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DECLASSIFIED BY AF/O IlAV [.0.12958 (AMENDED) DATE. 21IO71B

APPROVED

P111LIE

FO R RELEASE

I
* SOUTHEAST ASIA

IUSAF
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zol

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QUICK REACTION FORCES

CLASSIFIED BY 7AF/-L-A/CHEC0 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATIOYJ SHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3 DECLASSIFY ON I;uEFINITE

I'

K717.041448

20080910313
(THlIS PAGE IS
UNCIA,,ViF vij .-

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ontemporary

Historic.,
Examination of perations

REPORT RI

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USAF QUICK REACTION FORCES

20 JUNE 1974
CHECO/CORONA HARVEST DIVISION OPERATIONS ANALYSIS OFFICE HQ PACAF
Prepared by:
CAPT. DAVID K. MANN and CAPT. EDWARD P. BRYNN

I
n

Project CHECO

7th AF

K 717.0414-4

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

I

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

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8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

Department of the Air Force Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, CHECO Division

REPORT NUMBER

Hickam AFB, HI
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14. ABSTRACT

Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of

the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency
Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current

Operations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting
corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

CHECO reports, Vietnam War, War in Southeast Asia, Vietnam War- Aerial Operations, American

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Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

UNCLASSIFIW
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS PACIFIC AIR FORCES APO SAN FRANCISCO 96553

CA"P

PROJECT CHECO REPORTS

UThe

counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment of a Southeast Asia has resulted in USAF airpower being employed to meet have involved the multitude of requirements. These varied applications full spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support equipment, and manpower. should As a result, operational data and experiences have accumulated which and future impact upon be collected, documented, and analyzed for current USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine. Fortunately, the value of collecting and documenting our SEA experiences was recognized at an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directed CINCPACAF to establish an activity which would provide timely and analytical studies of USAF combat operations in SEA and would be primarily responsive to Air Staff requirements and direction. Project CHECO, an acronym for Contaiiporary Historical Examination of Current Operations, was established to meet the Air Staff directive. on the policy guidance of the Office of Air Force History and managed by 1lq PACAF, with elements in Southeast Asia, Project CHECO provides a scholarly "on-going" historical examination, documentation, and reporting on USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine in PACOM. This which CHECO report is part of the overall documentation and examination an authentic source for an assessment of is being accomplished. It is the effectiveness of USAF airpower in PACOM when used in proper context. The reader must view the study in relation to the events and circumstances on a at the time of its preparation--recognizing that it was prepared perspective and that the author's contemporary basis which restricted was limited to records available within his local headquarters area.

IBased

--

Iresearch

ROBERT E. HILLER Assistant for Operations Analysis DCS/Plans and Operations

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ii

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS PACIFIC AIR FORCES APO SAN FRANCISCO
i ,E[PLY TO

96553

4TTN YOF

XOAD

20 June 1974

SUBJECT

Project CHECO Report, "USAF Quick Reaction Forces"

Ioo

SEE DISTRIBUTION PAGE 1. Attached is a SECRET document. It shall be transported, stored, safeguarded, and accounted for in accordance with applicable security directives. Retain or destroy in accordance with AFR 205-1. Do not return. 2. This letter does not contain classified information and may be declassified if attachllent is removed from it. FOR THE COiiMANDER IN CHIEF

V P,.

A ObL--1 Atch (S) Project CHECO Report, "USAF Quick Reaction Forces," 20 June 1974

V. H. GALLACHER, Lt Colonel, USAF Chief, CHECO/CORONA HARVEST Division Ops Anal, DCS/Plans and Operations

I 3A601A

iii

UNCLASSIFIED
DISTRIBUTION LIST 1. SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE a. SAFAA b. SAFLL
c. SAFOI d. SAFUS

i. AFSDC
1) AFLGX
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c) HO ...... (d) ASD(RWST) * (e) RADC(DOT) . (f) ADTC(CCN) . (g) ADTC(DLOSL) (h)ESD(YWA) . . A-A-L'OL)' . ESD(XRP) . g. USAFSS (1) HEADQUARTERS (a) AFSCC(SUR).

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h. USAFSOS (1) HEADQUARTERS .. .1 (a) ESD .. i. PACAF (1) HEADQUARTERS ...... 1 (a) IN ... (b) XOEA . . .. . 2 (c) CSH .. ..... 1 1 (d) DC ...... .. 1 (e) LG ....... 6 (f) XOAD .......

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UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
(2)AIR FORCES (a) 5AF 4. SEPARATE OPERATIIG AGENCIES

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IUNCLASSIFIED

5. MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS, AND JOINT STAFFS ........................ 1 a. COMUSJAPAN/J3 ...... ..... . 2 . . ......... . . . b. CINCPAC (J301) ........ 1 ............. 3....... c. CINCPACFLT (Code 332). .................. .. d COMUSKOREA (ATTN: J-3) 1 . ........ e. COMUS1ACTHAI/MACTJ3....... ..... . 1 . . . . . ..... ............. f. COMUSTDC (J3) ... . g. USCINCEUR (ECJB) .............................. . 1 . (CL) ....... ........................ . 1 h. CINCLANT 1 ................... ....... i. CHIEF, NAVAL OPERATIONS (ABQ) . . . ............. J. COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS l... 1 . ................ k. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (ASM-D) .... . ................ ... 1 1. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (J3RR&A) .... ......................... 1 m. JSTPS ...... ..... n. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OASD/SA) . . .............. . o. CINCSTRIKE (STS) .................... . . . .. . . .. ....... . . p. CINCAL (J2) ...... 1 q. MAAG-CHINA (MGOT-LA) ....................... 1 . . r. U.S. DOCUMENTS OFFICE, HQALLIED FORCS'NORTiERN.

6. SCHOOLS a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. J. Senior Senior Senior Senior Senior Senior Senior Senior Senior Senior USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF USAF Representative, National War College .. .... . . 1 Representative, Armed Forces Staff College . . . . 1 Rep, Industrial College of the Armed Forces . . , 1 ..... I Representative, Naval Amphibious School .. ..... 1 Corps Education Center .. Rep, U.S. Marine War College ......... 1 Representative, U.S. Naval 1 Representative, U.S. Army War College ... ...... ...... 1 Rep, U.S. Army C&G Staff College ..... Representative, U.S. Army Infantry School . . . . 1 .1 Rep, USA JFK Cen for Mil Asst..

k. Senior USAF Representative, U.S. Army Field Artiliery'Schooi

.

1. Senior USAF Representative, U.S. Liaison Office m. Senior USAF Rep, U.S. Army Armor School, Comd and Staff'Dept

I..l... 1

vii

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I
FOREWORD ......... CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ...... ....................... .l.... .......... ............................ II. GENESIS OF THE QUICK REACTION CONCEPT ..... III. QRF IMPLEMENTED:

Page
. ix

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ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ....

......11 33 39 45

IV. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION ........

.................

FOOTNOTES ..................................... .. GLOSSARY ...... . . . ........ . . . . ...................

viii

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
FOREWORU (U) This report examines the evolution of the alert role of F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers in Southeast Asia air-to-ground combat operations. Seventh Air Force implemented the quick reaction concept as a

management tool to promote the effective allocation of air resources under circumstances of limited targets and variable weather conditions. Through the use of documentary evidence and interviews conducted with

Iindividuals involved in Seventh Air Force air operations, this study

traces the employment of the quick reaction concept from its inception in 1970 through April 1973.

ix

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UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION (S) During the late 1960s and into the 1970s, continued prosecution of the war under increasingly stringent materiel and logistics restraints prompted improvements of flexibility and efficiency in the conduct of air operations in Vietnam, Laos, and eventually in Cambodia. -The impact of In Laos,

these constraints was clearly manifested in operations in Laos.

U.S. air operations had been geared primarily to (1) air support for friendly forces, (2) interdiction of supplies moving south across a complex series of roads, trails, and other lines of communication (LOCs), and (3) destruction of increasingly sophisticated enemy weaponry, including that which posed a threat to friendly air operations. Discretion in

the prosecution of objectives in Laos and restrictions on American involvement imposed a requirement for economy in expenditures. The rapid movement

of enemy resources under cover of thick vegetation demanded precision in the delivery of ordnance and rapid response following the discovery of enemy targets. The relationship of the air war to diplomatic complexities

in Vientiane, to competing command and control initiatives in Saigon, and to the rapidly fluctuating and at times precarious fortunes of friendly

I
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forces in Laos itself called for reconsideration of solutions to problems of management coordination.

