Q.

To what extent would it be correct to consider Napoleon the heir to the

French Revolution?

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) is one of the most dramatic and fascinating

characters of modern European history, who has captured the imagination of
scholars, intellectuals, writers, poets and artists over centuries. Napoleon led a
glamorous and heroic life, found admirers like Hegel and Goethe, while at the
same time inviting the hatred and detest of people like Leo Tolstoy. As a
character Napoleon was an intriguing combination of varying and often
contrasting traits. And it was the presence of these very traits that made
Napoleon the most suitable man to lead France in a tumultuous period of flux.

The character of Napoleon raises many questions about the relationship

between individuals and historical processes, and the extent to which they are
dependent on and governed by each other. While it may not be possible to
arrive at an answer, Napoleon does show us what an individual can make out of
an opportunity given to him by these forces. The issue of historical inevitability
is a complex one, which we need to try and understand without putting undue
emphasis on either the genius of Napoleon or his circumstances.

The debate over whether Napoleon can be called the heir to the French
Revolution still remains open. This question presupposes a ‘revolution’, and a
‘revolutionary legacy’, which would need to be fulfilled. For this it is imperative
to get an idea of the Revolution and the forces it released. The French
Revolution has been considered by many as marking the turning point in
French history, where the Old Order collapsed, paving the way for a new
capitalist Order. This perception however is too simplistic and is based on a
Marxist understanding, in which the correlation between the nobility, the
bourgeoisie and capitalist development is uni-dimensional. The Revolution
definitely unleashed many radical forces, which held the potential for a
capitalist transformation, but had to face the unexpected challenge of a
tenacious, surviving Old Order.

When looking at the French Revolution, we also need to keep in mind that not
everyone is agreed on what the French revolution really was. For liberal
historians, the Revolution continued till 1791, or the phase of the bourgeoisie
revolution. Democratic and radical historians see the true revolution as
between 1792 and 1794, when the Jacobins held power. Some historians have
even gone on to see the Revolution right up to 1815, the fall of Napoleon.
Hence, when we talk about the heir to the revolution, we need to be careful
about our interpretation, since the ideology of the revolution changed from
1788 right up to 1799, when Napoleon came to power.

What this traditional perspective of the French Revolution also ignores is that
the French Revolution was not even a Revolution in the sense that the Old
Order never was overthrown completely. While many things did change, the
persistent Old Order did not allow a complete and radical transformation. The
ancien regime was not an institution, which could be destroyed from the top. It
was a set of attitudes, which had persisted in the minds of the French people in
spite of a revolution. Hence, when we speak in terms of fulfilling or betraying
the revolution, the continuance of the Old regime in many spheres of social,
political, and economic life needs to be kept in mind.

Before we can analyze Napoleon’s work as First Consul and then Emperor, we
need to briefly look at the circumstances preceding his coming to power. In
1792, following the bourgeoisie revolution, a government of radicals known as
the Jacobins, under Robespierre came to power. He was a committed
revolutionary and soon assumed dictatorial powers, creating the ‘reign of
terror’, in an attempt to control a France in disarray after the popular
revolution. In July 1794, Robesspierre was ousted in what is called the
Thermidore, and power was seized by another group of people. This group
comprised primarily of men of property who desired above all political
stability. They desired a moderate parliamentary regime of property owners
and in 1795 tried to push through a new constitution, which was never
effected. They were however not counter-revolutionaries and were walking a
tightrope between the radical left and the right. Soon, they were forced to turn
towards the army. It is interesting to note that as early as 1790, a time when
most people had thought that the Revolution was over, Edmund Burke had
predicted and warned of a more extreme form of revolution, which was to
come. He foresaw that increasing extremism would eventually lead to a
situation where the army would become the most powerful institution and
power would be seized by a military general.

By the late 1790s it was clear that the army was becoming exceedingly
important, especially in the face of a financial crisis in France. Huge war booties
also made the government further dependent on it. The financial stability of
the government was now closely linked to the performance and victories of the
army. It was at this point of time that a group of notables decided to orchestrate
a change, which would concentrate greater powers in the hands of the
executive, thereby weakening the legislative bodies. This could only be done by
a military general, who in this case turned out to be Napoleon. We can see at
this point how the coming of Napoleon was governed by forces beyond his
control, but the fact that it was a personality like him which came to power
changed things in a profound manner for Europe.

