Disarmament and

International
Security
Committee

Spring MUN 2025

 Table of Contents
1. Letters from the executive board

2. Introduction to the Agenda

3. History of Biochemical warfare

4. Introduction to Bioweapons

5. Current situation

6. Extremism and Biochemical Weapons

7. Bloc positions

8. Questions a resolution must answer

9. Position Papers

10. Paperwork guide

11. Bibliography

12. Recommended links for Research

 Disarmament and International Security Committee

Letter from the Director

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) at Spring MUN 2025.
My name is Aarav Parekh, and it is my honor to serve as your under secretary general and
director for this conference. I’m an IB student at Hill Spring International School and I have always
been interested in international relations and geopolitics, which is why I started my MUN journey
in the first place. I participated in my first MUN conference about three years ago, and it’s been
an incredible learning experience. Ever since, I was hooked on the challenge of finding solutions
to complex global issues, and over time, I've grown in my abilities to negotiate, speak publicly,
and think critically.

The agenda for this session, Addressing the Threat of Biochemical Warfare, is both timely and
critical. In recent years, advancements in biotechnology and chemical science have made it easier
for nations and non-state actors to develop and potentially deploy biochemical weapons. This
poses a serious threat not only to national security but also to public health, global stability, and
human rights. As you prepare for this conference, I encourage you to dive deep into your
research and consider the broader implications of the issues at hand. Remember, diplomacy is
not just about defending your country's position but finding common ground to create solutions
that benefit the global community.

For first-time MUN delegates, don’t be intimidated by the conference environment. Trust in your
preparation and feel confident in speaking up .The true value of this conference lies in your
ability to engage thoughtfully and contribute meaningfully to the discussions. When you
approach the topics with curiosity and an open mind, it’s always recognized and appreciated by
the Executive Board.

Finally, I hope that each of you finds the two days of Spring MUN to be both enjoyable and
enriching, leaving you with an experience that will stay with you long after the conference. I look
forward to seeing how your ideas and perspectives will shape the discussions in our committee.
I’m excited to meet all of you and see the collaboration and creativity you’ll bring to the table.

Best regards,
Aarav Parekh
Director of DISEC
Spring MUN 2025
Disarmament and International Security Committee

Letter from the Assistant Director

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to SpringMUN DISEC 2025! It is my absolute pleasure to be your Assistant Director

through the course of this conference. By way of introduction, my name is Moha Tungare, and I
joined Hill Spring International in grade 11 (their MUN culture was definitely a factor in that
decision). I enjoy talking about absolutely anything, so if you want to chat I'm all ears-especially if
you’re an avid reader, because I love my books as much as I love my MUNs.

MUNs aren’t only a way to gain a global perspective but are also opportunities to forge
friendships for a lifetime. So while you may be busy trying to obliterate your opposition,
remember that the delegate of the country you want to nuke may just end up becoming your
best friend. I absolutely love DISEC as a committee, not only because it's a delegate favorite, but
also because it usually has the most engaging and interesting topics which facilitate very fun
debates, and I assure you that we do not disappoint. Being a biology fanatic (and a Biology IBDP
student), our agenda for this conference intrigued me, so I'm also on a mission to make all of you
delegates love biology (looking at you PCM students) while honing your diplomatic skills.

So, remember to enjoy the process and the debates, make some friends and some enemies
along the way and do not hesitate to reach out to us, especially if you’re a first timer and have
some apprehensions. As a part of your EB Aarav, Veddant and I are here to guide you through the
entire process, so feel free to ask us questions in committee or at
[email protected]

Have fun and May the Odds Be Ever In Your Favour!

Warm Regards,
Moha Tungare
Assistant Director of DISEC
Spring MUN 2025
 Disarmament and International Security Committee

Letter from the Assistant Director

Dear Delegates,

It is with extreme pride and immense pleasure that I warmly welcome you to the Disarmament
and International Security Committee at Spring MUN 2025. My name is Veddant Mehta, and I
have the honor to serve as your assistant director for this committee. I served as the director-
general of the previous edition of Spring MUN. I have a deep passion for international relations
and its intersection with economics. An easy way to win brownie points is to discuss all things
Tottenham, and if you are an Arsenal fan you probably should not tell me about it. Apart from
football, I love following Indian politics and will have a conversation about it with literally anyone.
Model UN has helped me in countless ways, it has refined my ability to make a speech on any
topic, regardless of my existing knowledge and enhanced the skills of arguing with my friends –
and winning of course.

My advice to delegates is to truly enjoy the experience above everything, the emotions right
before a conference are irreplaceable, the sheer nervousness but also the anticipation of the
unknown. I hope you can acknowledge the magnitude of being a delegate, representing a set of
values and ideals you may not believe in, to a room full of people who are mostly unknown to you
– a lot like life actually - but most importantly, it forces you to look at an issue from almost every
angle, aiding in the development of a truly holistic perspective. I want to encourage delegates to
always ask for feedback and never hesitate to approach me (not during committee hours
obviously), because I know the importance of having an EB which is accessible and supportive,
something which we are striving for at the DISEC this year.

