Analyzing the Philippines' Standing in the World Governance Index: A

Quantitative Assessment of Governance Indicators and National Development

A Quantitative Research Paper

Submitted to the

Faculty of the Bachelor of Arts in Political Science

Social Sciences Department

College of Arts and Humanities

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for PSIE 6 Statistical Methods in Political Science

First Semester, SY 2024-2025

Prepared by:

Yasmien Jafe A. Aban

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science

December 17, 2024

 ABSTRACT

This study tends to investigate the factors that influence the Political Violence in the
Philippines such a gender-based power distribution, media biases, regional party
competition, and exclusion by political group. Using statistical methods, such as correlational
and regression analysis
The correlation analysis indicates that gender-based power distribution, media biases,
regional party competition, and exclusion by political group have a positive statistical
significance with political violence.

The regression analysis result says that us that 96.98% of the changes of Political violence
(y) around regression line are explained by Media Biases, Party competition across region,
and Power distributed by gender. This means that 93.50% of the values fit the regression
model, thus it is reliable. This study also suggests that the government must imposed a gun
ban during elections and before election.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The World Health Organization (2002) defined political violence as any act, whether physical
or psychological, that is meant to cause harm or put communities in danger. For instance,
home demolitions, arrests, torture, gunfire, or aerial bombardments. Deliberate denial of
human rights and basic necessities is also regarded by the WHO as political violence. There
is a direct link between political violence and structural violence as both involve aspects of
deprivation. Social structures such as the legal, cultural, educational, and healthcare
systems covertly function as "social machinery of oppression" that regularly, purposefully,
and methodically keep people from reaching their full potential through unequal distributions
of social, economic, and political power. It is abundantly evident that structural violence
frequently occurs before, alongside, and as a tool of political violence.

Furthermore, repression, torture, and forced exile are common forms of political violence that
target those most likely to threaten the prevailing and oppressive social order. While both are
influenced by each other, writers such as Galtung (1969), who is generally considered to
have created the first framework for structural violence, have distinguished some important
differences between political and structural violence: "direct" violence, or "personal violence,"
as Galtung refers to it, is overt, dynamic, and connects a visible aggressor to the victim,
while "indirect" violence is covert, static, and does not have a clear aggressor. Numerous
candidates and politicians are assassinated in the Philippines before, during, and after
elections.
Considering the ongoing and erratic violence, I explain why there is no sign of a solution and
why the barangay (village municipal ward) leadership elections in late October could result in
the deaths of several dozen incumbents and hopefuls. Violence is never denied; instead, it is
usually minimized and presented as uncommon. Philippine elections, with a few exceptions,
are often claimed to have been "generally peaceful and safe." Official assessments and
observations are fictitiously limited to campaign seasons and only concentrate on election-
related violence that has been verified by law enforcement, which makes this conceivable.
The degree of violence associated with democratic competition is significantly distorted by
this limited viewpoint.
First, because political killers are typically not punished, the confirmation procedure
effectively reduces the number of recorded cases and victims of election-related violent
events (ERVI). Compared to 133 in the 2016 national elections, over 47 in the 2018
barangay elections, and 60 in the 2019 national elections, there were officially just 16 ERVIs
in the 2022 elections. The fact that at least 451 politicians were killed, injured, or survived
assassination attempts uninjured during these four election years, whereas hundreds of
politicians were slain during non-election years, is entirely disregarded (own dataset).
Between January 2006 and August 2023, the dataset documents 1497 incumbents and
candidates who were slain, 312 who were injured, and 147 who managed to escape
unharmed by assassination attempts.
The shockingly high "success" rate of 76% and police arrests show that professional
gunmen are responsible for deaths, even though there may be some underreporting of
assassination attempts that did not cause harm to their targets.
Assassination attempts have always happened in the Philippines, even though the violence
is not dispersed equally, and that certain villages, cities, and provinces are immune to it. It is
ludicrous to assume that all these murders are connected to political rivalry, considering
nearly all of them had active legal proceedings involving the perpetrators. Nonetheless, there
is enough data to conclude that the great majority are.