By 1700, Napoleon had already distinguished himself as a successful military

leader after his campaigns in Italy and Egypt. The existing government in
France was becoming increasingly unpopular and a need was being felt for a
change. Napoleon found himself allied with three men, who like himself, had
survived the Revolution, had served under the Directory, and were now
convinced of the need for a new Constitution. These men were Fouché,
Talleyrand, and Sieyès. They captured power in a coup d’etat on 18th and 19th
Brumaire. .After the coup, Sieyès, Ducos and Napoleon Bonaparte were named
the provisional Consuls of the French Republic, with Napoleon being marked
out as First Consul. In 1802, Napoleon became Consul for Life and in 1804 he
acquired the title of an Emperor.

In calling Napoleon Bonaparte to their aid in Brumaire, Seiyes had hoped to

keep the political controls firmly in their own hands. While drafting the
Constitution, Seiyès had hoped, by inducing Bonaparte to accept a nominal
headship of the state, to confine him to the appointment of ministers and
generals, and to the supervision of their work. This idea was nothing new, but
this time, the man selected for the job was of a different temperament from
anyone before, and far from retaining control over the situation, the
Brumairians were soon to find that their would-be auxiliary was fully
determined to impose his own pattern on events. Markham writes that
Brumaire comprises of two distinct coup d’etet. The first was the victory of the
party of the Brumarians over the Jacobins on 18 and 19 Brumaire. The second
was the victory of Napoleon over Seiyes and the Brumarians. The second was
the unforeseen change, which produced a form of government radically
different from the Directory.

Any person who would come to power at this point of time in France would
have to tread a middle path in order to survive. One could not rule like a
monarch of the Old regime, in the new revolutionary circumstances, or he
would fall like Loius XVI. At the same time a completely radical revolutionary
like Robespierre would also not survive at a time when French society was in a
state of flux and the Old Order had survived. Napoleon successfully balanced
the two antagonizing neither left nor right, or at least not giving them the
power to show dissent, and thus was able to set up a stable government based
on centralized power.

When considering the internal history of France, one sees that the coup d’etat
of Brumaire opened the way for the restoration of personal power. However,
the essential unity between the Napoleonic and Revolutionary periods cannot
be ignored. It was to the Revolution that Napoleon owed his destiny. He was
always seen as the son of the Revolution, and it was as such that he made his
mark upon European civilization.

The victors in the coup d’etat faced a nation in economic, political, religious,
and moral disarray. Peasants worried lest some returning Bourbon should
revoke their title deeds. Financers hesitated to invest in the securities of a
government that had been so often overturned. The map of Europe had already
undergone noticeable change, and the expansion of French territory to the
‘natural frontiers’ had clearly upset European equilibrium. A social conflict
existed between the privileged classes and the bourgeoisie. A political conflict
existed also because royal despotism, like privilege, had been condemned, and
kings, having taken the aristocracy under their protection, ventured the risk of
perishing with it. Finally, there was also a religious conflict due to a Church
divided. Public spirit, which in 1789 had risen to rare heights of patriotism and
courage, was dying in a people weary of revolution and war, skeptical of every
leader, and cynical of its own hopes. The situation called not for politics, but
for statesmanship, and some sort of a dictatorship.

One of the most important institutions which Napoleon took over from the
Directory, and developed, was the Secretariat of State. Napoleon turned this
into the Ministry of State which became a central registry, enabling Napoleon to
supervise the separate ministries and departments without allowing them any
collective responsibility. Napoleon valued experts and was conscious of his own
limitations and of his need for a body of specialists, who could provide him
with the advice he needed in all fields of government. The Council of State was
also to draw up laws and administrative regulations and expound them to the
legislative bodies. The Council included ex-members of the Constituent
Assembly, moderates, royalists and Jacobins among others. The Council of State
was one of Napoleon’s principal instruments in centralization of power.

