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Criticality Analysis of Dry Storage Cask for Long Term Solution of

High-Level Radioactive Waste Management


Zainab Ejaz, Shahid Abbas, Rustam khan
Department of Nuclear Engineering PIEAS, Islamabad (Pakistan)

Abstract:
Since its inception, the nuclear power industry witnesses ups and down due to radiation fear, the principal cost

and management of radioactive waste. There are established techniques to manage low and medium level

radioactive but the high-level waste is considered as a serious challenge to human and its environment

therefore the management of high-level radioactive waste, especially the disposal phase, needs consistent and

continuous efforts to find the practicable solutions for safe long-term disposal. So far, the placement of spent

fuel and recycled high level waste in dry storage cask is practiced as an interim solution. It is mandatory safety

requirement to make detailed analysis of radiation shielding, decay heat removal and maintaining sub

criticality. This research paper focuses the detailed analysis of nuclear criticality using advance Monte Carlo

techniques for the spent fuel assemblies of the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant (unit 2), a Pressurized Water

Reactor (PWR) with a thermal capacity rating of 1000 MWth and have an average burnup of

32000MWth/MTU. The cask is composed of concrete over pack with an SS-304 inner and outer liner, a

canister containing helium and Boral plates placed among the spent fuel assemblies. This research investigates

the criticality of a single cask and an array 2 x 10 finite array arrangement under a variety of normal and

abnormal conditions in compliance with the ANSI regulatory standards and 10 CFR 72.124. The ORIGEN 2.0

code is used to simulate the source term while advance Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP5) is applied to develop

a detailed 3D model of dry storage cask (SC-21) which stores 21 spend fuel assemblies. The simulated results

show that the cask remains subcritical in all circumstances, with the neutron multiplication factor (keff) lower

than the regulatory limit of 0.95. However, reasonable increase in reactivity is observed under specific

accidental situations. In conclusion, the CNPGS dry storage cask (SC-21) ensures the sub-criticality, meets

regulatory requirements and safe storage of spent nuclear fuel under normal and abnormal/accidental

conditions for long term interim storage of spent fuel/high level waste.

Keywords: CNPGS, Long term dry storage cask, ORIGEN 2.0, MCNP5.0, criticality
1. Introduction:
Nuclear power plants use radioactive substances for producing electricity and generate radioactive waste. The

nuclear power industry has major obstacles in safely disposing of this waste. Safe and long-term disposal of

radioactive waste presents crucial challenges to engineering. According to the definition provided by the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission [] (10 CFR60.2), high-level waste comprises three items: (i) irradiated spent

nuclear fuel (ii) liquid wastes resulting from the initial stage in the solvent extraction system and (iii) Solids

produced from this waste streams [1].

Spent nuclear fuel is fuel that has been removed from the nuclear core after irradiation. This fuel is withdrawn

from the reactor since it is no longer capable of continuing the fission chain reaction due to the accumulation

of poison products such as xenon and the depletion of enriched uranium [2]. One of the most significant

challenges confronting the nuclear industry is the handling of spent nuclear fuel. Because major concerns are

its tremendous radioactivity, long half-life radionuclides, and radiotoxicity. The spent fuel is initially stored in

an intermediate facility, which can either be wet or dry[1]. Typically, the fuel is kept in a wet storage pool at

the site of the reactor for a period of five to ten years. This wet storage reduces radiation and decay heat to

safe, controlled levels. Following this period, the fuel can be transported to dry storage casks (Semi-permanent

storage facility) for long-term management[1]. Dry Cask storage System have shown to be a reliable substitute

for wet storage systems like Spent Fuel Pools (SFPs) for the interim storage of SNF[2]. Furthermore, nations

that reprocessed spent fuel, such as Japan and Russia, increasingly utilize interim storage in dry casks. In the

month of December 2010, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) announced that spent fuel could be

stored within pools or dry casks for as long as sixty years following the reactors' working life span. However,

the ultimate disposal of this irradiated spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste will demand

underneath repositories that are hundreds of meters below the surface[3]. Deep geological

formations like salt, rock, or clay operate as a natural barrier, inhibiting a radioactive substance from

