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Subjective Well-Being in Mental Health and Human Development Research

Worldwide: An Introduction

Article in Social Indicators Research · May 2006

DOI: 10.1007/s11205-005-5550-3

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Social Indicators Research (2006) 77:1–10 Ó Springer 2006
DOI 10.1007/s11205-005-5550-3

COREY L. M. KEYES

SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING IN MENTAL HEALTH

AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH WORLDWIDE:
AN INTRODUCTION

(Accepted 1 November 2005)

ABSTRACT. In this introduction to a special issue, the author suggests that a third generation
of research on subjective well-being has emerged that is focused on health and human devel-
opment as the presence of well-being (i.e., health) and not merely the absence of illness, disease,
and developmental deficiencies. In turn, this article describes the construct of subjective well-
being, its historical ties to the aftermath of World War II and the creation of the National
Institute of Mental Health, its conceptual foundations, and empirical evidence supporting the
view that it consists of two theoretical traditions – hedonia and eudaimonia. The nearly 50 years
of research on subjective well-being has yielded as many as 13 distinct dimensions of subjective
well-being in the United States. Consequently, new directions in subjective well-being are
emerging such as the study of mental health as a complete state, which suggest the need for
greater scientific attention to the integration of hedonic and eudaimonic measures and theory.

1. INTRODUCTION

I want to begin by expressing my gratitude to the editor-in-chief of Social

Indicators Research, Dr. Alex Michalos, for accepting my proposal and
encouraging me to edit this special issue entitled Subjective Well-Being in
Mental Health and Human Development Research Worldwide. The articles in
this special issue suggest to me that a ‘‘third generation’’ of research on
subjective well-being has emerged, is firmly rooted, and has blossomed in all
corners of the world.1 As the title suggests, this third generation of research
has taken on the task of investigating mental health and human develop-
ment as not merely the absence of illness or dysfunction, but also the
presence of subjective well-being.
Subjective well-being is a fundamental facet of the quality of life. The
quality of an individual’s life can be assessed externally and objectively or
internally and subjectively. From an objective standpoint, other people
measure and judge another’s life according to criteria such as wealth or
income, educational attainment, occupational prestige, and health status or
2 COREY L. M. KEYES

longevity. Nations, communities, or individuals who are wealthier, have

more education, and live longer are considered to have higher quality of life
or personal well-being. The subjective standpoint emerged during the 1950s
as an important alternative to the objective approach to measuring indi-
vidual’s well-being. Subjectively, individuals evaluate their own lives as
evaluations made, in theory, after reviewing, summing, and weighing the
substance of their lives. In short, subjective well-being is an evaluation or
declaration that individuals make about the quality of their lives (Diener
et al., 1999; Keyes et al., 2002).2
Well-being has been a paramount concern of thinkers since ancient times
as witnessed in much of Greek philosophical writings. It became a topic of
scientific inquiry during the 1950s when interest in fostering a better life was
facilitated by the Zeitgeist following World War II. The world’s recovery
from the manifold devastation – physical, psychological, social, and moral –
of the world war encouraged a commitment to social welfare, the diversity
of people and viewpoints, and a greater appreciation of the individual. This
atmosphere manifested itself in philosophical (e.g., Phenomenology and
Existentialism), sociological (e.g., Symbolic Interactionism), and psycho-
logical (e.g., Cognitive Psychology) movements that focused on the cen-
trality of the individual’s perceptions and viewpoints, and the importance of
personal meaning and concerns about life. Subjective well-being therefore
emerged as a scientific field in the late 1950s when social scientists developed
indicators of quality of life to monitor social change and to improve social
policy (Land, 1975) as well as pursue a humanistic scientific agenda.
Humanistic writings emphasized several concerns and constructs that
buttressed the study of subjective well-being. In reaction to orthodox psy-
choanalysis, humanistic scholars catalogued the individual’s capacity for
positive adjustment through the development of positive characteristics such
as maturity, ego-strength, generativity, and virtues (see e.g., Erik Erikson’s
writings). In reaction to the hegemony of behaviorism, humanistic writers
lauded introspection and subjective appraisal as meaningful data. Human-
istic social scientists also sought to understand whole lives by asking people
how their lives looked to them and how they felt about their own lives. The
humanism exemplified through the study of subjective well-being was dis-
tilled by Gordon Allport (1961, cited in Severin, 1965), who pronounced that
‘‘It is not enough to know how man reacts: we must know how he feels, how
he sees his world, . . . why he lives, what he fears, for what he would be willing
to die. Such questions of existence must be put to man directly’’ (p. 42).
During this same historical period, the U.S. congress passed the ‘‘Mental
Health Act’’ that earmarked future funds for the creation of a ‘‘National
 MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH WORLDWIDE 3

