Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 6, pp.

1045–1060, 2004

The ambivalence of
post-development: between
reactionary populism and radical
democracy
ARAM ZIAI

ABSTRACT The post-development critique of development discourse has by now

been widely discussed and criticised. Post-development texts have been inter-
preted as a cynical legitimation of neoliberalism or a futile romanticisation of
premodern times; more sympathetic critics have at least acknowledged its
potential to criticise the shortcomings of development theory and policy. There
is, however, widespread agreement on the assumptions that post-development
can be seen as a Foucaultian critique of development and that it forms a sort
of theoretical school. This article is concerned with challenging these assump-
tions by showing that 1) post-development only employs (if at all) a rather
impoverished version of Foucault’s discourse analysis; 2) there are in fact two
variants to be found under the heading post-development—a sceptical and a
neo-populist one—and most of the criticisms are only valid for the latter.
Whereas neo-populist post-development has reactionary political consequences,
sceptical post-development uses elements of postmodern and post-Marxist theory
and can best be described as a manifesto of radical democracy in the field of
development studies. For scholars interested in emancipation, the point is to
identify the crucial differences between post-development sliding into (sometimes
reactionary) neo-populism and post-development converging with theories of
radical democracy.

The post-development school of development theory bluntly rejects ‘develop-

ment’ simultaneously as a eurocentric discourse, an imperialist project and a
meaningless concept. It argues for alternatives to development, usually in the
form of communities combining elements of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ culture,
regaining control in the fields of politics, economics and knowledge in oppo-
sition to the state, global capitalism and science and thus finding ‘alternatives to
development’. In the past decade the school has been widely discussed and
criticised. Despite the differences between the critics, there seems to be wide-
spread agreement on the assumption that post-development is to be interpreted
as a Foucaultian critique of development, as well as on certain ‘standard

Aram Ziai teaches at the University of Aachen and can be contacted at Aretzstrasse 53, 52070 Aachen,
Germany. Email: [email protected].

ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/04/061045-16  2004 Third World Quarterly

DOI: 10.1080/0143659042000256887 1045
 ARAM ZIAI

criticisms’ of the post-development school. The article proceeds as follows: after

defining post-development it examines how far this can be seen as a Foucaultian
critique of development. Next the standard criticisms of the post-development
school are described and evaluated. This procedure leads us to distinguish two
variants of post-development: sceptical and neo-populist. The final sections are
concerned with investigating the dangers of reactionary populism in neo-populist
post-development and the convergence between the sceptical variant and radical
democracy.

Post-development…
To begin with it might be best to define the subject matter: what exactly are we
referring to by using the term ‘post-development’? There are two explicit
definitions by self-proclaimed post-development protagonists. Whereas one of
these is so vague as to be rather unhelpful—post-development texts are de-
scribed as ‘subversive’, ‘people-centered’ and ‘radical’ (Rahnema, 1997a: xif)—
the other seems more precise. Escobar (1995: 215) describes the hallmarks of
post-development as follows:
• an interest not in development alternatives but in alternatives to development,
thus a rejection of the entire paradigm;
• an interest in local culture and knowledge;
• a critical stance towards established scientific discourses;
• the defence and promotion of localised, pluralistic grassroots movements.
(Escobar, 1995: 215)
Taking this definition seriously, the scope of post-development has to be
widened beyond those writers generally subsumed under this heading (Esteva,
Escobar, Sachs, Rahnema, sometimes Rist), to include the works of Nandy
(1988; 1992), Alvares (1992), the United Nations University studies edited by
Apffel-Marglin & Marglin (1990; 1996), and maybe even DuBois (1991) and
Ferguson (1994). Common to these texts is that they criticise development
simultaneously as a eurocentric discourse, an at least partly imperialist project,
and (often) a meaningless concept.

…a Foucaultian critique of development?

The post-development texts are usually associated with the concepts of Michel
Foucault thanks to their frequent use of the terms and concepts of Foucaults ‘tool
box’: ‘archaeology of development’ (Esteva, 1985: 79; 1987: 136, 144; Sachs,
1999, part I), ‘knowledge as power’ (Sachs, 1992a), ‘autonomous production of
truth’ (Esteva, 1987: 146) and ‘insurrection of subordinated knowledges’ (Es-
teva, 1987: 146). The most obvious example is the nearly ubiquitous concept of
‘discourse’ (Esteva, 1987: 137; 1991: 77ff; Esteva & Prakash, 1998: 8, 116, 166,
192ff; Rahnema, 1992: 168; Rahnema, 1997c: 381), and in the introduction to
the first major post-development publication the critique of ‘development dis-
course’ is given as the main aim (Sachs, 1992b: 4). Further quotes from and
references to Foucault (Esteva, 1987: 146; Rahnema, 1997c: 402) have led to the
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widely shared assumption in the reception of post-development: ‘The largest