I am looking forward to seeing how delegates respond to crises and navigate past their
dichotomous foreign policies. The inclusion of non-state actors in this committee is something
that excites me thoroughly, therefore more than passionate speeches, I encourage you to be well
researched which will help you respond to crises. I wish you all the best, and hope that this
conference will be truly unforgettable for you.

Warm Regards,
Veddant Mehta
Assistant Director of DISEC
Spring MUN 2025
 Disarmament and International Security Committee

Introduction to the agenda

1.Disarmament and International Security Committee

The threat of biochemical warfare represents one of the most serious security challenges in our world
today. Biochemical weapons, which harness the power of harmful biological agents and toxic
chemicals, have a unique capacity to cause indiscriminate harm and prolonged suffering. Unlike
conventional weapons, biochemical agents can linger in the environment, spread through
populations, and trigger health crises that overwhelm local and global healthcare systems. Their use in
conflict not only results in immediate casualties but also inflicts long-term psychological, economic,
and societal damage on affected communities. As science and technology evolve, the potential for
these weapons to become more potent and accessible has increased, amplifying the risk of their use
by state and non-state actors alike.

Biochemical warfare is particularly concerning due to the ease with which biological and chemical
agents can be concealed, transported, and disseminated. These weapons can be deployed covertly,
leaving governments and populations vulnerable to surprise attacks. Additionally, advancements in
biotechnology, gene editing, and synthetic biology have made it easier to modify naturally occurring
pathogens, making them more deadly or resistant to countermeasures. This evolving nature of
biochemical threats complicates the task of tracking and containing potential sources and raises
ethical and security concerns surrounding biotechnological research.

Addressing the threat of biochemical warfare requires a concerted international effort to balance
scientific advancement with strict biosecurity measures. As the world becomes more interconnected,
with rapid international travel and trade, a single biochemical event in one part of the world could
have a ripple effect, impacting health and security worldwide. This agenda thus calls for nations to
work together in preventing the misuse of biological and chemical agents, to strengthen bio-
surveillance, and to build a global framework that can respond swiftly and effectively to any
biochemical threat. In doing so, the international community can take steps toward a safer world, one
where scientific and technological progress is guided by a commitment to peace and security.
 Disarmament and International Security Committee

History of Biochemical Weapons

2.1. 20th Century Developments

Early 20th Century: The use of chemical warfare was first prominently documented during World War
I. In 1915, the German army released chlorine gas at the Second Battle of Ypres, marking the first
large-scale use of a chemical agent in warfare. The psychological impact was immense, leading to
widespread fear and suffering. Countries quickly began to develop and deploy their own chemical
agents. By the end of the war, millions of soldiers had been affected, leading to an estimated 90,000
deaths and countless injuries .

Interwar Period: The aftermath of World War I led to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibited the
use of chemical and biological weapons. However, this treaty lacked enforcement mechanisms,
leading to ongoing research and development in many countries. The interwar period saw
advancements in chemical agent technology and an increase in stockpiles despite international
agreements .

World War II: During World War II, significant advancements were made in biochemical weaponry.
While large-scale use was avoided due to the fear of retaliation, countries conducted extensive
research. Japan, for example, conducted experiments with biological agents through Unit 731,
infamously testing anthrax and plague on prisoners. The war demonstrated the potential for mass
destruction through biochemical agents, leading to international calls for stricter regulations.

Cold War Era : The Cold War period marked a significant escalation in biochemical weapons
development. The U.S. and the USSR stockpiled large quantities of chemical and biological agents,
including nerve agents such as sarin and VX. The 1969 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) aimed to
eliminate biological weapons but lacked robust verification measures, allowing clandestine programs
to flourish. The existence of covert operations, such as the U.S. military's Project MKUltra,
demonstrated the willingness of states to explore the psychological and sociological impacts of
biochemical agents .
 Disarmament and International Security Committee
2.2. Countries’ Historical Use

United States: While the U.S. never deployed chemical weapons on the battlefield after World
War I, it used herbicidal agents such as Agent Orange during the Vietnam War. These agents had
devastating long-term ecological and health consequences. The U.S. also maintained an
extensive chemical weapons program until it joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in
1997, committing to destroy its stockpile.

