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I. DOCTRINE OF CASES

Co Kim Chan vs. DURING BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE
Valdez Tan Keh, INVADER CONTINUE ITS FORCE AND EFFECT EVEN AFTER THE CESSATION OF
75 Phil 113 – INVASION.
Suffice it to say that the provisions of the Hague Conventions which imposes upon a belligerent
(sovereignty) occupant the duty to continue the courts as well as the municipal laws in force in the country unless
absolutely prevented, in order to reestablish and insure "I'ordre et la vie publice," that is, the public
order and safety, and the entire social and commercial life of the country, were inserted, not for the
benefit of the invader, but for the protection and benefit of the people or inhabitants of the occupied
territory and of those not in the military service, in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of
society may not be unnecessarily deranged.

Dow v. Johnson: "As a necessary consequence of such occupation and domination, the political
relations of its people to their former government are, for the time being, severed. But for their
protection and benefit, and the protection and benefit of others not in the ordinary pursuits and business
of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights
of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are generally allowed to continue in
force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals as they were administered before the
occupation. They are considered as continuing, unless suspended or superseded by the occupying
belligerent."

The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupants, the latter
shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and issue, as far as possible, public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid.

Peralta vs. Director of CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH AND CONSTITUTION OF

Prisons, THE SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT
75 Phil. 285 BAR. — As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind
(of paramount force), the questions involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the
- (sovereignty) Constitution of the Commonwealth Government, because the belligerent occupant was totally
independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said
territory

The crimes penalized by Act No. 65 — as well as the crimes against national security and the law of
nations, and the crimes against public order, penalized by Ordinance No. 7 and placed under the
jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction — are all of a political
complexion, because the acts constituting those offenses were punished, as are all political offenses,
for public rather than private reasons, and were acts in aid or favor of the enemy and directed against
the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant.

It is therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and
valid, since it was within the admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate
the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted.

The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation of
the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation
of these Islands and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.

Calalang vs. Williams, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN PUBLIC LAW

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization
- (social justice) of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion
of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of
salus populi est suprema lex.

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Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

Laurel vs. Misa, LAW ON TREASON, THOUGH POLITICAL IN NATURE, IS NOT SUSPENDED DURING
77 Phil. 856 BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION.
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by
– (sovereignty) the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby
to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and
of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily
remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government
(which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must
be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and
transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be
suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-
called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty
with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the
occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied
by the military forces of the enemy during the war, 'although the former is in fact prevented from
exercising the supremacy over them' is one of the 'rules of international law of our times'; recognized,
by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary
of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation,
the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore
there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the
petitioner's contention rests.

Syquia vs. Almeda A private citizen claiming title and right of possession of a certain property may, to recover possession
Lopez, of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government who are said to be illegally
84 Phil. 312 withholding the same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting
for the Government, and the courts may entertain such a suit although the Government itself is not
– (doctrine of state included as a party-defendant.
immunity)
But where the judgment in the suit by the private citizen against the officers and agents of the
government would result not only in the recovery of possession of property in favor of said citizen but
also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as
one against the Government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be entertained by courts
except with the consent of said government.

This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure
imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers.

Held: It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no
jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised
and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to
the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a
case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of citizen
filing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more
obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are
so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support
thereof.

The Holy See vs. PROCEDURE IN INVOKING STATE IMMUNITY BY FOREIGN STATES
Rosario,
238 SCRA 524 In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or
the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a
– (doctrine of state determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant
immunity) is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that
the defendant is entitled to immunity.

In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect
instead of submitting a "suggestion".

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In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first
secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the
Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies.

In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just
sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the
respondent- employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.

In World Health Organization v. Aquino, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a
telegram to that effect.

In Baer v. Tizon, the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor
General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City,
Zambales, a “suggestion” to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the “suggestion” in a
Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.

TWO CONFLICTING CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign.

According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis. Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the
foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business.

REMEDY OF THE COMPLAINANTS WHEN THE STATE IMMUNITY IS INVOKED.

Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts
of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

The Province of North THE MOA-AD IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN

of Cotabato vs. “In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
Government of the time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving
Republic of the them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation so that they may be able to criticize
Philippines, and participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is
G.R. No.183591, by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a
October 14, 2008 government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people.”

– (territory) MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN COVERED BY THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION

INCLUDE STEPS AND NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE CONSUMMATION OF THE
CONTRACT
The right to information contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction. Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if
one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be
grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the
Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating
in the public discussion of any proposedcontract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the
Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State
of its avowed policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

INTENDED AS A “SPLENDID SYMMETRY” TO THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION

UNDER THE BILL OF RIGHTS IS THE POLICY OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE UNDER
SECTION 28, ARTICLE II OF THE CONSTITUTION

EFFECTIVITY OF THE POLICY OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE NEED NOT AWAIT THE

PASSING OF A STATUTE
As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for reasonable safeguards.
The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary
provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-
in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is already
enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest
is not enforceable until there is an enabling law.

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AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THESE FREEDOMS IS TO KEEP OPEN A CONTINUING

DIALOGUE OR PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT
AND THE PEOPLE
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end
that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Envisioned to be corollary to
the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms.

CNMEG vs. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
Santamaria, respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
G.R. No. 185572, Feb. immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state,
07, 2012 but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

– (state immunity) Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the
act involved — whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, functions.

Clearly, it was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese government. The Feasibility
Study was conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exercise of sovereign functions
by the Chinese government, but was plainly a business strategy employed by CNMEG with a view to
securing this commercial enterprise.

Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity, just as the term
"implementing agency" has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was
immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to
adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this Court's
ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed
to be a government-owned and -controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has
the capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.

Petitioner CNMEG is not entitled to immunity from suit, and the Contract Agreement is not an
executive agreement.

Magalona vs. Ermita, RA 9522 IS A STATUTORY TOOL TO DEMARCATE THE COUNTRYS MARITIME
G.R. No. 187167, July ZONES AND CONTINENTAL SHELF UNDER UNCLOS III, NOT TO DELINEATE
16, 2011 PHILIPPINE TERRITORY
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
- (territory) regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical
miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic
zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III states parties to mark-
out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured,
to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental
shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:

Baseline laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the
rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial
waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the
contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as
petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire
(or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by
executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea- use rights or enacting statutes to comply
with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to
land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international
law.

People vs. Perfecto Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force because it is abrogated by the change from
43 PHIL 887 Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and because it is inconsistent with democratic
principles of government.

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All those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as treason, lese majeste,
religion and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of minister of the crown, are no longer in
force. Article 255 of the Penal Code is of a similar nature.

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations
of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "It cannot be admitted that King of Spain could, by treaty or
otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted
that they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty
or otherwise, must hold it subject to the constitution and laws of its own government, and not according
to those of the government, and not according to those of the government ceding it.

Macariola vs. Asuncion It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of
114 SCRA 77 Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature
of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers
and employees, like justices and judges political law embraces constitutional law, law of public
corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it
regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to in business: hence,
political in essence.

Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this
Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been
abrogated because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former sovereign
are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.

Perfecto vs. Meer Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block
85 Phil 552 encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial
salaries is not a mere privilege of judges — personal and therefore waivable — but a basic limitation
upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest.

The imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and violates the
Constitution.

