Programme Evaluation Series

01//2021

Evaluation of the
Information on Nutrition,
Food Security and
Resilience for Decision
Making (INFORMED)
Programme
 Programme Evaluation Series
01/2021

Evaluation of the
Information on Nutrition, Food Security
and Resilience for Decision Making
(INFORMED) Programme

Project code: GCP/INT/245/EC

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Rome, 2021
Required citation:
FAO. 2021. Evaluation of the Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED) Programme .
Programme Evaluation Series, 01/2021. Rome.

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any
opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) concerning the legal or
development status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or
boundaries. Dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement. The mention
of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have
been endorsed or recommended by FAO in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.

The views expressed in this information product are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of
FAO.

© FAO, 2021
ISBN 978-92-5-133868-1

Some rights reserved. This work is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 IGO
licence (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/igo/legalcode).

Under the terms of this licence, this work may be copied, redistributed and adapted for non-commercial purposes, provided that
the work is appropriately cited. In any use of this work, there should be no suggestion that FAO endorses any specific organization,
products or services. The use of the FAO logo is not permitted. If the work is adapted, then it must be licensed under the same or
equivalent Creative Commons licence. If a translation of this work is created, it must include the following disclaimer along with
the required citation: “This translation was not created by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
FAO is not responsible for the content or accuracy of this translation. The original [Language] edition shall be the authoritative
edition.”

Disputes arising under the licence that cannot be settled amicably will be resolved by mediation and arbitration as described in
Article 8 of the licence except as otherwise provided herein. The applicable mediation rules will be the mediation rules of the
World Intellectual Property Organization http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/mediation/rules and any arbitration will be conducted in
accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).

Third-party materials. Users wishing to reuse material from this work that is attributed to a third party, such as tables, figures or
images, are responsible for determining whether permission is needed for that reuse and for obtaining permission from the
copyright holder. The risk of claims resulting from infringement of any third-party-owned component in the work rests solely with
the user.

Sales, rights and licensing. FAO information products are available on the FAO website (www.fao.org/publications) and can be
purchased through [email protected]. Requests for commercial use should be submitted via: www.fao.org/contact-
us/licence-request. Queries regarding rights and licensing should be submitted to: [email protected].

Cover photo credits (top to bottom): ©FAO/Patrick Zachmann/Magnum Photos, ©FAO/Stefanie Glinski, ©FAO/Sean Gallagher,
©FAO/Stefanie Glinski
Contents
Abstract.....................................................................................................................................................................................v
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................................................vi
Acronyms and abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ vii
Executive summary .......................................................................................................................................................... viii
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Purpose of the evaluation and intended users .................................................................................. 1
1.2 Scope and objective of the evaluation .................................................................................................. 1
1.3 Methodology and limitations.................................................................................................................... 2
1.4 Structure of the report ................................................................................................................................. 3
2. Background and context of the programme ......................................................................... 5
2.1 Context of the programme ........................................................................................................................ 5
3. Findings ........................................................................................................................................ 9
3.1 Analysis of food crisis situations .............................................................................................................. 9
3.1.1 Strategy and activities ............................................................................................................................. 9
3.1.2 Relevance ................................................................................................................................................... 13
3.1.3 Use of EWEA products .......................................................................................................................... 16
3.1.4 Factors influencing effectiveness ..................................................................................................... 21
3.1.5 Sustainability ............................................................................................................................................. 26
3.2 Resilience analysis ........................................................................................................................................ 31
3.2.1 Strategy and activities ........................................................................................................................... 31
3.2.2 Relevance ................................................................................................................................................... 32
3.2.3 Use of RIMA .............................................................................................................................................. 36
3.2.4 Factors affecting use and utility ........................................................................................................ 42
3.2.5 Sustainability ............................................................................................................................................. 45
3.3 Knowledge management .......................................................................................................................... 52
3.3.1 Strategy and activities ........................................................................................................................... 52
3.3.2 Relevance and appropriateness of KORE...................................................................................... 53
3.3.3 Effectiveness of KORE tools and products ................................................................................... 55
3.3.4 Factors influencing utility .................................................................................................................... 57
3.3.5 Sustainability ............................................................................................................................................. 59
4. Conclusions and recommendations ....................................................................................... 61
4.1 Conclusions..................................................................................................................................................... 61
4.2 Recommendations ....................................................................................................................................... 66
Bibliography ....................................................................................................................................... 69
Appendix 1. People interviewed ..................................................................................................... 80
Appendix 2. Evaluation matrix ........................................................................................................ 86
Appendix 3. Survey results............................................................................................................... 88
Appendix 4. INFORMED results ..................................................................................................... 102
Boxes, figures and tables
Boxes
Box 1: Early Warning Early Action (EWEA) Country Toolkit .............................................................................. 12
Box 2: EWEA impact studies .......................................................................................................................................... 19
Box 3: Anticipatory action in Somalia ....................................................................................................................... 23
Box 4: Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) dashboard....................................................... 23
Box 5: Linking EWEA to shock responsive social protection ........................................................................... 28
Box 6: Support from Germany for EWEA capacity development................................................................... 30
Box 7: The resilience marker ......................................................................................................................................... 33
Box 8: The New York Declaration and Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework ...................... 38
Box 9: Measuring impact of resilience programmes in Somalia .................................................................... 41
Box 10: RIMA trainings .................................................................................................................................................... 49

Figures
Figure 1: INFORMED intervention logic ..................................................................................................................... 6
Figure 2: Initial conceptualization of FAO EWEA system .................................................................................. 10
Figure 3: Awareness and use of EWEA Products (weighted average out of 10) ..................................... 16
Figure 4: Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA) allocations for early
action ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 25
Figure 5: Comparison of targeting criteria, triangle of hope, Mauritania .................................................. 39
Figure 6: Simple logic model for Knowledge Sharing Platform on Resilience (KORE) ......................... 52
Figure 7: KORE stepped approach to developing good practices ................................................................ 55
Figure 8: Use of KORE good practices ...................................................................................................................... 56

Tables
Table 1: Use of European Union funds by INFORMED project component ................................................ 8
Table 2: EWEA Outputs ................................................................................................................................................... 16
Abstract
The Information for Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience Decision Making (INFORMED)
programme, implemented by FAO from 2015 to 2019, was designed to contribute to “increasing
the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises and contributing to the reduction of food
insecurity and malnutrition”.
The programme’s increased focused on Early Warning for Early Action (EWEA) was very relevant to
fill existing gaps with a comparative advantage for FAO in slow onset and food chain crises
contexts. Promoting the use of pre-agreed plans and pre-identified anticipatory actions, the project
effectively improved risk analysis and decision making, including through the Global Report on
Food Crises, and increased access to appropriate financing instruments, while the EWEA country
toolkit initial positive spinoffs remain to be built on.
Efforts to support resilience measurement and analyses by applying the resilience index
measurement and analysis (RIMA) methodology are relevant given the significant investments in
resilience programming and the continuing methodological gaps. However, although RIMA
provides a basis for creating evidence on resilience investments, and FAO has been an important
pioneer in resilience measurement, a wider system supporting resilience analysis is needed, based
on a range of methodologies, responding to the information needs of decision-makers. Also, RIMA
baseline lacks sufficient detail to allow articulating the feasibility of possible response options and
have a practical impact on planning decisions; it has not demonstrated its added value over pre-
existing food security, nutrition and risk indicators to help target interventions, and is not well
adapted as an impact evaluation tool.
Assessing INFORMED results against its intention to support knowledge production and sharing,
to promote the replication of good practices and circular learning, the evaluation questioned the
choice of creating a new knowledge management platform versus adopting a collaborative
approach building on similar initiatives’ strengths. Poor strategic choices represented a
fundamental constraint to reach intended objectives, such as, an insufficient understanding of users
explaining the difficulty to trace the uptake and use of knowledge products. Nevertheless, the
evaluation recognized the progressive investments in knowledge management and sizeable
accomplishments of a relatively small team.
The evaluation suggests strengthening capacities for the production and dissemination of forecast,
scenario-based early warning as a basis for early action; developing a corporate strategy for
partnering to strengthen early warning system capacities at various levels; promoting the use of a
toolkit of approaches and investing in a knowledge management function dedicated to capturing
and disseminating lessons on the effectiveness of EWEA and resilience interventions.

v
Acknowledgements
The FAO Office of Evaluation (OED) would like to thank all those who contributed to this evaluation,
led by Aurelie Larmoyer and supported by Carolina Turano from the OED. The evaluation team was
led by Nick Maunder, supported by Patrice Chataigner and Hisham Khogali.
The evaluation was carried out with the invaluable assistance of the FAO staff including Luca Russo,
Lavinia Antonaci, Dunja Dujanovic, Marco d'Errico and Frederique Matras. Their insight, knowledge,
advice and comments made this review possible.
The evaluation benefited from the inputs of many other stakeholders, including government
officers, farmers’ organizations and the staff of other United Nations (UN) agencies, research
centres and private sector. Their contributions were critical to the team’s work and are deeply
appreciated.

vi
Acronyms and abbreviations
CILSS Permanent Interstate Committee for drought control in the Sahel

DfID Department for International Development

Department for International Development
EMPRES Emergency Prevention System

EWEA Early Warning Early Action

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FSIN Food Security Information Network

GNAFCPP Global Network Against Food Crises Partnership Programme

GIEWS Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture

GRFC Global Report on Food Crises

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development

INFORMED Information for Nutrition Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making

IPC Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

KORE Knowledge Sharing Platform on Resilience

NGO Non-governmental organization

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

RIMA Resilience index measurement and analysis

SICA Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana

UNICEF United Nations Children's Emergency Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WFP Word Food Programme

vii
Executive summary
Introduction
1. This report presents the results of the final evaluation of the project ‘Information on
Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making’ (INFORMED). The INFORMED
programme was designed to contribute to “increasing the resilience of livelihoods to
threats and crises and contributing to the reduction of food insecurity and malnutrition”. It
was intended to achieve this through the specific outcome of “improved availability of
regular, timely and early warning information as well as evidence-based analysis regarding
the food security, nutrition and resilience situation for decision-making”.

2. The programme provided technical, analytical and capacity development support to

institutions and decision makers – including international, regional and national
organizations, governments and institutions, and FAO country offices. The programme
budget of approximately EUR 33.5 million was supported by a voluntary contribution from
the European Union Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
(DG DEVCO) of approximately EUR 21 million.

3. The evaluation examined the relevance and appropriateness, use, utility and sustainability
of the INFORMED project. The scope of the evaluation included the entire period of
implementation, from 2015 to 2019, and covered activities at global, regional and country
levels. The evaluation focussed on Output 1 (analysis of food crisis situations) and Output
3 (measurement of resilience and knowledge sharing mechanisms). Output 2 on the
Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) was recently evaluated separately. 1

4. This evaluation pursues the dual objectives of accountability and learning. The evaluation
aimed at informing and refining under the new collaboration between the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the European Union in the Global
Network Against Food Crises Partnership Programme (GNAFCPP). The principal users of
the evaluation are the project donor European Union DEVCO and FAO.

5. Methods employed by the evaluation included a review of secondary information, semi-

structured interviews with project stakeholders, seven country case studies and two online
surveys. Due to travel restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the interviews were
conducted almost entirely by virtual means.

Main findings
6. The main findings of the evaluation are presented below, grouped by the main output
areas.

Early Warning Early Action

7. Most of the activities for Programme Output 1 fell under the banner of Early Warning Early
Action (EWEA), with additional activities oriented to enhancing data collection. Activities

1
A final evaluation of the Global Strategic Programme (GSP) of the IPC was finalized in 2019 and therefore to
avoid duplicating it, this evaluation rather examined the coherence and synergies between the IPC and other
INFORMED Outputs. Annex XX of this report references the recommendations from the 2019 evaluation of this
important component of INFORMED.

viii
 included the production of a global quarterly Early Warning Early Action report (QEWEAR)
on food security and agriculture, support to countries to access FAO’s Special Fund for
Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA) Early Action window, country level pilot
programmes, developing an EWEA Country Toolkit and impact studies. The production of
a Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) was added from 2017.

8. The increasing focus on EWEA within INFORMED was found to be highly relevant given
persistent gaps between early warning and timely action, and the mandate of FAO. Critically
INFORMED went beyond improved risk analysis for decision makers, with attention to
improving access to appropriate financing instruments and the definition of pre-agreed
plans and pre-identified anticipatory actions.

9. In terms of EWEA, FAO was found to have a comparative advantage in focusing on slow
onset crises and food chain crises. Other agencies provided a strong complementary focus
on EWEA in relation to rapid onset hazards, while FAO corporate systems are less agile in
responding to rapid onset crises, due to the inherent limitations of corporate systems.
Other agencies also generally had the mandate and skills for conflict early warning,
although FAO could do more to anticipate and respond to small-scale conflicts.2 The FAO
approach to EWEA was de facto limited by the realities of its resource constraints.

10. Improving the quality and availability of food and nutrition statistics remains a high priority
for many stakeholders, but this was not prioritized during implementation and the reasons
for this decision were not entirely clear to the evaluators.

11. The quarterly EWEA report was judged by stakeholders to be concise and well presented.
The quarterly EWEA report supported advocacy and encouraged investments in EWEA, and
served as an important coordination tool. However, given limitations of timeliness, the
process of compiling the EWEA report, rather than the report itself, was most helpful in
supporting programming decisions and there was a desire to move towards a dynamic
version of the report.

12. The EWEA Country Toolkit has helped to guide the development of country EWEA plans. It
was still early to assess the effectiveness of the country plans as many are yet to be
activated. Learnings from EWEA pilots – including Return on Investment studies - have
encouraged further investment in EWEA but more learning is needed to improve the design
and delivery of EWEA programmes.

13. The Global Report on Food Crises is widely viewed as an important and valuable additional
source of information. The publication and launch events kept acute food insecurity high
on the global agenda and assisted in the prioritization and allocation of resources by
donors. However, several stakeholders reported concerns about the uneven quality of the
country level analyses and decision makers asked for more timely information. (see finding
10)

14. A major constraint to EWEA is the capacity of FAO and other early warning systems –
including IPC, Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture
(GIEWS) and Emergency Prevention System (EMPRES) – to provide predictive forecasts. The

2 On this question, the evaluation of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDPN), also carried out in 2020,
should provide useful complementary views. At the time of finalising the present report, the HDPN evaluation was
yet to be finalized.

ix
 evaluation found a strong consensus on the limitations of IPC projections as an early
warning tool – as opposed to the IPC core function in analysing the current food security
situation. Very few stakeholders (from donors, non-governmental organization (NGOs),
United Nations agencies or governments) mentioned the early warning role of the IPC as
a particular strength or value added. EWEA products do not so far analyse the needs of –
or suggest tailored actions for - vulnerable groups including women.

15. Defining thresholds and triggers for early action is critical for timely action, but experience
demonstrated the need to combines ‘hard’ thresholds with qualitative information and
expert judgement that are contextualized to individual agencies.

16. Internal financing by the FAO SFERA window has been essential in enabling FAO to pilot
early actions. The ability to access such funds was seen as essential in allowing FAO to
operationalize early actions. SFERA funds have only been sufficient to pilot small-scale
projects in selected countries and are not currently sufficient to either meet demand from
a larger number of countries, or to bring the approach to scale.

17. There is a lack of clarity between early action as “rapid response” and as “forecast based
anticipatory action”. Most EWEA practitioners shared a common vision on the importance
of actions prior to a shock or before a shock translates into acute impacts ,but some staff
understood it more like preparedness or early response.

18. In spite of limited resources allocated to this component, FAO has contributed strongly to
the promotion and sustainability of EWEA at global level and the EWEA team was viewed
as credible and “a thought leader” by the main collaborating institutions. This had tangible
results, including contributing to the establishment of the Risk-informed Early Action
Partnership (REAP). Through appropriate partnerships, including with the World Bank
Famine Action Mechanism and the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund, FAO
has supported efforts to develop and institutionalize system level financing for EWEA.

19. The EWEA pilot phase has created a solid basis to move towards embedding the initiative
within corporate structures and processes. However, progress towards institutionalizing
EWEA within FAO is partial and incomplete. The accountability of field offices for EWEA was
low and internal standard operating mechanisms for logistics and procurement are ill-
suited to early action. Collaboration with the global Food Security Cluster (gFSC) on EWEA
remains nascent and weakly developed at implementation level.

20. EWEA has also contributed to capacity building, although national ownership of EWEA
processes is so far very limited. FAO has a well-established and generally effective strategy
of working through the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as an entry point
for analytical support to food and nutrition security, but this channel has so far been little
used for capacity building on EWEA. The new GNAFCPP aims to build capacity for carrying
out EWEA work at regional and country levels.

Resilience analysis

21. INFORMED supported regional and national technical capacities to conduct resilience
measurement and analyses by applying the resilience index measurement and analysis
(RIMA) methodology. This methodology has been simplified and improved to support
resilience programming, monitoring and impact evaluation. This included the rollout of the
“RIMA II” methodology, the introduction of RIMA “Excel” to replace the use of STATA

x
 software and the RIMA “Short” questionnaire to reduce data requirements. Optional
“modules” have also been added to gather data on: subjective perceptions of resilience;
conflict; social protection; local economy; and other context-specific features.

22. Following the conclusion of INFORMED, support to RIMA has continued under component
II of the Global Network Against Food Crises Partnership Programme. RIMA provides the
basis, both as data collection and analytical instrument, for creating evidence on European
Union resilience investments in a number of PROACT projects.

23. Support to resilience analysis is highly relevant given the significant investments in
resilience programming and the continuing methodological gaps. In recent years, large-
scale investments in resilience programmes have been made by both governments and
development partners to reduce food insecurity and malnutrition, but verifiable evidence
of the impact of these investments remains scarce. There is still a need for a robust system
for effective measurement to help generate evidence for informed decision-making and
further investment.

24. The understanding of decision makers needs was weak in the initial design of RIMA, but
efforts made during implementation have partially addressed users’ concerns. The origins
of RIMA was driven by an academic approach to conceptualizing and measuring resilience.
The INFORMED programme was intended to be paired with the European Union-funded
Food and Nutrition Security, Impact, Resilience, Sustainability and Transformation (FIRST)
policy support programme, but in practice both programmes lacked a comprehensive
approach linking evidence to policy and programming. FAO has acknowledged this gap
and there were evident efforts to orient RIMA studies to respond to the specific research
questions that countries were interested in. However, to some extent decision maker needs
remain unmet.

25. For many stakeholders the objective of building resilience to food insecurity emerged from
a humanitarian perspective and the rationale for resilience under INFORMED has been
aligned to managing risk, through building resilient livelihoods. Interpreting resilience
purely from a risk reduction perspective could lead to “resilient but poor”. Stronger links
could identify policy and programmatic options to address poverty and resilience that
integrate risk management into development plans.

26. It is difficult – if not impossible – to build resilience without considering the impact of
conflict and political shocks. A conflict module has been added to RIMA as a descriptive
and explanatory variable Other FAO tools have been developed to provide the primary
analysis to support conflict sensitive programming, including the FAO Guide to Context
Analysis and the Programme Clinic. Gender is routinely included in all RIMA analyses in line
with FAO policy commitments. The data is analysed by the gender of household heads and
all reports included gender-disaggregated recommendations.

27. The potential uses of RIMA included: planning of projects, programmes, strategies and
policies; targeting interventions; evaluating impact; and trend monitoring. In terms of
planning the Resilience Capacity Index (RCI) (based on the pillars of access to basic services;
household assets; household social safety nets; and household adaptive capacity) helped
to describe the factors contributing to resilience capacities. This helped to explain the
concept of resilience as a holistic approach spanning multiple sectors and brought
attention to the contribution of social protection and basic services. However, the RIMA

xi
 baseline analysis lacked sufficient detail to have a practical impact on concrete planning
decisions with a deeper analysis required to understand the feasibility of possible response
options.

28. Where context specific food security and nutrition data was collected through the RIMA
process, this was valued by planners. In data poor environments, users credited RIMA with
playing an important role in expanding the availability of information beyond the
immediate planned purpose of resilience analysis.

29. RIMA results have not been used to target interventions to areas or groups of low
resilience. In practice this has not happened as RIMA has not demonstrated a compelling
added value for targeting over more readily available food security, nutrition and risk
indicators.

30. RIMA is not well adapted as an impact evaluation tool. The RIMA I analysis demonstrated
aggregate changes in resilience capacity but did not attribute the role of specific project
interventions; nor are users able to conclude whether an adequate level of resilience had
been achieved. RIMA II is currently used as part of the evaluation framework (with control
groups) in Pro Act programmes. The baselines are currently being conducted and it will be
sometime before the performance of RIMA II as an evaluation tool in this context can be
properly assessed.

31. The RIMA tool – specifically the RCI within RIMA – is being increasingly applied for policy
monitoring. It is attractive to users as it provides a single figure that simplifies reporting on
a complex concept. It does not require an analysis of causality and is much less demanding
on the skills of analysts as it can be conducted using RIMA Excel. Existing datasets can be
used to conduct RIMA analysis at this level, reducing cost and data demand as in Niger or
Senegal.

32. RIMA has benefitted from strong technical collaboration in developing the methodology,
and from inter-agency coordination in implementation. However, the knowledge of RIMA
is centred amongst a small group of technical specialists. Many key decision makers were
found to be largely unaware of the RIMA process and products. INFORMED has invested
in significant efforts to improve communication with decision makers. However, overly
technical reports were judged as inaccessible by many decision makers. Consequently,
users lacked a solid understanding of the tool and felt unable to challenge or critique the
results.

33. Methodologically there are still clear challenges. There was surprisingly little testing of the
relationship between RIMA’s calculated “resilience capacity” and the actual ability of
households to weather shocks and stresses. To those more involved in the technical detail,
there is a concern around insufficient critical examination and validation of the index.
Resilience is best understood by drawing on a diverse range of methodologies – including
qualitative and participatory approaches and requires understanding the perspective of
affected populations and individuals. FAO programme staff also asked for FAO be more
open to promoting the use of a toolkit of approaches, so that the most relevant mix of
methods could be matched to a specific context and purpose.

34. INFORMED collaborated with regional institutions (including the Intergovernmental

Authority on Development, IGAD; African Union; Permanent Interstate Committee for

xii
 drought control in the Sahel (CILSS) and Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana, SICA)
and national governments to establish and enhance resilience analysis capacities. This
included the creation of two main regional hubs in Africa (Dakar and Nairobi) and
Resilience Measurement Units (RMU) at country level (including Uganda and South Sudan).
However, no specific institutionalization strategy for RIMA was found to guide the activities
conducted under this work area at global, regional or country level. The primary focus was
on supporting and producing RIMA analyses rather than institutionalization.

35. Regional and national authorities remained dependent on FAO’s technical and financial
support to conduct RIMA analyses. In some cases this collaboration has continued for over
a decade. There has been collaboration with other agencies in piloting RIMA, but no United
Nations agencies or international NGOs have adopted the tool. All partners reported that
they lacked the technical capacity or resources to use RIMA.

36. FAO has organized a large number of trainings at various levels to support the
implementation of RIMA studies. RIMA trainings were well received but only a small
number of professionals are capable of independently conducting a RIMA analysis as the
approach demands a strong statistical background. This situation was exacerbated by a
deficit of suitable RIMA guidance.

37. Stakeholders routinely referred to the heavy data demands of the RIMA tool as a major
barrier to the sustainability of the approach. RIMA requires multi-dimensional, high-
frequency, longitudinal data. In the majority of cases, RIMA analysis required the costly
collection of panel survey data.

Knowledge management

38. In 2016, FAO established a Knowledge Sharing Platform on Resilience (KORE), initiated as
an additional component of INFORMED. The intention was to support resilience building
by developing guidance and facilitating the production and dissemination of knowledge
products to help field practitioners share their practices and promote replication.

39. Establishing KORE within INFORMED responded to a rationale of systematically

documenting and sharing lessons from experience to improve resilience building
programmes. Various other institutions, such as IGAD or the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), also considered resilience building as a programmatic
area with high action-learning potential, which motivated these institutions to invest in
resilience knowledge management. The creation of a new resilience knowledge
management platform was not necessarily the most appropriate action to take to fulfil
needs expressed by practitioners. The community advocated for adopting a collaborative
‘and partnership-driven’ approach and warned against the risk of duplicating efforts.

40. The initial strategy underpinning KORE was not founded on clearly defined knowledge
needs and users. This represented a fundamental constraint to manage the initiative
effectively. However, regular user consultations helped improve the relevance of
knowledge products to potential users.

41. KORE delivered a well thought and structured approach to knowledge management. The
processes, tools and efforts of the KORE team led to the production of a number of outputs.
This included: documenting good practices; webinars; a quarterly newsletter; and a web
portal for resilience. A structured process was established to collect good practices.

xiii
 Figure 7 shows the stepped approach to developing good practices. KORE’s
engagement with partners such as IGAD and CILSS during regional knowledge share
fairs supported the dissemination of good practices and knowledge.

42. The use of knowledge products appears to be patchy with mixed levels of awareness and
appreciation of KORE products. Stakeholder interviews conducted by the evaluation, from
within and outside FAO, showed a generally low level of familiarity with KORE products. At
the field level, evidence of use is quite uneven. More needs be done to support replication,
for which dedicated capacity is necessary. The uptake and use of the knowledge products
was not monitored, limiting the opportunities for learning and adjustment.

43. Having strategic management decisions made by programme managers lacking

comprehensive knowledge management expertise affected KORE effectiveness in
generating knowledge and learning. With a reduced power on budget management, the
KORE team, exclusively working from temporary consultancy contracts, was not in an
advantageous position to influence strategic decisions.

44. Despite a positive evolution of human resources dedicated to knowledge management

over time, the resources available to KORE remained limited and insufficient, especially at
field level. Limited partnerships and coordination with internal and external platforms due
to competition over content (with the exception of few institutions) constrained outreach
and the efficient use of knowledge.

45. KORE was anchored in INFORMED, a time-bound project, and was not connected to
knowledge management as a core function of FAO. A Strategic Programme (SP) 5 MEAL
team has been formed in recent years. However, there has been little collaboration between
the two teams until recently. There are obvious opportunities to establish synergies with
knowledge management; however, a dialogue between the two teams only started
recently.

46. The creation of a dedicated knowledge management platform for resilience-related

knowledge management and limited engagement with others, and the lack of anchoring
in a broader knowledge management function in FAO, was not conducive to
institutionalization. The choice to set-up a standalone platform was less sustainable than
joining forces with existing stakeholder institutions and build a joint platform.

Conclusions
47. The main outcome areas of the INFORMED programme - promoting early warning early
action, resilience analysis and knowledge management – are key gaps for food security and
nutrition decision makers, and should remain priorities for FAO. While IPC activities were
mainly out of the evaluation scope, these were also undoubtably highly relevant – as
confirmed by the IPC evaluation. These demands remain strong and have not diminished,
and the need for programming in these areas should remain a priority for FAO. However,
FAO should do more to advocate for and support improved data streams to support these
analyses.

48. Overall many sound choices were made in the INFORMED design. However, the initial
understanding of the detailed needs of potential users – or the operating context – was
insufficiently developed. Consequently, it has taken time for the programme to develop a

xiv
 proper understanding of user needs and there is an outstanding demand to base the
design of products and processes on the needs of decision-making.

49. To its credit, INFORMED managers recognized this deficit and the programme has been
strongly adaptive over the implementation period as it has strived to improve its specific
relevance to decision makers. However, it has taken time for the programme to reorient
itself to better address user demands and it is evident that there are still important gaps in
both resilience analysis, EWEA and knowledge management tools.

