Original Research Article

Outlook on Agriculture
2024, Vol. 53(1) 37–48
Maize seed aid and seed systems © The Author(s) 2024

development: Opportunities for Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions
synergies in Uganda DOI: 10.1177/00307270231224085
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Jason Donovan1 , Rachel C. Voss2, Irene Bayiyana3

and Pieter Rutsaert2

Abstract
In the name of food security, governments and NGOs purchase large volumes of maize seed in non-relief situations to
provide at reduced or no cost to producers. At the same time, efforts to build formal maize seed systems have been
frustrated by slow turnover rates – the dominance of older seed products in the market over newer, higher performing
ones. Under certain conditions, governments and NGO seed aid purchases can support formal seed systems develop-
ment in three ways: i) support increased producer awareness of new products, ii) support local private seed industry
development, and iii) advance equity goals by targeting aid to the most vulnerable of producers who lack the capacity
to purchase seeds. This study explores the objectives and activities of seed aid programmes in Uganda and their interac-
tions with the maize seed sector. We draw insights from interviews with representatives of seed companies, NGOs and
government agencies, as well as focus group discussions with producers. The findings indicated that seed aid programme
objectives are largely disconnected from broader seed systems development goals. There is little evidence of public-pri-
vate collaboration in design of these programmes. Better designed programs have the potential to align with varietal turn-
over objectives, commercial sector development and targeting of underserved markets could promote equity and ‘crowd
in’ demand.

Keywords
Social inclusion, seed business, varietal turnover, seed systems, seed aid

Introduction increasing variation in rainfall and temperature (Cairns

et al., 2013). Over recent decades, these investments have
In many parts of the global South, faster progress towards delivered results: CGIAR and NARES breeding pro-
poverty alleviation and food security goals, will depend,
grammes release dozens of new seed products1 a year that
in part, on farmers having access to improved varieties vary in maturity levels and pest and disease resistance,
that meet their requirements as both farmers and consumers. among other attributes. Farmers have reliable access to a
Governments and donors have responded to this challenge
wide selection of maize seed products via thousands of
through their long-term support for crop breeding by retail shops spread across the region. The maize seed
CGIAR and National Agricultural Research Institutes sector consists of dozens of locally and internationally
(NARES). In the case of cereals, crop breeding for many
owned seed companies, some with decades of
parts of the global South has aimed to support farmers’ experience in production and marketing. Government and
resilience to changing agro-climatic conditions (Atlin donor investments in maize breeding and seed systems
et al., 2017). Investments in breeding have been comple-
development across East and Southern Africa have been
mented by investments in seed systems development an important factor in explaining overall increasing levels
aimed at improving farmer access to improved seed of maize productivity since the 1970s (Smale and Jayne,
through formal and informal channels. The issues surround-
2009).
ing seed systems development are complex, with strong,
and sometimes opposing, views on the appropriate roles
1
of farmers, governments and the private sector (Mulvany, CIMMYT, Texcoco, Mexico
2
2005; Thompson, 2012). CIMMYT, Nairobi, Kenya
3
National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO), Entebbe, Uganda
In East and Southern Africa, crop breeding and seed
systems development has a focused on rainfed hybrid Corresponding author:
maize – a crop that is critical for food security in the Jason Donovan, CIMMYT, Texcoco, Mexico.
region and which is facing considerable challenges due to Email: [email protected]
38 Outlook on Agriculture 53(1)