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(S) To these problems were added difficult air operating conditions imposed by a seasonal monsoon climate* and a mountainous terrain. Prior

to 1968, the Southwest Monsoon rains impeded enemy ground movement; after 1968, in all but the most severe monsoon weather, "the cumulative effects of continuing improvements to, and expansion of, the road network" permitted increased levels of wet season traffic. Thus, wet weather condi-

tions, which once had served to impede enemy traffic, now served to 2 complicate air interdiction efforts. (S) Meanwhile, the enemy's completion of new entry points from southern North Vietnam into Laos and northern South Vietnam (RVN) near the Demilitarized Zone, and more efficient exploitation of waterway resources, further complicated wet season interdiction. North Vietnam's expanded

route structure was not matched by concomitant increases in the number of aircraft at the disposal of American forces. Increasing efficiency

and flexibility in the application of air power was therefore necessary. The war in RVN required most available air resources, but support in Laos was also necessary to avert the danger that a major setback in that embattled nation might bring about a political decision to withdraw the consent of the Royal Laotian Government to further U.S. air efforts in *(U) Along the western and southern edges of the Annamite Mountain chain which separates Laos from North and South Vietnam, heavy rains fall during the Southwest Monsoon season from May to September. Clear periods are infrequent and unpredictable; the areas of clear weather are usually small and disappear quickly. Heavy rains fall on the higher elevations, and fog, thick clouds, and frequent rains occur in the valleys. Several clear days may occur in any given area in each month of the Southwest Monsoon season, and some areas enjoy bright late morning conditions for additional periods.

*
"Steel Tiger" (Southern Laos).

3
At the same time, American strategists

noted that the weather-related reduction of air activity in the monsoon season provided increased opportunities for the establishment of an alert force without an accompanying degradation of scheduled operations. On 22

March 1970, the Office of the U.S. Air Attache (OUSAIRA), Vientiane, urged a new and even radical change in interdiction procedures to match the enemy's increasing sophistication. Targets were obscure, but no less dangerous.

Furthermore, this very obscurity made accurate bomb damage assessment 4 difficult. (S) A force at once economical, flexible, capable of rapid response, and centrally coordinated was necessary. It would permit maximum exploita-

tion of limited opportunities for interdiction of enemy supplies in wet weather conditions, for the support of friendly forces, and for the destruction of in-place enemy facilities. Conditions demanded (1) the inte-

gration of the long-standing Air Force commitment in Barrel Roll (Northern Laos) and Steel Tiger with air priorities established by higher authorities and implemented by 7th AF, and (2) the coordination of rapid response authorizations with the central war strategy for all parts of SEA. These factors

prompted new efforts to establish a widely employed, functionally uniform, centrally directed, and completely resource-flexible system of fighter and reconnaissance sortie responses t.o enemy activities. It was as a

result of these considerations that the Quick Reaction (QR) concept

emerged.

CHAPTER II GENESIS OF THE QUICK REACTION CONCEPT (S) By 1970, North Vietnamese military activity along the Annamite chain into the Mekong Plain, and eventually deep into Cambodia, was steadily increasing as USAF resources were declining. Increased emphasis on economy,

flexibility, and efficiency in the USAF response suggested implementation of a concept of quick reaction for USAF strike and reconnaissance operations. In the context of Laotian operations, and as eventually extended

to Cambodia and RVN, the quick reaction concept used during and after 1970 was shaped by three principal factors: an increasing scarcity of targets

during the annual wet season campaign, a reduced number of sorties avail5 able for use in Laotian operations, diction. and mounting difficulties in inter-

Basically, Quick Reaction Forces and Quick Reaction Reconnaissance

called for the allocation of USAF aircraft and personnel to a ground alert status. Aircraft so allocated were to be armed and serviced for immediate

take-off to strike targets of opportunity, to support friendly troops in ground combat, or to photograph perishable and perishable-static* targets. Quick Reaction was an alert-posture concept in which sorties were placed in readiness for immediate launch from ground facilities rather than diverted from previously fragged missions. Central to the concept was the day-to6

day allocation of aircraft and personnel to the alert posture until activated, cancelled, or diverted to regularly fragged missions. This prescheduling

*E.g., truck parks.

of alert status distinguished this idea from previous alert situations in which briefing procedures, aircraft preparation, and other requirements were integrated into a firm time-over-target schedule. (S) In QR, all preparations were made without a commitment to launch, and no resources could be diverted from QR commitments, whatever the pressure of regular fragging requirements, without authorization from the 7AF Tactical Air Control Center (nicknamed Blue Chip). definition, QR was a wet season instrument. In its original

As such, it could supply

rapid response to the strike and reconnaissance opportunities provided by short periods of clear weather. Resources placed on alert, because

of weather restrictions, would not normally be required for other regularly scheduled sortie commitments. A ground alert posture minimized the launch-

ing of sorties which might later abort because of bad weather, the disappearance of lucrative targets, or other conditions which followed attempts to use prearranged fragging schedules for fleeting or perishable targets. It also partly satisfied a need for single management of SEA air operations by vesting QR control authority in one central command responsive to requests from Forward Air Controllers (FACs) or other agencies in a position to define a favorable opportunity for i,inediate use of air power. FurtherI

I 5

more, QR offered FACs an opportunity to request different mixes of ordnance without sacrificing time for changing ordnance, and was available wherever needed. (S) Quick Reaction as already defined evolved from conditions peculiar to Laotian operations in 1969 and early 1970. Its fundamental aspects,

however, reflected a heritage of air operations experience accumulated in SEA operations over several years. In 1964, the Army of the Republic

of Vietnam began to recognize the value of air power's quick response capability. Thereafter, the need for rapid response increased markedly.

New air bases were constructed, permitting the wide deployment of a modern jet strike and reconnaissance force, and the Tactical Air Control System was increasingly refined. to the combat situation. (S) By 1966, in Vietnam, the USAF could boast a viable system of preplanned and immediate air responses, complemented by procedures for rapid diversions. The role of the FAC as the on-the-scene originator These actions provided an air arm responsive

of requests and coordinator of strike action, and the Direct Air Support Center as a clearing house for requests and allocator of available resources, 7 This Air Force Immediate Air Request net decreased was working smoothly. response time for diverts to an average of 20 minutes and for scramble 8 The system, not surprisingly, sorties to an average of 40 minutes in RVN. I was geared to the ground war, and the most dramatic improvements were made in connection with efforts to support troops in contact (TIC). Refinements

in immediate air response stemmed from improved coordination between American ground and air units. Any remaining problems often reflected difficulties

in acconmmodating the divers priorities and interests of the American Armed Services within the Joint Air/Ground Operations System. (C) In Laos, objectives differed; the need for rapid response therefore took on a different shape. The role of the USAF was dominant, and the

....., Mogn MM.

character of the war effort placed an even greater premium on flexibility of air equipment and ordnance than was true elsewhere. In 1965, the USAF For air

accelerated its interdiction and close air support roles in Laos.

operations, tile country was divided into northern and southern sectors. Air support facilities in Thailand were expanded, and a number of new and at times previously untested programs were developed to support the air response effort. (C) For operations in Laos, no alert forces per se were established on the ground between 1965 and 1969. Instead, alert and bad weather

requirements were handled by giving every frag a primary mission, an alternate mission, and a tertiary mission. The primary mission was

usually far removed from the alternate mission during bad weather periods to capitalize on the possibility of differing weather conditions. The Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) designated tertiary targets to be exploited if neither the primary nor the alternate The immediate response requirement was, in effect, 9 met by the opportunity for instant diversion permitted by this system. target could be struck. While flexible within its preplanned limits, this system of tiered responses was not designed for the exploitation of lucrative targets which might appear after fragging requirements had been established. Furthermore, I I

during wet season conditions all targets frequently proved inaccessible,i or were of diminished value. (S) Two developments related to the war in RVN between 1965 and 1969 provided precedents for the introduction of the Quick Reaction conceptI

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into Laotian and other out-country operations in 1970.

In July 1966,

by General ARC LIGHT Quick Reaction strikes were implemented as recommended in a Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, message to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command. Six B-52 aircraft

KC-135s were were placed on continuous alert at Andersen AFB, Guam, and six 10 On 6 July the first B-52 alert at Kadena AB, Okinawa. put on standby sysQuick Reaction mission in RVN used the MSQ-77 Combat Skyspot bombing tem in support of operations in Phu Yen Province. Elapsed time between on tarreceipt of the Quick Reaction request by B-52 units and arrival of the get was 9 hours and 45 minutes, a creditable performance in view bear on 6 hour flight time to the target, and the firepower brought to ground action was enormous and accurately placed. For Laotian operations,

however, the important point was the precedent that ARC LIGHT QR strikes

represented:

implementation of a full-time alert status principle.

Subsequently, B-52s were deployed to U-Tapao Royal Thai Naval Base, Thailand, for closer proximity to the target area, and the alert principle was maintained. Reduction in response time permitted by the shift to Thailand

eliminated the need for in-flight diversions which occasionally marked

B-52 operations from Guam.