Russia (USSR): The Soviet Union pursued chemical and biological weapon development
aggressively, maintaining stockpiles that included novichok agents. Post-Soviet Russia has faced
international scrutiny for failing to fully comply with disarmament obligations and has been
linked to novichok poisonings, such as the 2018 Skripal case in the UK​(CIA) (UN Press)

United Kingdom: The UK engaged in small-scale biochemical research during World War II,
testing anthrax on Gruinard Island. It later shifted focus towards disarmament and became a
signatory to the CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

France and China: Both countries maintained research programs, though France pivoted to
disarmament in later years. China has faced allegations of conducting biological research beyond
permissible limits, raising concerns about potential violations of the BWC (​CIA)

Japan: During World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army conducted extensive biological warfare
research and operations, notably Unit 731. This unit developed and tested plague and anthrax
on Chinese civilians, resulting in countless deaths. Japan officially renounced biological weapons
post-war and became a signatory to the BWC in 1972, but there are ongoing concerns regarding
its historical accountability and transparency.(Human rights watch, WWII museum of biological
warfare)

Iraq: In the 1980s, Iraq developed and used chemical weapons, notably during the Iran-Iraq War.
The regime, led by Saddam Hussein, deployed mustard gas and nerve agents against Iranian
forces and Kurdish civilians, leading to significant casualties. Iraq's chemical weapons program
persisted until the Gulf War, when international forces uncovered stockpiles. Post-war, Iraq faced
severe sanctions and scrutiny over its disarmament obligations. (CNN, UN)

South Africa: During the apartheid era, South Africa developed a clandestine biological weapons
program, with research into agents like anthrax and plague. This program was reportedly
dismantled in the early 1990s, with the country joining the BWC in 1995. South Africa has since
focused on disarmament and has been involved in efforts to promote biosecurity.(SIPRI, BWC)

.
 Disarmament and International Security Committee
India: India has pursued biological and chemical research, primarily for defensive purposes.
While it has not been implicated in the use of biochemical weapons, concerns have been raised
regarding its potential dual-use research, particularly in light of regional tensions. India is a
signatory to both the CWC and the BWC, committing to disarmament and non-proliferation.(The
Hindu)

North Korea: North Korea has been accused of developing and stockpiling chemical and
biological weapons, although details remain largely opaque due to the country's secretive
regime. Allegations include the use of chemical agents against defectors and during military
exercises. North Korea is not a party to the CWC or the BWC, raising
.
 Disarmament and International Security Committee

Introduction to Bioweapons
3.1. Types of Biochemical Agents

1. Nerve Agents: Nerve agents are highly toxic chemicals that disrupt the normal functioning of the
nervous system by inhibiting acetylcholinesterase, an enzyme necessary for breaking down
acetylcholine. This leads to an accumulation of acetylcholine, causing continuous stimulation of
muscles, glands, and the central nervous system. Key examples include:
Sarin (GB): A colorless, odorless liquid that can evaporate into a vapor. Exposure can cause
symptoms like convulsions and respiratory failure, often leading to death within minutes.
VX: A synthetic organophosphorus compound, VX is more persistent in the environment than
sarin. It causes long-term effects and has a lethal dose that is smaller than that of sarin.
Novichok Agents: A group of nerve agents developed in the Soviet Union that are highly toxic and
resistant to degradation. Their effects include convulsions, paralysis, and death. They gained
notoriety following the poisoning of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in 2018.

2. Blister Agents: Blister agents, also known as vesicants, cause severe skin and respiratory tract
injuries. They can cause painful blisters and are primarily used in chemical warfare. Notable examples
include:
Mustard Gas (Sulfur Mustard): A well-known blister agent that causes severe burns to the skin,
eyes, and lungs. Its effects may not appear until hours after exposure, complicating treatment.
Lewisite: Another blister agent that can cause immediate pain upon contact with skin and severe
damage to the respiratory system. Its smell is often compared to geraniums.

3. Blood Agents: Blood agents are toxic substances that disrupt the body's ability to use oxygen at
the cellular level, leading to asphyxiation. Key examples include:
Cyanide: Rapidly absorbed by the body and interferes with cellular respiration. Exposure can occur
through inhalation or ingestion, leading to rapid death if untreated.
Hydrogen Cyanide (AC): A colorless gas that can be released in various forms. Symptoms of
exposure include headache, dizziness, and shortness of breath.
 Disarmament and International Security Committee

4. Biological Agents: Biological agents include pathogens and toxins that can cause diseases in
humans, animals, or plants. They are often more challenging to control due to their ability to spread,
mutate, and cause widespread outbreaks. Key types include:
Viruses:
Smallpox: A highly contagious and deadly virus eradicated in the late 20th century, but
concerns remain regarding its use as a bioweapon.
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers (e.g., Ebola, Marburg): These viruses cause severe symptoms,
including bleeding and organ failure, and can be transmitted through bodily fluids.
Bacteria:
Anthrax: Caused by Bacillus anthracis, anthrax spores can be aerosolized for use as a
biological weapon. It can affect the skin, lungs, and gastrointestinal tract.
Plague: Caused by Yersinia pestis, it can be transmitted through fleas or aerosolized, causing
pneumonia and rapid death if untreated.
Toxins:
Botulinum Toxin: Produced by Clostridium botulinum, it is the most potent toxin known. It
causes paralysis by blocking nerve signals and can be deadly even in minuscule amounts.
Ricin: A toxin derived from castor beans, ricin can cause severe respiratory distress and
organ failure if inhaled or ingested.

