Inequality-in-Norway
Inequality-in-Norway
Patrick Bennett
Kjell Salvanes
Inequality in
Norway:
1970-2017
Inequality in Norway:
1970–2017
October 2023
1 Executive summary
We use data from five decades of Norwegian Register data to examine trends in the employment,
hours worked, wages, earnings, after-tax and transfer income, and immigration in Norway.
There has been a substantial increase in female participation in the labour market, particu-
larly among women aged 25–60. At the same time, male employment rates showed a slight
decline within the same age group. Employment rates vary considerably based on education
levels, with higher rates among those with high education, followed by middle education and
low education. The gap between high and middle education employment rates has narrowed
over time. However, the employment rates of low-educated individuals have declined.
Education trends reveal a decline in the importance of middle education and a substantial
increase in higher education. Women have made remarkable progress in higher education, while
middle education (comprised primarily of those in the vocational education track) remains
relatively more important for men in Norway. The proportion of individuals with low education
There has been an increase in employment equality between genders over time. The em-
ployment gap between highly educated men and women has closed, and the gap among those
with middle education has considerably declined. The employment gap between low-educated
men and women has also reduced. Wage trends show growth for both men and women, but a
gender wage gap exists. High-educated women earn less than high- and middle-educated men.
∗
Email: [email protected]
†
Email: [email protected]
1
Low-educated men earn more than middle-educated women. Wage disparities have increased
over time, especially among highly educated individuals. Similar patterns exist using earnings
Earnings inequality in Norway has remained relatively stable over time, but there exist
notable differences by gender. Wage inequality among men has increased, while women have
experienced a decline in wage inequality. However, wages of women have increasingly lagged
behind those of men over time, particularly among women with higher education. As before,
roughly similar patterns exist using data on both earnings and wages.
The Norwegian welfare state plays a significant role in income redistribution, with benefits
allocated to individuals across all income levels, but particularly among those at the bottom
of the earnings distribution. Tax rates gradually increase with higher income, reflecting the
redistributive role of the tax system. Despite the presence of a strong welfare state, a substantial
proportion of households (around 15–20%) are classified as being in relative poverty. Family
structures have changed, with a decline in marriage rates across all education groups and an
Norway over time: while immigrants accounted for only 3% of the population in 1970, this
proportion increased to nearly 23% by 2017. While immigrant representation grew across all
income levels, the growth was concentrated in the bottom half of the distribution, particularly
the bottom 25%, suggesting the economic opportunities available to immigrants have become
2 Institutional background
In this section, we summarise some key institutional factors and features of the Norwegian
Unemployment benefits are awarded to individuals who have had their work hours reduced by at
least 50%. The replacement rate is 62% of the pre-dismissal income. The standard entitlement
period was 186 weeks until 2004, at which point it was reduced to 104 weeks. Unemployment
benefits are conditional on filing an employment form with the public employment office every
14 days.
2
Disability pensions are available to individuals who are unfit for work due to illness or injury.
The cause of disability and whether the condition is permanent or temporary do not matter,
but the disability must be verified by a doctor. Traditionally, access to disability pensions
has been very liberal, and prior literature has identified the disability pension as a common
channel through which individuals can permanently exit the labour force while still maintaining
a modest source of income. The after-tax replacement rate for previously average earners is
around 65%.
The Working Environment Act governs employment law, and, similarly to other Nordic
countries, Norway has a somewhat high degree of employment protection and generous unem-
ployment benefits, with no legal requirements for severance pay. There is no national minimum
wage in Norway, but wages are typically collectively bargained across sectors.
Maternal job protection, family support and child benefits play a key role in the Nordic welfare
state. First, parents are entitled to 12 months of fully paid parental leave provided that they
have worked for at least 6 of the 10 months before childbirth and earned a minimum amount.
While parental leave benefits are subject to a benefit cap, this cap is generous ($75,000 in
2010, roughly 450,000NOK), and most employers supplement benefits to ensure 100% coverage.
Second, all children have a fundamental right to childcare from August of the year they reach
1 year old. Childcare is heavily subsidised by the state, and the maximum monthly price is
currently $350. Around 80% of 1-year-olds attend childcare. Third, parents receive non-means-
tested financial child support from the state until the child turns 18 years old. This is intended
to cover some of the expenses associated with raising the child, and amounts to approximately
$130 per month. Finally, the government provides free universal healthcare and tuition-free
Education system
The Norwegian education system consists of 10 years of mandatory education starting at age
6. Following the successful completion of compulsory school, every child has a statutory right
Upper secondary education consists of two different tracks: an academic track which provides
3
students with direct access to higher education, and a vocational track which results in a trade or
journeyman’s certificate. The two tracks are further subdivided into different programmes (five
programmes within the academic track and 10 programmes within the vocational track). While
there is a difference in the type of courses that students take across the different programmes
within a given track, the structure of the programmes within a track is the same. We therefore
abstract from this subdivision in the paper. The vocational track does not directly grant the
student access to higher education. Approximately 50% of students choose to enrol in the
vocational track, and 50% choose to enrol in the academic track. Admission to Norwegian high
schools is very competitive from an international perspective. Individuals apply to high school
with their grades from compulsory school (10th grade GPA), and selection into schools and
A range of universities and colleges offer higher education in Norway, and the majority are
school track and satisfying a minimum grade requirement. If the number of applications exceeds
the number of seats, students are assigned exclusively based on high school GPA. Education is
Income tax
Similarly to other Nordic countries, the tax system in Norway focuses on redistribution. Labour
income is taxed progressively, and those with high labour incomes can face considerably higher
tax rates. Consistent with this, the average tax rate on labour income is higher in Norway
than the average among OECD countries.1 Taxes are paid to the national government and
local government (municipality and country). Many reforms have occurred relating to income
taxes, with a major reform in 1992 implemented a dual income tax system with separate rates
of taxation for capital and labour income. Some transfers from the state are also subject to
4
3 Notes on measurement and definitions
• At the earliest, the sample begins in 1970 with the 1970 census. Detailed data on earnings
• Figures represent the entire national population aged 25–60 unless indicated otherwise.
