TEACHING CASE STUDIES

Protecting American Soldiers: The

Development, Testing, and Fielding of
the Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH)
Robert F. Mortlock, Naval Postgraduate School’s Graduate School of Business and Public Policy,
Monterey, California, USA

Current Situation, Summer 2013 Project Manager: “What’s the funding situation?”
Monday Morning Project Management Office Chief Engineer: “We have over US$35 million in operations
Staff Meeting: and maintenance funding reserved for the buy that must be
Chief Engineer, Project Office: “Sir, we have an Enhanced obligated by the end of the September or the Army will lose
Combat Helmet (ECH) update. We just learned that Direc- the funding.”
tor, Operational Test & Evaluation sent Congress the ECH Project Manager: “Okay. Well, you know the drill. The
“Beyond Low Rate Initial Production Report,” and recom- operational testers probably already have the ear of the
mended that the Army not buy or field the helmet. The report boss—the Army Acquisition Executive, who is the deci-
says the unit cost is too high and that soldiers wearing the sion authority because the ECH was a wartime directed
ECH would have an unacceptably high risk of dying from requirement with high visibility. Let’s get together a solid
excessive backface transient deformation from threat bullets.” briefing to review, and let’s start scheduling the pre-briefs.
Project Manager:1 “Hmmm . . . that puts us right in the Also, we need to be prepared to provide the congressional
middle between the warfighters and the operational tes- committees an update with the Army’s decision. There are
ters. Both Army senior leaders and Congress rely on the many stakeholders involved with the ECH, and some will
independent assessment of operational testers for good not be happy. So, we need to think about how this will play
reasons. They have a lot of influence.” out with the media and senior leaders from all the stake-
holders with a solid strategic communications plan.”
Chief Engineer: “Yes sir. Also, the testers received concur-
rence from the Army Surgeon General with their assess-
Background
ments and recommendations.”
The protection of American soldiers in combat was a top
Project Manager: “So, after a four-year joint development priority for senior leaders in the U.S. Army, Defense Depart-
and testing effort with the Marine Corps in which the ment, and Congress. The Defense Department committed
ECH finally passed its requirements, now we have to get considerable resources and funding over the years in research
an Army decision on whether to buy and field the helmet and development, resulting in advanced materials and man-
against the recommendations of the testing and medical ufacturing processes. These investments paid off. American
communities, who have legitimate safety concerns?” soldiers went into battle with technologically advanced,
rigorously tested combat equipment. Soldiers knew that
Chief Engineer: “Yes sir. The warfighters and Army com-
their combat equipment worked as intended. In the end, that
bat developers have been very involved in this effort, and
increased the combat effectiveness of the soldiers and their
they remain adamant that the ECH should be fielded to
units. The force protection of soldiers was considered as a
deploying soldiers. The requirement remains over 35,000
layered approach. The outer force protection layer for sol-
helmets. The Marine Corps is strongly in favor of buying
diers was situational awareness. The middle force protection
and fielding the helmet as well.”
layer was concealment. The inner force protection layer was
personal protective equipment, like helmets, eyewear, and
1Within the U.S. Defense Acquisition, a project manager (usually a U.S. Army officer in ballistic vests with ceramic plate inserts. Specifically, combat
the rank of colonel) reports to a politically appointed civilian called the Army Acquisition
helmets provided soldiers skull and brain protection against
Executive—the ultimate program decision authority. The Director, Operational Test &
Evaluation (DOT&E) is an independent, politically appointed, senior executive charged both ballistic threats (e.g., bullets) and blunt impact forces,
with overseeing operational live fire testing and reporting directly to the Secretary of and prevented mild traumatic brain injury and concussions.
Defense and Congress on program testing.
During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army col-
lected battle-damaged helmets to better understand the
Project Management Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1, 96–109 threat and capabilities of the helmets. The battle-damaged
© 2018 by the Project Management Institute
Published online at www.pmi.org/PMJ helmets were often later returned to soldiers in ceremonies

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 Figure 1: Why were stakeholders so passionate about helmets? The photo on the right was a photo taken by the Army of a battle-
damaged helmet returned to a soldier in a ceremony at Fort Belvoir in 2016. In news coverage entitled “U.S. Army soldier reunited with
equipment that saved his life in Afghanistan,” the reporter covered the soldier’s description of how his helmet saved his life. The photo
on the left was another photo taken of a recovered helmet damaged by enemy fire in Afghanistan.