getting out[4]. Metal or concrete casks(Hi-Storm) are the most often utilized storage containers in dry interim

storage systems across the world[5]. Furthermore, numerous countries are actively developing different sorts

of storage systems. In dry-cask concrete storage, spent fuel assemblies are normally stored in stainless steel
canisters shielded by a heavy, barite concrete barrier. This concrete enclosure has passageways which enable

air to circulate around the canister, which helps to cool the fuel inside. Some other designs of the casks use

thickly walled welded stainless-steel rings and heads for the cask body[6]. In certain designs, the body of cask

is formed from a single cast of iron that is ductile[7]. Further components are then used to offer neutron

shielding. The cask's design and construction adhere to 10 CFR Part 72's safety criteria for typical storage

conditions, which emphasizes the cask’s security and long-term reliability. These criteria include dependable

radioactive waste confinement under a variety of mechanical loads, sub-criticality maintenance, effective

radiation shielding and dissipating heat management. This research focuses on ensuring the subcriticality of

spent nuclear fuel stored in the CNPGS (Chashma nuclear power generating station) designed SC-21 cask

under both normal and an accidental circumstances.

The criticality safety analysis of spent fuel storage cask of CNPGS is performed using MCNP5 computer code.

Sub criticality of the designed geometry for the construction materials shall have to be maintained to ensure the

safety of spent fuel dry storage cask. The criticality safety assessment results for concrete shielded SC-21

under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions were initially presented and evaluated to see if they met the

requirements of Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR Part72.124 "Criteria for Nuclear Criticality Safety" and

the technological code for PWR spent fuel storage described in NUREG-1536, the NRC's prescribed screening

guideline.

Following are listed assumptions, approximations and safety criteria used for the analysis:

1. By considering 75 % burnup credit, the stored spent fuel is assumed to have an average discharge

burnup of 24000 MWD/MTU [ref].

2. The credit for neutron poison material in fixed neutron absorbers is limited to 75 percent [].

3. For conservative analyses, the studs and bolts have not been included.

4. No credit for any negative reactivity due to non-fuel hardware is taken.

5. Normal condition refers to cask consisting of spent nuclear fuel with air as the media in-between (Dry

condition)

6. Accident condition refers to:


 Cask consisting of spent nuclear fuel submerged in water (Wet condition)

 Cladding failure under both dry and wet conditions

 For accidental conditions involving wet conditions, unborated light water is used.

 For criticality calculations, only material change is considered for full and partial flooding

while geometry change is not considered in accident conditions.

1.1. Description of Storage Cask SC-21

The SC-21 cask has been designed to store 21 spent fuel assemblies (FAs) under dry conditions during storage.

The storage cask (SC-21) consists of a container vessel with fuel cage, a barite concrete cask body and a lid

assembly. The principal shielding material of cask is concrete with associated SA 516 Grade 70 liners. The

cask is designed to keep SNF subcritical under normal and accidental conditions. FAs are loaded in the fuel

cage which provides support and neutron attenuation. The internal of Fuel Cage consists of 4 mm thick neutron

absorber plates of Boral (B4C+Al) placed in between the fuel assemblies. Whereas, the peripheral portion of

Fuel Cage is made up of Stainless Steel (SS) strips. The length of Boral plates and SS strips is 326 cm starting

from the bottom of cage. Above the height of 326 cm of Boral plates, the Fuel Cage is extended up to 350 cm

with Stainless Steel plates with a length of 24 cm.

Table 1 Geometrical Parameters of container vessel and storage cask

Parameter value(cm)
Container vessel (SS-304)

Inner Diameter 135

Height 366.3

Bottom Dish thickness 2.5

vessel thickness 2.5

Cask body (Barite concrete)

Inner Shell diameter 162

Concrete inner liner thickness 2.5

Outer shell diameter 270


Concrete outer liner thickness 2.5

Bottom concreter thickness 31

Seat thickness 2.5

Height 453.8

Top plate diameter 225

Top plate thickness 2.5

Fuel cage is then loaded in SS container vessel with shell thickness 25 mm and bottom dish thickness of 25

mm. It serves as confinement for SNF. Container Vessel (CV) is closed with 100 mm thick iron top. The

vessel is pressurized under Helium (He) atmosphere in normal conditions. Helium helps in the removal of heat

and provides an environment, which is non-reactive in order to protect fuel assemblies against degradation of

fuel cladding. The SC-21 design specifications are shown in Table 1.