The creation of a centralized bureaucratic state system had been the desire of
all Bourbon monarchs too. However, this had never been possible due to the
existence of numerous localized institutions, which had reduced the effective
powers of the monarch. This however changed with the revolution. The
utopian classical enlightened idealism behind the Revolution prompted a
destruction of all that represented the ancien regime, creating a clean slate on
which to begin the construction of the perfect institutions based on universal
rationality. Paradoxically, the very Revolution, which spoke about liberty
created the perfect circumstances to create an authoritarian government.

In local administration, the Consulate reversed the practice of the Revolution,

and returned to the centralization of the Bourbon monarchy. In the Bourbon
system there were thirty six provincial units known as generalites or provinces,
each under an Intendent. These were very powerful officials but only within
their local sphere. By the law passed in 1790, the old provinces of France were
replaced by new administrative areas called the Departments. This had
deprived the Central government of any effective control over the elected local
authorities. By a new law now passed in 1800, the elective principle was done
away with. The departments, cantons and communes were retained and
between the communes and the departements a new intermediary
administrative unit called the arrondissement was created. This was a revived
district but of a larger area. Prefects appointed by the First Consul, were to be
in sole charge of the Departments. The prefects exercised in their own sphere
ample executive authority. The powers of these provincial units were severely
curtailed. The idea behind such a system was at one level to increase
centralization of power, while at the same time keeping local level officials busy
enough so as not to interfere in political affairs.

This system of provincial administration has continued till the present day
with only minor modifications. In fact after 1800, the first change in it only
came about in 1884. It was much later that popular participation at this level of
governance was introduced. To say that such a centralized and authoritarian
system was in violation of the spirit of the revolution, a return to the ideals of
the ancien regime is a simplistic correlation between revolutionary ideals and
the degree of central control. While it may be argued that Napoleon
compromised on the libertarian aspects of revolutionary philosophy, it can also
be said that this kind of a system was a fulfillment of egalitarian principles, in
fact a system made possible by the egalitarian strand of the revolution. Once
again the idealistic connection that is drawn between liberty, equality and
fraternity as the mutually compatible pillars of revolutionary philosophy needs
to be questioned. All three need not have been completely in-sync and may
even have pointed in opposing directions. Hence, the very question of the
legacy of the revolution can be derived from three or more variable and
possibly incompatible values.

The revolutionary period in France had been bedeviled by weak and haphazard
financial and banking policy. The new government confronted the problem of
an almost empty treasury and consequently, it was forced to appeal to bankers
for loans. Credit, however would take too long to establish and it was not the
moment for another war of loot. The need for more prosaic measures was felt.
Administrative reforms were introduced in the realm of finances, and it was in
this area that centralization scored its first success.

Napoleon’s first act was to deprive local officials of the power to assess and in
part collect direct taxes, reserving this responsibility for agents of the central
government. Bonaparte appointed two sets of officials, one for assessment and
the other for collection of taxes, in every department and commune of the
country. At the head of the system was a general director for direct taxation and
deputy directors for each departement. Below them were auditors
(controleurs) and inspectors (inspecteurs) in charge of apportioning taxes
among the taxpayers in each commune. There was also a treasurer, a
paymaster, revenue agents and tax collectors in each departement. In the year
X or 1801 a separate Ministry of the Public Treasury was also created. These
reforms were the work of Gaudin, a financial bureaucrat of the ancien regime.

Banking hadn’t developed in France as it had in the Netherlands or in England.

Napoleon felt the necessity to set up a national bank in order to stabilize
government finances. After the coup de’etat of Brumaire and Bonaparte’s
promise of strong government, some amount of confidence of the bankers was
restored and with their active cooperation the Bank of France was founded in
February 1800. It was at first an independent corporation, and its constitution
was drafted by a leading Paris banker. It assisted the government, in return for
the handling of the tax-collectors’ deposits, government pensions and interest
on government loans. It essentially acted as a middleman of government
collecting and spending. Like many other Napoleonic institutions, the Bank of
France has continued till the present day. In 1803, the bank was given the
monopoly of the issue of bank-notes.