Definitions:
• Employment rate: the fraction of the population that is employed according to em-
ployment register.
– Self-employed workers are defined as those having their primary source of earnings,
– Earnings represent the sum of any earnings across any job held by an individual in
a year.
– Most figures include employee taxes but not employer taxes, pension contributions or
other contributions (e.g., health insurance). A few figures explicitly compare trends
– A few Appendix figures measure pre-tax income, which is the sum of annual earnings
sickness benefits.
– The period to which earnings data refer will vary across countries. In Norway, the
∗ Information on employee earnings is obtained from the tax and earnings register,
– Nominal earnings are converted into real terms in calendar year 2018 using the CPI
5
• Hours of work: hours worked are unavailable for all workers across the entire period,
– Every employee has employment status measured in bins of typical hours worked per
week. The bins are defined as: 30+ hours/week, 20–29 hours/week, and less than 20
hours/week.
– As detailed data on hours worked are not available across the entire period, we use
the median hours per week of actual hours worked for each hours worked bin per
week in 2006, and we assign the following hours worked per week for each worker for
all years:
– These bins are calculated for all workers aged 25–60, and using other years where
detailed data on hours worked per week produce similar numbers and trends.
– Imputing hours worked assigns hours worked per week, and creates an annual measure
– As exact hours worked per week are inevitably measured with some degree of error,
the probability of working 30 hours or more per week is also measured in some figures.
• Wages: individual real gross hourly wages are imputed, taking annual earnings divided
by imputed hours worked as defined above. We convert nominal wages into real terms in
– In 2018, there are the following average exchange rates: $1 = 8.142 NOK; 1 GBP =
– The main measure of household income used in this report is income before any
deductions, and after direct taxes and transfers have been deducted from or added
to household income.
6
– Income is measured as disposable income by Statistics Norway and includes: earnings
tax-free transfers.
– Income is net of: tax-free transfers and taxable transfers, including unemployment
– Incomes are equivalised using the modified OECD equivalence scale, normalised to
a single individual.
many residents.
Splits:
Classification of Education (ISCED) categories: ISCED 0–2, ISCED 3–5, and ISCED 6–
• The following figures, which are produced for other countries included in the country-
specific chapters for the Deaton Review, are not produced for Norway:
– Gini coefficient of gross individual earnings and total employer cost, over time
– Growth in gross earnings and employer cost by earning percentile, selected periods
– Disposable income as a proportion of gross income plus employer payroll cost, by net
The first three figures are not produced due to a lack of data on employer payroll cost.
The last figure is not produced as it is not applicable to Norway as there is no national
7
4 Individual employment and earnings
Here we examine trends in individual employment, earnings, education, and wages. Section 4.1
examines trends in employment, Section 4.2 examines trends in wages (where wages are mea-
sured using imputed hours worked as described above), Section 4.3 reports trends in hours
worked (measured using full-time employment probability) over time, and finally Section 4.4
Figure 1 illustrates trends in employment rates among different age groups and genders over
time. Firstly, there has been a substantial rise in female employment rates within the 25–59
age group, indicating a considerable increase in their participation in the workforce over time.2
Additionally, there has been an upward trend in female employment rates among individuals
aged 60–74, although to a lesser extent. Secondly, male employment rates were initially high
within the 25–59 age range but experienced a slight decline as time progressed. Thirdly, Figure
1 highlights the presence of significant gaps in employment rates between the sexes among
individuals aged 60–74, with men generally exhibiting higher rates of employment. However,
these gaps have shown a decreasing trend over the period. Finally, there has been a considerable
increase in employment rates among both men and women 16–24 from 2019 to 2021, potentially
Figure 2 provides a comprehensive overview of employment rates throughout the life cycle,
differentiating between sexes, from 1986 to 2017. The figure demonstrates significant upward
trends in female employment rates over time, particularly among women of prime working
age. Similarly, male employment rates also exhibit an increase, concentrated among men in
their mid-30s to early 60s. Irrespective of gender, the graph illustrates a consistent pattern of
rising employment rates over the life cycle, reaching their peak during the prime ages in the
labour market, and gradually declining as individuals approach retirement. By 2017, the levels
of employment over the course of the life cycle are relatively comparable between men and
women. However, women under 30 years old have slightly lower employment rates compared to
8
Figure 1: Employment rates by age and sex, over time
100
90
80
70
60
Percent
50
40
30
20
10
0
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
Year
Note: Data extracted from Labour Force Survey conducted by Statistics Norway from 1972 onwards for workers
in age groups 16–24, 25–59, and 60–74. “Percent” of y-axis refers to employment rate (%).
9
Figure 2: Employment rates over life cycle by sex, selected years
Female Male
100 100
90 90
80 80
70 70
60 60
Percent
Percent
50 50
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
16
21
26
31
36
41
46
51
56
61
66
71
16
21
26
31
36
41
46
51
56
61
66
71
Age Age
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. “Percent” of y-axis refers to employment rate (%).
10
Figure 3 presents an analysis of education trends over time, categorising individuals into
three groups: low educated (ISCED 0–2), middle educated (ISCED 3–5), and high educated
(ISCED 6–8). In the context of the Norwegian education system, the low-educated group gen-
erally comprises individuals with compulsory schooling. The middle-educated group primarily
consists of individuals with vocational high school degrees, including those who started voca-
tional high school but did not complete it, as well as graduates from technical colleges and
some university colleges, along with other post-secondary non-tertiary education programmes.
