GENERAL I AR1IC,LE

Scientific 'Laws', 'Hypotheses' and 'Theories'

Meanings and Distinctions

J R Lakshmana Rao
Science describes the world of phenomena in terms of
scientific 'laws', 'hypotheses' and 'theories'. There appears
to be a widespread confusion about the precise meaning
and significance of the three terms. This article attempts
to ascertain the meanings of the terms by examining their
actual use in scientific literature.
J R Lakshmana Rao was
Science endeavours to give a meaningful description of the a Professor of Chemistry
world of phenomena using what are known as laws, hypotheses in Yuvaraja's College,
and theories. Logicians and students of scientific method analyse Mysore. Interpreting
science to laymen in his
the structure of scientific knowledge and try to determine the
mother tongue, Kannada
precise significance of these terms. But it is surprising to note and popularising science
the prevalence of a widespread confusion in books on logic and through writing and talks
scientific method, regarding the meaning and significance of have been his favourite
pursuits.
the terms 'laws', 'hypotheses' and 'theories'.

In the midst of a variety of views on the subject, it is possible to

see that a particular view has found favour wi th a majori ty of the
authors. According to that view, hypothesis, theory and law are
successive stages in arriving at reliable knowledge about
anything. As an example of a clear statement of this view, one
can quote H E Cunningham, author of a popular textbook of
logic. "Facts suggest, point to, indicate, an hypothesis" says the
author, "ancJ.experience, practical and scientific, tendsto confirm
or validate it (or the contrary). As it becomes increasingly
verified, the hypothesis changes from the status of a 'mere'
hypothesis, and becomes more 'dignified' - it becomes a theory.
This, in turn, may 'work' so well, i.e., it may become so generally
accepted as an instrument of prediction and interpretation that
it becomes a law". This is more or less the view held by most of
the authors. According to this view, therefore, hypotheses,
theories and laws have the same fundamental character. The

-E-S-O-N-A-N-C-E--I-N-o-v-em--be-r-1-9-9-8-----------~-------------------------------6-9
R
 GENERAL I ARTICLE

Box 1. Hypotheses, Theories, Laws

Judy Harvey writes (Letters, 6 ~eptember p. 1321) that after significant experimental support is gathered,
a hypothesis becomes a theory. This much is true. She then writes that if, after further testing, the theory
"proves true in all circumstances, then it becomes a law". This should be restated. A law is a concise
verbal and mathematical statement of a relationship between experimentally observed parameters that
is always the same under the same conditions. A theory does not become a law~ rather, a theory explains
a pre-existing law and the body of facts upon which that law is based.

Hypotheses explain laws, and well-tested, corroborated hypotheses become theories. Harvey states,
"there is a law of Gravity and the laws of Thermodynamics, but there is not a law of Evolution ... " This
mixes apples with oranges. The laws of gravity and thermodynamics are mathematical equations. There
is no law of evolution because the facts explained by the theory of evolution cannot for the most part be
presented as alaw, in a mathematical format. This is not a flaw of the theory, but rather an idiosyncrasy
of the field. A theory that cannot explain significant data sets published in the peer-reviewed literature
inevitably falls out of favour and is replaced by a better theory. So far, evolution has repeatedly since
the mid-19th century, stood the test of time ... Evolution must be taught, along with the data that both
support and contradict the theory. A robust theory has nothing to fear from contradictory data~ on the
contrary, explaining confusing data strengthens a theory and leads to advances in science. Giving
students all the facts will allow them to see the excitement and power of the scientific method.

From: Todd P Silverstein, Letters, Science. Vol. 274,8 November 1996, 904-905.

differences between them lie only in that they stand at different

levels in their claim for acceptance. Thus they differ only in
respectability and not in essence.