METHODOLOGY
2.1 Research Design
The study will use a correlation research design to establish a relationship between the
extent of Political Violence and Exclusion by Political Group, Media Biases, Party
Competition Across Region, and Power distributed by gender.

2.2 Criteria for selection

The researcher gathered secondary data from the V-dem (Varieties of Democracy) Index
(https://v-dem.net/). The researcher chooses four independent variables such as Exclusion
by Political Group, Media Biases, Party Competition Across Region, and Power distributed
by gender, and one dependent variable—Political Violence. The researcher collected 31
selected values from 1963-2018 to serve as the basis of the study.
2.3 Statistical Tools
The researcher utilized Pearson’s Correlation coefficient to indicate the strength of
associations between the independent variables and dependent variable. The researcher
also utilizes Regression Analysis to determine how independent variables influence the
dependent variable.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Hypothesis: Political Violence and Exclusion by Political Group
Ho: There is no statistically significant linear association between Political Violence and
Exclusion by Political Group.
Ha: There is a statistically significant linear association between Political Violence and
Exclusion by Political Group.

P olit ical Com pet it ion vis - a- vis Ex -

clus ion by Polit ical Group
12
politiva Competition

10

0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
exclusion by political group

Table 1: Correlation Between Political Competition and Exclusion by Political Group.

Variables Numerical Result Description

Exclusion by Political Group r= 0.969624025 Strong positive relationship

(x) and between the two variables.
Political Competition p= 0.000000 Statistically significant
Note: R-value: 0-0.25 = little, very weak, or no association; 0.26-0.49 = fair degree of association; 0.50-0.74 = moderate
degree of association; 0.75 and above =strong association. P-value < 0.05**/0.1*=statistically significant
Based on Table 2, Exclusion by Political Group (x) have a strong positive relationship with
political violence (y). Additionally, it is statistically significant because the computed p-value
(0.000000) is less than the alpha (0.05).

Any democratic undertaking must consider the broad agency, status, and political
engagement of the broader public. Apart from the expansion of liberal democratic
institutions, the nature and course of democracy are determined by the types of people it
produces and retains. Furthermore, at least for the participatory and deliberative democratic
traditions, political empowerment—defined as having faith in the government as a
responsive entity and in oneself as a political player—is a prerequisite for democracy.

Even if most Filipinos are politically passive, disempowered, and even downright alienated,
only a small percentage engage in nonelectoral politics. A defective democratic system,
which is really an oligarchy supported by elections, is the most straightforward explanation
for this. This is the result of an approach that focuses on political institutions, elite
competitiveness, and electoral politics and is still frequently utilized in Philippine political
studies. The problem is that it considers both political involvement and disempowerment, the
former of which is presumed and the latter limited to voter behaviour and choices. The
systemic-structural explanation of the Philippine democracy dilemma can stand alone if we
limit democratic citizenship to voting, as liberal Democrats have done. The only elements
influencing political action in this case are the mobilizational strategies of the elites, such as
political marketing, clientelism, and patronage. However, political engagement and the
development of liberal democratic institutions become important issues when we consider
the amount and quality of political participation as well as the political and psychological
elements that influence the behaviour of common people. To put it another way, we can
convey to the public the challenges and issues of democratization.

Hypothesis: Political Violence and Media Biases

Ho: There is no statistically significant linear association between Political Violence and
Media Biases
Ha: There is a statistically significant linear association between Political Violence and Media
Biases
 P olit ical Violence vis - a- vis Media Bias
4
3.5
Political Violence

3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4
Media Biases

Table 2: Correlation Between Political Violence and Media Biases

Variables Numerical Result Description

Media Biases (x) and r= 0.953447072 Strong positive relationship

between the two variables.
Political Violence (y) p= 0.000000 Statistically significant
Note: R-value: 0-0.25 = little, very weak, or no association; 0.26-0.49 = fair degree of association; 0.50-0.74 = moderate
degree of association; 0.75 and above =strong association. P-value < 0.05**/0.1*=statistically significant

Based on Table 2, media biases (x) have a strong positive relationship with political violence
(y). Additionally, it is statistically significant because the computed p-value (0.000000) is less
than the alpha (0.05)