The high educated category encompasses individuals with a university education. Historically,
middle education has been a dominant educational pathway in Norway and has maintained its
significance over time. However, there was a slight decline in its importance during the 2000s,
reflecting a decrease in vocational high school enrolment. On the other hand, the high educated
category has experienced increasing importance, with over 40% of the population classified as
high educated by 2017 compared to just 15% in 1980. In contrast, the proportion of individuals
with low education has progressively diminished from 1980 to 2017, indicating a decreasing
education that align with those observed in Figure 3. However, the figure also highlights signific-
ant differences between the sexes. Notably, there has been a remarkable surge in high education
among females throughout the period examined. While males have also shown an increase in
high education, the magnitude of this increase is comparatively lower. Additionally, the figure
indicates that males have experienced a relatively smaller decline in middle education, indicating
that this pathway has remained relatively more important for them over time. Conversely, for
females, middle education has become a progressively less significant pathway than for males.
These findings underscore the shifting dynamics of educational attainment between genders,
Figure 5 illustrates employment rates based on different levels of education over time. The
figure clearly demonstrates that education levels impact employment outcomes. Individuals
with high education consistently exhibit the highest employment rates, followed by those with
middle education, and then those with low education. Interestingly, the employment gap be-
tween individuals with high education and those with middle education has narrowed over time.
This trend reflects the strong employment rates among individuals with vocational education in
11
Figure 3: Educational attainment over time
100
90
80
70
60
Percent
50
40
30
20
10
0
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. “Percent” of y-axis refers to share of total population corresponding to
each education group (%).
12
Figure 4: Educational attainment by sex, over time
100
90
80
70
60
Percent
50
40
30
20
10
0
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. “Percent” of y-axis refers to share of total population corresponding to
each education group (%).
13
Norway, contributing to their improved labour market prospects. On the other hand, employ-
ment rates among the low educated have experienced a decline. However, approximately 55%
of individuals with low levels of education remained employed by 2017, although this is lower
than the employment rates of 80–85% observed among the middle- and high-educated groups.
The findings emphasise the importance of education in relation to employment outcomes and
highlight both the positive impact of vocational and university education and the challenges
faced by those with lower levels of education in the Norwegian labour market.
100
90
80
70
60
Percent
50
40
30
20
10
0
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. “Percent” of y-axis refers to employment rate of each education group
(%).
Figure 6 provides further insights by breaking down employment rates based on both edu-
cation level and gender, exhibiting similar patterns to Figure 5. However, the figure highlights
an increase in equality in employment rates by sex over time. Over time, the employment gaps
by sex observed in 1980 decline, and in some cases, completely close. Initially, women with
high education had much lower employment rates than men with high education. However, this
gap completely closed by 2017, indicating a significant improvement in the relative employment
14
prospects for highly educated women. Similarly, men with middle education historically enjoyed
higher employment rates than women with middle education, but this gap has also considerably
declined over time. Furthermore, while females with low education continue to have the lowest
employment rates, the gap between them and their male counterparts has significantly reduced
in 2017 compared to the gap observed in 1980. These findings highlight the narrowing of em-
ployment gaps between genders across different education levels, indicating increased gender
100
90
80
70
60
Percent
50
40
30
20
10
0
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. “Percent” of y-axis refers to employment rate of each education group
and sex (%).
Figure 7 examines unemployment rate by the duration of time spent in unemployment over
time.3 Short- and long-term unemployed workers are defined using data on months spent in
unemployment in the current and previous year, leading to unemployment numbers which are
slightly high in a given year but produce a better understanding of long-term unemployed
workers. Unemployment, both in the short and long term, spikes in the early 1990s when many
3
Data on number of months spent in unemployment is only available until 2010.
15
Nordic countries experienced large financial crises and deep recessions. Unemployment rates
were very low during the Great Recession, with the lowest rate of unemployment over the entire
period in 2008.
Short-term Long-term
.15
.1
Percent
.05
0
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. Unemployment rate calculated as short-term (less than 1 year) and
long-term (1 year or more) using data on the total number of months unemployed in the current and last year.
Data on months spent in unemployment are only available until 2010. “Percent” of y-axis refers to
unemployment rate.
16
4.2 Trends in hourly wages
Figure 8 depicts the progression of median hourly wages over time, differentiating by sex. At the
beginning of the period in 1993, there is a gender gap in hourly wages. Men earn approximately
200 NOK per hour, whereas women earn slightly below 175 NOK per hour. Although both
men and women experience considerable growth in median hourly wages over time, the wage
gap has slightly widened over time. However, it is noteworthy that men and women generally
follow similar wage trends, albeit with a noticeable level difference. Overall, the median wages
for all workers increased from just below 200 NOK in 1993 to 300 NOK per hour by 2017. This
overall growth masks a considerable slowdown around the time of the Great Recession, and
later around 2014–15. While wage growth does slow around the time of the Great Recession, it
quickly picks up again afterwards. However, wage growth stagnates around 2014–15, coinciding
with a considerable fall in the price of oil which affected the Norwegian labour market more
than other countries. For a longer time horizon of such evolution, refer to Section 4.4 which
Figure 9 presents the evolution of hourly wages, categorised by both gender and education.
Such a split by education and sex highlights striking inequalities in hourly wages between women
and men. This is particularly true among females with high education, where such females have a
median hourly wage that falls just below that of males with middle education. In fact, the gender
wage gap in Norwegian kroner is most pronounced among those with high levels of education.