as shown and described in Figure 1. In many situations, the Advances in material research provided the opportunity
helmets saved the soldier lives, and these ceremonies under- to increase ballistic protection at a reduced weight. The
scored the importance of soldier protective equipment for maturation of ballistic fabrics based on para-aramid polymer
combat effectiveness and soldier force protection. technology enabled the Army to replace the M1 with the Per-
Despite an emphasis on improving force protection, efforts sonnel Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT) helmet in
to modernize helmets faced the challenges that all programs the mid-1980s. These helmets were in the three to four pound
within the Department of Defense faced: a complex, bureau- range (lighter than the M1) and provided increased ballistic
cratic Defense Acquisition institution.2 The accelerated pace protection. The shell of the helmet consisted of layers of bal-
of technology innovation, rapidly evolving threats, and declin- listic aramid fabric, the most famous of which is DuPont’s
ing defense budgets made program management within the Kevlar®—resulting in the “Kevlar” or “K-pot” nicknames.
DoD challenging but even more critical than ever. Defense The ballistic aramid technology allowed helmets to provide
Acquisition operated in an uncertain, complex, and ambigu- not only fragmentation protection from explosions but also
ous environment, but maintained a simple focus: develop, small caliber hand gun protection at a reasonable weight.
procure, and field advanced warfighting capability to soldiers Eventually, the Modular Integrated Communication Helmet
to enable technological superiority on the modern battlefield. replaced the PASGT helmet on a limited basis. By the mid-
2000s, the Advanced Combat Helmet was the Army’s primary
Army Combat Helmet Evolution helmet. The basis for all combat helmets after the M1 “steel
Army combat helmets evolved over time as the Army traded- pot” and prior to 2008 was para-aramid polymer technology.
off increased performance and cost (see Figure 2). The com- These helmets provided soldiers important performance
bat helmets that soldiers wore into battle showed a constant improvements like increased ballistic protection, reduced
improvement in performance and increase in cost over time. weight, and better blunt impact protection by replacing web-
Improvement in performance resulted from advances in bing suspension systems with padding systems between the
material research and manufacturing techniques. Soldiers helmet shell and the wearer’s head.
wore the M1 helmet, nicknamed the “steel pot,” from the In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. Army Research
1940s through the late 1970s. The M1 provided ballistic pro- Lab, the U.S. Army Research Development and Engineering
tection largely because steel is hard. The M1 helmet consisted Command, and commercial industry teamed to mature the
of a pressed manganese steel shell with a webbing suspension next generation of ballistics materials, resulting in the develop-
that soldiers fitted to their heads. Despite being an improve- ment of high-molecular-weight polyethylene ballistics fibers
ment over previous helmets, the M1 helmet was heavy and that could be weaved into fabrics with application to combat
uncomfortable, and it provided little blunt trauma protection. helmets. Polyethylene polymer materials had different perfor-
mance characteristics than para-aramid polymer materials.
2Referto Figure 4 and Appendix 1 for a description of the U.S. Defense Department Above certain temperatures, para-aramids (classified as ther-
Acquisition institution. mosets) polymers broke down, lost their properties, and could

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 Protecting American Soldiers: The Development, Testing, and Fielding of the
Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH)

Army Combat Helmet Evoluon

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Soldier Protection System

Future Combat Helmet
(in development)
Enhanced Combat High-molecular-weight
Helmet: Increase of 35% polypropylene technology
in Fragmentation
Protection, and select Procured: ?
Rifle Protection Enhanced Combat Helmet
Helmet Performance

Lightweight Advanced Combat Helmet

Lightweight Advanced
Combat Helmet: Weight
Still in development
Decreased by 8% Aramid technology Procured: 0 Total

Blunt Impact
Advanced
ACH Combat Helmet Procured:
Increased Protection
1,400,000

Weight Modular Integrated aramid technology

Procured:
Decreased Communication Helmet 20,000 aramid technology
by 10%

From the mid 1980s Procured:

Personnel Armor System for 1,900,000 aramid technology
Ground Troops Helmet
$150 $225 $280 $320 $840 $1,630
Personnel Armor Modular Integrated Advanced Lightweight Enhanced Future
System for Ground Communications Combat Advanced Combat Combat Helmet Helmet
Troops Helmet Helmet Helmet Helmet

Helmet Cost

Figure 2: The evolution of combat helmets.

not be remolded back into their original states when cooled. requirements to protect soldiers against both blunt trauma
On the other hand, above certain temperatures, polyethylene and ballistic threats. Three ballistic properties remained
polymers (classified as thermoplastics) broke down but could particularly important for describing impacts to helmets:
be remolded into their original state when cooled. The appli- complete penetration (the bullets goes completely through
cation of high-molecular-weight polyethylene fiber material the helmet), partial penetration (the bullet does not go
in helmets created the misperception that helmets might completely through the helmet), and backface deformation
easily lose their form under ballistic events and potentially (a measure for the amount the round’s impact indents the
jeopardize soldiers’ safety. Ultimately, the advantages of helmet material).
polyethylene helmets for reduced weight and greater ballistic The final performance of the helmet in testing and in
capability outweighed this concern. The basis of future Army combat depended both on the inherent properties of the
helmets—both the ECH and its eventual replacement, the materials used to develop the helmet and the processing
Soldier Protection System future combat helmet—remained techniques used to manufacture the helmet. Helmet require-
high-molecular-weight polyethylene technology. ments used performance-based requirements. Each helmet
manufacturer optimized its design over time using a com-
Helmet Testing Basics 3 bination of materials (layers of polymer fibers woven into
The Army rigorously tested combat helmets worn by sol- sheets with chemical binders) and different processes based
diers against protocols to ensure they conform to stringent on temperature, pressure, and time. The use of statistics was
important in testing because testing simulates live com-
3Appendix 2 presents a tutorial on helmet testing. bat, and the warfighter required a high confidence that the