Looking ahead, future progress in maize seed systems negotiated have important implications for seed systems
development will require solutions to slow varietal turnover development and crop breeding but is not well understood.
– that is, the persistence of previous-generation maize seed In general, a substantial body of literature has found that
products in farmer’s fields, despite the availability of new- input subsidy programmes’ beneficiary targeting is often
generation products that offer higher yields and are drought inadequate or inappropriate. This occurs when subsidies
and disease tolerant. Research has pointed to farmers’ are applied too widely (i.e., reaching farmers who would
overall lack of information on new seed products, and otherwise have access to quality seed without the aid), or
their lack of engagement with seed retailers on seed-product when farmers are excluded from received aid based on eli-
attributes (Rutsaert & Donovan, 2020). Farmers may per- gibility criteria or other factors but still receive seed aid
ceive new products, in particular new hybrids, to cost (e.g., through loopholes, fraud or corruption). In the case
more (Nakanwagi, 2021), and may have concerns over of fertilizer subsidies, poor targeting is thought to contribute
seed quality (Barriga & Fiala 2020; Gharib et al., 2021). to ‘crowding out’ (i.e., displacing) commercial sales (Jayne
In many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, open-pollinated et al., 2013; Mather and Jayne, 2018; Ricker-Gilbert et al.,
varieties (OPVs) continue to represent a major segment of 2013; Takeshima and Nkonya, 2014; Xu et al., 2009).
the maize seed market (Abate et al., 2017). Discussions While few studies have examined seed aid and seed
on maize seed systems development have offered few subsidies’ role in crowding in or crowding out commercial
insights on potential solutions to the varietal turnover seed purchases (Mason and Ricker-Gilbert, 2013; World
problem. Efforts to develop formal seed systems for non- Bank, 2014), the concerns raised by fertilizer subsidies
hybrid crops, such as sorghum, millet and groundnut, programmes are likely relevant.
have proven to be even more challenging, given the lack We argue that a targeted and coordinated seed aid
of incentives for private sector investment in seed multipli- programming agenda can advance maize seed systems
cation and distribution (Bagamba et al., 2022). development in multiple ways: i) greater gender equity
In this article, we explore the idea that maize seed and social inclusion in seed distribution, ii) distribution at
systems development can be accelerated when its goals scale of new products tailored to specific farmer require-
and actions are coordinated with seed aid programming. ments, and iii) local seed business development. Through
For decades, governments and donors have sought to a case study in Uganda, we looked to understand the
increase farmers’ access to improved seed through seed implications of how seed aid was implemented in relation
aid – that is, the direct distribution of seed products to to formal maize seed systems development. To what
farmers by government agencies and NGOs. Seed aid has extent did these programmes support varietal turnover,
generally been discussed in terms of emergency and relief increased social inclusion and the development of local
conditions that follow droughts, floods and civil wars seed businesses? Our insights are based on interviews
(e.g., McGuire & Sperling, 2013; Sperling et al., 2008; with representatives from seed companies, NGOs and
Sperling & McGuire, 2010). However, government and government agencies. The following section explores
donors have invested in seed aid during non-relief condi- the challenges facing seed systems development with a
tions as part of their strategies aimed at boosting agricultural focus on maize. ‘Materials and methods’ section
production and productivity (e.g., Bramel and Remington, describes how we designed the study, while ‘Results’
2004; Spielman et al., 2012). NGOs and government pro- section presents the results. We conclude with recom-
grammes purchase seed directly from individual seed pro- mendations for how seed aid programmes might better
ducers or seed companies and distribute it, either free or support wider seed system goals.
subsidized, to farmers (Sperling et al., 2008).
Governments and NGOs may also provide vouchers to
farmers to purchase seed products and other inputs at Seed sector development
reduced costs from agrodealers (Aloyce et al., 2014). For
the private seed industry, seed aid sales can represent a crit- Gender equity and social inclusion in seed distribution
ical source of revenue – for example, recent data showed Researchers have raised concerns that new maize hybrids
that NGO and select government programmes in Uganda fail to equally reach women and the poorest farmers (e.g.,
comprised 63% of seed companies’ maize seed sales, Fisher et al., 2019; Fisher and Carr, 2015; Fisher &
67% of bean seed sales and 77% of sorghum seed sales Kandiwa, 2014; Gebre et al., 2019; Kassa, 2013; Smale
(Mabaya et al., 2021). and Olwande, 2014). Researchers also have pointed to dis-
We know little about how NGOs and government agen- parities in information and training access (Katungi et al.,
cies engage with maize seed companies and farmers for the 2008; Mudege et al., 2018; Ragasa, 2014), women’s
implementation of seed aid in non-relief situations. limited access to required cash (Bourdillon et al., 2007;
Government and NGO seed purchases must involve deci- Mudege et al., 2015; Quisumbing and Pandolfelli, 2010),
sions on the benefits and costs of responding to what social constraints on mobility and agency (Galiè et al.,
farmers know and trust (e.g., high-selling products based 2017; Puskur et al., 2021), women’s limited access to com-
on decades-old genetic technologies) versus sourcing plementary resources such as land (Doss and Morris, 2001;
newer, but perhaps lesser-known, products that are Mudege et al., 2018) and gender-based differences in
designed and tested to deliver higher performance under product preferences or perceptions about seed sources
current growing conditions. How these trade-offs are (Bourdillon et al., 2007; Kilwinger et al., 2020). In addition,
Donovan et al. 39

maize seed companies and seed retailers lack incentives to Local seed business development
target distribution and marketing efforts to groups that
Direct seed aid and input subsidy programmes have been
face price and material constraints (e.g., transport) for pur-
criticized for disrupting commercial seed sector operations
chase. These discussions raise questions about the capacity
with free and below-cost distributions (Mutonodzo-Davies
of formal sector seed distribution pathways to support equit-
and Magunda, 2011; Sperling and Remington, 2006;
able uptake of new seed products and have generated
Sperling et al., 2008; Sperling and McGuire, 2010) and dis-
increased attention to seed system accessibility.
tribution of low quality seed that ultimately weakens
product demand (Tripp and Rohrbach, 2001). However,
Varietal turnover seed aid programmes can also support formal seed
systems development. For example, seed vouchers (Croft
Development-oriented, government- and donor-funded
et al., 2021) can increase sales by agrodealers and help to
maize breeding programmes in East and Southern Africa
expand their consumer base. Subsidy and direct seed aid
have, for decades, produced new, high yielding, stress-
programmes can generate bulk sales opportunities for the
resistant maize seed products (Cobb et al., 2019; Evenson
locally owned seed companies which may lack the financial
and Gollin, 2003; Walker and Alwang, 2015). Despite evi-
and human resources required for business growth and
dence of these products’ promising performance from
development. During the initial stages of small-scale seed
on-station and on-farm trials (Worku et al., 2020), their
business development, bulk sales can provide much
sales continue to lag behind the sales of older, well-known
needed resources for product development, retail network
maize seed products (Rutsaert and Donovan, 2020;
establishment and expansion and direct-to-farmer
Spielman and Smale, 2017). ‘Varietal turnover’ refers to
marketing.
farmers’ replacement of an older seed product with a
Seed companies’ dependence on sales to these pro-
more recently developed improved one, a process that
grammes can be risky, however, as delayed payments can
entails a genetic change (Spielman and Smale, 2017). In
throw company accounts, especially in small businesses
the case of hybrid maize, seed companies are expected
without significant alternative revenue streams, dangerously
play a critical role in this process by phasing out their
out of balance. Late or unplanned bulk orders can also
stock of older products, thus enabling their replacement
disturb supply to build up retail networks. For NGO and gov-
with newer products which have been designed and tested
ernment programmes to be effective partners in seed business
for higher performance. However, smaller-sized seed com-
development, transparent and predictable procurement pro-
panies with limited marketing budgets may resist calls to
cesses must be in place to enable seed companies to plan.
limit their production and distribution of older seed pro-
ducts that generate important revenue streams. Recent evi-
dence from Kenya showed that few farmers sought to
purchase the latest, highest performing products (Rutsaert Materials and methods
and Donovan, 2020), perhaps because varietal replacement
generates relatively incremental yield gains but requires Study context
farmers to bear risk (Spielman and Smale, 2017). We conducted this study in Uganda, a country with an emer-
Achieving faster rates of varietal turnover is a priority for ging maize seed industry and with high levels of government
government- and donor-funded maize breeding pro- and NGO involvement in agricultural development. By
grammes and, generally speaking, is considered important recent estimates, Uganda’s seed sector includes 23 seed
for farmers to achieve sustained yield gains in the face of companies, 19 of which produce and process their own
increased variability in growing conditions (Atlin et al., seed (Mabaya et al., 2021). Relatively limited regulation of
2017). seed quality (Langyintuo et al., 2010), low levels of compe-
Through careful selection of maize seed products, seed tition between agrodealers (Barriga and Fiala, 2020) and
aid programmes have the potential to deliver large agrodealers’ repackaging of inputs into smaller units have
volumes of new products to farmers. Seed companies raised concerns about low input quality and seed counterfeit-
stand to benefit from wider distribution and increased ing (Bold et al., 2017). However, despite numerous seed
awareness of their seed, brand recognition and promotion adulteration scandals, maize seed purity and quality was
of new varieties, which could aid in varietal turnover in the assessed as fairly good, despite challenges with product mis-
medium to long term. Achieving these objectives relies, handling and poor storage (Barriga and Fiala, 2020).
again, on NGO and government programme’s careful tar- Uganda has an active civil sector including NGOs
geting of underserved markets and quality assurance engaged in humanitarian assistance and rural livelihoods
efforts to ensure minimal disruption of commercial sales development. The country is also a major seed provider
or improved farmer trust of seed in the long term. It also for Sudanese refugees and their host communities. In
necessitates effective labelling of distributed seed to 2019, 32% of total maize seed produced went to the
increase brand awareness, cooperation and collaboration national subsidy programme called Operation Wealth
with seed companies in product selection to ensure that Creation (OWC), 31% to NGOs, 25% to agrodealers and
priority varieties are distributed, and deliberate facilitation 8% directly to farmers (Mabaya et al., 2021). Uganda’s
of varietal turnover through prioritization of new, high- formal maize seed system thus depends, in significant
performing products. part, on subsidy programmes and NGO and government
40 Outlook on Agriculture 53(1)