Table 2 Design Parameters of the CNPGS fuel Assembly

Item Specification
Enrichment of initial U235 [w/0] 3.4

Burnup [MWD/MTU] 24,000

Cooling time [years] 10

material of pellet UO2

Zircallo
Fuel rod material of cladding
y

density of pellet 10.181

no of rods in an assembly 225

UO2 mass[kg] 336.17

U-metal mass [kg] 297.88


No. of fuel rods/FA 204

No. of guided tube/FA 20

No. of instrumentation tube /FA 1

FA overall length[cm] 350

FA Active height[cm] 290

FA overall dimensions[cm] 19.93 x19.93 x 350

Arrays 15x15

Pitch between the rods[cm] 1.33

Fuel rod outer diameter[cm] 1

Fuel rod cladding thickness[cm] 0.07

The fuel assembly configuration selected to be placed into the SC-21 cask is a Westinghouse 15 x 15.

This spent fuel assembly was taken out from the Chashma nuclear power generation system (CNPGS)

operating in Pakistan. Criticality calculations have been performed for spent FAs of CNPGS having discharge

burnup of 24000 MWD/MTU, which is equivalent to the 75% burnup credit of fuel average burnup of 32000

MWD/MTU. The FA has 3.4 wt.% of enrichment of U-235, and having active fuel length of 2900 mm. This

Westinghouse 15 x 15 FA consists of 204 fuel rods having UO2 fuel pellets, one instrumentation thimble and,

20 guided tubes. The fuel assembly design specifications and the operational conditions are shown in Table 2.

Table 3 Summary Table of cask regional densities (compact)

Material Density(g/cm3) Density (atom/barn-cm)


Container vessel

Bottom Dish, vessel SS304 8.03 8.76E-02

Absorber material B4C+Al 2.53 6.46E-02

Cask
Lid Bottom Plate 8.03 8.76E-02

Lid Shell SA-516 GRADE 2.53

Top plate 70 7.8

SC gamma shield Barite Concrete 3.1 6.06E-02

SA-516 GRADE

Concrete inner/outer liner 70 7.8 8.59E-02

Carbon steel plate in cask SA-516 GRADE

bottom 70 7.8 8.59E-02

The following is an overview of the criticality safety evaluation requirements that are specified in technical

guidelines [] and the PWR spent fuel storage conditions regulation [8]:

1. The multiplication factor (keff), which accounts for all potential mistakes and uncertainties with 95%

certainty, must be less than 0.95 under any normal, abnormal, or accident situations[9].

2. To prevent inadvertent criticality, at least two rare, independent, and sequential modifications to

criticality safety conditions under normal, off-normal, and accident situations are required.

3. The following credits should not be used to ensure the criticality safety of the cask system[10]:

 fuel burnup

 burnable fuel-related neutron absorbers

2. Methodology:

2.1. ORIGEN2.0

The determination of source term is essential for the criticality analysis of the SC-21. In this work,

ORIGEN2.0-point depletion, one group, decay code, employed for the calculation of spent nuclear fuel

isotopic composition, their radioactivity, and thermal power[11]. ORIGEN utilizes matrix exponential method
in order to solve single order ordinary differential equation having constant coefficient[12]. Mathematically,

the rate of change of radionuclide concentration is as follow []:

dNi (2.1)
=∑ γ ij σ f , j N j φ+σ c, i−1 N i−1 φ+ λi N i−σ f ,i N i φ−σ c, i N i φ−λi N i
' '
dt j

Where N i is the ith nuclide’s concentration, γ ij σ f , j N j φ is the production rate of Ni nuclide induced by the

' '
fission of jth nuclide, σ c, i−1 N i−1 φ is the formation of N i−1nuclide by neutron absorption of N i nuclide, λ i N i

'
is the rate of change of production of N i due to the decay of N i nuclide, σ f , i N i φ is the loss rate of N i due to

fission, σ c, i N i φ is the rate of loss N i nuclide by inducing (n,2n), (n,n’) and (n,3n) reaction. The ORIGEN2.0

library comprises 1700 nuclides divided into three families: fission fragments (850), the actinides (130), and

activation products (720) []. Each family has its own library. The PWR 33 library has been used as a cross-

section library in our calculation.