intellectual influence on post-development theory is the work of Michel Fou-
cault. Following Foucault, post-development theory sees development as a
discourse’ (Storey, 2000: 40; similar statements can be found in Corbridge,
1998: 138; Kiely, 1999: 31; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000: 176).
This is certainly not plain wrong: ‘development’ is indeed seen as a discourse
in the sense of a historically situated mental and linguistic structure that has been
shaped by certain interests and implicates certain relations of power. Therefore
the way we speak about ‘development’ and the Third World is attributed
considerable significance in post-development (instead of dismissing it as a
superstructural phenomenon of less importance). However, a closer reading of
post-development texts leads to the impression that post-development is in the
same position to the discourse analysis of Foucault as Marxism–Leninism was
to the work of Marx. Contradictions to or deviations from the work of Foucault
can be discerned in the following points.
First, whereas Foucaultian archaeology—in opposition to the history of
ideas—emphasises the breaks, differences and discontinuities, and claims that
the unity of a discourse is constituted by its rules of formation (and not by
common assumptions) (Foucault, 1972), in post-development development dis-
course is portrayed as a monolithic structure (cf Esteva, 1992: 17; Rahmena,
1997b: xiv; Sachs, 1992b: 2ff). The heterogeneity of 40 years of development
theory and policy and especially the originality of alternative approaches
(declaration of Cocoyoc, Dag-Hammarskjøld-Report, etc) is not adequately
taken into account.
Second, a central rhetorical device in post-development is the unmasking of
development’s promise of universal prosperity as a ‘deceitful mirage’ (Rahnema,
1997a: x), or ‘malignant myth’ (Esteva, 1985: 78; 1991: 76). This is achieved by
pointing out the real, ‘true’ nature of development discourse (a eurocentric
construct and a political project for restructuring Third World societies according
to the image or the needs of the West, leading to spiritual and material
impoverishment), sometimes even using rhetoric recalling conspiracy theory:
‘the time has come to unveil the secret of development’ (Esteva, 1992: 6). The
post-development writers thus remain captured within a traditional objectivist
critique of ideology which Foucault explicitly rejected (Foucault, 1980a), in
particular because it uncritically claims to have found ‘truth’ without taking
account of the way its historical and social production and function reflect
structures of power .
Third, essentialisations (especially of ‘development’) are also a frequent
phenomenon in post-development literature. On the one hand, post-development
writers have (as a result of the many redefinitions of development since the
1960s) pointed out the ‘amoeba-like’ character of the concept of development—
its contours are blurred, it is hard to grasp and can be filled with almost any
content (Esteva, 1985: 79; Sachs, 1992b: 4). On the other hand, they maintain,
it can be unambiguously determined (in a very negative way). When Esteva
writes, ‘In saying “development”…most people are saying the opposite of what
they want to convey’ (1992: 6), this has little to do with archaeological discourse
analysis, but rather with linguistic structuralism, which links the concept with a
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 ARAM ZIAI

static, invariable content, and a (hermeneutic or Marxist) theory of false

consciousness, which assumes the people using the concept are ignorant of its
real meaning.

Fourth, despite his lucid analysis, Brigg’s (2002: 424ff) reproach that the
post-development texts were stuck within a sovereign, repressive concept of
power is at best partly accurate: it is frequently pointed out that the idea of
development owes its success to its ability to relate to the interests and desires
of people in the Third World and to create new needs and perspectives (cf
Rahnema, 1997b; 1997a: ix; Esteva, 1992: 6, 11, 18; Sachs, 1999: 5). Rahnema
expresses this view by claiming: ‘The “power” of development…lies in its
internalization by the host’ (1997c: 119). However, the power of development
discourse is merely conceived as disciplinary conditioning with little or no room
for autonomous decisions of individual actors, a point also made by Nustad
(2001: 485). A typical phrase is that the ‘victims of development’ ‘adopt as their
own the heterogeneous definitions of reality imposed upon them by the develop-
ers’ (Esteva, 1991: 75)—the subjects remain passive, and resistance to this
power is perceived (it even constitutes the starting point of post-development),
but cannot be theoretically explained. This weakness is especially visible in
Rahnema’s portrayal of the development idea as a virus infecting and transform-
ing traditional social structures and in his description of the modern system of
education as a mechanism for brainwashing (Rahnema, 1997b: 116ff). While
Nustad is correct in pointing out this weakness and in tracing it back to
Foucault’s conception of power in the mid-1970s (2001: 485; cf Foucault, 1979),
he overlooks the fact that in later works (on governmentality and the relationship
between power and freedom (1982; 1991)) Foucault has overcome this narrow
perspective.
Fifth, the ferocity of these and other comparisons (eg modernisation as Gulag
and Holocaust (Esteva & Prakash, 1998: 2)) draws attention to another point:
some of the post-development texts often engage in demonising industrial
modernity and simultaneously in romanticising premodern subsistence com-
munities. These are not subjected to similarly critical scrutiny, but are presented
as ‘alternatives to development’ and seemingly conceived as spaces untainted by
domination and conflict. In stark contrast to this, Foucault insisted that power
does not simply emanate from the state or international institutions, but is to be
found in everyday, local and self-evident relations and discourses, ie it is
ubiquitous (Foucault, 1980a; 1980b). Therefore the assumption of power-free
spaces must remain an illusion and even leads to the concealment of relations of
power. Apart from this, Foucault explicitly rejected suggesting normative models
and concentrated on an analysis of the power relations implicit in such models.
As a witness to the superiority of subsistence communities he is definitely
unsuitable.
Consequently, the frequent assumption that post-development amounts to a
Foucaultian critique of development has to be rethought. The theoretical merits
are for the most part undeserved. However, criticism of the improper and
somewhat vulgar use of Foucaultian concepts has to be restricted to the authors
quoted (Rahnema, Esteva, in part also Sachs). Other authors like Escobar,
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DuBois and Ferguson base their work on a more thorough reading of Foucault
(although Escobar’s anti-imperialism frequently prevails over nuanced analyses).
Still other writers (eg Marglin, 1996) have never claimed to use Foucaultian
concepts. At this point we get the impression that ‘referring to the post-develop-
ment idea in the singular runs the risk of caricaturing a number of different
writers’ ideas’ (Kiely, 1999: 49). Unfortunately, this is exactly what the standard
criticisms do.