5. Other Types of Chemical Agents

Incapacitating Agents: These are designed to incapacitate rather than kill. An example is fentanyl,
a powerful opioid that can cause respiratory failure in high doses.
Herbicides: While primarily used for agricultural purposes, certain herbicides like Agent Orange
have been deployed as chemical weapons, causing long-term health issues and environmental
damage.
 Disarmament and International Security Committee

3.2. Manufacturing and Delivery Systems

Manufacturing Processes
The production of biochemical agents requires specialized facilities and expertise. The key stages
include:
1. Synthesis of Chemical Compounds: This involves creating the chemical agents in a controlled
laboratory environment.
2. Cultivation of Biological Agents: Biological agents must be cultured under sterile conditions to
prevent contamination .
3. Stabilization and Storage: Both chemical and biological agents need stabilization to retain
potency over time, often requiring advanced storage conditions.

Delivery Systems
1. Missiles and Rockets: Military forces can deploy biochemical agents using ballistic missiles or
artillery shells, allowing for widespread dispersion.
2. Aerosol Sprays: Smaller-scale applications can be achieved through aerosol sprays, making it
easier for non-state actors to utilize these weapons .
3. Drones and UAVs: Emerging technologies such as drones have introduced new methods for
deploying biochemical agents with precision, raising concerns over their potential use in
asymmetric warfare .

3.3. Creation of Biochemical Weapons

The creation of biochemical weapons involves numerous considerations, including:

1. Ethical Implications: The moral questions surrounding the development and use of such
weapons are significant. Many researchers refuse to participate in biochemical weapons
programs due to ethical concerns .
2. Legal Restrictions: The CWC and BWC impose legal constraints on the creation and use of
biochemical weapons. However, enforcement remains a challenge .
3. Technological Advances: New technologies, particularly in synthetic biology, have made it easier
for both state and non-state actors to create novel biochemical agents. This raises alarm over
potential biosecurity breaches and the emergence of new biological threats. (SIPRI) (UN Press)
Disarmament and International Security Committee

Current situation
4.1. International Treaties and Agreements

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) are
the primary frameworks governing the prohibition and disarmament of biochemical weapons. While
the CWC has been effective in ensuring the destruction of chemical stockpiles, the BWC lacks robust
enforcement mechanisms. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
oversees compliance with the CWC, conducting inspections and investigations into reported uses,
such as in Syria​(CIA)

4.2. Global Stockpiles and Capabilities

Although the United States has completed the destruction of its declared stockpiles, countries such
as Russia face ongoing scrutiny over transparency. North Korea is suspected of maintaining both
chemical and biological weapons programs. Syria’s use of chlorine gas in its civil war has
underscored the limitations of international agreements in conflict zones​. (UN Press)

4.3. Use in Recent Wars

Chlorine and Sarin Gas Attacks in the Syrian Civil War - The Syrian regime has used chemical
agents, including sarin and chlorine gas, multiple times. One of the most notorious incidents
occurred in Douma in 2018, where chlorine bombs killed dozens of civilians. These attacks have been
used strategically to break opposition-held areas, spread fear, and force evacuations. Despite global
condemnation and investigations by the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons), chemical weapons remain a brutal tool in the conflict. These attacks not only cause
immediate casualties but also serve as psychological weapons to demoralize civilian populations and
rebel forces, forcing mass displacements.
Disarmament and International Security Committee
Alexei Navalny Poisoning (2020) - Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny was poisoned with a
Novichok nerve agent. This act of state-sponsored biochemical use highlighted how such agents are
leveraged for political purposes outside of traditional warfare. Other high-profile cases include the
2018 poisoning of Sergei Skripal in the UK, pointing to a pattern of covert biochemical operations by
Russian intelligence agencies.

Yemeni Conflict (Houthi-Saudi War) - In the ongoing Yemen conflict, there have been unverified
reports of chemical weapons used in skirmishes involving Houthi rebels and the Saudi-led coalition.
The chaotic nature of the conflict makes independent verification difficult, but local sources have
expressed concerns about the use of tear gas and toxic agents in urban combat zones. This
highlights how chemical agents can be introduced into civil wars even in states not traditionally
associated with these weapons.

Myanmar-Rohingya Conflict - Reports suggest that chemical agents might have been deployed
against the Rohingya population during military operations in Myanmar. Following the 2021 military
coup, the junta has escalated violence, allegedly using toxic substances during operations against
ethnic minorities. The repression of the Rohingya has included bombings and mass killings, with
witnesses reporting that drone strikes and artillery barrages released chemical substances during
attacks on fleeing civilians.