Usually the authors seldom give any example of a hypothesis, in

the history of science, which got elevated to the rank of a theory,
and which finally became a law. On the other hand, any number
of examples can be cited which contradict this view. For
example, the atomic theory, Arrhenius' theory of electrolytic
dissociation, the kinetic theory of gases and Maxwell's electro-
magnetic theory of radiation are a few of the scientific theories
which are well established and which 'are generally accepted as
instruments of prediction and interpretation'. But, they are
called 'theories' and not 'laws', even to this day. We have, on the
other hand, Newton's laws of motion, the law of flotation, the
law of parallelogram ofvectors, Kepler's laws of planetary motion,

-70------------------------------------~-------------R-E-S-O-N-A-N-C--E-I-N-O-V-e-m-b-e-r-1-9-9-8
 GENERAL I ARTICLE

the gas laws, the laws of chemical combination and Mendel's

laws of inheritance which have not passed through historical
stages in which they were called hypotheses and theories.

Such discrepancies between their understanding and actual

usage are explained away by saying that working scientists
sometimes use the terms loosely. This is somewhat like the
scientist who, on observing natural phenomena at variance with
his understanding of them, complains that nature sometimes
behaves improperly. The simile is justified, because scientists
act almost unconsciously, like nature, in this regard. When
working scientists use these terms, they scarcely pause to consider
whether they are using every time the appropriate term. Constant
practice helps them to use the right term at the right place. The
process is similar to our using grammatically correct language
without knowing the rules of grammar. If a logician explains to
the scientists, the precise significance of the terms they are
using, it is possible that they may be surprised like the character
in Moliere's play who discovered that he had spoken prose all his
life without knowing it.

To ascertain what scientists mean by a law, one has to examine

as many propositions as possible, which are known as laws in
scientific literature and find out what is common to all of them.
This applies to hypotheses and theories as well. When the
problem is viewed from this standpoint, it becomes obvious that
it is not the 'truth value' or the 'degree of<:ertainty' of a proposit ion
(or a set of propositions) which guides one to designate it as a
law, theory or hypothesis; it is the nature ofits content. Berzelius'
hypothesis was a failure, and Avogadro's hypothesis, which
replaced it, has stood the test of time. But both are referred to as
hypotheses. What is common between them is something other
than the truth or otherwise of what they state. Similarly, there
is something common between Newton's laws, which are precise,
the gas laws, which have a limited range of applicability, and the
laws of probability. In order to find out those common attributes,
we have to examine the nature of the contents of the various
propositions and not the degree of their certainty. We have to

-E-S-O-N-A-N-C-E--I-N-o-v-em--be-f-1-9-9-8-----------~-------------------------------n-
R
 GENERAL I ARTICLE

A law is a examine what they seek to state and not how true the statements
proposition, which are.
points out the
prevalence of an Scientific Laws
invariable
In our daily lives our actions are performed invariably with
association
certain expectations in view. When we pour water from a vessel,
between a
we expect it to flow down and not fly up. When we heat water,
particular set of
we expect it to boil and not freeze. Belief is implicit, in all such
conditions and
actions, that events in the world do not happen at random, but
particular
that they take place in an orderly manner.
phenomena.
A scientific law is nothing but a proposition, which points out
any such orderliness or regularity in nature. A law is a proposition,
which points out the prevalence ofan invariable association between a
particular set of conditions and particular phenomena. It is of the
nature of a generalisation, which covers all cases in which the
prevalence of such an association can be noticed.

Philosophers, however, have expressed varied views about the

validity of scientific laws. Some of them question the objective
existence of order in nature. They contend that the laws of
science are pure concoctions of the human mind. Others hold
the opposite view. According to the latter, the perception of
natural laws is due, no doubt, to the synthetic activity of the
mind, but it is possible only because the connection actually
exists in reality. Again, there are thinkers who argue that in
spi te of abundant data, on which a particular generalisation is
based, there is nothing to warrant the belief that the phenomenon
in question is sure to recur. According to Pearson "Science for
the past is a description; for the future a belief". However, it is
difficult to deny that, in the scientific attitude, there is an
implicit belief that order objectively exists in nature, and that
scientific laws arrived at on the basis of the accepted canons of
scientific inquiry do help us to predict natural happenings.
However much philosophers differ as to the validity of scientific
laws, there is no disagreement on the question of what the laws
seek to assert.