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 helmets performed as advertised. The testing balanced the Part One: Project Initiation Decision,
need for statistical confidence with the costly and destructive Early 2009 Timeframe
nature of the testing. Colonel Bob Smith4 was recently assigned as the Project Man-
ager, Soldier Protection and Individual Equipment—the office
Operational Field Data responsible for developing, testing, procuring, and fielding
As was presented previously, the Army collected battle- helmets to soldiers. Colonel Smith was a seasoned defense
damaged helmets from soldiers. Before returning them, the acquisition veteran with over 15 years of project management
Army conducted forensic studies to better understand enemy experience. During his preparation for this position, the guid-
threats and analyzed the performance of the helmets to ance from the warfighting community and senior leaders was
improve future designs. From combat operations in Iraq and clear: the top priorities were maximum protection and weight
Afghanistan, the Army collected 77 helmets hit by small arms reduction.
bullets. When the bullet completely penetrated the helmet, Colonel Smith was preparing for a key decision in the Pen-
the soldiers died nearly 75% of the time. When the bullets did tagon regarding the start of a new helmet program, named the
not completely penetrate the helmet (partial penetration), Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH). Luckily, Colonel Smith’s
the average permanent helmet deformation was about 9 mm chief engineer for the program office was an armor expert,
and the soldiers all survived with relatively minor head/neck Dr. James Suchez. Dr. Suchez led the efforts to mature high-
injuries and eventually returned to duty. molecular-weight polyethylene technologies across the DoD

Recovered Bale Damaged Helmet Data

• 77 Helmets collected: Helmet Injury
Ballistic Result
– All resulting from Small Arms Fire Deformation (mm) Summary
4.29 Partial Penetration
– 31 engagements resulted in wounded-in-action soldiers 1.52 Partial Penetration
– 45 engagements resulted in killed-in-action soldiers 15.61 Partial Penetration
15.25 Complete Penetration
Wounded- Killed-in- 2.07 Partial Penetration
Ballistic Results Total # Fatality % 0.48 Partial Penetration
in-Action Action
10.34 Complete Penetration
Partial Penetration 16 16 0 0% 1.42 Partial Penetration
23.98 Complete Penetration
Complete Penetration 61 15 45 73.7% 5.32 Partial Penetration Ranged
14.99 Complete Penetration
from no
13.68 Complete Penetration
• Analysis: 7.41 Complete Penetration injuries to
9.66 Complete Penetration minor
– If a helmet stopped the bullets, the soldier had a very high 3.02 Partial Penetration injuries
probability for survival 15.99 Complete Penetration and
– 0% fatality rate for partial penetrations 2.41 Partial Penetration eventual
3.53 Partial Penetration
– For partial penetrations, no serious behind helmet blunt trauma 9.53 Partial Penetration
returned-
reported and no serious neck injuries reported 15.78 Complete Penetration to-duty
6.49 Partial Penetration
– 73.7% fatality rate for complete penetrations 11.04 Complete Penetration
9.22 Partial Penetration
10.12 Partial Penetration
6.64 Partial Penetration
17.22 Complete Penetration
9.79 Complete Penetration
13.93 Complete Penetration
0.88 Partial Penetration

Average helmet deformation

Helmet depth = 9.02 mm
Deformaon

Figure 3: Recovered battle damaged helmet data.

4The names in this case are fictitious.

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 Protecting American Soldiers: The Development, Testing, and Fielding of the
Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH)

