secure-at001_-en-p (1)
secure-at001_-en-p (1)
Automation Products
Activities including installation, adjustments, putting into service, use, assembly, disassembly, and maintenance are required to be carried out by suitably trained
personnel in accordance with applicable code of practice.
If this equipment is used in a manner not specified by the manufacturer, the protection provided by the equipment may be impaired.
In no event will Rockwell Automation, Inc. be responsible or liable for indirect or consequential damages resulting from the use or application of this equipment.
The examples and diagrams in this manual are included solely for illustrative purposes. Because of the many variables and requirements associated with any
particular installation, Rockwell Automation, Inc. cannot assume responsibility or liability for actual use based on the examples and diagrams.
No patent liability is assumed by Rockwell Automation, Inc. with respect to use of information, circuits, equipment, or software described in this manual.
Reproduction of the contents of this manual, in whole or in part, without written permission of Rockwell Automation, Inc., is prohibited.
Throughout this manual, when necessary, we use notes to make you aware of safety considerations.
WARNING: Identifies information about practices or circumstances that can cause an explosion in a hazardous environment, which
may lead to personal injury or death, property damage, or economic loss.
ATTENTION: Identifies information about practices or circumstances that can lead to personal injury or death, property damage,
or economic loss. Attentions help you identify a hazard, avoid a hazard, and recognize the consequence.
IMPORTANT Identifies information that is critical for successful application and understanding of the product.
These labels may also be on or inside the equipment to provide specific precautions.
SHOCK HAZARD: Labels may be on or inside the equipment, for example, a drive or motor, to alert people that dangerous voltage
may be present.
BURN HAZARD: Labels may be on or inside the equipment, for example, a drive or motor, to alert people that surfaces may reach
dangerous temperatures.
ARC FLASH HAZARD: Labels may be on or inside the equipment, for example, a motor control center, to alert people to potential Arc
Flash. Arc Flash will cause severe injury or death. Wear proper Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Follow ALL Regulatory
requirements for safe work practices and for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).
Identifies information that is useful and can help to make a process easier to do or easier to understand.
Preface
About This Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Download Firmware, AOP, EDS, and Other Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Summary of Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Additional Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Chapter 1
Industrial Security Overview Industrial Automation Control Systems Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Vulnerability and Exploits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Security Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Defense in Depth Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
CIP Security is an ODVA Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Device Identity/Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Secure Data Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Chapter 2
CIP Security-capable Rockwell Software and Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Automation Products CIP Security Software Applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
CIP Security-capable Hardware Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Use Non-CIP Security-capable Controllers with CIP Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Benefits of Using Rockwell Automation Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
CIP Security Communication Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Security Profile and Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
CIP Security Components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Security Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Zone Properties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Conduit Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Limitations and Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Devices That Support DLR/Linear and Dual-IP EtherNet/IP Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Initial Security Model Deployment Fails If ControlLogix 5580
Controller is in Run Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Cannot Download to ControlLogix 5580 Controller from
Unsecure Workstation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Workstation Cannot Download to a Secured ControlLogix 5580
Controller if Security Policies Do Not Match . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Secure the Programming Connection to Redundant
ControlLogix 5580 Controllers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Chapter 3
CIP Security Design and Install the System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Implementation Process Identify CIP Security-capable and CIP Security-enabled Devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Unsecure Device Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Identify, Organize, and Create Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Create a Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Configure the Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Identify, Organize, and Create Conduits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Create a Conduit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Configure the Conduit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Identify and Create Security Features/Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Deploy Security Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Back Up the Security Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Save Security Model Backup to Another Secure Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Different From FactoryTalk Directory Backup File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Restore FactoryTalk System Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Remove the Security Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Remove the Security Policy From a Software Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Remove the Security Policy From a Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Set Mask Parameters on PowerFlex 755T and PowerFlex 6000T Drives
to Maintain Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Device Peripheral Interface (DPI) Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Setting Masks to Secure the DPI Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Use Syslog with CIP Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Syslog Collector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Define Event Policy in FactoryTalk Policy Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Facility Codes and Severity Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Syslog Message List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Chapter 4
CIP Security Implementation ControlLogix 5580 Controllers Example Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Example Architecture Phase One of Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Phase Two of Implementation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
CompactLogix 5380 Controllers Example Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Phase One of Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Phase Two of Implementation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Chapter 5
Add or Replace A Device In a Automatic Policy Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
CIP Security System Enable Automatic Policy Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Deployment Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Onboarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Merging. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Firmware Revision Updates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Benefits of Automatic Policy Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Disable Automatic Policy Deployment in FactoryTalk Policy Manager . . . . . . . . . 103
Add a New Device That Supports Automatic Policy Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
New Device is Not in the Security Policy Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
New Device is in the Security Policy Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Replace a Device That Supports Automatic Policy Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Replacement Device is Not Identical to the Existing Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Replacement Device is Identical to the Existing Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Devices That Do Not Support Automatic Policy Deployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Add a Device That Does Not Support APD to an Existing
CIP Security System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Replace a Secured Device That Does Not Support APD
in an Existing System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Appendix A
CIP Security Compatibility Software. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Logix Controllers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
ControlLogix 5580 and 5570 Controller Redundancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Other Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Appendix B
History of Changes SECURE-AT001C-EN-P, August 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
SECURE-AT001B-EN-P, August 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Index
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Make sure that you are familiar with the following before you use this manual:
• Basic understanding of EtherNet/IP™ networking fundamentals
• Basic understanding of network security terminology and concepts
• Use of Rockwell Automation® software, for example:
- FactoryTalk® Policy Manager
- FactoryTalk System Services
- FactoryTalk Linx
- Studio 5000 Logix Designer®
Summary of Changes
This table contains the changes that are made to this revision of the publication. Change bars indicate changes throughout the publication.
Topic Page
Added information about downloading firmware, AOP, EDS, and other files 7
Added content to the Security Assessment section 11
Added the PowerFlex 6000T drives to table CIP Security Hardware 18
Added content to the Disable CIP Security section 37
Added the Subject Alternative Name description 44
Updated the descriptions in table CIP Security Device State Icons 46
Moved content to Remove Security Policy From a Device Via FactoryTalk Policy Manager - 70
Option 2 section
Updated the Set Mask Parameters to Maintain Security with information about the 71
PowerFlex 6000T drives
Added categories to the Syslog Even Facility Codes table 76
Added categories to the Event Security Risk Severity Levels table 77
Add a CompactLogix 5380 controllers example architecture 88
Add the PowerFlex 6000T drives to table CIP Security-capable Devices That Do Not Support 108
APD
Added Studio 5000 Logix Designer application, version 36, to table CIP Security With Logix 111
Controllers in Logix Designer Applications
Added Studio 5000 Logix Designer application, version 36, to table ControlLogix 5580 and 112
5570 Controller Redundancy With a CIP Security System
Added the PowerFlex 6000T drives to the Other Devices Used With a CIP Security System 113
table
Updated the History of Changes section 115
Smart manufacturing represents a gateway to digital transformation that connects plant-level and enterprise networks, and securely connects
people, processes, and technologies.
Collectively, this opens new windows to connected smart devices for visibility into processes, data, and analytics. The visibility enables better and
faster decision-making and seamless connectivity for remote locations.
As EtherNet/IP™ becomes a growing standard, evolving these isolated IACS networks towards smart manufacturing, network convergence, and
industrial security become a necessity.
Security Threats
As IACS networks transition to open standards of Ethernet-media and Internet Protocol (IP) to meet the needs of end-to-end connectivity of entities,
the threat landscape broadens.
With an increase of smart devices and end-to-end connectivity come more assets to protect and a greater risk of security threats.
IMPORTANT This publication focuses on threat actors with malicious intentions, also called attackers. The word attacker is used
throughout the rest of the publication.
In this publication, attacker refers to a range from one individual or to an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), that is, or a
group of attackers working collectively.
Insecure communication protocols can be exploited to make data accessible for anyone to collect, and vulnerable endpoints can become open
targets for denial-of-service (DoS) and other types of attacks.
When attackers access a system, they use many ways to exploit the IACS communication protocol vulnerabilities.
Table 1 - Attack Types
Attack Type Description
EtherNet/IP Logix5585 TM
DC INPUT
SAFETY ON
NET
0000 LINK
EtherNet/IP Logix5585 TM
DC INPUT
SAFETY ON
NET
0000 LINK
EtherNet/IP Logix5585 TM
DC INPUT
SAFETY ON
NET
0000 LINK
Security Assessment
Getting a security assessment is the starting point for any security implementation. An assessment provides a picture of your current security
posture and what mitigation techniques that can be used to achieve an acceptable risk state.
An assessment is a collaborative process, between Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) personnel to maximize the
protection of confidentiality, integrity, and availability while still providing functionality and usability.
The DiD security approach establishes multiple layers of protection that are based on diverse technologies through physical, electronic, and
procedural safeguards.
For example, you restrict physical access to managed switches with port locks. Then you position edge industrial firewalls to restrict access and
block unapproved traffic flows. Finally, you employ an industrial demilitarized zone (IDMZ) as a perimeter buffer zone between the Industrial and
Enterprise zones. The IDMZ lets secure data sharing and services take place without direct connection.
The expectation of the DiD approach is that in case an attacker breaches one layer of defense, there’s always an additional layer that thwarts their
effort.
Policies,
Procedures,
Physical
Physical
Network
Computer
Application
Device
Recognizing the need for CIP-connected device protection, ODVA developed CIP Security. It’s an open-standard secure communication mechanism
for EtherNet/IP™ networks.
The following CIP Security properties are countermeasures that address the security risks:
• Device identity and authentication
• Data integrity and authentication
• Data confidentiality (encryption)
Positioned at the device-level in the DiD architecture, CIP Security enables CIP-connected devices to authenticate each other before transmitting
and receiving data. Device connectivity is limited to only trusted devices.
Optionally, to increase the overall device security posture, it can be combined with data integrity to guard against packet tampering and message
encryption to avert unwanted data reading and disclosure.
Figure 2 - CIP Security As Part of Defense in Depth Architecture
Policies,
Procedures,
Physical
Physical
Network
CIP Security-
enabled Device
Device Identity/Authentication
Before devices start communicating, each device must be able to verify that the identity of the device with which it wants to communicate is
authentic. This protects legitimate devices from a rogue device gaining access to the system by pretending to be a system component.
To build this endpoint trust, a certificate or pre-shared (secret) key can be used to provide identity to the device:
• Certificate is used to provide identity based on the X.509v3 standard.
Certificates are an agreement between communicating parties and a common entity that is called a Certificate Authority (CA). A trusted CA
signs and issues certificates to requesters to prove their identities. Mutual trust can be established when communicating parties exchange
certificates signed by a common CA.