The Fuel assembly has been irradiated for 3 cycles with 2 refueling outage [Anum]. The fuel assembly has

been burnt to 24000 MTW/MTU, irradiated at constant specific power of 8.25MW, and a cooling period of 10

years after being discharge from a reactor core. The number of days in each cycle and refueling outage is listed

in table.

2.2. MCNP5.0

The criticality safety analysis of the spent fuel storage cask, SC-21 of PDS has been performed by Monte-

Carlo simulation technique. Random sampling-based Monte Carlo techniques are extensively employed in

several domains to address problems with numerous coupled degrees of freedom. The techniques of Monte

Carlo are increasingly being employed to get accurate radiation transport estimates for a variety of projects.

MCNP-5 (Monte Carlo N particle), developed by LANL, is a general-purpose, continuous-energy, generalized

geometry, Monte-Carlo based particle transport code which enabled precise modeling of \ neutron, electron,

photon, or coupled electron/photon/ neutron interaction with in a given system. MCNPX provides a general,

criticality, and surface source, a broad collection of reduction of variance methods, an adjustable tally

structure, and an enormous collection of the cross-section data. In the following study, the MCNP code has
been used for modeling the CNPGS cask geometry, with a focus on criticality analysis. MCNP's sophisticated

characteristics, such as comprehensive geometry specification, material libraries, and capabilities of neutron

transportation, were used to simulate the behavior of neutron with in cask [13].

Figure 1 Flow chart illustrating methodology of calculating keff.

MC neutron transport codes are widely use in various reactor physics applications, traditionally related to

criticality safety analyses, radiation shielding problems, detector modeling and validation of deterministic

transport codes[14]. The main advantage of the method is the capability to model geometry and interaction

physics without major approximations. Based on this, MC based computer codes MCNP5 has been selected for

the calculation of Keff for the criticality safety analyses of the SC-21. Criticality calculations were performed

for 500 cycles (100 inactive cycles for source convergence) with 10000 number of source histories per cycle in

MCNP. Continuous energy and discrete neutron data library are used for MCNP-5 analysis[15]. The table lists

the most important isotopes which are considered for criticality analysis.
Figure 2 Detailed Arrangement of 21 Fuel Assemblies Separated by B4C Plates in Dry Storage
Configuration (Fuel cage).

Figure 3: Top view of the MCNP5 model of the storage cask (SC-21).
Figure 4 Axial view of storage cask (SC-21) modeled using MCNP5.0

Figure 5 Top view of the storage cask 2x10 array modeled using MCNP5.0

3. Results and Discussion


This section provides the criticality results for the dry storage cask carrying 21 fuel assemblies (FAs) of

CNPGS reactor. The ORIGEN 2.0 was used to determine the isotopic inventory of spent nuclear fuel. These

isotopic inventories were then subsequently used to execute MCNP simulations to predict the (keff) under

various circumstances. The research is performed on both a single cask and a 2 x10 finite array arrangement,
focusing at the cask's behavior under typical storage condition as well as probable unintentional events

including water penetration and geometric changes.

Figure 6 Cross section view of fuel assembly model of SC-21 cask (a) cross-sectional view of the
fuel cage of cask (b) details of one of the fuel assemblies, including fuel rod Pink circles),
Guided and instrumentational control tube (location without fuel rod), Boral plates (green
colour) and (c) fuel rod cross-section

The results show that the cask maintains subcritical in all investigated scenarios, with an uncertainty in the

MCNP outcomes of less than 1%, and it also give vital insights into the cask design's safety margins, assuring

regulatory compliance and entire storage system safety. The criticality analysis results from MCNP

calculations contain uncertainty as a relative error. In general, the uncertainty is below 1%. In this study, the

uncertainty for the single cask and that of 2x10 array is less than 1%.