Table 1. Overview of government programs that offered seed aid.

Program Implementing partner Timeframe Approach

Operation Wealth National Agricultural Country wide since Free seed distribution for key crops, including maize
Creation (OWC) Advisory Services 2015–2016 and beans
(NAADS)
Agriculture Cluster Ministry of Agriculture, 2016–2022 E-voucher system allowing eligible producers to
Development Animal Industry, and purchase inputs from decentralized outlets with a
Programme (ACDP) Fisheries (MAAIF) 67% subsidy the first year, 50% the second year,
and 33% the third year
Parish Development Ministry of Agriculture, 2022 to replace Enable localized (parish level) prioritization of
Model (PDM) Animal Industry, and ACDP development activities including seed access
Fisheries (MAAIF)
Northern Uganda Social Office of the Prime Minister 2003 after the war, NUSAF targeted districts in Northern Uganda
Action Fund (NUSAF). (OPM) phase 3 ended in performing poorly on key poverty indicators and
2022 the poorest of producers. Activities included
seed distribution, support extension, and
development of community seed banks

seed purchases. Table 1 provides an overview of four gov- process became clear. Interviews took 30–60 min and were
ernment programmes in Uganda that engaged in seed aid conducted in English or local languages. Where possible,
around the time this study was implemented. interviews were backed by secondary data available in
project reports, particularly for government programmes.
Twelve focus group discussions with maize farmers (six
Methodology with men and six with women) were organized in areas tar-
Between April and May of 2022, we conducted stacked, geted by NGO and government seed programmes to gather
semi-structured key informant interviews with representa- farmer perspectives on programme targeting and reach.
tives of seed businesses, NGOs and government agencies Communities were chosen based on partner contacts in
participating in seed aid programmes. We selected seed the area, and six to ten farmers were invited to participate
companies that represented diversity in terms of market in each, aiming for diversity of landholding size and pro-
share, production volume and past participation in govern- duction orientation. In these groups, farmers were prompted
ment and NGO seed distribution programmes: three to share experiences with NGO and government pro-
market leaders, two medium-scale and two small-scale com- grammes distributing seed and their perceptions of these
panies were selected, each pair showing varied past engage- programmes and the seeds themselves. Focus groups were
ment in government and NGO seed aid programmes. conducted in local languages and took 30–60 min.
Interviews targeted either owners or senior staff responsible Key informant interviews were recorded and transcribed,
for marketing, distribution and/or contract decisions related while focus groups were recorded and detailed notes and
to participation in seed aid programmes. These discussions representative quotes extracted. We applied deductive,
sought to clarify the process through which seed companies iterative coding with the software Dedoose, and used
engaged with the programmes, including selection of var- top-down and bottom-up analysis of patterns and themes
ieties to distribute, the importance of these distribution chan- to analyse interview and focus group data. Ethics approval
nels to their business model and marketing objectives, their was obtained from CIMMYT (IREC.2022.034) and
motives in participating and their perceptions of costs Makerere University (MAKSSREC 04.2022.544). Written
and benefits. A representative from the Uganda Seed consent was obtained from participants, using a witness in
Trade Association was also interviewed on these topics. the case of illiteracy. Interviewees were not compensated
Interviews were conducted in English or in local languages but focus groups participants were offered refreshments
(Luganda or Swahili) and took 60–80 min. and modest compensation for their time and transportation
Snowball sampling led to the identification of five NGOs costs to ensure equal ability to participate.
and three government programmes to which companies
supplied seed. Interviews were organized with staff at
these organizations who were knowledgeable about seed Results
procurement, programme objectives and implementation.
In most cases, more than one person was interviewed at Experiences of maize farmers
each NGO or programme office, as programming decisions NGO and government programmes were the most reported
and seed procurement were typically handled separately. seed sources for farmers. Focus group participants reported
Interviews covered programme objectives and operations, several problems with these programmes. A common theme
impact metrics, beneficiary targeting, details on procure- was late delivery. One farmer reported that seed deliveries
ment processes and perceptions of the programme’s role from OWC came ‘when they think about us’ rather than
in the wider seed system. Two local agricultural officers on a predictable schedule. Poor quality seed from these pro-
were also interviewed as their role in the product selection grammes also emerged from almost every discussion,
Donovan et al. 41