While internal financial reform was successful, the question of finances is

closely linked with the great power ambitions of France, especially since the
revolutionary crisis had been precipitated by a financial crunch due to these
very ambitions, among other things. Finances in the country had definitely
stabilized, but they were still not sufficient to support imperial conquest.
Napoleon decided that at this point of time war itself would pay for war. In
other words, plunder during the various campaigns would fund the immense
costs of war. Spoils, indemnities and even quartering of French troops on
foreign soil were part of this. Therefore, we see that success in war was still
crucial to maintaining the financial balance in France. Napoleon also tried to
raise money by increasing taxes.

Napoleon also wished to lay down the legislative basis on which the unified
administrative machinery was to operate. The idea of an enlightened ruler
discovering the perfect laws was central to the concept of an ideal ruler, and his
Code of laws is a reflection of this. The idea of fraternite, the unity of the French
nation, urgently required a codification of law. In 1789, there was nothing
approaching a state of legal unity of the French nation. There were no less than
366 local Codes in force at this time. In the south, property rights were based
on written Roman law, the Code of Justinian and in the north, on Teutonic
customary law. This situation was further complicated by feudal custom, Canon
Law and royal ordinance. The Revolution had brought a drastic upheaval in the
property-system of France. It had swept away feudal privilege, and had
redistributed a vast amount of land by the nationalization and sale of the lands
of the Church and the émigré nobility. In the new situation there could be no
confidence or stability in the revolutionary land settlement until the new
situation was defined.

The new Civil Code was promulgated as a law on March 21, 1804, under the
title Civil Code of the French People, and later renamed as the Code Napoleon in
1807. It essentially defined the relationship between persons and property.
The Code of 1804 struck a balance between the two – the traditional Roman
law and the Teutonic Customary law. It preserved legal egalitarian principles of
1789, tempered by a new and sharper insistence on the rights of property and
on the authority of parent and husband. Napoleon had taken personal interest
in the promulgation of family law where he was intent upon strengthening the
authority of the father and the husband in the home. The family was conceived
of as an important social entity which disciplined the behaviour of individuals.
These clauses of the code dealing with marriage, paternity, divorce and
adoption are among those strongly influenced by Roman law. While rejecting
the democratic principles of 1793, the Code adopted in their entirety the new
property-rights and rights of citizenship bequeathed by the revolutionaries of
1789. The destruction of feudalism and feudal privileges was endorsed, as
were liberty of conscience and employment.
George Lefebvre sees that like most of Napoleon’s achievements, the Code was
also dual in character. On the one hand it confirmed the disappearance of the
feudal aristocracy and adopted the social principle of 1789: the liberty of the
individual, equality before the law, secularization of the state, freedom of
conscience, and freedom to choose one’s profession. However on the other
hand, the Code also confirmed the reaction against the democratic
accomplishments of the Republic. Conceived in the interests of the bourgeoisie,
it was concerned primarily with consecrating and sanctifying the rights of
property, which it regarded as a natural right. The Code in some ways also
reflected the development of public opinion between 1799 and 1802, which
accepted the main results of the Revolution, but reacted against some of its
extremer manifestations.

The Civil Code was a compact document, which contained 2,281 articles. It was
written in simple and lucid French, and for these reasons it became immensely
popular almost as the bible of the new society. In spite of what can be termed
as regressive elements, the Civil Code of Napoleon has been widely copied all
over the world. The Code is not only reflective of a changing French society, but
also Napoleon’s essentially conservative tendencies arising possibly from his
Corsican background.

Religion in the France if 1800 was in a state of flux. In August 1789, lands of the
Church had been nationalized and Church lost its revenue from tithes and
payment for services. In February 1790, all religious Orders were also
dissolved. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1791 had provoked a religious
schism. A minority of the bishops and a majority of the clergy accepted the
Constitution; the remainder became non-jurors and émigrés, and were
suspected of counter-revolutionary activities. All bishops and clergy were
required to take an oath of fidelity to the nation, the law, and the king and of
support to the Civil Constitution. The Civil Constitution had been condemned
by the Pope as un-canonical, because it subjected the bishops and the clergy to
popular election. The Convention had provoked Civil War in the Bnrittany and
La Vendee. At least the superficial character of Catholicism in France had
changed by 1799.

