Justyna MICHALAK

Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism

W artykule zaprezentowano możliwości wykorzystania broni biologicznej w działa-

niach terrorystycznych. Autorka przedstawia rozwój badań nad bronią biologiczną
w ostatnich 50 latach, wysnuwając tezę, że stałą się ona jednym z najważniejszych
zagrożeń współczesnego świata. Łatwy dostęp i niskie koszty wytwarzania stwarza-
ją nieograniczone możliwości jej wykorzystania. Bioterroryzm stanowi więc jedno
z największych, potencjalnych zagrożeń współczesnego świata.

A threat of bioterrorism is old in the sense that it is a historic tool of war and new in the
sense that it is viewed as a present and clear danger in the post 9-11 era. The anthrax attacks
of 2001 and more recent use of terrorism on civilian targets in Madrid and London rein-
forces the need to address all potential terrorist threats. Therefore, counterterrorism efforts
need to focus on conventional warfare techniques as well as weapons of mass destruction.
(WMD) incorporating, inter alia, biological materials that would cause incalculable dam-
age in urban settings.
‘Biological Warfare’ (BW) is defined as the ’employment of biological agents to pro-
duce casualties in man or animals or damage to plants.’1 The deliberate use of microorgan-
isms and toxins as weapons has been attempted throughout history. Ease of production, the
broad availability of biological agents and technical know how have led to a further spread
of biological weapons and an increased desire among developing countries to have them.
Biological terrorism is intentionally to use infectious substances for developing diseases
or death in animals or humans, leading to disaster and panic in the community. Although
bioterrorism is not a new threat, it is progressively becoming more and more worrisome.
Many leaders have described biological weapons, particularly in the hands of terrorists, as
the most insidious threat to international peace and security. For instance, in 2001 French
president Jacques Chirac said that biological weapons are “possibly the most fearsome
weapons of mass destruction,” noting that the Biological Weapons Convention 1972 was
“incomplete” and stating that obstacles to improving the treaty regime “can be overcome if
there is the political will to do so”2.
Advancements in the life sciences are greater than ever, but so too are the destructive
capabilities they bring. During the past century, the progress made in biotechnology has
simplified the production and development of such weapon. Even as they have advanced
our treatment of disease, the achievements of modern biomedical research have also in-
creased people’s ability to misuse discoveries in ways that could threaten the public health
1
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO handbook on the medical aspects of NBC defensive operations.
Part II – Biological. NATO Amed P-6(B) Anonymous1996.
2
Speech by Mr. Jaques Chirac, President of the French Republic, to the Institute of Higher National Defence Stu-
dies, Paris, June 8, 2001, http://www.delegfrance-cdgeneve. org/chapter1/Chirac_IHDEN_080601_eng.htm.
 MATERIAŁY 145

or national security. Additionally, genetic engineering holds perhaps the most dangerous
potential.
In the uncertain environment created by international terrorism, one does not know
what threats or tactics will be used to create biological incidents. Therefore, a wide range
of potential threats must be considered, and a number of factors related to each potential
threat scenario must be addressed, including potential adversaries, hazards, threat delivery
mechanisms and targets. Multiple combinations of the above factors are possible.
Since the threat of bioterrorism is real, the risk posed by various microorganisms as
biological weapons needs to be evaluated and the historical development and use of bio-
logical agents better understood. In this paper biological agents which could be used in bio-
terrorist attack, their advantages and disadvantages and the dual-use enigma are presented.
The phrase „dual-use research” attempts to capture the relation between scientific ad-
vances and the potential development of new pathogens or biologic weapons. Virtually all
the equipment, materials and technology needed for a production of BW agent are dual-
-use. In consequence, very little distinguishes a pharmaceutical or vaccine plant from a BW
production facility. „In the language of arms control and disarmament, dual use refers
to technologies intended for civilian application that can also be used for military purposes,”
according to a 2003 report from a committee of the National Research Council on biotech-
nology. The technical skills required to run a program are consistent with relatively basic
training in microbiology. Because of this dual-use nature of BW equipment and research,
an offensive BW program could easily be disguised as a legitimate enterprise.

Fig. 1. The dual-use enigma (based on original by Huxsoll et al., 1989).