It might be challenging to tell if a media story is biased. It is increasingly challenging to

discern between bias and opinion because the media long ago gave up on the idea of
merely aiming for neutrality and objectivity in FavoUr of developing a more dedicated
journalism. Opinion is defined as "a thought or belief about something or someone."
According to the Cambridge Dictionary, bias is "an unfair preference for one thing" or "a
situation in which you support or oppose someone or something in an unfair way because
you are influenced by your personal opinions." These definitions suggest that the difference
between bias and opinion is based on whether a journalist employs rhetorical devices that
distort the facts to support his position.

Table 3: Statistical Linear Relationship Between Political Violence and Media Biases

Political Competition Description

and Media Biases

Adjusted R- 0,969876058106494 The computed R-value (0.69876058106494) tells

Square us that there is strong positive association
between Political Violence and Media Biases,
Party competition across region, and Power
distributed by gender.
R-square 0.971519182 Tells us that 97.50% of the changes of Political
violence (y) around regression line are explained
by Media Biases, Party competition across
region, and Power distributed by gender. This
means that 93.50% of the values fit the
regression model, thus it is reliable.
Regression -0,11371520163169 If Media biases variable (x) increased by one (1)
Coefficient unit, Political Violence decreased by
Intercept (0.113715202), noting the intercept (y) as
(3.01782015).
P-value 0.0000664 The computed P-value (0.0000664) is less than
the alpha (0.05), thus we reject the Null
Hypotheses (Ho) and accept the Alternative
Hypotheses (Ha). Therefore, the relationship
between the two variables is statistically
significant
Note: R-value: 0-0.25 = little, very weak, or no association; 0.26-0.49 = fair degree of association; 0.50-0.74 = moderate
degree of association; 0.75 and above =strong association. P-value < 0.05**/0.1*=statistically significant

Table 3 presents the statistical linear relationship between political violence and media
biases.
Based on the table, there is a strong positive linear relationship between political violence
and media biases (Adjusted e-square= 0.969876058106494). Further, 97.15% of the
changes in political violence (y) around the regression line are explained by media biases
(x). This means that 97.15% of the values fit the model hence the regression model is
reliable.