Despite their high levels of education, high-educated women still trail behind middle-educated
men in terms of wages earned. A similar pattern emerges among middle-educated women,
as low-educated men have a slightly higher median wage than their middle-educated female
show growth across all categories, the increase tends to be slightly steeper among individuals
with higher levels of education. Overall, there are significant gender gaps in wages, even when
Figure 10 provides insights into the dynamics of median wages across the life cycle, looking
into differences by gender and education levels, as well as changes between two different time
periods. The data highlight considerable changes over time, revealing the disparities between
men and women and across education levels. Notably, the absolute wage gap measured in
Norwegian kroner between men and women has increased over time. This trend is particularly
17
Figure 8: Median real hourly wage among employees, overall and by sex, over time
400
Median wage (NOK, 2018 prices)
350
300
250
200
150
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is employees aged 25–60. Wages are imputed as described in Section 3.
18
Figure 9: Median real hourly wage among employees, by sex and education, over time
400
Median wage (NOK, 2018 prices)
350
300
250
200
150
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is employees aged 25–60. Wages are imputed as described in Section 3.
19
prominent among high-educated individuals, where men experience considerably higher wages
later in their careers in 2015–17, despite starting at similar levels at age 25. These shifts in
the wage gap later in the life cycle among higher-educated workers are substantial compared
to the gaps observed in 1993–96. Furthermore, middle- and low-educated workers also witness
increasing absolute wage gaps over time, although to a lesser extent. These findings underscore
the varying effects of wage growth for men and women over time, as well as the significance of
Figure 11 presents insights into the inequality of hourly wages in Norway. The figure reveals
that overall inequality in wages, as measured by the Gini coefficient, remains relatively stable
over the period. However, considerable differences emerge when separating by sex. Among
women, there has been a considerable decline in wage inequality over time, and the distribution
of female wages has become more equal over time. In contrast, men have experienced a notable
increase in wage inequality. This suggests that wage disparities among male workers have been
Figure 12 presents similar patterns in inequality over time, defining inequality by 90:10 and
50:10 ratios instead of the Gini as in Figure 11. While inequality measured by the 90:10 ratio
has declined considerably for women, it has increased steadily among men. Given the relatively
unchanged levels of inequality at the bottom of the distribution, measured by the 50:10 ratio,
these changes in inequality among both men and women are driven by considerable changes in
the top half of the distribution. Indeed, male inequality is rising considerably in the top half of
Figure 13 plots the growth in wages across different wage percentiles, over time and separ-
ately by sex. Wage growth among men tends to be higher at higher percentiles of the distri-
bution. In contrast, female wage growth tends to be higher at the very bottom of the earnings
distribution. The relationship between wage growth and wage percentiles among men is even
stronger in the period 2006–17, where wage growth is considerably higher at the top of the
earnings distribution. Such changes are in line with previous figures on wage inequality, which
suggest that wage inequality is increasing among men primarily in the top half of the earnings
distribution.
20
Figure 10: Median real hourly wage among employees over life cycle, by sex and education
1993 to 1996
Male Female
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
Age Age Age
2015 to 2017
Male Female
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
Note: Sample is employees aged 25–60. Wages are imputed as described in Section 3.
21
Figure 11: Gini coefficient of hourly wages among employees, overall and by sex, over time
.38
.36
.34
.32
.3
Gini
.28
.26
.24
.22
.2
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is employees aged 25–60. Wages are imputed as described in Section 3. The top and bottom 1%
of the gender-specific wage distribution are excluded.
22
Figure 12: 90:10 and 50:10 ratios of hourly wages among employees, overall and by sex, over
time
4
Ratio
1
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is employees aged 25–60. Wages are imputed as described in Section 3.
23
Figure 13: Growth in hourly wages among employees by wage percentile, by sex, selected
periods
Male Female
4
Annualized growth (Percent)
3
2
2
1
1
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
Percentile Percentile
Note: Sample is employees aged 25–60. Wages are imputed as described in Section 3.
24
4.3 Trends in hours worked
Figure 14 illustrates the fraction of employees who are engaged in full-time employment, serving
as a proxy for hours worked, among all workers. Similarly to other labour market outcomes,
there is a substantial gender gap in full-time employment observed in 1970, but this gap has
declined considerably over time. Starting from 1986, the proportion of females employed full-
time exhibits a steady increase, while the proportion of men full-time employed experiences
a slight decline. While overall 80% of all workers are employed full-time in 2017, this masks
100
90
80
Percent employed full-time
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is employees aged 25–60. Figure plots trends in full-time employment probability rather than
average imputed hours worked. Full-time work here is defined as working in a job at least 30 hours per week,
measured in November. “Percent employed full-time” of y-axis refers to the percent of each group employed
full-time.
Figure 15 depicts the share of full-time employment among employees, separately by both
gender and education level. Male workers with high and middle education levels exhibit con-
sistent and high levels of full-time employment throughout the period. In contrast, the figure
25
reveals a notable increase in full-time employment among highly educated women, with the
share rising from around 50% in 1980 to over 80% by 2017. However, it is important to note
that females with middle and low education levels also experience increases in full-time em-
ployment over time. On the other hand, a group that sees a decline in the share of full-time
employment over the years is low-educated men. Their probability of full-time employment
decreases from a peak of over 95% in 1986 to roughly 80% by 2017, with a particularly sharp
decline observed from the mid-2000s and into the 2010s. Despite advances in full-time employ-
ment among women, full-time employment rates of women continue to lag behind those of men
within each education level, with the largest gender gaps in middle and low education levels.
Interestingly, full-time employment rates among high-educated women are lower than those of
middle-educated men and roughly similar to those of low-educated men, reflecting a strong
Figure 15: Mean weekly hours worked among employees, by sex and education, over time
100
90
Percent full-time employed
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is employees aged 25–60. Figure plots trends in full-time employment probability rather than
average imputed hours worked. “Percent employed full-time” of y-axis refers to the percent of each group
employed full-time.