Libyan Civil Conflict - Chemical Stockpiles in Militia Hands: Libya's post-Gaddafi instability has led to
concerns about chemical weapon stockpiles, such as mustard gas, falling into the hands of armed
groups. Though the Libyan government had pledged to eliminate its chemical arsenal, some reports
indicate that remnants of these weapons may still exist, posing risks of use by militias or extremist
factions.
Disarmament and International Security Committee

Extremism and Biochemical Weapons

5.1. Motivations and Ideologies

Extremist groups pursue biochemical weapons for various reasons, primarily due to their potential
to instill fear and cause mass casualties. The motivations for utilizing such weapons often align with
their ideological or religious objectives, aiming to disrupt societal structures, provoke government
responses, or demonstrate power.
1. Psychological Impact: The use of biochemical agents can create a significant psychological
impact on the population, leading to panic, distrust, and social upheaval. This aspect is
particularly appealing to extremist organizations, which seek to amplify their influence through
fear Goals: Many extremist groups, including religious or political factions, view the use of
biochemical weapons as a means to achieve their goals. They may perceive these weapons as a
form of warfare that allows them to fight against perceived oppressors, challenge state authority,
or achieve martyrdom .
2. Exploitation Abilities: Extremist organizations often exploit vulnerabilities in biological research
facilities to acquire dangerous pathogens or chemicals. For instance, inadequate security at
research centers can lead to the theft or misuse of biological agents. Reports have indicated that
groups have attempted to acquire materials from laboratories and hospitals, highlighting the
need for enhanced biosecurity measures .

5.2. Case Studies accidents demonstrate how extremist groups have

sought to deploy biochemical weapons:

1. Aum Shinrikyo: The 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack, carried out by the Aum Shinrikyo cult, is a
prominent example of biochemical weapon use by an extremist group. The attack resulted in 13
deaths and over 5,000 injuries, showcasing the potential for mass casualties. The group's prior
experimentation with nerve agents illustrates how a determined organization can acquire and
utilize sophisticated biochemical weapons .
2. ISIS: Reports suggest that ISIS has atl agents in Iraq and Syria, with limited success. Despite the
group's capabilities, they faced challenges in effectively deploying these weapons. The potential
for catastrophic outcomes increases if such extremist organizations acquire more sophisticated
agents or develop better methods of delivery .
Disarmament and International Security Committee

3.Potential for Catastrophe: The combination of technologicareasing ambition of extremist groups

raises alarms regarding future attacks. Experts warn that if groups gain access to advanced
biochemical weapons, the consequences could be devastating, particularly in urban settings where
civilian populations are concentrated.

5.3. Common Extremist Groups and Their Use

Several extremist organizations weapons, although their success rates vary:

1. ISIS: The Islamic State (ISIS) has demonstrated a persistent interest in acquiring and potentially
deploying chemical weapons. Reports from various security agencies indicate that the group
attempted to manufacture chemical agents, particularly in the context of their operations in Iraq
and Syria. For instance, in 2016, ISIS was linked to multiple incidents involving chemical weapons,
including the use of sulfur mustard gas against Kurdish forces. Intelligence assessments suggest
that ISIS has sought individuals with scientific backgrounds to enhance their capabilities, further
raising alarms among global security officials regarding their potential to produce and utilize
chemical agents effectively.
2. Al-Qaeda: Al-Qaeda has historically expressed interest in both chemical and biological weapons
as tools to further its ideological goals. Although it has not executed large-scale deployments of
such weapons, the group has made significant attempts to acquire knowledge and resources for
their development. The U.S. intelligence community has noted that Al-Qaeda's efforts to engage
with experts in biological sciences could pose a long-term threat to global security. This
continued aspiration is viewed as a significant concern, particularly given Al-Qaeda's
decentralized structure, which allows for flexibility and adaptability in their operations.
3. Lone Actors and Splinter Groups: Beyond organized terrorist entities, there is growing concern
about lone actors or splinter groups gaining access to chemical and biological agents. Such
individuals may exploit vulnerabilities in research facilities or engage with black-market networks
to acquire dangerous materials. These actors, while potentially lacking the resources of larger
organizations, can still pose a significant threat due to their motivations and ability to act
independently. Security analysts emphasize the importance of monitoring and securing dual-use
research materials to mitigate risks posed by individuals with malicious intent.
 Disarmament and International Security Committee

Key Treaties and Conventions on Biochemical

Warfare

6.1 Geneva Protocol – 1925

The Geneva Protocol is one of the earliest international agreements aimed at regulating the use of
chemical and biological weapons. Formally known as the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gasses, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare the Geneva
Protocol was adopted in the aftermath of World War I, where the widespread use of chemical
weapons resulted in horrific casualties and international condemnation.The Geneva Protocol bans
the use of chemical and biological weapons in armed conflict but does not prohibit their
development, production, or stockpiling. This limited scope made the protocol a somewhat
inadequate measure for fully addressing the dangers of chemical and biological weapons. Many
countries that signed the protocol reserved the right to retaliate with chemical weapons if they were
attacked with such weapons first, which further weakened its effectiveness as a comprehensive
disarmament tool.