Moreover, the slope is negative, hence if the independent variable, which is media biases, is
increased by 1 unit, then political violence (y) decreased by 0.113715201631690; noting the
y-intercept is 3.01782014994474. This relationship is deemed statistically significant
because the p-value (0.0000) is less than alpha, which is 0.05, thus we reject the null
hypothesis (Ho) and accept the alternative hypothesis (Ha).
The media community has long held the keys to the information gates in the Philippines,
where they have a monopoly on news reporting and a range of effects that either construct
or destroy the news agenda. However, viewers have steadily taken over control of the
information dissemination process since traditional media have not responded to the
distinctive attitude of the anti-media that the mainstream, often seen, biased media
businesses are not portraying their mission. the belief that editorial decisions and the political
and commercial interests of major news organizations limit their ideas and points of view.
Thanks to Facebook and smartphones, the average person may now freely engage in the
information age. As a result, the media's monopoly on information distribution is challenged.
Political experts have dubbed the last three elections the "social media elections,"
highlighting online platforms like Facebook in addition to the streets and grandstands. More
than half of the nation's 102 million inhabitants, or over 55 million individuals, have internet
connections, according to a 2016 report by the International Telecommunication Union.
Despite the nation's lower internet penetration than its neighbours, political campaigners
cannot dispute that the internet can provide them with easier tools to propagate propaganda.
Therefore, politics is not limited to stages and grandstands; it may also exist virtually. Online
sharing of political opinions is already happening, according to Sta Maria-Abalos of the
University of the Philippines Baguio. According to her, candidates' supporters are far more
engaged on social media, particularly Facebook, where they can click the "like" and "share"
buttons to express their views or initiate a languid conversation. However, the issue with
Facebook posts is that they typically provide impulsive and uninformed opinions instead of
comprehensive information. According to Sta Maria-Abalos, internet media is fundamentally
a location where people are limited by information, and because of its extensive use by both
individuals and organizations, it becomes a public arena for information sharing that has the
capacity to "influence political opinion," "What is evident from these Facebook pages is the
display of minimal content along with user interactions and comments that feature
exaggerated and nonsensical statements," she said. Since the majority of voters rely on the
article and comment thread as their primary source of information, posts like these raise
extra concerns and cause confusion regarding the content. Furthermore, because of these
specific connections, social media platforms operate differently. According to the "Social
Media Logic" theory, Facebook demonstrates "programmability" in that user involvement
through relational behaviours like liking, favouriting, or sharing may change the information
and communication flow. The quantity of likes, shares, or comments on a particular post
affects the social media platform's algorithms. A post will rank higher in people's news feeds
if it receives more of these interactions.
Elections are significant occasions where voters have the agency and power to restrain
intra-elite struggles for political dominance, notwithstanding the many issues besetting
Philippine democracy. Either a Duterte proxy must be selected in 2022, or the candidates
must be elected in a free and fair election to prevent the system from imploding. The primary
difference between what political scientists refer to as "competitive authoritarian" regimes,
such as Singapore or Malaysia prior to 2018, and even gravely flawed democracies, such as
the Philippines, India, and Indonesia, is a level playing field for elections. These countries
regularly hold free elections, although they are not very fair. As Danilo Arao states in this
week's top story, it is concerning that the Duterte administration has placed such a strain on
the Philippines' traditionally critical and active mass media, which is one of the main pillars of
Philippine politics. Arao claims that Duterte and his supporters in the Philippine Congress,
government, police, and military have created the "climate of media repression" to punish
and intimidate opponents. After the Duterte-controlled legislature declined to renew its
broadcasting license, ABS-CBN, the nation's leading television network, vanished from the
airwaves in July 2020. Like the 1970s attack on the same network by the Marcos regime,
this "sends a chilling message to journalists and media workers in the country that they
should toe the administration line." The Philippines is one of the most dangerous locations
in the world to work as a journalist because of the high rate of violence against journalists.
The Nobel Peace Prize greatly increased the international recognition of Maria Ressa, editor
of the daring online news outlet Rappler. However, the government in her native country has
been mistreating her in court and pursuing legal action against her.

The replacement of grassroots political parties and civic associations by the mass media in
promoting contact between citizens and politicians is one facet of the contemporary global
political era. This is especially true in the Philippines, where the system was established by
local political apparatus combinations rather than political parties. Presidents use the media,
particularly television, to interact with the people on a grassroots level. Because voters rarely
identify with political parties, how certain presidential candidates are portrayed in the media
has a big impact on their decisions at the polls. Due to these reasons, Arao's depiction of the
domestication of the mass media could significantly impact the fairness of the 2022 election
if, for example, media outlets feel under pressure to restrict coverage of their rival or back a
candidate with strong ties to the government. In the context of a political culture that is
dominated by the media, it is very important, especially considering the controversial
presidential election. Other large democracies in Asia also exhibit similar patterns, albeit to
differing degrees. As a result of Indonesian President Joko Widodo's active co-optation of
the country's broadcast media tycoons to sustain his popularity during the pandemic, his
government has received considerably more favourable coverage. There are serious
concerns in India that the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party is limiting the media's capacity to
report on public policy in a critical manner. Since then, social media has developed into a
haven for groups that are growing more wary of the mainstream media, some of which are
liberal and others of which are not. In India and Indonesia, this has meant using the legal
system as a tool to target specific critics; in the Philippines, the government has simply made
online spaces poisonous by flooding social media with hate speech and misleading material
directed at opponents. Governments are aware of this and are using a range of tactics to
impose social media restrictions, typically in the name of fighting "misinformation" or "fake
news."
Given the deeply ingrained domestic political incentives and interests driving these
developments, it is challenging to identify what could stop or reverse these attacks on online
speech and media freedom.
Liberal democratic countries, for example, may be able to identify when and how their own
initiatives to enforce social media regulations and stop foreign "interference," even when
they are implemented for legitimate reasons, use as a cover for illiberal regimes to do the
same for sinister purposes. In some contexts, "misinformation" might simply mean
something, but in the Philippines and other nations where media and free expression are
being repressed more and more, it typically refers to information that the government does
not want the public to be aware of.