26
Figure 16 plots the growth in imputed hours worked across the hourly wage distribution,
separately by sex. Growth in hours worked is considerably higher among women, who are
becoming increasingly attached to the labour force over the period. Among men, there is a
decline in hours worked over the period, particularly from 2004–06 to 2016–17. Despite this
decline, men still have very high rates of full-time employment, as seen in Figure 15. Figure 16
excludes the change in the top 25% of the hourly wage distribution.
Figure 16: Growth in mean hours worked among employees by wage ventile, overall and by
sex, selected years
Male Female
6
4
4
Total growth (Percent)
2
0
0
-2
-2
-4
-4
0
10
15
20
10
15
20
Note: Sample is employees aged 25–60. The figure plots the growth in the measure of imputed hours as
described in Section 3. It does not report the change in the top 25% of hourly wage distribution.
27
4.4 Inequality in individual earnings among those in work
Figure 17 presents trends in median gross earnings, differentiating between males and females.
Similarly to Figure 8, the figure demonstrates substantial growth in earnings for both males and
females over the period analysed. A substantial gender gap in earnings exists at the beginning
of the period in 1993, and this gap remains relatively unchanged over time. By 2017, the gender
gap in earnings is very similar to what it was over 20 years ago. Notably, earnings begin to slow
down from 2012 onwards, and there is even a decline observed around 2013–14.
Figure 17: Median real gross individual earnings, overall and by sex, over time
700
600
500
400
300
200
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Figure 18 illustrates the trends in median gross earnings, separately by both gender and
education levels. Similarly to Figure 9, the figure reveals that high-educated women have lower
median earnings than both high- and middle-educated men. Furthermore, low-educated men
tend to earn more than middle-educated women in terms of median earnings. Over time, the
growth in earnings is most prominent among the high-educated group, irrespective of gender.
28
Conversely, the lowest growth in earnings is observed among the low-educated cohort. These
findings highlight the persistence of earnings disparities based on both gender and education,
with higher-educated individuals experiencing greater earnings growth than their counterparts
700
600
500
400
300
200
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Figure 19 provides insights into inequality in earnings in Norway over time. The figure
reveals that overall income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, remains relatively
flat over the period. Moreover, the overall level of inequality in Norway is relatively low.
However, looking into differences by sex, considerable differences emerge. Inequality in earnings
for men has experienced a modest increase over the period, indicating a slight rise in inequality
among male earners. In contrast, inequality in earnings for women has remained relatively
unchanged. This finding suggests that the overall measure of inequality in Norway masks the
Figure 20 depicts the trends in two inequality ratios, 90:10 and 50:10, for all workers, male
29
Figure 19: Gini coefficient of gross individual earnings, overall and by sex, over time
.38
.36
.34
.32
.3
Gini
.28
.26
.24
.22
.2
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
30
workers, and female workers. Overall, Norway exhibits relatively low levels of earnings inequality
compared to many other countries. Examining the 90:10 ratio reveals that females have higher
levels of inequality at the beginning of the period than males. However, while female inequality
remains stable or slightly declines over time, male inequality steadily increases. Consequently,
by 2017, levels of inequality among men and women are relatively similar. Focusing on the
50:10 ratio reveals that inequality at the lower end of the earnings distribution remains higher
among women than among men throughout the period. Consequently, inequality among men
is growing more than among women in the top half of the distribution.
Figure 20: 90:10 and 50:10 ratios of gross individual earnings, overall and by sex, over time
3.5
3
Ratio
2.5
1.5
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Figure 21 plots the growth in gross earnings by percentiles. Consistent with the previous
figure, there is an increase in inequality in the bottom of the distribution for men, where earnings
growth is consistently higher among men in the top of the earnings distribution relative to the
bottom of the distribution. This is particularly true among men in the bottom half of the
distribution, while female earnings growth is considerably higher in terms of percentage change.
31
Figure 21: Growth in gross earnings by earning percentile, overall and sex, selected periods
1994-2006 2006-2017
Male Female Male Female
60
30
Percent change in gross earnings
50
20
40
10
30
20 0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Earnings percentile Earnings percentile
32
4.5 Self-employment
Figure 22 illustrates the trends in self-employment over time, where self-employment is defined
as having a primary source of labour earnings from business. The figure reveals a consistent
individuals were engaged in self-employment, but by 2017 this proportion had reduced to around
5%. These findings indicate a decreasing trend in self-employment and suggest a slight shift
Self-Employed Employee
100
80
60
Percent
40
20
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is employees aged 25–60. “Percent” of y-axis refers to the share of employees either self-employed
or employees (%).
This figure reveals notable differences compared to the previous figure, highlighting the im-
portance of both sex and education in self-employment dynamics. Firstly, males tend to have
observed over time is predominantly concentrated among low- and middle-educated men. Con-
33
versely, self-employment among both high-educated men and women remains relatively stable
15
10
Percent
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is employees aged 25–60. “Percent” of y-axis refers to the share of each group who are
self-employed (%).
Figure 24 illustrates the variations in self-employment across different ventiles of the earnings
distribution. The figure shows a U-shaped pattern, indicating that self-employment rates are
highest at the top of the earnings distribution and lowest in the middle of the distribution.
Self-employment levels decline consistently throughout the distribution, with a relatively equal
decrease across all earnings ventiles. These findings demonstrate the association between self-
employment and earnings, with higher rates of self-employment observed among individuals
with higher earnings. The decline in self-employment rates across all income levels suggests a
34
Figure 24: Share self-employed by ventile of individual earnings, selected years
1999 2006
2017
15
10
Percent
0
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Ventile
Note: Sample is employees aged 25–60. “Percent” of y-axis refers to the share of ventile who are self-employed
(%).