50. The Early Warning Early Action initiative has been highly effective at the global level. It has
positioned FAO as a key player in the main coordination forums and the Organization has
used this platform to effectively advocate for the promotion of EWEA with significant
results. FAO effectiveness as an advocate is given significant credibility through its
comparative advantage in generating key evidence and learning around anticipatory action
– rooted in its experience of implementation.

51. There is an opportunity to more explicitly link the GRFC and the quarterly EWEA to further
highlight opportunities - while the GRFC provides a backward looking view on the recent
food security situation, this could be linked to the forward looking view on emerging crises.

52. The implementation of pilot EWEA activities at country level provided important learning
opportunities and highlighted a number of constraints. At an operational level, there is the
need for sustained investment to enable effective anticipatory action systems to be
established, both internally in FAO and amongst partners. Key areas include improving the
forecasting ability of early warning, improving access to finance and forging strong and
inclusive partnerships at national level.

53. Through INFORMED support to RIMA FAO has been an important pioneer in resilience
measurement. However, detailed findings on the use and utility of RIMA analyses found
that the current tool is not widely used in planning, targeting or assessing the impact of
resilience policies or programmes. Furthermore the appropriateness and added value over
existing food security and nutrition indicators and approaches can be questioned for some
applications. RIMA does demonstrate more relevance to policy monitoring.

54. The tool in its current form unlikely to be independently sustained in national systems and
the further evolution of resilience methodologies is inevitable. The cost and technical
complexity of the method challenge prospects for institutionalization within Government
or other partners. RIMA analyses remain largely dependent on FAO technical and financial
support.

55. Given a continued strong demand for information and analysis to support resilience
policies and programming, there is a need for continued methodological innovation. This
demand is to support decision-making across a wide range of purposes including
advocacy, learning and accountability.

56. It would be desirable to unpack RIMA into a number of differentiated tools to be used for
different and specific purposes. In particular, there is a clear demand for understanding
community level perspectives on resilience and more open, participatory discussions on
pathways to achieving resilience.

xv
57. The various INFORMED outcomes areas developed largely in isolation. Recent attempts to
explore and develop synergies between the different analyses have had limited results.
However, there are strong arguments that all data collection efforts emphasized by
INFORMED should be integrated and linked, providing a fuller understanding of the multi-
sectoral nature of food insecurity and malnutrition that can then inform both national and
regional policies around food and nutrition security.

58. While tools, guidance and services developed and capacities established under KORE
constitute useful building blocks, promoting knowledge exchange for learning and
programme improvement requires more investment and giving staff skilled on knowledge
management the appropriate decision-making power to steer their mission.

59. The scope of evidence needs to be expanded. In the case of EWEA, information collected
so far has concentrated on supporting advocacy, principally by assessing the economic
benefits of acting early. However, programme staff responsible for both EWEA and
resilience need much more information on the substance of what works and in what
context. Nor is this evidence organized in a way that allows programme staff to identify
what may be relevant for their own objectives and context. This is partly the consequence
of a poorly developed corporate capacity in capturing lessons on the effectiveness of
livelihood interventions in supporting resilience and overall knowledge management.

60. The function of KORE would be more effectively leveraged by being directly connected to
a wider knowledge management function in FAO. Managing knowledge for resilience
should be a central and core function of FAO, resonating ideally across SPs, and most
certainly beyond the scope of a given project.

Recommendations
Recommendation 1. FAO should strengthen capacities for the production and dissemination
of forecast, scenario-based early warning as a basis for early action.

61. It is recommended that the FAO Office of Evaluation (OED) conduct a review of the
effectiveness of early warning systems (EWS), developing triggers for anticipatory action
and lessons in supporting EWS capacity. Based on this review, FAO headquarters should
develop a corporate strategy for partnering to strengthen early warning system capacities
at various levels.

62. It is recommended that the GNAFCPP transition the publication of the GRFC and QEWEA
reports to an online format with rolling updates, with an explicit link between the two
products.

Recommendation 2. FAO should work in partnership to strengthen the delivery of early

actions in selected priority high risk countries.

63. It is recommended that FAO update the corporate strategy to include operational
processes and accountabilities for anticipatory action. FAO should advocate for a
substantive increase in the SFERA EWEA window.

64. It is recommended that FAO Regional and Country Offices continue to work with national
and regional authorities to pilot the development and monitoring of country EWEA plans
in selected high priority countries and associated support for capacity development.

xvi
65. It is recommended that the gFSC support country clusters to embed responsibility (in
concert with national authorities) for EWEA planning, surveillance and implementation.

Recommendation 3. FAO should support policy and programme decision makers through a
diverse set of resilience-related analytical tools and improved data access.

66. It is recommended that FAO develop a broad strategy to support the analysis of resilience,
based on the specific needs of decision makers, that uses a range of methodological
approaches, including community based, participatory investigations of pathways to
resilience.

67. It is recommended that FAO advocate for, and where appropriate support, the production
of, and enhanced access to, food and nutrition statistics by the responsible agencies that
contribute to resilience analysis.

Recommendation 4. Within this wider resilience analysis strategy FAO should focus any
continued investment in the development, application and training of the RIMA tool in
contexts where it is demonstrating the greatest potential.

68. It is recommended that FAO focus on continued investments in the development,

application and capacity building for the use of the RCI as a tool for policy and programme
monitoring. FAO should also skill test the accuracy of the RCI in predicting the capacity of
households to maintain welfare levels in the event of a shock.

69. It is recommended that the GNAFCPP should continue to pilot use of RIMA II of the indirect
analysis of resilience to research the determinants of the ability to bounce back from
shocks. FAO should develop relevant guidance notes and further simplify the technical and
data demands of RIMA analysis.

Recommendation 5. FAO should further and more sustainably invest in a function dedicated
to capturing and disseminating lessons on the effectiveness of EWEA and resilience
interventions.

70. It is recommended that FAO invest in establishing a knowledge management function

within the Office of Emergencies and Resilience (OER) tightly networked with others in and
outside of FAO. FAO should investigate developing a decision support tool to help
programme staff determine which interventions would have most relevance in their specific
context.

71. FAO should further reinforce, and invest in, corporate capacities for monitoring, evaluation
and learning, and mainstream responsibility for capturing learnings around specific EWEA
and resilience interventions and system accountability.

xvii
1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose of the evaluation and intended users
1. This report presents the results of the final evaluation of the project ‘Information on
Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making’ (INFORMED), implemented
over an initial period of three years (2015-2018), with a no cost extension to the end of
2019. The evaluation was commissioned by the Office of Evaluation (OED) of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

2. This evaluation responds to the FAO evaluation policy and pursues the dual objectives of
accountability and learning. It provides accountability to the European Union, as the project
financial supporter. The evaluation also has a strong focus on learning, with a forward-
looking perspective in order to contribute to FAO’s continuing work around nutrition, food
security and resilience analysis.

3. The evaluation took into consideration that INFORMED has an immediate successor in the
Global Network Against Food Crisis Partnership Programme (GNAFCPP), and aimed at
identifying elements that may inform and further refine any subsequent strategies under
this new collaboration between FAO and the European Union.

4. The principal users of the evaluation are the project donor and FAO. European Union
Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) remains
a strategic donor in supporting food security and nutrition and is therefore expected to
have a high interest in the results of the evaluation. Such evaluation results are expected
to contribute the European Union strategies in preventing, mitigating and responding to
food crises. Partners in the Global network will also likely have an interest in the analysis
presented in this report.

5. The results are expected to be of interest to project managers, who can use the
independent assessment to improve their work. In addition, the strategic conclusions and
recommendations are addressed to FAO managers at the highest level.

1.2 Scope and objective of the evaluation

6. The evaluation examined the relevance and appropriateness, use, utility and sustainability
of the INFORMED project. The scope of the evaluation included the entire period of
implementation, from 2015 to 2019, and covered activities at global, regional and country
levels. The evaluation focussed on Output 1 (Data systems for long- and short-term trend
analysis of food crisis situations are improved and integrated) and Output 3 (Resilience
programming is improved through the application of a common methodology to measure
resilience, and through knowledge sharing mechanisms).

7. The evaluation does not evaluate Output 2 (The Integrated Food Security Phase
Classification (IPC) process is strengthened and applied at country level) in detail. A final
evaluation of the Global Strategic Programme (GSP) of the IPC was commissioned for the
period 2014-2018, which reported in March 2019 (FAO, 2019). It was agreed that this
evaluation would not duplicate the work of this recent evaluation, but would examine the
coherence and synergies between the IPC and other INFORMED Outputs.

1
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

8. More specifically, the evaluation examined the following key issues and questions:

i. On relevance and design:

a. How appropriate was the INFORMED programme design to the objective of
increasing resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises?
b. To what extent did the programme adapt using lessons learned during
implementation?
c. To what extent was INFORMED coherent with internal and external FSN and
Resilience analysis systems?
ii. On use and sustainability:
a. To what extent were INFORMED products used in policy and programmatic
decision-making?
b. What factors influenced the utility of INFORMED information?
c. How appropriate and effective was the strategy and approach to
institutionalization?

9. The terms of reference developed prior to the evaluation (Annex 1) provide further details.

1.3 Methodology and limitations

10. Evidence was collected using a variety of methods and tools to measure the results
achieved with the support of INFORMED and understanding the factors that might have
supported or hampered achievements. First, the team reviewed a large set of secondary
information, from published documentation to project information provided by the teams
managing INFORMED. In particular, the evaluation reviewed analysis and information
reports and guidance documents produced by each project component to substantiate the
assessment of utility. A list of references and a full bibliography follows at the end of the
report.

11. Secondly, the evaluation relied on data collected through semi-structured interviews with
a large sample of project stakeholders, including FAO staff, representatives of national
governments and regional organizations, donors, other United Nations agencies and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The evaluation was able to consult over 150
individuals from global, regional or national interests, therefore providing a solid basis for
triangulating information. Appendix 1 provides details regarding people consulted. Due to
travel restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, interviews were conducted almost
entirely by virtual means. The evaluation regularly engaged with the INFORMED
management team during the evaluation process.

12. A selection of seven country case studies, conducted virtually, provided an opportunity to
illustrate the way in which INFORMED contributed to addressing information needs of
decision makers in the field, the dynamics of these results and their sustainability. The
evaluation purposely selected country cases with the highest number and variety of
activities and deliverables, to maximize the learning potential. The country case studies
covered: Colombia, Mongolia, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, and West Bank and Gaza
Strip. Country case study reports assembled all relevant information gathered from virtual
interviews and secondary data review, and provided a grounding for the evaluation’s
assessment of field level achievements. Stakeholders from additional countries and the
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) – the Intergovernmental Authority on

2
Introduction

Development (IGAD), Permanent Interstate Committee for drought control in the Sahel
(CILSS), Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana, SICA and Southern African
Development Community (SADC) – were also consulted.

13. Two online surveys provided an additional channel to reach out to users of the INFORMED
information products to gather a critical mass of perspectives. Only one of the two surveys
received enough responses to allow using its results for the analysis. Appendix 3 presents
the survey results in full.

14. The evaluation, managed by an evaluation officer from the Office of Evaluation (OED),
benefitted from the expertise of three independent evaluation experts with solid
experience in analysing food security and nutrition information systems, resilience-support
programming and quantitative analysis. The evaluation officer and research analyst from
OED took part in the design, data collection, analysis and drafting phases, and supported
the team throughout the process with organizational aspects.

15. This evaluation started in January 2020, and with the data collection initially due to take
place in March 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic situation starting in Italy early March and
progressing throughout the globe in the following weeks and months forced the evaluation
to adopt drastic changes to initial plans. The evaluation replaced planned in-country
missions with virtual missions, and sought to diversify information sources and case studies,
as countries faced with the pandemic were also becoming less responsive to virtual
interview requests. The evaluation was successfully able to gather the necessary data using
a virtual approach.

16. These changes and the reorganization to a full virtual consultation had a significant impact
on the time required to gather the evidence desired to address all evaluation questions
appropriately. Consequently the evaluation was delayed by approximately one month.

1.4 Structure of the report

17. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 presents the background and context of the project.
Chapter 3 presents the main findings, substantiated by evidence, to address the evaluation
questions; the findings are organized by the main output areas. Lastly, Chapter 4 presents
the conclusions drawn from these findings, and recommendations proposed to relevant
FAO staff.

3
2. Background and context of the programme
2.1 Context of the programme
18. The Information for Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience Decision Making (INFORMED)
programme commenced in May 2015 (project code: GCP/INT/245/EC). The programme
was designed to contribute to “increasing the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises
and contributing to the reduction of food insecurity and malnutrition”. It was intended to
achieve this through the specific outcome of “improved availability of regular, timely and
early warning information as well as evidence-based analysis regarding the food security,
nutrition and resilience situation for decision-making”.

19. Supporting food security and nutrition information systems for improved decision-making
is a longstanding area of collaboration between the European Union and FAO. Since 2015,
strengthening resilience was defined as one of the top priorities of the European Union’s
External Action. In particular, INFORMED integrates within the European Union’s policy
commitment to contribute to building resilience of vulnerable communities by addressing
the root causes of food insecurity and more specifically with the methodology adopted by
the European Union in 2013, to guide the selection of countries to support, named PRO-
Resilience Action (“PRO-ACT”). The PROACT methodology relies on evidenced-based
needs assessments to identify the needs of a country and the severity of the crisis in terms
of number of people affected by food insecurity, and was built on the joint efforts of the
European Union and partners such as FAO an WFP. The analysis of food, nutrition and
resilience added value to the nearly EUR 8 000 million of European Commission funds
dedicated to improving food and nutrition security and sustainable agriculture (FNSSA) at
country level during the 2014-2020 period. INFORMED also contributed to the food and
nutrition security monitoring and resilience analysis-related results envisioned under FAO’s
Strategic Objectives 1 and 5.

20. The programme aimed to provide technical and analytical, as well as capacity development
support to relevant regional institutions and national government institutions involved in
food and nutrition security, and resilience analysis for policy and programming design
purposes. The programme included three output areas, which in turn each included three
workstreams, summarized in Figure 1 below.

21. INFORMED was managed and coordinated through a light Management and Coordination
Unit based at FAO Headquarters and relies on the FAO SO5 delivery mechanisms. For its
work at country and regional level, it worked through the established FAO delivery
mechanisms of Country Programming Frameworks (CPFs) and, where relevant, regional
initiatives, including the FAO subregional emergency and resilience Teams. The
implementation of INFORMED relies on multi-sector and multi-partner inputs and support,
which varies according to the area of work addressed.3

3 The IPC Global Strategic Programme works with a joint partnership, which includes NGOs (ACF International, CARE,
Oxfam, and Save the Children), United Nations agencies, (FAO, WFP and UNICEF), donor-related bodies (the
European Commission JRC and FEWSNET), regional intergovernmental (CILSS, SICA, IGAD and SADC) and the global
Food Security Cluster. United Nations agencies such as WFP, UNICEF and UNDP, and regional organizations such
as IGAD and CILSS, are key partners with regard to the resilience measurement work. The harmonization of
household survey data collection work has been supported by the existing partnership between FAO and the
World Bank.

5
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

22. The immediate beneficiaries of the project were defined as decision makers involved in
resilience-building programmes – including international, regional and national
organizations, governments and institutions, and FAO country offices – as the main users
of the information and analysis produced with the support of INFORMED. The selection of
countries supported was based on demand by country governments, relevant regional
bodies, the European Union delegation and FAO country offices, among those where
FNSSA has been selected as a focal sector for the European Union development
cooperation in the period 2014-2020.4

Figure 1: INFORMED intervention logic

IMPACT: Contribute to increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises and contribute to the
reduction of food insecurity and malnutrition.

OUTCOME: Improved availability of regular, timely and early warning information as well as
evidence-based analysis regarding the food security, nutrition and resilience situation for decision-
making.

Output 1: Data systems for long- Output 2: The Integrated Food Output 3: Resilience
and short-term trend analysis of Security Phase Classification programming is improved
food crisis situations are (IPC) process is strengthened through the application of a
improved and integrated. and applied at country level. common methodology to
measure resilience, and through
knowledge sharing mechanisms.

Area of work 1.1: Developing Area of work 2.1: Improving Area of work 3.1: Knowledge
and supporting action plans to global quality of the IPC tool sharing and lessons learning
enhance countries and regions through technical development, support the mainstreaming of
capacities in data collection and quality and compliance. resilience into programmes and
analysis through country level policies.
Community of Practices’ (CoP)
networking.

Rephrased during
implementation to drop “through
country level Community of
Practices’ (CoP) networking.”

Area of work 1.2: Improving Area of work 2.2: Enhancing Area of work 3.2: Technical and
longer term datasets (e.g. country level capacities to analytical support to Regional
household surveys) by better implement the IPC through IPC Analysis Unit and Platforms on
integrating the food security and capacity building and resilience is consolidated.
nutrition dimensions. professionalization.

4 A total of 36 expressions of interest to participate in INFORMED were received.

6
Background and context of the project

Area of work 1.3: Integrating Area of work 2.3: Supporting the Area of work 3.3: Specific
food crisis related analytical application of the IPC technical and analytical support
tools into a single global and methodology in a number of to countries is provided.
country-based food and countries so that a clear long-
nutrition security decision term food and nutrition security Rephrased during
making product to promote, analysis is available by country implementation as “Technical
inter alia, Early Warning Early and region. development of Resilience
Action linkages. Analysis Tool is conducted”

Rephrased during
implementation as “Enhancing
Early Warning Early Action
linkages by integrating food crisis
related analytical tools into a
single global and country-based
food and nutrition security
decision-making product”

Source: Adapted from the Project Document by the FAO Office of Evaluation (OED)

23. The programme budget of approximately EUR 33.5 million was supported by a voluntary
contribution from the European Union DEVCO of approximately EUR 21 million. The
remaining contributions were made of other resources partners’ funding (including the
Department for International Development (DFID) and United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) for IPC)5 and FAO regular programme resources. A
limited part of the budget was allocated to partners (e.g. CILSS, IGAD) for the
implementation of specific activities, for which detailed work plans were agreed.

24. Table 1 presents a breakdown in the use of European Union funds. The project ran for an
initial period of nearly four years (May 2015-2018), with a no cost extension until the end
of 2019.

5Through INFORMED, DEVCO provided approximately half of the IPC Global Strategic Programme (GSP) budget,
complementing contributions from DfID and USAID.

7
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

Table 1: Use of European Union funds by INFORMED project component

USD Percentage (%)

Output 1
EWEA 1 058 901 5.0
FSIN 357 867 1.7
Global Food Crisis Report 160 406 0.8
Household Surveys 738 244 3.5
Output 2
IPC 11 245 002 53.3
Output 3
Knowledge Management 520 652 2.5
(KORE)
M&E 80 649 0.4
Horn of Africa/IGAD 1 359 378 6.4
West Africa/CILSS 1 294 170 6.1
RIMA 4 293 801 20.3

Total 21 109 069 100.0

25. FAO provided regular reports to the European Union on INFORMED through interim
progress reports (2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018) with a final report including progress in 2019,
still to be submitted. A mid-term review of INFORMED was published in 2017,6 which
examined both INFORMED and FIRST,7 initially designed to complement one another. A
results-oriented monitoring (ROM) report was produced by the European Union in 2018.

26. INFORMED has been succeeded by a new partnership programme supported by the
European Union: the Global Network Against Food Crises Partnership Programme, which
built on the foundations put in place through INFORMED. Partners in the Global Network
are committed to working together and achieving results in three key areas:
i) understanding food crises by generating evidence-based food insecurity, resilience and
risk analyses to increase the understanding of food crises, including knowledge
management and communication monitoring, evaluation and learning; ii) strategic
investments by leveraging evidence-based, coherent and integrated strategic
programming with country level impact; and iii) going beyond food by seeking synergies
and coordination.

27. In 2019 the two programmes ran in parallel, with a transition of activities from INFORMED
to GNAFCPP. While GNAFCCPP is not specifically part of the scope of this evaluation, the
evaluation necessarily took this new programme into account in its analysis, and in making
forward looking recommendations.

6 In addition to INFORMED, the scope of this review included the Food and Nutrition Security Impact, Resilience,
Sustainability and Transformation (FIRST) Programme which was a joint initiative between the European Union
and FAO, to provide on-demand policy support to selected FAO and European Union priority country
governments and regional bodies.
7 A final evaluation of the FIRST was produced in 2020 by OED.

8
3. Findings
3.1 Analysis of food crisis situations

3.1.1 Strategy and activities

28. Under programme Output 1 (Data systems for long- and short-term trend analysis of food
crisis situations are improved and integrated) three areas of work were initially identified,
namely: i) analysis-based advocacy for more investment by countries and other
stakeholders in primary data collection and related analyses; ii) the integration of analytical
tools into a single decision-making oriented product to promote in particular early warning
for early action covering all levels (country, regional and global), specifically strengthening
linkages between the Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and
Agriculture (GIEWS)/IPC/ Emergency Prevention System (EMPRES) outputs and corporate
programme; iii) harmonization of data collection through household surveys and make
them more food security and resilience oriented so as to feed, inter alia, IPC and resilience
analysis.

29. The majority of activities for this Output fell under the banner of Early Warning Early Action
(EWEA). Figure 2 below outlines the strategic approach originally foreseen in implementing
this initiative; including the production of a consolidated risk overview, identification of
triggers for action, identification of early action activities and an internal FAO funding
mechanism.

9
Figure 2: Initial conceptualization of FAO EWEA system

Step 1 Step 5
Consolidate existing Development of an informal
EW products, eg: Step 3 Step 4 EA funding mechanism
Step 2
Overlay Development Identification
information on of indicative of appropriate
GIEWS
vulnerability, triggers for EA activities Re-
IPC EW monitoring allocation
resilience and
ongoing CRR of existing
EMPRES initiatives SFERA funds Ex. EA
EA funding
Window sources

Product 1 Monitoring of indicators

Ad-hoc Early
Consolidated risk overviews
product with risk
and triggers
Warning Alerts Early
monitoring with EA actions
recommendations

Sent to Validated by RO and CO

Sent to Activates

If relevant forwarded to
SO5 SO5 Senior
Core Core management
team team (forum tbd)

SO5 team SO5 team

reviews product 3 reviews EW alert
and
recommended
EA activities

If relevant forward to

Source: FAO. 2015. Project Charter FAO Early Warning – Early Action System Establishment. Rome.

10
30. From 2016 INFORMED developed a global quarterly Early Warning Early Action report
(QEWEAR) on food security and agriculture. This report focussed on creating coherence
amongst the different early warning systems (EWS) operated by FAO, through a common
risk prioritization method. The FAO report then contributed to the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee (IASC) reference group on risk, early warning and preparedness monthly (calls)
and biannual report to the emergency directors group.

31. Work at country level was triggered by the 2015/16 El Niño event. Working with the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), FAO developed the
IASC Inter-Agency Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Early Action to El Niño/La
Niña Episodes. FAO’s Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA) fund
was then established in mid-2016 as a result of a lessons learned exercise following the El
Niño work with the countries where the need for rapid flexible financing for
early/anticipatory action was identified. Subsequently the EWEA team also supported a
number of countries on an ad hoc basis to respond to demands for developing proposals
to access SFERA Early Action window. 8

32. The increasing demand from FAO country offices prompted the development of a more
systematic approach to EWEA. A concept note resulted in FAO’s EWEA pilot programme,
where support was given to FAO country offices in setting up risk analysis and early action
trigger mechanisms; triggers are monitored and once the threshold is met, early action is
activated (FAO, 2015).The main focus of the pilots for EWEA were on drought with pilots in
Kenya, Madagascar, the Philippines and Sudan.

Through this piloting phase a FAO EWEA Country Toolkit was developed and is now available
on the Handbook on Emergency Preparedness and Response Webpage (see Box 1). This
Toolkit has been further tested, including the methodologies and tools, prior to scaling up.

8 For example, in Mongolia EWEA staff from FAO headquarters were deployed to support the analysis and
submission to the SFERA early action window for an extreme cold temperature event (dzud). In Mongolia, the
hydro-meteorological agency provided impact-based forecasts that identify the geographical area of impact of
the dzud. This coupled with further vulnerability analysis enabled planning and submission for early action funds
from SFERA.

11
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

Box 1: Early Warning Early Action (EWEA) Country Toolkit

i. Step one involves elements such as identifying the geographical scope, identifying hazards, likelihood
and impact assessments as well as undertaking disaster risk ranking. This step also involves a
vulnerability analysis to identify the most vulnerable and their needs.

ii. Step two involves the identification of triggers (e.g. livestock body condition or hydrological data) and
agreed upon thresholds (e.g. < 60 percent of cumulative seasonal rainfall) that would trigger early
actions.

iii. Step three involves the identification of early actions, including targeting, timing of interventions due to
the relatively small window of appropriateness of different early actions. This also provides guidance on a
repository of early actions available on FAO’s intranet.

iv. Step four involves the development of an EWEA plan that captures steps one-three in a document that
enables monitoring to take place based on the triggers and thresholds set and the recommended
adjustments to the plan on an annual basis.

v. Step five of the process is supported through guidance on how the SFERA early action window can be
applied for.

vi. Step six involves the implementation of the early actions.

33. Efforts to determine the impact of EWEA at country level were made through impact studies
that included return on investment (ROI) analyses. Five impact studies were produced from
Colombia, the Horn of Africa, Madagascar, Mongolia, the Philippines and Sudan. The
impact studies enabled a better understanding of the effectiveness of early actions,
collected beneficiary perceptions and calculated a cost benefit ratio. These studies
supported both lesson learning and provided evidence for the effectiveness of the EWEA
approach. Guidance for the impact studies methodology was also produced.

34. From 2018 there was greater emphasis on external partnerships, including with
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), World Food
Programme (WFP), OCHA, the START Network and the World Bank, and participation in the
Inter-Agency Early Action Task Force (EATF). This included space for discussion of joint
programming and joint analyses.

35. There was limited implementation under the first of these areas of work in support of the
Food Security Information Network (FSIN). Under the third area of work INFORMED has
supported the development of an improved survey module for collecting data on food
consumption away from home that is being incorporated into country surveys supported
by the World Bank.

36. Output 1 was also adapted over time to include support to the development and
production of a Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC). Starting in 2017, four annual editions
of the report have been produced under the auspices of FSIN. The GRFC brings together
food insecurity and nutrition information and analyses by different regional and global
technical agencies, including FAO, WFP, IPC, Famine Early Warning Systems Network
(FEWSNET), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), CILSS, IGAD and SICA). The report

12
Findings

consolidates estimates of food insecure populations in emergencies, in selected highly

food insecure countries. The objective of the GRFC is to provide evidence for decision
makers, principally to support resource allocation decisions.

3.1.2 Relevance
Finding 1. The increasing focus on EWEA within INFORMED was highly relevant given persistent
gaps between early warning and timely action, and the mandate of FAO.
37. The literature and stakeholder interviews confirmed the continuing struggle of early
warning systems to link analyses to decision-making and action to protect livelihoods.
There is strong evidence that early warning systems all too often fail to result in action prior
to a crisis. As noted by Maxwell and Hailey (2020) “Despite early warning and humanitarian
diagnostics information being more available than ever in history, confusion persists as to
what it means and what to do with it”.

38. This challenge is not new and has featured in the literature for many years, indicating that
the solutions are not straightforward.9 As one stakeholder commented, “It is not so
different from early discussion of drought cycle management in 1980s and 1990s”.
However, the EWEA strategic approach (see Figure 2) was understood to appropriately
draw on key learnings from previous EWEA initiatives. Critically it goes beyond improved
risk analysis for decision makers, with attention to improving access to appropriate
financing instruments and the definition of pre-agreed plans and pre-identified
anticipatory actions.