Hypothesis: Political Violence and Party Competition across region

Ho: There is no statistically significant linear association between Political Violence and
Party Competition across region
Ha: There is a statistically significant linear association between Political Violence and Party
Competition across region
 P olit ical Violence vis - a- vis Part y Com pe -
t it ion acros s region
12
Political violence

10
8
6
4
2
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
party competition across region

Table 4: Correlation Between Political Violence and Party Competition Across Regions

Variables Numerical Result Description

Party Competition Across r= -0,930267695814342 Strong positive relationship

Regions (x) and between the two variables.
Political Violence (y) p= 0.000000 Statistically significant
Note: R-value: 0-0.25 = little, very weak, or no association; 0.26-0.49 = fair degree of association; 0.50-0.74 = moderate
degree of association; 0.75 and above =strong association. P-value < 0.05**/0.1*=statistically significant

Based on Table 4, Exclusion by Party Competition Across Regions (x) have a strong positive
relationship with political violence (y). Additionally, it is statistically significant because the
computed p-value (0.000000) is less than the alpha (0.05).
In every electoral system, political parties compete with one another for popular support,
political power, and influence. This rivalry is known as party competition. This competition
reflects the dynamics of democracy and representation in government and can impact the
political climate, voter behavior, and party strategies.

Table 5: Statistical Linear Relationship Between Political Violence and Party

Competition Across Regions

Political Violence Description

and Party
Competition Across
Regions

Adjusted R- 0,969876058106494 The computed R-value (0.969876058106494)

Square tells us that there is strong positive association
between Political Violence and Media Biases,
 Party competition across region, and Power
distributed by gender.
R-square 0.971519182 Tells us that 97.50% of the changes of Political
violence (y) around regression line are explained
by Media Biases, Party competition across
region, and Power distributed by gender. This
means that 93.50% of the values fit the
regression model, thus it is reliable.
Regression -0. 224535584 If Party Competition across region (x) is
Coefficient increased by one (1) unit, Political Violence
Intercept decreased by (0. 224535584), noting the
intercept (y) as (3.01782015).
P-value 0.0017226 The computed P-value (0.0017226) is less than
the alpha (0.05), thus we reject the Null
Hypotheses (Ho) and accept the Alternative
Hypotheses (Ha). Therefore, the relationship
between the two variables is statistically
significant
Note: R-value: 0-0.25 = little, very weak, or no association; 0.26-0.49 = fair degree of association; 0.50-0.74 = moderate
degree of association; 0.75 and above =strong association. P-value < 0.05**/0.1*=statistically significant

Based on the table, there is a strong positive linear relationship between political violence
and media biases (Adjusted e-square= 0.969876058106494). Further, 97.15% of the
changes in political violence (y) around the regression line are explained by party
competition across regions (x). This means that 97.15% of the values fit the model hence the
regression model is reliable.

Moreover, the slope is negative, hence if the independent variable, which is party
competition across regions, is increased by 1 unit, then political violence (y) decreased by
0.224535584; noting the y-intercept as 3.01782014994474. This relationship is deemed
statistically significant because the p-value (0.0017) is less than alpha, which is 0.05, thus
we reject the null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the alternative hypothesis (Ha).

Most of the violence against local leaders takes place outside of the Philippines' several
wars, such as the communist insurgency and the Moro separatist movement in Mindanao.
Many attacks take place for unidentified, undisclosed causes. According to ACLED data,
between 2018 and 2022, 79% of violence against local government officials occurred with
unknown perpetrators. Much of this violence is believed to be carried out by hired murderers
operating under the orders of local political leaders, even though the identities of those
involved are frequently unknown. Members of private armed groups connected to political
families might also be involved. Political players are more likely to use hired firearms for one-
time or infrequent operations than a private army, which may be easier for law enforcement
to track down and connect to the mastermind, according to Peter Kreuzer, a professor at the
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. The rise in violent incidents against local leaders during
election seasons in the Philippines is a result of political rivalry, although Kreuzer claims that
"it cannot be proven who actually ordered the killings in the vast majority of cases."