although the perceived reasons for this were unclear. Most benefits. One mid-sized seed company cited last-mile deliv-
focus groups reported that farmers did not engage on the ery as a benefit of partnering with NGO programmes:
selection of products to be supplied to them through NGO ‘Some of those NGOs reach even where we don’t have an
and government programmes, in part due to their limited agrodealer – they are close to the ground and able to take
knowledge of product availability. products even to the lowest farmer who wouldn’t access
Farmers in focus groups expressed appreciation for the town’. However, wider access to quality seed in under-
ACDP voucher system, which reportedly provided served areas appeared to be an incidental benefit. No seed
farmers with higher quality seed and a full input package. companies reported that reaching underserved communities
‘They used to give better seeds compared to the ones was a deliberate motivation behind their decisions to engage
from NAADS’, said one farmer. ‘In addition, what was with these programmes.
good was how they gave us seeds. They gave us everything, Government programmes, in contrast, reported a scatter-
a complete package of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and tar- shot approach to targeting, making programmes widely
paulins’. Concerns about quality in ACDP were less accessible to commercialize agriculture while generating
common, suggesting the voucher-based distribution goodwill and political support among rural communities.
channel had been more effective at connecting famers Political considerations entered government seed distribu-
with quality seed, although input delivery timelines again tion decisions at the sub-county scale, where a small propor-
emerged as a concern. Farmers offered a few areas that tion of seed was often set aside for members of parliament
could be improved in ACDP, including faster delivery, to allocate as they chose. This reportedly led to some dupli-
cheaper goods, improved market access and expanded eligi- cation and poor targeting in distributions. Wide seed distri-
bility for farmers without their own land (renters). bution had also become a challenge in recent years due to
While seed aid has its challenges, farmers’ assessments budget reductions and limited seed supplies; NAADS
of seed retail channels were also poor. Price was the most relied on extension officers to engage in beneficiary target-
frequently cited challenge associated with commercial ing at the district level, although the outcomes of this were
seed – unsurprising in a context where seed had been dis- unclear. In one focus group discussion, farmers reported
tributed for free for so long. A second set of challenges that OWC seed distributions had become first-come,
associated with commercial seed related to seed quality, first-served.
including sale of expired seed or seed that failed to germin- ACDP’s targeting was more deliberate, as the programme
ate, and availability of preferred varieties in agrodealer put in place a cap on land ownership to help direct subsidies
shops, pointing to problems with the reliability of commer- to potentially needy households. However, this requirement
cial seed supply chains. Quality concerns, availability con- was not practically enforceable, a programme representative
straints and limited farmer knowledge appeared to have admitted. ACDP did mandate farmer co-funding – in
eroded farmer trust in commercial seed. advance – to receive subsidized inputs, which focus
Focus groups underscored that farmer knowledge of groups reported led to the exclusion of farmers with very
seed companies and new products in Uganda was limited; limited financial resources. ACDP’s use of an e-voucher
when asked which seed companies sold high quality seed, system also had potential implications for women and the
one group pointed the researchers to shopkeepers as those poorest farmers’ ability to access and use the services.
who could best answer the questions. One women’s group Seed companies, district government officers and an
pointed the researchers to men, who typically acquired ACDP programme representative all relayed concerns
seed and reportedly had better knowledge – and indeed, about farmers’ limited digital literacy, which led middlemen
men’s focus groups were generally better able to identify (often input vendors) to facilitate input ordering and thereby
seed companies operating in their area and seed products influence farmer choices and/or deliberately cheat them of
available to them. their entitlements. Although ACDP reported that 42% of
input buyers were women, concerns about fair and equitable
engagement persisted.
Targeting by governments and NGOs
Many NGOs and NUSAF reported that they deliberately
targeted the ‘most vulnerable’ districts, parishes and com- Seed product selection
munities according to poverty indicators (also contributing Most procurement programmes published lists of desired
to their focus on OPVs over hybrids). Focus groups corro- products in their tenders. The generation of product lists
borated this. Although no government programmes for most NGO and government programmes aimed to be
reported intentional targeting at the household or sub- grassroots-driven, with farmers theoretically requesting
household level, one NGO representative stressed their par- products they wanted. Extension agents and their contacts
ticipatory efforts to identify vulnerable households, and one from the National Agricultural Research Organization of
focus group indeed alluded to NGO’s prioritization of Uganda (NARO) played a key role in this process, espe-
farmers who were considered to be most vulnerable. None cially for OWC. It was reported that extension agents
of the seed aid programmes reported a deliberate focus on were guided by farmers on choice of good seed, but only
gender in their seed distributions. one focus group discussion reported community involve-
Several study participants felt non-commercial distribu- ment in choosing seeds (and that only recently, through
tion channels inherently brought some social inclusion the PDM). One district-level procurement officer said that
42 Outlook on Agriculture 53(1)