On income other than judicial salary, tax assessments may be levied for men on the Bench. It is only
when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official
stipend when taxation becomes an infringement of the fundamental charter.

Endencia vs. David The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official,
93 Phil 696 especially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise. "Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not
limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution."

The act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-
defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to
make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the
Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.
Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order
to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give
way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

The doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer (85 Phil.,552) to the effect that the collection
of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution.

Nitafan vs. CIR The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations, was NOT to exempt
152 SCRA 284 justices and judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like members of the other
branches of the government, are subject to income taxation.

A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:
". . . (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office
. . ." 1 (Emphasis supplied).

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Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:

"The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their continuance
in office . . ." 2 (Emphasis ours). And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the
same 1973 Constitution specifically stipulated:
"No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional
officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax."

The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
"The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased.". 4 (Emphasis supplied). The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding
the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that
the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of
members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it should be given effect. the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon
the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as
affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. CONSTITUTION, DEFINED

GSIS A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
Feb. 3, 1997 supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates.

DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

It is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution, that law or contract, whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch, or entered into by private persons for private
purposes, is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract.

CONCEPT OF SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self- executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self- executing.

Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.

Lawyers League vs. Forms of government:

Aquino
May 22, 1986 1) De jure government - has rightful title but no power or control, either because this is withdrawn
from it or it has not yet actually entered into the exercise thereof; and

2) De facto government - is a government of fact; it exercises power or control but without legal title.

The government of President Corazon C. Aquino is a de jure government for the following reasons:
● It is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government
but in fact and law a de jure government.
● The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the
eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the
Republic under her government.

In re: Letter of POLITICAL QUESTION of Constitutionality:

Reynato Puno It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as
June 29, 1992 the “people power revolution” that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime.
This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government. It has been said
that “the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state” and from there is derived
“the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without
regard to the existing constitution.”

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DeLeon vs. Esguerra RATIFICATION

153 SCRA 602 ➔ The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. The canvass of the votes thereafter
is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite, and the
proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was
actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date
of the plebiscite.

Provisional Constitution
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive
order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a
plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed
to have been superseded.

In this case, the elected barangay officials should follow the 1987 Constitution for their reliance in the
forequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution cannot prosper since the Provisional Constitution
must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. Having
become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, therefore
to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.

In re: Bermudez The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness
145 SCRA 160 of the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common
public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon
C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the
extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence,
the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992
of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In
previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought
to be questioned with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said
cases were dismissed outright by this court which held that:

"Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy
of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted
the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so
that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic
under her government.

CIR vs. Campos Rueda State

G.R. No. L-13250 Oct. ➔ It is a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of
29, 1971 territory, independent of external control and possessing a government to which a great body of
inhabitants render habitual obedience.

FOREIGN COUNTRY IS DIFFERENT FROM A STATE; A FOREIGN COUNTRY DOES

NOT NEED TO POSSESS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A STATE.
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line
with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside
control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a
government functioning under a regime of law.

Tangier is a foreign country.

➔ It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society
under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.
➔ It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and
mutual safety and to promote the general welfare.

Mercado vs Manzano DUAL ALLEGIANCE, NOT DUAL CITIZENSHIP, IS PROSCRIBED BY THE

CONSTITUTION

DUAL CITIZENSHIP arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance,
such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso
facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.

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Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes
of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of
jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father’s
country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act,
be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship.

DUAL ALLEGIANCE, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.

Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows: When I speak of double allegiance,
therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos
but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance.

And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section,
probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows:

DUAL ALLEGIANCE OF CITIZENS IS INIMICAL TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND

SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was
not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160,
40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.

As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed
out: Dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is
considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control.

GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.

This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of which at the time he is a subject or
citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado
v. Republic, it was held:

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies
within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic.

No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the
Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not
what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has
thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost.
It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.

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PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC, it was
held:

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner’s contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private
respondent’s certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American
citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioner’s contention that, to be effective, such renunciation
should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the
election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution
of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.. . .
I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I reiterate a dual
allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom
intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages
or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

Dumatan vs Domingo Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and
G.R. No. 99358 does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended
January 30, 1995 stay here as an alien

In re: Vicente Ching Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
WHETHER HE HAS ELECTED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP WITHIN A "REASONABLE TIME."
In the affirmative, WHETHER HIS CITIZENSHIP BY ELECTION RETROACTED TO THE TIME
HE TOOK THE BAR EXAMINATION.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV,
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship.

This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that
"(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines.

Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which
states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens.

It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of
Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was
subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even
if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8 C.A.
No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes
the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under
Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made.

THE PHRASE "REASONABLE TIME" HAS BEEN INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT THE
ELECTION SHOULD BE MADE WITHIN THREE (3) YEARS FROM REACHING THE
AGE OF MAJORITY.
However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible
rule. We said: “It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching
the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable

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time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period
may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino.”

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not
indefinite: “Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age
on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over
twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is
clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority."

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years
after he had reached the age of majority.

Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was
clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the
privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e.,
his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a
registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the
law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as
informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, the
pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare was (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise
of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928,
and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the
elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship. Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining
therein are very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability.

First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of
C.A. No. 625.

Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for
electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him.

Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not
necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he
being a natural child of a Filipino mother.

Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen
(14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his
intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of
electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed
his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil
registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed
over.

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP CAN NEVER BE TREATED LIKE A COMMODITY THAT

CAN BE CLAIMED WHEN NEEDED AND SUPPRESSED WHEN CONVENIENT.
One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As
such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching
slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped
away from his grasp.

Bengzon vs HRET REPATRIATION HAS THE EFFECT OF REGAINING THE FORMER STATUS OF THE
REPATRIATE
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

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The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens. (see codal)
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship:
(1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.

These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen,
and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is
a natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic
Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.

The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has:
(1) not left the Philippines;
(2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession;
(3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or
(4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
(1) by naturalization,
(2) by repatriation, and
(3) by direct act of Congress.

NATURALIZATION IS A MODE FOR BOTH ACQUISITION AND REACQUISITION OF

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended.
On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire
Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned
in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

REPATRIATION, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to:
(1) desertion of the armed forces;
(2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
(3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time;
(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
(5) political and economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. Republic, we held, “Parenthetically, under RA Nos. 965 and 2630, the person desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he
had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact
with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.”
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On
the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 2630, which provides: (Section 1)

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Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Tecson vs COMELEC CITIZENSHIP IS A TREASURED RIGHT CONFERRED ON THOSE WHOM THE STATE
BELIEVES ARE DESERVING OF THE PRIVILEGE. IT IS A PRECIOUS HERITAGE, AS
WELL AS AN INESTIMABLE ACQUISITION, THAT CANNOT BE TAKEN LIGHTLY BY
ANYONE - EITHER BY THOSE WHO ENJOY IT OR BY THOSE WHO DISPUTE IT.

HISTORY / EVOLUTION OF PROVISIONS ON CITIZENSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES

● PHILIPPINE BILL OF 1902:

the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used
by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention
of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos."

In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions
of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 - That all inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between
the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and
except such others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions,
the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United
States under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."

● JONES LAW:
A native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April
1899 if he was:
(1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899;
(2) residing in the Philippines on said date; and
(3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli were a mode of acquiring
citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting,
once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship –

● SECTION 1, ARTICLE III, 1935 CONSTITUTION.