146 ROCZNIK BEZPIECZEŃSTWA MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO – 2007

Research with a microbial discovery in pathology and epidemiology, resulting in the

development of a vaccine to combat and control the outbreak of disease could be intention-
ally used with the aid of genetic engineering techniques to produce vaccine-resistant strains
for terroristic or warfare purposes. The best known example, reported by UNSCOM, is the
masquerading of an anthrax-weapon production facility as a routine civil biotechnological
laboratory at Al Hakam.

Fig. 2. Al Hakam Single-Cell Protein Plant. Iraq’s major facility for the production of biological
warfare agents. Under the watchful eye of the United Nations Special Commission, this
plant was destroyed by Iraqi workers in May and June of 1996; source: McGovern T. W.,
Christopher G. W., Biological warfare and its cutaneous manifestations [In:] The Electronic
Textbook of Dermatology. Available at: www.telemedicine.org/biowar/bw01.htm.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BWC) are treaties outlawing various activities associated with the use and acquisition of
germ weapons; the international community however has allowed these treaties to atrophy.
The international community’s first attempt to shape a global norm against biologi-
cal weapons dates to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of biological and
chemical weapons. As a hedge against nations not honoring the treaty’s terms, nations such
as e.g. the United Kingdom, France, China and the United States pledged to retaliate if
other countries used biological or chemical weapons against their forces. The agreement
was signed by a total of 108 nations, including eventually the 5 permanent members of the
United Nations (UN) Security Council. However, the Geneva Protocol did not address ver-
ification or compliance, making it a “toothless” and less meaningful document. Therefore,
several countries that were parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 began to develop biologi-
cal weapons capabilities soon after its ratification. These countries included Great Britain,
Belgium, Japan, Canada, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Poland and the Soviet Union. The
USA did not ratify the Geneva Protocol until 1975.
During World War II, some of the mentioned countries began an ambitious biological
warfare research program. The center of the Japanese biowarfare program, known as “Unit
 MATERIAŁY 147

731”, was located in Manchuria near the town of Pingfan. More than 10,000 prisoners are
believed to have died in consequence of experimental infection during the Japanese pro-
gram between 1932 and 1945. At least 3000 of these victims were prisoners of war, includ-
ing Korean, Chinese, Mongolian, American, British, Soviet and Australian soldiers.

Table 1. Biological warfare programs during World War II; source: Riedel S., Biological warfare
and bioterrorism: a historical review [in:] Proc (Bayl Univ Med Cent), 2004 October; 17(4), p. 406.
Numbers of workers
Nation Focus
(estimated)
Germany 100-200 Offense research forbidden
Canada small Animal and crop diseases, rinderpest, anthrax
United Animal and crop diseases, anthrax, foot and mouth
40-50
Kingdom disease
Extensive; official information suppressed by a treaty
Japan several thousands with USA in which all charges for war crimes were
dropped for exchange of information from experiments
Soviet Union several thousands Typhus, plague
Chemical herbicides, anthrax (started too late to be
USA 1500-3000
important)

In the USA, an offensive biological warfare program was begun in 1942 and included
a research and development facility at Camp Detrick, Maryland (renamed Fort Detrick in
1956 and known today as the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseas-
es [USAMRIID]), testing sites in Mississippi and Utah, and a production facility in Terra
Haute, Indiana. However, the production facility at Camp Detrick lacked adequate engi-
neering safety measures, precluding a large-scale production of biological weapons during
World War II.

Fig. 3. Front of main building at USAMRIID Fig. 4. Entrance to Fort Detrick with
on the grounds of Fort Detrick. Maryland headquarters building in background.

Source: McGovern T. W., Christopher G. W., op. cit.

The US program expanded during the Korean War (1950-1953) with the establishment
of a new production facility in Pine Bluff, Arkansas and by the late 1960s, the US military
had developed a biological arsenal. At Fort Detrick, biological munitions were detonated
148 ROCZNIK BEZPIECZEŃSTWA MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO – 2007

inside a hollow 1-million-liter, metallic chamber known as the “eight ball”. The studies were
conducted to determine the vulnerability of humans to certain aerosolized pathogens. Vol-
unteers inside this chamber were exposed to Francisella tularensis (tularemia) and Coxiella
burnetii (Q fever).

Fig. 5a, 5b. The “eight ball” one million liter test sphere at Fort Detrick, Maryland.