After its various tribulations, the Church had finally become disestablished by a
law of September 1795. It is interesting that religious persecution during the
Revolution had not merely failed to destroy the hold of Roman Catholicism on
the people; but had in fact strengthened religious feeling and played a part in
promoting a religious revival. During this period a variety of cults had sprung
up, and by the time of brumaire various religious practices were observed, by
various groups such as Catholics, Protestants, Decadists and
Theophilanthropists. This had produced what the radical historian Aulard has
called ‘a rich and varied flowering of religious life’. He wrote that cults ‘new and
rational, old and mystical’ existed side by side, ‘without coming to blows or civil
war’, and ‘without harbouring any serious grievances against the state’ by
1799. The Revolution had clearly failed in its religious policy.

The Concordat with the Papacy (1801) was conspicuously the personal policy
of Napoleon, a move which was probably one of the most significant of his
career. Napoleon was desirous of restoring stability to the Church and knew
that it was imperative to come to a religious settlement. Bonaparte’s approach
to the Vatican was eased by the Peace of Amiens in 1802 and the election of
Pius VII as Pope, on March 14th, 1800. The Concordat was finally passed in
April, 1802 by the Corps legislative. Firstly, the Concordat recognized the
Roman Catholic religion as ‘the religion of the great majority of the citizens’
(not as the Pope hoped, as the ‘established’ or ‘dominant’ religion). The Church
withdrew its claims to confiscated ecclesiastical property. The schism between
the constitutional and non-juror clergy was to be ended by the resignation of
all existing bishops, including the émigré bishops and the appointment of a
new episcopate, which would contain a proportion of bishops from the
Constitutional Church. All ‘constitutional’ bishops were to resign their sees; all
orthodox bishops were restored, and the Churches were officially opened to
orthodox worship. The control of the government was increased and the
payment of clerical salaries by the state was accepted. The right of the First
Consul to nominate, and of the Pope to institute, bishops was recognized. The
bishop’s control of the diocese was also limited in various ways.

Having secured the agreement, Napoleon proceeded to distort it in his own

interest by issuing Organic Articles. By these supplementary Organic Articles
Napoleon tried to turn the Concordat into the instrument of a new and
stronger Gallicanism. Through the 77 Organic Articles the Church was
subordinated to the State in every practicable way. For instance, no papal bull
was allowed to be published without the permission of the government and
bishops were placed under close control of the prefects. The Vatican to
protested against the Organic Articles, but was powerless to so anything.
Cobban points out that while the Concordat seemed to be a victory for
Napoleon, in spite of this, he failed to obtain any permanent religious sanction
for his rule. On the contrary, the Concordat did much to discredit Gallicanism
and strengthen the ultramontane tendencies in the French Church. Durant and
Durant, however believe that the 121 Organic Articles or ‘Articles Organiques’
were a part of Bonaparte’s attempt to appease his more skeptic critics, to
protect the preeminence of the state over the Church in France.

The reason behind the Concordat was not simply to return to the Old Catholic
order. This act was motivated by a number of tactical and strategic factors as
well. Napoleon was aware of the importance of religion. He maintained that,
“The people need a religion; this religion must be in the hands of the
government.” Napoleon knew that the peasants were still obstinately attached
to their churches and their priests. A religious revival was challenging the
atheism of the Enlightenment. Napoleon hoped too that through a religious
settlement with the Vatican he could check the Civil War smoldering in the
Vendee and Brittany. Napoleon also knew that émigré bishops were still very
influential among the French clergy and to destroy their influence the Pope’s
authority was required. With the Concordat, Napoleon was disarming the
royalists by denying them the support of the clergy. Also, in newly acquired
areas like Belgium and the Rhineland, the support of the local clergy was
required. Another factor was that with the large-scale transfer of Church lands
in the Revolution, a Concordat would also assure the new owners of Church
land that it would not be reclaimed by the Church. Hence, pragmatism became
the motivating factor behind this policy. One might argue that the Church
settlement was a violation of Revolutionary ideals, but we need to remember
that while the Church had been physically destroyed, its influence in the minds
of the people was immense. Also, protecting the newly distributed Church
lands was definitely not a violation of the ideal of equality.