39. While the design is holistic, the FAO approach remained limited by the realities of its
resource constraints and an appreciation of its own comparative advantages.
Consequently, the EWEA initiative includes an appropriate mix of direct programme
activities and strong inter-agency partnerships to address complementary areas of action
better addressed by other specialized agencies.10

Finding 2. The EWEA initiative is consistent with a range of global commitments, but the design
did not elaborate the specific contribution of INFORMED to these frameworks.
40. There have been a large number of international commitments over recent years with the
broadly related objective of improving risk management. The INFORMED programme
documents clearly demonstrated an awareness of these processes and situated EWEA as a
contribution to these goals and processes. The EWEA strategy contributes to a number of
international agreements and frameworks, including the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction commitments to strengthen early warning systems, Paris Agreement
commitments to reduce the risks of extreme events, and pledges to address disaster risk
reduction as a cross-cutting necessity to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs). More explicitly, FAO efforts on EWEA are aligned to commitments it made at the
World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) 2016 to enhance delivery of early warnings related to
agriculture, food security and nutrition to inform the design of shock-responsive social
protection systems.

41. More substantive linkages to these diverse frameworks have only started to emerge during
implementation. The argument was raised that these linkages are best developed when the

9 See for example World Disasters Report, Focus on Early Warning Early Action, 2009, IFRC, Geneva.
10 Specific examples are developed in the following text.

13
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

activities and scope of the initiative has had time to mature. For example, strengthening
and use of food security early warning to inform the design of shock-responsive social
protection systems is still very much underdevelopment by FAO in line with its’ WHS
commitments. Engagement with FAO’s climate and climate change resilience team has led
to the inclusion of EWEA efforts in the report to the United Nation Conference of Parties
(COP) in 2019 – but there is little evidence of linkages to field applications. FAO
commitments on mitigating instability and conflict are not yet well developed under EWEA;
nor is it clear how EWEA builds on the risk analyses pioneered under disaster risk reduction
commitments. However, this finding needs to be contextualized against the resources
available to the EWEA work and the limited practical application of some of the frameworks
at country level.

Finding 3. FAO has a comparative advantage in addressing slow onset crises and food chain crises.
42. FAO EWEA efforts have been aligned with addressing the needs of people affected by
natural hazards, particularly slow onset, climate related disasters such as droughts. The El
Niño episode of 2015/16 provided an initial entry point for EWEA and resulted in
development of the IASC SOP for the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO). FAO is also
acknowledged as a leader in early warning of pests and diseases and this is reflected in the
inclusion of support to the development and improvement of the Food Chain Crisis
Management Framework (FCC) Early Warning Bulletin as part of INFORMED. Although
more could be done to combine the analysis of FCC with other factors, these foci are
already judged as highly relevant when compared to the importance of losses caused by
these shocks and the expertise of FAO in early warning of these shocks and the
corresponding livelihood responses.

43. Analysis undertaken by FAO suggested that floods have the greatest impact on the crop
subsector while drought causes the greatest damage and loss in the livestock subsector.
However, other agencies provide a strong complementary focus on EWEA in relation to
rapid onset hazards. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
one of the main stakeholders in EWEA, is currently working in 31 countries. There is a
potential good complementarity between the IFRC and FAO, the former with a focus on
sudden onset, cold waves, heat waves, floods and cyclones. In Mongolia, for instance, the
two agencies coordinated their efforts to avoid duplication in undertaking Early Actions in
response to Dzud, through the livelihoods cluster in Mongolia, and learning webinars, in
which both participated.

44. Informants were clear on the current limitations of FAO in responding to rapid onset crises,
due to the inherent limitations of corporate systems. This would require significant
organizational changes, including more rapid decision-making protocols, new standard
operating procedures and faster procurement processes.

Finding 4. The role of conflict as a driver of food insecurity was appropriately considered, while
conflict early warning per se was left to other agencies with the appropriate mandate and skills.
45. Conflict is acknowledged as a key driver of food insecurity and consequently there is an
active debate on how it should be factored into the EWEA strategic approach. Conflict
prediction is inherently complex and difficult, with high political sensitivities. Furthermore,
conflict early warning is a specialist area where FAO lacks both mandate and skills. Most
stakeholders consulted made no suggestion that FAO itself should attempt to provide

14
Findings

conflict early warning, or develop its role beyond the work already performed by the team
in SP5 working on conflict analysis.

46. However, an important challenge is to predict future food insecurity resulting from already
observed conflict. There were suggestions that FAO could more systematically consider
and incorporate the consequences of conflict into food security scenario analysis (Maxwell
and Hailey, 2020). However, overall there was little evidence that FAO’s context and conflict
analysis had been used to inform the design of early actions. One example of the
integration of conflict in EWEA occurred in the Philippines. During an early warning
intervention in support of rice farmers suffering from drought, in an area prone to
outbreaks of conflict, farmers were displaced from increased skirmishes. Activities were
adapted to supported farmers with alternative livelihoods such as duck rearing, cash and
household gardens as an alternative to a planned rice seed intervention.

47. More consideration could be given to less politically sensitive, small-scale conflicts, driven
by resource constraints generated as a result of climate-related variations. For example,
inter-communal conflict associated with scarcity of water and pasture which invariably are
relatively easier to predict - given knowledge of migration patterns - and have less political
fallout. FAO’s experience in undertaking early action in Somalia may form a good example
of how this could be done in other contexts. FAO also has various experiences of supporting
technical work, related for instance to pest control, watershed management or use of
natural resources, in recognition of their potential for preventing conflict. Such work has a
significant forward-looking dimension which could have some use in framing Early Action.

Finding 5. Improving the quality and availability of food and nutrition statistics remains a high
priority for many stakeholders, but this was not a primary goal of INFORMED.
48. Stakeholders expressed a strong and consistent demand for more regular, timely, reliable
and accessible basic food and nutrition statistics. In many countries a lack of up-to-date
and quality data was reported as a major constraint. This issue was clearly addressed in the
INFORMED design in the first work area of “analysis-based advocacy for more investment
by countries and other stakeholders in primary data collection and related analyses”. The
relevance of this activity was reiterated by the INFORMED 2017 mid-term review, which
noted that of the 65 countries included in the 2017 Global Report on Food Crises, there
was no data or other evidence available to estimate food insecure populations in fourteen
countries (FAO, 2017).

49. Data is clearly a fundamental enabler for the analyses carried out by both EWEA and
resilience index measurement and analysis (RIMA). Many stakeholders also highlighted the
value of direct access to the basic datasets - not just the analytical products produced by
FAO – to support their own analyses to inform a range of policy and programming
decisions. However, this activity was not prioritized during implementation and the reasons
for this decision were not entirely clear to the evaluators.11 Possibly a decision was made
to concentrate on the more attainable programme outputs. Several stakeholders noted
that (under Output 1) the concentration had been on the more efficient analysis of existing
data, rather than supporting the generation of quality data or promoting open access.

11 The GRFC pays attention to identifying data gaps and making related policy recommendations.

15
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

3.1.3 Use of EWEA products

50. A summary of the main EWEA reports produced over the programme period is presented
in Table 2 below. The feedback received on the use of these various products is summarized
in this section.
Table 2: EWEA Outputs

Year Number of Number of Country level Number of SFERA

quarterly EWEA improved FCC EWEA plans EA window
reports reports activations
2015 4 2 5
2016 3 4 3 1
2017 4 4 4 4
2018 4 4 2 5
2019 4 4 10 9
Total 19 18 24 19

Source: INFORMED Monitoring Reports 2015-2019 and EWEA team data

Finding 6. The awareness and use of the Global Report on Food Crises and quarterly EWEA report
were particularly high.
51. Overall, awareness amongst survey respondents of FAO EWEA products varied with the
quarterly EWEA report and the EWEA country plans most commonly known. This awareness
was particularly strong at global level, amongst respondents who worked outside of FAO.
The patterns of awareness were mirrored by the use of information for decision-making
(see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Awareness and use of EWEA Products (weighted average out of 10)

IASC El Nino Oscillation SOP

IASC EWEA and Readiness Report

Return on Investment Plans

Webinars on EWEA

Good Practice factsheets

EWEA Country Plans

Quarterly EWEA Report on FS and Early Action

Global Report on Food Crisis

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Use Familiarity

Source: From OED survey results (see Appendix 3)

52. An EWEA Communications Strategy was developed in 2017 to increase visibility and
advocacy whilst bolstering evaluation frameworks. Furthermore communication plans were
developed and implemented in Mongolia and Sudan, including the development of videos

16
Findings

and human interest. The plans were well developed and highlighted specific target
audiences for outputs, including the general public, donors and other stakeholders (FAO,
2017 and 2018).

Finding 7. The quarterly EWEA report is valued primarily as a coordination and advocacy tool.
53. The original programme design brought together disparate FAO early warning systems
into a common, consolidated analytical product, namely the quarterly EWEA report. As a
global product the report consolidated and prioritized threats across countries and
different shocks. The report added value through greater analysis of the impact on people
and livelihoods, with recommendations on actions to mitigate against forecast hazards. 12
There was specific appreciation for the leadership provided in specialist areas of addressing
pest and diseases, such as the current locust infestation and the previous armyworm
attacks. The major value added of the EWEA report lies in its combining information sources
(e.g. EMPRES and others) that allowed determining the impact of e.g. the locusts on
peoples livelihoods, or assessing risks, and forming an early response on that basis.

54. The evaluation survey found that the majority of respondents thought the quarterly report
was of good quality and added significant value when compared to alternative products.
Stakeholders indicated a high confidence in the data generated (83 percent) and the
usability of the information products for decision-making (83 percent). The reports were
judged by stakeholders to be concise and well presented.

55. Interviews and the online survey found that overall the quarterly report was an important
advocacy tool. Examples of advocacy for EWEA include presentations of the report at the
periodic Working Party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA) meetings of the
European Union Member States, where participants credited the report with influencing
overall donor support to EWEA initiatives. Inclusion of crises in the quarterly EWEA report
supported local advocacy and fundraising. Smaller donors stated that the report
encouraged investments in EWEA at an unearmarked level through FAO and other
channels.

56. The quarterly EWEA report also served as an important coordination tool. The quarterly
EWEA report provided a consolidated statement by FAO on emerging risks, which in turn
fed into broader coordination platforms. For example, at a global level the quarterly report
is used to feed into the biannual EWEA report of the IASC Reference Group on Early
Warning and Preparedness to the IASC Emergency Directors Group meeting. In West Africa
the quarterly EWEA report was regularly presented and discussed at the Regional
Emergency Preparedness and Response Working Group (set-up to mirror the IASC group).
Alongside other information sources, this was used to identify priority countries for
monitoring or action.

12 See for example 2018 EWEA User Survey.

17
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

Finding 8. The process of compiling the EWEA report, rather than the report itself, was most helpful
in prompting action.
57. There was mixed feedback on the use of the quarterly report for programming decisions.
Internally it is used by FAO as an input to allocations from the SFERA window. Several
respondents noted that the schedule of publication did not allow a sufficient lead time to
mobilize a response. However, the process of compiling the report, with an ongoing
dialogue between headquarters and field, was important in triggering action rather than
necessarily the final report.

58. Externally there was less evidence that the report was used to inform specific programming
decisions. Several stakeholders remarked that detailed decision-making was primarily
driven by national or local information and analyses. Some recipients (such as smaller
donors) lacked the technical expertise or absorptive capacity to make specific use of the
reports. Other actors – including the World Bank - remained unsure of how to respond
within the limitations of their developmental tools.

59. Consideration is already being given to moving from a printed quarterly report to an online
version. This would address concerns raised on the timeliness of the report, especially for
users at field level. Ultimately the desire would be to move towards a dynamic version of
the report.

Finding 9. The EWEA Country Toolkit has helped to guide the development of country EWEA plans,
but the effectiveness of these plans in triggering early action is so far largely untested.
60. The EWEA Country Toolkit has been applied in multiple locations. Examples included:
Ethiopia (who are currently developing a FAO EWEA plan), Timor-Leste (to support the
development of the drought disaster risk management plan for the government), Fiji (to
set-up a drought EWEA system with the government), Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (as the base of training to the national government to support the development of
EWEA plans for both floods and drought). The Toolkit has been used more recently in Viet
Nam where the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) has
funded the first phase of development of an EWEA plan for two drought prone regions in
the country. In Central America, in 2020 FAO Subregional Office for Mesoamerica (SLM)
adapted the global guide into a practical guide with a specific focus on the Dry Corridor (El
Niño phenomenon affecting Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador) to support
the development of early warning plans.

61. Lessons from the Sudan pilot suggested that factors facilitating the use of the Toolkit
included a functional early warning system (ideally with FAO participation), and good
relationships with Government and other agencies such as WFP.

62. It was still early to assess the effectiveness of the country plans themselves as many are yet
to be activated. A desk review of several of the EWEA plans found that the indicators and
triggers were well developed in the text, but there was little detail on the early actions,
timelines for action and the implementation partners.13 In the case of Sudan it was reported
that the plan had helped to raise money early, but it was questioned whether it led to a
different, anticipatory response.

13 Kenya and the Philippines.

18
Findings

Finding 10. Learnings from EWEA pilots have supported advocacy efforts. There is strong demand
for greater knowledge to support the design and delivery of programmes.
63. The focus of learning activities has been largely on producing evidence for advocacy, to
generate agreement and buy-in from donors, set global targets and ultimately to
encourage further investment in EWEA. The EWEA impact studies that incorporated return
on investment (see box 2) have been highly valued internally and externally. FAO was
credited with presenting clear evidence at a time when few others – notably IFRC and the
START network - were providing this analysis and evidence on the cost efficiency of the
EWEA approach.14

Box 2: EWEA impact studies

An impact study methodology is described in draft guidelines as part of the EWEA Country Toolkit.
These describe four analyses required to assess the impact of EWEA, namely: i) return on investment: a
comparison of project costs and project direct benefits; ii) avoided cost of emergency response: an
estimation of the impact of early actions on reducing or avoiding the cost of standard emergency
response iii) food security and nutrition benefits: an assessment of the impact of early actions on the
food security and nutrition situation of beneficiaries; iv) beneficiaries’ perceptions: an analysis of the
qualitative data collected in interviews and discussions with beneficiaries and key informants.

EWEA Country Toolkit – Analysing the Impact of Early Actions

64. While this has been extremely helpful in making the general case for EWEA, as noted in a
recent study “greater attention now needs to be paid to producing evidence in a way that
can lead to improvement in the design and delivery of EWEA programmes” (WFP, 2020). A
number of unmet needs emerged in evaluation interviews, including:

i. Stronger crisis timelines – understanding the trajectory of events and defining

windows for different types of response including cash transfers and shock
responsive social protection.

ii. A better understanding of avoided losses through protected lives and livelihoods,
and faster recovery, and avoided or mitigated physical and psychological suffering.

iii. Role of early action in preventing and mitigating conflict and social tensions.

iv. Impact of early action on longer term resilience building.

v. System accountability, including the accuracy of forecasts and the effectiveness in

triggering action.

65. The FAO Evaluation of Transitions noted that “Country programmes reviewed are rich in
relevant interventions that can potentially produce benefits to affected populations.
However, impact on livelihoods of individual FAO activities is seldom verified, due to
inadequacy of monitoring mechanisms, always focused on timely delivery of outputs,

14Five Impact studies were produced from the Horn of Africa, Madagascar, Sudan, Mongolia and Columbia. The
return on impact studies enabled a better understanding of what actions worked, collected beneficiary perceptions
and calculated a cost benefit ratio. These studies supported both lesson learning and provided evidence for the
effectiveness of the EWEA approach. Guidance for the impact studies methodology was also produced (FAO, EWEA
Country Toolkit – Analysing the Impact of Early Actions – undated).

19
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

neglecting outcomes or broader impact on livelihoods” (FAO, 2014). Similar findings come
from country evaluations referencing the need to rebalance the compliance focus of FAO
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) with equal attention given to outcomes and impact and
to ensure that the M&E system feeds into learning as well as fulfilling accountability
requirements (FAO, 2013).

Finding 11. The Global Report on Food Crisis is widely viewed as an important and valuable
additional source of information and used for advocacy and prioritization.
66. INFORMED has supported the development and publication of a new global food security
report – the Global Report on Food Crises. Four editions have been produced starting in
2017. The 2017 report provided estimates of acutely food insecure populations in a total
of 48 countries – with the number of countries covered increasing to 59 countries in 2019.
More recently the regional chapters have been spun-off into separate regional reports –
for example, a GRFC for the Horn of Africa was published in 2019. Stakeholders identified
two main additionalities of the GRFC report over pre-existing products. First, it focuses on
the specific issue of emergency-driven, acute food insecurity.15 Second, it draws
information from multiple countries into a single reference document.

67. A major use of the publication was keeping acute food insecurity high on the global
agenda. The publication of the report was accompanied by several high-profile launch
events which brought senior and high-level stakeholders together, and generated
considerable attention amongst donors, governments and media. Second, the report
assisted in the prioritization and allocation of resources both by donors (where it
amalgamated the analysis of acute food insecurity in one place) and for regional economic
organizations such as IGAD (who welcomed the regional GRFC for this purpose). Third, the
report is seen by some to have the potential – albeit not yet realized - to monitor progress
in addressing acute food insecurity by examining trends over time. However, inter-annual
comparability was viewed as problematic due to changes in coverage each year.

Finding 12. There are divided opinions on the added value of deepening the GRFC analysis.
68. Several technical actors reported concerns about the uneven quality of the country level
analyses. Stakeholders felt that the quality of analysis by country was highly variable and
the GRFC risked according an undeserved level of credibility across all countries. As one
stakeholder commented “In practice quality control has to happen at the country level and
cannot be “second-guessed'” later”. However, even where the actual figures in the GRFC
were disputed, the report was still perceived as useful in sparking a debate on the correct
figures.

69. Some stakeholders advocated for the report to become more analytical. For example,
including an analysis of the emergency responses that had followed the publication of the
(IPC) situational analysis. However, opinion was heavily divided on this point and others felt
that this was repetitive of existing reports, such as the country appeal documents and
cluster reporting. Other stakeholders called for real time updates on the situation in a
rolling “real time” report. There are inevitable delays with an annual report and decision
makers asked for more timely information, even at the risk of it being less robust.

15The FAO State of Food Insecurity (SOFI) report already provides a well-established annual estimate of chronic
food insecurity.

20
Findings

3.1.4 Factors influencing effectiveness

Finding 13. The utility of EWEA is constrained by the capacity of early warning systems to provide
predictive forecasts.
70. The EWEA process depends heavily on existing FAO early warning systems and products
including IPC, GIEWS, FCC-EMPRES to provide an overall forecast analysis coupled with
recommended early actions. Constraints were evident in the predictive capacity of these
systems.

71. The evaluation found a strong consensus on the limitations of IPC as an early warning tool.
The IPC Acute Food Insecurity (AFI) scale was primarily designed to analyse the current
food security situation and provides a gold standard for emergency response decisions.

72. The most relevant IPC product in the context of EWEA are the IPC projections. However,
the quality and reliability of the IPC projections are widely questioned. Guidance to develop
the projections was reported as lacking standardization with the analyses themselves
reportedly produced as an after-thought to the AFI. In many contexts, IPC data is collected
infrequently, i.e. sometimes once a year making it less useful for making forecasts. More
fundamentally there are questions over the extent to which forecasts are straight-line
projections of the current situation rather than scenario-based analyses drawing on early
warning signals. There has been no systematic attempt to retrospectively assess the
accuracy of these forecasts.

73. This issue was repeatedly raised by the IPC evaluation, which noted that “What is apparent
is that the AFI is not currently fulfilling an early warning function well compared with its
ability to capture the current status of food insecurity. Very few stakeholders (from donors,
NGOs, UN agencies or governments) mentioned the early warning role of the IPC as a
particular strength or value added”. The report went on the recommend that “The GSP
should commission research to assess … whether the analytical method used for the AFI is
appropriate for EW, whether it requires adaptation, and ultimately whether the AFI can fulfil
both roles of classifying the current status and providing early warning through projections.
(FAO, 2019) There is a general agreement that, at best, IPC projections should be situated
as one part of a wider set of early warning tools alongside risk monitoring and probabilistic
scenarios (Maxwell and Hailey, 2020). While the IPC GSP is addressing the previous
evaluation findings, stakeholders were yet to observe tangible improvements.

74. The EWEA quarterly report also draws on GIEWS work including the i) Agricultural Stress
Index System (ASIS); ii) Price Analysis module to highlight price anomalies; iii) Crop and
Food Supply Assessment Missions (CFSAMs); and iv) GIEWS global analysis of food balance
sheets that provides an overall analysis of countries‘ food self-sufficiency.

75. When available, the CFSAMs are used as part of EWEA analysis as they were for example in
the Mongolia analysis (FAO, 2018). However, they are only conducted in a handful of
countries per year and only provide a snapshot of the situation rather than forecasting. The
ASIS, which monitors drought using remote sensing, was found to be most useful in
countries where it has been tailored and calibrated according to the context – but so far
this is limited, for example, Kenya (FAO, 2016) and Sudan (FAO, 2017).

76. Some stakeholders identified the frequency and timeliness of GIEWS reporting as
challenges to its utility for EWEA. As a regular programme there has been no requirement

21
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

to evaluate the use and utility of GIEWS products nor were there any recent user surveys
the evaluation could draw on.

77. The EWEA report drew on the FCC-EMPRES results to integrate the potential impact of
animal disease on the food chain and the projected number of food insecure respectively.
There was considerable appreciation for FAO’s unique contribution in this specific area.
INFORMED supported the early warning bulletin of the FCC, which is potentially predictive
of future food insecurity, as mediated through pest and disease outbreaks but currently
lacks a methodology to quantify food security impacts of such threats.

78. At the country level, FAO early warning information is combined with other national
sources, e.g. hydro-meteorological data. However, hydro-meteorological agencies do not
generally have the mandate or expertise to do impact-based forecasting and countries
such as those in the Sahel have very low capacity. Several stakeholders also noted that
national early warning capacities had degraded – for example SADC noted that the
operational capacities of national early warning systems in southern Africa had diminished
over the last decade. Historically FAO has been a key supporter of national EWS, but a drop
off in support was noted in recent years.

Finding 14. Defining thresholds and triggers for early action is critical, but complex and agency-
specific.
79. There is a long running debate on the use of trigger mechanisms to translate early warning
signals into clear decision points for early action. Determining thresholds justifying a
preventative response based on the probability of a crisis has been a key constraint to
timely action. Consequently, there have been attempts by several agencies to identify clear
thresholds that automate the release of funds and predictive mechanisms.

80. At a strategic level FAO also used a mixed method approach, contextualized to the local
situation. FAO’s trigger mechanism combines ‘hard’ thresholds (e.g. climate forecasts, food
security forecasts, remote sensing data) with qualitative information and expert judgement.
All the evidence suggests that this is a pragmatic and sensible strategic approach and
aligned to best practice. There is a need for more experience of using the FAO EWEA
country defined triggers in practice and they largely remain to be tested.

Stakeholders pointed to the complexity and challenges of operating an effective trigger

mechanism and this remains an important area of learning. It is apparent that a multitude
of triggers may be needed, tailored to the needs and mandate of specific organizations and
to the specific actions. The need for sequential triggers, with different agencies focusing on
different types of responses, was also identified by the evaluation (see Box 3).

22
Findings

Box 3: Anticipatory action in Somalia

The case of Somalia illustrates the complexity and layering of agencies and mechanism that may
contribute to early or anticipatory action.

Examples included:

i. community-based responses including the use of community savings groups;

ii. agency level emergency response funds controlled by NGOs, NGO consortia and United
Nations agencies;

iii. crisis modifiers which enable implementing agencies to redirect resources towards early
action;

iv. additional response funds of donors (e.g. DfID Internal Risk Facility, IRF) or inter-agency
response funds (e.g. Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), World Bank Famine Action
Mechanism (FAM)).

Each of these sources have their own characteristics in terms of timeliness, the volume of funds available
and the types of activities that can be supported. Consequently, a nuanced set of triggers is needed
and no one single trigger will be appropriate. Several NGOs reported developing triggers
contextualized to the local situation and argued that this level of specificity is required for a meaningful
link to livelihood specific interventions.

81. Practical experience from longer established efforts also pointed to unresolved challenges.
For example, the FAO managed Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) IPC
project in Somalia has developed a “dashboard” with DfID support. The dashboard
complements the seasonal IPC assessments with near real time data on a wide range of
indicators. While users appreciated the additionality of the tool, they reported continuing
difficulties in how to apply it as it lacks clear thresholds for action. At best it is designed to
trigger a discussion and further assessment (see Box 4).

Box 4: Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) dashboard

FSNAU developed the “dashboard” as an attempt to corral forward-looking indicators into a single data
“signal” that would indicate a worsening situation. Lessons learned from the 2011 famine suggest that
a tool is needed to provide a more regular snapshot of the situation and that would be connected to
triggers for decision-making and easier to understand by decision-making bodies such as the United
Nations Humanitarian Country Team.

The dashboard presents real time updates of a range of food security and related indicators, including
WASH and protection. These are consolidated with an interactive dashboard enabling users to explore
and visualize the data.

It is designed to be discussed within existing inter-agency coordination mechanisms, with the objective
of triggering further assessment where the situation is deteriorating. This process has yet to be
institutionalized.

Feinstein International Center and Centre for Humanitarian Change. 2018. Constraints and Complexities
of Information and Analysis in Humanitarian Emergencies Evidence from Somalia

23
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

Finding 15. EWEA products do not so far analyse the needs of – or suggest tailored actions for -
vulnerable groups including women.
82. In general, vulnerable people and those in marginal groups may face an increased risk of
death, injury, abuse and deprivation in crises due to pre-existing and crisis-related barriers,
discrimination and stigmatization. Consequently, an inclusive approach to EWEA requires
that the most vulnerable people in affected communities are included in the design,
implementation, monitoring and funding decisions of programming in anticipation of a
crisis. However, the FAO EWEA analysis and products were generally acknowledged to
integrate gender. Underlying this is the fact that the early warning products also lack a
disaggregated analysis of impacts by gender. For example, the IPC analyses occurred at
household level and does not report on gendered food insecurity.

83. The EWEA team have acknowledged this gap and have engaged with the FAO gender team
in drafting an “Inclusive Approach to Anticipatory Action”, in order to make anticipatory
action more inclusive and to address commitments such as “leaving no one behind”. This
is in the early stages of development, but shows promise.

84. Many of the early actions undertaken by FAO target women and other vulnerable groups
as beneficiaries. However, this appeared to reflect standard FAO guidelines rather than
being attributed specifically to the EWEA initiative. For example, targeting female-headed
households and those with disabled, elderly or pregnant members in Madagascar; equal
inclusion of men and women in a drinking water project in La Guajira; and improving access
to milk from livestock for children and women in Somalia.

Finding 16. Internal financing sources have been essential in enabling FAO to pilot early actions.
85. In concert with the establishment of the EWEA initiative under INFORMED, FAO established
a new USD 3 million funding early action window within SFERA. This includes both an
“Organizational preparedness window” and financing of anticipatory actions that prevent
or mitigate the impact of an anticipated event on the food security of vulnerable people.
Allocations from the USD 3 million are capped at maximum USD 400 000.

86. The SFERA early action window was activated 18 times between 2017-2019 (see Annex E
for the list of countries that accessed the SFERA window). Technical support from the EWEA
was reported as very important and effective in assisting countries to realize funds from
both tracks. Informants suggested that all proposals to the early action window of SFERA
have been accepted and this was predominantly due to the fact that proposals are formed
through the support of the EWEA team at headquarters level engaging, and in some cases
undertaking field level support to country offices.