35
5 Labour market institutions
Figure 25 highlights the strong presence of unions in Norway, with a prevalence that has re-
mained significant over time, albeit with a slight decline. Despite this decline, union membership
remains typical and widespread. In 1993, approximately 55% of employees were union members,
and even by 2017, the proportion of union members among employees was still around 50%.
The figure indicates that union membership continues to be common among Norwegian employ-
ees, and as unions collectively bargain over wages, reflects the enduring influence of unions in
the labour market. The fraction of workers who are covered by collective bargaining is roughly
36
Figure 25: Union density and fraction of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements,
over time
70
60
50
Percent
40
30
20
10
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is employees aged 25–60. Figure plots trade union density over period, measured by
individual-level union membership. Data on collective bargaining coverage are extracted from the OECD,
Collective bargaining coverage, (https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=CBC) which measures the
percentage of employees with the right to bargain in various years. “Percent” of y-axis corresponds to the
percentage of workers who are union members (solid line) and covered by collective bargaining (dotted line) (%).
37
5.2 Benefits from the state
Figure 26 demonstrates the significant influence of the Norwegian welfare state across the earn-
ings distribution. The figure reveals that while individuals at the bottom of the distribution
receive the highest proportion of their income through benefits, there is also a substantial frac-
tion of benefits allocated to those at the top. In fact, the share of income received by the top
25% of the distribution has been increasing over time, surpassing 30% of total income by 2017.
While there has been a decline in benefit receipt at the lower end of the household income
distribution, it has remained stable, or even increased, at all other points in the distribution.
The figure highlights the comprehensive and inclusive nature of the Norwegian welfare state, as
it provides support not only to the most vulnerable individuals but also to a significant extent
Our measure of benefits in Figure 26 includes taxable benefits such as disability, unem-
ployment, and sickness absence, but interestingly, it is an increase in tax-free benefits among
the top quartile that drives the increase in benefits as a proportion of gross income in the fig-
ure. Similarly, a decrease in receipt of tax-free benefits among the bottom quartile drives the
decrease in benefits as a proportion of gross income. Among tax-free benefits, child benefits
represent roughly 40–50% of the total average benefit among all workers, depending on the year
examined. Such benefits are universal, and anyone responsible for a child under age 18 will be
Figure 27 provides an overview of the tax rates in Norway across the household income dis-
tribution. Consistent with the previous figure on the prevalence of benefits, this figure demon-
strates that taxation is prevalent across all income levels. Even individuals at the bottom of
the distribution, who receive a significant portion of their income from benefits, pay approxim-
ately 10% in taxes throughout the period. As we move up the income distribution, tax rates
gradually increase, with the top 25% of households facing the highest rates. Importantly, tax
rates remain relatively stable across all points in the distribution over time. While there is a
slight decline in tax rates among the third and fourth quartiles, the bottom and second quartiles
remain roughly unchanged in their percentage of tax paid. This data showcases the progressive
tax system in Norway, where individuals with higher incomes contribute a larger share of their
earnings to taxation, supporting the comprehensive welfare state and social programmes in the
country. While tax rates are high, they are not as high as taxes paid as a percentage of gross
38
Figure 26: Benefits as a proportion of gross income, by net household income quartile
70
60
50
Percent
40
30
20
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. There is a break in the definition of households in 2005 as described in
Section 3. “Percent” of y-axis corresponds to the percentage of gross income made up by benefits for each
quartile (%).
39
earnings, reflecting the contribution of benefits to gross income seen previously.
Figure 27: Tax payments as a proportion of gross income, by net household income quartile
30
25
Percent
20
15
10
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. There is a break in the definition of households in 2005 as described in
Section 3. “Percent” of y-axis corresponds to the percentage of gross income made up by tax payments for each
quartile (%).
Figure 28 provides the ratio of disposable income to gross income. Disposable income has
remained relatively constant as a share of gross income over time, with slight increases among
the third and fourth quartiles. The bottom quartile receives a considerable share of total gross
40
Figure 28: Disposable income as a proportion of gross income, by net household income
quartile
90
85
Percent
80
75
70
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. There is a break in the definition of households in 2005 as described in
Section 3. “Percent” of y-axis corresponds to the percentage of gross income made up by disposable income for
each quartile (%).
41
6 Household incomes
Figure 29 provides insights into the changing landscape of family structure in Norway over time.
Marriage rates have significantly declined across all education groups, with a more pronounced
decrease among the low educated. Marriage has become increasingly common among highly
educated individuals over the period studied. While the figure does not directly capture co-
females across all age groups. Additionally, the fraction of single females has also witnessed a
significant increase across all age groups. These findings suggest that while the figure focuses
solely on marriage, the overall decline in family formation would persist when considering cohab-
itation. The data underscore the shifting dynamics of family structures in Norway, highlighting
changes in marital patterns and the growing prevalence of alternative forms of partnership.
Figure 30 plots the relationship between marriage and having a working partner and income
separately by sex. There is a very strong earnings gradient among married men, while the same
is true among those with working partners, though to a lesser degree. A similar pattern exists
Figure 31 plots trends in assortative mating, asking how spousal earnings varies across the
earnings distribution. There exists a strong gradient where both females and males at lower
ends of the earnings distribution have lower earning partners and those at higher ends of the
distribution have higher earning partners. There have been some changes over time, where for
females, the relationship between spousal and own earnings has become stronger at the bottom
of the earnings distribution from 1993–2017. In contrast, the relationship between spousal
and own earnings has become stronger at the top of the earnings distribution for men. It is
worth noting that partners are only identified conditional on marriage, so differences in rates of
Figures 32–33 plot the change in the composition of households over time. While Figure
32 plots for all households, Figure 33 separates by sex and education. There have been large
increases in the share of individuals who are unmarried without children across all education
groups and males and females. At the same time, there have been declines in those who married
with children. Among men, there is a strong relationship between education and the increase
42
Figure 29: Share married, overall and by education, over time
80
70
Percent
60
50
40
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. Due to a break in the definition of households in 2005, the plot reports
only the proportion of married individuals by education. See the Appendix for figures on the evolution of
cohabitation and single (non-married, non-cohabiting) rates over time. “Percent” of y-axis corresponds to the
percentage of each education group who are married (%).