Napoleon instituted the Legion of Honour in May 1802, a personal act which
was opposed by most of his advisors in the Council of State, and passed only by
narrow majorities in the Tribunate and Legislature. The Orders and
decorations of the monarchy had been abolished by the Convention, as relics of
privilege and contrary to equality. As First Consul, Napoleon granted ‘swords of
honour’ to members of the army. In 1802 he brought forward a comprehensive
project for a ‘Legion of Honour’. There were to be sixteen ‘cohorts’ and the
different ranks – grand officer, commander, and chevalier – were to be granted
varying scales of life-pension. The members could be civil or military. Napoleon
disliked the idea of a privileged body which was independent of himself, and
was determined that the grant of any privilege or distinction should be under
his control. George Rude however believes that with this measure one of
Napoleon’s intention was to create a new order of merit open to all.
By a senatus-consultum on April 26 1802, amnesty was granted to émigrés
provided they returned to France before September 23, 1802, and agreed to
swear fidelity to the Constitution. The return of the émigrés made a deep
impression and it is notable that Napoleon received no compliments at all on
this measure of his. While they did act with caution now, they still behaved like
masters in their villages. Already a number of émigrés had become a part of the
Napoleonic regime.

It is not possible to draw any simple causative correlation between the French
Revolution, the Napoleonic regime and the rise of a new capitalist class, even as
Napoleon sanctioned its social ascendancy, Napoleon distrusted the middle
class, and spoke harshly of wealth acquired by such means. He didn’t attack all
forms of wealth, but was against masses of liquid capital, which were precisely
the origin of bourgeoisie fortunes. This wealth was producing individuals, who
determined to preserve their own independence, a consequence of being
indebted to no one, tended to shatter the social structures, which Napoleon
strove to establish. Napoleon was contemplating a system, where his authority
would be based on the support of a landed aristocracy.

In continuance with Napoleon’s policies that tended to point towards the Old
Order, a regular hierarchy of titles was reestablished in 1808, comprising of
Prince, Duke, Count, Baron, and Knight. Their titles were to be hereditary, if
they were supported by an income adequate to the rank, and the endowment
attached to the title were to be inalienable. Napoleon viewed the creation of an
imperial nobility as an act of policy, intended to efface the prestige of the old
noblesse, and promote a fusion of the old and the new aristocracies. But the
policy eventually defeated its own purpose. The more he lavished titles and
grants, the less they were inclined to risk death or confiscation in further
adventures, and eventually his former royalists proved more faithful to him
than his marshals or ex-revolutionaries.

According to Napoleon, social hierarchy was to be founded on wealth,

especially since he had seized power with the sanction of the bourgeoisie. By
making free education available to all, he had intended to introduce men of
talent into leading government positions. But wealth naturally tends to reserve
this privilege for itself. Whenever Napoleon proclaimed himself the
representative of the Revolution, he always referred to the abolition of
privileges of which the rise of the properties bourgeoisie was a direct
consequence.
Napoleon paid much attention to the question of education, because of his need
for trained officers and civil servants; moreover the formation of opinion was
an important ‘source of power’. The Revolution had produced grandiose
schemes on paper for free state education, but by 1800 primary education had
sunk to a level lower than in 1789. The Revolutionary assemblies had set up
ecoles centrales or County secondary schools. Napoleon did not like these
county schools. He believed that the education they provided was too liberal
and detached from political and civic utilities. The decree of May 1, 1802, left
the elementary schools (ecoles populaires) to the care of the municipalities, just
as under the Old Regime. Like Voltaire Napoleon believed that to educate the
poor was politically and socially inconvenient. Secondary institutions of
learning would of course educate future leaders. These were patterned on the
Prytanee, which was one of the few old schools preserved by the Revolution.
But Napoleon’s distinctive creation was the lycee a selective secondary school
for the training of leader and administrators, with a militarily strict and secular
curriculum and with its direction reserved to the state alone. There were to be
forty-five lycees in which 2400 places would be reserved for sons of officers
and civil servants. In 1808, a constitution for a ‘University of France’ was
produced. This was like a Ministry of Education, which, under its Grand Master,
was to control and license all teachers.

In the context of education, Napoleon’s views on women are particularly

illuminating. In a Note he dictated in 1807, he said, “What we ask of education
is not that girls should think, but that they should believe”. He had no use for
the education of women; he dismissed it summarily by saying, “I do not think
we need bother about the education of young girls; they cannot be better
brought up than by their mothers. Marriage is their only destination.”