Table 4 Spent fuel isotopic inventory at 24000MWD/MTU Burnup[16]

Density Density
Isotopes Isotopes
atom/barn-cm atom/barn-cm
U-235 3.19E-04 Eu-155 3.30E-07

Pu-239 1.11E-04 Eu-154 5.93E-07

U-238 2.16E-02 Eu-153 2.63E-06

O-16 4.55E-02 Sm-152 3.19E-06

Xe-135 7.38E-09 Sm-151 4.10E-07

Cm-244 9.07E-08 Sm-150 7.41E-06

Cm-242 1.53E-07 Sm-149 8.33E-08


Am-243 5.52E-07 Sm-147 2.12E-06

Am-242 7.20E-09 PM-148 2.60E-08

Am-241 5.53E-07 PM-147 5.98E-06

Pu-242 4.51E-06 Nd-145 1.91E-05

Pu-241 1.95E-05 Nd-143 2.55E-05

Pu-240 3.55E-05 Cs-135 1.28E-05

Pu-238 1.42E-06 Cs-134 2.50E-06

NP-237 6.09E-06 Cs-133 3.45E-05

U-236 8.04E-05 Xe-131 1.41E-05

Rh-103 1.64E-05 Ag-109 1.87E-06

Kr-83 2.18E-06 Rh-105 4.14E-08

3.1. Single cask

The criticality safety analysis of the spent fuel dry storage cask has been performed for a single under both

normal and accidental conditions as per requirement of verification of design safety. Different calculational

configurations/scenarios have been used to calculate Keff for SC- 21. Dry condition refers to cask consisting of

spent nuclear fuel with air as the media in between. Whereas, flooding condition refers to the state in which the

cask is submerged in unborated water or its interior is filled with unborated water.

3.1.1.Normal scenario

The cask interior and its surrounding are completely in dry state (He filled inside container, air outside the

cask) with the clad remains structurally intact as well. Findings IN Table 5 show that cask remain subcritical

with multiplicative factor keff came out of 0.29353, which is less than regulatory limit (keff < 0.95)[17]
Table 5 Criticality Analysis of PWR spent fuel storage cask (SC-21) single package under
normal and accidental condition

Cask condition Description about the case Clad status Keff

Normal Dry inside and outside 0.26021 ±0.00011

Partial flooding
0.26018±0.00011
(outside water, air inside)

Partial flooding Clad intact


Accidental 0.80435±0.00032
(outside air, inside water)

Complete flooding
0.80443±0.00032
(outside water, inside water)

3.1.2. Accidental conditions

Several scenarios were examined with MCNP to determine the safety of the dry storage cask under accidental

circumstances. These included partial and complete flooding of the cask in which cask is fully submerged in an

unborated water (table 5), to determine its impact on the effective multiplication factor. Furthermore, the

influence of cladding failure was studied, indicating a clear association between cladding deterioration and

enhanced reactivity (table 6), (k) values increased with the degree of cladding failure[18].

Table 6 Criticality Safety Analysis of PWR Spent Fuel Storage Cask (SC-21) Single package
Under Complete Flooding condition with Varying Levels of Clad Failure

Cask
Description about the case Clad failure Keff
condition

Accidental Complete flooding 5% 0.80546±0.00032

(outside water, 10% 0.80791±0.00032


20% 0.81289±0.00033

30% 0.81696±0.00034

40% 0.82165±0.00033
condition inside water)
50% 0.82677±0.00033

60% 0.83118±0.00032

The research also evaluated the possibility of different misloading schemes under dry and wet conditions[19].

Misloading of fresh FAs and underburned FAs has been considered at different locations inside the fuel cage

under both dry and wet conditions. The loading of two fresh FAs at the center under wet condition results in

most severe misloading event as shown in Table 07.