FactoryTalk® System Services is the certificate authority. It is the service that signs and issues certificates to give assurance for a
communicating party's authenticity.
An advantage to using certificates is that they provide a greater level security than pre-shared keys.
• Pre-shared keys are used to prove identity that is based on keys that are shared in advance among the communicating parties.
Pre-shared keys are agreement between two entities to the parameters that determine identity and authentication. The entities are the
devices that communicate with each other.
An advantage to using pre-shared keys is that they provide less performance impact on when establishing connections.
IMPORTANT Devices can only use one pre-shared key, as a result, any conduits that are required between any Zones that are configured
with pre-shared key must be created using Trusted IP.
TLS and DTLS are network protocols that facilitate data transfer privately and securely between an originator and a target device.
DTLS is based on TLS but is used for User Datagram Protocol (UDP) connections instead of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connections.
For complete descriptions of the security properties, see the ODVA home page available at: https://www.odva.org/.
Table 2 defines the icons that are used in Table 3 on page 15.
Table 2 - CIP Security Icons
Name Symbol Definition
An electronic representation of an identity. A certificate binds the identity’s public key to its identifiable information, such as,
Certificate name, organization, email, user name, and/or a device serial number.
This certificate is used to authenticate a connection to a zone or device. Selected by default when CIP Security is enabled.
A secret that is shared among trusted entities to represent identities. FactoryTalk Policy Manager can create a key that can be
Pre-shared key shared.
Integrity Checks whether data was altered and whether a trusted entity sent the data. Altered and/or untrusted data is rejected.
Check mark Symbol used to indicate that the endpoints for communication between devices have been authenticated and can be trusted.
Encryption Encodes messages or information to help prevent reading or viewing of EtherNet/IP data by unauthorized parties.
Table 3 describes how secure data transport enables a CIP-connected device to help protect itself from malicious communication.
Table 3 - CIP Security Properties
Security Properties Description
FactoryTalk® Linx
0000
SAFETY ON
RUN FORCE SD OK
TM
NET
LINK
DC INPUT
1756-EN4TR
FactoryTalk Linx
NET
0000 LINK
1756-EN4TR
FactoryTalk Linx
NET
0000 LINK
1756-EN4TR
Notes:
For information on the tasks that are required to use CIP™ Security-capable products in an IACS, see:
• CIP Security Implementation Process on page 45
• CIP Security Implementation Example Architecture on page 79
• Publications listed in Additional Resources on page 8
You download software at the Rockwell Automation Product Compatibility and Download Center (PCDC).
IMPORTANT • The minimum firmware revisions that are listed for Logix 5000 controllers in Table 5 represent the first firmware
revision at which you can connect the controller to an IACS with CIP Security that is implemented via a secure
connection to the controller Ethernet port.
There are some configurations in which you can use earlier firmware revisions to connect the controller to an IACS with
CIP Security implemented. For more information, see CIP Security Compatibility on page 111.
• The table represents products that are CIP Security-capable at the time of this publication.
Over time, new products will be released that are CIP Security-capable. New versions of existing products that aren’t CIP
Security-capable will be released in the future to make them CIP Security-capable.
To see if a product is CIP Security-capable, see the product documentation.
For more information on how to do so, see CIP Security Compatibility on page 111.
In FactoryTalk Policy Manager, the Authentication Method property for a conduit uses the term Trusted IP to represent AllowedList.
Rockwell Automation CIP Security-capable products support the following security attributes:
Property Description
Certificate base on the X.509 v3 standard is used to provide identity.
Device Identity and Pre-shared keys are shared secrets that are shared among trusted entities that are used to provide identity.
Authentication The TLS protocol facilitates mutual authentication to create trusted endpoints.
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) is used as a cryptographic method of providing data integrity and message authenticity to
Data Integrity EtherNet/IP traffic.
Data Confidentiality Data encryption is used to encode messages or information to help prevent reading or viewing of EtherNet/IP data by unauthorized parties.
IMPORTANT The rest of this section describes each component and, for zones and conduits, steps to create and configure them.
However, the descriptions aren’t exhaustive.
For more detailed information on security models, including the tasks that you must complete to configure them, see the
FactoryTalk Policy Manager Getting Results Guide, publication FTALK-GR001.
The following table describes icons that are used in this publication.
Symbol Definition
Devices are the modules, drives, controllers, HMI panels, computers, and servers that work together to create an IACS network. You add devices that
share security requirements for a particular function to the same zone.
Considerations with devices in the security model when you use devices in an IACS network:
• The lists of current CIP Security-capable Rockwell Automation products are on page 17 and page 18.
More CIP Security-capable Rockwell Automation products are in development.
• Just because a device is CIP Security-capable, you aren’t required to enable CIP Security on that device in an IACS network.
• You can use non-CIP Security-capable devices in an IACS that includes CIP Security-enabled devices.
Zones
Zones are groups to which devices are added. Zones establish the rules for data integrity, data privacy, and the authentication method that is used
to authenticate trusted devices.
• You can have multiple zones in a system and set security policy on a zone-by-zone basis. By using zones, you simplify management of large
sets of devices in a system.
• Zones can include devices that are CIP Security-capable and devices that aren’t. There can be multiple zones in an IACS network, but a
device can only belong to one zone.
• Once a CIP Security-capable device is added to a zone, the device uses the policy settings of that zone.
Communication between devices in the same zone is implied and mutually trusted. Therefore, you do not have to create conduits between
devices in the same zone.
Figure 3 shows a zone that includes devices that are CIP Security-capable, for example, a ControlLogix 5580 controller, and devices that
aren’t, for example, a PanelView™ Plus terminal.
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
4
I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D-
-
MBRK
+
Zone
DC INPUT
OK
LINK 1
F1 F9 LINK 2
DEVICE
PORT
F2 F10
F3 F11
F4 F12
F5 F13
F6 F14
F7 F15
F8 F16
1783-CSP
1 2
(rear) (front)
Conduits
Conduits create trusted communication pathways outside of zones. You must have at least two endpoints, that is, zones or devices, to create a
conduit.
PC Zone
Conduit 1
Conduit 2
Zone 1 Zone 2
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
4 4
I/O I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
- -
MBRK MBRK
+ +
DC INPUT DC INPUT
OK OK
LINK 1 LINK 1
LINK 2 LINK 2
DEVICE DEVICE
PORT PORT
1783-CSP 1783-CSP
1 2 1 2
(rear) (front) (rear) (front)
Security Model
The security model is a fully configured instance of zones, devices, and conduits, along with their respective CIP Security properties, in FactoryTalk
Policy Manager software. The zones and conduits structure the security model. The security model is deployed to the devices in the IACS via
security profiles for individual devices.
If multiple devices use the same security policies and are in the same zone, we recommend that you configure the security policies at
the zone level.
The advantage to configuring security policies at the zone level is that you can configure the policies once and apply them to multiple
devices. This method avoids the possibility of differences in security policies across devices that should use the same policies.
Zone Properties
Table 6 lists the configurable fields that are available when you configure zone properties.
Table 6 - Zone Security Properties
Property Available Choices Example FactoryTalk Policy Manager Screen
Name User configurable
Description User configurable
• Enable
Enable/Disable CIP Security
• Disable
• Certificate
Authentication Method
• Pre-Shared Key
• None
I/O Data Security • Integrity Only
• Integrity + Confidentiality
• Integrity Only
Messaging Security
• Integrity + Confidentiality
• Enable
Disable Ports - HTTP (80)
• Disable
IMPORTANT For more information on the Zone Properties, see the FactoryTalk Policy Manager Getting Results Guide,
publication FTALK-GR001.
Conduit Properties
Table 7 lists the configurable fields that are available when you configure conduit security policy.
Table 7 - Conduit Security Properties
Property Available Choices Example FactoryTalk Policy Manager Screen
Name User configurable
Description User configurable
Connection
Can be any of the following based on how you
assign each Endpoint: • Endpoint 1 (Device or Zone)
• Device-to-Device • Endpoint 2 (Device or Zone)
• Device-to-Zone
• Zone-to-Zone
• Trusted IP
Authentication Method
• Certificate
• None
I/O Data Security • Integrity Only
• Integrity + Confidentiality
• Integrity Only
Messaging Security
• Integrity + Confidentiality
IMPORTANT For more information on the Conduit Properties, see the FactoryTalk Policy Manager Getting Results Guide, publication
FTALK-GR001.
CIP Security-capable devices with built-in dual Ethernet ports, that is, CompactLogix 5380 and Compact GuardLogix 5380 controllers, support the
following EtherNet/IP modes. The modes determine how the controllers connect to EtherNet/IP networks and how they operate on them.
• Linear/DLR
• Dual-IP
Linear/DLR
In DLR/Linear mode, the device uses one IP address for both Ethernet ports and you can secure communication on both ports.
Dual-IP Mode
In Dual-IP mode, Ethernet ports A1 and A2, respectively, can connect to separate EtherNet/IP networks. In this mode, each port requires its own
network configuration.
Port A1 can connect to enterprise-level networks and device-level networks. Port A2 can only connect to device-level networks. Figure 5
shows example applications in which CompactLogix 5380 controllers use Dual-IP mode.
Port 2 Connected to a 2
4
I/O
2
1
I/O
6
2
1
I/O-A
6 1
I/O-B
6
2
1
I/O-A
6 1
I/O-B
6
Device-level Network
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D-
-
MBRK
+
Port A1
Connected to
an Enterprise-
level Network
When you use Dual-IP mode, you can only secure the connection on one Ethernet port for CIP Security.
IMPORTANT You must install FactoryTalk Policy Manager and FactoryTalk System Services software on the same server as the
FactoryTalk Directory.
So the network to which the secured port is connected must also have the server with this software that is connected to it.
Because CIP Security does not support configuring separate security policies for the different Ethernet ports on the same
device, you can only deploy a security model to one of the networks to which the controller is connected.
For example, if you secure the port A1 connection to an enterprise-level network, you can’t deploy a security model to the
network to which port A2 is connected.
For more information on Dual-IP mode, see the CompactLogix 5380 and Compact GuardLogix 5380 Controllers User Manual, publication
5069-UM001.
Initial Security Model Deployment Fails If ControlLogix 5580 Controller is in Run Mode
If a ControlLogix 5580 controller is in Run mode, that is, the keyswitch is in the RUN position, the first time that you attempt to deploy the security
model in FactoryTalk Policy Manager software, the deployment fails. The initial security model deployment is successful if the controller is in
Remote Run, Remote Program, or Program mode.