their decision to prioritize a specific product (i.e., Longe Contributions to local seed business development
10H) each year was based on knowledge of its performance
Discussions with seed companies focused largely on the
and affordability, rather than assessment of farmer demand.
implications of NGO and government seed programmes
NGO and government programmes offered seed com-
for their business growth and development. Reported
panies the chance to propose alternative products. Some
impacts were largely positive, with important caveats. All
companies shared that they had proposed alternatives, but
seed companies reported that their bulk sales to these pro-
rarely with the intention to get newly launched products
grammes were a boon, as a small number of centralized
purchased by seed aid programming. Neither seed compan-
sales were logistically simpler and more profitable than
ies, government programmes, nor NGOs reported incen-
sales through agrodealer networks. These bulk sales
tives to make available newly released seed products.
helped companies settle accounts, particularly where out-
Relationships between seed aid programmes and seed com-
growers were involved in seed production. ‘When you get
panies were perceived by both sides as transactional, with
an order from an NGO or government, you are sure,
no evidence of collaboration on questions around turnover.
though there also some delays in payment, that when they
A large-scale seed company representative explained the
put that transaction on your account at once, it helps you
challenge in introducing new products through these
to clear off most of your [payments to outgrowers] and
programmes:
settle for the next season’, said a small-scale seed company.
Despite the benefits of direct sales to NGO and govern-
They are all buying what they know; they are not going to buy ment programmes, seed companies reported variability
what they don’t know. A new product will raise a lot of ques- in demand as a persistent challenge. Typically, NGO
tions. Even if you convince them, even if it has the lowest price and government programmes released invitations for
but it is new to them, there is no incentive for them to take it. tenders and seed companies submitted bids to supply
Especially with the government, they try as much as possible to seed. Companies found procurement timelines and levels
collect data from the district and what is required, and people difficult to predict, however. ‘[Allocations to] government
[farmers] will talk about what they know. varies; some seasons they don’t take, some seasons they
take… if government offered you a contract, in that
season, they will take the largest, almost all volume’, a mid-
The NGO and government seed programmes tended to sized seed company reported. Seed aid programme repre-
promote and distribute both OPV and hybrid seed products. sentatives attributed this variability to annual budgeting
Focus groups indicated that the most common products sup- processes and demand assessments by local extension
plied through government programmes were Bazooka and agents. In 2022, after NAADS’s budget for seed procure-
Longe 10H (both hybrids), while NGOs most commonly ment was slashed, purchase orders for seed companies
distributed Longe 5 (the market leading OPV) and Longe were drastically reduced.
10H. Few other products were mentioned in focus groups. Because tendering processes occurred when government
Ultimately, it appeared that the demand-driven approach and NGO programmes were ready to buy seed rather than
to varietal selection employed by most programmes meant when seed companies were planning production, compan-
that communities received well-known varieties that were ies’ ability to tailor production to actual demand was
requested by local agricultural officers, rather than new pro- limited. A representative of a mid-sized company said
ducts introduced intentionally. that bid winners were sometimes unable to meet their
Several NGOs and one government programme sales commitments, leading to inter-company seed sales
(NUSAF 3) sought primarily or exclusively OPVs – a deci- that undermined quality control. Furthermore, intra-
sion reported to be linked to their focus on community governmental coordination was lacking.
resilience, humanitarian relief and efforts to serve the
most vulnerable, as well as constraints on their ability to ‘Our biggest challenge as the private sector, for all of us, is that
deliver seeds to communities indefinitely. One NGO pro- there is no systematic planning from the government. The [end
gramme representative involved in product choice reported of the] financial year is coming in July, and we know OPM will
deep scepticism about the benefits of hybrid maize for require 1000 tons of seeds… then NAADS will come and say,
smallholders: “For us we need this”, and then ACDP… If we would have that
planning information given to us as a seed sector, it could be
easy to manage’.
Scientists keep changing seed, time after time keep changing
seed, so it brings discontentment into the minds of farmers…
we encourage our farmers to produce for food security, we Government programmes that undertook regular seed distri-
also encourage them to produce for income, and also keep butions (including NAADS and NUSAF programmes)
some to be planted in the next season. You find that with reported working to announce invitations for tenders well
most [hybrid] seed… the farmer is not enabled to create an in advance, but these timelines were not always adequate
environment where he can stand and sustain himself… So the to inform companies’ seed production decisions. NGO
farmer is forced to look back to us or to look back to the orders were typically said to be even less predictable.
market to the seed producer…. [A hybrid] promotes the seed Furthermore, the tendering process meant seed compan-
industry but not the farmer. ies had no guarantees to win a purchase order. Several
Donovan et al. 43