24
Findings

Figure 4: Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA) allocations for
early action

Number and value of allocations made through the Early

Action Window of the SFERA (2017-2019)
10 3.5
3
Number of Allocations

8
2.5

Millions USD
6 2

4 1.5
1
2
0.5
0 0
2017 2018 2019

Number of Allocations Total Amount Allocated

Source: Data provided by EWEA team

87. The ability to access such funds was seen as essential in allowing FAO to operationalize
early actions. Examples of eligible actions include support to: livestock (de- and restocking,
disease control, water supply, nutrition and shelter ahead of drought, for example); crop
production (forecast-based climate advice, adapted agronomic practices, early water
resource management, input supply, plant protection, crop storage); fisheries and forestry
(supply of fishing gear, fire risk management); and rural income and employment (safety
nets; alternative livelihoods).16

Finding 17. There is a lack of clarity between early action as “rapid response” and as “forecast-
based anticipatory action”.
88. Different characterizations were used by stakeholders in defining what constitutes an “early
action”. Most EWEA practitioners shared a common vision of the importance of
“anticipation”. At the heart of the concept is generally a core idea of utilizing weather and
other forecasts to trigger funding for concrete, pre-determined actions prior to a shock or
before a shock translates into acute impacts. However, for some stakeholders “The
response mindset of the sector makes in inevitable that early action will sometimes be
understood or framed more like preparedness or early response.” (FAO, 2019).

89. There is a critical period between preparedness and response, when early actions can be
taken. Different partners interpret it differently to range from preparedness actions,
assessment, deployment of staff, to actions to mitigate the potential impact of a hazard on
lives and livelihoods (WFP, 2020). With a number of global initiatives gaining momentum
there is “a pressing need to formalize the structure to ensure coherence and collaboration
in advancing anticipatory efforts” (Early Action Focus Task Force). Confused messages on
this may result in a loss of credibility with donors who have the expectation that livelihoods

16 FAO’s Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA) and the Early Action window.

25
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

and food security are protected through early action, rather than the consequent needs
addressed through early response.

90. To address this OCHA initiated the formation of the early action Task Force in September
2018 to provide a platform for information-sharing and FAO has been a key stakeholder in
this platform. More recently, FAO hosted an inter-agency level workshop bringing together
all the key stakeholders in January 2020, from which a joint note on Anticipating Food Crisis
has been drafted and awaits final agreement.

91. There was evidence that FAO programme staff lack a clear distinction in their corporate
early actions from rapid response. For example, in Colombia EWEA appeared to be more
of a response to a displaced population, rather than an anticipatory action to prevent
displacement. What also emerged in conversations with FAO programme staff was that the
EWEA initiative was in some cases being deliberately “stretched” to compensate for limited
organizational capacities and instruments to work comprehensively across the disaster risk
management cycle in areas of preparedness and response.

3.1.5 Sustainability
Finding 18. FAO has contributed strongly to the promotion and sustainability of EWEA at global
level.
92. EWEA work under INFORMED has placed FAO as one of the leading organizations in EWEA.
Stakeholders noted that FAO is “ahead of other agencies on the conceptualisation of
EWEA” and that “the fact that FAO has dedicated resources and teams on this issue has
allowed FAO to lead conversations”. The EWEA team was viewed as credible and as “a
thought leader” by the main collaborating institutions.

93. FAO has played an important role in coordinating EWEA efforts both at global and country
level. The EWEA team has effectively engaged externally through a number of coordination
forums. These include:

i. IASC analysts group of the Reference Group on Risk, Early Warning and Preparedness;

ii. Early Action Task Force coordination of partners including IFRC, START NETWORK,
WFP and German Red Cross;

iii. participation in global and regional EWEA platforms, including an EWEA workshop
hosted by FAO in January 2020.

94. These coordination efforts have had tangible results that collectively promoted increased
and sustained attention to EWEA by the global community. The Inter-Agency ENSO SOPs,
developed jointly with OCHA, gave the international community its first ever framework for
a common monitoring, warning and early action planning for El Niño/La Niña events.
Visibility for, and communication of EWEA priorities has been promoted through joint
products including the IASC EWEAR report and joint advocacy efforts aimed at ECOSOC.
Conceptual clarity is being promoted, for example a joint note has been drafted on
“Addressing challenges to anticipating food crises”.17

17 This remains in draft and has not been officially released.

26
Findings

95. FAO has also contributed to the establishment of the Risk-informed Early Action
Partnership (REAP), which is a major step forward in promoting and sustaining EWEA. REAP
was launched at the United Nations Secretary General’s Climate Action Summit on
23 September 2019, with more than 30 partners committing to vastly increasing the
coverage of early action. The target is to cover 1 billion more people by financing and
delivery mechanisms connected to effective early action plans by 2025 (Climate Action
Summit, 2019.

Finding 19. Through appropriate partnerships, FAO has supported efforts to develop and
institutionalize system level financing for EWEA.
96. Stakeholders pointed to an unwillingness of governments and donors to fund early action
as a system-wide issue, with United Nations agencies generally lacking resources for early
action. As one report noted “Although there is increased recognition that early action
following quality forecasts can reduce humanitarian needs after extreme weather events,
financing is fragmented, agency-specific and small-scale” (ibid). To address this, the EWEA
initiative has coordinated effectively with other key initiatives on EWEA financing through
the World Bank Famine Action Mechanism (FAM) and OCHA.

97. The World Bank is developing the Famine Action Mechanism as a global mechanism
dedicated to supporting interventions in famine prevention, preparedness and early action.
The FAM seeks to formalize links between early warnings, financing and implementation
arrangements (FAM). FAO has collaborated with the World Bank on this. Two key areas of
collaboration were on triggers/thresholds and the use of artificial intelligence as well as
thinking through crisis timelines to understand what actions could have been taken earlier
to avert a crisis. FAO’s contribution to this process was highly valued, although the
mechanism is yet to become fully operational.

98. The United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is exploring a role in
anticipatory action (ODI, 2019). While the exact role and mechanisms have yet to be
defined, explicit efforts are underway to explore through pilots the role that CERF can have.
FAO has supported the use of CERF for Anticipatory Action at both a global level and in
Somalia where the first pilot is being set-up by ensuring the food security cluster had
developed triggers, timelines and action plans for early action. In general, informants were
supportive of CERF anticipatory use citing the scale of funding and the convening and
coordination role it incentivises across sectors and organizations and promoting
mainstreaming of the approach; while others questioned the effectiveness of what would
be a complex (inter-agency) and potentially bureaucratic process.

Finding 20. EWEA has contributed to capacity building, but national ownership of EWEA processes
is so far very limited.
99. The initial focus of the EWEA initiative was on embedding the approach within FAO
corporate structures and processes, including FAO country offices. This was necessary given
that the approach was new and needed to be accepted and understood within the
organization. At the same time FAO staff indicated a keen appreciation of the need to
entrench the approach within government systems, reflecting the primary responsibilities
of States for the welfare of their citizens and ensuring a pathway towards longer term
sustainability.

27
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

100. Some capacity building of national institutions has taken place under the INFORMED
programme. The EWEA Country Toolkit – developed in 2017 – has provided a framework
for collaboration with in-country stakeholders. The process of developing country EWEA
plans engaged local actors including national hydro-meteorological offices, national
emergency management agencies, United Nations organizations and civil society actors,
and inevitably transferred some of the methodological and technical knowledge required
for EWEA. There was also some emerging direct experience of institutionalizing the
resulting approach with local authorities. For example, FAO is working to institutionalize
EWEA into the Viet Nam disaster management authorities in partnership with the German
Red Cross and other international NGOs.

101. An increasingly important strand in the EWEA approach is linking government-led shock
responsive social protection mechanisms to EWEA. Experience of institutionalizing the
approach at regional and country level is also emerging through ECHO funded scale up
EWEA and shock responsive social protection in selected Association of Southeast Asian
Nations(ASEAN) countries (see Box 5).18

Box 5: Linking EWEA to shock responsive social protection

Building on an European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) funded FAO pilot
on EWEA in Viet Nam, as well as IFRC efforts in the region, ECHO is supporting the scale-up EWEA and
Shock Responsive Social Protection in select Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries
that are underpinned by innovative use of climate and disaster risk information to become new
approaches in the implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency
Response. The proposal will be implemented by a Consortium of five United Nations agencies (United
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), WFP, FAO, UN Women and UNICEF), the Red Cross
and Red Crescent Society and NGOs. The intention is to consolidate the Forecast based Financing
/EWEA pilots and support the implementation of the ASEAN Guidelines and country Roadmap to
Establish SRSP Systems in ASEAN and select countries (Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines and Viet Nam).
These interventions will be supported by capacity building for use of climate information for enhanced
risk analysis, forecast and early warning, identification of financial options. All will be facilitated by
strengthened regional coordination and collaboration for knowledge sharing, developing coherent and
standardized tools and training materials and joint advocacy.

FAO. 2019. Scaling up Forecast based Financing/Early Warning Early Action and Shock Responsive Social
Protection with innovative use of climate risk information for disaster resilience in ASEAN. Rome.

102. FAO has an organizational structure and governance system that closely links FAO to
governments. Still, to consider appropriate approaches to enhancing national ownership,
FAO can draw from the experience of the IPC. Practice has shown that in some specific
humanitarian situations, there can be a conflict between the objectives of delivering an
impartial needs-based assessment and national ownership. Furthermore, national
governments are currently the least significant users of the IPC for decision-making with
implications on scheduling activities on-budget. This suggests that nuanced approaches to
institutionalization may be required, as hinted in the IPC mid-term review “While the
inappropriateness of a one-size-fits-all approach to institutionalization may be generally
accepted within the GSP, there is a continued lack of clarity about what institutionalization
means, and the strategy to achieve it in different contexts”.

18 Although
strictly speaking these efforts are not under the INFORMED programme, they are technically supported
by the EWEA team.

28
Findings

Finding 21. A wide range of partnerships have been essential in developing pathways to effective
institutionalization.
103. FAO has a well-established and generally effective strategy of working through the various
Regional Economic Communities as an entry point for analytical support to food and
nutrition security. This includes historical support to early warning systems (for example
work in the SADC region) and to the IPC process (for example working in conjunction with
CILLS to introduce the Cadre Harmonisé in West Africa). However, there is little evidence
of this channel being used in support of EWEA at country level.

104. The main regional engagement has been with IGAD in supporting the establishment of the
IGAD Food Security, Nutrition and resilience analysis Hub (IFRAH). Under this umbrella,
FAO has provided technical support to the operation of the regional Food Security and
Nutrition Working Group (FSNWG). This support has been highly appreciated and FSNWG
has been revitalized. IFRAH and the FSNWG played a key role in the desert locust response
in 2019. This included aspects of technical analysis, coordination, information sharing and
communication, and fund mobilization. However, these results have not yet been replicated
at the country level.

105. Collaboration with other agencies was reported as very positive. IFRC has been a key
collaborator in various countries including Mongolia and the Philippines, to coordinate on
triggers, thresholds for response, geographical coverage of early actions as well as
advocacy with government.19 While there has been limited success in engaging with the
global Food Security Cluster (gFSC), despite FAO’s leadership role, collaboration with
clusters at country level were noted. In Mongolia, plans for early action were discussed and
agreed in the agriculture cluster and in the case of Somalia FAO drove the development of
early action plans in the Food Security Cluster in readiness to programme CERF funds. In
Sudan, FAO, WFP and OCHA established the EWEA Technical Working Group together with
the Sudan Food Security Technical Secretariat and the Sudan Humanitarian Aid
Commission. This was a significant partnership effort which also contributed to
institutionalization of EWEA.

The new GNAFCPP aims to build capacity for carrying out EWEA work at regional and country
levels. The inception note specifies that “EWEA will seek to increase the quality, coverage
and reliability of risk analysis through capacity building at country level and
institutionalization at regional level, as well as through improving global risk analysis and
reinforcing links with IPC and resilience analysis” (FAO, 2018). In addition, the recently
sourced three-year funding from the German Government focusses on capacity
development and scaling up EWEA (see Box 6).

19 IFRC are currently working in 31 countries on forecast-based financing.

29
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

Box 6: Support from Germany for EWEA capacity development

A recent successful application for funding to the German government focuses on scaling up efforts in
EWEA over three years and totals USD 5 million. It proposes the following goals: i) in selected priority
high risk countries, FAO has an established and fully functioning EWEA capacity and is able to anticipate
disaster impacts with rapid deployment of early action funds; ii) FAO has a robust and dynamic risk
analysis system linking country, regional and global levels, and producing effective and actionable
agriculture and food security early warnings for FAO and partners; iii) FAO is a reference institution for
agriculture and food security EWEA, helping build capacity of humanitarian partners as well as national
institutions, informing policies and legislation (where appropriate); iv) FAO continues to be a key actor
in advancing the global agenda on anticipatory action, including by generating key evidence and
learning, and promoting partnerships and joint advocacy (FAO, 2019). The proposal includes increasing
FAO’s capacity at country and regional levels to achieve these goals.

Finding 22. Progress towards institutionalizing EWEA within FAO is partial and incomplete.
106. The EWEA pilot phase has created a solid basis to move towards embedding the initiative
within corporate structures and processes. However, there is no documented strategy for
institutionalizing EWEA work corporately within FAO. The accountability of field offices to
management for implementing EWEA was low and depended on individual judgement and
initiative. Core challenges in internal standard operating mechanisms for logistics and
procurement to allow adequately scaled and timely early action, have not been addressed.

107. The EWEA initiative has been developed with relatively low levels of budget and human
resources. These resource levels have been commensurate with piloting the approach,
rather than the full-scale roll-out. This would need to be addressed in taking the approach
forward as a corporate tool, with close consideration of the necessary levels of technical
assistance and financial support required at headquarters, regional and country levels. The
requirements are not just for developing an EWEA plan, but also the ongoing responsibility
for updating and implementation.

108. Ownership of the EWEA initiative within FAO’s regular programmes has only been partially
achieved. In some areas it is embedded – for example in the work of EMPRES – but in other
areas the integration of the approach within existing workstreams requires attention. For
example, the GIEWS team perceived their role to stop at the point of delivering early
warning and have not integrated key lessons from EWEA to make their analysis more
actionable. The global Food Security Cluster – through the national clusters – has a highly
relevant role in bringing stakeholders together to develop and implement plans as well as
institutionalization of EWEA plans and approaches into the humanitarian system more
widely. However, collaboration with the gFSC remains nascent and weakly developed at
implementation level.20

109. SFERA funds have only been sufficient to pilot small-scale projects in selected countries
and are not currently sufficient to meet demand from a larger number of countries, or to
bring the approach to scale. The availability of funds if further stretched as the
organizational preparedness window has been used to finance the roll out of the EWEA
system in Pakistan and technical support provided to the early action implementation in

20Despite this, some national clusters have supported the development of implementation partnerships at country
level.

30
Findings

Colombia, Kenya and the Niger funded the analytical capacity underpinning the quarterly
global EWEA report on food security and agriculture.

3.2 Resilience analysis

3.2.1 Strategy and activities

110. Programme Output 3 states that “Resilience programming is improved through the
application of a common methodology to measure resilience, and through knowledge
sharing mechanisms”. Under this there were three main areas of work. This chapter presents
the findings in relation to two work areas falling under this output of i) supporting regional
and national technical capacities to conduct resilience measurement and analyses at
country level by applying the RIMA methodology; and ii) improving the RIMA methodology
to respond to different challenges related to decision-making processes. Findings on the
other area of work under this output – on knowledge management - are presented in
Chapter 3.3.

111. In 2008 FAO proposed an econometric approach, RIMA, for measuring resilience (Alinovi,
Mane and Romano, 2008).21 RIMA I analyses were conducted in a number of countries.
Based on the experience of using RIMA I, the methodology was subsequently simplified
and improved over the period 2012–2016, in conjunction with the FSIN Resilience
Measurement Technical Working Group. RIMA II was launched in 2016. RIMA II includes
“direct” and “indirect” measures of resilience to support resilience programming,
monitoring and impact evaluation:

i. A direct (or descriptive) measure of resilience designed to identify households more

or less likely to resist a shock by estimating their “resilience capacity”. The direct
approach calculates a Resilience Capacity Index (RCI) based on the pillars of access
to basic services; household assets; household social safety nets; and household
adaptive capacity.

ii. An indirect (or inferential) measure of resilience, which employs regression analysis
for assessing the effects of shocks on, and determinants of changes in resilience and
food security. The indirect approach is designed to analyse the determinants of food
security loss and recovery.

112. Further adaptations to the tool included the introduction of RIMA “Excel”, that simplified
the calculation of the RCI to dispense with the necessity of specialized statistical expertise
and STATA software. The RIMA “Short” questionnaire simplified the data requirements.
Optional “modules” have also been added to gather data on: subjective perceptions of
resilience; conflict; social protection; local economy; and other context-specific features.

113. INFORMED collaborated with regional institutions (including IGAD, African Union, CILSS
and SICA) and national governments to establish and enhance resilience analysis capacities.
This included the creation of two main regional hubs in Africa (Dakar and Nairobi) and
Resilience Measurement Units (RMU) at country level (including Uganda and South Sudan).
As part of the capacity building effort more than 50 trainings were conducted during the

21Resilience is defined by FAO and others as “The capacity that ensures adverse stressors and shocks do not have
long-lasting adverse development consequences”. It is connected to, but different from, vulnerability. (RMTWG 1).

31
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

project period. Field support was given to the production of at least 33 RIMA reports and
policy briefs in 14 countries (see Annex E).22

114. Following the conclusion of INFORMED, support to RIMA has continued under component
II of the Global Network Against Food Crises Partnership Programme. RIMA is embedded
within the M&E framework and provides the basis, both as data collection and analytical
instrument, for creating evidence on European Union resilience investments in a number
of PROACT projects.

3.2.2 Relevance
Finding 23. Support to resilience analysis is highly relevant given the significant investments in
resilience programming and the continuing methodological gaps.
115. In recent years resilience has gained prominence in both development and humanitarian
policies. Numerous United Nations agencies, development, governmental and non-
governmental organizations, and donors look to the concept of resilience to understand
how households cope with shocks and stresses, and are operationalizing its use in
programming. Large-scale investments in resilience programmes have been made by both
governments and development partners to reduce food insecurity and malnutrition.

116. FAO was one of the first organizations to adopt the concept of resilience in a food security
context, with the goal of addressing the root causes of food insecurity and reducing the
need for regular humanitarian interventions (Pingali P., Alinovi L. and Sutton J., 2005). The
European Union has also been a major supporter of resilience building initiatives, as
demonstrated by policy commitments to invest more in tackling the root causes of
recurrent crises and large investments such as Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (AGIR)
and SHARE (European Commission, 2012). While investments continue to be made in
resilience capacity building across sectors, verifiable evidence of the impact of these
investments remains scarce.

117. While multiple approaches have been proposed over recent years, using both quantitative
and qualitative data, measurement has proved complex and challenging. There is still a
need for a robust system for effective measurement to help generate evidence for informed
decision-making and further investment. Consequently, continued investment in
methodological improvements also remained highly relevant for all stakeholders, including
FAO and the European Union. Given this context, the development of the RIMA
methodology is highly relevant to support the design and monitoring of relevant resilience
policies and programmes.

Finding 24. The understanding of decision makers needs was weak in the initial design of RIMA,
but efforts made during implementation have partially addressed users concerns.
118. Multiple stakeholders acknowledged that there had been inadequate attention on the
relationship between RIMA analysts and decision makers. The origins of RIMA – as
evidenced by the FSIN process and technical papers - were highly technical and driven by
an academic approach to conceptualizing and measuring resilience. There was little
consideration given to how the results would be integrated into the decision-making
process. The first round of RIMA studies were characterized as desk driven studies with
limited reference to the needs of decision makers. The 2017 INFORMED mid-term review

22 Additional RIMA reports were produced in Central America using a sperate channel of European Union funding.

32
Findings

noted that “resilience analysis needs to be made less academic and more programme and
policy relevant” (FAO, 2017).

119. Originally the INFORMED programme was intended to be paired with the European Union-
funded the Food and Nutrition Security, Impact, Resilience, Sustainability and
Transformation (FIRST) policy support programme. INFORMED was expected to develop
evidence which would have directly fed into the policy work of FIRST. In practice this
synergy was never realized. The country prioritization for each project was very different
and INFORMED focused on SP5, while FIRST on SP1. Without this anchor INFORMED lacked
the connection to decision-making processes of policymakers or an appreciation of the
political economy surrounding the choices being made. This left both programmes lacking
a comprehensive approach linking evidence to policy and programming.

120. FAO has acknowledged this gap and there were evident efforts to orient RIMA studies to
respond to the specific research questions that countries were interested in. An example
was orienting the northern Uganda RIMA study to the design of the refugee response. Prior
to data collection exercises for RIMA, workshops are held with stakeholders to design the
data collection exercises as well as meetings after data is processed to present and validate
the RIMA findings. The development of the Resilience Marker in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory provides an example of adapting tools to support decision makers

Box 7: The resilience marker

An innovation introduced by the resilience working group in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (FAO, 2017)
(United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), WFP, FAO and
partners, Aquatic Animal Health (AAH), OXFAM, WWI, PU-AMI, Weffect, Employment and Social Development
Canada (ESDC)) was the development of a “resilience marking tool” in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. This
was piloted in 2016 and 2017 to review projects submitted for inclusion in the HRP and assess the extent to
which they contribute to improving resilience to food security. The marking enhances quality of humanitarian
actions by ensuring a systematic reflection and inclusion of resilience considerations in all stages of the project
cycle; promote discussions on how resilience can be better included in programming; and what it practically
means in different Occupied Palestinian Territory contexts.

Two pilots of the resilience marker were conducted in 2016-2017 by the Resilience working group, with feedback
loops from participants. Main feedback received allowed to tailor the tool to the Occupied Palestinian Territory
different contexts, i.e. Gaza Strip, West Bank no camp and West Bank camp. The marking was used in support of
HRP processes 2017 to 2019. It was not applied for the HRP 2020 due to some delays in identifying the contextual
variables that should apply to each context in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The marking is considered a
useful but demanding consultative process requiring facilitation and resources. Discussions are ongoing to
simplify the resilience marking approach.

121. However, to some extent this criticism has continued. Interviewees noted “a lack of clarity
on who the users were” and what information was needed for decision-making purposes,
including “what information was good enough in practical terms” and that “INFORMED
produced information and tried to sell it”. Other needs are unmet. For example, donors
were keen to understand the extent to which resilience interventions had averted
humanitarian costs and have a clearer understanding of the costs and benefits of building
resilience. Programme staff expressed interest in modelling the impact of specific
interventions on levels of resilience.

122. The inception report from the new GNAFCPP highlighted the need to improve the linkages
of RIMA to decision makers. A second phase of the Resilience Measurement Technical

33
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

Working Group (RM-TWG) has been initiated with the goal of moving beyond basic
conceptual work on resilience measurement. This next phase of work, referred to as the
Resilience Evidence for Decisions in Development Initiative (REDDI), is designed to place
the evidence-related needs of countries and regions at the centre of the process (FSIN).
However, the implementation of REDDI appears to have been slow and there is little
publicly available information on the initiative.

Finding 25. The RIMA approach is primarily embedded within an emergency response perspective
and stronger links with development programming are required to increase its overall relevance.
123. For many stakeholders the objective of building resilience to food insecurity emerged from
a humanitarian perspective. As one stakeholder stated “given the protracted nature of the
situation in South Sudan and the recurrent shocks experienced by the population, the use
of a resilience analysis tool to better understand which interventions contribute to
resilience is relevant in order to reduce the need for regular humanitarian interventions.”

124. The rationale for resilience under INFORMED has been aligned to managing risk, through
building resilient livelihoods. The focus on keeping people from being worse off differs
from the development objective of moving people to better states of welfare (Davis, 2018).
Interpreting resilience purely from a risk reduction perspective could lead to “resilient but
poor”.

125. As one paper stated, “Because the central project of development is to improve human
well-being among the under-resourced, merely stabilizing living standards around ex ante
low levels, or accelerating recovery to an unacceptably low level does not advance these
common goals” (Upton, Constenla-Villoslada, Barrett, 2020). Another report argued “It is
probably not practical to see resilience as a primary programme objective in itself, but
rather the concept should shape how a programme is implemented to achieve other
objectives i.e. success of an intervention is not measured by resilience per se but by
achieving other specific positive livelihood outcomes such as food security” (Sturgess,
2016).

126. It was noted that the location of the RIMA team within SP5 may have contributed to a
predominantly humanitarian perspective and called for stronger links to development
analysis and actors in house. Arguably RIMA could have interacted more with SP1 and SP3
and brought together the three Strategic Programmes (SPs) under a resilience-food
security-poverty nexus to identify policy and programmatic options to address poverty and
resilience that integrate risk management into development plans (Davis, 2018).

Finding 26. The addition of a conflict module to RIMA reflected the importance of conflict as a
driver of food insecurity. Other FAO tools provided the primary analysis to support conflict
sensitive programming.
127. The importance of the interrelationship between conflict and food security is clear – with
global acute food insecurity mainly due to complex emergencies and in situations of
protracted crises (Keen, Mitchell and Harris, 2013). However, historically FAO has been
careful to clarify that its mandate does not extend to conflict resolution, peacebuilding and
governance, but to keep attentive to ensuring that its interventions do not exacerbate

34
Findings

conflict23. But previous evaluations pointed out that capacities in conflict analysis and
management cannot be completely outside the responsibilities of any agency active in
fragile states, if the goal is to help vulnerable people (FAO, 2014). Conflict management is
integral to natural resource management and the resolution of local disputes, tensions and
conflicts is a pillar of effective sustainable natural resource management.

128. Consequently, FAO’s position has evolved to acknowledge that in fragile and conflict-
affected contexts FAO, broadly speaking, intervenes across two programmatic areas:
i) developing and implementing interventions to offset the impacts of conflicts on food
security, nutrition, agriculture and natural resources; and ii) identifying ways to minimize,
avoid, positively transform and resolve conflict(s) where food, agriculture or natural
resources are (or hold the potential to serve as) conflict drivers (FAO, 2018). FAO has
developed specific guidance for project interventions in fragile and conflict-affected
contexts. These include the FAO Guide to Context Analysis and the Programme Clinic:
Designing Conflict-Sensitive Interventions that have been developed for decentralized
office programme staff.24

129. It is difficult, if not impossible, to build resilience without considering the impact of conflict
and political shocks. The differential impacts of the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa
made it clear how conflict and political instability can exacerbate the impacts of natural
hazards: central southern Somalia experienced famine, while similarly drought-affected
populations in northern Kenya did not. However, the original RIMA approach focused on a
limited set of risks or stressors, excluding conflict.

130. Collaboration between RIMA and FAO conflict teams has resulted in the development of
an (optional) conflict module. The module gathers data on household exposure to violence
with a view to better understanding the impact of violence on household resilience. The
coping mechanisms of household are also explored, as well as developing the
understanding of the interrelation between conflict and food insecurity. This conflict data
does not influence the calculation of the RCI, but is used as a descriptive and explanatory
variable. This area remains a work in progress. No reports are available and the benefits to
users of integrating conflict into the resilience analysis are yet to be determined.

Finding 27. Gender is routinely included in all RIMA analyses in line with FAO policy commitments.
131. The FAO Policy on Gender Equality provides the rationale for how reducing gender
inequalities in the agriculture sector is relevant to FAO’s mandate of reducing hunger,
poverty and injustice in the world (FAO, 2013). This policy includes specific commitments
to: i) generating and communicating the evidence base through the use of sex-
disaggregated data to substantiate the importance of closing the gender gap for achieving
FAO’s overall mandate; and ii) ensuring that gender analysis is incorporated in the
formulation, implementation and evaluation of all field programmes and projects.