IMPORTANT This designed limitation protects the controller from a DoS attack by an attacker.
The asset owner is the only party with physical access to the controller. Confirm that the controller mode is Remote Run,
Remote Program, or Program so the initial security deployment is successful. If desired, you can change the controller to
Run mode after the initial deployment and future security model deployments are successful.
After a ControlLogix 5580 controller has a security profile, the controller mode does not affect future security model deployments.
Unsecured Workstation
Studio 5000 Logix Designer, version 32
DC INPUT
ControlLogix5580controller, 2
4
I/O
2
1
I/O
6
2
1
I/O-A
6 1
I/O-B
6
2
1
I/O-A
6 1
I/O-B
6
2
1
I/O-A
6 1
I/O-B
6
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D-
-
MBRK
+
F1 F9
Zone
F2 F10
F3 F11
F4 F12
F5 F13
F6 F14
F7 F15
F8 F16
Workstation Cannot Download to a Secured ControlLogix 5580 Controller if Security Policies Do Not Match
A workstation that is running Logix Designer application can’t download a project to Logix 5000 controller, if the project has a different security
configuration than the Logix 5000 controller.
The following example uses a ControlLogix 5580 controller. The following conditions exist:
• The workstation is configured for permitted communication, that is, Authentication Method = Trusted IP.
• The ControlLogix 5580 controller is configured for secure communication, that is, Authentication Method = Certificate or Authentication
Method = Pre-shared Key (PSK).
PC Zone
DC INPUT
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET
4
I/O
2
5
I/O
UFB
6
10
2
5
I/O-A
UFB-A
6 1
10 5
I/O-B
UFB-B
10
6
2
5
I/O-A
UFB-A
6 1
10 5
UFB-B
I/O-B
10
6
2
5
I/O-A
UFB-A
6 1
10 5
UFB-B
10
I/O-B
6
configuredforsecurecommunication. D+
D-
MF-A
D+
D-
MF-B
D+
D-
MF-A
D+
D-
MF-B
D+
D-
MF-A
D+
D-
MF-B
-
MBRK
+
Zone 1 F1
F2 F10
F9
F3 F11
F4 F12
F5 F13
F6 F14
F7 F15
F8 F16
To avoid this limitation, update the workstation and controller security profiles to use Authentication Method = Certificate.
PC Zone
DC INPUT
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET
4
2
1
I/O
6
2
1
I/O-A
6 1
I/O-B
6
2
1
I/O-A
6 1
I/O-B
6
2
1
I/O-A
6 1
I/O-B
6
configuredforsecurecommunication.
I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D-
-
MBRK
+
Zone 1
F1 F9
F2 F10
F3 F11
F4 F12
F5 F13
F6 F14
F7 F15
F8 F16
IMPORTANT The 1756-EN4TR communication modules must be configured not to use IP address swapping.
• Two 1756-EN2x communication modules, one in each chassis, that connect to the I/O devices
Figure 6 on page 30 shows an application in which a workstation that is running the Logix Designer application and FactoryTalk Linx
software is connected to a ControlLogix 5580 controller redundant pair.
Figure 6 - ControlLogix 5580 Controllers - Redundant Chassis Connected to I/O Network Devices
IMPORTANT:
1756-EN4TR
1756-EN4TR
1756-L85E
1756-L85E
X10
FLEX 5000 I/O
STATUS
TM
EtherNet/IP™ Adapter
FLEX 5000 I/O
TM
POWER STATUS FLEX 5000 I/O
TM
POWER STATUS
NET
X100
FLEX 5000 I/O FLEX 5000 I/O
TM TM
POWER STATUS POWER STATUS
FLEX 5000 I/O
TM
EtherNet/IP™ Adapter
X10 STATUS
NET
The CompactLogix 5380 controllers must use firmware revision 34.011 or later. There is no need for the 1783-CSP Proxy because you can connect
the workstation to an Ethernet port on the controller.
Figure 7 shows an application in which the workstation that is running the Logix Designer application and FactoryTalk Linx software is
connected to a CompactLogix 5380 controller. The controller is operating in Linear/DLR EtherNet/IP mode.
IMPORTANT This example shows the controller that is connected to a DLR ring via a 1783-ETAP tap. The controller can be connected to
any valid I/O architecture, for example, a linear topology that doesn’t include a 1783-ETAP tap, and the concepts that are
described in this section still apply.
Figure 7 - CIP Security with CompactLogix 5380 Controllers Connected to the I/O Network
CompactLogix 5380
Workstation with Logix
controller
Designer application and
FactoryTalk Linx software
1783-ETAP X100
FLEX 5000 I/O
TM
EtherNet/IP™ Adapter
FLEX 5000 I/O
TM
POWER STATUS FLEX 5000 I/O
TM
POWER STATUS
Tap
X10 STATUS
NET
LINK 1 5094-IB16 DIGITAL 16 INPUT 24 VDC 1 1 TB3 5094-OB16 DIGITAL 16 OUTPUT 24 VDC 1 2 TB3
X1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
IP ADDRESS LINK 2
5094-AENTR
Secure Enclosure
POWER
PRP
DLR
In this example, the 1756-EN4TR in M1 Zone (Machine 1) can use CIP Security because the Stratix® 5700 switch performing the NAT contains a NAT
translation for the 1756-EN4TR and a Gateway Translation. When NAT with routing is configured correctly, the outside computer/server with
FactoryTalk Policy Manager can access the CIP Security endpoint via the Outside translated IP address that is configured in the Stratix 5700 switch.
It’s important that NAT is properly configured before you apply any CIP Security implementation. For more information, see Deploying Network
Address Translation within a CPwE Architecture Design and Implementation Guide, publication ENET-TD007.
Line Controller
10.10.30.15
VLAN 10 VLAN 20
M1 Zone M2 Zone
Inside Inside IES
IES Stratix 5700
192.168.1.x/24 Stratix 5700 192.168.1.x/24
NAT
NAT
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
F4 F12 F4 F12
.10 .10
F5 F13 F5 F13
F6 F14 F6 F14
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
.16 .16
.11 - .13 .11 - .13
.14 - .15
.14 - .15
Machine 1 Machine 2
Policy Provisioning
CIP Security protocol policies can only be deployed over an EtherNet/IP network. A device must reside on the same physical Ethernet network as
FactoryTalk Policy Manager server or on a different network that is connected with a router. Policy deployment over multiple different networks and
platforms using CIP Bridging is not supported.
For example, in Figure 8 on page 34, you can deploy CIP Security policies to Kinetix 5700 Drives_1 and Kinetix 5700 Drives_2 because they are
on the same physical Ethernet network.
You can’t provision the policy to Kinetix 5700 Drives_3 because it is on a different physical network. Even though CIP allows communication bridging
over multiple networks and backplanes, CIP Security is effective only on one (or multiple-routed) network and FactoryTalk Policy Manager software
does deploy policies accordingly.
To provision CIP Security policies to devices connected to 1756-EN4TR Bridge_2, like 5069-AENTR, 5094-AENTR and Kinetix 5700 Drives_3, you must
have a second instance of FactoryTalk Policy Manager connected directly on that physical Ethernet network.
CIP Security is easier to deploy and manage in flat EtherNet/IP networks that are designed and implemented according to Connected
Plant-wide Ethernet principles. For more information, see Deploying CIP Security within a Converged Plantwide Ethernet Architecture
document.
For more information, see Deploying CIP Security within a Converged Plantwide Ethernet Architecture, publication ENET-TD022.
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
4
I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D-
-
MBRK
+
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
4
I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
FactoryTalk Linx
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D-
PowerFlex 755TDrives_1
Studio 5000 Logix Designer -
MBRK
+
X100
FLEX 5000 I/O FLEX 5000 I/O
TM TM
POWER STATUS POWER STATUS
FLEX 5000 I/O
5069-AENTR 5094-AENTR
TM
EtherNet/IP™ Adapter
X10 STATUS
NET
LINK 1 5094-IB16 DIGITAL 16 INPUT 24 VDC 1 1 TB3 5094-OB16 DIGITAL 16 OUTPUT 24 VDC 1 2 TB3
X1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1
2
1
I/O
6
2
1
I/O-A
6 1
I/O-B
6
2
1
I/O-A
6 1
I/O-B
6
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D-
IMPORTANT CIP Bridging Control is only available with FactoryTalk Policy Manager software, version 6.30 and later.
CIP Security policies define which EtherNet/IP-enabled devices can communicate securely with each other, for example, whether a ControlLogix
5580 controller can communicate securely with a 1756-EN4TR communication module. CIP Bridging Control compliments those policies.
This example describes how you can use CIP Bridging Control to isolate secure and unsecure communication.
It’s common for modern devices to be part of a larger platform connected via a backplane. Some of them, for example, ControlLogix systems, let
you combine many communication modules for network-to-network connectivity.
With the introduction of CIP Security, many existing control system owners are challenged by the requirement to define an adoption strategy that
becomes a multi-step process that secures only certain parts of IACS in each step. This scenario can create a backdoor to secure networks.
Controlling CIP bridging can help to close that backdoor.
HMI/Supervisory Network
1756-L85E controller
1756-EN2TR modules
HMI/Supervisory Network
For information on how to implement CIP Bridging Control, see the FactoryTalk Policy Manager Getting Results Guide, publication FTALK-GR001.
However, you can establish CIP Security Class 3 connections to a 1756-EN4TR communication module in a redundant configuration to secure
Studio 5000 Logix Designer connections.
For information on how to secure programming connections to ControlLogix Redundancy systems, see the CIP Security Proxy User Manual,
publication 1783-UM013.
After device configuration is downloaded, you must add the drive to the security model and deploy it to establish secure connections with the drive.
This applies whether the drive is CIP Security-capable and connected directly to the network or non-CIP Security-capable and connected via
a 1783-CSP CIP Security Proxy.
To disable CIP Security in FactoryTalk Linx software, you must disable Port 2221. If you disable CIP Security on a device, you must re-enable the port
before you can implement CIP Security on the device again.
IMPORTANT To re-enable Port 2221, you must reset the device to its factory default settings. Before you reset a device to its
factory default settings, consider the impact on your control system.
For example, if you reset a ControlLogix 5580 controller to its factory default state, it clears the application program from
the controller, requiring you to download it again.
2. On the General tab of the Advanced Settings dialog box, enable Enable Device Configuration if it’s not already enabled, and click OK.