The following are citizens of the Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935
Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that women
would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted
in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino
citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still
elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well
as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the
1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns
● SECTION 1, ARTICLE III, 1973 CONSTITUTION
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

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For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that "A female citizen of the
Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she
is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection
(3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the
1935 Constitution.
● SECTION I, ARTICLE IV, 1987 CONSTITUTION now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."

“NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS”, DEFINED

It includes "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship” The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to
be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of
acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only
two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of
the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.

WHERE JURISPRUDENCE REGARDED AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AS TAKING

AFTER THE CITIZENSHIP OF ITS MOTHER, IT DID SO FOR THE BENEFIT THE
CHILD

It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support
her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.

The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more
explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the
citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no
cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

Frivaldo vs COMELEC LOST OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED THROUGH SUBSEQUENT

NATURALIZATION DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONFER PREVIOUS PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP

The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines
at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

In the certificate of candidacy filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-
born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his
answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection
from the persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States.

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing
American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free
and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

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There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them
subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have been coerced
— to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the
petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the
laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here.

The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should be
obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could
not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced.

At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he
became a stateless individual. Frivaldo contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he
had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal
declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply
recovered.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while
owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon
does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only
to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person
seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great
price. BUT ONCE IT IS SURRENDERED AND RENOUNCED, THE GIFT IS GONE AND
CANNOT BE LIGHTLY RESTORED. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is
like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms
its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal
act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo is hereby declared not a citizen of
the philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as governor of the province of sorsogon.

AKBAYAN Youth vs Section 1, Article V of the Constitutions provides:

COMELEC
"SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES NOT OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST
EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES
FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE
FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION. NO
LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE
IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE."

As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain
procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a
citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements
set by fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996."

The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage.

Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State
undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate
the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful

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election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be
performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner - one which is not
indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of
the times.

The Supreme Court cannot compel COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters. The
Writ of Mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.
For the determination of whether or not the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible,
possible, or practical within the remaining period involves the exercise of discretion and thus, cannot
be controlled by mandamus.

Macalintal vs RA 9189 – An Act Providing for a System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the
COMELEC Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds therefor, and for Other Purposes.

Section 5 (D) of RA 9189: DISQUALIFICATIONS

An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she
executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years
from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name
of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

AKBAYAN VS. The subject of Article VI Section 28 (2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties and
AQUINO, GR 170516 international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes.
Article VI Section 28 (2) of the Constitution provides:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program
of the Government.

As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII — the
article on the Executive Department — which states:

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole
organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief
architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then)
conceded.” Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members
of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him.

While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised
by the President only by delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter
into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty.

While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of
the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover,
it is not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking
the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.

Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of
the House of Representatives fail to present a "sufficient showing of need" that the information sought
is critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-
negotiation.

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MACALINTAL VS The issue of locus standi is derived from the following requisites of a judicial inquiry:
PET; 1. There must be an actual case or controversy;
GR 191618; 2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

The Supreme Court's constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving our
country's highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not
restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof. PET, as intended by the
framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department.

Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. the PET is not a separate and distinct
entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that
the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it
faithfully complies — not unlawfully defies — the constitutional directive.

FORT BONIFACIO As mandated by Article 7 of the Civil Code, an administrative rule or regulation cannot contravene the
VS CIR; law on which it is based. RR 7-95 is inconsistent with Section 105 insofar as the definition of the term
GR 173425 "goods" is concerned. This is a legislative act beyond the authority of the CIR and the Secretary of
Finance. The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of
a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law,
should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the objects and
purposes of the law, and should not be in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law.

Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of
Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative
ruling, the basic law prevails.

RR 7-95, insofar as it restricts the definition of "goods" as basis of transitional input tax credit under
Section 105 is a nullity.

TANADA VS CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY OF A “SELF-RELIANT AND INDEPENDENT NATIONAL

ANGARA ECONOMY” CONTEMPLATES NEITHER “ECONOMIC SECLUSION” NOR
GR 118295; “MENDICANCY IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY”; CONSTITUTION DID NOT
INTEND TO PURSUE AN ISOLATIONIST POLICY
Commissioner Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy: “Economic self-reliance is a primary
objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for
even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign
control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural
resources and public utilities.”

In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country
is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part
of our own laws.

ESTRADA VS Estrada had constructively resigned, because both elements of resignation were present, namely: 1.
DESIERTO GR Intent 2. Acts of relinquishment (calling for snap election in which Estrada would not be a candidate,
146710-15; listening to Pimentel's advice for resignation, negotiation for peaceful and orderly transfer of power,
declaring his intent to leave without anything about reassuming the presidency, etc.)

As for prosecution of cases against him, resignation or retirement is not a bar to prosecution. Neither
was there a pending impeachment case when he resigned; if this were a bar to a criminal prosecution,
then he would be perpetually immune. Finally, Congress has already recognized Arroyo as the new
President, and so the decision can no longer be reviewed by the Court. the government of respondent
Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under
the 1987 Constitution. In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987
Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the
authority of the 1987 Constitution.

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In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA
I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it
caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I
presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of
speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are
the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.

COMELEC VS CRUZ Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
GR 186616 people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government; it is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure".

Our own reading shows that no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has been
there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution took
effect; it was continued under the LGC and can still be found in the current law. We find this obvious
from a reading of the historical development of the law.

What the Constitution clearly provides is the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for
elective local posts; thus, the question of eligibility for an elective local post is a matter for Congress,
not for the courts, to decide. SK membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution
because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to
change or even withdraw the statutory right.

To achieve synchronization of the barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths
of the terms of office of barangay officials and SK officials is necessary. Closely related with length
of term is term limitation which defines the total number of terms for which a barangay official may
run for and hold office.

MBTC VS. TOBIAS Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over
GR 177780 which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or
to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the
Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.

In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence
of probable cause is not part of a trial. MBTC appeal is denied.

LAMP VS LAMP would have the Court declare the unconstitutionality of the PDAF's enforcement based on the
SECRETARY absence of express provision in the GAA allocating PDAF funds to the Members of Congress and the
GR 164987 latter's encroachment on executive power in proposing and selecting projects to be funded by PDAF.
Regrettably, these allegations lack substantiation. No convincing proof was presented showing that,
indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them
according to their sole discretion.

Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the
petitioner's request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
In a case like this, the Court's hands are tied in deference to the presumption of constitutionality lest
the Court commits unpardonable judicial legislation.

PHILCONSA VS The power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects and activities to be
ENRIQUEZ GR funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is NOT an encroachment by the legislature on
113888 executive power. The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity
to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.

Court upheld the authority of individual Members of Congress to propose and identify priority projects
because this was merely recommendatory in nature. In said case, it was also recognized that individual

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members of Congress far more than the President and their congressional colleagues were likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.

Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves implementation of the priority
projects specified in the law.

The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be
implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce
examine whether the proposals submitted by the members of Congress fall within the specific items
of expenditures for which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are
in line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for
funding under the Fund, it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and
identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory.

The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are
likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given
each project.

BELGICA VS The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively
EXECUTIVE SEC allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. The power
GR 208566 to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-
sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise
of the power of appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators
to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which
the Constitution does not, however, allow.

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release
and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.
Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in — as Guingona, Jr. puts it — "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including
"the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of
funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically
articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated — from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation
or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.

Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that
the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress' role must be confined to mere
oversight. Any post-enactment measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of
any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of
executive functions.

Villavicencio vs GOOD INTENTIONS CANNOT JUSTIFY ACTS DONE WITHOUT AUTHORITY FROM
Lukban, LAW
39 phil 778; No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to
safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors.

Justice Miller: “The law is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who
by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it
gives.

IBP vs. Zamora The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent
Aug 15, 2000; or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the
Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or
substitute its own. It does not, however, prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police
patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. the
conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution is
committed.

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Senate vs. ERMITA The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter
GR 169777 of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition,
an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must
be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular
case.

A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping
policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except
privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted
in the separation of powers under the Constitution.

Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation"
under Section 21. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads
to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through
the power of impeachment.

MINERS ASSOC VS. The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a
FACTORAN statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment.
GR98332
Well -settled is the rule, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted
by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are
subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.

Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the
demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No.
279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry
into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

We, therefore, rule that the questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the
accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure
the paramount interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity and
constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be sustained, and their force and effect
upheld.

OPOSA VS THE RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, THOUGH NOT

FACTORAN INCLUDED IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS, IS A SOURCE OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL
GR1010183; RIGHTS
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.

La Bugal Blaan vs RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned
DENR corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.

Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

Japzon vs COMELEC There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He was born and raised in the Municipality of
GR 180088 General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left to work in the USA and eventually
became an American citizen. On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking
his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, in accordance with the provisions of

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Republic Act No. 9225. 16 At this point, Ty still held dual citizenship, i.e.,American and Philippine.
It was only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his American citizenship before a notary public and,
resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to
allow for dual citizenship.

Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2)
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.

It was held that the term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
"dwelling" or "habitation", but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)".

Domino vs COMELEC The Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for
GR 134015 business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. It is a question of intention and
circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1)
that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a
new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.

To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice (1) must be for an indefinite period of time; (2) the change of residence must be
voluntary; and (3) the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. As a general
rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to
adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will
result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in
the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without
intention. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of
residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector
claims as, or believes to be, his residence. The fact that a party continuously voted in a particular
locality is a strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile.

Pundaodaya vs Private respondent's claim that he is a registered voter and has actually voted in the past 3 elections in
COMELEC Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental do not sufficiently establish that he has actually elected residency in the
said municipality. Indeed, while we have ruled in the past that voting gives rise to a strong presumption
of residence, it is not conclusive evidence thereof. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal
presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only
such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and
permanent place of abode.

In this case, Noble's marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his actual physical presence in
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does it prove an intention to make it his permanent place of
residence. We are also not persuaded by his alleged payment of water bills in the absence of evidence
showing to which specific properties they pertain.

Social Justice Society A candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
vs Dangerous Drug Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.
Board Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
GR 195649 qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade,
or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Alaba vs COMELEC We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article
GR 188078 VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have "a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand." The Certification of Regional Director Miranda,
which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda
has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification, which states that the

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population of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010," violates the requirement that intercensal
demographic projections shall be "as of the middle of every year."

There is no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population
of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.

Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000,
actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections

Ang Ladlad vs RELIGION CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF DISQUALIFICATION

COMELEC GR We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
190582 the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Estrada v. Escritor: “x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not
religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate
may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds
articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating
public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some
might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to
conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion,"
anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it
would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or
non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full
religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved
are second-class citizens.”

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal
law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct
because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or
the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence
on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation
punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions
and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the
temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven.

Lewis vs COMELEC There is no provision in the dual citizenship law — R.A. 9225 — requiring "duals" to actually establish
GR 162759 residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On
the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants
under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to
vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003.

Abundo vs COMELEC The Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Put a bit differently, an elective local official
GR 201716 cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth term, albeit he is
allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position after the election where he could have sought his
fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition. An interruption usually occurs when
the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third.

The Court finds Abundo's case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his
opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively
removed Abundo's case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.

To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms
and/or involuntary interruption, viz.:

1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the
position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion
of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs
again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to
said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption
(Montebon).

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2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective
position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the
continuity of the official's service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term
up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).

3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not,
by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official's continuity of service (Latasa).

4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event (Aldovino, Jr.).

5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is
interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from
serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years
or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).

6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official
had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an
interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the
defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation
came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).

BAR EXAMS SAMPLE QUESTIONS

TOPIC: ARTICLE I National Territory

QUESTION 1. Archipelagic Doctrine (2013) No.VI.

Congress passed Republic Act No. 7711 to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In a petition filed
with the Supreme Court, Anak Ti Ilocos, an association of Ilocano professionals, argued that Republic Act No. 7711 discarded the
definition of the Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and in related treaties; excluded the Kalayaan Islands and the
Scarborough Shoals from the Philippine Archipelagic baselines; and converted internal waters into archipelagic waters. Is the
petition meritorious? (6%)

ANSWER 1.

No, the petition is not meritorious. UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It merely regulates
sea-use rights over maritime zones, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves which it delimits. The
Kalayaan Islands and the Scarborough Shoals are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago. A straight baseline loped around them from the nearest baseline will violate Article 47(3) and Article 47(2) of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III. Whether the bodies of water lying landward of the baselines of the Philippines
are internal waters or archipelagic waters, the Philippines retains jurisdiction over them (Magallona vs. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

No, the petition is not meritorious. UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral
treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights among maritime zones and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. The court
finds RA No. 7711 constitutional and is consistent with the Philippines’ national interest. Aside from being the vital step in
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones, the law also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. The court also finds that the conversion of internal waters to archipelagic waters
will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic state has sovereign power that extends
to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the
regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters
and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein (Prof. Merlin Magallona, et al v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, et al, G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011)

TOPIC: ARTICLE II Declaration of Principles and State Policies

QUESTION 2. Armed Forces; Servant of the People (2003) No I

- Article II. Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution expresses, in part, that the "Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the
people and (of) the State." Describe briefly what this provision means. Is the Philippine National Police covered by the same
mandate?

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FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Article II, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution means that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines should not serve the interest of the President but of the people and should not commit abuses against the people. (Record
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 133.) This provision is specifically addressed to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and not to the Philippine National Police, because the latter is separate and distinct from the former. (Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. V, p. 296; Manalo v. Sistoza. 312 SCR A 239 [1999].)

SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Article II, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution can be interpreted to mean that the
Armed Forces of the Philippines can be a legitimate instrument for the overthrow of the civilian government if it has ceased to be
the servant of the people. (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2003 ed., p. 66.) This provision does
not apply to the Philippine National Police, because it is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. (Record of
the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 296, Manalo v. Sistoza. 312 SCRA 239 [1999].)

QUESTION 3. What do you understand by the "Doctrine of Incorporation" in Constitutional Law?

ANSWER: The DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION means that the rules of International law form part of the law of the
land and no legislative action is required to make them applicable to a country. The Philippines follows this doctrine, because
Section 2. Article II of the Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land.

QUESTION 4. Servanda (2000) No X.

The Philippines has become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and resultantly agreed that it "shall ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." This
is assailed as unconstitutional because this undertaking unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty and means among
others that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will
not conform with the WTO Agreements. Refute this argument. (5%) Doctrine of Incorporation; Pacta Sunt

ANSWER: According to Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997), the sovereignty of the Philippines is subject to
restriction by its membership in the family of nations and the limitations imposed of treaty limitations. Section 2. Article II of the
Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. One of such principles is
pacta sunt servanda. The Constitution did not envision a hermit-like isolation of the country from the rest of the world.