The standard criticisms

Among the diverse commentators on the post-development authors (Corbridge,
1998; Kiely, 1999; Nederveen Pieterse, 1998; 2000; Storey, 2000; Nanda, 1999;
Knippenberg & Schuurmann, 1994; Schuurman, 2000; Eriksson Baaz, 1999;),
the vast majority agrees that the former’s ideas have to be dismissed—Nustad
(2001) and Brigg (2002) are exceptions to this rule. In most cases post-develop-
ment texts have been interpreted as a cynical legitimation of neoliberalism or a
futile romanticisation of premodern times; more sympathetic critics have at least
acknowledged their potential to criticise the shortcomings of development theory
and policy, but argue that post-development offers no constructive alternatives.
According to the first interpretation, there is at the least an affinity between
post-development and neoliberalism (Nederveen Pieterse, 2000: 184): the propo-
nents of neoliberal capitalism would welcome the post-development perspective
because it has said good-bye to the idea of universalising Western standards of
living, because it rejects the idea of development aid, because it relies not on a
strong state, but on ‘civil society’ and the self-help powers of the people, and
because it questions the materialist view of prosperity and, by implication, the
necessity of redistributive policies. Post-development would thus allow the
unhindered expansion of global capitalism while providing some cheap remedy
for those regions irrelevant to the world market for lack of competitiveness,
resources and skilled labour. However, what is overlooked by the critics is that
the creation of alternatives to the world market could, on the other hand, also
function as a threat to neoliberal capitalism and lead to the withdrawal of
urgently needed labour and goods from the world system. The alleged lack of
alternatives to global capitalism after 1989 is the basic premise on which
neoliberal policies are accepted, even by those clearly impoverished or disadvan-
taged by them, and it thus constitutes a central ideological foundation of
neoliberalism.
Other widespread points of criticism which are voiced by nearly all critics are
the following:
1. In post-development there is an uncritical stance towards local communities
and cultural tradition. The post-development texts seem to offer ‘the last
refuge of the noble savage’ (Kiely, 1999), hopelessly idealising life in
premodern communities and projecting romantic images onto the grim reality
in these ‘alternatives to development’.
2. On the other hand, the complete rejection of modernity and development
ignores the numerous positive aspects undoubtedly closely related to them,
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from the rights of the individual to the achievements of modern medicine in

lowering child mortality (Corbridge, 1998: 145).
3. Post-development authors, in their celebration of cultural difference and their
rejection of universalism, conceal or willingly accept the oppression legit-
imised by these notions (Knippenberg & Schuurmann, 1994: 95). Female
genital mutilation is only one among countless examples.
4. Post-development is only another blueprint for the establishment of a better
society which is based on reversed, anti-Western values and practices, but
still tells people how they ought to live and is thus as authoritarian as the
concept of development itself (Cowen & Shenton, 1996: 457ff, 470).
5. Almost the opposite reproach is articulated by other commentators: although
post-development may be useful in attacking mainstream development theory
and policy, there is merely ‘critique but no construction’ (Nederveen Pieterse,
1998: 366; 2000: 188), the post-development proponents refuse to lay out
alternative methods of social change.1 In restricting themselves to promoting
whatever alternatives are favoured by the social movements and grassroots
organisations in question, they fall back on some kind of ‘Pontius-Pilate
politics’ (Kiely, 1999: 45ff).
Summing up the first four points of the critics, one gets the impression that
post-development neatly fits Hettne’s description of neo-populism:
Traditional populism was essentially a defence of the territorial community against
the functional system created by modern economic growth, both in its original
capitalist form and in its derivative socialist form. Neo-populism, similarly, is an
attempt to re-create community as an offensive against the industrial system…It
negates mainstream development and in this negation lies the essence of the
Utopian vision, historically expressed by the counterpoint tradition in Western
politics, as well as in resistance against the imposition of the non-indigenous nation
state on the peoples of the non-European world…Neo-populism resembles classical
populism in several respects: the urge for community, the stress on primary
production, the distaste of industrial civilization. However, there are significant new
elements of relevance in this context: an environmental consciousness, encompass-
ing the global ecological system, and a strong commitment to a just world order.
(Hettne, 1995: 117f)
However, a closer look reveals that this description is only partially accurate.