and with commercial industry for the last decade. Dr. Suchez Two important determinants of program success were
explained that the application of these new novel polymers requirements definition and alignment of those requirements
to helmets allowed the Army to consider the following basic against capability gaps. Simply put, poorly defined require-
options for the new helmet requirements: (1) maintain the ments set a project’s initial trajectory that would be difficult to
protection levels of the current helmets with a reduced weight fix later in the development cycle. Project initiation was some-
of up to 20%, or (2) increase the protection levels but maintain times the result of a need from the warfighters generically
(or increase) the weight of the helmet. called capability pull. Alternatively, a project resulted from
Colonel Smith knew that the Army’s senior leaders would an innovative new technology without a specific identified
rely on the advice and recommendations of the project man- warfighting application generically called technology push.
ager during the meeting. The final decision would be made The question of technology push or capability pull at program
by the Army Acquisition Executive, the Honorable (Hon) initiation often delayed efforts and created perception chal-
Ron Cho. The Hon Cho would likely turn to key stakeholders lenges among key stakeholders. The ECH effort was driven
before making the final decision. by the urgent need for a new helmet to address protection for
The first stakeholder was the project manager, and Colo- soldiers against rifle threats in combat, and enabled by the
nel Smith thought that he was well prepared to discuss key maturation of high-molecular-weight polyethylene technolo-
considerations from a cost, schedule, performance, and tech- gies. The helmet requirements had to balance acceptable min-
nology perspective. The second stakeholder was the warf- imum risk versus maximum safety for protective equipment,
ighter representative, also called the “user” representative. and weight reduction (soldier load) versus protection (bal-
The warfighter representative was a crusty old officer named listic and blunt force). Colonel Smith knew that this balance
Colonel Billy Johnson from Fort Benning, home of the U.S. would not be an easy compromise for any of the stakeholders.
Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. Colonel Johnson spent During the meeting hosted by the Hon Cho, Colonel
most of his time in the Army leading soldiers in combat. Colo- Johnson was adamant that the ECH had to address the
nel Johnson took his job seriously as the ultimate approver of rifle threat, be fielded as quickly as possible, and reduce
the requirements. He was passionate about the possibility for the weight on soldiers in combat. Colonel Smith laid out
a new helmet because he believed that the current helmets the basic options that he had discussed with Dr. Suchez; the
were too heavy and uncomfortable. He also represented the ECH would not be able the address the rifle threat and also
warfighters currently downrange in combat, and was under reduce the helmet weight. Colonel Johnson was not happy,
extreme pressure to approve requirements for a new helmet and doubted the validity of the technology assessment. He
to protect soldiers not only against fragmentation and hand- stated that, just a week prior, he received an industry brief
gun rounds, but also against enemy rifle threats. Another key from a company that claimed they could develop a helmet
stakeholder was Colonel Harry Crisp, the representative from at reduced weights that also addressed increased threats.
the testing community—specifically from the Director, Opera- Dr. Suchez, also in attendance, spoke up and said that it was
tional Test and Evaluation. Any new helmet development not unusual for industry to make claims that they could not
program fell under operational testing oversight to approve back up, and that the application of a new technology into
the testing protocols used to ensure the requirements were helmets is technically challenging from a manufacturing
met. Director, Operational Test and Evaluation also provided perspective. “It’s one thing to produce a prototype helmet in
an independent assessment of the helmet’s operational effec- a controlled laboratory,” he said, “but completely different to
tiveness and suitability for soldiers to Army senior leaders produce many helmets from a manufacturing line that consis-
and documented that assessment in reports to Congress. tently perform against rigorous testing requirements.”
Colonel Harry Crisp had years of experience as a tester and To address the schedule aspect of the program, Colonel
evaluator of Army systems. The importance, influence, and Smith next laid out the options of pursuing a formal program
visibility of operational tester’s independent assessment were of record through the deliberate acquisition process versus
increased by the recent congressional and public concerns pursuing a rapid acquisition process supported by a directed
calling into question the adequacy of soldiers’ protective or urgent requirement. Establishing a formal ECH program
equipment. involved a four-year time period of contracting, development,
Colonel Smith knew that each of the stakeholders was and testing. Year one allowed for the refinement, analysis,
passionate about a new helmet program. He realized that and approval of formal requirement documents and the
his role as the project manager was not to advocate for a development of testing protocols. Year one also allowed for
new program but to give advice about the underpinning the Army to request development and procurement funding
technological possibilities; additionally, he needed to lay out from Congress in the Army’s base budget for the program.
the cost, schedule, and performance implications of various Years two and three involved the development and testing
strategies for the development, testing, and procurement of of helmet prototypes resulting from competitively awarded
the new helmet. contracts (cost-plus type contracts) to be awarded to industry