Institute of Mental Health’’ (NIMH), which came into being at the end of
the 1940s. It is almost ironic that the joint commission on mental health and
illness, which served as the advisory board for the creation of the future
NIMH, may have planted the intellectual seeds of the two dominant streams
of research on subjective well-being today. This commission, chaired and
dominated by psychiatrists, requested several topical reports ranging from
the state of mental health services to epidemiology of mental illness. Though
clearly in the minority, several Ph.D.s, including M. Brewster Smith (1959),
were responsible for two separate reports on mental health, both of which
reported on the status of theory and research on subjective well-being.
The first publication was Marie Jahoda’s (1958) now seminal volume on
positive mental health. This volume reviewed the personality and clinical
psychology literatures regarding dimensions of psychological well-being
(e.g., purpose in life, personal growth, and self acceptance) that reflected
aspects of the eudaimonic stream of subjective well-being. The second vol-
ume, in terms of its publication, was Gurin et al.’s (1960) book on the state
of American’s mental health. This volume featured the hedonic stream of
subjective well-being with its focus on individuals’ assessments of their
satisfaction and happiness with life overall and domains of life. The over-
whelming odds of psychiatry pitted against mainstream social psychologists
in the mid-1940s played history’s ironic cards: The Mental Health Act of
1946 gave way in title only to the National Institute of Mental Health. In
practice and programs, the NIMH remains committed to the promotion of
America’s mental health through the study of the etiology and treatment of
mental illness. Although subjective well-being did not become part of this
nation’s mental health agenda, the impetus to launch the NIMH may have
responsible for planting the seeds of the study of subjective well-being as it
appears today in the traditions of eudaimonic and hedonic well-being
(Keyes et al., 2002).
Since Jahoda’s (1958) and Gurin et al.’s (1960) now seminal reviews of
elements of ‘‘mental health,’’ social scientific scholars have spent the past
40 years moving forward the nascent agenda of mental health via the study
of subjective well-being. In the 1980’s, three seminal journal articles brought
the study of subjective well-being and its two traditions into the mainstream
of social psychological inquiry. The first was Norbert Schwartz and Gerald
Clore’s (1983) article on how judgments of hedonic well-being were derived,
in part, by misattribution of one’s current mood states. The second was Ed
Diener’s (1984) review article of the state of the first generation of research
and theory on subjective well-being, which had focused squarely on hedonic
(i.e., happiness, life satisfaction, or affect balance) well-being. The third
4 COREY L. M. KEYES

article was Carol Ryff’s (1989) paper that operationalized the theory of
psychological well-being outlined in Jahoda’s (1958) volume. These influ-
ential and highly cited articles revitalized the traditions of subjective well-
being research that form the basis for much the ‘‘third generation’’ of
research that is now flourishing.
Until the late 1980s, research on subjective well-being has become
synonymous with hedonic well-being (Kahneman et al., 1999). Despite this
prejudice to equate subjective well-being with happiness (see Ryff, 1989),
new research clearly shows that subjective well-being is a multifactorial,
multidimensional concept. One result of the nearly 50 years of research on
this important concept is that researchers have proliferated, by my count
(Keyes, 2005a), at least 13 dimensions of subjective well-being in the United
States.3 Moreover, research has confirmed the meta-theoretical hypothesis
of hedonic and eudaimonic traditions of thought and functioning that
inform the study of subjective well-being (Ryff, 1989; Waterman, 1990,
1993; King and Napa, 1998; Ryan and Deci, 2001; Keyes et al., 2002).
Hedonic, or emotional, well-being is a specific dimension of subjective
well-being that consists of perceptions of avowed interest in life, happiness
and satisfaction with life, and the balance of positive to negative affect
(Cantril, 1965; Bradburn, 1969; Bryant and Veroff, 1982; Diener et al., 1985;
Lucas et al., 1996; Shmotkin, 1998). In contrast, eudaimonic well-being,
sometimes referred to as positive functioning, consists of individual’s
evaluation of their psychological well-being (Ryff, 1989; Ryff and Keyes,
1995).
A variety of concepts from personality, developmental, and clinical
psychology have been synthesized as criteria of mental health (Jahoda,
1958) and psychological well-being (Ryff, 1989). Elements of psychological
well-being are descended from the Aristotelian theme of eudaimonia, which
states that the highest of all goods achievable by human action is person-
ified in concepts of self-actualization (Maslow, 1968), full functioning
(Rogers, 1961), individuation (Jung, 1933), maturity (Allport, 1961), and
successful adult development that results in the realization of virtues
(Erikson, 1959). Ryff (1989) integrated these writing into psychometrically
sound measures reflecting a multidimensional model of psychological well-
being. Each of the six dimensions of psychological well-being indicates the
challenges that individuals encounter as they strive to function fully and
realize their unique talents (see Ryff, 1989; Ryff and Keyes, 1995). The six
dimensions encompass a breadth of well-being: Positive evaluation of
oneself and one’s past life, a sense of continued growth and development as
a person, the belief that one’s life is purposeful and meaningful, the
 MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH WORLDWIDE 5