Evaluating the criticisms

None of the criticisms mentioned is entirely unfounded, neither is the charge of
neo-populism. Nevertheless, it is possible to find examples indicating that not all
the post-development writers are justifiably attacked—and, in some texts, while
certain examples support the criticisms, others contradict them (for a detailed
discussion of post-development and its critics, see Ziai 2004).

Uncritical stance towards local communitities and cultural tradition

Although it is true that many post-development authors are overly enthusiastic
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 THE AMBIVALENCE OF POST-DEVELOPMENT

about their ‘local alternatives and traditions’, some maintain a more nuanced
view: in discussing the communities and movements in question, Escobar
explicitly rejects the assumption of pure vernacular societies free of domination
(1995: 188, 219) and emphasises the need to avoid both extremes: ‘to embrace
them uncritically as alternatives; or to dismiss them as romantic expositions’
(p 170). Nandy and Marglin also point to the fact that, in many cultural
traditions, women and children are subjected to humiliating and violent practices
(Marglin, 1990: 12; Nandy, 1992: 63). (However, this should not be a pretext for
dismissing the whole culture and forgetting the victims of modern societies.) But
even writers who certainly do romanticise local communities and tradition on
occasion admit that deprivation, domination and violence exist in these ‘vernacu-
lar societies’ (Rahnema, 1997b: 114) and that the return to a ‘state of nature’ is
‘neither desirable nor feasible’ (Rahnema, 1997c: 381).

Complete rejection of modernity and development

The fundamental critique of ‘development’ does not necessarily lead to the
assumption that all the evils in the world are merely the result of development
(Rist, 1997: 3). The possibility, or even the necessity and desirability, of
scavenging positive elements of modernity from the ruins of development, is
emphasised by some post-development authors. Rist characterises the post-de-
velopment essentials as follows: ‘The idea, then, in spite of “development”, is to
organize and invent new ways of life—between modernization, with its suffer-
ings but also some advantages, and a tradition from which people may derive
inspiration while knowing it can never be revived’ (Rist, 1997: 244) Marglin
agrees that the ‘decolonization of the mind will require a critical re-evaluation
of both Western and non-Western cultures, and the encounter between them’
(Marglin, 1990: 26; see also Nandy, 1988: 11). Escobar points to the processes
of cultural hybridisation and mentions that ‘many “traditional cultures” survive
through their transformative engagement with modernity’ (1995: 218). On the
other hand, Escobar also writes that the ‘debt crisis, the Sahelian famine,
increasing poverty, malnutrition and violence are only the most pathetic signs of
the failure of forty years of development’ (1995: 4)—clearly not acknowledging
that these phenomena can be traced back not to development but to its lack, and
that famine, poverty and violence are incidents not alien to premodern societies.2

Cultural difference as potential instrument of oppression, rejection of universal-

ism
Whereas the starting point of post-development seems to be the insistence on
cultural difference in the face of the alleged superiority of the Western model of
development, in some texts there are numerous hints that the implied concept of
culture is not an ontological, but a constructivist one.3 In Escobar’s warning that
‘one must be careful not to naturalize ‘traditional’ worlds, that is, valorize as
innocent and ‘natural’ an order produced by history…The ‘local’…is neither
unconnected nor unconstructed’ (Escobar, 1995: 170), he indicates that ‘local,
traditional culture’ is a construct derived from the actual practices of the
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 ARAM ZIAI

people—and not a rigid set of customs which can be defined by some autocratic
ruler. Escobar emphasises the importance of cultural difference not as a static,
but as a ‘transformed and transformative force’ (p 226). This is in line with
Marglin’s postulate: ‘Tradition is actively constructed and dynamic—except
when it is artificially frozen in an archaic pattern’ (1990: 15).
The significance of a constructivist in opposition to a static concept becomes
clear when we examine the potential for oppression. If culture consists of a given
set of rules and practices, deviant behaviour can be punished in the name of
cultural tradition and those who decide on the interpretation of cultural norms
are in a dangerous position of power. In this context, a position of cultural
relativism easily legitimates oppression. If, however, culture is defined in a
constructivist manner as the (changing) practices of a certain group of people,
deviant behaviour is a signal that some practices are apparently no longer
consensual, and the attempt by those in power to punish this behaviour appears
illegitimate from a position of cultural relativism, because those who are
punished belong to the same culture and can be assumed to have a different
opinion on the interpretation of cultural tradition. Thus, the constructivist
concept of culture takes the danger out of cultural relativism.4 Nevertheless, this
rejection of universalism is implicitly based on a universal right to self-determi-
nation: people living together should be able to decide on the norms of their
community without outsiders intervening in the name of universal principles.
Therefore Schuurman’s fierce reaction to the questioning of the universality of
the Western model of society in post-development is inappropriate. This ques-
tioning does not arise from ‘indifference’ towards and ‘contempt for the poor in
the South’ (Knippenberg & Schuurman, 1994: 96; cf Schuurman, 2000: 15), but
from respect towards culturally different world-views, in which Western con-
sumer society is not seen as the ultimate goal, and from the insight that Western
standards of consumption are highly oligarchic and cannot be generalised.5