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 companies. Year four allowed for the Army to award procure- with industry. The requirements generation system provided
ment contracts to the successful companies for the manufac- requirements and the resource allocation system provided
ture and production of helmets. Again, Colonel Johnson was funding. Depending on the program, the public and media
not happy that it would take four years to get the new helmet perceptions became important considerations.
to soldiers. The alternative to a program of record was to use The warfighters in combat wanted a new lighter helmet
the rapid acquisition process. In rapid acquisition, the Army that also protected soldiers against rifle bullets—soldiers
wrote a directed requirement (within a month) for the ECH, were dying in combat. Colonel Smith knew that the Hon Cho
and the Army awarded competitive contracts (fixed-price wanted a follow-up meeting with him before deciding what
contracts for certain quantities with production options) to the Army should do. He gathered his thoughts and wrote
industry within six months. A rapid acquisition effort could down what he thought were the key questions he had to
be funded with money from overseas contingency operations consider:
accounts (separate from the Army’s base budget approved by
Congress), which was limited to procurement money and no • Who are the key stakeholders in the ECH program initiation
development money. Another six months would be required decision and how does he manage their expectations?
to test the helmets. So, ECHs could be on soldiers in just over • Would the ECH program be considered a “technology push”
a year. Colonel Johnson was much happier with the second or “capability pull” program, and what are the implications?
strategy. Colonel Crisp was quick to point out that for the • How should the ECH requirements be set? Should increased
rapid acquisition options, the new helmet’s requirements protection or weight reduction be emphasized?
would not be underpinned by analysis, and the test protocols • What is the right balance between reductions of soldier load
had to rely on the protocols for current helmets because there (combat weight) versus greater soldier protection?
would be no time to develop test protocols specifically for the • How does the Army set testing protocols for the ECH prior to
ECH. Colonel Crisp noted this was particularly important for development and manufacturing of a helmet based on a new
the ECH, which would rely on thermoplastic polymers. A hel- technology?
met based on polyethylenes might perform much differently • What are the advantages and disadvantages of various acqui-
than the current para-aramid based helmets. For example, sition approaches for the development, testing, procurement,
ECHs had the potential to lose their rigidity after being shot and fielding of the ECH? What are the criteria used to com-
once and offered much less protection from multiple shots. pare the alternative approaches?
Also, the ECH may deform excessively, leading to head
trauma and skull fractures. There were legitimate testing and The ECH Program
safety concerns that would have to be addressed. The ECH program began in early 2009 (as shown in Figure 5).
Colonel Smith tried to remain neutral. Both strategies had The Army and the U.S. Marine Corps approved urgent
advantages and disadvantages. Decision making involved requirements based on combat operations and the need for
defining and analyzing alternative approaches and came increased protection against enemy rifle threats. The overseas
down to the level of risk the Army was willing to accept. The contingency operations account funded the ECH program.
ECH project initiation decision also encompassed setting The acquisition procurement objectives were set based on
future funding levels and procurement quantities, as well as the predicted numbers of deploying soldiers. The Army set
addressing industrial base concerns, competition, and testing broad requirements to include a 35% increase in fragmen-
implications. From past experience, Colonel Smith under- tation protection, increased 9-mm pistol protection, and
stood that stakeholder management was key to the success of rifle threat protection—all at the same weight of the current
the ECH program and that proper communication and col- Advanced Combat Helmet. The acquisition strategy was a
laboration increased the chances of program success. single step development in which competition was encour-
The Hon Cho was pleased with the frank dialog between aged among industry manufacturers. The original request for
the key stakeholders and stated that enough information proposal asked for each vendor to deliver test data validat-
was presented for an informed decision on whether or not ing their claim that their design met the combat helmet test
to initiate the ECH program. Before prioritizing resources protocols used at the time and the new ECH requirements for
for the ECH program, the ECH had to be considered through rifle protection. Four vendors submitted proposals; however,
the lens of the Defense Acquisition institutional framework only one vender’s design was acceptable. At the end of 2009,
(see Figure 4). The project manager had cost, schedule, and this vendor received a contract to produce ECHs to undergo
performance responsibilities, and managed the effort with government developmental testing with contract options for
the Defense Acquisition Management System. The project production deliveries after successful first article tests. In
manager’s official chain of command was in the executive late 2010, after successful developmental testing, the Army
branch, but the project manager also reported to Congress approved the program milestone to enter into low rate initial
with program status updates and worked through contracts production with the selected vendor. The decision permitted

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 Protecting American Soldiers: The Development, Testing, and Fielding of the
Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH)

Defense Acquision Instuon

PROJECT
PROJECT
MANAGER
MANAGER

Figure 4: U.S. Defense Acquisition Institution.

the production of a small number of helmets to undergo The testing results demonstrated that the ECH met its
testing in order to validate that the contractor could success- requirements and offered soldiers the potential for greater
fully produce the helmets to performance requirements. protection compared to the current helmet. Against a require-
In late 2011, the ECH passed the second round of first arti- ment for a 35% increase in fragmentation protection, the
cle testing. To meet an aggressive production schedule for the ECH demonstrated an average increase of 53%. For the 9-mm
Army, the vendor submitted an engineering change proposal pistol deformation requirements, the ECH demonstrated
for second and third production lines. It took all of 2012 for an average increase in performance of 10% over the current
the vendor to successfully pass the third round of first article helmet. Finally, against the chosen test rifle threat, the ECH
testing for all three production lines after working through demonstrated an over 153% increase in protection for resis-
issues between test sites, the U.S. Army Test Center, and the tance to penetration; of note, was the fact that there was no
National Institute Justice laboratories, as well as issues with backface deformation requirement against rifle threats for the
the source of testing rifle rounds (Winchester versus Hornady ECH. The current helmet 9-mm pistol backface deformation
versus Remington). requirements were too restrictive for rifle threats, and there

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 Figure 5: ECH program timeline.

was no basis to assign these requirements to rifle threats The full rate production decision involved significant pro-
without injury data, which did not exist. To avoid jeopardizing curement money (US$35 million) to buy and field the ECH.
the program due to unachievable or unrealistic requirements, Despite testing results in which the ECH demonstrated supe-
rifle backface deformation testing occurred for government rior performance against the requirements over current hel-
reference purposes only. mets, Army leaders, specifically the Hon Cho and Colonel
Smith, faced a difficult decision. Not all key stakeholders
Part Two: ECH Procurement and Fielding interpreted the test results similarly, raising significant con-
Decision, Summer of 2013 cerns about the safety of soldiers who might wear the ECH in
After passing testing and four years since program initiation, combat. The Director, Operational Test & Evaluation issued a
in the summer of 2013, the ECH was ready for a full rate pro- congressionally mandated “Beyond Low Rate Initial Produc-
duction decision. Subsequently, the ECH would be produced tion Report” recommending that the ECH not be fielded to
as quickly as possible to the approved acquisition objective soldiers. The operational testers believed that the cost per
quantity. Each production lot of helmets would undergo lot helmet (roughly 2.5 times the current helmet) did not justify
acceptance testing to verify continued compliance to speci- the minimal performance increase, and were also concerned
fication requirements. Finally, after passing lot acceptance that the Army did not test the ECH against the most stressing
testing, the Army could field helmets to soldiers deploying or most prevalent enemy rifle threats. Additionally, and more
into combat. importantly, the testers stated that soldiers wearing the ECH in