A prototype of the Quick Reaction concept alert status, ininediate response,

later established in Laos was emerging:

and so drastic a reduction in elapsed time that secondary and tertiary targets need not be attached to the alert frag. (S) Even as the ARC LIGHT system was being refined, steps to imple-

ment the Quick Reaction concept were being taken in RVN itself.

On 5 August

1968 the U.S. First Marine Wing initiated an experimental airborne alert posture in I Corps of RVN. Under this system a fighter scheduled for If not scrambled

combat air patrol remained on ground alert for 30 minutes.

during that time, the alert-status aircraft took off and maintained combat air patrol posture over the Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) facility at Phu Bai for approximately 45 minutes or until diverted to a target. If

no immediate request materialized, the aircraft refueled and was directed 12 This system, with some to a less lucrative or lower priority target. modification, was continued through 1969. Fighters operating under this

program achieved a highly satisfactory reaction time (14.9 minutes), half taken by scrambles. the time generally (S) The 11arine experiment expanded options available to the formulators of the Air Force Quick Reaction program, but also brought to the fore some of the problems involved. ARC LIGHT, with its heavy payloads directed

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against massed troops and materiel, was in effect hitting fixed targets with a high degree of guaranteed success. The Marine experiment involved

a pre-commitment, and thus faced the possibility of reducing its effectiveness and increasing its cost by applying resources to relatively non-lucrative targets. This was the major problem of the three tiered fragging operation The practice

already employed in Laos in both Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger.

3 5
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of holding aircraft in airborne alert, moreover, was expensive in terms of maintenance hours and fuel consumption. For these reasons, the experi-

ment did not impress 7AF favorably, but as long as fragged Marine sorties were met and ground alert aircraft were available, Blue Chip did not restrict 14 the practice. 9

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(5) Meanwhile, new developments also suggested the need to formulate a Quick Reaction concept and its implementation in terms which would accommodate the peculiar demands of war in the Laotian theater. In

1968, single management control was introduced for all air resources for both in-* and out-country sorties. Requirements were established and This system tended to increase

sortie numbers allocated every Sunday.

flexibility in the use of air resources for the war effort as a whole, but reduced local options for exploiting unanticipated interdiction opportunities or meeting sudden demands for support of friendly troops. The introduction of Igloo White sensor equipment and of aircraft equipped with Long Range Air Navigation (LORAN) greatly increased reconnaissance capabilities and offered unprecedented opportunities for strikes against 15 The introduction fleeting, perishable, and static-perishable targets. of this technology permitted significant improvement in the real time 16 But enemy tactics response to truck convoys even during the wet season. had also improved considerably, and as the 1970 wet season approached,

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establishment of a new Quick Reaction program capable of interdiction of LOCs and destruction of fleeting targets during monsoon conditions began to receive priority. The establishment of the QR program was greatly enhanced by the lessons which had accumulated from ARC LIGHT, from the Marine experiment, and from continued refinements in Laotian fragging operations.

*In-country referred to RVN; out-country, to areas in SEA outside RV14.

10

CHAPTER III QRF IMPLEMENTED: ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

(S) On 25 March 1970 the new Quick Reaction Force (QRF) program, designed to meet the peculiar demands of the Laotian theater, was briefed to FACs attending a conference at Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN. The program, which

evolved from proposals formulated by Maj Gen Joseph G. Wilson, 7AF Director of Operations, and his successor, Maj Gen Alton D. Slay, applied the prin-

ciples of economy, flexibility, rapid response, and central coordination to the Laotian requests for air resources. (S) Air power needs in Laos fluctuated with the seasonal weather. To meet the need for the interdiction of fleeting targets during wet weather conditions, a ground alert program was established for aircraft assigned to Udorn and Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Bases (RTAFBs), Thailand. Because of reduced demands for air resources to meet regularly scheduled frags during the Southwest Monsoon season, implementation of alert status allocations was regarded as a reasonable burden upon existing facilities, but no effort was made to follow the Marine concept of planned take-offs at

1the

end of a ground alert period.

Because monsoon weather conditions

differed greatly from region to region, fast FACs were assigned the task of discovering clear weather areas containing lucrative targets, and air resources were made available wherever needed. Sensor devices provided

target information which, if matched with suitable weather conditions, permitted immediate air strikes. 17 were established in the plan. On-target times of 45 minutes to 1 hour

11

(S) As briefed to the FACs, the 7AF Directorate of Combat Operations was responsible for planning all out-country USAF tactical fighter, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance operations. This responsibility included

acquiring and researching targets, determining appropriate weapons and general tactics, publishing and disseminating fragmentary orders, and maintaining Blue Chip, which exercised operational control over all 7th AF units in Thailand. The new QRF concept was integrated into this system

through Blue Chip, which acted as a central clearing house for all reconnaissance inputs and authorizations for fragged, diverted fragged, and quick reaction missions. obtained from FACs In most cases, reconnaissance information was

and from Udorn-based RF-4 Bullwhip'and Atlanta recon-

naissance operations, which surveyed enemy movements in Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger every morning. The information was passed to the ABCCC C-130 Here the Fighter

orbiting overhead, and in turn relayed to Blue Chip.

Division of 7AF was to assimilate the information in planning, coordinating, scheduling, and monitoring the application of QRF sorties in the Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger sectors (and later elsewhere). The Scheduling Branch
18

1 5

considered various factors in the development of the daily frag, and was to assign to QRF those missions which required immediate action. Blue Chip

was then to iniediately notify the appropriate unit on alert, specifying air resources required, and was to pass the flight's call sign to the iiBCCC 19 for relay to the FAC in the target area. (S) On 22 Ilay 1970 Seventh Air Force established QRF at the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Ubon RTAFB, and on 27 May at the 432nd Tactical Reconnaissanc5

12

M&-IPq

20

Wing, Udorn RTAFB.

Initially, at each base, QRF consisted of six aircraft

capable of taking off within 30 minutes after notification by Blue Chip. The number of aircraft was quickly increased to 12 at each base, but in 21 In 1971 QRF June was reduced to 8 each because of requirements in RVN. forces were also established at DaNang for both in- and out-country operations. The F-4 Phantom jet constituted the primary QRF aircraft, although Ordnance

occasionally the A-l, A-37, AC-119, and AC-130 were also used.

for aircraft on QRF status (as specified in the 1 May 1970 amendment to 7AF Operations Plan 730) consisted of three types of MK-82 bombs, CBU-24 22 (Cluster Bor.L Units), incendiary boribs, and miscellaneous munitions. Later, four of the Ubon aircraft were equipped with Laser Guided Bombs for use against especially lucrative targets. One fairly standard load

consisted of six 500-pound MK-82s, half with fuse extenders, and four Variations included high-drag bombs, napalm, or the newly 23 Take off times, originally established at 30 minutes, introduced CBU-38s. 24 Periods were met from the outset and subsequently reduced to 20 minutes. CBU-24/49s. of coverage were also established to include all daylight hours up to one and one-half hours before sunset at Udorn RTAFB, and from 0700 to 30 minutes

3prior to sunset at Ubon RTAFB.

--

Quick Reaction Force aircraft were required 25 to be prepared to launch within 2 hours and 15 rainutes of landing. (S) The Southwest Monsoon season campaign in 1970 was directed pri-

3 3

marily to the interdiction of LOCs, principally routes 922 and 966 in Steel Tiger, which the enemy was attempting to maintain during the wet weather, 26 These Route 7 in Barrel Roll, and storage areas serving all these routes. 13

amr

priorities were maintained into the dry (Northeast Monsoon) season which followed. Quick Reaction Force activity, originally conceived as a wet During

season operation only, was continued on a reduced scale thereafter.

the dry season, QRF was given greater responsibility for attacking antiaircraft artillery, but also continued to provide assistance to friendly forces. (S) Plans for the 1971 wet season offensive included a role for QRF, though not on as extended a scale as in 1970. Quick Reaction Force F-4

sorties averaged 13 per day, or only half the 25 daily sorties flown dur27 ing the high period in 1970. With the addition of facilities at DaNang AB, RVN (from which the 366th TFW* was specifically tasked with interdicting 28 the Waterway Seven Complex**), heavy emphasis in several areas--including increased use of LORAN and sensor detection equipment--enhanced the QkF 293 role. Of great importance was the increasingly economical use of all When rains made roads impassable, emphasis was shifted from 30 LOCs to storage areas. In contrast to the 1970 wet season campaign, and as a departure from one principal reason for the establishment of 31 the QRF system, strikes against trucks were reduced. Operations in Laos continued to engage 80 percent of U.S. strike sorties in SEA, with 32 Steel Tiger receiving 70 percent of these Laotian sorties. (S) Operations during the 1971 wet season reflected changes based on experience gained during the previous year's program. *TFW--Factical Fighter Wing. **Se Bang Hieng river flowing west then south out of the DMZ. Diverted frags I resources.

14

m uauY-

~I

began to supplement QRF sorties.

Quick Reaction Force was expanded to flight operations began in

include search and rescue (SAR) operations.