5a 5b

Biological weapons research was continued in many other countries, including Britain,
France, Canada and the Soviet Union.
During the post–World War II period some allegations occured:

During the Korean War, North Korea, the Soviet Union and China accused the
USA of using agents of biological warfare against North Korea

The Eastern European press stated that Great Britain had used biological weapons
in Oman in 1957.

The Chinese alleged that the USA caused a cholera epidemic in Hong Kong in
1961.

In July 1964, the Soviet newspaper Pravda asserted that the US Military Commis-
sion in Columbia and Colombian troops had used biological agents against peas-
ants in Colombia and Bolivia.

In 1969, Egypt accused the “imperialistic aggressors” of using biological weapons
in the Middle East, specifically causing an epidemic of cholera in Iraq in 1966.

In the 1970s, the USSR and its allies were suspected of having used „yellow rain”
(trichothecene mycotoxins) during campaigns in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghani-
stan.

In November 1969, the World Health Organization issued a report regarding the pos-
sible consequences of the use of biological warfare agents (table 2).
 MATERIAŁY 149

Table 2. Approximately, the number of biological attack’s victims (after pulverization 50 kg

of biological agent in the air along the 2 km-long line from windward of the city having
500,000 inhabitants); source: WHO Group of Consultants. Health Aspects of Chemical and
Biological Weapons. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization; 1970.
Agent Downwind reach (km) Number killed Number incapacitated
Rift Valley fever 1 400 35,000
Tickborne encephalitis 1 9500 35,000
Typhus 5 19,000 85,000
Brucellosis 10 500 125,000
Q-fever >20 150 125,000
Tularemia >20 30,000 125,000
Anthrax >20 95,000 125,000

In the same year President Richard Nixon halted the American biological weapons pro-
gram after being advised by his Joint Chiefs of Staff that germ weapons were militarily unre-
liable. After the termination of the offensive program, USAMRIID was established to con-
tinue research for development of medical defense for the US military against a potential
attack with biological weapons. Nowadays, the USAMRIID is an open research institution
and none of the research is classified.
In 1972 the United States and many other countries signed in BWC that went into ef-
fect in March 19753. Signatories to the BWC are required to submit the following infor-
mation to the UN on an annual basis: facilities where biological defense research is being
conducted, scientific conferences that are held at specified facilities, exchange of informa-
tion or scientists and disease outbreaks. The treaty prohibits the development, production
and stockpiling of biological weapons for offensive military purposes and forbids research
into offensive employment of biological agents. It does not however prohibit research and
development of defensive measures against these agents. That is because such research is es-
sential to develop medications and defensive capabilities. In addition, there are unresolved
controversies about the definition of “defensive research” and the quantities of pathogens
necessary for benevolent research. Research that can help scientists find a cure for a disease
could also be the springboard to make that disease resistant to known vaccines and treat-
ments. The thin line between legitimate research and activities designed to develop illicit
weapons gives proliferators an edge and poses challenges for any attempt to monitor ad-
herence to the BWC. Moreover, the treaty has no real on-site monitoring provisions. Arms
control agreements incorporated inspectors only in the late 1980s, long after the advent of
the BWC4.
Since 1972, there have been several cases of suspected or actual use of biological weap-
ons. The former Soviet Union and the government of Iraq were both signatories to BWC,
3
Eitzen, EM., Jr; Takafuji, ET. Historical overview of biological warfare. [In:] Sidell FR, Takafuji ET, Franz DR.,
(editors), Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon Gene-
ral, Borden Institute, Walter Reed Army Medical Center; 1997. pp. 415–423. Available at http://www.pubme-
dcentral.gov/redirect3.cgi?&&reftype=extlink&artid=1200679&iid=121137&jid=302&&http://www.borde-
ninstitute.army.mil/cwbw/default_index.htm;
4
Smithson A. E., Biological Weapons: Can Fear Overwhelm Inaction? [in:] The Washington Quarterly, Winter
2004-05
150 ROCZNIK BEZPIECZEŃSTWA MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO – 2007