Another blueprint for a better society

At least to some of the post-development authors it is clear that, if the
post-development principles are to be taken seriously, if no outside expert can
legitimately define the goal according to which social change is evaluated within
a certain culture, then of course people also have the right to pursue Western-
style development. Banuri admits: ‘this may entail a prior emphasis on such
conventional objectives as economic growth, consumption, industrialization,
equity, or basic needs. On other occasions, other goals may assume greater
importance, such as political participation, social harmony, ecological conser-
vation, or the maintenance of social and cultural values. It is not for the outside
expert to insist that the goals which he or she thinks worth pursuing are the ones
which should be pursued by all societies’ (Banuri, 1990: 96). Marglin also
emphasises this point: ‘Whatever one’s reservations may be about the necessity
or utility of radios, televisions, motorcycles, and the like, the division between
the necessary, the merely useful, and the wastefully luxurious is not ours to
make; it is not our place to argue the virtues of simplicity and abstinence to those
for whom material abundance is a distant dream’ (Marglin, 1990: 27). Esteva
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 THE AMBIVALENCE OF POST-DEVELOPMENT

illustrates the paradoxical position that some writers explicitly reject prescribing
universal models while promoting one particular model as a cure for all ills. On
the one hand, all attempts to educate others or formulate blueprints and universal
solutions are rejected (Esteva, 1987: 141; Esteva & Prakash, 1998: 8, 36), on the
other hand, the complete rejection of modernisation, the notion of universal
human rights and the individual notion of the self, nation-states, modern
technologies, the global economy, etc does seem to lead to a universal blueprint
of local subsistence communities.

Critique but no construction

Consequently, the opposite criticism, that post-development does not present any
blueprints for social change, is incorrect in some cases but cannot be denied in
others. Post-development often does present alternatives to development in the
form of communal solidarity, direct democracy, informal economy, traditional
knowledge, and so on. Admittedly, little thought is given to how development
institutions could contribute to the flourishing of these alternatives, but to expect
that from post-development would certainly go too far. The failure to present
alternatives in other cases appears less as a flaw but as a merit in the view taken
here. If the authoritarian and ethnocentric elements of development theory and
policy are to be avoided, it is impossible to define ‘development’ in normative
terms (as the state of a ‘good society’ or the process approaching this state). This
definition can only legitimately be reached by the people concerned through a
democratic discussion leading ideally to a consensus.

Sceptical and neo-populist post-development

If it seems easy to disprove the majority of the criticisms by citing examples
from some writers, this does not mean that these criticisms were utterly
unjustified, rather, it seems that under the heading ‘post-development’, certain
significant differences exist between—and within—the texts. A systematic
examination of these differences shows that post-development is divided on four
specific points which correlate to the first four points of criticism.
1. While post-development sometimes engages in unhelpful romanticisation of
traditional culture and local communities, on other occasions it is more
sceptical and does not promote them uncritically.
2. While development and modernity are sometimes rejected in toto, on other
occasions post-development finds some positive elements that can be of use
in the age after the development era.
3. While some texts see cultures as static and rigid, others promote a construc-
tivist perspective which sees culture as unstable and changing in its practice.
4. While sometimes the return to subsistence agriculture is preached, sometimes
post-development writers explicitly avoid doing this and reject the idea of
formulating blueprints for a better society.
The important point is that these differences do not occur according to some
random pattern: it appears that there are two conflicting discourses to be found
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 ARAM ZIAI

within post-development. On the one hand a discourse which romanticises

traditional culture, portraying cultures as static and rigid, is based on a complete
rejection of modernity and promotes the return to subsistence agriculture. On the
other hand, a discourse which is more sceptical in evaluating local communities
and cultural tradition, more cautious in criticising modernity, employs a con-
structivist perspective on culture and avoids sketching models of future transfor-
mations of society. These discourses can be termed the neo-populist and the
sceptical variant of post-development. In almost all post-development texts, one
can find these conflicting discourses.6
This division matches Hoogvelt’s separation between post- and anti-develop-
ment: ‘Postdevelopment theory and practice is different from anti-development
sentiments in that it does not deny globalization or modernity, but wants to find
some ways of living with it and imaginatively transcending it’ (Hoogvelt, 2001:
172).7 The critics of post-development have so far focused mainly on the
neo-populist variant, and have more-or-less ignored the sceptical elements within
the school. The sceptical post-development discourse, the view put forward in
this article, is based on an implied metatheory which can be loosely described
as postmodern. This assertion is based on the definitions (or rather descriptions)
of postmodernism by Rosenau8 and Lyotard9 and in addition on the following
points: the impossibility of ascribing any characteristics to ‘development’,
‘modernity’, ‘traditional culture’, etc (which is found, for example, in the
characterisation of development as an ‘amoeba word’) and the constructivist and
anti-essentialist perspective which regards culture as something which is actively
constructed. The unwillingness to define ‘development’ in a normative sense is
typical of the postmodern rejection of the principle of representation, the
principle of ‘speaking for others’. The consequence of adopting this perspective
is, however, rarely reflected upon in post-development literature: it becomes
impossible to reject ‘development’, because the signifier cannot be fixed to a
specific signified. Focusing on one of the prominent post-development writers,
Crush correctly remarks: ‘Thus, in the very call for banishment, Sachs implicitly
suggests that it is possible to arrive at an unequivocal definition [of develop-
ment]’ (1995: 3). Nederveen Pieterse extends this critique to dismiss the entire
post-development perspective: ‘Apparently this kind of essentializing of
“development” is necessary in order to arrive at the radical repudiation of
development, and without this anti-development pathos, the post-development
perspective loses its foundation’ (2000: 183). The first part of the statement can
be readily agreed with, but it is possible to find a post-development perspective
in the sceptical texts which is based on the radical repudiation of the concept of
development without necessarily condemning everything that has been given the
name of development. The aim of this perspective is to ‘transfer the power of
defining the problems and goals of a society from the hands of outside experts
to the members of the society itself’ (Banuri, 1990: 96)—first of all by rejecting
the dominant view of certain societies as ‘underdeveloped’ and in need of
‘development’. Here, the consequence of the line of argument becomes visible:
if a critique of the eurocentrism and cultural imperialism of ‘development’ is
combined with a constructivist and anti-essentialist perspective, it will inevitably
lead to the radical democratic position prominent in the sceptical post-develop-
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ment discourse.10 If the cultural critique is linked with a static conception of