3. On the FactoryTalk Linx Network Browser dialog box, navigate to the device.
4. Right-click on the device, and choose Device Configuration.
6. When the warning dialog box appears prompting you to continue the process, click Yes.
7. When the dialog box indicates that CIP Security was successfully disabled, click Close.
The dialog box appears that indicates the port status is pending and that a device reset is required for the change to take effect.
IMPORTANT To re-enable Port 2221, you must reset the device to its factory default settings. Before you reset a device to its
factory default settings, consider the impact on your control system.
For example, if you reset a ControlLogix 5580 controller to its factory default state, it clears the application program from
the controller, requiring you to download it again.
This is also true for re-enabling Automatic Policy Deployment (APD).
However, because such a configuration can result in an unauthorized device, for example, a hijacked device, or a spoofed IP address, we
recommend that you do not connect legacy devices to the IACS.
We recommend that you consider adding legacy devices to security model only if they are intended to initiate connections with secured devices
and you accept the associated risk.
Subject Alternative Name increases the degree of security on a connection to a trusted device. The feature confirms that not only is the target
device a trusted device but also that it is the actual device to which the connection must be made. It helps prevent against specific communication
redirect attacks.
With Subject Alternative Name configured, the device's IP address is used as a unique identifier and added to the Subject Alternative Name field in
the trusted device’s certificate. A connection attempt between devices is successful if the IP address in the Subject Alternative Name field of the
certificate matches the IP address of the intended target device in the connection. Connection originators, for example, a ControlLogix 5580
controller or 1756-EN4TR communication module, check the trusted device’s certificate for the IP address before establishing a secure connection.
For example, Figure 10 shows a ControlLogix 5580 controller that sends commands to trusted PowerFlex 755T drives. The commands are
unique to each drive, including the drive’s IP address in its trusted certificate. An attacker intercepts command A that is intended for
PowerFlex 755T drive A in an attempt to redirect it to PowerFlex 755T B.
Because the command includes drive A IP address = 192.168.1.10, and PowerFlex 755T drive B has an IP address = 192.168.1.11, the command is not
sent to PowerFlex 755T drive B.
Command B
Command B Command B
IMPORTANT Subject Alternative Name is enabled by default with FactoryTalk® Policy Manager software, version 6.40.00 or later, and
only connection originators can verify the Subject Alternative Name in a target device when making a secure connection.
If you change a device’s IP address, you must redeploy the security model. Subject Alternative Name updates the IP
address in the trusted certificate to match the new IP address on the device.
For information on a more complex IACS, see CIP Security Implementation Example Architecture on page 79.
You can use the security assessment process to assign security levels to zones and conduits. We recommend that you assign zone and conduit
security levels based on the potential consequences if an attack objective be achieved in that zone.
Remember, the system can include products that are CIP™ Security-capable and products that aren’t. The list of CIP Security-capable products that
are currently available from Rockwell Automation are listed at the following:
• CIP Security Software Applications on page 17
• CIP Security-capable Hardware Devices on page 18
IMPORTANT We generally recommend that you design and implement your CIP Security model before you download your Logix Designer
application project to a Logix 5000 controller.
However, there are some systems in which it is more appropriate to download a project to the system before you
implement CIP Security.
The device is CIP Security-capable, but no configuration action has been taken yet.
The device is CIP Security-capable and is in the CIP Security configuration process.
The following example shows the CIP Security status of ControlLogix 5580 controllers in FactoryTalk Linx Network Browser.
If a device does not support CIP Security, there is no icon in front of it.
When devices are added to the zone, communication between the devices is implied while still letting mutual trust be established through an
exchange of certificates or pre-shared keys. It’s worth noting that any device in a zone that is deemed to be ‘trusted’ is only trusted by other
devices in the same zone, not all devices in the IACS.
For example, if a ControlLogix® 5580 controller and Kinetix® 5700 drives are added to Zone 1 and certificates are used with integrity, the devices are
authenticated by exchanging certificates with each other.
If a zone includes devices that are non-CIP Security-capable and CIP Security-enabled devices, connections to the non-CIP Security-capable
devices are not secured using standard ports.
You can create zones and add other computers/servers that do not use FactoryTalk Linx software but still require communications to IACS devices.
The devices that do not use FactoryTalk Linx are added as generic devices. This lets you easily create Trusted IP conduits between the computers/
servers to the IACS devices.
PC Zone
Zone 1 Zone 2
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
4 4
I/O I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
- -
MBRK MBRK
+ +
DC INPUT DC INPUT
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
F4 F12 F4 F12
F5 F13 F5 F13
F6 F14 F6 F14
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
After you identify and organize the zones, create a detailed security matrix that lists what devices occupy each zone. Table 9 is a security
matrix with zones and devices.
Table 9 - Security Matrix - Zones and Devices
PC Zone Zone 1 Zone 2
FactoryTalk Linx(1)
FactoryTalk Policy Manager ControlLogix® 5580 controller ControlLogix 5580 controller
FactoryTalk System Services
1756-EN4TR EtherNet/IP communication module 1756-EN4TR EtherNet/IP communication module
Studio 5000 Logix Designer®(2) Kinetix 5700 servo drives Kinetix 5700 servo drives
FactoryTalk Linx PowerFlex® 755T drive PowerFlex 755T drive
FactoryTalk View
PanelView™ Plus terminal(3) PanelView Plus terminal(3)
(1) This group of software is installed on the same server/computer.
(2) This group of software is installed on the same computer. It’s a second computer, that is, another one from the server/computer on which FactoryTalk Linx, FactoryTalk Policy Manager, and
FactoryTalk System Services is installed.
(3) This device is not CIP Security-capable.
Create a Zone
1. In the FactoryTalk Policy Manager navigation bar, choose Zones.
2. On the toolbar next to ZONES, click [+].
3. Add devices to the zone. You can add devices in three ways:
- Discover devices via FactoryTalk Linx.
- Manually add devices.
If a zone includes devices that aren’t CIP Security-capable, a warning notification appears in the zone properties. An AllowedList isn’t needed,
however. All CIP Security-capable devices in the zone automatically allow this device.
PC Zone
Conduit 1
Conduit 2
Zone 1 Zone 2
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
4 4
I/O I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
- -
MBRK MBRK
+ +
DC INPUT DC INPUT
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
F4 F12 F4 F12
F5 F13 F5 F13
F6 F14 F6 F14
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
Table 10 is an example of an updated security matrix after conduits are identified and organized.
In the table, the Source row and Destination column cell intersections represent the endpoints of the Conduit between the zones. For example, cell
at column 2/row 3 indicates that Conduit 2 uses a Zone-to-Zone pathway between PC Zone and Zone 2.
Table 10 - Security Matrix - Conduits
Destination
Source
PC Zone Zone 1 Zone 2
PC Zone Permit(1) Conduit 1: Zone-to-Zone Conduit 2: Zone-to-Zone
Zone 1 Conduit 1: Zone-to-Zone Permit Denied
Zone 2 Conduit 2: Zone-to-Zone Denied Permit
(1) Default permits pathway.
Create a Conduit
1. In the FactoryTalk Policy Manager navigation bar, choose Conduits.
2. On the toolbar, click [+].
In Filter, you can type part of the name to list only endpoints that match that criteria.
5. Click OK.
In Filter, you can type part of the name to list only endpoints that match that criteria.
8. Click OK.
9. Click Next.
If you must create another conduit, repeat the process, starting at step 2 on page 52.
If both endpoints are CIP Security capable, configure CIP Security Communication.
- In I/O Data Security and Messaging Security choose one of the following:
• Integrity only - Use to check if the data or message was altered and reject altered information.
• Integrity & Confidentiality - Use to check integrity plus encrypt the data or message so the corresponding decryption key is required to
read the information. Rejects altered and/or untrusted information while also protecting the confidentiality of the information.
• In I/O Data Security, click None to stop using additional security checks on I/O data.
PC Zone
Conduit 1
Conduit 2
Zone 1 Zone 2
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
- -
MBRK MBRK
+ +
DC INPUT DC INPUT
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
F4 F12 F4 F12
F5 F13 F5 F13
F6 F14 F6 F14
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
After you identify and create security features/policies, update the security matrix that details applicable security policies between conduits. For
example, enable certificates or pre-shared keys, enable/disable confidentiality and AllowedList.
Table 11 is an updated security matrix with security features and policies defined.
Table 11 - Security Matrix - Security Features and Policies
Conduit 1 Zone to Zone Security Policy
Secure FactoryTalk Linx Communication
Zone to Zone • Certificates
PC Zone Zone 1 • Integrity
(Secure communication with FactoryTalk Linx.) • Confidentiality
You click the Deploy button in FactoryTalk Policy Manager software to trigger FactoryTalk System Services to deploy the security model. FactoryTalk
System Services runs in the background. You do not take action in the client.
IMPORTANT Before a deployed security model becomes active, communication must be reset to all configured devices, resulting in a
short loss of connectivity.
Once the security model is deployed and active, that is, communication is reset on a device, the device only accepts communication from other
devices in the same zone or using conduits that are configured to enable communication with other security zones or devices.
Before deploying a security model, make sure that all devices are operational and have network access.
After the security model is deployed and active on all affected devices, FactoryTalk Policy Manager and FactoryTalk System Services are no longer
required for real-time operations. They’re required again if changes to the security model must be deployed.
IMPORTANT If the list contains unexpected devices, click CANCEL and then change the model as needed.
b. Choose one of the following options for when to reset the communication channels for the items included in the security model.
The following types of deployment are available:
• During deployment - The CIP connection is closed and reopened on the device during the deployment process.
Similar to when the network card on a computer is reset, the device stays functional but is disconnected from the network for a few
moments. This option applies the new policy to the device when the policy is deployed.
• After deployment - Security policy changes are applied to devices with existing connections only after those connections are closed
and reopened. For example, you can close and reopen existing connections by cycling power to a device, or by inhibiting and
uninhibiting the connection.
IMPORTANT With the After deployment option, the security policy is applied to each connection individually. If the connection
reset is postponed and an unexpected connection drop occurs, the system can enter a state in which the security
policy operates only in parts of the system.
In this case, unexpected connection outages can occur. Connection outages are difficult to track. We recommend
that you use extreme caution when using the After deployment option.
This option is useful if there’s a scheduled maintenance reset process in your environment that can be relied upon to perform this
function.
4. Click DEPLOY.
The Results pane updates with the results of the deployment as it occurs. After deployment is complete a summary report is provided listing the
successes, failures, and errors encountered during the process.