23 FAO, 2015, CFS Framework for Action for Food Security and Nutrition in Protracted Crises
http://www.fao.org/3/a-bc852e.pdf
24 Good examples of these analyses include: “In support of the PBF project: Water for Peace in Yemen:

Strengthening the role of women in water conflict resolution and climate change mitigation”, and “Programme
Clinic Report for the Improvement of food and nutrition security of vulnerable population in Rakhine State -
Practical recommendations based on a mixed methods analysis of conflict dynamics”.

35
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

132. Consistent with this policy, RIMA has incorporated gendered analysis from the outset.
While the unit of analysis for RIMA is the household rather than individuals, the data is
analysed by the gender of household heads. The analysis has included the dynamics of
gender and resilience (how resilience shifts in periods of stress), differences in asset
endowments by gender, differences in adaptive capacity (for example involvement in social
associations) and access to social safety net receipts. For example, in Honduras RIMA
analysis shows that the most vulnerable were older adults and women, following large
migratory displacement towards the United States of America: the elderly remained to look
after kids.

133. All the RIMA reports reviewed systematically included gender-disaggregated

recommendations. For example, the Sudan report concluded and recommended that
“Gender policies that should aim at increasing asset endowment and access to credit for
female household heads. Also, female household heads seems to suffer of a low average
education level, which is likely to be the side effect of gender discrimination in local
cultures. Given this, interventions for improving education should be prioritized, especially
in rural areas.” (FAO, 2016). Gender experts were included in the formulation of
recommendations – for example RIMA reports in Somalia.

3.2.3 Use of RIMA

134. This section discusses the evidence of the extent to which the RIMA analysis has supported
decision makers. The discussion of the uses of RIMA are presented against the main
potential uses of the RIMA analysis identified by FAO, including (FAO, 2016):

i. Planning: providing evidence for developing projects, programmes, strategies and

policies.

ii. Targeting: identifying populations for interventions; disaggregates populations for

more effective targeting (by livelihoods, gender, region, etc.).

iii. Evaluating impact over time and identifying the main determinants of food security
recovery.

iv. Monitoring trends in levels of resilience over time.

Planning

Finding 28. The RCI in RIMA baselines helped to explain factors contributing to resilience
capacities, but there was little evidence of its use in planning policies and programmes.
135. The RIMA analyses generally included both a calculation of the overall resilience index (the
RCI) and an analysis of how the different pillars contribute to the overall index (the
Resilience Structure Matrix, RSM). 12 of the 14 reviewed RIMA reports included a
quantitative analysis of the factors contributing to household resilience to food insecurity,
which was designed to support policy and programme formulation. 25 For example, in
Senegal all RIMA reports published between 2011 and 2019 included a section on main
determinants of resilience. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, RIMA was used in 2014

25 The two RIMA reports not including this analysis were based on secondary data.

36
Findings

and 2018 to identify the main factors contributing to low resilience levels and high food
insecurity.26

136. The baseline analyses provided a background understanding of factors contributing to

resilience. Stakeholders reported that this helped to explain the concept of resilience as a
holistic approach spanning multiple sectors and brought attention to the contribution of
social protection and basic services. This was arguably most relevant in the early days prior
to INFORMED, when the concept of resilience was still emerging.

137. However, the majority of users reported challenges in applying the results of the RCI- and
RSM-based analyses to decision-making. Some examples were cited of where RIMA
analysis had informed specific planning decisions. FAO sources suggested that the RIMA
analysis in Mali had influenced the decision of the European Union to support an NGO
project in building access to basic services. RIMA analyses were credited with influencing
the design of joint FAO/WFP/UNICEF resilience strategies in Somalia and Uganda.27 In
Central America, SICA reported RIMA had been a factor in guiding public investments and
programmes, although details were lacking.

138. Despite several high-level resilience programmes or strategies at country or regional level,
there is only anecdotal evidence of the use of RIMA or Analysis and Measurement of
Resilience (AMR) results for decision-making in Senegal. Here, decision makers reported
struggling with the resilience concept, its measurement and its use for decision-making.
Despite long-term strategies and programmes in Senegal aiming at improving resilience, 28
no evidence was found of use of the measure to inform policymaking. In Colombia, RIMA
was not perceived as useful to allocate funding at national level.

139. For most stakeholders the RIMA baseline analysis lacked sufficient detail to have a practical
impact on planning decisions. As one stakeholder said, “At the end the RIMA analysis
tended to tell us at a macro-level what we already knew and is largely unilluminating”. This
point was reinforced by a review of the reports. Most RIMA reports reached broadly similar
conclusions on the importance of household assets, access to basic services (including
education, water, health and electricity), agricultural productivity, livelihood diversification,
transport and access to markets, and safety nets. This is perhaps unsurprising given that
many of these assumptions are inbuilt in the construction of the RIMA index (FAO, 2016).

140. Aggregate analyses at national level were also found to be challenging to apply to decision-
making. For example, one stakeholder in Kenya referenced the problems of using a
common resilience analysis that spanned pastoralists, farmers and urban populations and
argued for a disaggregated analysis of each specific group. This issue is not specific to the
RIMA methodology per se, but did reflect choices made during the definition of the scope
of the analysis.

141. Stakeholders also reported that the use of a composite index made it hard for some decision
makers to use it. One interviewee gave the analogy of applying the human development
index (HDI) to decisions on development policy and programmes. While the composite
index has a purpose, most practical decisions depend on more specific indicators such as

26 2014, 2018 Socio Economic and Food Security Surveys (SEFSec).

27 However, no reference was made to the use of RIMA in FAO Country Programming Frameworks.
28 National Strategy for Food Security and Resilience Strategy (SNSAR), PNASAR.

37
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

water scarcity or lack of education. The household level analysis also needs to be
complemented by a much deeper analysis to understand the feasibility of possible
response options.

Finding 29. The context specific food security and nutrition data collected through the RIMA
process was valued by planners.
142. Over the programme period there has been an increasing level of local adaptation of the
RIMA model to the country or area of analysis. This included the collection and analysis of
locally relevant data, in addition to the indicators required to calculate the core RIMA
results of the RCI and RSM. This contextual analysis, tailored to the demands of local
planners, was generally well received.

143. For example, in August 2017 FAO was asked by the Commissioner for Refugees in the
Office of the Prime Minister of Uganda to support the implementation of a socio-economic
analysis within the refugees’ settlements and host communities, with the aim of providing
a comprehensive assessment of the current state of the refugees’ food security, well-being
and resilience. This study was highly relevant to the Government’s decision to pilot the
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and support the self-reliance of refugees
and move away from long-term humanitarian assistance (see Box 8).

Box 8: The New York Declaration and Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework

The New York Declaration incorporates a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) to be applied to
large-scale movements of refugees and protracted refugee situations. The CRRF focuses on the importance of
supporting countries and communities that host large number of refugees, promoting the inclusion of refugees
in host communities, ensuring the involvement of development actors from an early stage, and developing a
‘whole-of-society’ approach to refugee responses.

New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 September
2016.

144. The refugees study in Uganda provided an important reference document for planning for
the Government and FAO. However, a closer analysis suggests that the main benefit of the
study has been understanding refugee livelihoods and pathways to self-reliance, rather
than the analysis of resilience to shocks per se. It was also notable that the RIMA study of
pastoralists in the Karamoja region of Uganda - where resilience to shocks is the primary
concern – was viewed by stakeholders in-country as much less useful.

145. In data-poor environments, users credited RIMA with playing an important role in
expanding the availability of information on areas such as consumption patterns and
gender issues. Consequently food security analysts have used RIMA data beyond the
immediate planned purpose. To give one example, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) relied on data collected during the RIMA exercise for an analysis of refugee
land dynamics (UNDP, 2018).

38
Findings

Targeting

Finding 30. RIMA results have not been used to target resilience interventions and did not
demonstrate a comparative advantage for this purpose.
146. RIMA has been proposed as a tool for targeting resilience interventions. This has included
mapping RCI values as a basis for geographically targeting interventions to areas of low
resilience and socially targeting interventions to groups of low resilience (rural populations,
female headed households).

147. In practice, there was no evidence that the RIMA results had been used for geographical
targeting purposes. A number of factors contribute to this outcome. First, lack of timeliness
was a factor as many RIMA baselines were noted to have only been analysed and reported
(and in some cases started) after the commencement of the associated resilience
programmes. RIMA analyses lacked agility, given their complexity and resource demands
of the RIMA process.

148. Second, it was not clear that the RCI had a compelling added value for targeting over more
readily available food security and nutrition indicators, used in conjunction with indicators
of risk exposure. The resilience index broadly corresponded with measures such as poverty
and malnutrition (see Figure 5). Even where these do diverge, the justification for directing
resources to less resilient areas (lower RCI), but with less poverty and malnutrition is
uncertain.

Figure 5: Comparison of targeting criteria, triangle of hope, Mauritania

Source: FAO. 2015. Resilience analysis in the triangle of hope, Mauritania.

149. RIMA could potentially also be used to target vulnerable groups, but no clear examples
were found of where this had happened. RIMA has consistently disaggregated the analysis
of resilience by gender. While, welcome and in line with FAO policy, no specific examples
were encountered of how this analysis was used to target resilience interventions. Multiple
RIMA reports highlighted a general disparity between the resilience of rural and urban

39
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

populations. Again the use of high-level conclusions was hard to track into concrete
decision-making.

150. The resource demands of RIMA also make it an impractical tool for household level
targeting. For example, in Colombia RIMA is used to support an inter-agency project in
identifying the least resilient households. However, the baseline was only set after the
project was designed and the instrument (RIMA Short) was considered heavy and
“complex”.

Impact evaluation

Finding 31. The revised RIMA II analysis may contribute to a better understanding of the drivers
of resilience. However, the contribution of programme interventions to changes in resilience has
not been assessed too far.
151. RIMA may be used in two ways in evaluating changes in resilience. Both approaches require
multiple rounds of data collection for the analysis of impact, with sufficient amount of time
in between to allow resilience levels to change - making the tool more suited to evaluate
multi-year programmes.

i. First, through an analysis of the changes in resilience capacities. The analytical approach
is to determine: i) What factors affect resilience? ii) What sorts of programmes can
change these factors? and iii) Do these factors change as a result of the programmes
implemented? This corresponds to what is termed by FAO as the “direct”
measurement of resilience. This has the advantage that the measurement is not
dependent on a shock occurring.

ii. Second, there is the analysis of the determinants (including interventions supported
by the project) of how households are able to maintain their welfare – in this case
levels of food security or nutrition – in the event of a real shock. This corresponds to
what is termed by FAO as the “indirect” measurement of resilience. This analysis
option has been added into the design of RIMA II. It corresponds to stakeholder
interest in understanding if and why project beneficiaries were able to bounce back
after a shock.

152. There have been relatively few examples where repeated rounds of RIMA surveys have
been completed and changes in the “direct measure” could be compared.29 In Somalia,
RIMA I baselines and endlines of projects were available, but the analysis did not attribute
the role of specific project interventions to changes in resilience. “It is not possible with
RIMA to disentangle the effect of each single intervention on a specific indicator, it is only
possible to see whether those household who have been reached by the JRS (treated) have
had a significant and positive impact on a list of indicators” (FAO, 2016). Efforts are currently
ongoing between MEAL, RIMA and FAO M&E Strategic Objective teams to develop
guidance to address this challenge.

153. In Somalia the change in the RCI overtime was used to support a basic accountability
function, with the analysis concluding that “a positive and significant impact has been
reported on treated households, which turns to increase resilience capacity by 23.2 percent

29Differences in methodology between RIMA I and RIMA II have limited the comparability of data between survey
rounds.

40
Findings

(on average)” (FAO, 2016). However, it was noted that the results are difficult to interpret
in the absence of thresholds. Users were unable to conclude whether an adequate level of
resilience had been achieved or not.

154. RIMA II is currently used as part of the evaluation framework (with control groups) in Pro
Act programmes funded under the GNAFCPP. Examples of the planned application of RIMA
for this purpose include Colombia, South Sudan (for the SAFER and Cross border
programming initiatives) and Uganda (to evaluate the Karamoja Integrated Development
Plan and the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, NUSAF). In South Sudan USAID has
placed RIMA as a requirement for proposals submitted for resilience programming. It was
also reported that FAO is supporting UN Women to use RIMA as a measure of impact of
their programmes on women in the Middle East.

155. The baselines are currently being conducted and it will be sometime before the
performance of RIMA II as an evaluation tool can be properly assessed. However, while the
analysis should help to understand what factors are associated with “realized” resilience,
the extent to which this can be linked to specific programme interventions is less clear in
the absence of appropriate and adapted guidance on RIMA use for impact evaluation. In
addition, there is a strong continuing demand for mixed method approaches as a basis for
impact evaluation (Box 9).

Box 9: Measuring impact of resilience programmes in Somalia

The Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS, 2013-2017) is a DfID-funded NGO humanitarian
consortium comprising Concern, Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children, International Rescue
Committee and CESVI.

In the first phase of the programme, the international and local NGOs involved in BRCiS spent time with the
communities to understand hazards, sources of internal conflicts, threats to their security, root causes of
vulnerabilities and capacities, resources and assets. This participatory process led to the development of locally-
adapted understanding of resilience, based on the attributes of each village. To evaluate the impact of the
programme, they are using a combination of internationally recognized indicators: the Coping Strategies Index,
the Dietary Diversity Score, Food Consumption Score and the Household Asset Score. They added a number of
indicators relevant to Somali society in general and for the communities in particular. These ranged from literacy
levels, access to safe water and sanitation, income diversification to community capacity to solve internal
disputes. Qualitative information is collected by their staff on a weekly basis.

Sturgess, P. 2016. Measuring Resilience. DfID.

Monitoring

Finding 32. RIMA – and specifically the RCI – are potentially useful for policy and strategy
monitoring.
156. The RIMA tool – specifically the RCI within RIMA – is being increasingly applied for policy
monitoring. A prominent example includes the decision of the African Union to adopt the
RCI to monitor commitment 6 of the African Union Malabo Declaration. The focus is on
monitoring – the African Union reported approaching the REDDI initiative (see paragraph
122) to provide a complementary analysis of policy implications. The rollout of RIMA within
the African Union has only recently commenced and consequently it is still too early to
provide feedback from users on its effectiveness.

41
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

157. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, discussions and reviews led to the implementation of
the new food security measurement framework, where RIMA is a central pillar, alongside
food consumption and poverty. The report is intended to be produced every two years.30
RIMA was reported by interviewers to be an interesting and relevant approach to measure
resilience, but donors were not interviewed and it is not possible to confirm how they are
using it.

158. In Niger, the national development plan has integrated resilience as a measure of policy impact.
In Mauritania RIMA was reportedly used to monitor government policy, although
Government staff were not interviewed to confirm this. In Uganda it was applied to monitor
the Joint Resilience Strategy (FAO, WFP and UNICEF) and resilience programming in
Karamoja by other stakeholders. RIMA was mooted for similar applications in monitoring
overall resilience trends, for example as part of the monitoring framework for the NDP 9 in
Somalia (alongside other food security indicators including the food consumption score
(FCS) and GAM/SAM) and as part of the 2020 HRP in South Sudan (OCHA, 2020).

159. As a policy monitoring tool the RCI has several potential advantages. It is attractive to users
as it provides a single figure that simplifies reporting on a complex concept. It does not
require an analysis of causality and is much less demanding on the skills of analysts as it
can be conducted using RIMA Excel. Existing datasets can be used to conduct RIMA analysis
at this level, reducing cost and data demand such as in Niger or Senegal.

3.2.4 Factors affecting use and utility

Finding 33. RIMA has benefitted from strong technical collaboration in developing the
methodology, and from inter-agency coordination in implementation.
160. The RIMA team has been an active member of the Food Security Information Network
technical working group on resilience measurement.31 As resilience was a relatively new
concept, establishing a common framework has been extremely helpful in creating
consensus around the definition and approach to measurement. The RIMA headquarters
team also developed strong partnerships with institutions and universities to work on
specific resilience issues (conflict module with the Uppsala University; resilience subjective
measure with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), modelling with a German
university). RIMA has been developed alongside other quantitative methodologies
developed to measure resilience, principally the TANGO International and the Cissé and
Barrett method. A “healthy competition” contributed to promoting resilience measurement
and fostered an academic rigor.

161. National and regional coordination of resilience measurement was effective in promoting
the roll-out and use of resilience measurement tools. National groups in several countries
have conducted reviews of alternative methodological approaches. This provided a forum
to discuss and solve technical issue and adapt the approach to the context, reduce
individual data collection costs and facilitate a shared understanding of resilience issues.

30It was not done in 2016, and the 2018 survey is not published yet as of May 2020.
31The first official meeting took place in Rome on 9 and 10 October 2013 and it has been convening on a regular
basis since up to and including the IFPRI 2020 Conference on Building Resilience for Food and Nutrition Security in
Addis Ababa, May 2014.

42
Findings

162. In South Sudan, informants reported that the Partnership for Recovery and Resilience
Framework, with the backing of USAID as the key donor, has created a coordinated
approach among the United Nations and NGOs to using RIMA for resilience measurement,
which had proved difficult in the past. In Sahel, the technical Platform for the analysis and
measurement of resilience (PT-AMR) among populations in the Sahel and West Africa
gathered in Niamey in 2016 to review existing resilience measurement tools and decided
on the parameters of the future analysis and measurement of resilience.

Finding 34. Knowledge of RIMA is centred amongst a small group of technical specialists and the
awareness and understanding amongst decision makers is low.
163. Many key decision makers were found to be largely unaware of the RIMA process and
products. The 2018 ROM review visits to Kenya and Niger indicated that European Union
Delegations (EUDs) have limited, if any, knowledge of the INFORMED initiative, even
though there is close collaboration of the EUDs with the respective FAO Country Offices.
The current evaluation also found low levels of awareness of RIMA amongst EUDs even
though the European Union - through the linkage with PROACT – is targeted as a major
user.

164. In Uganda, donors including USAID, DfID and ECHO were not aware of the RIMA tool,
despite efforts at raising awareness of RIMA through the livelihoods working group and
the Resilience Measurement Unit. Awareness centred amongst the technical agencies –
including WFP, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Renewed
Efforts Against Child Hunger and Undernutrition (REACH) - who had used the tool in
assessment or monitoring frameworks. RIMA is known by a number of stakeholders in
South Sudan, but the Government is not aware of the tool. FAO’s Agriculture, Livestock and
Food Security Information conducted a recent user survey across stakeholder groups which
reported that only 3 percent of respondents accessed resilience reports, compared to
84 percent accessing the IPC reports.32 It is perhaps indicative of general levels of
awareness of RIMA that efforts to gather stakeholder opinions on RIMA through an online
survey by this evaluation failed – with only 7 responses out of over 1 000 targeted requests
for feedback.33

165. There was an acknowledged problem in communicating RIMA results to decision makers.
Overly technical reports were judged as inaccessible by many decision makers.
Consequently, under INFORMED there have been significant efforts to improve
communication. Report templates have been developed, the report language has become
less technical and the graphics simplified – for example replacing the poorly understood
spider graphs with bar charts. Furthermore, the diversity of products has also increased to
include: policy briefs aimed at providing key findings and messages to decision makers;
workshops organized at national and regional level to present resilience measurement
tools and compare approaches; webinars; the RIMA webpage; and a RIMA newsletter.

166. Despite these efforts users still reported difficulties in digesting the information produced
by RIMA. Reporting was still critiqued for remaining overly research-focussed. It was noted
that the RIMA team all had very technical backgrounds, and expertise in the team in
knowledge management is lacking. INFORMED did not develop a full communication

32Survey results were reported in April 2020.

33The target list of respondents was provided by the RIMA team. This compares to 159 completed responses
received to the online questionnaire on EWEA.

43
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

strategy. Stakeholders also indicated that insufficient involvement of users in the original
design and framing of the research questions perpetuated the disconnect from decision
makers.

167. Consequently, users lacked a solid understanding of the tool and felt unable to challenge
or critique the results. Several users who integrated the RCI index in reporting admitted
that they did not really understand how it was constructed. Part of the problem was a
continuing challenge in explaining the concept of resilience – this is inherently complex
and hard to simplify. The academic debates around the resilience concept, the best way to
measure it as well as the proliferation of tools and approaches contributed to confusion
amongst potential users (Sturgess, P., 2016).

168. Part of the problem is also specific to the measurement of resilience using a composite
measure as well as the absence of commonly agreed normative thresholds defining an
acceptable level of resilience. As one stakeholder queried “What does it mean when RIMA
decreased by 0,5?” To many stakeholders the RIMA analysis is perceived as a “blackbox”
which depended on implicit trust in expert opinion and advice, rather than methodological
transparency. While RIMA Excel has made it easier to calculate the index, it has not
increased the capacity to understand and explain how it is constructed and the implications
for policies and programmes. Users reported more comfort in using the underlying
indicators rather than a blended index.

Finding 35. There has been little testing of the skill of the RIMA index in predicting the ability of
households to weather shocks and stresses.
169. There was surprisingly little testing of the relationship between RIMA’s calculated
“resilience capacity” and the actual ability of households to weather shocks and stresses. A
recent study conducted a comparative performance analysis of three methods (RIMA,
TANGO International and Cissé and Barrett) using nationally representative panel data from
Ethiopia and Niger (Upton, J., Constenla-Villoslada, S. and Barrett, C. 2020). One of the key
findings was a poor correlation between households defined as having a high resilience
capacity (by all methods) and those who were able to maintain their food security in the
event of a shock.

170. The study went on to argue that “we need a measure (or measures) that allows us to
accurately and reasonably inexpensively identify those most likely to suffer from shocks or
stressors, to be able to rigorously estimate impacts of interventions on the resilience
measure(s), and ensure that any such change reflects improvement in the shock-and-stress-
proofing of wellbeing over time. While existing resilience measures have made some progress
in those directions, the development community is clearly not there yet. … it does not
consistently add much value as compared to the far simpler method of just using the most
recent wellbeing measure available to predict future resilience.”

171. Conclusions on the skill of the method cannot be based on one study and FAO have
rebutted the findings. There is also some counter evidence - one earlier FAO study in
Nicaragua had concluded that the RCI, estimated through RIMA I, is a good predictor of
household food security (Romano D. and Ciani F., 2014). However, those more involved in
the technical detail, are concerned about insufficient critical examination and validation of
the index. This suggested a continued need for thoughtful reflexion around definition and
measurement.

44
Findings

Finding 36. Resilience is best understood by drawing on a diverse range of methodologies –

including qualitative and participatory approaches.
172. Previous research had concluded that the understanding of resilience must incorporate
information that is not readily captured by quantitative models. “Resilience measurement,
like most efforts to measure complex phenomena, requires a multi-dimensional, multi-
method approach. Measuring resilience means understanding the perspective of affected
populations and individuals, so analysis must include context-specific, qualitative and
subjective information – and some kind of measures of that information” (FSIN, 2015).

173. Many stakeholders, especially amongst the NGO community, also argued that participatory
methods provide a deeper contextual understanding of resilience conditions and
challenges at the community level. For example, a participatory Tufts study of recovery in
Uganda identified key challenges of the impacts of climate change, poor governance and
corruption, limited opportunities for decent work, livelihood changes and conflict over
land. This provided a very different set of findings that could stimulate a richer debate of
causality and responses (FAO and Tufts University, 2019). UNICEF work in Somalia on
“Pathways to resilience” also provides a useful example of a more open-ended study.

174. The quantitative and participative approaches should be complementary, but at times they
were competitive with a push for standardization. For example, FAO and UNDP (who
developed the Community Based Resilience Analysis (COBRA) tool) were perceived to
compete for their respective tools to be adopted by the IGAD Resilience Analysis Unit. A
degree of confusion and competition was also reported in other settings where both actors
are active – including South Sudan and the Sahel. As one stakeholder commented “All
agencies - FAO, USAID, NGOs - risk getting lost in pushing their measurement model. We
need to step back and ask what is really wanted, for what purpose?”.

175. IGAD was conducting a review of the alternative resilience measurement tools to determine
whether one tool might be adopted for comparability across the region. The resulting
country consultation indicated that countries were not in favour of adopting a standard
regional tool and perceived it important to maintain a toolbox of different and
complementary resilience analysis tools methods. The inter-agency United Nations
guidance on resilience measurement does not promote any one tool and suggests that
alternatives methodologies of FAO, UNDP and WFP may all play a role according to the
context (UNSDG, 2020). Some FAO programme staff also asked for FAO be more open to
promoting the use of a toolkit of approach, so that the most relevant mix of methods could
be matched to a specific context and purpose.

3.2.5 Sustainability
Finding 37. INFORMED prioritized the production of RIMA analyses over the institutionalization
of the RIMA tool.
176. Under INFORMED, work area 3.1 is defined as “Technical and analytical support to Regional
Analysis Unit, Platforms, and countries on resilience is consolidated”. The main objective of
this area of work is stated as building capacities of countries and regional authorities in
resilience measurement and analysis, and in the use of information to ensure the overall
sustainability of the systems created. The specified targets were for the creation of one
resilience technical platform, capacity development activities in ten countries and 18 RIMA
analyses being conducted and supported.

45
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

177. No specific institutionalization strategy for RIMA was found to guide the activities
conducted under this work area at global, regional or country level. FAO resilience hubs in
Dakar and Nairobi were established and strengthened as the basis for country level
engagement. Activities included technical and/or financial support to regional bodies
(IGAD, CILLS, African Union), RIMA analyses country support (e.g. Kenya, Mauritania, Niger,
Senegal, etc.), training of national statistical offices (Niger, Senegal, Somalia, etc.),
promotion of resilience initiatives and case studies. Support to regional and national
institutions appears to have been principally demand-driven, rather than proactive or
strategic. The evaluation team found no evidence of ambition to develop a strategy to
institutionalize further RIMA internally or externally, or document summarizing the services
provided by FAO to external actors regarding RIMA. It was also not clear how the shift in
emphases in conducting national-level baselines to project-level monitoring under the
GNAFCPP related to any institutionalization strategy.

178. With limited headquarters staff resources available to support capacity building -
reportedly just two staff - several interviewees concluded that the primary focus was on
supporting and producing RIMA analyses and FAO did not place a high priority on
institutionalization.

Finding 38. Regional and national authorities remained dependent on FAO’s technical and
financial support to conduct RIMA analyses.
179. FAO has worked with a wide range of partners –governmental, United Nations agencies
and NGOs – to jointly implement RIMA analyses. In some cases this collaboration has
continued for over a decade. Technical and financial assistance has come from both the
FAO RIMA team based in Rome and a number of regional resilience hubs created in Dakar
and Nairobi. Even though there has been some progress in building ownership of RIMA
outside of FAO, it has been slow and patchy.

180. A primary entry point for capacity development has been through the regional institutions.
CILSS and IGAD and SICA have all received financial assistance to promote resilience
analysis in their respective regions.34 Working with Regional Economic Communities
provides a connection with national policymakers and a range of technical ministries and
statistical offices. Different levels of progress are evident in the various regions.

i. FAO and CILSS established a technical platform on resilience measurement. This

provided a technical forum to progress the discussion of resilience measurement in
the region. A workshop was held in Niamey in 2016 to identify relevant contextual
variables adapted to the region. The collaboration with CILSS led to the creation of
the “Analyse et Mesure de la Resilience”, an ad hoc tool that adopts the econometrics
of RIMA and the analytical framework of CILSS to measure resilience in the Sahel
region.35 This is currently being piloted in several Sahelian countries (Niger, Senegal).
While this is a good sign of appropriation and contextualization of the tool at regional
level, there is no clear strategy or recommendation for AMR use decided or

34In the case of SICA, this did not come through INFORFMED but another European Union project.
35A CILSS working group simplified and contextualized the RIMA, both at conceptual level (use of three pillars
instead of four) and at technical level (choice of contextually adapted variables, often available in existing surveys
such as LSMS across the region).