culture, it will lead to a conservative or reactionary anti-modern position.

Post-development as a programme of reactionary populism

The political implications of a merely anti-modern position become especially
clear in the works of Alvares and Rahnema. Rahnema describes the idea of
development as a virus undermining the people’s immune system—their tra-
ditional culture (Rahnema, 1997a). Thus the culture of the people is conceived
as static, and its change as a result of contact with Western modernity is seen
as a strange illness, a deviation from its healthy original state. In other words,
culture is something independent of people’s actual preferences and practices.
This has the dangerous implication that certain people (who claim superior
knowledge about their culture) may try to stop the ‘disease’ of cultural change
by violent means—beating up women wearing make-up, for example. From an
emancipatory point of view, however, there is nothing regrettable about the
‘decay of cultural diversity’ bemoaned by Rahnema or Esteva; opposition is
appropriate only if people are forced to adopt or give up certain cultural
practices. The neo-populist view, however, maintains that the people’s opinion
should not be ultimately relevant, because the poor have ‘internalized the
developers’ perception of what they need’ (Rahnema, 1997c: 389). Therefore
‘the good of the community’ should be entrusted to certain leaders, ‘the wisest,
most virtuous and hence the most “authoritative” and experienced persons of the
groups—those who commanded everyone’s respect and deference’ (1997d: 388).
Thus the radical demand for autonomy ends in dismissing (not only liberal, but
even direct) democracy and celebrating the model of enlightened authoritarian-
ism.11
Similarly, Alvares’ critique of the Western model of development seems at
least partly based on the reproach that it is an ‘alien model of development’
(Alvares, 1992: 34), that is, one that comes from a different culture and is
therefore incompatible with people’s traditional culture, or rather with a static,
reified conception of their culture. The eagerness to defend this conception leads
to the statement: ‘Our continuing xenophilia compels us to export our best
genetic resources at zero cost to economies abroad while simultaneously import-
ing less than the very best and often, mostly questionable and inappropriate
sources of productivity from abroad’ (p 54). This sort of identity thinking
regards peoples as unrelated entities sharing genetic resources and being in
competition with one another; it amounts to nationalism with racist undertones.
After this statement, it hardly comes as a surprise that Ayatollah Khomeini is
portrayed as a liberator of Islamic civilisation from Western culture (p 149).
Especially from the point of view of the women’s movement, whose consider-
able achievements in Iran have been crushed by the Islamic revolution, this
reference can be seen as a definite negation of progressive values.
As Meera Nanda (1999) illustrates with reference to India, the political
dangers of post-development are very real. Because it emphasises the problem
of cultural authenticity and largely ignores domination within cultures, Nanda
claims, post-development ‘has come to serve as a mobilizing ideology for the
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relatively well-to-do rural beneficiaries of development…without intending to,

the postmodern-influenced critiques of modern science and modernization are
laying the foundations of a neo-populist movement that seeks to subordinate
modernization to the anti-modernist and patriarchal values of the traditional
elites’ (Nanda, 1999: 6).