Table 7 Criticality Safety Analysis of PWR Spent Fuel Storage Cask (SC-21) Single package
under various misloading conditions

Misloading Fuel type Condition Position Keff

Single fresh FA Dry 0.26321±0.00012


Center
Single fresh FA Full flooding 0.80375±0.00034

Single fresh FA Dry 0.26167±0.00012


Side
Single fresh FA Full flooding 0.77967±0.00030

Two fresh FA Full flooding Center 0.82756±0.00031

Two fresh FA Full flooding Side 0.78918±0.00033

Variations in the inside density of water were simulated to determine how variations in the moderator density

may affect keff. The results show that Keff increase with density of internal water moderation. By considering

the presence and absence of preferential flooding, graphical representations of variation of Keff with density of

inside water are shown in Figures 8. From the analyses, it is evident that the most reactive case is internal

moderation with full water density (1 g/cc).


Table 8 Criticality Safety Analyses for a Single SC-21 under different Internal Moderating
condition

Case Water density(g/cc) Keff


Internal External

1 0.002 1 0.26395±0.00012

2 0.01 1 0.27758±0.00013

3 0.1 1 0.35881±0.00018

4 0.2 1 0.43383±0.00023

5 0.3 1 0.50908±0.00027

6 0.5 1 0.61220±0.00030

7 0.75 1 0.71645±0.00031

8 1 1 0.80443±0.00032

One of the conditions in which the cask is fully submerged in unborated water, cask interior is completely

filled with unborated water and the clad structure is completely failed. This condition leads to most reactive

case with highest moderation and fuel direct exposure.


Figure 7 Variation of keff with cladding failure percentage

The results of the criticality safety analyses for a single cask (SC-21) including normal and accidental

conditions are enclosed in Table 51. The results showed that in all these accidental scenarios, multiplication

factor (Keff) remained below 0.95, confirming that the cask stays safely subcritical even in these accidental

conditions.
Figure 8 Variation of Keff with Internal Water Density (Preferential Flooding with Water)

3.2. Finite array of storage package (2x10)

Finite arrays of the storage casks containing 2x10 packages has been modeled and evaluated under normal

conditions of transport. The pitch of the arrays of the cask has been assumed 0.6 m for conservative analyses

figure 5.

In normal dry condition, there is no moderating or poison material between the packages. Furthermore,

evaluations have also been made with water reflections around the casks for these finite arrays in order to

consider more credible configuration under normal conditions (no water leakage inside the casks has been

assumed). The results for Keff for a finite 2x10 array under normal and different accidental conditions have

been presented in Table 9.


Table 9 Criticality Safety Analysis for Multiple Packages (2x10 Array) of SC-21 under normal
and hypothetical accidental conditions

Cask condition Description Clad status Keff


Complete dry
Normal 0.26026±0.00012
(Both inside, outside)

Complete flooding Clad intact

Accidental (Water inside, water between the 0.77048±0.00030

cask)

The results showed that in all both these normal and accidental scenarios, multiplication factor

(Keff) remained below 0.95, confirming that the 2x10 packages stays safely subcritical.

4. Conclusion
The criticality analysis is thoroughly performed for the storage Cask -21 (SC-21) concrete cask. For sake of

criticality safety, a conservative approach is applied to design the SC-21 storage system. Therefore this cask

system is designed to store 21 used fuel assemblies of burn up of 24000 MWd/MTU, which is 75% of the

average burnup of CNPGS reactor spent fuel (32,000 MWd/MTU). The cooling and decay period of 10 years

is applied to the spent fuel loaded to the SC-21 cask. The CS-21 has been is verified under both normal and

accidental situations. The material composition of the spent fuel is calculated using ORIGEN2.0 computer

code, which is input to a detailed 3D MCNP5 model of the SC-21 to predict the criticality parameter k eff. The

results indicate that, under all situations (normal and abnormal conditions including total flooding, cladding

failure and fluctuations in internal water density), the k eff remained less than 1.0 (1.0 or 0.95???). This validates

that the SC-21 cask complies with the regulatory criteria established in 10 CFR 72.124, as well as the

American Nuclear Society's (ANSI) design requirements for independent spent fuel storage systems. Thus, the

SC-21 cask presents an effective and compliant alternative for long term interim storage of spent nuclear fuel,

assuring continued safety and compliance with regulations.


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