46
Findings

communicated by CILSS to Sahelian countries. Resilience analysis in the region still

remains reliant on FAO technical and financial support.

ii. Cooperation with SICA in Central America supported RIMA studies being
implemented in five countries (Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, El
Salvador). Surveys are collected by national statistical offices. In each country RIMA
has a technical group on resilience analysis and SICA has been working with these
groups to prepare the reports. The SICA focal point is an active promoter and well
aware of the developments in this field of work having been involved with FAO in the
development of RIMA I. Through SICA, the RIMA team supported National Institute
of Statistics and academia (universities). They also collaborate with the Central
American Institute of Public Administration. RIMA is still at an early stage of
development in Central America.

iii. In the Horn of Africa FAO supported IGAD to establish the IFRAH unit, to bring
together a range of food security, nutrition and resilience analysis capacities. 36 This
process is still in its early stages and a resilience analyst has yet to be recruited by
IGAD. A good practice in terms of sustainability and cost efficiency is that FAO
supported IGAD to recruit their own staff to the unit, rather than seconding FAO
technical assistance.

iv. As noted above, the African Union has adopted the RIMA RCI as an indicator for
monitoring Result 6 of the Malabo Declaration (see paragraph 156). FAO is providing
technical assistance to support the biannual analysis of this indicator for inclusion in
future reports. It is still early to assess progress towards building and sustaining the
necessary capacities within the African Union and Member States.

181. At the national level support has mostly been demand-driven and provided on request.
Support in some countries predated INFORMED and has been provided over many years.
Some of the most prominent examples of collaboration at national level included the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda. Interviews with
a range of stakeholders in these countries confirmed a high level of interest in resilience
analysis alongside challenges in establishing national ownership.

i. In South Sudan, RIMA is placed at the centre of discussions on resilience analysis.

However, it is situated in a donor/United Nations-led partnership programme
without the engagement of the Government. It was suggested that FAO could have
involved partners more on the contextualization of the tool to South Sudan to create
a higher sense of ownership among partners, as only a few partners (specifically the
International Food Policy Research Institute, IFPRI) truly understood the tool.37 FAO
retains the technical responsibility for utilization of the tool in South Sudan supported
by the Regional Office in Nairobi. Expectations on the use of RIMA have been raised
and there is concern about whether FAO can continue to meet the demand
generated due to capacity constraints.

36 The connection between IFRAH and IDRSSI (the IGAD platform tasked with supporting resilience in the region) is
unclear.
37 FAO was making efforts in this regard with an awareness raising and technical training on RIMA planned for

March 2020 with partners, however this is delayed due to the COVID-19 outbreak.

47
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

ii. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the RIMA RCI has been integrated as a key
indicator since 2014, alongside other food and nutrition indicators. The methodology
is adapted to the Palestinian context and is taken as one of the references for food
security measurement in the area. It is reported as fully integrated within the official
food security measurement mechanisms and used by all partners. This is further
complemented with the resilience marker embedded in the 2017-2019 HRP
processes.

iii. However, the analysis and use of the RCI has been intermittent. It is designed to be
reported on at two yearly intervals. It was reported in 2014, not collected in 2016 and
the 2018 survey is not published yet as if May 2020 - although intermediary findings
are available. This limited the application of findings for programming or advocacy.
This was attributed to resource constraints as the responsible agency is dependent
on external funding. While technical capacities have been built locally by the RIMA
team, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics still seek final validation of the RIMA
team in Rome before publication.

iv. In Senegal, technical support from FAO and CILSS have led to a good level of
awareness among technicians, with RIMA I, RIMA II and AMR analyses being
conducted. The national statistical offices reportedly had the capacity to implement
the RIMA methodology. However, recent staff turnover in SSNSA requires further
capacity building to ensure the technical capacity to use RIMA autonomously in the
future. It is unclear when the AMR will become the official resilience measure at the
regional level and how this will be absorbed at country level.

v. In Somalia, Government officers perceived the introduction of RIMA as “top-down”

from FAO rather than based on the needs of Somalis. Training of national
counterparts was well received, but it was short-term, limited in scope and has not
been sufficient in itself to embed capacities in the country. Overall the approach is
not seen as suited to institutionalization in fragile contexts and the relevance or
viability of attempting to embed RIMA in the national system in Somalia is
questioned. A more pragmatic approach was suggested of focussing on
strengthening the collection of the underlying data and indicators, rather than RIMA.
Alternative qualitative tools were also perceived to offer a more appropriate solution
for the specific context.

vi. FAO has worked with the Uganda Resilience Measurement Unit under the Office of
the Prime Minister. The positioning within the Office of the Prime Minister is seen as
strategically important as the relevance analysis goes beyond any one Ministry.
However, FAO are still heavily involved in the analysis, as the national authorities can
do the technical data processing but not interpretation.

Finding 39. There has been collaboration with other agencies in piloting RIMA, but no United
Nations agencies or international NGOs have adopted the tool.
182. There has been a limited uptake of RIMA amongst United Nations agencies. WFP has
collaborated with FAO in piloting RIMA in several countries. WFP is currently taking stock
of alternative resilience measurement methodologies, including RIMA, but has not yet
agreed on a corporate standard. WFP expressed reservations on the complexity and cost
of the method and currently lack the capacity for RIMA analysis. Some WFP interviewees
suggested that for their purposes it may not be necessary to attempt to measure resilience

48
Findings

capacities directly and existing food security and nutrition indicators may be sufficient, and
has reportedly “almost given up on resilience measurement in corporate results
framework”.

183. The UNICEF perspective on resilience is very different from the one in the food security
sector. Consequently UNICEF reported struggling with the use of quantitative measures of
resilience such as RIMA. UNICEF respondents at various levels expressed more interest in
qualitative and participative analyses of resilience to understand changes in nutrition.

184. International and national NGOs reported that they lacked the technical capacity or
resources to use RIMA. When they are required to use RIMA (e.g. donors requested NGOs
to use RIMA in South Sudan to monitor progress), they are challenged by the tool
technicalities. It is considered costly and required consultants to support the process and
calculation, which leaves no sustainable capacity in house. Most NGOs, including Action
Against Hunger (ACF) and CARE, are analysing resilience based on either existing food
security indicators or participatory analysis. For example, BRICS (a consortium of NGOs in
Somalia) uses the coping strategy index (CSI), the Food Consumption Score (FCS) and six
or seven main indicators to measure resilience over time, using annual surveys.

Finding 40. RIMA trainings were well received but only a small number of professionals are capable
of independently conducting a RIMA analysis.
185. FAO has organized a large number of trainings at various levels to support the
implementation of RIMA studies. A number of curricula have been developed for different
audiences (see Box 10). Training has been principally conducted by RIMA experts based at
the FAO headquarters, supported by regional and country staff.

Box 10: RIMA trainings

Four different RIMA training courses have been developed:

i. Two-three days RIMA AWARENESS (non-technical training explaining what is RIMA, how it is created (with
no math and statistics involved), and awareness raising to involve policymakers or other stakeholders after
RIMA analysis is finalized).

ii. Five- days RIMA Basic training (STATA introduction and DATA manipulation/crunching/programming; it is
generally addressed to those people with no or limited knowledge of STATA, who will be future users of
RIMA methodology.).

iii. Five days RIMA Advanced training is addressed to those people who attended the Basic training or those
having a knowledge of STATA or familiarity with STATA language.

iv. RIMA in Excel which is specifically designed and developed for Monitoring & Evaluation officers, Evaluators
and other operators without a proper background of econometrics and use of statistical tools (such as
STATA).

186. Trainings have been offered to individual countries and through regional institutions. In
addition to the trainings, several workshops and conference were organized and videos on
using RIMA Excel produced. Feedback on the quality and conduct of the training and
associated sessions was universally positive and the videos were complemented as user-
friendly.

49
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

187. However, there has been limited progress in establishing a sufficient corps of professionals
able to autonomously conduct RIMA analyses, and technical knowledge of RIMA
implementation remains concentrated amongst a few experts. The stand-alone capacity
among national entities or regional bodies for analysing resilience remains lacking. Apart
from the headquarters RIMA team, it is estimated that only six trained and expert resources
in different offices in Africa can implement RIMA autonomously or under minimum
guidance (FAO, 2020).

188. FAO staff has generally a good knowledge of the tool and its use, however in some
instances there is a limited ability to use the method due to the level of skills required to
run the analysis and internal staff turnover. To date, the transfer of competence to the FAO
regional offices is considered insufficient and capacity building efforts with partners mostly
require the participation of headquarters staff.

189. Multiple factors appear to underlie this outcome. It did not help that the resources available
to support RIMA capacity building are limited and inadequate to the scale of the task. There
is a common agreement that there are not enough trainers – and budget - to deliver at
scale. High staff turnover amongst trained staff was frequently encountered undermining
capacity. Staff who qualified for RIMA training were highly skilled individuals with strong
employment prospects in more lucrative careers outside Government. For example, in
Somalia nearly all the staff trained in RIMA were reported to have left Government service
within two years.

190. The complexity of the RIMA tool required high levels of skill to conduct. Trainings are
therefore limited to organizations with statistical capacities (statistical offices, universities)
and left out a significant part of the humanitarian sector (notably international NGOs, local
NGOs). FAO acknowledged this limitation and introduced RIMA Excel to circumvent the
use of statistical packages and this has significantly simplified the calculation of the RIMA
RCI index. However, to do any further analysis of causality still requires statistical expertise.
Therefore, for most RIMA applications this constraint remains.

191. This situation was exacerbated by a deficit of suitable RIMA guidance. INFORMED
developed global level guidance (RIMA II, RIMA Short, FSIN publications), and contributed
to resilience methodological developments and advance research (FSIN publications,
articles and academic papers) on resilience measurement. However, much of this guidance
is highly technical and not easily accessible to the majority of food security analysts. More
guidance materials were requested regarding the choice of the most appropriate “tool for
the job”.

Finding 41. The heavy data demands of RIMA, and associated costs, continue to constrain
adoption of the tool, despite improvements made over time.
192. Stakeholders routinely referred to the heavy data demands of the RIMA tool as a major
barrier to the sustainability of the approach. RIMA requires multi-dimensional, high-
frequency, longitudinal data. There are two main options for accessing the data – either
through the use of existing data sets (for example Living Standards Measurement Study
(LSMS) data) or through the collection of survey data.

193. Some select countries have recent and detailed data needed for the RIMA analysis. The
LSMS surveys currently provide this data for six countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
Consequently, RIMA studies have been run using pre-existing data, for example several

50
Findings

RIMA surveys in the Sahel region (Niger, Mauritania and Senegal) were based on existing
datasets. Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System data is used for RIMA in South
Sudan but it is collected to be representative at county level. There is interest in analysis at
Payam and household level, where data is not available and bespoke panel survey data38 is
required to support project evaluations.

194. However, even where the data has already been collected, data processing demands need
to be considered. For example, the African Union Malabo Declaration monitoring of the
RCI is based on data from multiple Ministries (including Agriculture and Health) in addition
to the World Bank LSMS data. These data have to be extracted and cleaned, which requires
time and expertise. National data sets are often old and infrequent. In Honduras, the RIMA
analysis has relied on data from the ENCOVI National Survey, conducted by the National
Institute of Statistics for the last time in 2014. Until another ENCOVI is conducted, it would
not be possible to conduct a follow-up RIMA analysis.

195. The repurposing of existing or pipeline surveys to support resilience analysis has been
mooted and is a possibility for more flexible surveys, such as multiple indicator cluster
surveys (MICS) and LSMS, rather than fully standardized Demographic and Health Surveys
(FSIN, 2015). To some extent this has been achieved in Senegal and Uganda, albeit with
challenges on synchronizing data collection with the reporting time frame and financial
sustainability.

196. In the majority of cases, RIMA analysis required the collection of survey data. The cost and
data demands of RIMA analyses is still questioned, despite the introduction of RIMA Short
to lessen this burden. While RIMA Short has been helpful in making RIMA significantly less
data-intensive, data demands are still significant. The collection of panel data to support
RIMA is particularly demanding.39

197. In practical terms the heavy data demands translated into high costs. WFP reported a
reluctance to mainstream the use of RIMA, specifically due to concerns on the cost. It was
noted that if this was an issue for a well-endowed United Nations agency, it was likely to
be an even bigger issue for budget constrained national authorities. In Colombia, where
RIMA is used for monitoring and evaluation, staff from the project reported that data
collection was long and tiring, and “The whole exercise in general is very complex”, that’s
why they are not envisioning the use of RIMA at mid-term to redirect programmes but just
two measures (baseline and endline). IGAD States reported that that they are already
overstretched and overburdened with monitoring the SDGs.

198. RIMA-related data collection exercises have been heavily dependent on FAO financial
support – and in kind support from other United Nations agencies including WFP and
UNICEF (for example, the first round of RIMA data collection in Karamoja). Partners
reported concerns about FAO’s capacity to continue to deliver on the monitoring
requirements due to a lack of internal FAO capacity.

199. Unfortunately it was not possible to determine the cost of data collection associated with
RIMA. Even though FAO is tracking all INFORMED expenses and is allocating these
expenses to the corresponding outputs, no attention has been given on the cost for the

38A further option would be to create synthetic panels using existing and experimental techniques.
39It was noted that alternative impact assessment tools – notably the Barrett method – only require a single round
of data collection for impact assessment.

51
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

delivery of each output produced; nor had the RIMA team estimated the cost of survey
data collection. Stakeholders in Uganda estimated the cost of data collection for one survey
round for one project at USD 100 000 to 200 000.

3.3 Knowledge management

3.3.1 Strategy and activities

200. In 2016, FAO established a Knowledge Sharing Platform on Resilience, KORE (“Knowledge
Resilience”), initiated as an additional component of INFORMED, under work performed
towards programme Output 3. The intention was to support resilience building by
developing guidance and facilitating the production and dissemination of knowledge
products to help field practitioners share their practices and promote replication. KORE
developed a structured approach to support learning processes. Figure 6 below presents a
simple logic model illustrating the intention at design.

Figure 6: Simple logic model for Knowledge Sharing Platform on Resilience (KORE)

Identify, devise and disseminate tools, approaches, analyses and good practices on resilience
building to inform resilience-strengthening interventions of FAO and partners

Provide a suite of mechanisms and products to facilitate knowledge generation on resilience-related

initiatives across sectors and themes, such as food security and nutrition, disaster risk reduction,
peace sustaining and climate change

Develop good practice studies and guidance material; produce newsletters; organize and facilitate
webinar and knowledge sharing sessions

Source: Evaluation team

201. The KORE initiative included the following work streams:

i. Documenting and broadcasting of good (or promising) practices by facilitating the

capture and systematic analysis of resilience-related interventions and their
dissemination within FAO networks. The aim was to enable replication and
upscaling. Supporting tools include templates and process maps.
ii. Facilitating knowledge sharing on resilience-related interventions, through
webinars advertised both externally and internally and other internal knowledge
sharing e-sessions.
iii. Draw attention of potentially interested practitioners on relevant knowledge
products or events, whether produced with support of KORE or not, through a
quarterly newsletter sent to a wide external and internal list of stakeholders since
November 2017.
iv. Establishing and maintaining a web portal for resilience compiling all knowledge
gathered; and a community of practice open to any practitioner of resilience
building interventions to facilitate knowledge exchange between practitioners.

52
Findings

202. All the above initiatives were financed exclusively from INFORMED resources - and
continue under the GNFCPP. Costs mainly supported the salaries of consultants composing
the headquarters-based KORE team, which steadily grew from one to four between 2016
and 2019. With a total level of financial expenditures of about USD 522 018, KORE
represented only 2.4 percent of the total project costs. The KORE team at headquarters
identified colleagues in the field to support them in championing knowledge management
and distributing tools and products through field networks. KORE thus progressively built
a network of focal points based in East Africa and IGAD, in West Africa (Regional Resilience,
Emergency and Rehabilitation Office for West Africa/Sahel, REOWA office) and more
recently in Latin America (Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (RLC) office).

3.3.2 Relevance and appropriateness of KORE

Finding 42. Establishing dedicated support under KORE to leverage existing knowledge responded
to a need amongst practitioners to learn for replication or upscaling of interventions.
203. Establishing KORE within INFORMED responded to a rationale of systematically
documenting and sharing lessons from experience to improve resilience building
programmes. Various other institutions, such as IGAD or USAID, also considered resilience
building as a programmatic area with high action-learning potential, which motivated these
institutions to invest in resilience knowledge management.

204. The e-consultation launched in 201640 revealed that the community of practitioners
identified three main areas of need:

i. broadcasting analytical lessons learned and good practices;

ii. structuring and synthesizing the proliferation of knowledge on resilience;
iii. having an interactive and action-oriented platform for practitioners (knowledge
providers and consumers) to exchange their experiences, discuss and debate, share
methods, data and analysis.
205. Generating learning warranted dedicated support, considering that resilience building
programme managers tended to focus on implementation and on documenting practices
merely to meet reporting obligations. Additionally, managing knowledge for learning is a
function that requires specific skills sets, which programme managers often lack. The
INFORMED mid-term review already highlighted the need to continue to expand the
knowledge management component of the programme.

Finding 43. The creation of a new resilience knowledge management platform was not necessarily
the most appropriate action to take to fulfil needs expressed by practitioners.
206. Within the 2016 e-consultation, some experienced practitioners (including FSIN, USAID,
TANGO and IGAD) warned against the risk of duplicating efforts and pointing to the need
to streamline, cross-reference and structure an already prolific number of resilience
knowledge management platforms. The community advocated for adopting a collaborative
‘and partnership-driven’ approach. Suggestions included assembling the wide range of
actors developing local, regional and global resilience knowledge management and
learning platforms under a shared initiative that could start with mapping existing

40 The e-consultation was launched via the FSN forum.

53
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

references, developing a shared framework to organize resilience knowledge and clarifying

the demand.

207. Although the team examined the opportunity of supporting an integrated platform that
may build on pre-existing partner efforts such as IGAD’s under the IGAD Drought Disaster
Resilience Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) strategy,41 the establishment of an ad hoc
platform prevailed as it had been agreed upon with the project donor. Also, there are
practical challenges in coordinating knowledge initiatives due to competition over visibility
and funding; and the team in charge of developing FAO’s knowledge management offer
encountered a level of reluctance amongst other initiatives in sharing the knowledge they
had captured.

Finding 44. The initial strategy underpinning KORE was not founded on clearly defined knowledge
needs and users. This constituted a fundamental constraint to manage the initiative effectively.
However, regular user consultations helped improve the relevance of knowledge products to
potential users.
208. Effective knowledge management starts with identifying the needs and characteristics of
target audiences and requires matching product formats and outreach modalities to them.
KORE was not designed based on a thorough needs assessment, as knowledge
management was only given limited attention prior to INFORMED. Having a vaguely
defined user base made it challenging for KORE, once created, to devise suitable strategies
to generate knowledge and learning that suited defined needs. This was also a fundamental
constraint to measure knowledge uptake.

209. With this initial constraint, the KORE team has assessed needs of potential users in various
ways. The team kept attentive of FAO’s internal knowledge needs largely through regular
interactions with the FAO teams under the SP5 at headquarters and field offices. This led
to the development of the webinars which, in turn, provided an opportunity to gather
feedback from attendees, who were asked to provide suggestions for further learning
sessions. The community of practice is another tool that facilitated communication with
and feedback from practitioners, in particular on their knowledge needs.

210. Decisions on topics to choose for good practices sheets mainly stemmed from proposals
offered to programme managers interested in documenting and giving visibility to
successful approaches. This offer-driven approach risked leaving many good practices
unseen. KORE’s progressive network building with teams leading on thematic work streams
(e.g. nutrition, peace sustaining) and field-based colleagues involved in resilience work, has
helped collect good practices more systematically. This allowed disseminating templates

41Existing initiatives, network or platforms mentioned in the e-consultation included: The Open Data for
Resilience Initiative (OpenDRI) supported by the World Bank (https://www.gfdrr.org/opendri); the Knowledge
sharing platform through BRACED with support from DfID and ODI (http://www.braced.org/); the Global
Resilience Partnership (http://www.globalresiliencepartnership.org/); USAID’s Center for Resilience
(https://www.usaid.gov/resilience/resources); the Food Security Network supported by TOPS / USAID
(https://www.fsnnetwork.org/); Agrilinks supported by USAID (https://www.agrilinks.org/topics); Rockefeller
Foundation’s Resilience page (https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/our-work/topics/resilience/); the Farmerfirst
platform (http://www.farmingfirst.org/resilience); the Linkedin community of practice on Resilience by PopTech:
(https://www.linkedin.com/groups/5074090 ); the Food Security Information Network’s Resilience Measurement
Technical Working Group ; and the global Food Security Cluster.

54
Findings

developed by KORE to support the documentation of good practices, and progressively

sensitizing colleagues to knowledge management needs and approaches.

3.3.3 Effectiveness of KORE tools and products

Finding 45. KORE has delivered a significant number of well-designed products and services.
211. The evaluation of Strategic Programme 5 on resilience, conducted in 2016, deplored a lack
of structured knowledge exchange within FAO’s resilience Strategic Programme team (SP5)
(FAO, 2016). Several of KORE’s products, including the community of practice and internal
knowledge exchange sessions, demonstrate attempts to promote knowledge exchange
within FAO, addressing the need identified, despite limited resources.

212. KORE delivered a well thought and structured approach to knowledge management. The
processes, tools and efforts of the KORE team led to the production of a number of outputs,
listed below (KORE communication material):

i. Over 30 good (or promising) practice sheets were produced on topics such as SAFE,
gender mainstreaming, cash-based transfers, social cohesion, livestock/pastoralism,
institutionalization processes, etc. (see Annex for full list). In REOWA, the knowledge
management consultant supported national facilitators who might help famers adopt
good practices;

ii. 22 webinars were organized for externals users, which gathered on average around
80 participants, and a maximum of 135 participants, with numbers growing over time;

iii. 25 knowledge exchange sharing sessions were organized for FAO staff since 2017, to
capture attention on a focused topic, with 49 participants on average reported
(during the webinar), and recordings posted on internal share drive. (see Annex X for
details).

213. A structured process was established to collect good practices. Figure 7 shows the stepped
approach to developing good practices. A template was developed in 2016 and updated
throughout the programme based on feedback and use, to encourage a capture of
information that isolates features to help identify the conditions for replicating the
practices in different contexts. The suite of tools provided solid guidance and support for
practitioners who do not necessarily have expertise in relation to knowledge transfer, and
an incentive to take the time to reflect and share experience.

Figure 7: KORE stepped approach to developing good practices

Source: From FAO/KORE website on capacity development

214. The KORE web portal structure improved over time, with dedicated pages for webinar
series, good practices or publications, and investments in mobile-friendly interface, to allow
for smoother navigation for mobile resilience practitioners and expand good practices
dissemination. KORE reported the website to have attracted over 25 000 visitors since its
launch in 2017.

55
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

215. There are over 2 200 subscribers42 to the KORE community of practice and regularly sharing
updates via a newsletter has kept the community engaged. Experience showed that the
website use peaks immediately after sending the newsletter to approximately 2 250
subscribers.

216. KORE’s engagement with partners such as IGAD and CILSS during regional knowledge
share fairs supported the dissemination of good practices and knowledge. KORE facilitated
good practice documentation of cross border resource and livestock sharing in the Horn
of Africa and won a presentation spot at Expo 2020 Dubai Global Best Practice Programme.

Finding 46. The use of knowledge products appears to be patchy with mixed levels of awareness
and appreciation of KORE products.
217. The survey launched by the KORE team in 2018 showed that a large majority of respondents
found webinars and good practices useful, and expressed an interest in KORE continuing
to offer them.43 The online survey conducted for the evaluation also confirmed that a
majority of respondents know where to find good practices and have used them (see
Figure 8).

Figure 8: Use of KORE good practices

Source: From OED survey results (see Appendix 3)

218. The KORE team also reports receiving anecdotal evidence from FAO colleagues that good
practices are being replicated. KORE knowledge products were cited in the recent FAO
handbook for emergency preparedness of FAO. IGAD also reports regularly using tools,
guidance and good practices, and disseminating within their community. REOWA reported
use of information and good practices collected by FAO in the region by Federation of Red
Cross colleagues.

219. However, stakeholder interviews conducted by the evaluation, from within and outside
FAO, showed a generally low level of familiarity with KORE products. At the field level, the
evidence of use is quite uneven:

i. In REOWA, a consultant dedicated to managing knowledge reported a few good

results: first, the regional office developed a strategy to capitalize on experience, with
KORE and other support from the emergency operational support teams of the
Emergency and Rehabilitation Division (PSE) at headquarters. This is a step forward

42 Figure reported as end 2019, as per KORE communication material.

43 Most users were in Africa and Europe.

56
Findings

as there was no previous structure to manage knowledge. The team also mentored
national consultants in documenting good practice in such way that they will be
easier to replicate. Lastly, the team also worked on a process to facilitate the
replication of relevant good practices at community level, developing tailored
activities.

ii. In Uganda, where the knowledge management focal point is mainly dedicated to
another task (RIMA), the overall contribution of the team to knowledge management
is much less visible and results less evident. In countries where KORE had no
champion, such as Colombia, Honduras or Mongolia, FAO staff are generally not
familiar with KORE knowledge products and awareness was even lower with FAO
partners.

220. The REOWA knowledge management team acknowledges that more needs be done to
support replication, for which dedicated capacity is necessary. However, where staff have
training around and can dedicate time to knowledge management, there are more visible
results.

3.3.4 Factors influencing utility

Finding 47. Having strategic management decisions made by programme managers lacking
comprehensive knowledge management expertise affected KORE effectiveness in generating
knowledge and learning.
221. Some decisions related to the design of the KORE strategy suggest that the requirements
of an effective knowledge management function were not fully appreciated by non-expert
programme managers. With a reduced power on budget management, the KORE team,
exclusively working from temporary consultancy contracts, was not in an advantageous
position to influence strategic decisions. The progressive growth of human resources and
efforts to institutionalize the knowledge management function within the subsequent
GNAFC points to a recognition by Management of the importance of establishing an
effective knowledge management function.

222. The following paragraphs describe how some of the strategic decisions made by non–
expert managers influenced KORE effectiveness.

Finding 48. Despite a positive evolution of human resources dedicated to knowledge management
over time, the resources available to KORE remained limited and insufficient.
223. KORE articulated its work around the stimulation of people’s engagement, providing them
with tools, to facilitate knowledge and learning generation. This approach supposes long-
term and regular investments into understanding user needs and building channels of
communications with them. This aligned to the purpose of supporting capturing, creating,
distilling, sharing and using know-how (FAO, 2011). Still, insufficient resources - in
particular human resources - were invested to permit the required interactions with users.
The limited number of staff in the KORE team inevitably limited the capacity of KORE to
nurture the level of interactions with colleagues required to manage knowledge sharing–
oriented collaborations, as reported by the KORE team and other teams in FAO HQ.

224. The low level of resources available to KORE limited staffing of field offices. Consequently,
KORE relied on focal points, whose primary focus was on programmatic areas and were
sensitized to knowledge management. Although this was a pragmatic approach, relying on

57
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

staff who hold different responsibilities entails a risk. For example, one knowledge
management focal point was unaware of basic information such as an upcoming regional
knowledge share fair and the internal knowledge sharing mechanisms used by KORE. This
is also true for work done at the headquarters level: for instance, maintaining a community
of practice typically requires ongoing attention, and members of the KORE team, who
attend many work areas, cannot afford to dedicate adequate time to the facilitation of such
community.