Post-development as a project of radical democracy

On the other hand, sceptical post-development can be interpreted not as a
neo-populist nor as a neoliberal project, but as a project of radical democracy in
the sense used by Lummis (1996) and Laclau & Mouffe (2001). The criticisms
and demands of sceptical post-development are quite in line with those of radical
democracy, as is demonstrated below.
According to Laclau and Mouffe, many social antagonisms cannot be recon-
ceptualised in terms of Marxist categories (2001: ix). The Marxist critique of
capitalism is seen as important, but other relations of oppression and exploitation
(eg in the fields of gender relations, culture and knowledge or ecology) are as
significant. Post-development texts wholeheartedly agree, but usually focus on
the fields of culture, knowledge and the relationship to nature—gender and the
relations of oppression associated with it are something of a blind spot in
post-development.12 Escobar, for example, acknowledges the importance of
global processes of capital accumulation, but emphasises other relations of
power in the Third World—‘new forms of domination and subjection (concern-
ing areas such as education, demography, housing, psychiatry, cultural values,
ethnic oppression, etc)’ (Escobar, 1985: 393)—that can not be reduced to their
function in this process (p 389).
The existing democratic structures are seen as inadequate, as curtailing the
right of self-determination and not democratic enough. Laclau and Mouffe
describe their project of ‘radical and plural democracy’ as the ‘extension of the
democratic struggles for equality and liberty to a wide range of social relations’
(2001: xv). Likewise, post-development tries to extend struggles for self-deter-
mination in the South to seemingly benign efforts aiming at ‘development’ and
in general to various structures of modern societies (state, market, science). The
political system of representative democracy is seen as primarily serving the
interests of an elite (‘In modern democracies, a small minority decides for the
people…A minimal minority promulgates the laws and makes the important
decisions. Alternance in power between competing parties or “democratic
counterweights” does not modify that fact’ (Esteva & Prakash, 1998: 156)), but
generally accepted as an ‘umbrella’ under which the odds of social movements’
struggles for autonomy are far better than under a dictatorship (Esteva, 1987:
139; Esteva & Prakash, 1998: 153).
Consequently, existing power structures have to be radically decentralised,
power has to remain at the local level. In the words of Lummis: ‘democracy is
a critique of centralized power of every sort’ (1996: 25). This implies a critique
of the system of political representation but is not limited to polity and politics:
epistemological and economic structures also come into the picture (Laclau &
Mouffe, 2001: 178, 184; Lummis, 1996: 18, 25, 135). Banuri agrees: ‘a vision
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of the future in the Third World must explicitly be one of a decentralized polity,
economy, and society. In addition to the obvious forms of political and economic
decentralization, there is also a need for what may be termed epistemological
decentralization’ (1990: 97ff; on political and economic decentralisation see also
Esteva, 1991: 78; Esteva & Prakash, 1998: 37ff, 103, 152ff). This decentralis-
ation of epistemological structures includes a challenge to the notion of univer-
sal, ‘objective’ knowledge (Banuri, 1990: 97; Apffel-Marglin, 1996: 1).13
Therefore, it is not only the principle of political representation that is challenged
by the radical democratic/post-development critique, but also the principle of
epistemological representation: ‘The ability to represent the world conceptually
and symbolically enables the disengaged observer to manipulate that world’
(Apffel-Marglin, 1996: 12).
In opposition to most variants of Marxism, any philosophy of history and any
essentialism leading to objective interests, universal blueprints and thus to new,
knowledge-related structures of domination are to be rejected. Laclau and
Mouffe correctly observe that the interweaving of science and politics must lead
to an authoritarian politics (2001: 60; see also 21ff, 81): ‘there is no radical and
plural democracy without renouncing the discourse of the universal and its
implicit assumption of a privileged point of access to “the truth” ’ (p 191). The
critiques of political and epistemological representation converge in the rejection
of universal models of society and universal descriptions of reality. The
imposition of such models inevitably includes an antidemocratic element, be-
cause it neglects the pluralistic conceptions of a good society or the different
perceptions of reality (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001: 183; Lummis, 1996: 76).
Accordingly, Esteva criticises not only the Marxist category of class—because
‘social classes never existed as such’ and society ‘cannot be reduced to the
economic sphere’ (Esteva, 1987: 146, emphasis in the original)—and its concep-
tion of history—because this privileged knowledge amounts to ‘blind faith’
(p 146), but also and in consequence seeks to ‘give up the idea of educating
others’ and ‘combat all proposals for a common discourse’ (p 141). This
rejection of universal models (which has to be based on a universal right to
self-determination (Lummis, 1996: 138) is just what has led the critics of
post-development to the accusation of ‘Pontius Pilate politics’. So Rist’s state-
ment that ‘respect for cultural diversity…prohibits generalizations. There are
numerous ways of living a “good life”, and it is up to each society to invent its
own’ (Rist, 1997: 241) not only articulates a central tenet of sceptical post-devel-
opment, but also sums up a major argument of the radical democratic perspec-
tive.14
Therefore, sceptical post-development could be seen as a manifesto of radical
democracy in the field of ‘development’ policy and theory. Its main achievement
can be described in the terminology of Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 193) as
follows: it extends social conflictuality to the area of development policy and
development aid through reformulating relations of subordination implicit in
development discourse as relations of oppression. In contrast to earlier theories
of imperialism and dependency, the critique is not restricted to economic issues
but includes the field of culture and knowledge and questions the whole
perception of some countries being ‘developed’ and others less so. If progress is
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 ARAM ZIAI

defined, as in one of the sceptical post-development texts, as ‘growing awareness

of oppression’ (Banuri, 1990: 95ff), this achievement is not an insignificant one.

Conclusion
In treating post-development as a coherent school of theory, many critics have
failed to differentiate between the heterogeneous points of view subsumed under
this name and accordingly to grasp their political implications. Notwithstanding
the sharp critique of the neo-populist variant of post-development, it has to be
said that the trenchant critique of the eurocentrism and power relations implicit
in mainstream (and at least partly also in alternative) development discourse
remains an important achievement. ‘After post-development’ (Nederveen
Pieterse, 2000), development theory is certainly not the same as before. As
Nustad (2001) and Brigg (2002) have shown, post-development can be a
stimulating basis for criticising development theory and practice and thinking
about alternatives. But before celebrating the post-development critique, its
ambivalence has to be taken into account. It is of crucial importance to be aware
of the dangers of reactionary populism on the one hand, while not overlooking
the emancipatory potential of the project of radical democracy in post-develop-
ment on the other.