but despite this fact, biological warfare research continued in both countries. The Soviet
Union continued a high-intensity program to develop and produce biological weapons
through at least the early 1990s. The scope and size of this program were enormous. In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, over 60,000 people were involved in the research, development,
and production of biological weapons. Hundreds of tons of anthrax weapon formulation
were stockpiled, along with dozens of tons of smallpox and plague. The total production ca-
pacity of all of the facilities involved was many hundreds of tons of various agents annually.
Soviet cheating on the BWC came to light when the U.S. government attributed the
1979 outbreak of anthrax at Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) to a covert weapons program.
An incident appeared to be an accidental release of anthrax in aerosol form from Soviet
Military Compound 19, a microbiology facility. Soviet officials attributed it to consumption
of contaminated meat that was purchased on the black market5. However, epidemiological
data showed that most victims worked or lived in a narrow zone extending from the mili-
tary facility to the southern city limit (at least 66 people died out of 77). Additionally, many
livestock died of anthrax in the same area, out to a distance of 50 km. The epidemic has
occasioned intense international debate and speculation as to whether it was natural or ac-
cidental and, if accidental, whether it resulted from activities prohibited by the Biological
Weapons Convention of 1972. In May 1992, Boris Yeltsin, then the president of Russia, ad-
mitted that the facility had been part of an offensive biological weapons program and that
the epidemic was caused by an accidental release of anthrax spores.

Fig 6. Time course of the epidemic: onsets of fatal cases by week. The first week begins on 4 April
1979, the date of the first onset was recorded. Lighter shading represents cases for which the
onset date is unknown and is estimated by subtracting 3 days from the date of death.

Source: The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979, UCLA.

Department of Epidemiology [in:] http://www.ph.ucla.
edu/epi/bioter/sverd/sverd_fig1.html

5
Caudle, LC., III . The biological warfare threat. [In:] Sidell FR, Takafuji ET, Franz DR. (editors), Medical Aspe-
cts of Chemical and Biological Warfare. Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, Borden Institute,
Walter Reed Army Medical Center; 1997. pp. 451–466. Available at http://www.pubmedcentral.gov/redire-
ct3.cgi?&&reftype=extlink&artid=1200679&iid=121137&jid=302&&http://www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/
cwbw/default_index.htm;
 MATERIAŁY 151

After the incident in Sverdlovsk, the research was continued at a remote military facili-
ty in the isolated city of Stepnogorsk in Kazakhstan, producing an even more virulent strain
of anthrax. In 1980, the former Soviet Union expanded its bioweapons research program
and was eventually able to weaponize smallpox. This research was conducted at remote
facilities in Siberia, and very little information is available about the extent, outcome and
place of this research6.
The Soviet Union was not the only country to violate the BWC. Other concerns still
shadow the BWC, such as U.S. government concerns that Iran, North Korea and China
maintain offensive biological weapons programs.
Despite BWC, the threat of biological warfare has actually increased in the last two dec-
ades, with a number of countries continuing to conduct research on the use of these agents
as offensive weapons. Russia’s low-paid biological weapons experts and other scientists earn
salaries of about $100 a month. With scanty earnings and their institutes no longer receiv-
ing the generous subsidies of the Soviet era, scientists have been forced to look for trade
and business opportunities. Abandonment their research or the country seems to be their
only other alternative. Some of them, therefore, could be tempted to aid terrorists. Many
former Soviet scientists, including biological weapons experts, have left Russia and emi-
grated to the United States and other Western countries.
The United States and Russia are also working on a program to curb the proliferation
of biological material left over from the Soviet era.
The possibility of terrorist use of biological agents to threaten civilian populations is
increasing concern.
The aims of terrorism do not require massive casualties for their fulfilment: death and
physical damage are the means to an end, not an end in itself. The literature identifies the
following aims of bioterrorism:
1. creating mass anxiety, fear and panic;
2. creating helplessness, hopelessness and demoralisation;
3. destroying our assumptions about personal security;
4. disruption of the infrastructure of a society, culture or city;
5. demonstrating the impotence of the authorities to protect the ordinary citizen and
his/her environment.