January and continued until cancelled in June because of deteriorating 33 weather conditions. from Thailand bases. Operations were expanded into RVN, and into Cambodia Because of the role of QRF forces at DaNang AB, RVN,

and auxiliary assistance from Thailand operations, QRF in RVN rose to 20 percent of total missions flown. In Barrel Roll, the scene of a North

Vietnamese Army (NVA) holding operation, QRF represented less than 10 percent of all sorties flown in the Hay-September 1971 period. The fluid

and rapidly expanding requirement for combat air support in Cambodia gave QRF a chance to demonstrate its responsiveness; here nearly 2,300 QRF missions were flown, constituting 30 percent of the total, the largest of any area in which QRF operated. In Steel Tiger QRF contributed 1,642 34 of 19,500 flown. sorties to a total (S) Uuring 1971-72 dry season Commando Hunt VII operations, QRF continued to assist in entry interdiction, preparation of blocking belts, and in exit interdiction of the main passes. The blocking belts, mine fields

aerially seeded with various types of anti-personnel and anti-materiel mines and sensors, provided F-4 QRF sorties an opportunity to strike when 35 the enemy attempted to clear the mine field or by-pass the blocking belt. Beyond this, QRF forces, which were reduced substantially to free air resources for normal, scheduled dry weather missions, concentrated on striking fleeting 36 targets.

I
1

15

Iffiff
(S) Of perhaps greater significance was the extension of the QRF concept to reconnaissance. In April 1971 an isolated use of QRF in

reconnaissance operations confirmed the feasibility of expanding the concept. On 14 April 1971, General F. C. Blesse, Assistant 7AF/DO,

ordered a night reconnaissance operation established at Udorn to perform night photoflash work on trucks claimed destroyed by AC-130 gunship crews. Seventh Air Force believed vehicles which AC-130 crews were

assessing as destroyed were being towed off roads before early daylight photography confirmed their destruction. Using LORAN coordinates supplied

by the gunship crews, the RF-4C's photography provided strong evidence to support the belief that the destroyed vehicles were, in fact, being 37 reroved before daylight Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) was accomplished. (S) Other reconnaissance operations which included some aspects of the QR concept were two ongoing programs, Bullwhip and Atlanta, which performed daily visual and photographic reconnaissance over the principal LOCs in Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger, respectively. In September 1970,

3
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I

the official name of these programs became the 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance 38 It is true that Atlanta Wing (TRW) Real Time Target Generating System. and Bullwhip sorties were fragged daily for early morning missions, were not on alert for quick launching, and thus were not "Quick Reaction" in the purest sense. However, besides their fragged targets they also covered

targets requested by FACs while the reconnaissance mission was airborne, or other targets of opportunity which appeared to be of significant value. Their primary difference from normally fragged missions was that they 16

3 5
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provided greatly improved responsiveness.

As a consequence, the photo

collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination cycle was reduced from six days to less than 24 hours. Detailed target information was

expedited to FACs and QRF strike crews, and QRF strikes were often conducted on the same day as, or the day following, the discovery of the target by 39 the Atlanta/Bullwhip reconnaissance mission. The usefulness of these

programs, which were referred to as Quick Reaction Reconnaissance, was 40 The Bullwhip and Atlanta operations, by virtue of their unquestioned. timely responsiveness, integrated more easily into QRF operations than did normally fragged reconnaissance sorties, and this ability to work with the QRF capability at Udorn, Ubon, and DaNang was one important 41 continue this type of reconnaissance. reason for the decision to (S) Nevertheless, an even faster reconnaissance response than that provided by Bullwhip and Atlanta was needed. Therefore, on 22 November

1971, General Lavelle, Commander, 7AF, directed a Quick Strike Reconnaissance (QSR) program be instituted using guidelines already established in QRF. Under General Lavelle's QSR, which started with two aircraft in

alert status each day, FACs and ABCCC, through Blue Chip, requested irmediate scrambles of RF-4 aircraft from the 432nd TRW, Udorn RTAFB. Photo Interpretation readout from these missions was telephoned to Blue Chip within one hour of the reconnaissance aircraft's return to base. As in the case of QRF-allocated sorties, if not launched on the QSR mission before the end of the alert period the aircraft could be fragged into a 42 pre-planned photo mission. The inspiration of this program, which was

17

.fM%jW:V

extended to cover targets in Cambodia and RVN as well as in Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger, was conceded to be the QRF program already in operation. When General Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff, questioned the effectiveness

43

of tile new "unfragged reconnaissance" program in the course of a visit to 44 he was briefed that Bullwhip and Atlanta were fragged by Udorn RTAFB, Blue Chip. Apparently, his question about the QRS program was not answered The confusion,

correctly due to confusion on the part of the briefer.

the while unintentional, suggested how easily 45 concept of Quick Reaction could be confused with Real Time Response. (S) Ultimately, the answer to General Ryan's question, while not immediately forthcoming, was provided by the fact that Bullwhip and Atlanta, not QSR, continued to provide most of the targeting information. In fact,

in Barrel Roll, Bullwhip was more frequently used for delineation of targets than regularly fragged reconnaissance and Quick Strike Reconnaissance sorties combined. Nevertheless, Bullwhip and Atlanta were cut back in

April 1972; Atlanta was stopped corpletely during the NVN invasion of 1972, and Bullwhip was reduced to one sortie daily and integrated into 46 By July 1972 both Steel Tiger operations in response to the invasion. programs had been reinstated; two Bullwhip sorties were scheduled on a daily basis in Barrel Roll, and tile Atlanta program was expanded to three sorties per day covering MR I (SVN), Route Package I (NVN), and Steel Tiger East. January 1973.* *Tile programs continued at decreased sortie levels until September 1973. 18 This rate was maittained until tile cease-fire in

5 I 3

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(S) The tendency to experiment (displayed during the development of QSR, in night QRF, and in acconnodation of QRF to the introduction of more sophisticated strike armament and reconnaissance devices) was nowhere more in evidence than in the varied techniques used by tactical fighter and tactical reconnaissance wings to meet immediate launch requirements. Ordnance mixes were continually adjusted in an effort Preliminary briefings provided alert crews as

to anticipate demands.

much information as was possible without knowing in advance what the FACs' target requests would be. The most important areas of experi-

mentation dealt with fragging procedures and alert activation requests. In the first instance, the number of aircraft allotted to QRF alert status varied from wet to dry season. Dry season increases in regularly

scheduled sorties against lucrative targets necessarily pressed heavily on allotments to QRF. time to time. Secondly, scheduling of alerts was changed from

The original operational system established a single long

alert for each QRF aircraft and crew in an effort to have as much airpower as possible available when areas of good weather opened. For the crews, this

system proved psychologically and physically demanding, especially if no scramble materialized or if the scramble came at the end of the day, when crew rest limitations could have been exceeded. Long continuous alerts also

disrupted maintenance schedules, especially in the dry season when the demand on available unit aircraft was intense, and unlaunched aircraft 47 Recognition of these problems on alert status could not be utilizec. led to experiments in reducing the length of alert times. 19 Thus, early

5401

i
in 1971 a Limited Quick Reaction Alert Force was authorized at the 432nd TRW for the Southwest Monsoon season, and a two hour alert limit was put into effect. If a strike was not requested before the end of two hours,

the mission was to be launched against a prilary target, or cancelled if 4b The decision to release an aircraft and the weather was unsuitable. crew from alert status, however, always remained with Blue Chip. Requests

to terminate alert status were generally granted at the end of the short 49 into place. alert periods, when other aircraft were brought (S) Some units, as the 13th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) at Udorn, continued to use the extended alert system, since the time limit system had the tendency to exhaust QRF resources in the execution of routine missions. DaNang AB used both systems, maintaining three sets of two Once launched, these

aircraft each on QRF staggered throughout the day.

flights were not returned to QRF status upon their return to base. Instead, the next set of scheduled QRF aircraft was moved into alert status. In addition, two F-4 aircraft constantly maintained a strike (Blue Chip on occasion requested that the crew remain These aircraft were assigned several mission

alert posture.

5 3
I

on alert in the aircraft.)

numbers on the daily frag so that they could be called on repeatedly 50 during the day. (S) Even when aircraft and crews were generally underused, there were periodic problems. Within four days of the beginning of QRF in

May 1970, 8th TFW at Ubon RTAFB broached the idea of establishing a formula to meet the possibility of heavy QRF alert demands coinciding

5
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20

14 04lJ"

with heavy regular fragging requirements.