QUESTION 5. Freedom from NuclearWeapons; Foreign Military Bases (1988) No. 22:

The Secretary of Justice had recently ruled that the President may negotiate for a modification or extension of military bases
agreement with the United States regardless of the "no nukes" provisions in the 1987 Constitution. The President forthwith
announced that she finds the same opinion "acceptable" and will adopt it. The Senators on the other hand, led by the Senate President,
are skeptical, and had even warned that no treaty or international agreement may go into effect without the concurrence of two-
thirds of all members of the Senate A former senator had said, "it is completely wrong, if not erroneous," and "is an amendment of
the Constitution by misinterpretation." Some members of the Lower House agree with Secretary Ordonez, while others lament the
latter's opinion as "questionable, unfortunate, and without any basis at all." Do you or do you not agree with the aforementioned
ruling of the Department of Justice? Why?

ANSWER: No. The Constitution provides that if foreign military bases, troops or facilities are to be allowed after the
expiration of the present Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement in 1991, it must be "under a treaty duly concurred in by
the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum." (Art.
XVIII, sec. 25) A mere agreement, therefore, not a treaty, without the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate
will not be valid (Art. VII, sec. 21, Art. XVIII, sec. 4). With respect to the provision allowing nuclear weapons within the bases, the
Constitution appears to ban such weapons from the Philippine territory. It declares as a state policy that "the Philippines, consistent
with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory." (Art, II, sec. 8) However,
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would seem to indicate that this provision of the Constitution is "not something
absolute nor 100 percent without exception." It may therefore be that circumstances may justify a provision on nuclear weapons.

QUESTION 6. State Immunity from Suit (1996) No. 6;

The Republic of the Balau (formerly Palau Islands) opened and operated in Manila an office engaged in trading Balau products with
Philippine products. In one transaction, the local buyer complained that the Balau goods delivered to him were substandard and he
sued the Republic of Balau, before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, for damages.

a) How can the Republic of Balau invoke its sovereign immunity? Explain.

ANSWER: The Republic of Balau can invoke its sovereign Immunity by filing a motion to dismiss in accordance with
Section l(a), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over its person. According to the Holy
See vs. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524, in Public International Law, when a State wishes to plead sovereign immunity in a foreign court,
it requests the Foreign Office of the State where it is being sued to convey to the court that it is entitled to immunity. In the
Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign immunity.

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In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity is submitted directly to the local court by the foreign government through counsel
by filing a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court has no Jurisdiction over its person.

b) Will such defense of sovereign immunity prosper? Explain.

ANSWER: No, the defense of sovereign Immunity will not prosper. The sale of Balau products is a contract involving a
commercial activity. In United States vs. Ruiz, 136SCRA487 and United States vs. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644, it was stated that a
foreign State cannot invoke Immunity from suit if it enters into a commercial contract. The Philippines adheres to RESTRICTIVE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.

QUESTION 7. Annika sued the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry, and asked
for the revocation of a deed of donation executed by her in favor of said Bureau. She alleged that, contrary to the terms of the
donation, the donee failed to install lighting facilities and a water system on the property donated, and to build an office building
and parking lot thereon, which should have been constructed and made ready for occupancy on or before the date fixed in the deed
of donation. The Republic invoked state immunity and moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that it had not consented
to be sued. Should the Republic’s motion be granted? (2.5%)

ANSWER: The motion of the Republic should be granted. There appears to be no consent on the part of the State to be
sued. In Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution it is provided that: “The State shall not be sued without its consent.” That no
consent was given by the Republic is shown by the fact that the Bureau or the Government did seem to have complied with the
demands of the deed of donation. Compliance with the state immunity is essential for two reasons: It is required as a provision of
the Constitution; and Immunity is an essential element of state sovereignty.

ARTICLE IV Citizenship

QUESTION 8. Atty. Richard Chua was born in 1964. He is a legitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. His father
became a naturalized Filipino citizen when Atty. Chua was still a minor. Eventually, he studied law and was allowed by the Supreme
Court to take the bar examinations, subject to his submission to the Supreme Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. Although he
never complied with such requirement, Atty. Chua practiced law for many years until one Noel Eugenio filed with the Supreme
Court a complaint for disbarment against him on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen. He then filed with the Bureau of
Immigration an affidavit electing Philippine citizenship. Noel contested it claiming it was filed many years after Atty. Chua reached
the age of majority. Will Atty. Chua be disbarred? Explain.

ANSWER: No, Atty. Chua will not be disbarred. Atty. Chua is already a Filipino citizen and there was no need for him to
file the affidavit electing Filipino citizenship. An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien.
His father, however, already became a Filipino citizen when Atty. Chua was still a minor and thus, he was already a Filipino before
the age of majority (Co v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30,1991).

TOPIC: ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

QUESTION 9. Congress enacted an appropriation law containing a provision that gives individual legislators the discretion to
determine, post-enactment, how much funds would go to a specific project or beneficiary which they themselves also determine.
Consequently, disbursements were made in the interim pursuant thereto. Eventually, Mr. Z filed a petition questioning the
constitutionality of the statutory provision on the ground that it violates the separation of powers principle. On the other hand, certain
Congressmen argued that there was nothing wrong with the provision because, after all, the power to appropriate belongs to
Congress.

(a) Rule on the arguments of the parties. (2.5%)

ANSWER: Mr. Z is correct. This is pork barrel system which the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional. It was
held that insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas
of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers. Also, the argument of these Congressmen is
misplaced because insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary
funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power (Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013).

QUESTION 10. Candidate X, a naturalized Filipino citizen, ran for Congressman for the Lone District of Batanes. After a close
electoral contest, he won by a slim margin of 500 votes. His sole opponent, Y, filed an election protest before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), claiming that X should be disqualified to run for said position because he is not a natural-born citizen.
While the case was pending, X was proclaimed by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Batanes as the duly elected Congressman
of the province.

(a) Distinguish between natural-born and naturalized citizen under the 1987 Constitution. (2%)

ANSWER: In general, natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. As an exception, those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are also natural-born citizens although they perform a

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certain act to perfect their Philippine citizenships. Naturalized citizens, on the other hand, are those who have undergone
naturalization procedure in accordance with law. Simply put, all naturalized citizens have performed a certain act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenships, while some natural-born citizens have and some have not (Art. IV, Sec. 2, Const.).

(b) Is X qualified to run for Congress? Explain. (1%)

ANSWER: No, Candidate X is not qualified. Under the Constitution, no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines (Art. IV, Sec. 2, Const.). Candidate X is a naturalized Filipino.