‘Conventional’ terrorism made use of explosive and standard weaponry, but the au-
thorities made access to such items more difficult and terrorists have had to seek methods
of achieving an even higher level of threat. Although there are impediments to their use,
including storage and dispersal, biological agents generally commend themselves to terror-
ists for at least following reasons:
1. it is relatively easy to obtain information about them (e.g. the accessibility of infor-
mation on how to prepare biological weapons on the Internet);
2. compared to nuclear material or chemical agents, biological agents are relatively
cheaper (the cost required to produce mass casualties during a biological attack has
been estimated as approximately $1/km˛, in comparison to conventional weapon
– ca. $2000, nuclear armaments – ca. $800 and chemical agents – $600) and easier
6
Eitzen, EM., Jr; Takafuji, ET, op. cit.
152 ROCZNIK BEZPIECZEŃSTWA MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO – 2007

to produce, and can be delivered without high technology or much scientific knowl-
edge; only a small amount of the agent is required to initiate large-scale production
(minimal resource allocation required to develop and maintain a BW program; the
ease of concealing even large scale BW production and weaponization efforts);
3. although there have been considerable advances in the scientific understanding of
the most lethal (Category A) biological agents such as Variola major (smallpox),
Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) and Yersinia pestis (plague) and highly toxic (Category
B) chemicals such as ricin toxin, there is much to be learned about their effects and
how to combat; certain substances cause temporary disability and are not lethal
(advances in biotechnology make mass production of BW agents easier to accom-
plish and may allow for development of agents that are more deadly and harder
to detect and protect against, e.g. genetically manipulated organisms or antibiotic
resistant organisms);
4. the effects of biological agents are commonly distant in time and place from the site
of any initial incident and so perpetrators can attack without being identified and
escape long before BW agents cause casualties; there is also a short window for ef-
fective intervention;
5. there is no clearly defined ‘low point’ from which survivors and their care-givers
can look forward to respite and improvement;
6. viruses and microbes cannot be detected by traditional anti-terrorist detection sys-
tems;
7. the terrifying results of agents’ implementation will exacerbate anxiety and cause
panic;
8. relative to conventional weapon, the biological agents can be camouflaged, trans-
ported and introduced into the target area with the ease7.

An agent to be considered for use in a biological warfare weapon must also have the ca-
pability to be effectively incorporated into a delivery system. Therefore, a biological weapon
consists of both the agent and the means of delivery. Biological agents can be acquired,
even by stealth, from research institutions or hospital clinical samples that have less strin-
gent controls. A wide range of delivery systems for BW agents, such as spraying equipment
which is available in the hardware stores and agricultural industry, can be purchased and
used with few modifications. Low-technology aerosolization methods such as: agricultural
crop-dusters; aerosol generators on small boats, cars or trucks; backpack sprayers; and even
purse-size perfume atomizers suffice. Aerosolized dispersal of biological agents is the mode
most likely to be used by terrorists and military groups. Long-range delivery systems such
as missiles and aircraft are also becoming more widely available to Third World countries.
All of these advantages make BW agents attractive for state and nonstate actors alike.
Due to these factors the threat from bioterrorism is particularly ominous.
There are however some disadvantages to using BW agents as weapons which include
hazards to the user, dependence of biological agents on optimal weather conditions to re-
sult in effective dispersal and their possible inactivation by climatic conditions, e.g. solar
7
Dany Shoham, The new map of chemical and biological weapons in the Middle East [in:] NATIV online, vol 4,
June 2004.
 MATERIAŁY 153

irradiation. BW attacks would most likely occur late at night or early in the morning when
agents would be less likely to undergo inactivation by ultraviolet radiation.
A disaster caused by the intentional release of biological agents would be very differ-
ent from conventional military strikes, some natural disasters (figure 1) or attacks with
other weapons of mass destruction (e.g. chemical or nuclear). When people are exposed
to a pathogen such as smallpox or plague, they may not feel sick for some time and they
may not be aware of their exposure, although they would be contagious. The incubation
period may range from several hours to a few weeks, and consequently, an attack would
not become obvious for a similar period. By that time modern transportation could have
widely dispersed the pathogen and greatly expanded the population of victims, perhaps
exponentially. Moreover, in their initial stages, many of the diseases delivered by biological
weapons resemble common illnesses.

Table 3. Disaster preparedness, Source: Noji E. K., Bioterrorism: a ‘new’ global environmental
health threat [in:] Global Change & Human Health, volume 2, no. I (2001).
Disaster preparedness
Bioterrorism natural disaster
warning not likely common
location not localized localized
coordination
law enforcement civil defense
unusual pathogen likely not likely

Detection of a BW attack requires recognition of the clinical syndromes associated

with various BW agents. Indications of possible BW agent attack include inter alia the fol-
lowing:

Multiple disease entities in the same patients, indicating that mixed agents have
been used in the attack;

Disease entity that is unusual or that does not occur naturally in a given geographic
area or combinations of unusual disease entities in the same patient;

Large numbers of both military and civilian casualties when such populations in-
habit the same area;

Data suggesting a massive point-source outbreak;

High morbidity and mortality rates relative to the number of personnel at risk;

Illness limited to fairly localized or circumscribed geographic areas.