The proposal suggested that

alert sorties be limited to 1.5 times the number of aircraft available for alert status, and that the number of QRF sorties launched be subtracted from the number of fragged sorties established prior to imple51 One persistent complaint at the command level was of QRF. mentation the difficulty, and perhaps inadvisability, of tying up resources for QRF status when it reduced the cominand's ability to meet regularly scheduled missions against lucrative targets. Conflict developed between Blue

Chip's reliance on an inviolable alert force and the commands' wish to pare parts of it away as pressure on resources increased. manifested itself in several ways. The conflict

Aircrews complained that assignment

to alert status denied them opportunities to participate in regular operations, subjected them to the stress of alert status with only limited chances of being used, and even reduced their proficiency. In support Of

of these points, the 555th TFS cited its August 1970 QRF record.

380 QRF sorties on alert, 123 (33 percent) were cancelled because of weather. Of the 257 launched, 84 (33 percent) returned to base without The squadron reported that it was not uncommon to hear

expending ordnance.

that an air crew had not dropped bombs for weeks, with a consequent decline

52
in morale and expertise. Pilots complained of long alerts which terminated in a cancellation or in QRF activation after crews had been on alert status

3
m

for up to 12 hours.

In April 1972 Lt Colonel Wayne T. Frye, Commander of

the 555th TFS, observed that crews briefed at 0330 for an 0530 QRF cormmitment might remain on alert status until well past 1530, the 12 hour limit. 53 The problem was intensified when night frag obligations arose. 21

(S) Fragging to supply imediate air support also encroached upon QRF alert resources. If FAC specifications called for ordnance which

was not already uploaded, ABCCC often tried to divert an airborne fragged ordnance to be changed. sortie rather than wait for the ground alert Often a crew was scrambled instantly, and Blue Chip accepted whatever ordnance was uploaded on an available aircraft. Blue Chip also intro-

3 I 3
i

duced a distinction between fragged alert and unfragged alert, the former equated to a Blue Chip anticipation of the availability of a lucrative target at a set future time, and the placement of an aircraft and crew on alert status prepared to launch if the opportunity appeared. Not

only did this give the crews a time for takeoff, but it assisted in crew briefing. Alternately, a regularly fragged hard mission might be

delayed in expectation of subsequent availability of more lucrative tar55 gets and placed on QRF status.

(S) Experimentation with defining targets appropriate to QRF played a prominent role in the evolution of the concept as a whole. specified as appropriate for the QRF, The targets I

as defined in the amendment to the

1970 Southwest Ionsoon Operations Plan, were limited to "fleeting" or "perishable," which was largely interpreted to mean vehicles moving under cover of bad weather or storage facilities exposed to air attack for brief periods due to clear skies. But as wet weather made roads impassable and Water-

slowed truck movement, NVN forces turned increasingly to waterways.

way targets, which moved rather quickly, were difficult to find and hard to hit without precisely suitable ordnance. 22 As a result of its time and

ordnance flexibility, QRF found itself in the forefront of efforts to interdict this type of movement. Late afternoon scrambles to hit water-

way targets with hard bombs and CBU-24s became a primary responsibility 56 Seventh Air Force suspected, of QRF sorties during the 1970 campaign. however, that the effectiveness of such interdiction was very limited and 57 tried to discourage it. (S) In the same season, in the Barrel Roll region of Laos, QRF was called on to assist General Vang Pao's Meo irregular army. This army's air support needs had previously been filled by diverts from the numerous

flights operating in the area during high sortie rate, dry weather condi-

58

tions.

The QRF's effectiveness here was never sufficiently proved

because the ground troops were not able to describe where the enemy was situated and thus were not able to direct the strikes accurately. As 59 return to road interdiction. to a result, AF sorties tended (S) In succeeding seasons the relationship of QRF to sensor devices became more important. In June 1971, Seventh AF warned of a rapid expan-

sion of enemy logistics and troop movements during the coming dry season which will allow a and called for the development of a "flexible plan 60 Properly and strashift of effort to meet the tactical requirement." tegically placed sensors and QRF aircraft with LORAN guidance permitted effective attacks on truck parks with MK-82 hard bombs from 15,000 feet. Little preliminary briefing was required; the terrain and weather conditions were not crucial factors. 61 Often, in anticipation of the need, m QRF alert management had two LORAN-equipped aircraft available to lead

S23

623

larger numbers of F-4s to the proper site.

In August, QRF missions

participated in strikes against sensor-detected activity with a mixture 63 of anti-personnel and anti-materiel ordnance. (S) The QR concept was increasingly applied to aspects of the air mission which its originators had not suggested: SAR operations, gatherSAR in

ing of BDA, and strikes against anti-aircraft artillery (AAA).

some ways was a difficult operation to accommodate within QRF's limitations. There was a specific requirement for a certain ordnance, and

because of the inadvisability of uploading CBU-52 without an intention to use it, Q11F alert status aircraft were rarely equipped with this ord643 nance without specific command. When needed, therefore, it was sometimes necessary to download ordnance off a QRF aircraft and upload the SAR area 65 Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) also became a special denial munitions. area of operation for QRF activity. During the dry season of early 1971,

QRF was devoted largely to BDA objectives; of 348 sorties flown between 10 February and 10 March of that year, 194 were employed for BDA; in the week from 3 Ilarch to 10 flarch, only 6 of 61 QRF sorties were assigned to 66 Suppression of AAA by QRF resulted from a Director other objectives. of Operations/Director of Materiel Conference on Force Employient held 29 June 1971. Participants agreed that gunship escorts against AAA targets

3
S

during wet season operations complicated fighters' work inasmuch as their own fire was confused with enemy action, thus making visual pinpointing of threat sources more difficult. QRF sorties were suggested as an

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24

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appropriate substitute and were frequently used against AAA targets 67 thereafter. (S) The most dramatic extensions of the original QR concept were in the decisions to continue QRF as a dry season operation after its usefulness was demonstrated in the wet season operations of May-September 1970, to use QRF sorties for night missions, and to extend the operation into new areas. All decisions, interdependent as they were, fundamentally altered In the case of dry season operations, one of the

the original QRF concept.

original purposes of QRF--commitment of aircraft and crews to alert status during the wet season, when competing requirements would diminish--was voided. (S) The original pattern of using QRF to exploit brief periods of clear weather in the Southwest Monsoon season continued to be a predominant factor in QRF scheduling in Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger. The extension

of QRF to Cambodia on a large scale, however, moved this program to some degree outside the constraints imposed by (1) weather conditions along

3 3m 3 3
3

the Annamite chain and (2) primary emphasis on LOCs and storage facilities in Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger. QRF became a widely used device for

assisting friendly troops in combat during the dry season (November 1971 to March 1972); subsequently, because of the NVN offensive, QRF 68 operations were substantially reduced. (S) extension of QRF to dry season operations had an important The impact on allocation of resources. The inevitable competition between a

high rate of regularly scheduled frags associated with dry season operations 25
w

Immu

and the allocation of aircraft and crews to alert status was not easily resolved, and at two points, in 1970 and in 1971, serious consideration was given to extending QRF facilities to Takhli and Korat so that QRF facilities at Udorn and Ubon would be less burdened. The proposal was

eventually dropped; Takhli and Korat were too far removed from Steel Tiger 69 When and Barrel Roll operations to make response times meaningful. operations in Cambodia began to take precedence a year later, no move was made to revive the idea, probably because of intense pressure on existing resources at these bases attending increased regularly fragged operations. (S) Extension of QRF to night operations did not engender the same competition for scarce air resources in dry season activities, but it did involve changes of a different type in the QRF concept. In June 1970,

just one month after QRF had been implemented for the first time, a proposal surfaced to add night QRF sorties. The proposal noted that between the

middle of March and the middle of June, 54 percent of fleeting targets detected by FACs at night had not been struck because no ordnance or strike aircraft had been available. At that time, no action was taken to use QRF

at night, because it was doubtful whether the night FAC could maintain contact with a moving target long enough to bring in QRF sorties. In

3
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September, however, "to compensate for the lack of strike sorties from 2400 until early morning," QRF sorties were placed on alert at Ubon RTAFB 70 duty. for Steel Tiger night (S) During the following dry season QRF was converted increasingly 71 During March 1971, 152 of 224 effective QRF to a night operation. 26

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missions were night sorties.

In April the proportion was 184 of 274.

In April, also, 6 of the 10 QRF sorties on alert and in place at Ubon and Udorn were scheduled to support Candlestick night flare operations. Three 72 All of the night QRF sorties used flareship operations were involved. infra-red techniques to deliver their ordnance. QRF missions were night sorties. In May, 160 of 196 effective

In June, of 62 night QRF missions completed, 73 Overall, 28 wereCombat Skyspot, 20 LORAN, 12 Commando Nail, and 2 TACAM. fewer than 10 percent of night missions were cancelled or aborted. With 74 Night the onset of the wet weather in June, the program was cancelled. QRF operations were not resumed during the next Northeast Monsoon season. (S) Reduction of the time required to place QRF sorties over the target was constantly urged by Headquarters 7AF, and commanders worked constantly to reduce take off times to 20 minutes. was the time consumed in briefings. A major difficulty

A regular briefing was scheduled for The nature of the QRF mission On occasion

crews prior to assumption of alert status.

dictated the need for further, sometimes extensive, briefings.