According to ACLED statistics, there was a noticeable rise in the targeting of local politicians
between the May 2019 midterm elections and the May 2022 presidential elections, in which
Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos, Jr. defeated Rodrigo Duterte to win the presidency. More
than 30 of these violent occurrences occurred in May 2019, and the number increased to
over 35 in August 2019, when the election winners took power. Even more bloodshed
occurred during the May 2022 election campaign, when over 35 violent attacks on local
authorities occurred. Local governments are the primary goal in the Philippines' rural areas.
According to data from ACLED, just under 86 percent of incidents classified as violence
against local officials between 2018 and 2022 took place in rural areas. In this study, "rural
areas" refers to all the Philippines' regions outside of the 33 cities that were classified as
"highly urbanized" in the 2020 census, 16 of which are in the National Capital Region (NCR)
and 17 of which are not. Certain rural features that encourage its use are the primary cause
of the high prevalence of political violence in the Philippines, especially in rural regions. The
influence and power of local politicians running for office at the local government level is one
notable aspect of Philippine rural communities. Decades of government efforts to
decentralize are largely responsible for this power and influence. The Local Government
Code of 1991, which gave the various levels of local government authority over a broad
range of significant governmental duties and services, undoubtedly served as the catalyst for
this trend. The lowest echelons of Philippine administration are typically the sites of violence.

Authorities in *barangays * (sub-city or sub-town districts), such as councillors and barangay

chairpersons, are the target of a sizable percentage of violence against local authorities,
according to ACLED. At the municipal or city level, attacks on other local government
positions are less common than at the provincial level. The nation's general populace
roughly corresponds with regional trends of violence against officials of local government.
Consequently, most violent attacks against local authorities between 2018 and 2022 occur in
the eight regions that make up Luzon, the nation's largest island group and home to about
60% of its people.
The Visayas and Mindanao came next. However, some areas—especially the BARMM—
have a disproportionately high rate of this kind of violence in relation to their population. With
a 4% population share and the second-highest number of violent incidents against local
officials from 2018 to 2022, BARMM is ranked in the middle of the pack nationally. BARMM
has a slightly higher rate of violence against local officials (more than 10%) than Calabarzon,
the most populated region in the country (almost 11%). Between 2018 and 2022, the two
provinces of Maguindanao accounted for about three-fourths of all violent occurrences in
BARMM that targeted local government. Of these violent incidents in the region, 44%
occurred in Maguindanao del Norte and 32% in Maguindanao del Sur. Lanao del Sur and
Basilan also have higher rates of violence, except for Isabela City, which was excluded from
BARMM in the 2019 Bangsamoro plebiscite.

Hypothesis: Political Violence and Power distributed by gender

Ho: There is no statistically significant linear association between Political Violence and
Power distributed by gender
Ha: There is a statistically significant linear association between Political Violence and
Power distributed by gender

P olit ical Violence vis - a- vis Power dis t ribut ed

by gender
12
political violence

10
8
6
4
2
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
power distribution between gender

Table 6: Correlation Between Political Violence and Power Distributed by Gender

 Variables Numerical Result Description

Power distributed by gender r= -0,914396554682309 Strong positive relationship

(x) and between the two variables.
Political Competition (y) p= 0.000000 Statistically significant
Note: R-value: 0-0.25 = little, very weak, or no association; 0.26-0.49 = fair degree of association; 0.50-0.74 = moderate
degree of association; 0.75 and above =strong association. P-value < 0.05**/0.1*=statistically significant

Based on Table 6, Power Distributed by Gender (x) have a strong positive relationship with
political violence (y). Additionally, it is statistically significant because the computed p-value
(0.000000) is less than the alpha (0.05).