6.2 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) – 1972

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is the primary international treaty that prohibits the
development, production, stockpiling, and acquisition of biological and toxin weapons. It is the first
multilateral disarmament agreement to ban an entire category of weapons, underscoring the
international community’s recognition of the uniquely dangerous nature of biological warfare.
The BWC applies to a wide range of biological agents and toxins that could be used for hostile
purposes. The treaty bans the development, production, acquisition, and retention of microbial or
other biological agents or toxins in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes. It also
bans equipment and delivery mechanisms specifically designed to disseminate biological weapons.
However, the BWC permits the use of biological agents for peaceful, prophylactic, and protective
purposes, such as scientific research and public health measures, provided they are not used for
offensive purposes.
 Disarmament and International Security Committee
6.3 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) – 1993

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a landmark treaty that comprehensively bans the
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. It is
regarded as one of the most successful arms control agreements in history, having achieved near-
universal adherence and resulted in the verified destruction of over 99% of declared chemical
weapon stockpiles worldwide.The CWC defines chemical weapons broadly to include both toxic
chemicals and their precursors, munitions, and delivery devices. Toxic chemicals are defined as any
chemicals that can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or
animals. The CWC covers all chemical weapons, regardless of whether they are intended for warfare,
riot control, or other purposes, and it requires member states to declare and destroy their
stockpiles.
Disarmament and International Security Committee

Bloc positions
1. United States

The United States has a long and complex history with biochemical weapons, going back to its use of
chemical agents like mustard gas during World War I and later, the infamous deployment of Agent
Orange in the Vietnam War. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. maintained a large stockpile of
chemical weapons and conducted significant research into biological agents under covert programs
such as Project SHAD. However, by 1997, the U.S. signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
and made efforts to dismantle its chemical weapons stockpiles, which were fully destroyed by
2023.Despite these disarmament efforts, concerns remain over the country’s extensive biodefense
research. The U.S. continues to invest heavily in biotechnology and the development of chemical
defenses, raising suspicions about the dual-use potential of such technologies. While the U.S. is a
strong advocate for global compliance with the CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),
its role in shaping future biochemical warfare technologies cannot be ignored.

2. Russia

Russia, as the successor to the Soviet Union, inherited one of the world’s most advanced biochemical
weapons programs. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed the highly lethal Novichok
nerve agents, which came to global attention after the poisoning of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal
in the UK in 2018. Although Russia is a signatory to both the CWC and BWC, the country’s continued
development and suspected use of chemical agents, alongside its clandestine research, have raised
international concerns about its compliance with these treaties.Russia’s involvement in supporting
the Assad regime in Syria, where chemical weapons have been used in civilian areas, further
complicates its position. Its history, technological capabilities, and geopolitical actions make Russia a
critical player in discussions about the ongoing risks of biochemical warfare.
 Disarmament and International Security Committee

3. Syria

Syria has become a central figure in discussions on biochemical warfare due to its documented use
of chemical weapons during its civil war. Despite acceding to the CWC in 2013, after international
pressure following the Ghouta chemical attack, the Assad regime has continued to deploy chemical
weapons, including sarin and chlorine gas, against civilians. These violations have been confirmed by
investigations led by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).Syria’s
repeated breaches of the CWC and ongoing conflict present a challenge for international
enforcement mechanisms. The country remains a focal point for global efforts to prevent the use of
chemical weapons, but the ongoing war and the regime’s denial of responsibility create significant
barriers to effective disarmament.

4. European Union (EU)

The European Union has positioned itself as a key diplomatic actor in the fight against the
proliferation of biochemical weapons. All member states of the EU are signatories to the CWC and
BWC, and the bloc actively promotes global compliance with these treaties. The EU has also been a
major financial supporter of disarmament initiatives, particularly through contributions to the OPCW.
In addition to its disarmament efforts, the EU is at the forefront of efforts to hold violators of
chemical weapons conventions accountable, such as in Syria. The EU also promotes capacity-building
programs that help states implement international obligations related to chemical and biological
weapons. However, Europe’s advanced biotechnology sector has raised concerns about potential
dual-use risks, particularly if cutting-edge research is repurposed for offensive means.
 Disarmament and International Security Committee

5. Iraq (Historically)

Iraq’s use of chemical weapons under Saddam Hussein remains one of the most notorious cases of
chemical warfare in the modern era. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iraqi forces employed
mustard gas and other chemical agents, particularly in the infamous 1988 Halabja attack against the
Kurdish population, killing thousands. Iraq’s chemical weapons program, along with its development
of biological agents, was a major focus of international sanctions and disarmament efforts following
the Gulf War. UN-led inspections and disarmament efforts in the 1990s successfully dismantled
much of Iraq’s biochemical weapons program, though the suspicion of hidden stockpiles contributed
to the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Iraq’s legacy serves as a reminder of the devastating potential of
chemical weapons and underscores the importance of rigorous international monitoring and
enforcement.