For information on how to deploy a security model, see the FactoryTalk Policy Manager Getting Results Guide, publication FTALK-GR001.
Back up FactoryTalk System Services to save a copy of the security model and its associated certificates. After the model has been created, the
FactoryTalk System Services backup file is included with the FactoryTalk Services Platform backup when it’s performed.
IMPORTANT You must have Administrator privileges to back up FactoryTalk System Services.
To be clear, a FactoryTalk Directory backup excludes product backup files. You must back up individual applications separately from a FactoryTalk
Directory backup. However, once you create a backup of the Security Model (FTSS_Backup folder), this folder is included in the FactoryTalk
Directory Backup when performed.
For more information on how to back up the FactoryTalk Directory, see the FactoryTalk Security System Configuration Guide,
publication FTSEC-QS001.
You can restore a FactoryTalk System Services database backup in a later revision of software. For example, you can open a backup of a
FactoryTalk System Services database, version 6.11 with version 6.20 or later.
IMPORTANT Before you migrate from version 6.11 to version 6.20 or later, we recommend that you see the following Rockwell Automation
Knowledgebase articles that are available at https://rockwellautomation.custhelp.com/app/home:
• Backup and restore CIP Security models of FactoryTalk Policy Manager and FactoryTalk System Services, click here.
• Fail to migrate existing FactoryTalk System Service data with CIP Security policy models, click here.
• FactoryTalk Policy Manager download and install, click here.
We recommend that you use the latest version of FactoryTalk Policy Manager.
After you click Delete, the device stays in the table but is crossed out. The device no longer appears in the list after you deploy the updated
security model and state in the next step.
3. Deploy the security model as described starting on page 59, and choose to reset the communication channels During deployment.
For more information on how to use FactoryTalk Administration Console, see the software online help.
Remove Security Policy From a Device Via FactoryTalk Policy Manager - Option 1
1. In the FactoryTalk Policy Manager navigation bar, select Devices, and then select the device.
3. Deploy the security model as described starting on page 59, and choose to reset the communication channels During deployment.
The device security policy is reset to none.
Remove Security Policy From a Device Via FactoryTalk Policy Manager - Option 2
1. In the FactoryTalk Policy Manager navigation bar, select Devices, and then select the device.
After you click Delete, the device stays in the table but is crossed out. After you deploy the updated security model and state, the device no
longer appears in the list.
3. Deploy the security model as described starting on page 59, and choose to reset the communication channels During deployment.
IMPORTANT If the device can’t be reached when the Deploy attempts to clear the security policy from the device, the attempt fails and
the security policy remains in the device.
When you remove the security policy from a device, if APD is enabled, the device automatically re-enrolls in the model in the onboarding
zone. To avoid this, you can disable APD on the device itself.
To disable APD for a device with FactoryTalk Policy Manager software, complete the following steps.
1. Remove the device from the model.
2. When prompted, choose to disable the automatic discovery for this device and click Delete.
Remove Security Policy From a Device By Resetting the Device to Factory Default State
You can remove the security policy from a device by resetting the device to its factory default state.
IMPORTANT The methods by which you reset devices to their factory default, and the conditions of each device when it is in its factory
default state, vary.
Before you reset a device to its factory default state to remove the security policy, be aware of the impact the reset can
have on your IACS in general.
Resetting a device to its factory default state can affect the overall system in ways unrelated to CIP Security.
For information on how to reset a device to its factory default state, see the technical documentation for the device.
Set Mask Parameters on PowerFlex 755T and PowerFlex 6000T Drives to Maintain Security
You can only apply CIP Security to the built-in EtherNet/IP interface on PowerFlex 755TL/TM/TR/TS and PowerFlex 6000T drives. There are ports in
addition to the built-in EtherNet/IP interface that you should secure.
There are ports on these products where Human Interface Modules (HIMs) and communication option cards can connect. You can secure these
ports by configuring mask parameters in the host PowerFlex product.
Port 1 is the HIM cradle on the control pod. Ports 2 and 3 are accessible through the DPI connector on the back of the HIM cradle on the control pod.
Communication option cards can connect to DPI ports 4…6. The cards include the following devices:
Drives Possible Devices
• 20-750-CNETC
• 20-750-DNET
• 20-750-ENETR
PowerFlex 755T
• 20-750-PBUS
• 20-750-PNET
• 20-750-PNET2P
• 20-750-DENC
• 20-750-ENC
• 20-750-ENETR
PowerFlex 6000T • 20-750-PBUS
• 20-750-PNET
• 20-750-PNET2P
• 20-750-UFB
For more information, see the PowerFlex Drives with TotalFORCE Control Programming Manual, publication 750-PM101.
1. Identify which ports contain HIMs, serial communication devices and communication option cards.
For example, this drive has a HIM at port 1 and a PROFINET option card in port 6.
Clearing the bit that corresponds to the port helps prevent a device at that port from controlling the start and logic command (such as direction) of
the host product.
3. Clear the corresponding bits in the parameter 0:230 [Write Mask Cfg].
In this example, port 1 and port 6 are disabled. You must clear the corresponding bits 1 and 6.
Clearing the bit that corresponds to the port helps prevent a device at that port from writing values to any of the parameters in the host
product.
4. Cycle power or perform a reset to allow the configuration in parameter 0:230 [Write Mask Cfg] to take effect.
5. Verify that the corresponding bits are properly set in parameter 0:231 [Write Mask Act].
Syslog Collector
A Syslog collector stores event messages that are sent from the generating device to the collector.
IMPORTANT The syslog collector and the generating device must be connected to the same Ethernet network.
If you use another tool as the Syslog collector, it must support the following:
• RFC-5424 syslog protocol
• Ability to receive messages from CIP Security-enabled devices
You must configure an IP address for the Syslog Collector in FactoryTalk Policy Manager software.
Also known as Secure Eventing, this service uses the following communication protocols to log messages:
• UDP - A protocol that gives good performance for a high volume of messages, however, it can lose data during network issues.
• TCP - A protocol that is best suited for high-priority messaging.
To use syslog in FactoryTalk Policy Manager software, complete the following tasks.
1. Enable Security Eventing.
2. Configure the IP address of the syslog collector.
3. Configure endpoint filtering based on the following:
- Severity Level of Information based on the descriptions in Table 13 on page 77.
- Log failures - Select whether only failures or both successes and failures are logged.
4. Change the port of the syslog server.
5. Set the protocol - TCP or UDP.
6. Enable Sequence ID and Time Quality.
7. Select what details are included in events, that is, Sequence ID and/or Time Quality.
When an event occurs, the syslog generates an event that includes metadata that is related to the syslog configuration.
For example, if an unauthorized device that uses IP address 192.168.1.102 tries to make a connection to a device in the system. The connection
attempt is denied and the syslog generates an event that indicates that an unauthorized device tried to make the connection.
In this case, the event ID = cipsec_tls_srv_session_failed, event=13. The syslog indicates the time, in milliseconds or nanoseconds, when the event
occurred.
Table 12 describes the facility codes that syslog uses to label events.
Table 12 - Syslog Event Facility Codes
Category ID Facility Code Definition
null 0 local0(16) For future use, no events belong to this category.
comms 1 local0(16) A general communications-related event
config 2 local0(16) A general configuration-related event
diag 3 syslog(5) A general fault or error diagnostic
stat 4 local0(16) A general event providing statistical data
alert 5 syslog(5) A general event-related to a potential threat
control 6 local0(16) A general control system-related event
audit 7 local0(16) A general audit log-related event
backup 8 local0(16) A general backup or restore-related event
security 9 auth(4) A general security-related event
cip 10 local0(16) A CIP-related event
http 11 local0(16) A web server or client-related event
opc 12 local0(16) An OPC or OPC-UA-related event
log 13 local0(16) A log-related event
cert 14 local0(16) A certificate-related event
discovery 15 local0(16) A system discovery-related event
auth 16 auth(4) An account management-related event
sys 17 local7(23) A general system-related event
cipsec 18 auth(4) A CIP Security-related event
ra-wks 19 local0(16) A workspace-related event (frontend and backend)
ra-comms 20 local0(16) An automation device communication-related event
ra-top 21 local0(16) A topology-related event
ra-cat 22 local0(16) A category-related event
ra-ns 23 local0(16) A Namespace-related event
ra-authc 24 local0(16) An authentication-related event
ra-authz 25 local0(16) An authorization-related event
ra-cert 26 local0(16) A certificate-related event
ra-secret 27 local0(16) A secret-related event
ra-log 28 local0(16) A logging management-related event
ra-vcs 29 local0(16) A version control system management-related event
ra-sys 30 local0(16) A general system management-related event
safety 31 local0(16) A safety-related event
ctlr 32 local0(16) A Programmable Automation Controller-related event
Severity Levels
Events can have security risks that can take many forms, for example:
• Threat actors that try to gain unauthorized, and undetected, access to an IACS network with the intention to commit malicious acts.
• Well-intentioned personnel with no malicious intention but who make mistakes that can result in unintended consequences.
Table 13 describe the severity levels as defined by The Syslog Protocol, RFC 5424, standard.
Table 13 - Event Security Risk Severity Levels
Severity Name Severity Level Definition
emrg 0 Emergency System is unusable.
alrt 1 Alert Should be corrected immediately
crit 2 Critical Critical condition
err 3 Error Error condition
warn 4 Warning Error may occur if action is not taken.
note 5 Notice Events are unusual.
info 6 Informational Normal operations, no action required.
dbg 7 Debug Information for developers
audit 8 Audit Information for the audit system
time 9 Time Timestamp value to format according to RFC 3339
causeid 10 Cause Identification Uniquely identifies a transaction of operations (by UUID)
Notes:
For more information on the CIP Security properties that you can use to secure communication, see Secure Data Transport on page 14.
We recommend that you secure communication between the PC Zone to each IACS zone because it has the most vulnerabilities from Windows-
based operating systems when it is not secured.
Create zones and all applicable devices including CIP Security-capable and non-CIP Security-capable devices.
• PC Zone (FactoryTalk® Site servers and engineering workstations [EWS])
• Cell Zone A (Controller zone)
• Cell Zone B (I/O zone)
• Cell Zone C (Controller zone)
IMPORTANT The example zones that are shown in this section are all in the same subnet/VLAN.