Napoleon had created a strong institutional basis of state, a system not just
dependent on the personality of the emperor, yet inextricable linked with the
figure of Napoleon. This was a state system, which was followed by so many
nations in later, but, could only have been instituted by a personality with as
much talent and foresight as Napoleon.

Napoleon lashed out at individualistic society which had been born out of the
Revolution. He characterized it as many ‘grains of sand’ and he stressed the
necessity ‘to erect some pillars of granite upon the soil of France’, so as to ‘give
the French people a sense of civic direction’. He wanted to create clusters of
interests attached to the regime, who in return for advantages and honours
were expected to secure the loyalty of the populace by virtue of the influence
they had upon them. This was tantamount to the revival of the kind of
corporate bodies and institutions prevalent under the Old Regime, with the
safeguard that they would not be able to degenerate into oligarchies. The
creation of these social bodies, would however be left to him and to him alone.

Napoleon was a despot, often enlightened, often hastily absolute. Some of his
tyranny could be excused as control by the government in the time of war.
Napoleon preferred monarchy to all other forms of government even to
defending hereditary kingship. He said, “There are more chances of securing a
good sovereign by heredity than by election.” People are happier under such a
stable government. He recalled that Robespierre had recommended a
dictatorship as needed to restore order and stability to a France verging on the
dissolution of the state. He did not feel that he had destroyed democracy. He
felt that he had destroyed the liberty of the masses, but that liberty was
destroying France with mob violence and moral license, and only the
restoration and concentration of authority could restore the strength of France
as a civilized and independent state. Like the reforming despots of the
eighteenth century, Napoleon pursued, behind a façade of humanitarian
pretexts, the basic program of administrative consolidation.

From the standpoint of national policy Napoleon had reached his pinnacle with
the Treaty of Amiens. He gave the French people their much desired peace, and
in the eyes of the people he has preserved the social accomplishments of the
revolution. They still hadn’t contemplated that he had started to abuse his
power. Lefebvre believed that Napoleon by 1802 had in his heart broken with
the Republic and with the notion of egalite. The reforms of the Consulate,
considered as a whole, look both ways. From one aspect, they are a
continuation of the Revolution; from another, a surreptitious return to the
institutions of the Bourbon monarchy. They confirmed and secured the
national gains of in equality, legal and administrative unity, the career open to
talents etc. In this sense Napoleon’s claim to represent the Revolution is
justified.

“Napoleon was a man of strange paradoxes and contradictions: a modern

romantic hero cast in the mould of a Caesar or an Alexander; a man of action
and rapid decision, yet a poet and dreamer of world conquest; a supreme
political realist, yet a vulgar adventurer who gambled for high stakes; an
organizer and statesman of genius, and yet as much concerned to feather the
nests of the Bonaparte clan as to promote the fortunes of greater glory in
 France; a product of the Enlightenment who distrusted ideas and despised
intellectuals and ‘systems’; a lucid intellect with a vast thirst and capacity for
knowledge, yet strangely impervious to forces that he had himself helped to
unleash” (George Rude). An understanding of the contradictions in Napoleon is
helpful in assessing the dual characteristics of Napoleonic policies. Napoleon
Bonaparte was a man caught in between an ingrained enlightened ethos and a
romantic temperament. Yet, what surpassed all these tendencies in him was his
realism and unfailing pragmatism. Napoleon himself, even in his wildest
moments of renunciation, always acknowledged his debt to the Revolution; and
certainly no career illustrates better than his own, the justice of the
revolutionaries’ claim to have opened careers to talent.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
● Alfred Cobban A History of Modern France - Volume II
● Georges Lefebvre Napoleon: From 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, 1799 – 1807
● FMH Markham Napoleon
● FMH Markham Napoleon and the Awakening of Europe
● JM Thompson Napoleon Bonaparte: His Rise and fall
● George Rude Revolutionary Europe: 1783 – 1815
● Will and Ariel Durant The Age of Napoleon
● Pieter Geyl Napoleon: For and Against
● Geoffrey Bruun Europe and the French Imperium, 1799 - 1814
● David Thomson Europe since Napoleon