Gender plays an important role in many aspects of political violence. It first facilitates its
occurrence. Second, sexual violence is extremely unpleasant during times of conflict. Finally,
long-term peacekeeping requires the participation and inclusion of women. Gender is a
major factor in political violence since men dominate women in many areas of political,
social, and economic life. By raising the risk and expense of political violence for everybody,
perversions in the marriage market—particularly polygyny—and inequities in family law
support the persistence of male dominance hierarchies.

Table 7: Statistical Linear Relationship Between Political Violence Power Distributed

by Gender

Political Violence Description

and Party
Competition Across
Regions

Adjusted R- 0,969876058106494 The computed R-value (0.969876058106494)

Square tells us that there is strong positive association
between Political Violence and Media Biases,
Party competition across region, and Power
distributed by gender.
R-square 0.971519182 It tells us that 97.15% of the changes of Political
violence (y) around regression line are explained
by Media Biases, Party competition across
region, and Power distributed by gender. This
means that 97.15% of the values fit the
 regression model, thus it is reliable.
Regression -3.01782015 If Power distributed by gender (x) is increased by
Coefficient one (1) unit, Political Violence decreased by
Intercept (0.327637178), noting the intercept (y) as
(3.01782015).
P-value 0.000000 The computed P-value (0.000000) is less than
the alpha (0.05), thus we reject the Null
Hypotheses (Ho) and accept the Alternative
Hypotheses (Ha). Therefore, the relationship
between the two variables is statistically
significant
Note: R-value: 0-0.25 = little, very weak, or no association; 0.26-0.49 = fair degree of association; 0.50-0.74 = moderate
degree of association; 0.75 and above =strong association. P-value < 0.05**/0.1*=statistically significant

Based on the table, there is a strong positive linear relationship between political violence
and media biases (Adjusted e-square= 0.969876058106494). Further, 97.15% of the
changes in political violence (y) around the regression line are explained by power
distributed by gender (x). This means that 97.15% of the values fit the model hence the
regression model is reliable.
Moreover, the slope is negative, hence if the independent variable, which is power
distributed by gender, is increased by 1 unit, then political violence (y) decreased by
0.327637178; noting the y-intercept as 3.01782014994474. This relationship is deemed
statistically significant because the p-value (0.0017) is less than alpha, which is 0.05, thus
we reject the null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the alternative hypothesis (Ha).

In many facets of political violence, gender is a significant factor. It first makes it possible for
it to happen. Second, it is quite terrible to witness sexual assault during a battle. Finally,
women's engagement and participation are essential for long-term peacekeeping. Given that
men predominate over women in many spheres of political, social, and economic life, gender
plays a significant role in political violence. By raising the risk and expense of political
violence for everybody, perversions in the marriage market—particularly polygyny—and
inequities in family law support the persistence of male dominance hierarchies. Nations with
greater domestic gender equality are less likely to launch a forceful attack on another nation
first. Moreover, intrastate conflicts, including civil wars, are more likely to occur in countries
with higher levels of gender inequality. Importantly, these relationships are valid for both the
number and intensity of international conflicts. As gender inequality increases, so does the
level of violence in disputes. Given the wealth of previous data, the obvious issue is how
gender disparity contributes to violence. Valerie Hudson et al. have identified some of the
most significant processes via which gender inequality leads to increased levels of both
internal and external violence. She has previously examined the connection between son
selection, the ensuing imbalance in the sex ratio, and the increase in interstate violence, with
an emphasis on Asia. First, a system of unequal family law is created and upheld when male
dominance permeates a community, ultimately resulting in state instability and national
security issues. The term "family law" refers to the body of regulations that influence how a
family operates, including those that deal with inheritance rights, divorce, child custody, and
the legal marriage age. In countries where men's rights are given precedence over women's
rights, dispute resolution procedures are frequently severe and ineffectual.