-n-------------------------------~~----------R-ES-O-N-A-N-C-E--I-N-o-v-em--be-r-1-9-9-8
 GENERAL I ARTICLE

If, as has been made out, the only condition to be satisfied by a It also follows that
scientific proposition in order to be called a law is that it should laws do not cease
seek to point out a regularity or orderliness in nature, it follows to be laws, merely
.that it is in no way necessary that it should faithfully represent because they did
the law, inherent in nature, in all its aspects. That is why we find not start their
that some scientific laws, like Bode's law in astronomy, are careers as
approximately true; some, like the gas laws, have only a limited hypotheses and
range of applicability and still others are only of a statistical pass through the
nature. stage of theories
as required by the
It also follows that laws do not cease to be laws, merely because
logicians.
they did not start their careers as hypotheses and pass through
the stage of theories as required by the logicians. The earliest
laws, which man came to be aware of, are those empirical
generalisations, which he imbibed through his everyday
experience. For instance, the stone age man would not have
believed the story that water flows up a hill in any other part of
the world. He was aware of the law that water always flows from
a higher level to a lower level though he might not have had the
vocabulary to formulate it. He inferred the truth of the law ·on
the basis of repeated experience without having to propose it as
a hypothesis requiring verification. A number of such empirical
laws were known to man long before the rudiments of modern
science appeared: there cannot be rain without clouds in the
sky; snow is always to be found on high mountains; spring is
followed by summer; etc. It has been argued that hypotheses,
however short-lived, are necessary steps to arrive at definite
knowledge of things. It may be true of knowledge acquired by
science in the later stages ofits development; it cannot be true of
the simple empirical laws mentioned above.

Some time later, in history, we acquired knowledge of an other

kind of laws which are also empirical generalisations, but are
based on planned experiments or organised collection of a mass
of observational data. The law of constant composition in
chemistry, the gas laws and Kepler's laws of planetary motion
are laws of this category. It is doubtful if formation of hypo-
theses has played any role in the discovery of these laws either.

-R-ES-O-N-A-N-C-E--I-N-o-v-em--b-er--19-9-8----------~~-------------------------------7--3
 GENERAL \ ARTICLE

Laws, in the exact At any rate, the scientific world has never referred to them as
sciences, can hypotheses or theories. They are known as laws from the very
often be day they were made known by their discoverers. It is because
expressed in the they are statements about regularities in nature.
form of
Later still, in the history of science, a new class of laws, the
mathematical
derived laws, came on the scene. These are laws deduced by
relationships.
reasoning (mathematical or otherwise) based on, and starting
from, premises (which are of the nature of hypotheses) and
already known laws. Stefan's law concerning black body
radiation, Stokes' law concerning the descent of a body under
gravity through a viscous medium, Hess' law of constant heat
summation and Ostwald's dilution law derived by applying the
law of mass action to the dissociation of an electrolyte, are all
examples of such laws. If one needs examples of laws, which
cannot possibly be claimed to have been suggested first as
hypotheses, they are here. They are deductions from premises,
which are often of the nature of validated hypotheses. If the laws
are shown to be valid, by experimental verification, the premises
gain support. For instance, Dalton provided support to his
atomic theory by deducing from it the law of multiple proportions,
which could be exper.imentally verified.

Laws, in the exact sciences, can often be expressed in the form of

mathematical relationships. N ewton's law of gravitation is
summarised in the equation f = G mm' fd 2. His second law of
motion is expressed as f = mao The derived laws, in particular,
are often more conveniently expressed in the form of
mathematical relationships than in the form of statements or
words. The Gibbs-Helmholtz equation, Clausius-Clapeyron
equation, van der Waals's equation and such other 'equations'
are essentially laws expressed in a mathematical form.

Address for Correspondence This, in brief, is the meaning and significance of the term 'laws'
J R Lakshmana Rao as inferred by an examination of propositions, which are called
'Maithri',121h Main laws in scientific literature. In like manner, it is possible to
Saraswathipura,
ascertain the meaning and significance of what scientists call
Mysore 570009, India.
hypotheses and theories.

-74-------------------------------~------------RE-S-O-N-A-N-C-E--I-N-o-v-em--be-r-1-9-9-a