43
Figure 30: Share married and share with working partner, by sex and individual gross
earnings percentile, selected years
1993-Female 1993-Male
100
100
80
80
60
60
Percent
Percent
40
40
20
20
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
Female gross earnings percentile Male gross earnings percentile
2017-Female 2017-Male
100
100
80
80
60
60
Percent
Percent
40
40
20
20
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
Female gross earnings percentile Male gross earnings percentile
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. Figure excludes the bottom and top 1% of the gender-specific earnings
distribution. The proportion with a working partner is conditional on being married. “Percent” of y-axis
corresponds to the percentage of each percentile who are either working married or working with a working
partner (%).
44
Figure 31: Mean gross earnings percentile of partner/spouse by individual’s gross earnings
percentile, selected years
1993 2017
Female Male
100
100
80
80
Partner's gross earnings percentile
60
40
40
20
20
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
Female gross earnings percentile Male gross earnings percentile
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. Figure excludes the bottom and top 1% of the gender-specific earnings
distribution. The proportion with a working partner is conditional on being married.
45
in the share of those unmarried with no children, where the growth is much stronger among low
educated men relative to high educated men. In contrast, the growth rate of those unmarried
without children is roughly similar across all education groups for females.
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. “Percent” of y-axis corresponds to the share of the total population in
each group (%).
46
Figure 33: Share of individuals by position in the household, by sex and education, over time
100
80
80
60
60
Percent
Percent
40
40
20
20
0
0
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
year year
100
80
80
60
60
Percent
Percent
40
40
20
20
0
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
year year
100
80
80
60
60
Percent
Percent
40
40
20
20
0
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
year year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. “Percent” of y-axis corresponds to the share of the total population in
each group (%).
47
6.2 Earnings and incomes among working households
Figure 34 sheds light on the disparities in living in a household with at least one working adult
based on education levels. The figure highlights substantial differences across the different
levels of education. Individuals with the lowest levels of education are becoming less and less
likely to reside in a household with a working adult as time progresses. In contrast, the trends
among high- and middle-educated individuals follows a similar pattern over time, albeit with
a consistent disparity in levels. However, the magnitude of this gap is not substantial when
reflects the greater availability of employment opportunities for high- and middle-educated
individuals in Norway. The figure highlights the challenges faced by those with lower levels of
100
90
80
Percent
70
60
50
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. A working household is defined as a household in which at least one
adult is in work. There is a break in the definition of households in 2005 as described in Section 3. “Percent” of
y-axis corresponds to the share within each group who are in a working household (%).
Figure 35 provides insights into the disparities in disposable income between working and
non-working households, highlighting substantial differences in income levels between the two
groups. Working households exhibit significantly higher levels of disposable income than non-
48
working households. Furthermore, the figure illustrates that working households also experience
much stronger income growth over time in comparison to non-working households, whose income
has remained relatively stagnant in recent years. The earnings of working households steadily
increase throughout the period, contributing to their overall higher levels of disposable income.
These findings emphasise the importance of employment in driving income growth and the
Figure 35: Median real gross household earnings and disposable household income, by
household working status, over time
Gross household earnings (working HHs) Disposable household income (working HHs)
Disposable household income (non-working HHs) Disposable household income (all HHs)
Norwegian kroner ('000s, 2018 prices)
500
400
300
200
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. A working household is defined as a household in which at least one
adult is in work. There is a break in the definition of households in 2005 as described in Section 3.
Figure 36 plots the annualised growth in household earnings and disposable income among
working households from 1993–2006, and from 2006–2017. Annual growth has declined over
time, from 1993–2006 there was around 3% growth in both measures, while from 2006–2017,
there is around 1–2%. This is true across the distribution, but the decline in annual growth of
earnings and income is even worse among those at the bottom of the distribution. While there
was a U-shape in annualised growth previously, with stronger growth at both the bottom and
the top, from 2006–2017 there exists a strong gradient in growth across the distribution, where
those at the lower end of the distribution have considerably lower growth rates than those at
49
the top of the distribution. Even among working households, growth in earnings and income
has slowed down at the bottom of the distribution relative to the top of the distribution over
time.
Figure 36: Annualised growth in real equivalised gross household earnings and household
disposable income for working households, by percentile, selected years
4
3
3
Annualized growth (Percent)
2
1
1
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentile Percentile
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. A working household is defined as a household in which at least one
adult is in work. There is a break in the definition of households in 2005 as described in Section 3.
50
6.3 Inequality in incomes among all households
Figure 37 provides insights into the relationship between education and median disposable
income. The figure illustrates that individuals with higher levels of education experience much
stronger income growth over time. As observed in previous figures, the disposable income
of individuals with low levels of education reaches a plateau, showing limited growth in recent
years. In contrast, individuals with middle-level education follow a similar income trend to those
with high education, although there may be an initial difference in income levels. The income
when compared to the slowdown among those with low levels of education. These findings
confirm the significant role of education in determining not only individual labour market success
450
Norwegian kroner (2018, 000's)
400
350
300
250
200
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. There is a break in the definition of households in 2005 as described in
Section 3.