possession of quality relations with others, the capacity to manage effec-

tively one’s life and surrounding world, and a sense of self-determination
(Ryff and Keyes, 1995).
Within the eudaimonic tradition, there was scant recognition of the social
dimensions of an individual’s functioning in life. The quality of individuals’
relationships to, and functioning in, society and social groups remain under-
studied aspects of individuals’ health. This is largely the reason I initiated a
study of social well-being (Keyes, 1998), defined as individuals’ perceptions
of the quality of their relationships with other people, their neighborhoods,
and their communities. As predicted theoretically, social well-being is
multidimensional, and Americans view the quality of their functioning in life
based on whether they see social life as meaningful and understandable
(social coherence); see society as possessing potential for growth (social
actualization); feel they belong to and are accepted by their communities
(social integration); feel they accept other people (social acceptance); and see
themselves as having something worthwhile to contribute to society (social
contribution). In short, eudaimonia consist of both private and public facets
of positive functioning. Whereas psychological well-being is conceptualized
as a primarily private phenomenon that is focused on the challenges
encountered by adults in their private lives, social well-being represents
primarily public phenomenon, focused on the social tasks encountered by
adults in their social structures and communities.
Ancient civilizations conceived of well-being – i.e., health – as an ideal, a
value, or as one of the highest goods in life (see Sigerist, 1941). Well-being
was not merely an end, it also was a means to creating and sustaining a
flourishing society and civilization. Today, mental as well as physical health
are considered forms of human capital, because studies consistently linked
the presence of mental illness and chronic physical disease to high levels
social and economic burden to society (i.e., disability, premature death, and
direct and indirect costs). Health, and not solely industriousness or crea-
tivity, is now viewed among the greatest sources of the ‘‘wealth’’ of a nation,
for it is tied to the growth and development of nations (Bloom and Canning,
2000; Berger et al., 2003; Sullivan, 2004). Unfortunately, almost all of this
research focuses on the presence and absence of disease and illness rather
than also the presence and absence of health and well-being (cf. Keyes and
Grzywacz, 2005). This is an unfortunate bias in the scientific and policy
community, which is the assumption that individuals who are not ill are
therefore healthy.
Of course, there has been very little research that has investigated whether
measures of health are distinct from measures of illness. What research
6 COREY L. M. KEYES

exists has clearly shown that measures of subjective well-being, which are
conceptualized as indicators of mental health, are factorially distinct from
but correlated with measures of symptoms of common mental disorders
such as depression (see Headey et al., 1993; Keyes, 2005a). Despite countless
proclamations that health is not merely the absence of illness, there had been
little or no empirical research to verify this assumption. Research now
supports the hypothesis that health is not merely the absence of illness, it is
also the presence of higher levels of subjective well-being.
In turn, there is growing recognition of the personal and social utility of
subjective well-being, both higher levels of hedonic and eudaimonic well-
being. Increased subjective well-being has been linked with higher personal
and social ‘goods’: higher business profits, more worker productivity,
greater employee retention; increased protection against mortality;
increased protection against the onset and increase of physical disability
with aging; improved cognitive and immune system functioning; and
increased levels of social capital such as civic responsibility, generativity,
community involvement and volunteering (Spector, 1997; Wright and
Bonnett, 1997; Wright and Staw, 1999; Keyes et al., 2000; Wright and
Cropanzano, 2000; Harter et al., 2003; Keyes and Waterman, 2003; Diener
and Seligman, 2004).