PC Zone
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
OK
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
LINK 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LINK 2
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
DEVICE 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
PORT 4
I/O
4
I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
L85_Line1 -
MBRK
+
-
MBRK
+
L85_Motion
1756-EN4TR module 1
1783-CSP
(rear)
2
(front)
1756-EN4TR module
1734-AENTR
1783-CSP Proxy module Kinetix® 5700 Kinetix 5700
POINT I/O™ servo drives_1 servo drives__2
modules
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
F4 F12 F4 F12
F5 F13 F5 F13
F6 F14 F6 F14
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
PC Zone
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
OK
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
LINK 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LINK 2
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
DEVICE 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
PORT 4
I/O
4
I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
L85_Line1 -
MBRK
+
-
MBRK
+
L85_Motion
1756-EN4TR module 1
1783-CSP
(rear)
2
(front)
1756-EN4TR module
1734-AENTR
1783-CSP Proxy module Kinetix 5700 Kinetix 5700
POINT I/O servo drives_1 servo drives_2
modules
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
F4 F12 F4 F12
F5 F13 F5 F13
F6 F14 F6 F14
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
Table 15 is an example of an updated security matrix after conduits are identified and organized.
Table 15 - Security Matrix - Conduits
Destination
Source
PC Zone Cell Zone A Cell Zone B Cell Zone C
PC Zone Permit(1) Conduit 1: Zone-to-Zone Conduit 2: Zone-to-Zone Conduit 3: Zone-to-Zone
Cell Zone A Conduit 1: Zone-to-Zone Permit Denied Denied
Cell Zone B Conduit 2: Zone-to-Zone Denied Permit Denied
Cell Zone C Conduit 3: Zone-to-Zone Denied Denied Permit
(1) Default pathway.
Configure the conduit security policies that use certificates and message integrity in the following ways:
• Between the FactoryTalk Linx software to the ControlLogix® 5580 controller in Cell Zone A (Controller zone).
• Between the FactoryTalk Linx software and the Kinetix 5700 drives in Cell Zone B (I/O zone).
• From the FactoryTalk Linx software to the ControlLogix 5580 controller in Cell Zone C (Controller zone) through a 1756-EN4TR communication
module.
Optionally, you can establish an allowed list from the PC zone to each IP address of the non-CIP Security-capable devices.
PC Zone
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
OK
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
LINK 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LINK 2
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
DEVICE 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
PORT 4
I/O
4
I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
L85_Line1 -
MBRK
+
-
MBRK
+
L85_Motion
1756-EN4TR module 1
1783-CSP
2
1756-EN4TR module
(rear) (front)
1734-AENTR
1783-CSP Proxy module Kinetix 5700 Kinetix 5700
POINT I/O servo drives_1 servo drives_2
modules
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
F4 F12 F4 F12
F5 F13 F5 F13
F6 F14 F6 F14
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
Integrity
Zone to Zone Conduit
Certificate
Allowed
Table 16 is an example of an updated security matrix after the conduit security policies are configured.
Table 16 - Security Matrix - Conduit Security Policies Matrix
Secure Linx Communication: Conduits 1, 2, and 3 Zone to Zone Security Policy
PC Zone Cell Zone A • Certificates
Zone to Zone PC Zone Cell Zone B • Integrity
(Secure communication with FactoryTalk Linx.)
PC Zone Cell Zone C • Confidentiality
Create a device-to-device conduit for secure CIP-connection from the ControlLogix 5580 controller in Cell Zone A (Controller zone) to the
ControlLogix 5580 controller in Cell Zone C (Controller zone).
PC Zone
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
OK
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
LINK 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LINK 2
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
DEVICE 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
PORT 4
I/O
4
I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
L85_Line1 -
MBRK
+
-
MBRK
+
L85_Motion
1756-EN4TR module 1
1783-CSP
(rear)
2
(front)
1756-EN4TR module
1734-AENTR
module Kinetix 5700 Kinetix 5700
1783-CSP Proxy
POINT I/O servo drives_1 servo drives_2
modules
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
F4 F12 F4 F12
F5 F13 F5 F13
F6 F14 F6 F14
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
Integrity
Zone to Zone Conduit
Certificate
Device to Device Conduit
Allowed
Create a zone-to-device conduit from the Kinetix 5700 drives in Cell Zone B (I/O zone) to the ControlLogix 5580 controller in Cell Zone C
(Controller zone).
PC Zone
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
OK
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
LINK 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LINK 2
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
DEVICE 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
PORT 4
I/O
4
I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
L85_Line1 -
MBRK
+
-
MBRK
+
L85_Motion
1756-EN4TR module 1
1783-CSP
(rear)
2
(front)
1756-EN4TR module
1734-AENTR
1783-CSP Proxy module Kinetix 5700 Kinetix 5700
POINT I/O servo drives_1 servo drives_2
modules
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
F4 F12 F4 F12
F5 F13 F5 F13
F6 F14 F6 F14
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
Integrity
Zone to Zone Conduit
Certificate
Device to Device Conduit
Table 17 is an example of an updated security matrix after conduits are identified and organized.
Table 17 - Security Matrix - Device-to-Device and Zone-to-Zone Conduits Added
Destination
Source
PC Zone Cell Zone A Cell Zone B Cell Zone C
PC Zone Permit(1) Conduit 1: Zone-to-Zone Conduit 2: Zone-to-Zone Conduit 3: Zone-to-Zone
Cell Zone A Conduit 1: Zone-to-Zone Permit Denied Conduit 4: Device-to-Device
Cell Zone B Conduit 2: Zone-to-Zone Denied Permit Conduit 5: Zone-to-Device
Cell Zone C Conduit 3: Zone-to-Zone Denied Denied Permit
(1) Default pathway.
Create the conduit security policies that use certificates, message integrity, and data encryption between endpoints in Conduit 4 and Conduit 5.
PC Zone
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
OK
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
LINK 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LINK 2
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
DEVICE 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
PORT 4
I/O
4
I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
L85_Line1 -
MBRK
+
-
MBRK
+
L85_Motion
1756-EN4TR module 1
1783-CSP
(rear)
2
(front)
1756-EN4TR module
1734-AENTR
1783-CSP Proxy module Kinetix 5700 Kinetix 5700
POINT I/O servo drives_1 servo drives_2
modules
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
F4 F12 F4 F12
F5 F13 F5 F13
F6 F14 F6 F14
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
Integrity
Zone to Zone Conduit
Certificate
Device to Device Conduit
Allowed
Zone to Device Conduit
Encryption
Table 18 is an example of an updated security matrix after the conduit security policies are configured.
Table 18 - Security Matrix - Conduit Security Policies Matrix
Secure Linx Communication: Conduits 1, 2, and 3 Zone-to-Zone Security Policy
PC Zone Cell Zone A • Certificates
Zone to Zone PC Zone Cell Zone B • Integrity
(Secure communication with FactoryTalk Linx.)
PC Zone Cell Zone C • Confidentiality
Deploy the updated security policies to the devices as described on page 59.
IMPORTANT You can only apply CIP Security to one of the ports in Dual-IP mode. Typically, CIP Security is applied to port A1
because it can connect to enterprise-level and device-level networks.
In this example architecture, one controller is configured for Dual-IP mode, and the other controller is configured for Linear mode. On the controller
that uses Dual-IP mode, Port A1 is configured for CIP Security.
We recommend that you secure communication between the PC Zone to each IACS zone because it has the most vulnerabilities from Windows-
based operating systems when it is not secured.
Create zones and all applicable devices including CIP Security-capable and non-CIP Security-capable devices.
• PC Zone (FactoryTalk Site servers and EWS)
• Cell Zone A (Controller zone)
• Cell Zone B (I/O zone)
• Cell Zone C (Controller zone)
IMPORTANT The example zones that are shown in this section are all in the same subnet/VLAN.
DC INPUT ControlLogix
1
1783-CSP
2
5580
Device level (rear) (front)
controller
connection 1734-AENTR
PowerFlex PowerFlex 1756-EN4TR
1783-CSP module
6000T drive_1 6000T drive_2 module
Proxy POINT I/O
modules
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
F4 F12 F4 F12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
F5 F13 F5 F13 4
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
4
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
I/O I/O
F6 F14 F6 F14
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
- -
MBRK MBRK
+ +
DC INPUT ControlLogix
1
1783-CSP
2
5580
Device level (rear) (front)
controller
connection 1734-AENTR
PowerFlex PowerFlex 1756-EN4TR
1783-CSP module
6000T drive_1 6000T drive_2 module
Proxy POINT I/O
modules
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
F4 F12 F4 F12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
F5 F13 F5 F13 4
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
4
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
I/O I/O
F6 F14 F6 F14
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
- -
MBRK MBRK
+ +
Table 20 is an example of an updated security matrix after conduits are identified and organized.
Table 20 - Security Matrix - Conduits
Destination
Source
PC Zone Cell Zone A Cell Zone B Cell Zone C
PC Zone Permit(1) Conduit 1: Zone-to-Zone Conduit 2: Zone-to-Zone Conduit 3: Zone-to-Zone
Cell Zone A Conduit 1: Zone-to-Zone Permit Denied Denied
Cell Zone B Conduit 2: Zone-to-Zone Denied Permit Denied
Cell Zone C Conduit 3: Zone-to-Zone Denied Denied Permit
(1) Default pathway.
Configure the conduit security policies that use certificates and message integrity in the following ways:
• Between the FactoryTalk Linx software to the CompactLogix 5380 controller in Cell Zone A (Controller zone).
• Between the FactoryTalk Linx software and the PowerFlex 6000T drives in Cell Zone B (I/O zone).
• From the FactoryTalk Linx software to the Compact GuardLogix 5380 controller in Cell Zone C (Controller zone).
Optionally, you can establish an allowed list from the PC zone to each IP address of the non-CIP Security-capable devices.
DC INPUT ControlLogix
1
1783-CSP
2
5580
Device level (rear) (front)
controller
connection 1734-AENTR
PowerFlex PowerFlex 1756-EN4TR
1783-CSP module
6000T drive_1 6000T drive_2 module
Proxy POINT I/O
modules
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
F4 F12 F4 F12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
F5 F13 F5 F13 4
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
4
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
I/O I/O
F6 F14 F6 F14
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
- -
MBRK MBRK
+ +
Integrity
Zone to Zone Conduit
Certificate
Allowed
Table 21 is an example of an updated security matrix after the conduit security policies are configured.
Table 21 - Security Matrix - Conduit Security Policies Matrix
Secure Linx Communication: Conduits 1, 2, and 3 Zone to Zone Security Policy
PC Zone Cell Zone A • Certificates
Zone to Zone PC Zone Cell Zone B • Integrity
(Secure communication with FactoryTalk Linx.)
