir-
cumstances and regarding certain issues, each one of us is limited within his rationality,
self-control and egoism.
Not considering the limitation of rationality, self-control and egoism and the
resulting behavioural failures prevents neoclassical economics from presenting correct
descriptive picture of human behaviour and forces for its idealized understanding for
“Homo Economicus” to be corrected. A new stream in the theory of economics that
became popular as behavioural economics tries to put the real human and the beha-
vioural failures in the centre of the economic analysis attention in the last forty years.
Its goal is to improve the reality and quality of economic analysis, which would result
in better prognosis of the real humans’ behaviour and in formulating better recom-
mendations for the followed policy.
The present article aims to summarize the achievements and challenges ahead of
behavioural economics in achieving its purposes. It would track the sources and the
logic of its development, would present its main achievements worldwide and at home
and would outline its role and perspectives within the frame of modern economic
sciences and the state governing practice.
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
And Poseidon’s burnished axle
Drifts a wreck upon the foam.
Softer breathe the gentle zephyrs, and like visitants they seem
From a latitude benigner, from a climate more serene.
Dream the heavens warm and glowing, shining veils of tepid haze,
Nimbus-like investing nature, through the long celestial days.
Such perchance the lenient ether, such as these the tranquil skies,
Spread above the fields of heaven, arching over Paradise.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also
govern what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most
countries are in a constant state of change. If you are outside
the United States, check the laws of your country in addition to
the terms of this agreement before downloading, copying,
displaying, performing, distributing or creating derivative works
based on this work or any other Project Gutenberg™ work. The
Foundation makes no representations concerning the copyright
status of any work in any country other than the United States.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form,
including any word processing or hypertext form. However, if
you provide access to or distribute copies of a Project
Gutenberg™ work in a format other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or
other format used in the official version posted on the official
Project Gutenberg™ website (www.gutenberg.org), you must, at
no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a copy, a
means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
request, of the work in its original “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other
form. Any alternate format must include the full Project
Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the
method you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The
fee is owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
but he has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to
the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty
payments must be paid within 60 days following each date on
which you prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your
periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked
as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information
Welcome to our website – the ideal destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. With a mission to inspire endlessly, we offer a
vast collection of books, ranging from classic literary works to
specialized publications, self-development books, and children's
literature. Each book is a new journey of discovery, expanding
knowledge and enriching the soul of the reade
Our website is not just a platform for buying books, but a bridge
connecting readers to the timeless values of culture and wisdom. With
an elegant, user-friendly interface and an intelligent search system,
we are committed to providing a quick and convenient shopping
experience. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery
services ensure that you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading.
textbookfull.com