2. CONCLUSIONS

The first generation of subjective well-being research emerged from, or

followed in the wake of, World War II and the efforts to create the National
Institute of Mental Health. The Jahoda (1958) and Gurin et al. (1960)
volumes from the joint commission of mental health and illness did not,
however, influence the psychiatric hegemony of the nascent and, now nearly
50-year old, National Institute of Mental Health (i.e., the NIMH). Admit-
tedly, the psychometrics of subjective well-being in Jahoda and Gurin et al’s
volumes were immature, compared with the second generation of research
that sharpened the assessment and theories of hedonic (e.g., Diener, 1984;
Diener et al., 1999) and eudaimonic (Ryff, 1989; Keyes, 1998; Keyes et al.,
2002) well-being.
It is now incumbent upon researchers to theoretically justify their choices
of well-being outcomes rather than simply equate subjective well-being with
hedonic well-being. Moreover, the interesting and theoretically fecund
challenge of integrating the hedonic and eudaimonic traditions lies ahead of
subsequent generations of researchers. In addition, I believe it is imperative
for well-being researchers to connect this important tradition with the
 MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH WORLDWIDE 7

ongoing inquiry into the nature and causes of pathology (i.e., physical and
mental illness). In other words, rather than only fostering a field of
salutogenesis (i.e., the study of the nature and causes of health), well-being
researchers should also seek to bridge the study of salutogenesis and path-
ogenesis. This has been the focus of my own research on mental health
(Keyes, 2002, 2004, 2005a, b) and overall health as complete states (Keyes
and Grzywacz, 2002, 2005; Grzywacz and Keyes, 2004).
Mental health, for example, has been conceived of and diagnosed as a
syndrome of positive feelings and functioning in life that are measured by
subjective emotional well-being (i.e., hedonia) and subjective psychological
and social well-being (i.e., positive functioning). Specifically, flourishing is a
state of mental health in which people are free of Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual mental disorders such as major depression and filled with high
levels of emotional, psychological, and social well-being. Human languish-
ing, is a state of emptiness in which individuals are devoid of emotional,
psychological, and social well-being, but they are not mentally ill. Moder-
ately mentally healthy adults are not depressed or languishing, but neither
have they reached the level of flourishing in life.
The mental health research (Keyes, 2002, 2004, 2005a, b) has revealed
that few U.S. adults between the ages of 25 and 74 are genuinely mentally
healthy (i.e., just under 20% were flourishing), and mentally healthy indi-
viduals missed fewer days of work, were more productive at work, had fewer
health limitations of activities of daily living, and were at lower risk of
chronic physical diseases such as cardiovascular disease. While adults who
were moderately mentally healthy functioned better than adults who were
languishing, an astonishing finding was that languishing adults functioned
no better, and sometimes worse than, depressed adults (e.g., in terms of sick
days, low productivity, physical limitations, and risk for chronic disease).
Mental health, which is a complete state of subjective well-being (i.e.,
hedonic and eudaimonic well-being) as well as the absence of common
mental disorders, is unequivocally a valuable asset to both individual and
society. However, there appears to be a shortage of it in the population.
Populations in economically developed nations are living longer. However,
in most of those populations, the added years of life have not been
accompanied by healthier years. Worldwide, subjective well-being has
emerged as an important and complimentary stream to psychopathology in
basic and applied research. However, it is clear that the study of subjective
well-being must take deeper institutional roots to begin to foster research
and its application toward understanding how to add more health to human
life expectancy. With support of governmental and non-governmental
8 COREY L. M. KEYES

agencies, this research will move us toward the day envisioned by Sen (1999)
when mental health and human development (i.e., viewed positively) are as
central to policy decisions as the reduction of disease, illness, and devel-
opmental deficiencies. However, the key to developing human capabilities
lies not merely in the promotion of human happiness (i.e., only hedonic well-
being; see Layard, 2005), but in the concerted effort to enable youth (Keyes,
2005c) as well as adults to develop their eudaimonic capacities such as
purpose in life, social integration, personal growth, social contribution, and
autonomy.

NOTES

1
I want to also thank the outside reviewers, and I’m particularly grateful for the collegiality
and assistance of Kerry Chamberlain and Robert Cummins.
2
Miringoff and Mirgingoff (1999) documented the rise of the standard of living (GDP) in the
U.S. and the stagnation of individuals’ evaluations of their quality of life during the last third of
the 20th century, a poignant reason for not focusing solely on either objective or subjective
measures of quality of life.
3
The 13 facets of subjective well-being are as follows: positive affect, avowed happiness,
avowed life satisfaction, the six dimensions of psychological well-being, and the five
dimensions of social well-being (see Keyes, 2005a, b, c). This research has not included the
absence of negative affect, because it was included through the diagnosis of major
depression.

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Emory University C. L. M. Keyes

Atlanta, GA, 30322,
USA
E-mail: [email protected]

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