(c) Did X's proclamation divest the COMELEC of its jurisdiction to decide the case and vest the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction to hear the case? Explain. (2%)

ANSWER: This question should be considered a bonus for having several errors which would confuse the examinees.
First, an election protest (or even quo warranto) can be filed only after proclamation, within ten (10) days therefrom. In the given
set of facts, it was filed before proclamation. Second, ineligibility such as in citizenship is not a proper ground for an election protest.
It is a ground for a petition for quo warranto or a petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of certificate of candidacy
(COC). In the given set of facts, it states that the ground used for the election protest was because Candidate X is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Lastly, since the issue involves eligibility of a candidate and the case was filed before proclamation, the case must
have referred to a petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of COC. However, this is filed within five (5) days from
the last day for filing of COC, but not later than twenty-five (25) days from the time of filing of the COC subject of the petition. In
the given set of facts, it appears that the case was filed way after the prescribed period or after the election but before proclamation.
If the case is an election protest filed within 10 days from the proclamation then there will be no issue and the Comelec retains its
jurisdiction until it decides the case. The same goes with petition for quo warranto. But if the case filed was for the denial of due
course to or cancellation of COC, proclamation would ipso jure divest the Comelec of its jurisdiction in favor of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal provided the winner, aside from proclamation, has taken the proper oath, and assumed the office.
Otherwise, the Comelec may still continue in hearing and deciding the case (Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013).

QUESTION 11. H, a naturalized American citizen who later became a dual citizen under Republic Act No. 9225 (the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act), decided to run for Congress and thus, filed a certificate of candidacy (COC). A citizen argued
that H is ineligible for the position because of his status as a dual citizen. H responded that his act of filing a COC amounted to his
renunciation of foreign citizenship, rendering him eligible for the position.

(a) Was H's filing of a COC sufficient to renounce foreign citizenship? Explain. (2.5%)

ANSWER: No. While the Supreme Court has previously declared that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a
certificate of candidacy is already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by
the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation
of foreign citizenship for those who desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines (Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 198742, August 10, 2012)

(b) Assuming that H is a dual citizen because his parents are Filipino citizens and he was born in California, USA, was filing
of a COC sufficient to renounce his foreign citizenship? Explain. (2.5%)

ANSWER: This time the answer is yes. H’s dual citizenship is from birth without performing another act such as swearing
allegiance thereto to be naturalized. The candidate, who have Filipino parents, became a citizen of the foreign state where he was
born under the principle of jus soli and had not taken an oath of allegiance to said foreign state. A dual citizen from birth seeking
public office in the Philippines does not need to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. His COC which
states that he renounces any and all foreign citizenships suffices (Cordora v. Comelec, G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009; Valles
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000)

QUESTION 13. The 2016 mayorality race in the City of Ardania included Arnaldo and Anacleto as contenders. Arnaldo filed a
petition with the Comelec to cancel Anacleto’s Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for misrepresenting himself as a Filipno citizen.
Arnaldo presented as evidence a copy of Anacleto’s Spanish passport and a certification from the Bureau of Immigration (BI)
showing that Anacleto used the same passport several times to travel to and from Manila and Madrid or Barcelona. In his Comment,
Anacleto claimed that, a year prior to filing his CoC, he had complied with all the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition of Act of 2003) to reacquire his Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance and executing a
sworn renunciation of his Spanish citizenship. He defended the use of his Spanish passport subsequent to taking his oath of
allegiance to the Philippines as a practical necessity since he had yet to obtain his Philippine passport despite reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship. Even after he secured his Philippine passport, he said he had to wait for the issuance of a Schengen visa to
allow him to travel to Spain to visit his wife and minor children.

(a) Based on the allegations of the parties, is there sufficient ground to cancel Anacleto’s CoC?

ANSWER: The sole act of using a foreign passport does not divest Anacleto of his Filipino citizenship which he acquired
by repatriation. By representing himself as a Spanish citizen; however, Anacleto voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier
status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Anacleto represented himself as a Spanish citizen

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by using his Spanish passport. He is, thus, disqualified for being a dual citizen, and his CoC should be cancelled (Macquiling v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013).

[Note: The use of the foreign passport amounts to a recantation of the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position].

(b) In case Anacleto’s CoC is properly cancelled, who should serve as mayor of Ardania City: Arnaldo, who obtained the
second highest number votes, or Andrea, the duly-elected Vice Mayor of the City?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The rule on succession would not apply if the permanent vacancy was caused by one whose certificate of candidacy was
void ab initio. Specifically with respect to dual citizens, their certificates of candidacy are void ab initio, because they possess “a
substantive [disqualifying circumstance] . . . [existing] prior to the filing of their certificate of candidacy. “Legally, they should not
even be considered candidates. The votes cast for them should be considered stray and should not be counted.

In cases of vacancies caused by those with void ab initio certificates of candidacy, the person legally entitled to the vacant
position would be the candidate who garnered the next highest number of votes among those eligible; in this case, it was Arnaldo
(Chua v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 216607, April 5, 2016).

QUESTION 14. In 1990, Agripina migrated to Canada and acquired Canadian citizenship. In 2008, Agripina retired and returned
to the Philippines to permanently reside in her hometown of Angeles, Pampanga. A month after returning to the Philippines,
Agripina took her oath of allegiance and executed a sworn renunciation of her Canadian citizenship in accordance with R.A. No.
9225. In 2009, Agripina filed her certificate of candidacy for Congress for the 2010 elections. Agripina’s political rivals lost no time
in causing the filing of various actions to question her candidacy. They questioned her eligibility to run as member of Congress.
Since Agripina had to take an oath under RA No. 9225, it meant that she needed to perform an act to perfect her Philippine
citizenship. They claimed, therefore, that Agripina could not be considered a natural-born citizen. Agripina raised the defense that,
having complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225, she had reacquired, and was deemed never to have lost, her Philippine
citizenship.

Is Agripina disqualified to run for Congress for failing to meet the citizenship requirement? (2.5%)

ANSWER: Agripina is eligible to run as member of Congress. Repatriation results in the recovery of a person’s original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a Filipino citizen. If
she were originally a natural-born citizen before she lost her Philippine citizenship, she would be restored to her former status as a
natural-born Filipino (Bengson III vs. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001. See also: Parreno v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
162224, June 7, 2007, and Tabasa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016).

RA 9225 makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the
effectivity of RA No. 9225. For those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have reacquired their
Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to RA No. 9225.

In the case of those who became foreign citizens after RA 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite
having acquired foreign citizenship, provided they take the oath of allegiance under the new law.

Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of RA 9225, she belongs to the
first category of natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country, under the first
paragraph of Section 3. As the new law allows dual citizenship, she was able to reacquire her Philippine citizenship by taking the
required oath of allegiance (See Bengson v. HRET and as affirmed by Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March
8, 2016).

TOPIC: SEPARATION OF POWERS

QUESTION 15. A law was passed exempting the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from the payment of filing fees in collection
cases on loans granted by LBP to its borrowers. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court issued a
Memorandum requiring all courts to continue to collect filing fees in collection cases filed by LBP, stating that only the Supreme
Court can decide on exemptions from payment of filing fees. LBP assails the OCA Memorandum, arguing that the exemption found
in the law is within the plenary power of Congress to enact legislation. Moreover, the law was approved by the President. Thus,
LBP argues that the act of the OCA violates the principle of separation of powers. Is LBP correct? Explain briefly.

ANSWER: No. LBP is incorrect. The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure within the sole province
of the Supreme Court. In this case, the OCA Memorandum does not violate the principle of separation of powers as the Congress
could not have carved out an exemption to LBP from payment of filing fees without transgressing another equally important
institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence i.e. fiscal autonomy. Hence, LBP is incorrect.