government and NGO programmes had adopted pre- market-leading company praised the splitting up of pur-
qualification processes and multi-year framework contracts chase orders as a way to avoid any one company ‘monop-
with seed companies, which added some certainty. olizing the business’, a smaller seed company with little
However, these tools primarily benefitted NGO and govern- share in these programmes said that with government pro-
ment actors by increasing confidence in seed companies’ grammes, ‘It’s luck, very big luck’. A mid-sized company
quality control and production capacity, rather than added representative emphasized that they have no idea how
certainty for seed companies concerning demand. tonnage is allocated among companies for programmes
Government programme representatives said that frame- like OWC.
work contracts, despite specifying quantities to be pur- Because NGO and government programmes published
chased over multiple years, were not always adhered to lists of desired seed products in invitations for tenders,
due to funding variability. Purchase orders could ultimately entry into seed aid markets could be challenging for new
fall up to 25% above or below the level specified in a frame- or smaller-scale seed companies or companies promoting
work contract. Seed companies incurred losses if they new products. Long-operating NGOs and government pro-
resorted to selling carry-over seed as grain when purchase grammes already had a clear idea of which companies they
orders did not come through as expected. want to source from, alleged a small seed company represen-
tative with limited engagement in these programmes: ‘If they
‘Sometimes we are not able to determine whether the orders say they want Longe 5, in their mind, they know which
will actually come through or not. Sometimes you submit [a company. They always have an idea’. Government pro-
bid] and tell [the NGO or government programme], “I can gramme representatives reported prioritizing medium- and
produce fifty metric tons of hybrid”, and boom! They give large-scale seed suppliers due to trust in their production
you twenty. Maybe you can sell twenty, so the other balance, capacity, quality and reliability. This added opaqueness to
now, that is where we … probably look out for other means the procurement process for small or new seed companies.
on how to sell the balance’. (marketing manager, large scale According to seed companies, there was little evidence
company). of ‘crowding out’ of commercial demand due to free or sub-
sidized distributions. One large-scale company that had
As the number of seed companies engaged in seed aid pro- focused heavily on development of retail channels did criti-
grammes increased, one small company reported, certainty cize seed aid programmes’ impacts:
around NGO and government sales eroded. Government
programme representatives did not appear to perceive We have seen that these specific interventions have disrupted
limited predictability of programme demand as a problem both the distribution chain as well as farmer decisions on
– one explained that seed suppliers kept large stocks of how to buy seeds. Farmers were sitting back and waiting for
seed and had ample other channels through which to distrib- the government to come in to get free seeds, so the retail
ute it, so variability in orders was not a concern. sector went to square one. Many shops lost hope and they
A further element of uncertainty in seed aid procurement had to close, they had to divert the business into something
related to limited transparency in purchasing processes. else, and this was really a big problem. Currently we are
Seed companies rarely understood how final procurement seeing a new revival of agrodealer networks which is quite
decisions were made. For most NGOs and government pro- good and necessary for farmers, giving them a choice of
grammes, standards were in place (and typically pre- buying seeds and inputs.
qualification processes) to ensure that prospective seed sup-
pliers were reputable enterprises with adequate production Several companies noted that the ACDP voucher pro-
capacity and quality control systems. Beyond that, the gramme had increased farmers’ seed choices without dis-
primary criterion for evaluation of seed company bids rupting commercial channels as much as direct seed aid.
was typically price. This was particularly true for smaller ACDP allowed seed companies to set their preferred
procurements and NGOs with strict budget constraints, prices and required co-funding by farmers, reducing the
which incentivized cheap seed production rather than rigor- likelihood that farmers would resell free or highly subsi-
ous quality control. One market-leading seed company dized seed. However, one mid-sized seed company
reported that the focus on price has been a big issue in expressed a preference for direct procurement over the
some programmes: ‘For the NGOs, they count the voucher system, as ACDP strained their capacity by requir-
numbers. They may take the cheapest supplier but then ing their direct involvement in decentralized distribution of
they have the issue with quality, purity’. Only for ACDP seed. The numerous flaws in ACDP’s rollout also generated
did seed companies report freely setting their desired prices. widespread criticism and had contributed to the withdrawal
For larger procurements (notably government pro- of many companies from the programme. Still, the voucher
grammes), price was the primary consideration following model attracted much praise from seed suppliers.
verification of supplier capacity. Ultimately, however, NGO and government programme representatives
large government programmes’ purchase orders were appeared to have limited awareness of the seed retail
often split among qualifying companies to improve the like- sector in areas where seed aid systems operated, but
lihood of timely delivery. This meant that the final purchase reported that the commercial sector did not adequately
orders issued to seed suppliers were dependent on the size serve seed aid programmes’ target beneficiaries. For
and nature of other purchase orders issued. While one instance, one NGO representative said they were generally
44 Outlook on Agriculture 53(1)