PC Zone Cell Zone C • Confidentiality
Create a device-to-device conduit for secure CIP-connection from the CompactLogix 5380 controller in Cell Zone A (Controller zone) to the Compact
GuardLogix 5380 controller in Cell Zone C (Controller zone).
Enterprise- L310ERMS2_Motion
level L310ERM_Line1 Linear mode
connection Dual-IP mode OK
LINK 1
LINK 2
DEVICE
PORT
DC INPUT ControlLogix
1
1783-CSP
2
5580
Device level (rear) (front)
controller
connection 1734-AENTR
PowerFlex PowerFlex 1756-EN4TR
1783-CSP module
6000T drive_1 6000T drive_2 module
Proxy POINT I/O
modules
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
F4 F12 F4 F12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
F5 F13 F5 F13 4
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
4
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
I/O I/O
F6 F14 F6 F14
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
- -
MBRK MBRK
+ +
Integrity
Zone to Zone Conduit
Certificate
Device to Device Conduit
Allowed
Create a zone-to-device conduit from the PowerFlex 6000T drives in Cell Zone B (I/O zone) to the Compact GuardLogix 5580 controller in Cell Zone C
(Controller zone).
Enterprise- L310ERMS2_Motion
level L310ERM_Line1 Linear mode
connection Dual-IP mode OK
LINK 1
LINK 2
DEVICE
PORT
DC INPUT ControlLogix
1
1783-CSP
2
5580
Device level (rear) (front)
controller
connection 1734-AENTR
PowerFlex PowerFlex 1756-EN4TR
1783-CSP module
6000T drive_1 6000T drive_2 module
Proxy POINT I/O
modules
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
F4 F12 F4 F12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
F5 F13 F5 F13 4
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
4
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
I/O I/O
F6 F14 F6 F14
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
- -
MBRK MBRK
+ +
Integrity
Zone to Zone Conduit
Certificate
Device to Device Conduit
Table 22 is an example of an updated security matrix after conduits are identified and organized.
Table 22 - Security Matrix - Device-to-Device and Zone-to-Zone Conduits Added
Destination
Source
PC Zone Cell Zone A Cell Zone B Cell Zone C
PC Zone Permit(1) Conduit 1: Zone-to-Zone Conduit 2: Zone-to-Zone Conduit 3: Zone-to-Zone
Cell Zone A Conduit 1: Zone-to-Zone Permit Denied Conduit 4: Device-to-Device
Cell Zone B Conduit 2: Zone-to-Zone Denied Permit Conduit 5: Zone-to-Device
Cell Zone C Conduit 3: Zone-to-Zone Denied Denied Permit
(1) Default pathway.
Create the conduit security policies that use certificates, message integrity, and data encryption between endpoints in Conduit 4 and Conduit 5.
Enterprise- L310ERMS2_Motion
level L310ERM_Line1 Linear/ mode
connection Dual-IP mode OK
LINK 1
LINK 2
DEVICE
PORT
DC INPUT ControlLogix
1
1783-CSP
2
5580
Device level (rear) (front)
controller
connection 1734-AENTR
PowerFlex PowerFlex 1756-EN4TR
1783-CSP module
6000T drive_1 6000T drive_2 module
Proxy POINT I/O
modules
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
F4 F12 F4 F12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
F5 F13 F5 F13 4
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
4
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
I/O I/O
F6 F14 F6 F14
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
- -
MBRK MBRK
+ +
Integrity
Zone to Zone Conduit
Certificate
Device to Device Conduit
Encryption
Table 23 is an example of an updated security matrix after the conduit security policies are configured.
Table 23 - Security Matrix - Conduit Security Policies Matrix
Secure Linx Communication: Conduits 1, 2, and 3 Zone-to-Zone Security Policy
PC Zone Cell Zone A • Certificates
Zone to Zone PC Zone Cell Zone B • Integrity
(Secure communication with FactoryTalk Linx.)
PC Zone Cell Zone C • Confidentiality
Deploy the updated security policies to the devices as described on page 59.
The processes for adding or replacing a device differ based on whether the device supports Automatic Policy Deployment (APD).
APD lets EtherNet/IP™ endpoints, for example, field devices, initiate deployment of security policies that are defined on a system server. This
feature makes it easier to add and replace CIP™ Security-capable devices that support APD to an IACS with CIP Security implemented.
During the onboarding process, the devices are discovered, identified, and provisioned with identities and temporary policies. The onboarded
devices can then be merged into the security model and have their policies deployed automatically.
APD requires a system server with FactoryTalk Policy Manager installed and FactoryTalk System Services running.
After the FactoryTalk Policy Manager installation, FactoryTalk System Services start automatically with Windows® and run
independently from FactoryTalk Policy Manager. FactoryTalk System Services operate in the background even if the FactoryTalk Policy
Manager application is closed.
To enable APD, you must check the boxes in the Automatic Policy Deployment section of FactoryTalk Policy Manager software. The Automatic Policy
Deployment section is in the software’s global settings.
Deployment Operation
APD discovers the device on the network that you can add to the security model.
IMPORTANT • The server with the certificate authority, that is, FactoryTalk System Services, must be turned on and connected to the
EtherNet/IP network.
• APD can onboard and merge only one EtherNet/IP device interface. This applies to CompactLogix 5380 and Compact
GuardLogix 5380 controllers when they’re configured for Dual-IP mode.
4
3
2
1
DC INPUT
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
F1 F9
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
4 F2 F10
I/O
5
UFB
10 5
UFB-A
10 5
UFB-B
10 5
UFB-A
10 5
UFB-B
10 5
UFB-A
10 5
UFB-B
10 F3 F11
F4 F12
F5 F13
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D-
F7 F15
F8 F16
-
MBRK
+
Onboarding
The onboarding process automatically identifies EtherNet/IP endpoints and provisions certificates and temporary policies. Once the onboarding
process finishes, the identified devices are placed in the Onboarding Area.
The devices in the Onboarding Area aren’t a part of the security model. You can’t add a conduit to the Onboarding Area or to any onboarding device.
Depending on the onboarding policy, you can allow or restrict the onboarding devices from connecting with other devices in the network.
While you can restrict communication over the EtherNet/IP network, you cannot restrict communication over the backplane. For example, you can
restrict connections to a ControlLogix 5580 controller via its Ethernet port. However, a module in the same chassis can still communicate with the
controller via the backplane.
When the device is in the Onboarding area, there is security because other devices can’t communicate with the device. You must add the device to
the FactoryTalk Policy Manager security model for other devices to communicate with it.
You can manually move the devices from the Onboarding Area into the security model.
IMPORTANT When you move a device from the Onboarding Area to a zone or make the device unassigned, you can’t assign the device to
the Onboarding Area again.
If you delete a device that can be discovered by APD, FactoryTalk Policy Manager prompts you to:
• Disable the automatic discovery for the endpoint to help prevent the device from reappearing in the Onboarding Area.
• Keep the automatic discovery enabled to restore the device in the Onboarding Area.
Device Does Not Appear in Onboarding Area
It is possible that a device that supports APD is connected to the network and doesn’t appear in the Onboarding area of FactoryTalk Policy Manager
software.
If the APD function is disabled on the device, it does not appear in the Onboarding Area. You can enable APD by resetting the device to the out-of-
the-box state.
Once the EST server has been discovered then the device interacts with it to request an identity and trust information.
The following issues can prevent devices from appearing in Onboarding Area:
• For some reason, a firewall is preventing communication to mDNS and/or EST servers, therefore FactoryTalk System Services cannot
respond to requests.
To resolve this issue, you must add or modify the firewall rules to allow the communication between the CIP Security-capable device and the
mDNS and/or EST servers.
The ports that must be enabled are:
- mDNS: UDP 5353
- EST: TCP 40014
If this issue exists in your application, we recommend that you use resources available with the company that designed your firewall to
resolve the issue.
• If multiple network interfaces are used in the workstation, there are two IP addresses that are used in the same workstation, one for each
interface.
In this case, FactoryTalk System Services software can fail to identify, and use, the correct IP addresses. That is, the EST server uses one IP
address. But the mDNS-SD functions as if the EST server is using the other IP address.
As a result, the request for a certificate is not responded to, and the device is not onboarded.
For more information, see the FactoryTalk Policy Manager Getting Results Guide, publication FTALK-GR001.
If the device is connected to a switch that knows the location of the server with FactoryTalk System Services installed on it, you can configure the
switch to respond to the mDNS requests on behalf of the server with FactoryTalk System Services.
In this case, the switch functions more like a proxy. When the device makes the request for the EST server, the switch responds with the location of
the EST server.
However, you must configure the switch to respond with the location of the EST server. If the switch is not properly configured, the device can’t
obtain the IP address of the EST server.
The following is an example of a system in which FactoryTalk System Services and FactoryTalk Policy Manager are on different subnets.
The application requires an external DNS-SD server or a switch with technology that bridges mDNS over subnets.
LEVEL 3.5-4
DMZ/IT
Network IDMZ
Firewalls
Proxy servers
supervisory
network
DC INPUT
F1 F9
F2 F10
F3 F11
F4 F12
F5 F13
F6 F14
F7 F15
F8 F16
LEVEL 0…1
Controller/
sensor
network
Merging
Depending on the security model and the devices available in the network, the merging process can be automatic or manual.
Automatic Merging
The merging process is automatic if the onboarding device has the same IP address as the matching device in the security model.
The onboarding device does not need to be identical with the matching device in the security model. During the merging process, the newer device
properties overwrite the older device properties.
IMPORTANT The automatic merging process never overwrites the following properties:
• IP address
• Device name
• Device description
Manual Merging
The merging process is manual if the onboarding device can’t be associated with any device in the security model.
An administrator can manually move the discovered device from the Onboarding Area to the security model.
In this example, for the replacement communication module to support Automatic Policy Deployment, updates the communication module from
revision 3.002 to revision 4.001 or later.
When you disable APD in the software, you disable the EST services and the queries from any APD-capable devices are not responded to.
The Automatic Policy Deployment section is in the software’s global settings.