Finding 49. Limited partnerships and coordination with external platforms (with the exception of
few institutions) constrained outreach and the efficient use of knowledge.
225. Considering that managing knowledge entails minimizing duplication, searching for
synergies and complementarities with other platforms and consolidating knowledge was a
relevant strategy. The 2016 e-consultation offered several leads for reflection on existing
initiatives FAO might build on, including:

i. IGAD’s resilience knowledge management and research pillar under the IDDRSI
strategy as the framework within which an integrated knowledge sharing platform can
be established and coordinated;

ii. the Food Security Information Network’s Resilience Measurement Technical Working
Group, cited as a good example of how to build and share knowledge on resilience
among different stakeholders;

iii. the global Food Security Cluster, serving as a neutral platform for coordinating action
avoiding any duplication or overlaps and offering a potential platform for partners to
also share ideas, products and good practices on resilience building in food security
sector.

226. In practice, collaboration with other external platforms was limited due to competition over
content. In contrast to this general finding, both the KORE and IGAD’s knowledge
management teams report positive and ongoing collaborations in preparing products,
sharing tools and cross-referencing. The drivers of these open collaborations appears to
stem from a shared vision and understanding of mutual interests. The KORE portal
references good practice booklets of key partners (European Union, IGAD, CILSS) but does
not cross reference other resilience knowledge management platforms.

227. Even the efforts made to coordinate with knowledge platforms internal to FAO did not
yield convincing results. Although a few good practices sheets were prepared jointly with
the TECA platform, documenting good practices for small agricultural producers (FAO,
2017), and despite sustained efforts to coordinate both portals, many other practices
relevant to resilience still appear only on TECA’s pages. As the KORE team itself
acknowledges, much of the knowledge remains scattered across various hosting sites, and
is not all cross-referenced in a way to facilitate use.

Finding 50. The uptake and use of the knowledge products was not monitored, limiting the
opportunities for learning and adjustment.
228. Although the end goal of sharing good practices is to allow their replication, this is not
tracked. The headquarters-based KORE team acknowledges that they do not have a full
grasp on the use of their products, owing to lack of mechanism to track users. The fact that
the KORE strategy did not stem from systematic user analysis may have instigated this

58
Findings

challenge to track knowledge use. The team is aware of the need to work further on this,
as demonstrated by the hiring of new staff to track good practices application. In the field,
knowledge management ‘champions’ recognize that “There is a huge gap in monitoring
GP in the field” because they lack an approach to measure use.

229. The survey conducted in 2018 demonstrated an interest in gathering user feedback. KORE
also seized the opportunity of each webinar to consult attendees systematically at the end
of each session via a short questionnaire collecting metrics (institution, localization), asking
standard questions on satisfaction in relation to the quality and contents of the webinar,
but also probing for suggestions for future topics. The questionnaire was short and could
be fill out immediately (initially it was a google form link which was less conducive).

Finding 51. The limited proactive collaboration between KORE and MEAL was a missed
opportunity for cross-fertilization between two initiatives despite their complementary purposes.
230. An SP5 MEAL team has been formed in recent years. However, there has been little
collaboration between the two teams until recently. There are obvious opportunities to
establish synergies with knowledge management. However, a dialogue between the two
teams only started recently. From early 2020 KORE and MEAL started to discuss possible
synergies, although processes to facilitate these synergies were still not clear.

231. Prior to this, the emphasis was on building synergies between MEAL and the RIMA analysis.
A difference in ‘culture’ might have caused the slowness in collaborating - as KORE tends
to use qualitative approaches to generate knowledge, while MEAL has so far emphasized
quantitative approaches which aligned better with the RIMA methodology. However, this
difference in approach offers a strong rationale for collaboration. KORE could provide the
MEAL approach with complementary qualitative understandings and with a solid approach
to ‘learning’.

3.3.5 Sustainability
Finding 52. KORE was anchored in INFORMED, a time-bound project, and was not connected to
knowledge management as a core function of FAO.
232. The knowledge management function ties in well with the focus of INFORMED, but also
pertains to FAO’s entire work on resilience and beyond. Both the INFORMED mid-term
review and 2018 results-oriented monitoring identified a vision of KORE becoming a
knowledge sharing and knowledge management platform, expanding beyond the subject
of resilience and INFORMED, as well as becoming a reference point for other organizations,
not just FAO. Still, KORE’s influence lacked the support of a broader knowledge
management culture in SP5 and beyond, reflecting a wider issue related to the limited
development of knowledge management strategies in FAO.

233. KORE’s role within the wider SP5 information management systems is not fully clear, from
a general browsing of the webpages dedicated to FAO’s work on resilience (FAO). The
criteria distinguishing knowledge reported under the KORE portal from that reported under
other SP5-related webpages are not clear. More generally, the SP5 web portal structure
does not help bring clarity.

59
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

Finding 53. The creation of a dedicated knowledge management platform for resilience related
knowledge management and limited engagement with others, and the lack of anchoring in a
broader knowledge management function in FAO was not conducive to institutionalization.
234. KORE opted for leveraging FAO’s programme human resources by building a network of
champions in the field and building their capacities in managing knowledge and relaying
KORE approaches and products. As mentioned above, in principle this was a valid solution
to expand FAO staff knowledge and engagement in knowledge management, with limited
resources,. In practice, relying on people whose primary responsibility is elsewhere also
entails distilled attention onto their knowledge management-related tasks, hence risking a
shallow anchoring of knowledge management within the institutional culture.

235. The use of a community of practice was another approach to keep the network engaged
and unified, but again, it requires maintenance to remain active and appealing to members,
and KORE‘s reliance on project-dependent financial and human resources did not provide
sufficient investment.

236. Lastly, as noted above, the choice to set-up a stand-alone platform was less sustainable
than joining forces with existing stakeholder institutions and build a joint platform.

60
4. Conclusions and recommendations
4.1 Conclusions
237. As noted in the scope of the evaluation, the evaluation report, including the conclusions,
focus on the EWEA, RIMA and KORE work areas. A separate evaluation of the IPC was
finalized in 2019 and this provides a detailed set of findings, conclusions and
recommendations in relation to that component of INFORMED.

Conclusion 1. The main outcome areas of the INFORMED programme - promoting Early
Warning Early Action, resilience analysis and knowledge management – are key needs for
food security and nutrition decision makers and should remain priorities for FAO. However,
the Organization should do more to advocate for and support improved data streams to
assist these analyses.
238. The general relevance of all the main areas of INFORMED to the priorities of decision
makers responsible for food security, nutrition and resilience is clear. Improved analysis to
support early action, build resilience and related areas of knowledge management is highly
relevant. In developing the GRFC, INFORMED also addressed an important gap in bringing
together a global picture of the incidence of, and trends in, acute food in security. While
IPC activities were mainly out of the evaluation scope, these were also undoubtedly highly
relevant – as confirmed by the IPC evaluation.

239. The design originally recognized the need to improve access to food, nutrition and
resilience statistics, alongside improving the analysis, and this was very relevant as well.
However, this was not carried forward as a priority under INFORMED and remains an
important gap.

240. The demand for this information and analysis responded to a well-articulated demand
amongst a range of key users. FAO was a principal beneficiary, both as a normative agency
supporting the capacities of national authorities and in its role in implementing
humanitarian and development interventions. The European Union, with its large food
security, nutrition and resilience portfolios, was a second key stakeholder, alongside other
development partners active in addressing food security and nutrition. Furthermore, there
is evidence that the INFORMED design responded to the needs of national authorities
themselves, and their supporting regional organizations.

241. These demands remain strong and have not diminished, and the need for programming in
these areas should remain a priority for FAO.

Conclusion 2. An important lesson is that the initial design lacked a sufficient understanding
of specific decision-making processes and needs. Consequently, it has taken time for the
programme to develop a proper understanding of decision makers’ needs. To enhance
utility, the design of INFORMED products should find their inspiration in identified users’
needs, rather than seek to communicate research findings retrospectively.

242. Overall the INFORMED design made many sound choices. However, the initial
understanding of the detailed needs of potential users – or the operating context – was
insufficiently developed. The consequence of this was that the design of tools and activities
did not align well with user needs. The programme would have benefitted from a starting

61
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

point of how it could facilitate decision-making processes – rather than trying to

retrospectively communicate research findings to decision makers.

243. This was evident in the case of resilience analysis, which had a very academic and research
focussed entry point. Similarly, the EWEA initiative was initially at first driven by an internal
demand for greater coherence and synergies between the different early warning streams
within the organization. And the initial KORE design was also not strongly anchored in user
information needs assessment. To their credit, INFORMED managers recognized this deficit
and the programme has been strongly adaptive over the implementation period, striving
to improve its specific relevance to decision makers. Both formal and informal
accountability and learning mechanisms enabled and supported adaptation.

244. However, it has taken time for the programme to reorient itself to better address user
demands and it is evident that there are still important gaps. There is still a lack of clarity
in how the RIMA analysis addresses different purposes, rather than offering a common
analysis for multiple purposes. A wide range of analytical gaps remains around resilience,
and decision makers still require many other metrics that are not yet available. The
relevance of resilience analysis across the nexus could improve with resilience analysis
informing poverty reduction programming.

245. Similar challenges were also evident in the other output areas. The initial design of EWEA
lacked a consideration of decision-making processes at the country level and the addition
of a country-level pilot was essential in providing evidence on the effectiveness of the
EWEA approach. By itself, the production of the quarterly EWEA report would not have
moved EWEA beyond a theoretical approach. Knowledge management tools developed
under KORE still do not respond to the practical needs of programme staff to identify
context specific early actions or resilience interventions.

Conclusion 3. The Early Warning Early Action initiative has been highly effective at the global
level. It has positioned FAO as a key player in the key coordination forums and FAO has used
this platform to advocate for the promotion of EWEA with significant results.
246. Through INFORMED, FAO has developed into a highly influential member of the EWEA
community at the global level. Through participation in the main coordination platforms at
global levels, FAO has been a key contributor to the international debate on promoting
and developing anticipatory action. While hard to attribute to FAO’s efforts, there is clearly
a refreshed interest amongst a range of stakeholders in anticipatory action. This has
resulted in very significant collective outcomes, most notably the REAP partnership.

247. Core products, including the GRFC and the quarterly EWEA report, have been particularly
helpful in raising the profile of EWEA. There is an opportunity to more explicitly link the
GRFC and the quarterly EWEA report to further highlight opportunities - while the GRFC
provides a backward-looking view on the recent food security situation, this could be
married with the forward-looking view on emerging crises. FAO’s credibility as an advocate
lies on its comparative advantage in generating key evidence and learning around
anticipatory action – rooted in its experience of implementation.

Conclusion 4. At an operational level, establishing effective anticipatory action systems will

require sustained investments, both internally in FAO and amongst partners. Key areas
include improving the forecasting ability of early warning, improving access to finance and
building partnerships.

62
Conclusions and recommendations

248. The implementation of pilot EWEA activities at country level have provided important
learning opportunities on establishing EWEA systems. These pilots served to highlight a
number of constraints, both internal to FAO and across the system as a whole, that need
to be addressed as the EWEA initiative moves forward. Many of these factors are outside
the manageable interest of the EWEA initiative itself and require attention from senior
levels of management.

249. Foremost amongst these constraints is the limited predictive, or forecast capacity, of early
warning systems. This emerged a critical constraint to the effectiveness of EWEA. The heavy
reliance of IPC projections is problematic given the fact that IPC was not designed as an
early warning tool and has yet to be adapted for this purpose. Improved risk analysis and
scientific partnerships for early warning are needed.

250. Furthermore, the trigger mechanisms linking early warning to action are untested.
Communication of the results could be improved - FAO also needs to move towards digital
solutions for the aggregation and dissemination of early warning information, including
creating or adapting existing online platforms to host early warning alerts and trend
analysis for the benefit of both FAO and partners.

251. Other constraints within FAO include its own protocols and procedures, which inhibit timely
action. The EWEA initiative remained heavily dependent on project-based budget
resources and has not yet been adequately embedded in sustained funding commitments.
While internal financing through SFERA has been key to implementation, it lacks the
resources to deliver at scale. Internal financing through SFERA has been key to rolling out
pilots, but insufficient to meet rising levels of demand. Critically, there is still a lack of
understanding and clarity in the distinction between early (anticipatory) action and early
response.

252. It is still too early to determine the utility of the EWEA Country Toolkit and the associated
plans – but it is clear that early action is complex and is dependent on strong partnerships
across a large number of government and non-governmental stakeholders. Forging strong
and inclusive partnerships at national level is key, alongside access to appropriate sources
of finance.

Conclusion 5. With INFORMED’s support to RIMA, FAO has been an important forerunner in
resilience measurement. However, the current tool is not widely used for planning, targeting
or assessing the impact of resilience policies or programmes. It has had more utility to policy
monitoring. The tool in its current form is also not likely to subsist in national systems
independently. An evolution of resilience methodologies is therefore inevitable.
253. Investments in INFORMED have strategically positioned FAO as a key global contributor
on debates on resilience measurement. FAO has been recognized as an important pioneer
in resilience analysis and has been an influential member of the global technical
coordination platforms. Through this, FAO has undoubtedly made important contributions
to the development of resilience measurement methodologies.

254. However, detailed findings on the use and utility of RIMA analyses point to major
challenges in both application and sustainability. The RIMA tools and products remain
poorly understood. The use of the RIMA index for many of the intended purposes -
including planning, targeting or assessing the impact of resilience policies or programmes
- is limited. Furthermore, the appropriateness and added value over existing food security

63
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

and nutrition indicators and approaches can be questioned for some applications. The
utility of the new “indirect” measure to analyse the determinants of resilience has yet to be
demonstrated.

255. There has been insufficient attention to monitoring the use and utility of the analytical
products, which could have helped managers to adapt the programme. The indicators
included in the LogFrame are insufficient to capture the achievement of the expected
results and their contribution to the INFORMED objective of evidence-based analysis
regarding the food security, nutrition and resilience situation for decision-making.

256. The cost and technical complexity of the method challenge prospects for
institutionalization within Government or other partners. RIMA analyses remain largely
dependent on FAO technical and financial support. Capacity building is limited to individual
training rather than a strategic approach to institutionalization. Further methodological
innovation and simplification is required if RIMA is to move beyond a niche research tool.

257. There are relatively few contexts where RIMA currently has strong prospects as an effective
and sustainable tool to support decision makers. Using the RIMA index to monitor policy
commitments is one example; where the main constraints are mitigated as data can often
be extracted from existing surveys rather than conducting a bespoke survey, and technical
demands are limited by the use of RIMA Excel.

Conclusion 6. Considering the sustained demand for information and analysis to support
resilience policies and programming, there is a need for continued methodological
innovation. This will require dedicated efforts towards measuring and analysing needs and
undercurrents of resilience, based on a diversity of tools and approaches.
258. There is clearly a strong demand for continued support and innovation from multiple
stakeholders in resilience analysis. This demand is to support decision-making across a
wide range of purposes including advocacy, learning and accountability.

259. RIMA analyses have been substantially adapted to different contexts and purposes over
the years. However, these diverse processes are still effectively presented as a single
methodology. This has compounded confusion amongst users on the purpose of RIMA.
Furthermore, as RIMA has attempted to respond to multiple purposes it risked becoming
increasingly complex and cumbersome through the continued addition of optional
modules.

260. There is a need to clarify how FAO analyses can contribute to the measurement and analysis
of resilience in different contexts and for different purposes. It would therefore be desirable
to unpack RIMA into a number of differentiated tools, to be used for different and specific
purposes.

261. There is a strong need to build on good practices and provide practical and cost efficient
approaches to resilience measurement at strategic and operational level. Existing large-
scale national survey data are amongst those that may be used to derive the RCI and
identify hotspots where to conduct more in-depth resilience surveys, complemented with
qualitative data collection.

262. Furthermore, there is strong demand and justification for using a wider range of analytical
approach. In particular, there is a clear demand for understanding dynamics influencing

64
Conclusions and recommendations

resilience at community level, possibly based on more open and qualitative approaches,
and using participatory tools to understand pathways to achieving resilience. FAO would
benefit from access to a mix of resilience methodologies, rather than an exclusive focus on
RIMA.

Conclusion 7. The various INFORMED outcome areas developed largely in isolation. Recent
attempts to explore and develop synergies between the different analyses have had limited
results. A more appropriate level to develop synergies would be in identifying and
supporting common data set to support the different food and nutrition security analysis
tools.
263. The various programme pillars operated autonomously and there were few examples of
synergies between the different analytical pillars. This was partly explained by an initial
emphasis on developing each of the tools. Only when they had reached a certain level of
maturity did the different initiatives start to examine possible areas of complementarity.
The location of different systems in different FAO units has also impeded interaction.

264. Much of the debate concerned attempting to create synergies between the main analyses
and tools. For example, using RIMA as a tool to assess the contribution of early actions to
resilience outcomes, or using the RIMA index as an input to the IPC phase classification. In
reality, most of these linkages have been found to be impractical. The main exception was
the use of IPC as an input to EWEA, albeit with identified limitations.

265. However, there are strong arguments that all data collection efforts emphasized by
INFORMED should be integrated and linked, providing a fuller understanding of the multi-
sectoral nature of food insecurity and malnutrition that can then inform both national and
regional policies around food and nutrition security.

Conclusion 8. While tools, guidance and services developed, and capacities established under
KORE constitute useful building blocks, promoting knowledge exchange for learning and
programme improvement requires more investment and giving staff skilled on knowledge
management the appropriate decision-making power to steer their mission.
266. Under INFORMED, FAO has made important contributions to learning on resilience
building and early action interventions. Understanding which interventions work, in which
contexts, is critical given the weakness of the existing evidence base. However, there are
important opportunities to strengthen this evidence base.

267. The scope of evidence needs to be expanded. In the case of EWEA, information collected
so far has concentrated on supporting advocacy, principally by assessing the economic
benefits of acting early. However, programme staff responsible for both EWEA and
resilience need much more information on the substance of what works and in what
context; nor is this evidence organized in a way that allows programme staff to identify
what may be relevant for their own objectives and context.

268. This is partly the consequence of a poorly developed corporate capacity in capturing
lessons on the effectiveness of livelihood interventions in supporting resilience and overall
knowledge management. The gradual growth in human resources dedicated to knowledge
management and the new MEAL capacity established within SP5 partly addresses this and
reflects an acknowledgment of the importance of such investment. Still, until recently, the
KORE and MEAL initiatives remained insufficiently connected.

65
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

269. The function of KORE would be more effectively leveraged by being directly connected to
a wider knowledge management function in FAO. Managing knowledge for resilience
should be a central and core function of FAO, resonating ideally across Strategic
Programmes, and most certainly beyond the scope of a given project. An effective function
of knowledge management would likely entail some extent of exchanges and networking
with FAO and external knowledge providers on resilience and food security.

4.2 Recommendations
Recommendation 1. FAO should strengthen capacities for the production and dissemination
of forecast, scenario-based early warning as a basis for early action.

(This recommendation is based on Conclusions 1 and 4, and Findings 5, 13, 14 and 17)

270. It is recommended that the FAO Office of Evaluation (OED) conduct a review of i) the
effectiveness of FAO-supported early warning systems (including GIEWS, IPC and EMPRES)
and their relation to other external early warning systems; ii) lessons from supporting early
warning system capacity development at national level and an assessment of the capacity
building needs of regional and country partners.

271. Based on this review, it is recommended that FAO headquarters develop a corporate
strategy for its role in both the production of forecast-based early warning, and
partnerships to strengthen early warning system capacities at various levels.

272. It is recommended that FAO conduct a review of lessons in developing triggers at country
level to link early warning to anticipatory action. Such review may include the conflict
analysis dimension.

273. It is recommended that the GNAFCPP transition the publication of the GRFC and quarterly
EWEA reports to an online format with rolling updates. Furthermore, an explicit link should
be developed between the two products, combining the backward-looking perspective of
the GRFC and the forward-looking perspective of the quarterly EWEA report.

Recommendation 2. FAO should work in partnership to strengthen the delivery of early

actions in selected priority high risk countries.

(This recommendation is based on Conclusion 4, and Findings 3, 9, 16, 17, 20, 21 and 22)

274. It is recommended that FAO update the corporate strategy to include operational
processes and accountabilities for anticipatory action. This should clarify the distinction
between forecast-based anticipatory action and early response.

275. It is recommended that FAO regional and country offices continue to work with national
and regional authorities to pilot the development and monitoring of country EWEA plans
in selected high priority countries. FAO should continue to develop the capacity of national
institutions and humanitarian partners in the spirit of active learning in piloting of tools,
rather than institutionalization of finalized products.

276. It is recommended that the gFSC support country clusters to embed responsibility (in
concert with national authorities) for EWEA planning, surveillance and implementation.

66
Conclusions and recommendations

277. It is recommended that FAO advocate for a substantive increase in the SFERA EWEA
window.

Recommendation 3. FAO should support policy and programme decision makers through a
diverse set of resilience-related analytical tools and improved data access.

(This recommendation is based on Conclusions 1, 2 and 6, and Findings 23, 24, 29, 36)

278. It is recommended that the FAO develop a broad strategy to support the analysis of
resilience. This should be based on a consideration of i) the specific needs of users for
information to support decision-making; ii) the comparative advantages of FAO in
responding to these needs; and iii) the skills required at headquarters (stakeholder analysis,
quantitative and qualitative skills sets) to support the delivery of a range of methodological
approaches.

279. It is recommended that FAO advocate for, and where appropriate support, the production
of, and enhanced access to, food and nutrition statistics by the responsible agencies that
contribute to resilience analysis.

280. It is specifically recommended that FAO investigate the potential for supporting
community-based, participatory investigations of pathways to resilience.

Recommendation 4. Within this wider resilience analysis strategy, FAO should focus any
continued investment on the development, application and training of the RIMA tool in
contexts where it is demonstrating the greatest potential.

(This recommendation is based on Conclusion 5, and Findings 28, 30, 31, 32, 35 and 41)

281. It is recommended that FAO focus continued investments on the development, application
and capacity building for the use of the RCI as a tool for policy and programme monitoring.

282. It is recommended that FAO collaborate with partners to skill test the accuracy of the RCI
in predicting households’ capacity to maintain welfare levels in the event of a shock.

283. It is recommended that the GNAFCPP continue to pilot use RIMA II of the indirect analysis
of resilience to research the determinants of the ability to bounce back from shocks.

284. It is recommended that FAO develop guidance notes in support of these differentiated
analytical purposes, presented in an accessible language. FAO should also continue efforts
to further simplify the technical and data demands of RIMA analysis.

Recommendation 5. FAO should further and more sustainably invest in a function dedicated
to capturing and disseminating lessons on the effectiveness of EWEA and resilience
interventions

(This recommendation is based on Conclusions 2 and 8, and Findings 10, 36, 42, 50, 51 and 52)

285. It is recommended that FAO invest in establishing a knowledge management function

within the Office of Emergencies and Resilience (OER) tightly networked with others in and
outside of FAO.

67
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

286. It is recommended that FAO further reinforce, and invest in, corporate capacities for
monitoring, evaluation and learning and mainstream responsibility for capturing learnings
around specific EWEA and resilience interventions and system accountability.

287. It is recommended that FAO investigate developing a decision support tool to help
programme staff determine which interventions would have most relevance in their specific
context.

68
Bibliography
African Union (AU). 2014. Second Biennial Review Report of the African Union Commission on the
Implementation of the Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for
Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods. The 2019 Progress Report to the Assembly Highlights on
“Resilience and Livelihoods”. Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (DREA). Addis Ababa. (also
available at: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38119-doc-2019_biennial_review-en.pdf).
Alinovi, L., Mane, E., & Romano, D. n.d.. Measuring Household Resilience to Food Insecurity:
Application to Palestinian Households. (also available at:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228609523_Towards_the_Measurement_of_Household_Resil
ience_to_Food_Insecurity_An_Application_to_Palestinian_Households).
Barrett, C. & Upton, J. 2018. Resilience as an Integrative, Measurable Concept for Humanitarian and
Development Programming. Benjamin Trump, Marie-Valentine Florin, & Igor Linkov, eds., Resource
Guide on Resilience, Volume 2: Domains of resilience for complex interconnected systems. New York.
(also available at:
http://barrett.dyson.cornell.edu/files/papers/2018%20IRGC%20Resilience%20Guide%20Vol2%20(Barre
tt%20&%20Upton).pdf).
Cahier Agricultures. 2016. L’intégration des concepts de résilience dans le domaine de la sécurité
alimentaire: regards croisés. (also available at:
https://www.cahiersagricultures.fr/articles/cagri/full_html/2016/06/cagri160043/cagri160043.html).
CERF. 2018. CERF for the future: Anticipatory humanitarian action. Update for the CERF advisory group.
(also available at: https://cerf.un.org/sites/default/files/resources/cerf_ag_anticipatory-
action_20181017_en_0.pdf)
Climate Action Summit. 2019. Risk-informed Early Action Partnership (REAP). (also available at:
http://www.globalresiliencepartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/REAP-two-pager-
230819.pdf).
Constas, M., Cisse, J., Knippenberg, E. & Downie, K. 2016. A Focused Review of Methodologies to
Measure Resilience: An Analysis of Conceptual Presentations, Indicators, and Estimation Procedures.
Report prepared by The Technical Consortium, a project of the CGIAR. Technical Report Series No 2:
Strengthening the Evidence Base for Resilience in the Horn of Africa. Nairobi, Kenya: A joint
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics
and Management, College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, Cornell University publication (also
available at:
https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/Constas%2520et%2520al%25202016%
2520-%2520Review%2520of%2520methodologies.pdf).
D’Errico, M. & Smith, L. 2020. Comparison of FAO and TANGO measures of household resilience and
resilience capacity. Research Gate. (also available at:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340233351_Comparison_of_FAO_and_TANGO_measures_of_
household_resilience_and_resilience_capacity).
D’Errico, M., Garbero, A., Letta, M., Winters, P. 2020. Evaluating Program Impact on Resilience:
Evidence from Lesotho’s Child Grants Programme, The Journal of Development Studies. (also available
at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2020.1746279).
D’Errico, M., Pietrelli, R. & Donato, R. 2018. Household resilience to food insecurity: evidence from
Tanzania and Uganda. Rome.
Davis, B. 2018. Strengthening resilience analysis for food security and poverty reduction. FAO internal
document. Rome.