6. Libya

Libya, under Muammar Gaddafi, developed a robust chemical weapons program in the 1980s,
including the production of mustard gas. Gaddafi's government later joined the CWC in 2004 and
began dismantling its stockpiles, but progress was slow, and by the time of the 2011 revolution, the
process was still incomplete. International disarmament efforts, led by the OPCW, oversaw the
destruction of Libya's remaining stockpiles by 2016, but concerns linger over the possibility that
some materials may have fallen into the hands of non-state actors during the civil unrest.
Libya’s case highlights the challenges of securing chemical weapons stockpiles in unstable political
environments, where the risks of proliferation to extremist groups or neighboring conflict zones are
high.
 Disarmament and International Security Committee

7. Non-State Actors

Non-state actors represent one of the gravest threats in the contemporary discussion of biochemical
warfare, given their increasing interest in acquiring and using chemical and biological weapons.
These groups operate outside the framework of international law and treaties, making them harder
to monitor and control. Here are three of the most prominent non-state actors:

ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria): ISIS has repeatedly sought to acquire and use chemical
weapons during its campaigns in Iraq and Syria. The group has been linked to the use of chlorine
gas and mustard agents, particularly in attacks targeting civilians and opposition forces. ISIS’s
ability to control territory in conflict zones allowed it access to chemical weapon precursors,
creating a dangerous precedent for other terrorist groups. The international community
continues to monitor and address the threat of ISIS's biochemical capabilities, especially in
destabilized regions.

Al-Qaeda: Al-Qaeda has long expressed interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction,
including biochemical agents. Though less successful than ISIS in developing chemical weapons,
the group’s decentralized structure and global reach make it a persistent threat. Al-Qaeda has
explored bioweapons as a means to inflict mass casualties and has previously sought access to
chemical precursors through sympathizers or rogue state actors.
Disarmament and International Security Committee

Qarma
1. How can the enforcement of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) be strengthened, or should they be replaced?
2. What mechanisms can ensure greater compliance by state and non-state actors?
3. How can advancements in synthetic biology and chemistry be monitored to prevent
misuse?
4. How can international cooperation and intelligence-sharing be enhanced to detect
and prevent biochemical attacks?
5. How can international inspection and monitoring agencies be better supported?
6. Should there be a new framework to regulate emerging technologies like CRISPR and
gene editing?
7. What steps can be taken to improve global preparedness for a large-scale biochemical
attack?
Disarmament and International Security Committee

Position Papers
Each position paper is divided into three sections: your country’s national interests, your
country’s national policies with respect to your stance on this issue, and suggestions for potential
solutions with respect to the DISEC mandate. The first part highlights the statement of the
problem that the committee must deal with. The second part focuses on national policies and the
country’s attempts to secure its interests. These policies can be amended after negotiation in
committee. For the third and most substantial part, refer to the background guides’ section on
‘questions a resolution must answer’ to ensure that the solutions provided are pertaining to the
problem at hand with respect to religion. What solution the delegate and its nation believe is
viable to put an end to the crisis must be mentioned. Details are not required as those will be
brought out in committee however a rough idea must be portrayed. Delegates may use some
additional material like maps, images etc. to support their papers. However, they must not
compromise on textual material due to this. The rough flow of a good position paper is given
below.

Format : Times New Roman, size 12, language in third person (eg."The delegate of [Country
Name] believes...")

Information in the header : Moha Tungare – Hill Spring – USA

(Replace this section with your own name, school, and country allocation)

The first part of your position paper must include the general statement of the problem.
Eg. The delegate of [Country Name] believes that the committee should focus on the key issues
surrounding [state the key issues]. A basic description of the problem would entail [briefly
describe the crisis or concern related to the agenda]. This issue demands collective attention
because [mention why it’s significant]. The committee must address these challenges holistically,
considering the political, economic, and social implications.
Disarmament and International Security Committee

The second part must entail the country’s stance on the topic
Eg. The delegate of [Country Name] emphasizes the importance of aligning with its national
policies and international commitments. Historically, [Country Name] has [mention specific
actions taken or key policies relevant to the agenda]. This demonstrates [explain how the
mentioned actions or policies reflect the country's stance]. Additionally, the delegate
acknowledges that [discuss any treaties, alliances, or international actions the country has
supported or opposed].
[Provide evidence of your country’s involvement—such as laws, actions, military alliances, or
resolutions it has supported. Mention key events if relevant.]