53 I
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the alert status crew knew in some detail what the target would be and it was largely a question of waiting for the proper moment. This was especially

the true in case of a continuing SAR effort, or attacks on surface-to-air 75 At other times, however, QRF alert crews had little idea missile sites. what targets FACs would call to be hit. In these cases the lack of adequate

I
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briefing arrangements or even of a knowledge of the object of the mission 76 after Blue Chip had called for assistance was a cause for concern.

27

IPR

AA

(S) Equally difficult was the problem of justifying a continuation of QRF operations when targets moved far away from QRF alert facilities. Extension of QRF operations into Cambodia added significantly to arrival times on target. The momentum of the QRF program saw the system so stretched

by logistics difficulties that QRF-launched aircraft were arriving on target in no less time, and occasionally in far greater time, then regularly 77 fragged sorties diverted from less lucrative targets. (S) The reduction of the time to target problem was never resolved. Indeed, the extension of QRF into dry season operations and into areas beyond Laos inevitably raised questions as to the viability of the entire concept, for in dry season operations opportunities for diversion of regularly scheduled air sorties were often so great as to obviate the need for QRF. Brig General Cramer, Seventh Air Force Assistant Deputy -

Chief of Staff, Operations, observed in December 1970 that QRF was not3 an effective competitor for the already launched and diverted frag, which could reach truck targets faster and work more effectively, even though 78 The tire to the ordnance it was carrying was sometimes inappropriate. target problem was, in effect, resolved in these instances by suspending tha QRF concept entirely. (S) As a consequence of these considerations, changes were made in fragging schedules, alert allotments, diverts, and tir.e limits. The

I 3
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intent of the changes was to reduce pressure on conands' regular fragging operations during dry season activity, and to have on hand as many air resources as possible during wet season clear weather periods. 28 Seventh

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Air Force wanted as many as six aircraft flights standing alert at each QRF location in wet Weather, when diversions were relatively unavailable since there were but few regularly scheduled frags. While the pressure of dry A high attri-

season commitments was avoided, other difficulties increased.

tion rate between alert status and delivery of ordnance on target suggested that too many air resources were being devoted to the QRF program in relation to its output. August 1971 may be used as an example. That month,

314 QRF sorties were available to Blue Chip. Blue Chip.

Twenty were cancelled by

One hundred twenty-two were cancelled because of unfavorable Eight

weather, often after an alert status which lasted an entire day. sorties were cancelled for other reasons.

Of the 164 remaining, two were QRF

aborted on the ground and six returned with ordnance unexpended. effectiveness was thus 156 of 314, or 50 percent.

The principal considera-

tion was a factor of one's point of view; Blue Chip noted that 158 sorties which miaht otherwise have been launched and then weather cancelled had been saved; from the commands' point of view, 158 aircraft and crews had been prepared for launch, restricted from use in other engagements for the duration of the alert, and removed from normal maintenance, ordnance, and 79 rotation schedules. (S) The character and dynamism of QRF in action is best captured by

a review of several examples of the system as it operated between 1970

3 3 U

and 1972, tile period of its widest use.

The effectiveness of QRF sorties

against storage facilities detected (luring short intervals of clear weather the in 1970 Southwest Monsoon season was demonstrated in a strike conducted 12 June 1970. Blue Chip requested a QRF strike response to one of the 8th

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29

TFW's Wolf FACs who sighted some petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) drums beside a river. The flight rendezvoused with the FAC in the Steel

Tiger area, the storage area was marked with a smoke rocket, and the lead F-4 and the follow-up made three passes on the target. Each air-

craft dropped nine 500-pound bombs and two CBU-24s, destroying 100 POL resulting in a large POL explosion. drums and a storage tank, and (S) Rarely did weather conditions permit QRF sorties to participate in both Steel Tiger and Barrel Roll on the same mission. On 16 August

1970, however, a Wolfpack flight destroyed targets in both parts of Laos. The F-4s were launched early in the morning to attack a 23mm gun in Barrel Roll. After refueling, the flight met a FAC on the spot and destroyed the Since the flight had no nre targets, the mission

gun with one bomb. headed home.

Enroute, however, ABCCC directed the F-4s to meet a FAC in

Steel Tiger, where, after a second refueling, the flight destroyed a stalled bulldozer, 15 meters of the road, and an undetermined amount of enemy materiel stacked beside the road. (S) Increasingly sophisticated targeting procedures were erlployed in the dry season applications of the QRF concept. On 24 November two

3 3 3
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F-4Us were scrambled to hit a target marked by an OV-10 FAC configured to integrate LORAN targeting devices into the PAVE SPOT* program. Suc-

cessive strikes were planned and tiwed to deliver ordnance as the previous ordnance was detonating. Fifteen barrels of POL and 20 crates of supplies

were destroyed, and two large and several small secondary fires followed. *An OV-10 night observation device with boresighted laser range designator. 30

(S) On 3 January 1971 two F-4Ds from Phu Cat, RVN, were placed on alert with BLU-52, anti-personnel agent, arid BLU-27, incendigel, for possible use in a SAR effort for Tiger 02, a fast FAC downed in a notoriously hostile area of Laos.' Shortly after first light the Phu Cat F-4s, Cobra 05 flight, were scrambled, and despite bad weather conditions and intense enemy ground fire were able to successfully employ their ordnance. This was the first

instance of the use of BLU-52 in a SAR effort in SEA and it was highly successful; the BLU-52 thwarted enemy attempts to find and capture the downed aircrew and permitted the rescue forces to effect successful aircrew pickups without incident. (S) Anti-aircraft artillery emplacements were sometimes allocated to QRF sorties, especially in the absence of lucrative LOCs or when AAA counter-measures were required before further operations in the area could be carried out. In April 1971 a Wolfpack F-4 flight carrying a Paveway I S8 2 Despite more than 200 load was QRF scrambled to work with PAVE NAIL.* rounds of enemy 37mm AAA fire, the mission destroyed three 37mm guns and 83 killed 12 enemy troops with three MK-84 LGBs. (S) A critical role for QRF sorties involved support for friendly troops in combat. On 7 September 1971, two F-4Ds from the 435th TFS at In the face of heavy

Ubon were directed to Military Region One in RVN.

anti-aircraft fire and using a figure eight weave pattern to attack the target from opposite directions, they destroyed three fortified military

3-

structures, damaged two others, and caused three large sustained fires 84 complex area. within the enemy command *The OV-l0 PAVE SPOT program expanded to include integrated LORAN. 31

(S) The NVA invasion during the spring virtually eliminated tile use of QRF except for search and rescue operations. When at length QRF was

restored to something approaching its former scope, the changing geographical pattern of the war tended almost immediately to reduce the significance of its contribution. The Cambodian operations proved to be too far removed

for QRF sorties from Ubon and Udorn, and increasingly from DaN4ang, to compete effectively with regularly scheduled and diverted frags now on hand to meet short time requirements. Finally, the generally reduced level of

air resources available to the USAF in SEA after early 1972 necessarily took its toll of those programs which were not already tied intimately to specific, on-going operations. By the middle of 1973 QRF had ceased

at Udorn, and was substantially reduced in scope elsewhere.

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CHAPTER IV ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION (s) The QR concept was remarkable for the diversity and variety of its applications during three years of widespread use, for the clarity of its conceptual framework, for the durability of its major problems, and for its decidedly mixed reception in the Air Force chain of command. The proliferation of QRF responsibilities, the transition from wet season day operations to dry season night operations, the increased geographic scope of deployment and employment, and the delineation of new targets fundamentally altered the QRF concept as defined in 1970. By the time

operations were curtailed in 1973, QRF had come to mean something substantially more than a wet season, daytime effort to strike fleeting targets in Laos, or conserving resources by remaining in alert status until a lucrative target was isolated and identified. In some respects

the redefinition of QRF was a natural response to changes in combat conditions, air resources available, and experience gained. To a consider-

able degree, however, the changes exacerbated rather than eliminated problems associated with the original concept, and the ultimate result was a failure to establish a quick reaction system, either in its strike or reconnaissance aspects, which reconciled practice with theory. Limita-

tions of the QRF concept were addressed by changes in operations rather than by a re-evaluation of the applicability of the concept itself, and, consequently, operations changes did not always prove sufficient to overcome difficulties. 33