aware of commercial operations in their target regions but we don’t do it, our competition will do it, then we are out of
did not feel they infringe upon these: ‘[Agrodealer business’.
outlets] are only established in those big towns, and… our
farmers are deep in the villages, to the extent that accessing When asked how companies balanced involvement in
towns is quite hard. That’s why at least we tend to give them NGO and government programmes with retail opera-
the seed or they go to the local markets’. Many NGO and tions, some were quick to emphasize their prioritization
government programme representatives pointed out that of retail channels – if not in terms of actual seed
their seed distributions are particularly important for vulner- allocations, then in terms of company strategy.
able community members like those in female-headed However, other companies appeared to have dedicated
households with limited mobility. little attention to retail channels to date. For instance,
Rather than feeling ‘crowded out’ by seed aid, most one small-scale company representative emphasized
companies were pleased with the brand awareness gener- that balancing retail and seed aid programme participa-
ated through their engagement with NGO and government tion was not a consideration:
programmes. Seed aid packages in Uganda were legally
required to include company branding and product informa- ‘It’s just the packaging [that changes] – when we produce seed,
tion. Several companies offered examples of cases where we don’t care that it went to government or what… we can
new products were rapidly picked up or where the pack almost 90% of [what’s produced] in small packs if the
company entered a new market through seed aid pro- demand is there. We can also pack in big packs if the
grammes. ‘I know we had incidences of supplies going to demand is there’.
NAADS and the farmers were so happy because germin-
ation was high and products performed well, so the [subsi- A large-scale company representative said that NGO and
dised] packs sparked some sales within the regions’, government sales were enabling them to invest more in
reflected a market-leading company representative. A retail channels:
medium-sized seed company listed numerous districts that
they had been able to reach thanks to collaboration with The seed business, especially for you to perfect your distribution
NAADS, beyond their retail operations: network, it calls for a lot of investment. So our whole main idea
is to build and grow with the primary off-takers [seed aid pro-
grammes] that we look forward to; we take advantage of what
‘You find they cover beyond where we could not have reached.
is available to give us revenue. So it may look as though we
So you find that if government has given you an order, and
much interested in dealing with NGOs and government, but
even they pay you to transport your product all the away to
that is only to leverage to help us build this other [retail] side.
Ishaka, where you probably wouldn’t have reached by your
own financial capacity’.
Seed demand from NGO and government programmes
had long been variable, but in 2022, Ugandan seed aid pro-
The same company reported reaching several remote dis- grammes were at a turning point. The NUSAF 3 project
tricts through NGO partners as well, and a clear instance ended, direct procurement by NAADS scaled back as
of demand creation. ‘We went to [two remote] areas MAAIF shifted focus to voucher systems and decentralized
through an NGO’, said their representative. ‘They invited procurement via the PDM programme, and many relief and
us to exhibit in their farmers’ show they had. We went development NGOs appeared to be shifting away from
and participated, spread our product, and we have been direct procurement – often towards seed demonstrations,
taking farmers’ calls direct, saying they want supplies, indi- local seed enterprise development and Quality Declared
vidually’. This was not an uncommon story among seed Seed. Seed companies’ dependence on bulk purchasing
companies. thus appeared increasingly risky. In response to these
A more worrying impact on the commercial sector changes, most seed companies were increasing their focus
related to the effect seed aid programmes have had on on retail. However, seed company comments and farmer
seed companies’ distribution strategies – notably their pri- complaints about variable seed availability at agrodealers
oritization of sales to NGO and government programmes indicated that development of a healthy commercial seed
despite aid programmes’ unpredictable budgets and shifting sector may have been hampered by long-term prioritization
approaches. Several companies interviewed made it clear of seed aid programmes.
that NGO and government programmes’ bulk purchases
came first, and remaining stock was distributed through
retail channels. The draw of NGO and government procure- Discussion
ment options was irresistible, even for more established The findings presented here provide insights into the
companies. potential for seed aid programmes to support Uganda’s
maize seed system development, including growth of
‘We are entirely focusing on the little markets. Having said the commercial seed sector, varietal turnover and equit-
that, yes, you may focus on the little markets, but if there is able seed access. We now reflect on how seed aid pro-
an opportunity to make a sale to an NGO, government entity grammes operated in relation to these seed system
or other well-wisher, it becomes sensible for us to do it. If development objectives.
Donovan et al. 45

Beneficiary targeting seed companies, as well as product selection processes

deliberately oriented towards turnover. Neither of those
Supporting commercial seed operations and improving the
conditions appeared present in Ugandan seed aid pro-
equity of seed access in Uganda both depend on effective
grammes. Seed procurement processes were highly transac-
beneficiary targeting, which should ensure that seed aid
tional, with neither seed suppliers nor NGO or government
and subsidy programmes reach under-served populations
buyers invested in the product selection process. In most
with minimal disruption to retail operations. While several
cases, although NGO and government programmes pub-
NGO programmes and one government agency reported
lished product lists for procurement, seed suppliers could
intentional targeting of vulnerable regions and communi-
propose substitutes. However, seed companies rarely
ties, there was minimal evidence of targeting vulnerable
opted to push new products.
individuals within those communities – i.e., women and
While most seed aid programmes implemented a
the poorest farmers. In the few cases of deliberate house-
demand-driven seed procurement process, there is a clear
hold targeting, this process was delegated to local govern-
trade-off between this approach and varietal turnover
ment, NGO actors or participatory wealth ranking
goals. Very likely, product selection procedures and pol-
approaches, all of which allow for flexibility as well as pos-
icies need to be revisited to assess if and how varietal turn-
sible co-optation. Only ACDP appeared to have clear eligi-
over goals might be balanced with existing demand-driven
bility criteria in place for subsidy recipients, although a
approaches, ensuring farmers’ needs and priorities are met
programme representative stated that those screening cri-
while allowing promising new varieties to enter the
teria were largely unenforceable.
market. ‘Demand-driven’ varietal selection in the pro-
None of the NGO and government programmes showed
grammes examined here evidently involved more discus-
much understanding of commercial seed operations in their
sions between local agricultural officers and NARO staff
target areas, especially not an understanding grounded in
than direct engagement with farmers – however, farmers’
any deliberate assessment of retail sector capacity. Seed
limited knowledge of varieties means their engagement
companies also did not see NGO and government pro-
would not be likely to contribute to varietal turnover,
grammes as an explicit means to reach regions and commu-
either. If NARO and local agricultural officers are the ultim-
nities under-served by retail channels. Still, reaching
ate decision-makers, there is need to ensure that these indi-
under-reached populations appeared to be an incidental
viduals are attuned to challenges of varietal turnover and
benefit for seed companies, as NGOs in particular provided
clear about new varieties’ potential benefits. The latter
last-mile delivery to remote locations. Many seed compan-
would require varietal performance data to be more
ies were able to point to explicit instances of demand cre-
readily and publicly available than it typically is.
ation (‘crowding in’) through participation in NGO and
government programmes. Few complained about ‘crowd-
ing out’ of demand, in contrast to much prior research on
input subsidy programmes (Jayne et al., 2013; Mather and
Jayne, 2018; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2013; Takeshima and Enabling conditions for seed industry growth
Nkonya, 2014; Xu et al., 2009). It is unclear to what
The results also suggested that procurement processes,
extent this was simply because strong retail channels that
despite recent improvements, still present obstacles to
might be disrupted by seed aid were not present in
seed companies. The late release of tender invitations
Uganda in the first place.
does not typically allow seed companies to plan production
Most worrying were the targeting practices for
in advance, and issuance of purchase orders remains some-
large-scale government seed distributions through
what unpredictable. Both factors leave seed suppliers at
NAADS, which appeared to be motivated primarily by
heightened risk of carry-overs. However, as both govern-
the objective of reaching as many farmers as possible.
ment and NGO players appear to be moving away from
Instead, in the clearest sign that these distributions are poli-
direct procurement and distribution models, greater focus
ticized, a portion of OWC seed was openly diverted to local
should be on public-private collaboration in the develop-
members of parliament for distribution. In none of the NGO
ment of new models, including voucher programmes and
and government programmes were deliberate targeting
the PDM approach, to support seed business development.
practices implemented to ensure that seed aid and subsidy
Experiences with ACDP’s e-voucher programme
programmes complemented rather than undermined the
provide important lessons. Seed companies appreciated
seed retail sector and expanded equitable access to
that the e-voucher approach allowed them to set their own
improved seed. Thus, the possibility of inadequately tar-
prices and left seed choices in the hands of farmers,
geted seed aid ‘crowding out’ emerging commercial opera-
although digital literacy constraints meant that farmers’
tions persists.
choices were not always honoured. Decentralized distribu-
tions for the e-voucher programme proved a burden for
many seed suppliers, especially smaller companies.
Product selection Identifying ways to facilitate the involvement of smaller
Ensuring that NGO and government seed aid programmes enterprises in voucher programmes is of critical interest
support varietal turnover goals requires some degree of but requires acknowledgement by NGO and government
cooperation and collaboration between these actors and programmes that seed business development matters.
46 Outlook on Agriculture 53(1)