Biological weapon agents may be used against people, animals, or plants. Pathogens
may kill or just incapacitate victims. Incapacitating agents may be more effective in battle
by preventing a unit from carrying out its mission and overwhelming medical and evacu-
ation assets. Agents with long incubation periods would appeal to terrorists, while those
with shorter incubation times would be most effective in a tactical setting. Biological at-
tacks against large populations would most likely be disseminated by aerosol. Such attacks
could be also attempted by contaminating food and water supplies, although modern water
purification and the dilution effects in large volumes of water would negate the effective-
154 ROCZNIK BEZPIECZEŃSTWA MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO – 2007

ness of a water-borne attack8. More unusual methods of dispersion could include releas-
ing agents in their natural arthropod vectors. Dissemination of BW agents may also occur
by explosives (artillery, missiles, detonated bombs), however it is not very effective, since
such agents tend to be inactivated by the blast. Contamination of municipal water sup-
plies requires an unrealistically large amount of agent and introduction into the water af-
ter it passes through a regional treatment facility. Person-to-person transmission of several
agents (especially plague and smallpox) could perpetuate an epidemic.
The potential spectrum of bioterrorism ranges from hoaxes and use of non–mass casu-
alty agents by small groups or individuals to state-sponsored terrorism that employs classic
biological warfare agents and can produce mass casualties. Such scenarios would present
serious challenges for patient treatment and for prophylaxis of exposed persons. Further-
more, environmental contamination could pose continuing threats. The agents that could
be used by terrorists are divided into three categories: A, B and C, depending on how easily
they can be spread and the severity of illness or death they cause (table 4).

Table 4. Critical biological agents in priority order; source: Noji E. K., Bioterrorism: a ‘new’
global environmental health threat [in:] Global Change & Human Health, volume 2,
no. I (2001).
Category A Category B Category C
High priority agents include Second highest priority agents Third highest priority agents
organisms that pose a risk include those that are moderate include emerging
to national security because easy to disseminate; cause pathogens that could be
they can be disseminated moderate morbidity and low engineered for mass
or transmitted person-to- mortality; and require specific dissemination in the future
-person; cause high mortality, enhancements of diagnostic because of availability;
with potential for major capacity and enhanced disease ease of production and
public health impact; might surveillance. dissemination; and potential
cause public panic and social for high morbidity and
disruption; and require mortality and major health
special action for public impact.
health preparedness.

8
Simon J.D., Biological terrorism: Preparing to meet the threat [In:] J Am Med Assoc 1997; 278: 428–430.
 MATERIAŁY 155

A Agents: B Agents: C Agents:

– Variola major (smallpox) – Coxiella burnetti (Q fever) – Nipah virus,
– Bacillus antrhacis (anthrax) – Brucella species (brucellosis); – antaviruses,
– Yersinia pestis (plague); – Burkholderia mallei (glanders) – Tickborne hemorrhagic fever
- Clostridium botulinum toxin – Alphaviruses viruses
(botulism) a) Venezuelan – Tickborne encephalitis
– Francisella tularensis encephalomyelitis, viruses,
(tularemia); b) Eastern and western equine – Yellow fever, and
– Filoviruses, encephalomyelitis – Multidrug-resistant
a) Ebola hemorrhagic fever; – Ricin toxin from Ricinus tuberculosis.
and communis (castor beans);
b) Marburg hemorrhagic – Epsilon toxin of Clostridium
fever; and perfringens; and
– Arenaviruses, – Staphylococcus enterotoxin B
a) Lassa (Lassa fever) A subset of List B agents
b) Junin (Argentine includes pathogens that
hemorrhagic fever) and are food or waterborne. These
related viruses pathogens include but are not
limited to:
– Salmonella species,
– Shigella dysenteriae,
– Escherichia coli O157:H7
– Vibrio cholerae, and
– Cryptosporidium parvum.