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2023 BAR EXAM

QUESTION 16. Professor Chiara, a natural-born Filipino citizen, is a resident expert on global military affairs at the National
Defense College where she taught for 12 years. In 2017, she was tenured as a faculty member at the leading military academy in
the United Kingdom (UK). In April 2022, she was granted British citizenship. Having learned of the renowned expertise of Professor
Chiara, the President invited her to return to the Philippines to be appointed as National Security Adviser. Upon her appointment,
Professor Chiara took her oath of allegiance to the Philippines and renounced her allegiance to the UK. Not satisfied with these
actions, Ramon, the spokesperson of a non-government organization monitoring national security affairs, demanded that Professor
Chiara renounce her British citizenship. Is Ramon correct? Explain.

*No, dual citizenship is allowed but dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest of the state.

QUESTION 17. Gerardo, a public official, filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone legislative
district of his province. Despite such filing, Gerardo continued to occupy his public office since, according to his lawyer, he can
only be considered resigned from public office upon the commencement of the campaign period for local officials. What is the
effect of the filing of certificate of candidacy by Gerardo? Explain

SAMPLE EXAM QUESTIONS

QUESTION 1. Margarita was born in 1986 to a Filipino mother and a Swedish father. She has been living in the US for the last 20
years and has also been naturalized as a US citizen. She reacquired Philippine citizenship in 2008 under RA 9225, the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. She then established a beach house in Palo, Leyte where she stays during her visits in the
Philippines. After executing an affidavit of renunciation of her American citizenship, Margarita announced her intention to run as
Vice-president in the 2022 Presidential elections. Is she qualified to run for said office? Discuss your answer. (TOPIC:
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. Margarita is not qualified to run as Vice-president. Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be a
Vice- President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the
President. Section 2, Article VII states that, no person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for
at least ten years immediately preceding such election. In the case at bar, Margarita must have all the qualifications set by Section
2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, to be qualified to run for said office. However, Margarita was born in 1986 and by 2022,
she is only 36 years old. The 1987 Constitution requires that the President and Vice-president must be at least 40 years old on the
day of the election.

QUESTION 2. Article VI, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires that for a city to be entitled to have at least one district
representative, its population shall be at least 250,000 inhabitants. The island of Suargao was recently created as a new province by
virtue of a bill sponsored by Congressman Mando Rugas, the outgoing Representative of the second district of Dunagat, the mother
province of Suargao before it became a province. In the next elections Mando Rugas run for Governor of Suargao and his son
Mando Rugas Jr. run as congressman for the lone district of Suargao. The creation of the new legislative district of Suargao was
questioned by the governor of Dunagat citing that Suargao only has a population of 200,000 inhabitants therefore it is not qualified
to become a new legislative district. Is Mando Rugas qualified to run for governor of the newly created province of Suargao?
(5 points) Was the creation of the lone legislative district of Suargao valid? (TOPIC: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. Mando Rugas is qualified to run for governor of the newly created province of Suargao. The concept of Forbidden
office mandates that no member of the Congress can be appointed to any office created or the emoluments of which have been
increased during the term for which he was elected. In the case at bar, the office of governor of the province of Suargao is not the
forbidden office manifested by the Constitution. The appointment to any office created or the emoluments of which have been
increased during the term for which he was elected is prohibited. However, the Office of the Governor is an elective office. Mando
Rugas is also not prohibited under provisions of the Local Government Code. Thus, Mando Rugas is qualified to run for governor
of the province of Suargao since there is no prohibition against it.

Yes. The creation of the lone legislative district of Suargao is valid. In the case of Aquino v. COMELEC, the Court ruled
that a province is entitled to an initial legislative seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population. It was held by
the Court that initial apportionment of legislative districts for provinces does not require a minimum population. In the case at bar,
the creation of the lone legislative district of Suargao is valid despite its population of 200,000 inhabitants. Upon the creation of the
new province of Suargao, it has become entitled to a legislative district so that it will be represented in the Congress. Since the

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minimum population requirement does not apply to initial apportionment of provinces, the Province of Suargao is entitled to have
an initial legislative seat.

QUESTION 3. In order to help finance the costly Build Build Build program of the government, the President decided to guarantee
a loan secured by the state-owned Lamp Bank of the Philippines from China. The minority block in the Senate questioned the said
transaction before the Supreme Court citing that the Constitution requires the concurrence of Senate in order to ratify the agreement.
Is the contention of the Senators valid? Explain your answer. (TOPIC: POWERS OF THE CONGRESS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The contention of the Senators is not valid. In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, the Court
distinguished treaties from executive agreements. The Court defined treaties as international agreements which involve political
issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character. On the other hand,
executive agreements are international agreements involving adjustments of details carrying out well-established national policies
and traditions and involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature. While treaties require ratification, executive
agreements become binding through executive action. Furthermore, Section 20, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. In the case at bar, the loan guaranteed by the President
is not a treaty that will require the concurrence of the Senate. Not all international agreements will be considered as a treaty that
must be ratified by the Senate to be valid and binding. In this case, the transaction is valid and binding even without the concurrence
of the Senate. The concurrence must be made by the Monetary Board, not by the Senate, for the transaction to be valid pursuant to
Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution.

QUESTION 4. In order to evade the rainy season and to synchronize the assumption of new Senators with the new school calendar,
Congress enacted a law changing the commencement of the term of office of Senators from June 30th to August 30th. Members of
the Makabayad block in Senate questioned the constitutionality of the law stating that the June 30th commencement in office was
mandated by the Constitution therefore it cannot be changed by mere legislative action. Do you agree with the contention of the
Makabayad block? (TOPIC: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

#1: No. I do not agree with the contention of the Makabayad Block. Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided
by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. In the case at bar, the Congress may enact a law changing
the commencement of office pursuant to the phrase “unless otherwise provided by law”. The Congress is only prohibited to shorten
or lengthen the term of office of the members of the Congress, but not the tenure. Thus, the law changing the commencement of the
term of office of Senators is valid.

#2: YES, the contention of Makabayad block in questioning the constitutionality of the law in changing the date is tenable.
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and it can only be modified in amending the Consti, thus a law amending the date
is unconstitutional.

QUESTION 5. Distinguish pardon from amnesty. (TOPIC: EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OR POWER OF THE PRESIDENT)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Pardon. An act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment that the law inflicts for
the crime he has committed. Amnesty. Act of grace, concurred in by the legislature, usually extended to groups of persons who
committed political offenses, which puts into oblivion the offense itself.

In People v. Casido, the Court distinguished Pardon from Amnesty. The Court held that Pardon concerns infractions of
peace of the state committed by individuals. Acceptance is necessary but does not require the concurrence of the congress. It is
private act which must be pleaded and proved. It looks forward and relieves the pardonee of the consequences of the offense. On
the other hand, Amnesty is addressed to political offenses, and classes of persons. No need for distinct acts of acceptance and
requires concurrence of Congress. It is a public act which the courts may take judicial notice of. Amnesty looks backward and puts
into oblivion the offense itself.