(S) A fundamental conceptual problem in QRF was a tendency to resist recognition of, rather than assimilate, five sets of internal contradictions. The first was placement of aircraft and crews (which were in

limited supply) on alert, an action which implied that these resources need be used only under special conditions in order to justify their effectiveness. Second was the reduction in elapsed time between notification of launch

and arrival on target to the smallest level possible while providing crews sufficient preparation to make missions as effective as possible. The

third was the limitation of QRF to targets both lucrative and fleeting while insuring at the same time that the average QRF participation levels would be high enough to contribute meaningfully to overall operations. Fourth was a desire for flexibility in armaments, alert schedules, and deployment without appropriation of large amounts of available resources to the QRF operation. Finally, fifth was the accommodation of Blue Chip's

fluctuating demands for QRF resources to the restricted and in large measure prepledged resources at the disposal of the conands. (S) The first problem was viewed differently by Seventh Air Force Headquarters on one hand and the various commands on the other. In Seventh

Air Force's eyes, QRF's viability rested squarely on the inviolability of the concept that aircraft and crews be available for intediate response whenever called upon during (at least as originally defined) daylight hours. Adherence to this view implied opposition to the following: -

3 3

(1) release of resources from alert status if not employed quickly, (2) staggering of alerts (which in effect reduced the resources available

34

at any one time), and (3) using QRF resources to fill ordinary, fragged commitments. Here the original identification of QRF with wet season

operations was valid, and difficulties intensified when the concept was extended to dry season operations. In wet season operations in Laos,

7/13th AF had concluded that the principal problem was not a dearth of resources at its disposal, but difficulties in exploiting intermittent opportunities for their use. QRF met this in effect by purchasing accel-

eration in response time with stepped-up mobilization of aircraft and crews. The complete solution, an automatic limit on alert status obli-

gations, was strongly suggested by several commanders and conceded from time to time by 7th AF. But the shorter the alert status time, the smaller

the number of aircraft available sii,multaneously for QRF deployment, and the Blue Chip wish for six crews and aircraft on 12 hour alert was never effectively reconciled with the commands' desire for 2 hour alerts, with one or (depending on the time of return to base) two crews available at

85
any given time. (S) The QRF required a relative abundance of resources, especially in its extensions to more varied targets and geographic locales. In its

most limited application against fleeting targets in wet season conditions, a natural limit on types of ordnance required was in effect. As targets

were expanded to include storage areas, water traffic, AAA, SAR, and TIC operations, demands for sorties increased and armament needs diversified. In the dry season a Blue Chip call might find its needs entirely beyond 86 The problens of changing fulfillment without incurring a long delay. 35

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ordnance, and the time needed, have already been discussed.

Commands

were forced to anticipate requirements, and attempted to do so by offering assorted packages in different alert status aircraft. This was made

difficult when implementation of cut-off times for alert status reduced the number of aircraft available simultaneously and thus the number of 87 line. packages on the alert different ordnance (S) The demands of regularly scheduled fragging missions made accommoF dation to QU difficult. The implications of this competition for limited QRF excepted, daily sorties were

resources have already been mentioned.

geared to a preestablished multiple of available aircraft and crews, which air combat experience indicated air support facilities could handle and crews accommodate physically and psychologically. To the extent that QRF

sorties were subtracted from the pre-QRF level of fragging demands, maintenance and crew rest problems could be met. operational difficulties. But QRF introduced other

In the first place, aircraft were tied up and

maintenance problems accumulated. Aerospace Ground Equipment normally rotated among aircraft was tied up for long periods abreast of the alert 88 rttdaog status aircraft. Long alerts without launch on a QRF rission or release

from alert for a regularly fragged mission reduced the sortie rate in relation to the number of aircraft available. Commanders were loud in

3
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their complaints that their efficiency marks were falling because of QRF 89 conditions, and pressed for changes. non-launch (S) The increasing tendency to apply QRF to dry season and night operations against a growing array of targets during successive campaigns 36

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blurred the QRF principle, i.e., providing the ordnance desired in the least possible time at the smallest possible expense. effectiveness increased rather than diminished. Thus, doubts as to its The viability of QRF

was in part reduced by geographic changes, changes in objectives, and by other factors over which there was no control. But it was also com-

promised by a loosening of the QRF definition, by an overestimation of its transferability to new operations, and by adoption of subsidiary commitments which undermined the initial dedication to economy, immediate response, and precision in targets. In Uecember 1971, Maj Gen Evans, 7/13AF

Deputy Commander, suggested that outside its limited sphere of wet weather operations QRF was competing unsuccessfully for recognition as a viable strike and reconnaissance tool. He noted as one instance the lack of

appreciation shown by Raven FACs for QRF; the FACs wanted sorties every day, whether a target was available or not, and were not able to exploit 90 Increasingly, QRF QRF successfully except in wet weather situations.* sorties arrived on target to find themselves competing for attention with diverted and regular frags, circling in patterns and refueling while their 91 Most important of original advantage, immediate response, was lost. all, the relatively large commitment of resources to QRF in terms of the *(S) In their pre-publication review, Hq PACAF/INT noted that "the commitment of scarce F-4 and gunship sorties to QRF further complicated the existing sortie shortage problem. The Raven FACs were rarely without good targets, and as a result, normally requested launch of the QRF missions at the beginning of the availability period. This effectively eliminated the alert concept unless Blue Chip refused the QRF launch request."

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number of effective sorties flown could be justified only when targets 92 were both scarce and lucrative, and competition for resources was limited. The signal compliment extended to QRF by the American Embassy, Vientiane, in August 1970 captured the true value of the QRF program in its earliest and most limited phase; the Embassy congratulated the QRF program on its high level of success in interdiction in wet season conditions in Laos and anticipated that further demonstrations of this effectiveness would greatly assist the war effort in Laos. In terms of this type of operaBut by its very success here

tion, the Embassy's forecast was correct. QRF was eventually overextended. its own capabilities.

It was applied in areas which lay beyond

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UNCLASSFIED
FOOTNOTES 1. (S) EOT Report, Maj Gen Joseph G. Wilson, UCS/OPs 7AF, 1 Dec 71. 2. (S) Richard L. Garwin and Charles P. Schlichter to Maj Gen George B. Simler, DO, OES/PO (BD913), Hq USAF, DE, 16 May 69. 3. (S) Interview, 11r. Kenneth Sams and Major Philip Caine with General Creighton Abrams, COI4US1ACV, 3 Har 70. 4. (S) Msg, OUSAIRA, Vtn to 7AF DI/DOE, Subj: Situation Report MR II, 22 Mar 70, in Project CHECO Report (S), Air Operations in Northern Laos 1 Nov 1969-1 Apr 1970, Chapter IV. 5. (S) Project CHECO Report, Air p4rations in r1orthern Laos 1 Apr-l Nov 70, 15 Nov 70, p. 21. Hereafter cited as Air Operations in Northern 6. (C) Intvw, Capt David K. 11ann with Lt Col Wayne T. Frye, Comdr, 555TFW, 6 Apr 72. (C) Intvw, Capt David K. Mann with Lt Col Eugene C. Buttyan, Chief, Command Control Div (DOC), 432TRW, 4 Apr 72. 7. (S) Project CHECO Report, Air Response to I,mmediate Air Requests in SV14, 15 Jul 69, p. 7. 8. Ibid., pp. 10, 24. 9. (C) Intvw, Capt David K. Mann with Lt Col Richard D. Hilton, Cmdr, 433TFW, 8TFW, 10 Apr 72. 10. 11. * * (S) 7AF Chronology, 1 July-31 December 6G. (S) lisg, CGI FFORCEV to Cmdr 3AD, 111045Z Jul 66.

12. (S) Project CHECO Report, Single lianager for Air in SVN, 18 Mar 69, pp. 37-38. 13. 14. 15. Ibid. Ibid. (S) History of 25TFS, I Apr-30 Jun 70, p. 6.

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UNCLASSIFIED
16. (S) Garwin and Schlichter to Simler, 16 Hay 69.

17. (S) Ernest C. Hardin, Maj Gen USAF, to 8TFW Ubon, 19 May 70, containing "Minutes of 7AF FAC Conference at TSN AB 25 Mar 70," pp. 1-2. 18. 19. 20. (S) History of 7AF, 1 Jan-30 Jun 70, p. 7 and Fig 2, p. 12. (S) Air Operations in Laos, p. 21. (S) History of 7AF, 1 Jan-30 Jun 70, pp. 23-24. (S) Msg, 7AF to 432TRW, 261115Z May 70, Subj: Quick Reaction Force.

21. (S) Darrell S. Crarer, Brig Gen, USAF, Asst DCSO, "Background Paper on Quick Reaction Force," 4 Dec 70. (S) History of 432TRW, April-June 70, p. 20. 22. 23. 24. 25. (S) Cramer, "Background Paper on Quick Reaction Force." (S) CHECO Report, Air Operations in Northern Laos, p. 21. (S) History of 8TFW, Jul-Sep 71, Vol I, p. 94. (S) rlsg, 7AF to 432TRW, 261115Z May 70. (S) History of 7AF, 1 Jan-30 Jun 70, p. 7. 26. 27. (S) History of 7AF, 1 Jul-30 Sep 70, pp. 67-68. (S) Project CHECO Report, Commando Hunt VI, 7 Jul 72, pp. 86-87.