Notes
1
While Nustad defends post-development theory by pointing out that the ‘lack of instrumentality is not
a weighty argument against the analysis itself’ (2001: 479), he shares the assumption that it does not
present alternatives.
2
Another point is that Escobar here uses the same indicators of development and underdevelopment which
he later convincingly describes as derived from a eurocentric and technocratic development discourse
(‘Development proceeded by creating “abnormalities” (the “illiterate”, “underdeveloped”, “malnourished”)
which it would later treat and reform’ (1995: 41).
3
Given the standard post-develpoment criticism that the concept of development is a construct specific to
Western culture (eg Rist, 1991: 11), anything else would be a serious methodological insoncistency.
4
Of course, the concept of cultural relativism still implies that one has to accept practices in another culture
that are indeed based on a consensus by those affected.
5
Equally inappropriate is Schuurman’s remark that ‘Hunger and high morbidity and mortality rates do not
disappear merely by changing the perspective of the people involved’ (2000: 15). None of the post-de-
velopment writers has ever attributed magic powers to discourse, nor have they denied the existence of
misery in the Third World (eg Escobar, 1985: 389; 1995: 52). What they are emphasising is the need
for a new conceptualisation of misery that is less eurocentric, technocratic and depoliticising than
development discourse. In this vein, ‘changing the order of the discourse is a political question’ (1995:
216), it is part of the struggles of social movements in the Third World against a politics and a world-view
that defines them as culturally inferior.
6
Although, for example, the sceptical discourse is dominant in the work of Nandy and Marglin, relatively
strong in that of Escobar, relatively weak in that of Rahnema, and hardly discernible in that of Alvares.
7
Likewise, Rist also differentiates between post-development and anti-development (1997: 248).
8
‘Postmodernism challenges global, all-encompassing world-views, be they political, religious, or so-
cial…[It] dismisses them all as logocentric, transcendental totalizing meta-narratives that anticipate all
questions and provide predetermined answers. The postmodernist goal is not to formulate an alternative
set of assumptions but to register the impossibility of establishing any such underpinning for knowl-
edge…In the fields of administration and public planning, suspicion of rational organization encourages
a retreat from central planning, a withdrawal of confidence from specialists and experts. In political science
it questions the authority of hierarchical, bureaucratic decision-making structures that function in carefully
defined, non-overlapping fields. In anthropology it inspires the protection of local, primitive cultures and

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opposition to “well-intentioned” First World planned intervention that seeks to modify (reorganize) these
cultures. In philosophy this translates into a renewed respect for the subjective and increased suspicion
of reason and objectivity. Post-modernists in all disciplines reject conventional, academic styles of
discourse; they prefer audacious and provocative styles of delivery’ (Rosenau, 1992: 6ff).
9
Post-development is evidently based on incredulity towards the modern metanarrative of development.
10
One has to bear in mind that the body of texts referred to as sceptical in this paper would not be classified
as sceptical in the terminology of Rosenau (1992: 14ff), but rather as ‘affirmative’. This means that these
texts cling to the possibility of meaningful political action in spite of their insights into the relativity
of norms and knowledge. While the sceptical post-development texts can be described as ‘Activist
affirmative’, the neo-populist texts match Rosenau’s description of ‘New-age-affirmative’ and ‘Third-
world-affirmative’. ‘Activist affirmative’ denotes perspectives emphasising autonomous organisation, direct
democracy, voluntary association and pluralism (p 144ff), while the ‘New-age-affirmative’ view stresses
the spiritual, emotional and irrational aspects of human beings (p 148ff) and the ‘Third-world-affirmative’
standpoint links the rejection of modernity with a return to the purity of traditional culture and
anti-democratic decision making (p 152ff). However, because the neo-populist post-develoment texts often
employ typically modern arguments (universal models, false concsciousness, etc), it seems inappropriate
to equate post-development with postmodernism, as some critics do.
11
From the perspective of cultural relativism, it is of course inappropriate to rule out such models as an
outsider. If all (all – this is the condition posed by the constructivist view of culture) people in a community
favour an authoritarian political system, to prescribe liberal democracy would amount to the same cultural
imperialism that has long been practised by development experts or vanguard parties.
12
Rare exceptions to this rule can be found in Nandy (1992: xvi, 141) and Escobar (1995: 43, 171ff).
13
Apffel-Marglin reminds us that the whole concept of ‘development’ is ‘based on the premise that the
world is objectively knowable, and that the knowledge so obtained can be absolutely generalized’
(Apffel-Marglin, 1996: 1). Only because of this premise can the knowledge of experts be exported
world-wide and applied in varying contexts.
14
Both perspectives thus display a healthy distrust towards any ‘foundational’ knowledge and any ‘foun-
dational’ politics (cf Bauman, 1992).

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