Family law inequality and state stability and security are significantly correlated, according to
empirical data. Second, clan authority typically emerges as the favoured form of political
organization when family laws favour men over women. The strong predilection for the male
family line is one feature that sets clan government apart. This leads to severe perversions
in the marriage market and quickly contributes to the extreme subordination of women.
When male relatives choose who and when to marry their female relatives, this is one of the
most important ways it might happen. It is common for daughters with male relatives to
marry young or form a strong male relationship. In addition, women are physically
compelled to leave their birthplace to live with their husbands' family due to the patrilocal
nature of clan government systems, cutting off their connections to male relatives who may
otherwise shield them from danger. Lastly, the effect of patrilocality on male dominance over
female relatives is one aspect of the perversions in the marriage market. Two further related
phenomena exist. Polygyny rates tend to rise when men dominate the marriage market.
Recent research indicates that the level of polygyny has a direct impact on over a dozen
negative consequences, including civil and political rights, for men, women, children, and the
nation-state.

Wealthy men control the system and utilize it to get more women. Many young, poor men
are therefore unable to get married or establish a family, which forces them to resort to
violence to raise their status or income and purchase a woman. Rising bride prices, or the
amount of money that the woman's family must receive from the groom's family after
marriage, have also been connected to violent conflicts and terrorism, according to Hudson
et al. In systems where male lines are privileged, men cannot enter adult society unless they
have a son. For over 75% of the world's population, this means earning enough money—
typically from their father—to purchase a wife. This encourages organized crime and other
violent means of obtaining brides or the money to purchase them, in addition to making it
simpler for older males to manage such important resources. Because women frequently
have little discretion over who they marry, when they marry, how they marry, and when or
how many children they must have, high and growing bride prices both contribute to and
produce higher rates of gender inequality.

The significant role bride costs play in distorting marriage markets in agnatic civilizations
underscores the use of kidnapping by terrorist groups such as Boko Haram to provide low-
income men with mates. But there are additional ways in which gender issues contribute to
terrorism. Using qualitative approaches, several recent studies have investigated the degree
to which gender role stereotypes encourage other terrorist acts. Many of these ideas stress
the need of honour and shame in cultures that encourage and reward violent,
hypermasculine actions. Survey findings indicate that environments that promote gender
disparity are more conducive to male political violence, and similar feelings toward
dominance seem to be felt by other outgroups. Supporters of gender inequality are more
inclined to harbour animosity toward minorities both at home and abroad. Furthermore,
some quantitative study on the relationship between gender equality and political violence,
including terrorism, has been conducted by Victor Asal et al. After analysing more than 100
Middle Eastern political organizations over a 25-year period, they conclude that women who
are denied formal legal and political rights—a condition they call gender exclusivity—are
more likely to experience political violence. This study found that gender inclusion predicts
political violence more accurately than religious membership. Over the past 35 years, other
researchers have examined domestic terrorism in over 150 countries and found a clear
negative correlation between terrorist activity and women's political rights.

Another study that examined American victims of terrorist attacks in 156 countries during the
last 25 years found a strong negative correlation between the incidence of terrorist attacks
and women's political, social, and economic rights. In other words, terrorist acts are more
likely to occur in places with lesser levels of women's rights and during historically significant
events. Gender may have an impact on both the assault victims and the perpetrators. Huber
offers a controversial model of terrorist targeting that contends that, in contrast to assaults
on the government, gender equality increases the cost of striking civilians by escalating the
public's negative reaction. By showing that attacks against civilians rather than government
targets decline as gender equality increases, Huber's study of terrorist attacks in India
between 1970 and 2007 highlights the significant influence of gender on terrorist targeting
strategies

CONCLUSION
Mitigating political violence in the Philippines requires a multifaceted approach that
addresses both the immediate causes and underlying systemic issues. Disbanding the
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU) and retrieving all munitions is crucial to
prevent the use of these paramilitary groups for political retribution. Stricter regulations on
firearm sales and rudimentary forensics are essential to curb the flow of weapons and
improve investigations. Furthermore, strengthening witness protection programs and
ensuring accountability for local officials complicit in violence are vital for restoring public
trust. To address electoral violence, the government should enforce the gun ban during
election season, limit the number of security personnel candidates can employ, and address
loopholes in the law that allow private security agencies to operate with impunity. Finally,
depoliticizing the military and ensuring its adherence to democratic principles is essential to
prevent military involvement in coups or other undemocratic activities. By addressing these
issues, the Philippines can work towards a future where political violence is no longer a
defining characteristic of its society.

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