Figure 27 - Add a New Device When the Device is Not in the Security Policy Model
Existing CIP Security System CIP Security System with Newly Device
Device To Be Added
1756-EN4TR
Communication Module
DC INPUT
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
4 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
I/O
4
I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D-
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
-
MBRK
+ -
MBRK
+
DC INPUT
F1 F9
F1 F9
F2 F10
F2 F10
F3 F11
F3 F11
F4 F12
F4 F12
F5 F13
F5 F13
F6 F14
F6 F14
F7 F15
F7 F15
F8 F16
F8 F16
Figure 28 - Add a New Device When Device is in the Security Policy Model
Existing CIP Security System CIP Security System with New Device
Device To Be Added
1756-EN4TR
Communication Module
DC INPUT
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
4 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
I/O
4
I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D-
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
-
MBRK
+ -
MBRK
+
DC INPUT
F1 F9
F1 F9
F2 F10
F2 F10
F3 F11
F3 F11
F4 F12
F4 F12
F5 F13
F5 F13
F6 F14
F6 F14
F7 F15
F7 F15
F8 F16
F8 F16
IMPORTANT When you replace a device with another device that uses the same IP address, the new device’s properties overwrite the
existing device’s properties.
Figure 29 shows an example in which the PowerFlex 755T drive with IP address 192.168.1.10 is replaced by a 1756-EN4TR communication
module with the same IP address.
Figure 29 - Replace a Device With a New Device That Only Uses the Same IP Address Only
Existing CIP Security System CIP Security System with Replacement Device
Replacement Device
1756-EN4TR
Communication Module
DC INPUT
MOD
NET
2
MOD
NET
MOD
NET
MOD
NET
MOD
NET
1756-EN4TR DC INPUT
2
MOD
NET
2
MOD
NET
2
MOD
NET
2
MOD
NET
2
MOD
NET
Communication Module
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 4
4 I/O
I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+
D-
MF-A
D+
D-
MF-B
D+
D-
MF-A
D+
D-
MF-B
D+
D-
MF-A
D+
D-
MF-B
IP address - 192.168.1.10 -
MBRK
D+
D-
MF-A
D+
D-
MF-B
D+
D-
MF-A
D+
D-
MF-B
D+
D-
MF-A
D+
D-
MF-B
- +
MBRK
+
PowerFlex DC INPUT
DC INPUT
755T Drive
F1 F9
F1 F9
F2 F10
F2 F10
F3 F11
F3 F11
F4 F12
F4 F12
IP address -
F5 F13
F5 F13
F6 F14
F6 F14
F7 F15
F7 F15
F8 F16
F8 F16
192.168.1.10
Existing CIP Security System CIP Security System with New Device
Replacement Device
1756-EN4TR
Communication Module
DC INPUT
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD
NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET NET
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B 1 I/O I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B I/O-A I/O-B
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6
4 4
I/O I/O
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B UFB-A UFB-B
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D- D-
MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B MF-A MF-B
- -
MBRK MBRK
+ +
DC INPUT DC INPUT
F1 F9 F1 F9
F2 F10 F2 F10
F3 F11 F3 F11
F4 F12 F4 F12
F5 F13 F5 F13
F6 F14 F6 F14
F7 F15 F7 F15
F8 F16 F8 F16
1756-EN4TR 1756-EN4TR
Communication Module Communication Module
The security policy is automatically deployed to the new communication module using APD.
Add a Device That Does Not Support APD to an Existing CIP Security System
Complete the following steps to add a CIP Security-capable device that does not support APD to an existing CIP Security system.
1. Connect the device to the network.
2. In FactoryTalk Policy Manager software, add devices to the zone. You can add devices in the following ways:
- Discover devices via FactoryTalk Linx.
- Manually add devices from the catalog.
3. Deploy the updated security model as described in Deploy Security Model on page 59.
Replace a Secured Device That Does Not Support APD in an Existing System
When you replace a CIP Security-enabled device that does not support APD, it can’t function in a secured IACS as before without a policy
redeployment.
IMPORTANT This restriction does not apply when you use a 1783-CSP Proxy to connect a proxied device to an IACS that uses CIP
Security.
If you replace a proxied device that is connected to a 1783-CSP Proxy with an identical device, that is, same device type,
catalog number, firmware revision, and IP address, you aren’t required to redeploy the security model.
For more information on how to use a 1783-CSP Proxy in an IACS that has CIP Security implemented, see the CIP Security
Proxy User Manual, publication 1783-UM013.
Complete the following steps to replace a CIP Security-enabled device that does not support APD.
4. When the following dialog box appears, choose when to reset device communication on ports included in the model, and click Deploy.
Notes:
Software
Table 26 lists the software that is used to implement CIP Security.
Table 26 - Software That Is Used to Implement CIP Security
Software Version Required
FactoryTalk® Policy Manager 6.11 or later Yes
FactoryTalk System Services 6.11 or later Yes
FactoryTalk Linx 6.11 or later Yes
Not required but commonly used with
Studio 5000 Logix Designer® 31.00.00 or later CIP Security.
Logix Controllers
Table 27 lists how you can use CIP Security with Logix 5000 controllers that are used in Logix Designer application projects, versions 31 or
later.
Table 27 - CIP Security With Logix Controllers in Logix Designer Applications
Studio 5000 Logix Designer Application
Controller V31 V32 V33 V34 V35 V36
CIP Security is supported by
using either of the following: CIP Security is supported by using one of the following:
• A 1756-EN4TR • The controller Ethernet port.
ControlLogix® 5580 communication module in • A 1756-EN4TR communication module in the same chassis.
the same chassis. • A CIP Security Proxy.(1)
• A CIP Security Proxy.(1)
CIP Security is supported by using either of the following:
ControlLogix 5570 • A 1756-EN4TR communication module in the same chassis.
• A CIP Security Proxy.(1)
CIP Security is supported by using one of the following:
CIP Security is supported by using either of the following:
• The controller Ethernet port.
GuardLogix® 5580 • A 1756-EN4TR communication module in the same chassis.
(1)
• A 1756-EN4TR communication module in the same chassis.
• A CIP Security Proxy.
• A CIP Security Proxy.(1)
CIP Security is supported by using either of the following:
GuardLogix 5570 • A 1756-EN4TR communication module in the same chassis.
• A CIP Security Proxy.(1)
CIP Security is supported by using one of the following:
CompactLogix™ 5380 CIP Security is supported by using a CIP Security Proxy. (1) • Either controller Ethernet port.
• A CIP Security Proxy.(1)
CompactLogix 5370 CIP Security is supported by using a CIP Security Proxy. (1)
CIP Security is not available with any of the following controllers in any programming software version:
• ControlLogix 5560
• ControlLogix 5550
• GuardLogix 5560
• CompactLogix 5480
• 1768 CompactLogix
• 1768 Compact GuardLogix
• 1769 CompactLogix
• FlexLogix™ L34
• DriveLogix™ 5370
• SoftLogix™ 5800
Table 28 - ControlLogix 5580 and 5570 Controller Redundancy With a CIP Security System
Studio 5000 Logix Designer® Application
Controller V31 V32 V33 V34 V35 V36
CIP Security is
supported by using CIP Security is supported by using one of the following:
one CIP Security Proxy • One CIP Security Proxy through an Ethernet switch to 1756-EN2x
through an Ethernet EtherNet/IP communication modules in a redundant chassis pair.
ControlLogix® 5580 switch to 1756-EN2x
Redundancy not available (1)
controllers communication
modules in a • A pair of 1756-EN4TR communication modules, firmware revision
redundant chassis 4.001 or later. (2)
pair. (1)
ControlLogix 5570 CIP Security is supported by using one CIP Security Proxy through an Ethernet switch to 1756-EN2x EtherNet/IP communication modules in a
controllers redundant chassis pair.(1)
(1) IMPORTANT: This is only for workstation programming, upload/download, and data collection, not for I/O. For more information, see the CIP Security Proxy User Manual, publication 1783-
UM013.
(2) IMPORTANT: This is only for workstation programming, upload/download, and data collection, not for I/O. For more information, see the High Availability Systems Reference Manual,
publication HIGHAV-RM002.
Other Devices
Table 29 lists other devices that you can use with CIP Security.
Table 29 - Other Devices Used With a CIP Security System
Device Firmware Revision
1756-EN4TR EtherNet/IP communication module Any
Armor™ PowerFlex® drives 10.001 or later
Kinetix® 5300 drives 13.003 or later
Kinetix 5700 drives 11.001 or later
PowerFlex 755T drives 10.001 or later
PowerFlex 755TS drives 11.001 or later
PowerFlex® 6000T drives 9.001 or later
1783-CSP CIP Security Proxy Any
For information on the devices that have been tested with a CIP Security Proxy and
Proxied devices that have been tested with the 1783-CSP CIP Security Proxy can be used in a system with CIP Security implemented, see the CIP Security Proxy
User Manual, publication 1783-UM013.
Notes:
E M
events man-in-the-middle attack 10
use with syslog 74 - 77 mask parameters
set on PowerFlex 755T drives 71 - 74
monitor data attack 10
F
FactoryTalk Administration Console
remove security configuration from N
FactoryTalk Linx 66 network address translations
FactoryTalk Directory limitations with CIP Security 32
back up 62
FactoryTalk Linx
description 17 P
disable CIP Security 37 Policy provisioning 33
FactoryTalk Policy Manager
PowerFlex 6000T drives
description 17
remove security policy from a device 64 - 71 description 19
FactoryTalk System Services PowerFlex 755T drives
back up 62 description 19
description 17 set mask parameters 71 - 74
restore 63 PowerFlex 755TS drives
firmware revision updates 102 description 19
pre-shared keys 14
G
GuardLogix 5580 controllers
R
description 19 remove security policy
from a device 67 - 71
from a software application 64 - 67
I restore
I/O connections 37 FactoryTalk System Services 63
risk assessment 11
RSLinx Classic software 43
K
Kinetix 5300 drives S
description 19
Kinetix 5700 drives secure eventing 75
description 19 security assessment
conduct threat assessment 11
perform risk assessment 11
L perform vulnerability assessment 11
security matrix
legacy devices
conduits 81, 90
add to security model 43 zones and devices 47, 80, 89
limitations security model
CIP bridging 33 back up 62
Dual-IP mode 26 - 27 deploy 59 - 61
I/O connections 37 security policy
no connection between workstation and
controller 29 remove from a device 64 - 71
no deployment to controller in run mode 28 security policy properties
no download from unsecure workstation 28 conduits 25
using network address translation 32 zones 24
software
CIP Security-capable 17
FactoryTalk Linx 17
disable CIP security 37
FactoryTalk Policy Manager 17
FactoryTalk System Services 17
restore 63
RSLinx Classic 43
Studio 5000 Logix Designer 17
Studio 5000 Logix Designer
description 17
Syslog 74 - 77
collector 75
fault codes 76
secure eventing 75
severity levels 76
T
threat assessment 11
V
vulnerability assessment 11
Z
zones 22, 47 - 50
configure 49
create 48
security matrix 47
security policy properties 24
Notes:
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