Among biological agents that have been studied as potential weapons, anthrax may be
the most likely choice for terrorists. It is not only easier to acquire than most but also quite
lethal, killing 80 to 90 percent of all unvaccinated people who are not treated promptly.
Furthermore, the anthrax spore is very durable, able to survive for decades in the soil or
other areas protected from direct sunlight. However, anthrax does not spread from one vic-
tim to another and that limits its impact to those who inhale the aerosols.
Smallpox is an even bigger worry for some experts because of the global pandemic
it could trigger. Unlike anthrax, smallpox is contagious, spreading from person to person
through the air, and it kills about 30 percent of unvaccinated victims.

Fig. 7. Man with smallpox (variola major); source: CDC; http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/

smallpox/smallpox-images/smallpox1.htm
156 ROCZNIK BEZPIECZEŃSTWA MIĘDZYNARODOWEGO – 2007

Fig. 8. This 15 year old girl developed cutaneous anthrax of the left lower eyelid;

source: http://dermatlas.med.jhmi.edu/

Fig. 9. Cutaneous anthrax on the finger Fig. 10. A 45 year old Iranian farm
of a veterinarian who contracted condition worker developed a non-tender swelling of
through animal exposure the upper lip followed overlying skin and
formation of a black eschar.

source: http://dermatlas.med.jhmi.edu/

source: http://dermatlas.med.jhmi.edu/

Denying access to technology, safeguarding WMD facilities, and conducting inspec-

tions at borders and ports should be considered important tools to lower the likelihood of
successful biological weapons acquisition and attack by terrorists. Yet, such tools will always
be somewhat unreliable as long as a dedicated group of trained individuals can construct
at least crude biological weapon. As there is no comprehensive structure for reviewing all
of the research currently underway, scientists are being asked to exercise self-restraint and
to establish codes of conduct consistent with norms against the proliferation of biological
weapons. Although such codes do not provide active oversight of research, advocates claim
that they would educate scientists on where to “draw the line” in their work, encourage
them to report illegal activities and help them resist pressure from proliferators to make
weapons.
The effects of an attack using viruses will be tremendous and they are for need to be
acted upon quickly. Early detection of a biological agent in the environment allows for early
 MATERIAŁY 157

specific treatment and time during which prophylaxis would be effective. Unfortunately,
currently no reliable detection systems exist for BW agents. Many critical hours or even
days could silently go by before we might know about the devastating effects of an attack
using dangerous disease causing germ. Essential actions must be taken immediately after
an attack to save lives. A great deal of responsibility has been placed on the health, medi-
cal, intelligence and military agencies to be prepared in the event of biological attack. The
staff working at public health institutions, including legal medicine, must be involved in as
a first responder when bioterrorism would happen. Both medical knowledge of bioterror-
ism and the preparedness with training under simulation should be required in advance.
A different agency coordination and integration, e.g. law enforcement, is also required. As
long as nations are acting individually and not collectively, proliferators will find loopholes.
Proliferators will only be truly hindered if uniform, robust regulations are applied in thou-
sands of laboratories and culture collections worldwide. Additionally, a complete approach
to biosecurity would augment the licensing of facilities to receive and possess dangerous
pathogens with the appropriate access and accounting controls, regularly updated select-
-agent lists, background assurances on laboratory personnel and emergency response plans
and procedures9.
The consequences of biological terrorism are liable to be tactical or strategic, acute
or chronic, and/or physical or psychological. A bioterrorist attack will undoubtedly raise
many important political, moral, legal and ethical issues involving the authorities of state,
civil liberties and liability in the event mass vaccination is necessary. An effort to identify
and better understand such issues is important.
What is crucial, is the international community’s political will to make the norm against
biological weapons and its principal instruments more than empty constructs. The costs of
failing to meet the challenge could be astronomical as the passivity makes all nations equal
prey to proliferators who could instigate biological disaster.

Biological Warfare and Bioterrorism

Summary
This article is focused on the possibilities of using biological warfare in terrorist op-
erations. The author presents a development of research on biological warfare in
last 50 years, advancing a thesis that biological warfare becomes one of the most
important threats of the contemporary world. Free access to, and low costs of pro-
duction of biological warfare create unlimited possibilities of using biological war-
fare. Therefore, bioterrorism constitutes one of the biggest, potential threats of the
contemporary world.

9
Jonathan B. Tucker, Preventing the Misuse of Pathogens: The Need for Global Biosecurity Standards [In:] Arms
Control Today, June 2003, pp. 3–10.