Public-private collaboration crop breeding and seed systems development to support

increased social inclusion. The use of digital communica-
All the above concerns – the need for complementary bene-
tion systems has the potential to improve targeting, as
ficiary targeting, more intentional product selection, and the
well as coordination among the key players (e.g., seed com-
improved functioning of procurement and distribution pro-
panies, agrodealers and government agencies). Careful
cesses to support seed companies’ growth – can and should
monitoring of the effects of seed aid on the performance
be addressed through increased collaboration between seed
of seed businesses should be considered. Seed aid can con-
companies and NGO and government seed aid pro-
tribute positively to local seed business development when
grammes, CGIAR and NARES breeding programs, as
the seed aid purchases are time bound and designed to
well as government agricultural extension programs. The
support brand recognition for newly launched products,
interviews conducted for this study indicate that this
when purchases are planned with sufficient lead time to
cooperation has been lacking.
allow companies flexibility to meet the demands of seed
The seed aid programmes were principally motivated by
aid programmes and commercial clients, and when seed
objectives unrelated to seed systems development, so were
aid is complemented with other types of support designed
typically designed without input from the wider seed sector
to build capacities for seed production and marketing.
and implemented without attention to seed systems devel-
opment goals. The Uganda Seed Trade Association
Acknowledgements
learned about the PDM programme through a press
release, their representative shared. They and their The authors extend their gratitude to the research participants who
members were left scrambling to understand how seed sup- offered time and insights, and to Godfrey Asea (Director
NaCRRI), Daniel Kwemoi Bomet, Wilber Wambi, Joab
pliers fit into the new approach. One government pro-
Murungi and Abraham Kibirige for their contributions to the
gramme representative admitted, ‘Every year we review study design and execution. They are also grateful to the funders
what happened in each season, and we also support those who supported this work, including the Bill & Melinda Gates
[seed suppliers] who had challenges in receiving money Foundation, UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development
so we follow up, and then we plan for the next season Office, United States Agency for International Development
about what should we do better. But I think it’s the first (USAID), Foundation for Food and Agricultural Research
time as a project we were really engaging with private (FFAR), and CGIAR Initiative Seed Equal. For a full list of
sector’. CGIAR Fund Donors please see: http://www.cgiar.org/about-us/
This lack of historic coordination has meant that seed our-funders/. The perspectives shared in this paper are those of
companies have had to repeatedly adapt to work within pro- the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their institu-
gramme structures that are designed without their own tions or funders.
needs and constraints in mind; there have been few oppor-
tunities for seed companies to engage directly with these Declaration of conflicting interests
programmes to discuss challenges, complementarities and The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
shared objectives. Greater collaboration will be critical to respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
improved linkages between these programmes and seed article.
system development objectives.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support
Conclusions for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article:
This work was carried out in the framework of the Accelerating
In this study, we explored the design and implementation of Genetic Gains project, which is supported by Bill & Melinda
maize seed aid programmes in non-relief situations and the Gates Foundation (grant number INV-003439, INV-018951), UK
implications of these programmes for development of Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, United States
formal maize seed systems. The results showed that seed Agency for International Development (USAID), Foundation for
aid programmes had no deliberate focus on varietal turnover Food and Agricultural Research (FFAR), and CGIAR Initiative
and minimal attention to social inclusion – two factors Seed Equal. For a full list of CGIAR Fund Donors please see:
required for future maize seed systems development. http://www.cgiar.org/about-us/our-funders/. The perspectives
Limited coordination between public, private and civil shared in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily
sector actors instead appeared to constrain the potential reflect the views of their institutions or funders. CGIAR Initiative
‘social goods’ generated through these efforts. Seed Equal, BMGF.
Improved coordination in aid recipient targeting, product
selection and seed business engagement will be essential to ORCID iDs
improve the outcomes of interventions in both seed aid and Jason Donovan https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7733-7451
seed systems development in Uganda. Farmers and exten- Pieter Rutsaert https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9691-6088
sion agents will require more information on the seed pro-
ducts available and their performance across different Data availability
agroclimatic zones. Innovation in the targeting of seed aid Original qualitative data for this study can be supplied upon
will be critical for seed aid to deliver on the larger develop- request, but have not been made publicly available in the interest
ment goals upon which seed aid is justified, as well as for of protecting research participants’ identities.
Donovan et al. 47

Note AgriGender Journal of Gender, Agriculture and Food Security

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