Figure 38 reveals that inequality at the household level remains relatively stable over time,
as measured by various indicators such as the Gini coefficient (presented both with and without
winsorising the top 1%), relative poverty (defined as income below 60% of the median net
51
income), and the top 1% ratio. One exception is the Gini coefficient, which shows a slight
rise from 1993 to 2017. The rise in the Gini coefficient is observed in both measures with and
without winsorising the top 1%, and eliminating the influence of the top 1% serves to decrease
the Gini by a roughly equal share over time. The level of the top 1% share is high compared to
the other measures, indicating high levels of disposable income concentrated at the top of the
income distribution. Despite the presence of a robust welfare state, around 8–10% of individuals
aged 25–60 are classified as being in relative poverty, a number which is very slightly increasing
over time. Similar to individual inequality, household inequality shows a consistent pattern over
time.
Figure 38: Gini, relative poverty and top 1% share of net household income for all households,
over time
50
40
Gini (x100), Percent
30
20
10
0
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. There is a break in the definition of households in 2005 as described in
Section 3. The Gini inequality index is multiplied by 100. The relative poverty rate is defined as the proportion
of people living in households with less than 60% of contemporaneous disposable median income. “Percent” of
y-axis corresponds to the percentage of the population in either relative poverty or the top 1% (%).
The data reveal that the 90:10 ratio shows a slight increase over the period. On the other hand,
the 50:10 ratio remains relatively constant. These findings suggest a growth in inequality at the
top half of the disposable household income distribution over time, although the extent of this
52
growth is modest. While the 90:10 ratio indicates a widening income gap, the stability of the
50:10 ratio suggests that inequality in the bottom half of the distribution is relatively constant
over time.
Figure 39: Percentile ratios of disposable household incomes for all households, over time
3.5
3
Ratio
2.5
1.5
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. There is a break in the definition of households in 2005 as described in
Section 3.
53
7 Immigrant outcomes
Figure 40 displays the remarkable growth in the proportion of the population born outside of
Norway from 1970 to 2017. At the beginning of the period in 1970, immigrants accounted for just
3% of the population. However, over time, there has been a substantial increase in this share.
While the immigrant share is growing prior to the early 2000s, the rate at which immigration
is increasing becomes even stronger after 2004, coinciding with the EU expansion to include
the ‘A10; countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). This expansion facilitated a more accessible immigration
process into Norway from these countries, and by 2017 immigrants comprised nearly 23% of
the total population aged 25–60. This strong growth after 2004 represents a doubling of the
25
20
15
Percent
10
0
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. Immigrants are defined as those born outside of Norway. “Percent” of
y-axis corresponds to the percentage of the population who are immigrants (%).
Figure 41 depicts the significant changes in the presence of immigrants across the equivalised
disposable income distribution in Norway, coinciding with the increase in immigration discussed
in Figure 40. The figure reveals a disproportionate representation of immigrants in the bottom
54
25% of the income distribution in 1996, a pattern that has considerably intensified over time.
While there is substantial growth in the immigrant share across all points in the distribution,
this growth is primarily concentrated in the bottom half of the distribution, particularly the
bottom 25%. In 2017, around 30–50% of individuals in the bottom 25% of the distribution are
non-Norwegian born, compared to 20% at the median and approximately 10–15% at the top of
has significantly influenced the composition of the bottom of the income distribution in Norway,
suggesting that immigration may be linked with patterns of inequality in the 2000s in Norway.
Figure 41: Share of immigrants in population, by disposable income distribution over time
1996 2004
2007 2017
60
40
Percent
20
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. Immigrants are defined as those born outside of Norway. “Percent” of
y-axis corresponds to the percentage of the population who are immigrants within each point of the distribution
(%).
Figure 42 plots the relationship between the immigrant and native-born population, separ-
ately by sex and over time. These are normalised with respect to native workers, such that a
value of 1 corresponds to equality between immigrants and natives, while anything less than
1 highlights areas where immigrants lag behind the labour market outcomes of natives. As
immigration has increased considerably into the period from 1986 to 2017, there are consid-
erable changes in the relative outcomes of natives and immigrants. Immigrants into Norway
55
are considerably more likely to be highly educated than natives, but this has also declined
considerably as immigration into Norway has increased. However, by 2017, male immigrant
workers in Norway were on average more highly educated than native workers. Despite these
differences in education, employment rates of immigrants, hours worked per week, and earnings
of immigrants lag behind those of natives, for both men and women. The gap with native
workers in earnings is considerable, and becoming even larger over time, which is also reflected
in disposable household income. Despite being, on average, more highly educated than native
workers, the labour market outcomes of male and female immigrants lag behind those of native
workers.
Figure 42: Outcomes of immigrants relative to native-born population, by sex and over time
2
1.5
1
.5
0
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Share high educated Employment rate Hours per week Personal earnings Disposable household income
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. Immigrants are defined as those born outside of Norway. Y-axis
corresponds to the ratio of immigrant outcomes to native outcomes ( immigrant
native
).
56
8 Appendix
Figure 43: Median real gross individual income, overall and by sex, over time
600
Median gross earnings (including benefits)
500
(NOK'000s, 2018 prices)
400
300
200
100
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Year
Note: Sample is individuals aged 25–60. Gross income, measured as earnings plus benefits such as
unemployment insurance, sickness benefits, and parental leave.
57
Figure 44: Share single/cohabiting, by age, over time
50
40
30
Percent
20
10
0
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
Year
50
40
30
Percent
20
10
0
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
Year
58
Note: Data available from Tidligere kilder har vært Fruktbarhetsundersøkelsen (1977), Familie- og
yrkesundersøkelsen (1988), and Omnibusundersøkelser (1993–2004). From 2005 onward, representative survey
of 8,000 residents.