The last part should touch upon solutions the delegate proposes
Eg. The delegate of [Country Name] proposes that the following steps can effectively address the
crisis: (Feel free to give as many solutions as you want)
1. [Solution 1] – [Briefly describe the first solution your country supports].
2. [Solution 2] – [Explain the second potential solution].
3. [Solution 3] – [Mention another viable strategy or initiative].
The solutions presented aim to balance the interests of all involved nations while maintaining
international security and stability. [Add any further strategies or considerations your country
believes in.]

Bibliography
[List all the sources you consulted during your research to avoid plagiarism. This section is crucial
for ensuring the originality of your paper.]

Please submit your position papers to [email protected]

 Disarmament and International Security Committee

Paperwork
Given the ever-evolving nature of DISEC this year, communique will be one of the most
important tools at delegates’ disposal during committee. A communiqué is simply an executive
order from a delegate asking an organization, a group of people, an agency or even an
unauthorized power to perform some kind of action or to take some kind of a policy decision,
which will affect the proceedings in committee. These communiques must at all times be realistic.

Types Of Communiques:
Open Communiques: These are communiques where whatever action you take is displayed in
front of the committee and you are directly identified as a perpetrator of that action. These will
only be permitted when necessary, and should not be used to inform the committee of arbitrary
domestic developments or policy changes in response to the crisis.
Closed Communique: In most committees, this is the most widely used communiqué and it is
the ideal tool to take action. The EB will not disclose the authors of the communique however
may introduce the content of the communique in the form of a crisis.
Joint Communiques: These are communiques where two or more entities take some kind of
action together, where both countries are directly involved. These communiques can again be
open or closed. While joint communiques are more likely to be implemented, it is important to
remember the kind of delegate you would pass a communiqué with.

For a communiqué to be implemented, not only does it need to be detailed and specific, but
also feasible. While good communiques generally tend to be improbable actions in the real
international community, they are well-detailed and do not stray too far from actual
possibilities. The implementation of any communique regardless of its implications are solely at
the discretion of the chair and are not subject to debate or being challenged in committee
Disarmament and International Security Committee

Bibliography
World Health Organization. “Biological Weapons.” WHO, World Health Organization,
www.who.int/health-topics/biological-weapons#tab=tab_1. Accessed 5 Nov. 2024.
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. “What Are Biological Weapons?” UNODA,
United Nations, disarmament.unoda.org/biological-weapons/about/what-are-
biological-weapons/. Accessed 5 Nov. 2024.

Reuters. “Russia, Ukraine Trade Allegations of Chemical Weapons Use to Global

Watchdog.” Reuters, 7 May 2024, www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-trade-
allegations-chemical-weapons-use-global-watchdog-2024-05-07/. Accessed 5 Nov.
2024.

Associated Press. “Biological Weapons.” AP News, Associated Press,

apnews.com/hub/biological-weapons. Accessed 5 Nov. 2024.

“The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) at a Glance.” Arms Control Association,

www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/biological-weapons-convention-bwc-glance-0.
Accessed 5 Nov. 2024.

United Nations. “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and

Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.”
United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,
www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-
crimes/Doc.37_conv%20biological%20weapons.pdf. Accessed 5 Nov. 2024.
“Biological Weapons Convention.” Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI
www.nti.org/analysis/articles/biological-weapons-convention/. Accessed 5 Nov. 2024.
Brown, Lorna L. “A Comprehensive Approach to Biological Warfare Defense.” National
Center for Biotechnology Information, U.S. National Library of Medicine, National Institutes
of Health, pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1200679/. Accessed 5 Nov. 2024.

“Biological Warfare.” ScienceDirect, Elsevier, www.sciencedirect.com/topics/medicine-

and-dentistry/biological-warfare. Accessed 5 Nov. 2024
Disarmament and International Security Committee

Recommended links for further research

https://www.who.int/health-topics/biological-weapons#tab=tab_1

https://disarmament.unoda.org/biological-weapons/about/what-are-biological-
weapons/

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-trade-allegations-chemical-
weapons-use-global-watchdog-2024-05-07/

https://apnews.com/hub/biological-weapons

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/biological-weapons-convention-bwc-glance-0
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-

\crimes/Doc.37_conv%20biological%20weapons.pdf

https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/biological-weapons-convention/

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1200679/

https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/medicine-and-dentistry/biological-warfare

https://disarmament.unoda.org/biological-weapons/

https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3815869/

https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCU-Journal/JAMS-
vol-14-no-1/Future-Bioterror-and-Biowarfare-Threats/
https://www.who.int/health-topics/biological-weapons#tab=tab_3
https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/4579-biological-
weapons