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 Protecting American Soldiers: The Development, Testing, and Fielding of the
Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH)

combat would face an unacceptable risk of head injuries due the test rifle threat was 18% to 89% higher than the 9-mm pistol
to excessive backface deformation caused by rifle rounds. The requirement. Colonel Smith concurred with those numbers
medical community, through the Army Surgeon General, sup- but indicated that he was not finished presenting the rest of the
ported the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation conclusions field data results, which indicated that nearly 74% of soldiers
that ECH would put soldiers in unacceptable risk of head inju- died if the threat round completely penetrated the helmet.
ries. These concerns put the Hon Cho and Colonel Smith in a Again, Colonel Crisp dismissed that data, and again brought
difficult position. To further complicate matters, the Hon Cho up the rifle threat round used in testing. Colonel Johnson
had just spoken to the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, asked a question about the operational safety margin built
who emphatically stood behind their recommendation. into the testing. Colonel Smith replied in the affirmative that
Again, the Hon Cho convened the same Council of Colo- the chosen rifle round was fired at the ECH at muzzle velocity
nels that met four years earlier to discuss the decision to and at 0% obliquity, operationally providing soldiers a safety
initiate the ECH program. Colonel Smith admitted the ECH margin, because in combat, rounds are fired at considerable
program had not met the original timelines, but emphasized distance, slowing down in flight and striking at non-direct
that the helmet had finally successfully passed testing and met angles. Therefore, even though the chosen test round was not
its performance requirements. Colonel Smith also stressed the most stressing rifle threat round, the ECH still provided
that US$35 million was at risk if the procurement decision considerable protection and 153% more protection from pen-
passed the end of the fiscal year, which was nearing. Colonel etration than the current helmet against the rifle threat.
Crisp noted that he understood the program history well and The Hon Cho realized that the meeting of the Council
understood the challenges. He reiterated that, in operational of Colonels was probably at a point of agreeing to disagree.
testers’ opinion, the ECH was not operationally effective or He understood each of the positions clearly and thanked
operationally suitable for fielding to soldiers. The risk of injury everyone for their candid and articulate input. Colonel Smith
to soldiers was unacceptable; in the testers’ and the Army understood well what that meant. Again, he had to recom-
Surgeon General’s opinions, soldiers wearing the ECH could mend a path forward for decision with the major stakehold-
suffer life-threatening skull fractures from excessive backface ers not on the same page. Colonel Smith wrote the following
deformation from threat rifle rounds. Additionally, Colonel questions that he knew he would have to address with Hon
Crisp noted that the ECH was not tested against the most Cho before any decision was made:
stressing threats, bringing into question the validity of the
requirements. Colonel Johnson was livid that there was even a • Who were the key stakeholders and how would he manage
question about the requirements. The entire community and their expectations?
all stakeholders had agreed to the original requirements more • How does the Army balance the importance of development
than four years earlier. Everyone had accepted the program test data versus field data from helmets that were battle dam-
risks. Now, three years later than planned, when the ECH aged? Should developmental test results or field data carry
finally passed testing, concerns were raised. Colonel Johnson more weight in decision making? How can the same develop-
stated that the warfighter community strongly recommended ment test data be interpreted differently by stakeholders?
getting the ECH to soldiers as quickly as possible. • Are the concerns of the testing and medical communities
Colonel Smith again tried to remain neutral to avoid warranted?
the appearance that the project manager was biased toward • How does the Army address these concerns with Congress,
buying the ECH. He was compelled to provide the complete the media, and the American public?
picture to the Hon Cho for the most informed decision. His • What are the advantages, disadvantages, and second order
program office was also charged with the collection and implications of various courses of actions for the path for-
analysis of battle-damaged helmets from soldiers who had ward? What are the decision criteria?
been shot in the head while wearing their helmets. Analysis of • How do you quantify benefits such as saving a soldier’s life
those helmets indicated that no soldiers had died or suffered and compare these benefits with long-term, potential health
major injuries as a result of excessive backface deformation problems like concussions or musculoskeletal neck injuries
of the helmet. The average deformation observed was 35% of from the weight of helmets?
the 9-mm pistol requirement of 25.4 mm (or coincidentally,
exactly 1 inch). Colonel Crisp interrupted and stated that the Suggested Readings
operational testers placed no value on the results because they Aubert, A. (2016, April 19). U.S. Army soldier reunited with
were not statistically robust, and were not done under strict equipment that saved his life in Afghanistan [Audiovisual
testing conditions where the variables were controlled. Colo- media]. Aired on ABC7. Washington, DC.
nel Crisp also pointed out that the government’s own reference Cox, M. (2013, July 30). Army, Marines to field better ballistic
testing indicated that the backface deformation observed from helmets. Retrieved from http://www.military.com