QUESTION 6. Cite 5 provisions in the Constitution which are intended to maintain the independence of the Judiciary.
(TOPIC: JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body and may not be abolished by the legislature.
2. Members are only removable by impeachment. (1987 Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 2)
3. The SC may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate jurisdiction (1987 Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 2); appellate
jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice or concurrence. (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 30)
4. The SC has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and personnel. (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 6)

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5. The SC has exclusive power to discipline judges/justices of inferior courts. (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 11)
6. The members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure. [1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 2 (2)]
7. The members of the judiciary may not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions. (1987
Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec 12)
8. The salaries of judges may not be reduced; the judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy. (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 3)
9. The SC alone may initiate the promulgation of the Rules of Court. [1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5)]
10.The SC alone may order temporary detail of judges. [1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (3)]
11.The SC can appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary. (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (6)]

QUESTION 7. While Congress was in session the President appointed five (5) acting department secretaries. The five thus
appointed immediately assumed office without any confirmation from the Commission on Appointments. The minority block in the
Senate questioned the said appoints arguing that the same are unconstitutional for lack of CA confirmation and instead suggesting
that the President designate an undersecretary to act as secretary pending the confirmation of the five (5) appointees. Was the
appointment made by the President valid? (5 points) Can the president be compelled to designate the undersecretaries
pending the confirmation process? (TOPIC: EXEC OR COMMISSION??)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

#1: Yes. The appointment made by the President is valid. In the case of Pimentel v. Ermita, the Court ruled that acting
appointments are not subject to the confirmation from the Commission on Appointments. The Court also held that the essence of an
appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. In case of a vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President,
such as the office of Department Secretary, the President must necessarily appoint the alter ego of her choice as Acting Secretary
before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. In the case at bar, the President is not prohibited to make acting
appointments even without the confirmation from the Commission on Appointments. In this case, the appointments made are
temporary in nature. The acting appointments were made to fill the offices for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office. The President has also the power to appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary. Since the department
secretaries are the alter ego of the President, the acting appointees to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence.
Thus, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session.

#2: No. The President cannot be compelled to designate the undersecretary pending the confirmation process. Section 17
of the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President the power to issue temporary designation to perform the functions of an
office in the executive branch. In Pimentel v. Ermita, the Court ruled that the Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the
President the obligation to automatically appoint the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. In the case at bar, the Senate cannot
compel the President to designate the undersecretaries as temporary department secretaries. The department secretaries are the alter
ego of the President, thus, the president must appoint in an active capacity a person of her choice. As the alter ego of the President,
the acting secretary must have the President’s confidence. Thus, before the permanent appointee could assume office, the President
has the discretion to make acting appointments of her choice.

QUESTION 8. The President decided to appoint his fraternity brother Kapal Mukha as Supreme Court Chief Justice two (2) months
before a presidential election. Kapal Mukha promptly accepted the appointment and assumed the office of the Chief Justice.
Members of the Makabayan block questioned the appointment saying that Kapal Mukha cannot assume office because appointments
are forbidden three months before any election. They argued further that the appointment was a “midnight” appointment which is
prohibited by law. Do you agree with their contentions? Explain. (TOPIC: JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The contentions of the Makabayan Block are not meritorious. In De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council, the Court ruled
that the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments in the judiciary. In the case at bar, the appointment made by the President in favor of Kapal
Mukha cannot be considered as a midnight appointment, which is prohibited by law. The prohibition against midnight appointments
only applies to positions or offices of the executive branch. The prohibition does not apply to appointments to fill the vacancy in
the SC or to other appointments in the judiciary. In this case, the appointment of Kapal Mukha does not violate the Constitution.
The prohibition found in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not cover all kinds of presidential appointments.
Such prohibition cannot be found in Article VIII of the Constitution. Thus, Makabayan Block is incorrect in saying that Kapal
Mukha’s appointment is prohibited by law.

QUESTION 9. Due to rampant reports regarding “justice for sale” coming from the court of Judge Fera Makabenta of the Regional
Trial Court of Tarlac, the Ombudsman decided to conduct an investigation and a “lifestyle check” on Judge Makabenta. The
Ombudsman found out that the judge has several mansions in Metro Manila and owns a fleet of luxury vehicles. The Ombudsman
then decided to order the suspension for 6 months of Judge Makabenta pending further investigation. Is the suspension valid?
Explain. (TOPIC: JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

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No. The suspension is not valid. Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall
have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. In Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the
Court ruled that the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against a
judge. In the case at bar, the investigation and suspension ordered by the Ombudsman against Judge Fera Makabenta violated the
doctrine of Separation of Powers. The suspension of Judge Makabenta is beyond the powers of the Ombudsman. The suspension
likewise encroached into the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The
Ombudsman can only indorse the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. The Ombudsman has no power to conduct its
own investigation and suspend Judge Makabenta. Thus, the suspension is not valid for violating the Constitution and the principle
of Separation of Powers.

QUESTION 10. The anti drugs campaign of the President caused massive congestion in the court dockets because of the multiple
drugs cases being filed every day. The congestion of dockets was more intense in the cities because of the volume of cases already
pending. In order to fast track the prosecution of cases the President ordered that Judges from the provinces with minimal number
of cases be allowed to hear and decide cases in the cities thru a newly created mobile drugs court. Several judges questioned the
order arguing that the President does not have the authority to re-assign judges to other courts. Do you agree with the judges?
Explain. (TOPIC: JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. I agree with the judges. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme Court has the sole
power to assign temporarily lower court judges to other stations as public interest may require. In the case at bar, the President has
no authority to re-assign judges to other courts. The order of the President is unconstitutional for violating the Principle of Separation
of Powers. The act of the President in ordering the re-assignment of the judges to other courts constitutes encroachment upon the
power of administration of the Supreme Court. Thus, the Judges are correct in saying that the President does not have the authority
to re-assign judges to other courts.

QUESTION 11. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal decided and proclaimed Dongdong Carmos as the duly elected Vice-president
of the Philippines against Neli Dobrero by a margin of only 50,000 votes. Dobrero strongly questioned the said decision and argued
that members of the PET were bribed by Carmos into favoring him. Dobrero lost no time and immediately filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Supreme Court within fifteen days from receipt of the decision challenging and praying for its reversal. Will the
petition prosper? Explain. (TOPIC: PET)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The Petition will not prosper. Rule 69 of the 2010 PET Rules provides that the decision of PET shall become final 10
days after receipt of a copy by the parties or their counsel if no motion for reconsideration is filed. In Macalintal v. PET, the Court
ruled that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is an institution independent but not separate from the Supreme Court. In the case at
bar, the decision of PET declaring Carmos as the winner has become final. Such decision can no longer be challenged through a
petition for certiorari. Furthermore, since PET is not a tribunal separate from the Supreme Court, its decision cannot be assailed by
filing a petition for certiorari.

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari filed by Dobredo. The Supreme Court acting as PET
can only entertain a motion for reconsideration before the finality of such decision, but its decision cannot be challenged by a petition
for certiorari. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed by Dobredo will not prosper.

QUESTION 12. Congress passed a law authorizing the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to regulate the conduct of the Bar Exams,
provide for the qualifications of lawyers and regulate admission to the practice of law. Retired members of the Supreme Court
questioned the said law for being unconstitutional arguing that only the Chief Justice has the authority to perform the above-
mentioned acts. Do you agree with the contention? Explain. (TOPIC: POWER OF CONGRESS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. I do not agree with the contention of the retired members of the SC. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides
that the Supreme Court shall have the power to Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. It is also a well-settled jurisprudence that the Congress cannot enact a law that will alter the conduct of the bar
examinations and modify the qualifications of the practice of legal profession in the Philippines.

In the case at bar, while it is true that the Congress has no authority to authorize the IBP to regulate the conduct of Bar
Exams, provide for the qualifications of lawyers and regulate admission to the practice of law, the retired members of the SC is also
incorrect in contending that it is the Chief Justice of the SC, who has such authority. Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, the authority
to regulate the admission to the bar and practice of law in the Philippines is vested in the Supreme Court as the Judicial Department
of the government. Thus, the contention of the retired members of the SC is also wrong.

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