28. (S) Project CHECO Study, Interdiction of Waterways and POL Pipelines, SEA, 11 Dec 70, pp. 11-12. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. (S) 7AF OPLAN 730 (5 May 71), pp. EE-2, B-2. Ibid., p. EE-1. Ibid., p. EE-2. Ibid., p. B-1. (S) History of 432nd TRW, 1 Oct-31 Dec 70, p. 31.

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UNCLASSIFIED
34. 35. 36. (S) CHECO Report, Commando Hunt VI, p. 96. (S) 7AF, Commando Hunt VII, Jun 72, pp. 15-16. (S) 7/13AF, "Barrel Roll Conference Minutes," 29 Nov 71.

(S) History of 8TFW, Jul-Sep 71, Vol I, p. 87. 37. 38. (S) History 7AF, 1 Jan-30 Jun 71, Vol I, p. 1. (S) History of 432nd TRW, Jul-30 Sep 70, pp. 27-28.

39. (S) Interview, t1ajor Richard R. Sexton with Col Lyle E. Mann, Cmdr, 432TRW, 14 Sep 71. 40. (S) rlsg, Task Force Alpha NKP RTAFB to 7AF/DO, TSN, RVN, 23 Sep 71. (S) Air Operations in Northern Laos, p. 22. 41. (S) 1lsg, 7AF/DO, 15 Sep 71. (S) (S) Msq, 388TFW/DO, 17 Sep 71.

Msg, 7/13AF/Iti, 18 Sep 71.

(U) Msg, 366TFW/DO, 23 Sep 71. (C) Ltr, 7AF/DO, 24 Sep 71. (C) Msg, 7AF/INXP, 24 Sep 71. 42. (S) Henry C. Gorden, Col, USAF, 7AF/DO Plans, "Staff Summary Sheet," Subj: Quick Strike Reconnaissance, 22 Nov 71. 43. (S) Talking Paper on Tactical Reconnaissance in Barrel Roll, 2 Dec 71.

44. (S) Robert M. Pomeroy, Col, USAF, Chief, Recon FW Division, 7AF, to DOX, Subj: Follow-up on Item H from Report on General Ryan's Visit to Udorn, 1 Dec 71. 45. (S) tsg, 7/13AF Udorn to 7AF/UO/DOX/DOXR/IIH/INT/INTTU, 6 Apr 72.

46. (S) !Isg, George Hammond, Col, USAF, DO Plans 7AF TSN to 7/13AF Udorn DO, 9 Apr 72. 47. (C) Buttyan Interview. (S) Mann Interview

41

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UNCLASSIFIED
48. 49. (S) 7/13AF Barrel Roll Operations: (C) Buttyan Interview. (S) 7AF DO/DM Conference on Force Employment. (S) Commando Hunt VI, 29 Jun 71, p. 2. 50. (C) Intvw, Capt David K. Mann with Capt John Pierne, 7AF/UOXF, I May 72. QRF Forecast for Aug 71 (Udorn).

51. (S) Historical Input, 8TFW/DCOOC Ubon to 7AF, by Patrick Paxton, Capt, USAF, May 70. 52. 53. (S) History 555TFS, 1 Jul 70-30 Sep 70, p. 13ff. (C) Frye Intvw. (C) Hilton Intvw. 54. 55. (C) Buttyan Intvw. (C) Frye Intvw. (C) Buttyan Intvw. 56. (S) Intvw, Project CHECO Personnel with Col Gordon H. Scott, Director of Operations, 7/13AF, 30 Oct 70. (Abstracted from Interdiction of Waterways and POL Pipelines, SEA, p. 11.) , 57. 58. (S) 7AF, Minutes 7AF FAC Conference TSN AB, 25 Mar 70. (S) CHECO Report, Air Operations in Northern Laos, p. 21. 1

59. (S) CHECO Report, Air Operations in Northern Laos, 1 Nov 69-1 Apr 70, pp. 10-11. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. (S) Msg, 7AF, 10 Jun 71. (C) Hilton Intvw. (C) Buttyan Intvw. (S) Commando Hunt VI, p. 17. (S) Commando Hunt VII, pp. 15-16.

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UNCLASSIFIED
65. (C) Hilton Intvw. Quick Reaction 66. (S) Barrel Roll Working Group, 16 Mar 71, Subj: Force. Hereafter cited as BRWG with date. 67.

(S) 7AF, DO/DM Conference on Force Employment, Commando Hunt VI, p. 41. 68. (S) USAF Attack Sorties in SEA, Nov 71-Mar 72, source: east Asia Data Base. 7AF South-

69. (S) Memo for the Record: Increase of QRF/Airborne Alert for Southwest M4onsoon Season, undated. Attachment to Hq 7AF Form 4, dated 4 Dec 70, from Brig Gen Cramer, Asst UCS/Operations. 70. Ibid.

71. (S) History of 7AF, 1 Jul-31 Dec 70, Vol I, Part I, Chapter II, pp. 35-36. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. Ibid. BRWG June 71. BRWG, June 71.

(S) History of the 7/13AF, Jul-Sep 1971.

(S) Barrel Roll Working Group, Jun 71, "Quick Reaction Force." (C) Hilton Intvw. Ibid. (S) 7AF, DO/DM Conference on Force Employment, Commando Hunt VI, p. 4.

78. (S) Brig Gen Darrell S. Cramer, Asst DCS/Operations, Command Correspondence Staff Summary Sheet, 4 Dec 70. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. (S) History 7/13AF, Jul-Sep 71. (S) Sortie Recap, 433rd TFW, 12 Jun 70. (S) History of 8th TFW, Jul-Sep 70, pp. 48-49. (S) Commando Hunt V, 7AF, May 71, p. 3. (S) History of 433rd TFW, Oct-Dec 70. (S) History of 8th TFW, Jul-Sep 71, p. 95.

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UNCLASSIFIED
85. (C) Intvw, Capt David K. Hann with Capt Steve Eves, Crew Scheduling Officer, 555TFW, 6 Apr 72. (C) Frye Intvw. 86. 87. (C) Frye Intvw. (C) Buttyan Intvw. (C) Frye Intvw. (S) History of 555th TFW, 1 Jul-30 Sep 70. 88. (C) Intvw, Capt David K. Hann with Capt Norman J. Bell, Work Load Control Officer, 555TFW, 6 Apr 72. 89. (C) Frye Intvw. (C) Bell Intvw. (S) History of 433rd TFW, Oct-Dec 70. (S) History of 555TFW, 1 Jul-30 Sep 70, p. 13. 90. (S) Intvw, Capt David K. ilann with General Evans, 25 Dec 71.

91. (C) Intvw, Capt Edward Brynn with Leland K. Lukens, Lt Col, USAF, Cmdr, 13th TFW, Udorn RTAFB, 24 Jun 73. 92. (S) Mann Intvw. (C) Frye Intvw. 93. (S) lsg, AMEI1B Vientiane to 7AF; Subj: Mission," 1 Aug 70. "Appreciation for Outstanding

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AAA ABCCC ARC LIGHT ARVN Atlanta Barrel Roll BDA Blue Chip Bullwhip CAP CBU CINCPAC Combat Skyspot CO1USMACV COMMANDO NAIL DASC DMZ FAC frag JAGOS LGB LOC LORAN MR

mm
GLOSSARY Anti-aircraft Artillery Airborne Battlefield .Command and Control Center (S) B-52 operations in SEA Army of the Republic of Vietnam (S) RF-4 Quick Reaction Reconnaissance flights over Steel Tiger area Geographical area of northern Laos Battle Damage Assessment 7AF Tactical Air Control Center (S) RF-4 Quick Reaction Reconnaissance flights over Barrel Roll area Combat Air Patrol Cluster Bomb Unit Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (S) A ground radar (MSQ-77) controlled all weather bombing system Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam All weather bombing operations by aircraft equipped with airborne radar bombing systems Direct Air Support Center Demi li tari zed Zone Forward Air Controller A fragmentary operations order Joint Air/Ground Operations System Laser Guided Bomb Line(s) of Communication Long Range Air Navigation Military Region North Vietnamese Army North Vietnam(ese) Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants

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NVA NVN POL

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QR QRF QSR Raven RTAFB RTNB RVN SAI SAR Steel Tiger TACAN TACC TACS TFS TFW TIC TOT TRW

Quick Reaction Quick Reaction Force Quick Strike Reconnaissance Those USAF FACs in Laos under the direct control of the Air Attache, Laos Royal Thai Air Force Base Royal Thai Naval Base Republic of Vietnam Surface-to-Air M1issile Search and Rescue Geographic area of southern Laos Tactical Air Navigation (radio air navigation system) Tactical Air Control Center Tactical Air Control System Tactical Fighter Squadron Tactical Fighter Wing Troops in Contact Time Over Target Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

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