104 February/March 2018 ■ Project Management Journal

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 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. (2011). Enhanced Program Manager Soldier Protection and Individual
combat helmet. In Director, Operational Test and Evaluation FY Equipment, Program Executive Office Soldier. (2014,
2011 annual report (pp. 123–124). Washington, DC. Retrieved February 13). Body armor information paper [Memorandum].
from http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/fy2011/ Fort Belvoir, VA: COL Robert F. Mortlock.
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. (2012). Enhanced Program Manager Soldier Protection and Individual
combat helmet. In Director, Operational Test and Evaluation FY Equipment, Program Executive Office Soldier. (2002,
2012 annual report (pp. 151–152). Washington, DC. Retrieved October). Ballistic testing basics [PowerPoint presentation].
from http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/fy2012/ Fort Belvoir, VA: James Q. Zheng.
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. (2013).
Enhanced combat helmet. In Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation FY 2013 annual report (pp. 171–172).
The teaching case studies published in PMJ only feature
the case per se. Course instructors can ask for the instruc-
®
Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.dote.osd.mil/ tor’s manual by emailing [email protected]
pub/reports/fy2013/
Enhanced combat helmet goes back to research and Robert F. Mortlock, PhD, Col., USA (Ret.), managed defense systems develop-
development test. (2009, December 7). Inside the Navy. ment and acquisition efforts for the last 15 of his 27 years in the U.S. Army,
Retrieved from http://insidedefense.com culminating in his assignment as the project manager for soldier protection
and individual equipment in Program Executive Office for Soldier. He retired
Marine Corps notice on combat helmet. (2009, February 27).
in September 2015 and is now a lecturer for defense acquisition and program
Inside Defense. Retrieved from http://insidedefense.com
management in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval
New helmets could be deployed in late FY11 if testing Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, USA. He holds a PhD in Chemical
successful. (2010, August 13). Inside the Navy. Retrieved Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley; an MBA from Webster
from http://insidedefense.com University, St. Louis, Missouri; an MS in National Resource Strategy from the
Program Manager Soldier Protection and Individual Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, DC; and a BS in Chemical
Equipment, Program Executive Office Soldier. (2013, Engineering from Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. He is also a recent
August 1). ECH decision briefing [PowerPoint presentation]. graduate from the Post-Doctoral Bridge Program of the University of Florida’s
Briefing prepared for Army Senior Leadership. Washington, Hough Graduate School of Business, Gainesville, Florida, with a management
DC: COL Robert F. Mortlock. specialization. He can be contacted at [email protected]

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 Protecting American Soldiers: The Development, Testing, and Fielding of the
Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH)

Appendix 1: U.S. Defense Acquisition Programs within Defense Acquisition require resources
Institution—Decision Framework (for funding) and contracts (for execution of work) with
Within the U.S. Defense Department, the development, test- industry. Congress provides the resources for the Defense
ing, procurement, and fielding of capability for the warfighter programs through the annual enactment of the Defense
operates within a decision-making framework that is com- Authorization and Appropriation Acts, which become law and
plex. Within the private sector, similar frameworks exist. The statutory requirements. The project manager, through war-
U.S. Defense Acquisition Institution has three fundamen- ranted contracting officers governed by the Federal Acquisi-
tal support templates that provide requirements, funding, tion Regulations, enters contracts with private companies
and management constraints. The Executive Branch, Con- within the Defense industry. Other important stakeholders
gress, and Industry work together to deliver capability with include actual warfighters, the American public, the media,
the program manager as the central person responsible and functional experts (like engineers, testers, logisticians,
for cost, schedule, and performance. Figure 6 depicts this cost estimators, etc.), as well as fiscal and regulatory lawyers.
framework. As a backdrop to this complicated organizational structure
The government project manager is at the center of for Defense project managers, there are three decision-making
Defense Acquisition, which aims to deliver warfighter capa- support templates: one for the generation of requirements, a
bility. The project manager is responsible for cost, sched- second for the management of program milestones, and a third
ule, and performance (commonly referred to as the “triple for the allocation of resources. Each of these decision support
constraint”) of assigned projects—usually combat systems systems is fundamentally driven by different and often contra-
within the Defense Department. The Executive branch of dictory factors. The requirement generation system is driven
government provides the project manager a formal chain of primarily by a combination of capability needs and an adaptive,
command in the DoD. The project manager typically reports evolving threat. The resource allocation system is calendar-
directly to a program executive officer, who reports to the driven by Congress writing an appropriation bill—providing
Service Acquisition Executive (an Assistant Secretary for that control of funding to the Congress and transparency to the
Service—either Army, Navy, or Air Force), who reports to American public and media for taxpayer money. The Defense
the Defense Acquisition Executive (the Under Secretary of Acquisition Management System is event driven by milestones
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Depend- based on commercial industry best practices of knowledge
ing on the program’s visibility, importance, and/or funding points and off-ramps supported by the design, development,
levels, the program decision-making authority is assigned to and testing of the systems as technology matures. Often inte-
the appropriate level of the chain of command. gration and manufacturing challenges occur.

Defense Acquision Instuon

Resource
CONGRESS Allocation EXECUTIVE
Calendar-Driven
Public Legal

Cost Events-
Needs-
Project Driven
Driven
Media Management
Performance Schedule
Defense
Requirements Acquisition
Generation Management
System System
Warfighter Testers
INDUSTRY

Figure 6: Defense Acquisition Institution.

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 Appendix 2: Helmet Testing Basics partial penetration (the bullet does not go completely through
The Army rigorously tests combat helmets worn by soldiers the helmet), and backface transient deformation (a mea-
against protocols to ensure they conform to stringent require- sure for the amount the round’s impact indents the helmet
ments to protect soldiers against both blunt trauma and material).
ballistic threats. Typical battlefield ballistic threats include Depending on the materials selected and the manufactur-
fragments from explosive devices, and bullets from hand- ing process, each helmet will demonstrate a ballistic testing
guns and rifles. Within the Department of Defense, System curve, represented in Figure 7. The frequency of complete
Threat Assessment Reports document relevant and existing penetration can be plotted against the striking velocity of the
helmet threats and these threats are validated by the National round. A striking velocity of V0 is the highest velocity at which
Ground Intelligence Center. With respect to fragmentation, no rounds completely penetrate the helmet shell. A striking
the Army Research Laboratory proved that five fragment velocity of V100 is the velocity at which all rounds completely
simulators represent 95% of the range of threat fragments penetrate the helmet shell. The V50 striking velocity repre-
soldiers expect to face from exploding munitions. Fragment sents the velocity at which 50% of the rounds completely
threats used in testing include the 2, 4, 16, and 64 grain right penetrate and 50% partially penetrate the helmet. Figure 7
circular cylinders, as well as 17 grain fragment simulating pro- labels the zones of variation and non-variation. The variation
jectile. Handgun threats include the 9-mm full metal jacket zone represents a performance area for the helmet in which
124 grain, 0.357 Sig full metal jacket 125 grain, and the 44 Mag the helmet may provide the different levels of protection but
240 grain. These threats are defined by the National Institute demonstrate the same V0 and V100 characteristics.
of Justice (NIJ). Rifle threats include eight different rounds V0 is the “protection parameter” because it identifies the
to include 5.45-mm, 5.56-mm, and 7.62-mm rounds (both warfighter’s guaranteed protection level. It is an important
armor piercing and non-armor piercing varieties). parameter in production quality and control; however, it
Helmet testing is a form of destructive testing because does not completely measure material performance and
the helmets are non-recoverable after the testing. Gener- depends greatly on the production process. Generally, helmet
ally, testing can focus on physical properties (like density or manufacturers want to make the actual V0 demonstrated by a
melting point), mechanical properties (like tensile strength helmet higher than the V0 required to ensure a helmet passes
or impact strength), and ballistic properties. Three ballistic testing (see Figure 8). V50 is the “material parameter” because
properties particularly important for helmets are complete it does not represent a guaranteed level of protection but is
penetration (the bullets goes completely through the helmet), important in the optimization of the helmet design. There is

Ballisc Tesng – Parameters

Non-variation zone)
Frequency of complete penetration

Variation Zone
0.5

0
V0 V50 V100
(0 penetration) (100% penetration)

Striking Velocity

Figure 7: Ballistic helmet testing—Penetration.

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 Protecting American Soldiers: The Development, Testing, and Fielding of the
Enhanced Combat Helmet (ECH)

Penetraon Tesng Conclusion

Frequency of complete penetration

To Increase Testing
0.5 Success, Keep Away
From V0 (Required)
as Far as You Can

0
V0 (required) Striking Velocity
(0 penetration)

Figure 8: Penetration testing conclusion.

a unique V50 for each helmet design. Generally, the design exhibited by a helmet in testing, the lower the potential for inju-
goal is to make V50 as high as possible and as close to V100 as ries to the wearer’s head. Figure 9 is a pictorial representation
possible. of a sample backface deformation measurement. After a series
During ballistic testing, if a bullet only partially pen- of tests, testers plot the observed backface deformations for a
etrates the helmet, testers measure the backface deformation helmet. This results in a distribution of values around an aver-
using calipers or laser techniques. The lower the deformation age value (Figure 10). The lower the average measured backface

Ballistic Testing – BackFace Deformation

Backface Deformation Measurement

Original helmet surface

Helmet surface after testing
Original clay test surface
Clay surface after testing

Figure 9: Ballistic testing—Backface deformation.

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 Deformaon Tesng – Conclusion

To Increase Testing Success,

Keep Deformations this way
(less is better)
Data Frequency

Data Distribution

Backface Average +σ +2σ +3σ

Deformation 25.4 mm (front/rear helmet requirement)
or
16.0 mm (crown/side helmet requirement)

Figure 10: Deformation testing—Conclusion.

deformation compared to the required value, the more protec- represents a worst-case condition that is representative of
tion the helmets offers and the greater the testing success rate extremely close combat scenarios. Under these conditions,
for the design and manufacturer (see Figure 10). the round strikes the helmet with the maximum force and
There is an additional important point to understand the highest chance for penetration, but during combat, the
about helmet testing with respect to battlefield operational enemy fires at various distances from their targets. Over these
relevance. In testing, the Army performs V0 resistance to distances, bullets slow down and strike their intended targets
penetration and backface deformation testing with the threat at various angles. Therefore, in combat, bullets strike soldier
rounds fired at the helmet at speeds representing threat helmets at speeds significantly lower than muzzle velocity
weapon muzzle velocity and at angles of 0% obliquity. This speeds and from non-perpendicular angles.

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