69
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

ECHO. 2014. Resilience Marker. General Guidance. (also available at:

https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/resilience_marker_guidance_en.pdf).
European Commission (EC). 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council. The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises. Brussels. (also
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/com_2012_586_resilience_en.pdf).
European Union. 2017. Operationalising the EU Strategic Approach to Resilience. Bietlot. (also available
at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/7c941258-d971-11e7-a506-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF).
FAM. n.d.. Famine Action Mechanism (FAM). Also available at
https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/famine-early-action-mechanism
FAO and European Union. 2019. Strengthening Livelihood Resilience of Pastoral and Agro- Pastoral
Communities in South Sudan’s cross-border areas with Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Baseline
report. Rome.
FAO and IFRC. 2019. Financing for anticipatory action. Key messages from the members of the Early
Action Focus Task Force: IFRCI, WFP, FAO, START Network, OCHA. New York. Unpublished.
FAO and IGAD. 2019. Promoting effective resilience investments – Delivering peace, agriculture-led
growth and socio-economic transformation in the Horn of Africa. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/ca3703en/ca3703en.pdf).
FAO and Interpeace. 2020. Pathways to sustain peace at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO). A thematic paper jointly authored by FAO and Interpeace as a contribution to the
2020 Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace. (also available at:
https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/fao_-
_peacebuilding_and_sustaining_peace_thematic_paper_1.pdf).
FAO and the World Bank. 2018. Food Data Collection in Household Consumption and Expenditure
Surveys. Guidelines for Low- and Middle-Income Countries. Rome. (also available at:
http://surveys.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/publications/6_Guidebook_final_Web2.pdf).
FAO and Tufts University. 2019. Comparative analysis of livelihood recovery in the post-conflict
periods in Karamoja and northern Uganda. Mind the gap – briefing paper 2. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/ca7105en/CA7105EN.pdf).
FAO and UNESCO. 2019. Global Network against Food Crises Partnership Programme. Country
Investment South Sudan. Resilience Pastoral Livelihoods and Education Project. Baseline survey report.
Unpublished.
FAO and WFP. 2020. Monitoring food security in countries with conflict situations. Rome. (also available
at: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-
0000112228/download/?_ga=2.165734654.1507455778.1592849307-1182248685.1592849307).
FAO, UNICE), WFP, UNDP and IFPRI. 2019. Report on Resilience and Vulnerability in South Sudan.
(also available at: https://climis-southsudan.org/uploads/publications/Report-on-Resilience-and-
Vulnerability-in-South-Sudan-FINAL-min.pdf).
FAO, WFP and UNICEF. 2012. A Joint Resilience Strategy for Somalia. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs_high_level_forum/documents/Resilience_HLEF_sideevent_
_13Sept12_.pdf).
FAO. 2005. Resilience Analysis in Senegal. FAO resilience analysis N.1. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4456e.pdf).
FAO. 2011a. Knowledge Strategy, March 2011, definition of knowledge management, Annex 1

70
Bibliography

FAO. 2011b. FAO Knowledge Strategy. Rome. (also available at:

http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/capacity_building/KM_Strategy.pdf).
FAO. 2011c. Gender Considerations for the Impact Assessment of OSRO/GAZ/912/UK, 2010-2011.
Focus group session. Rome.
FAO. 2011d. Resilience Analysis in Senegal. FAO resilience analysis N.8. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6584e.pdf).
FAO. 2013a. Evaluation of FAO’s Cooperation in Somalia 2007 to 2012. Management Response. Rome.
(also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-bq904e.pdf).
FAO. 2013b. Policy on Gender Equality. Attaining Food Security Goals in Agriculture and Rural
Development. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3205e.pdf).
FAO. 2014. Evaluation of FAO’s contribution to crises-related transition. Linking Relief, Rehabilitation
and Development. Office of Evaluation. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-bd494e.pdf).
FAO. 2015a. The impact of natural hazards and disasters on agriculture and food security and nutrition.
A call for action to build resilient livelihoods. Rome.
FAO. 2015b. Evaluation of FAO’s resilience sub-programme in Somalia (2013-2014). Office of
Evaluation. Resilience programme evaluation series. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-
bd443e.pdf).
FAO. 2015c. External Review of the Food Security Information Network. FAO Internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2015d. RIMA-II: Moving forward the development of the resilience index measurement and
analysis model. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5298e.pdf)
FAO. 2015e. Project Charter FAO Early Warning – Early Action System Establishment
FAO. 2016a. A dynamic analysis of resilience in Uganda. ESA Working Paper No. 16-01. Rome. (also
available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5473e.pdf).
FAO. 2016b. Early Warning Early Action report on food security and agriculture October-December
2016. Rome (also available at: http://www.fao.org/emergencies/resources/documents/resources-
detail/en/c/883858).
FAO. 2016c. Evidence from Mid-Term Review of the Impact Evaluation For the “Building Resilience in
Somalia” Joint Strategy. Rome.
FAO. 2016d. FAO early action plan Kenya – country level. FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2016e. Final Evaluation of the Improved Global Governance for Hunger Reduction Programme.
Office of Evaluation. Project evaluation series. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-
bd492e.pdf).
FAO. 2016f. FSS Palestine presentation. Resilience Marking: A modest proposal. Power Point
presentation. FAO internal document. Rome
FAO. 2016g. Investing in education, healthcare and productivity: how to strengthen resilience in Matam.
Building resilience: a policy brief series N.7. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-
i6213e.pdf).
FAO. 2016h. Karamoja region (Uganda), baseline report for impact evaluation of FAO-UNICEF-WFP
resilience programming. FAO baseline impact evaluation report N.2. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5473e.pdf).
FAO. 2016i. Livestock refuge mounds to strengthen resilience against natural hazards in Bolivia.
Protecting livestock and agricultural production during floods and droughts. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6613e.pdf).

71
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

FAO. 2016j. Peace, Conflict and Food Security. What do we know about the linkages? Rome. (also
available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5521e.pdf).
FAO. 2016k. RIMA-II. Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis II. Rome. (also available at:
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AnalysIng%20Resilience%20for%20better%20ta
rgeting%20and%20action.pdf).
FAO. 2016l. Strategic work of FAO to increase the resilience of livelihoods. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6463e.pdf).
FAO. 2016m. Evaluation of FAO Strategic Objective 5: Increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats
and crises
FAO. 2017a. Early Warning Early Action report on food security and agriculture April-June 2017. Rome.
(also available at: http://www.fao.org/emergencies/resources/documents/resources-
detail/en/c/883853).
FAO. 2017b. Early Warning Early Action report on food security and agriculture January-March 2017.
Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/emergencies/resources/documents/resources-
detail/en/c/883857).
FAO. 2017c. Early Warning Early Action report on food security and agriculture July-September 2017.
Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/emergencies/resources/documents/resources-
detail/en/c/902638).
FAO. 2017d. Early Warning Early Action report on food security and agriculture October-December
2017. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/emergencies/resources/documents/resources-
detail/en/c/1042125).
FAO. 2017e. Evaluation of FAO’s Programme in West Bank and Gaza Strip (2011-2015). Office of
Evaluation. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-bd698e.pdf).
FAO. 2017f. FAO Mongolia. SFERA Early Action Fund Proposal. FAO internal document.
FAO. 2017g. FAO Philippines. SFERA Early Action Fund Proposal. FAO internal document.
FAO. 2017h. FAO Sudan. Early Warning – Early action plan. FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2017i. FAO Sudan. SFERA Early Action Fund Proposal. FAO internal document.
FAO. 2017j. Kuxur rum agroforestry system against natural hazards in Guatemala. Integrating
agricultural production with agroforestry to build resilience during heat wave season in Ch’ortí region.
Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/in-action/kore/good-practices/good-practices-
details/en/c/854298/).
FAO. 2017k. Mid-Term Review of FAO & EU Joint Programme FIRST & INFORMED. Unpublished. Rome.
FAO. 2017l. Resilience Analysis in Karamoja Uganda. FAO resilience analysis report N. 10. Rome. (also
available at: http://www.fao.org/3/i9708en/I9708EN.pdf).
FAO. 2017m. The Sustainable Agriculture for Economic Resiliency (Safer) Project. Baseline Report –
South Sudan. FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2018a. 2018/2019. El Niño. High risk countries and potential impacts on food security and
agriculture. FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2018b. ANALYSE DE LA RÉSILIENCE EN MAURITANIA. Rapport d’analyse de la résilience N.14.
Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/ca2258fr/CA2258FR.pdf).
FAO. 2018c. Building resilience of livelihoods in Karamoja, Uganda. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/ca0345en/CA0345EN.pdf).

72
Bibliography

FAO. 2018d. Communication Plan. Mongolia Early Warning Early Action Pilot. Return on Investment
Study 2018. FAO internal document.
FAO. 2018e. Corporate Framework to support sustainable peace in the context of Agenda 2030. Rome.
(also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/I9311EN/i9311en.pdf).
FAO. 2018f. Early Warning Early Action Plan. The Philippines. Drought & Cyclones. FAO internal
document. Rome.
FAO. 2018g. Early Warning Early Action report on food security and agriculture 2018. Rome.
FAO. 2018h. Evaluation of the Emergency Prevention System (EMPRES) Programme in Food Chain
Crises. Office of Evaluation. Project Evaluation series. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/I8924EN/i8924en.pdf).
FAO. 2018i. Food security, resilience and well-being analysis of refugees and host communities in
Northern Uganda. FAO resilience analysis report N.12. Rome (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/i9708en/I9708EN.pdf).
FAO. 2018j. Global Network Against Food Crises Partnership Programme. Evidence innovations and
policy change. Rome.
FAO. 2018k. Horn of Africa. Impact of Early Warning Early Action. Protecting pastoralist livelihoods
ahead of drought. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/ca0227en/CA0227EN.pdf).
FAO. 2018l. Human Interest Story Collection Sudan Early Warning Early Action Pilot Return on
Investment Study 2018. FAO internal document.
FAO. 2018m. Institutionalization of resilience measurement and analysis in Uganda through the
establishment of a Resilience Measurement Unit (RMU). Building resilience livelihoods using the
Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA). FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2018n. Mongolia. Impact of Early Warning Early Action. Protecting the livelihoods of heards from a
dzud winter. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/ca3933en/ca3933en.pdf).
FAO. 2018o. Resilience Analysis in Jordan. FAO resilience analysis report N.11. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/I8394EN/i8394en.pdf).
FAO. 2018p. Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis – Short questionnaire. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/ca0878en/CA0878EN.pdf).
FAO. 2018q. Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis II. RIMA-II. FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2018r. Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA). Annual Report 2018.
Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/ca4120en/ca4120en.pdf).
FAO. 2018s. Strengthening resilience analysis for food security and poverty reduction. FAO internal
document. Rome.
FAO. 2018t. Vegetable and staple food production in refugee settlement in northern and mid-western
Uganda. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/in-action/kore/good-practices/good-practices-
details/en/c/1046058/).
FAO. 2019a. Analyse de la résilience au Tchad. Rapport d’analyse de la résilience N.15. Rome. (also
available at: http://www.fao.org/3/ca2971fr/CA2971FR.pdf).
FAO. 2019b. Changing the way disasters are managed. Linking social protection mechanisms with Early
Warning Early Action systems. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/ca5006en/CA5006EN.pdf).

73
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

FAO. 2019c. Colombia. Impact of Early Warning Early Action. Boosting food security and social cohesion
on the frontline of the migration crisis. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/ca6818en/ca6818en.pdf).
FAO. 2019d. Colombia. Impact of Early Warning Early Action. Boosting food security and social cohesion
on the frontline of the migration crisis. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/ca6818en/ca6818en.pdf).
FAO. 2019e. Cross-border coordination of livestock movements and sharing of natural resources among
pastoralist communities in the Greater Karamoja Cluster.
FAO. 2019f. Early Action focus task force coordination meeting. Meeting notes. FAO internal document.
Rome.
FAO. 2019g. Early Warning Early Action (EWEA) for agriculture and food security. Concept note for a
scale-up 2020-2022. FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2019h. Early Warning Early Action report on food security and agriculture 2019. Rome.
FAO. 2019i. Early Warning Early Action. Power Point presentation. FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2019j. Evaluation of the “Food and Nutrition Security Impact, Resilience, Sustainability, and
Transformation” FIRST. Office of Evaluation. FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2019k. FAO’s work on climate change. United Nations Climate Change Conference 2019. Rome.
(also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/ca7126en/CA7126EN.pdf).
FAO. 2019l. Final Evaluation of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Global Strategic
Programme (GSP). 2014-2018. Office of Evaluation. Project evaluation series. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/ca4203en/ca4203en.pdf).
FAO. 2019m. Guide to context analysis: informing FAO decision-making. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/ca5968en/CA5968EN.pdf).
FAO. 2019n. Horn of Africa. Impact of Early Warning Early Action. Protecting pastoralism livelihoods
ahead of drought. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/ca0227en/CA0227EN.pdf).
FAO. 2019o. Madagascar. Impact of Early Warning Early Action. Protecting farming livelihoods from
drought and food insecurity. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/ca3933en/ca3933en.pdf).
FAO. 2019p. Operationalising the humanitarian-development-peace nexus through the promotion of
intercommunity coexistence. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/ca7178en/ca7178en.pdf).
FAO. 2019q. Resilience Analysis of pastoral and agropastoral communities in South Sudan. Cross-border
areas with Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. FAO resilience analysis report N.17. Rome. (also
available at: http://www.fao.org/3/ca4975en/CA4975EN.pdf)
FAO. 2019r. RIMA Conflict Module. FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2019s. South Sudan. Resilience Strategy 2019-2021. Working across the humanitarian-peace-
development nexus for resilience and food security. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/ca5727en/ca5727en.pdf).
FAO. 2019t. Sudan. Impact of Early Warning Early Action. Protecting agropastoralist livelihoods ahead
of drought. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/ca4653en/ca4653en.pdf).
FAO. 2019u. Sustainable Agriculture for Economic Resiliency Project. Follow-up Survey Report. FAO
internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2019v. The Programme Clinic: Designing conflict-sensitive interventions – Facilitation Guide.
Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/ca5784en/CA5784EN.pdf).

74
Bibliography

FAO. 2019w. The UN Common Guidance on Resilience for Humanitarian-Development-Peace Actors.

The Global Food Security Cluster. FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2019x. The United Nations (UN) Common Guidance on Resilience for Humanitarian-Development-
Peace Actors. Webinar – 22 October 2019. Summary points, questions and answers. FAO internal
document. Rome.
FAO. 2019y. UN Common Guidance on Helping Build Resilience Societies. Webinar – 22 October 2019.
Summary points, questions and answers. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/ca7487en/ca7487en.pdf).

FAO. 2020a. INFORMED End of Project Reflection (unpublished)

FAO. 2020b. About KORE Knowledge Resilience. Power Point Presentation. FAO internal document.
FAO. 2020c. Dimitra Clubs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: improving the prospects for local
peace. A community-driven model reinforcing conflict prevention and resilience in the Tanganyika
Province. Rome. (also available at: http://www.fao.org/3/ca7711en/ca7711en.pdf).
FAO. 2020d. Early Warning Early Action report on food security and agriculture 2020 January-March.
FAO. 2020e. FAO’s Agriculture, Livestock and Food Security Information User Survey Report. FAO
internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2020f. Provisional Outline of the New Strategic Framework. PC 128/2. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fao.org/3/nc850en/nc850en.pdf).
FAO. 2020g. Resilience Good Practice Template and Guide. FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. 2020h. Food value chains. PowerPoint presentation. FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. n.d.. An Inclusive Approach to Anticipatory Action. Internal FAO document.
FAO. n.d.. Capitalisation des expériences et bonnes pratiques de résilience. Stratégie pour l’Afrique de
l’Ouest et le Sahel (2018-2021) Amélioeer l’impact des programmes de résilience, en favorisant
l’émergence, la partage, l’adoption et la mise à l’échelle des bonnes pratiques. Note interne. Internal FAO
document.
FAO. n.d.. Early Warning Early Action Toolkit. FAO internal document. Rome
FAO. n.d.. FAO’s Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA) and the Early Action
window. FAO internal document.
FAO. n.d.. Key evidence from FAO’s analyses on the impact of early actions. FAO internal document.
FAO. n.d.. Optional Conflict Module Interpretation. Rome. FAO internal document.
FAO. n.d.. Project Document GCP/INT/245/EC. Rome. FAO internal document.
FAO. n.d.. Report of the Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA). FAO internal
document. Rome.
FAO. n.d.. Resilience good and promising practices. Collection of factsheets 2016-19. FAO internal
document. Rome.
FAO. n.d.. Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis Short Questionnaire. FAO internal document.
FAO. n.d.. SHORT RIMA Manual 1.0. Part A. How to use Excel for the creation of the Resilience Capacity
Index. FAO internal document. Rome.
FAO. n.d.. SHORT ROMA Manual 1.0. Part B. Data Cleaning and management. FAO internal document.
Rome.

75
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

FAO. n.d.. The Regional Initiative on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition (RI-FSN).
Knowledge Management proposal and action plan. FAO internal document.
FSIN. 2013. Resilience Measurement. Proceedings of the Technical Working Group Consultative Meeting.
Rome.
FSIN. 2014a. A common Analytical Model for Resilience Measurement. Causal framework and
methodological options. Rome. (also available:
http://www.fsincop.net/fileadmin/user_upload/fsin/docs/resources/FSIN_Paper2_WEB_1dic%20(WEB).
pdf).
FSIN. 2014b. Resilience Measurement Principles. Toward an agenda for measurement design. Rome.
(also available at:
http://www.fsincop.net/fileadmin/user_upload/fsin/docs/resources/FSIN_29jan_WEB_medium%20res.p
df).
FSIN. 2015a. Households Data Sources for Measuring and Understanding Resilience. Rome. (also
available at: https://www.fsnnetwork.org/sites/default/files/FSIN_TechnicalSeries_3.pdf).
FSIN. 2015b. Measuring Shocks and Stressors as Part of Resilience Measurement. Rome. (also available
at: http://www.fsincop.net/fileadmin/user_upload/fsin/docs/resources/1_FSIN_TechnicalSeries_5.pdf).
FSIN. 2015c. Qualitative Data and Subjective Indicators for Resilience Measurement. Rome. (also
available at:
http://www.fsincop.net/fileadmin/user_upload/fsin/docs/resources/1_FSIN_TechnicalSeries_4.pdf).
FSIN. 2015d. Systems Analysis in the Context of Resilience. Rome. (also available at:
http://www.fsincop.net/fileadmin/user_upload/fsin/docs/resources/1_FSIN_TechnicalSeries_4.pdf).
FSIN. 2016. Quantitative Analyses for Resilience Measurement. Guidance for constructing variables and
exploring relationships among variables. Rome. (also available at:
https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/paragraphs/documents/FSIN_TechnicalSeries_7_3.PDF)
FSIN. 2018. Global Report on Food Crises. Rome. (also available at:
https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-
0000069227/download/?_ga=2.2786544.1507455778.1592849307-1182248685.1592849307).
FSIN. 2019a. Global Report on Food Crises. Joint analysis for better decisions. Rome. (also available at:
https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC%202019_Full%20Report.pdf).
FSIN. 2019b. Regional Focus on the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Member
States. Global Report on Food Crises. Joint Analysis for better decisions. (also available at:
https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/IGAD_RRFC_2020.pdf).
FSIN. n.d.. FSIN in Action 2013-2014. (also available at:
http://www.fsincop.net/fileadmin/user_upload/fsin/docs/FSIN-in-Action-2013-2014.pdf).
FSIN. n.d.. Resilience Evidence for Decisions in Development. An Initiative for Country and Regionally
Focused Work on Resilience Measurement. Rome. (also available at:
https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/6July_REDDI%20concept%20note.pdf).
FSIN. n.d.. South Sudan. Operational Strategy for Food and Nutrition Security Information Systems
Capacity Development. (also available at:
https://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/FSIN%2520South%2520Sudan%2520O
perational%2520Startegy.pdf).
German Red Cross. 2017. Forecast-based financing: A policy overview. Berlin. (also available
at: https://www.drk.de/fileadmin/user_upload/FBF/Policy_overview_sep_2017.pdf).

76
Bibliography

Gershon Kodwo Ansah, I., Gardebroek, C. and Ihle, R. 2019. Resilience and household food security:
a review of concepts, methodological approaches and empirical evidence. (also available at:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12571-019-00968-1).
Hailey, P., Kim, J., McCloskey, E., et al. 2018. Constraint and Complexities of Information and
Analysis in Humanitarian Emergencies. Evidence from Somalia. A Feinstein International Center Brief.
(also available at: https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/Somalia-Case-Study-Report_11-16.pdf).
IASC. 2018. Standard Operating Procedures. Early Action to El Niño episodes. Inter-Agency Standard
Operating Procedures. (also available at:
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/inter_agency_sops_for_early_action_to_el_nino
_la_nina_episodes.pdf).
IFPRI. 2019. Resilience and Food Security in South Sudan: Evidence from Communities. PowerPoint
presentation. Unpublished document. Juba.
IGAD. 2019. Market access, trade and financial services. Resilience of Focus Issue 6/2019. Djibuti. (also
available at: https://resilience.igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/RFM_Issue6-19_Final.pdf).
Joint Research Centre (JRC). 2017. Building a Scientific Narrative Towards a More Resilient EU Society.
Part 1: a Conceptual Framework. Luxemburg. (also available at:
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC106265/jrc106265_100417_resilience_sci
enceforpolicyreport.pdf).
Jones, L., Samman, E. ND. Measuring Subjective Households Resilience. Insights from Tanzania. (also
available at: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10651.pdf).
Maxwell, D. & Hailey, P. 2020. Towards Anticipatory Information Systems and Action: Notes on Early
Warning and Early Action in East Africa. Boston. Feinstein International Center, Tufts University;
Nairobi: Centre for Humanitarian Change. (also available at: https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Towards-Anticipatory-Information-Systems-and-Action.pdf).
Maxwell, D. 2019. Conflict Research Programme. Famine Early Warning and Information Systems in
Conflict Setting: Challenges for Humanitarian Metrics and Response. LSE, CRP, Tufts University & World
Peace Foundation. (also available at: https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/CRP-Famine-Early-
Warning-and-Information-Systems-in-Conflict-Settings-D-Maxwell-final-20191119.pdf).
Maxwell, D., et al. 2020a. Food Policy. Determining famine: Multi-dimensional analysis for the twenty-
first century. (also available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2020.101832).
Maxwell, D., et al. 2020b. The Politics of Information and Analysis in Humanitarian Emergencies.
Evidence from Kenya. Tufts University. Boston. (also available at:
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/PIA-Kenya-April-2020-FINAL.pdf).
National Institute of Statistics (Niger) (INS), CILSS. 2017. Rapport de l’etude sur la mesure et
l’analyse de la resilience l’insecurite alimentaire au Niger. Niamey.
Nkunzimana T., Custodio E., Thomas A.C., Tefera N., Perez Hoyos A., Kayitakire F. 2016. Global
analysis of food and nutrition security situation in food crisis hotspots. Belgium. (also available at:
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/global-analysis-
food-and-nutrition-security-situation-food-crisis-hotspots).
OCHA. 2020. Humanitarian Needs Overview. South Sudan. Humanitarian Programme Cycle. (also
available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South%20Sudan%20-
%20Humanitarian%20needs%20overview%202020.pdf).
ODI. 2014. Assessing resilience: why quantification misses the point. HPG Working Paper. London. (also
available at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9049.pdf).

77
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

ODI. 2015a. A comparative overview of resilience measurement frameworks. Analysing indicators and
approaches. London. (also available at: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/9754.pdf).
ODI. 2015b. Measuring ‘subjective resilience’ perceptions to quantify household resilience. Working
paper 423. London. (also available at: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/9753.pdf).
ODI. 2016. Analysis of Resilience Measurement frameworks and approaches. The Resilience
Measurement, Evidence and Learning Community of Practice (CoP). London. (also available at:
https://www.fsnnetwork.org/sites/default/files/analysis_of_resilience_measurement_frameworks_and_a
pproaches.pdf)
ODI. 2019. Anticipatory humanitarian action: what role for the CERF? Moving from rapid response to
early action. Working paper 551. London. (also available at:
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12643.pdf)
OXFAM. 2013. A multidimensional Approach for Measuring Resilience. Oxfam GB Working Paper. (also
available at: https://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/a-multidimensional-approach-to-
measuring-resilience-302641).
Pingali P., Alinovi L. and Sutton J. 2005. Food Security in Complex Emergencies: Enhancing Food
System Resilience. Disasters Volume 29, Issue s1
REACH. 2018. South Sudan. “Now the Forest is Blocked”: Shocks and Access to Food. (also available at:
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ssd_report_shocks_and_access_to_food_march_2
018_final.pdf).
Romano, D. and Ciani, F. 2014. Testing for household resilience to food insecurity: evidence from
Nicaragua. Paper presented at the EAAE 2014 Congress, Slovenia
Smart Resilience. 2016. Analysis of existing assessment resilience approaches, indicators and data
sources: Usability and limitations of existing indicators for assessing, predicting and monitoring critical
infrastructure resilience. Stuttgart. (also available at:
https://www.ivl.se/download/18.4a88670a1596305e782de/1484131257184/E002.pdf).
Start Network and Climate Centre. 2020. Sector-wide review of the development and use of
methodologies and guidance for the monitoring and evaluation of forecast-based action. Unpublished.
State of Palestine Ministry of Agriculture. 2016. National Agriculture Sector Strategy (2017-2022)
“Resilience and Sustainable Development”. (also available at:
http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/pal174456E.pdf).
State of Palestine Ministry of Agriculture. n.d.. National Agriculture Sector Strategy “Resilience and
Development” 2014-2016. (also available at:
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1417423273.pdf).
Sturgess, P. 2016. Measuring Resilience. DFfID
UN Women, ECHO, FAO and Save the Children. n.d. Development process of early warning early
action for drought in Vietnam.
UNDP and INS Niger. 2016. Rapport sur le developpement humain (RNDH) Niger. Developpement
Humain er Résilience des ménages à l’insecurité alimentaire au Niger. Niamey.
UNDP. 2014. Understanding Community Resilience: Findings from Community-Based Resilience
Analysis (CoBRA) Assessments. Marsabit, Turkana and Kajiado countries, Kenya and Karamoja sub-
region, Uganda. New York. (also available at:
https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/environment-
energy/sustainable_land_management/CoBRA/CoBRA_assessment.html).

78
Bibliography

UNDP. 2018. Understanding Land Dynamics and Livelihood in Refugee Hosting Districts of Northern
Uganda.
UNDSG. 2020. United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) Guidance
– also see IPC,. 2019. Technical Manual Version 3.0
UNOCHA. 2020. Humanitarian Response Plan South Sudan. Humanitarian Programme Cycle. (also
available at:
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20191210_hrp_2020_south_sudan.pdf).
Upton, J., Constenla-Villoslada, S., Barrett, C. 2020. Caveat Utilitor: A comparative assessment of
resilience measurement approaches. New York.
USAID. 2018. Resilience and Resilience Capacities Measurement Options. Full Approach. Methodological
guide: A Guide for Calculating Resilience Capacity. Washington. (also available at:
https://www.fsnnetwork.org/resilience-and-resilience-capacities-measurement-options).
USAID. 2019a. Resilience Profile – Yambio. (also available at:
https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/resilience_profile_-_yambio_-_2019.pdf).
USAID. 2019b. South Sudan. Resilience Profile – Aweil. (also available at:
https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/resilience_profile_-_aweil_-_2019.pdf).
USAID. 2019c. South Sudan. Resilience Profile – Torit. (also available at:
https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/resilience_profile_-_torit_-_2019.pdf).
USAID. 2019d. South Sudan. Resilience Profile – Wau. (also available at:
https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/resilience_profile_-_wau_-_2019.pdf).
Von Uexkull, N., d’Errico, M. and Jackson, J. 2020. Drought, Resilience, and Support for Violence:
Households Survey Evidence from DR Congo. Journal of Conflict Resolution. (also available at:
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022002720923400).
WFP and Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem. 2010. Socio-Economic and Food Security Atlas in the
occupied Palestinian territory. (also available at: https://unispal.un.org/pdfs/SocEcoFoodSec_Atlas.pdf).
WFP, FAO, PCBS. 2010. Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey. West Bank and Gaza Strip, occupied
Palestinian territory. A survey carried out by World Food Programme, Food and Agriculture
Organization and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. (also available at:
https://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp232398.pdf?iframe).
WFP, FAO, UNDP, UNICEF. 2018. Declaration concerning Joint Resilience Analysis, Measurement and
Monitoring for Programming in South Sudan Among FAO, UNICEF, UNDP and WFP. South Sudan.
Unpublished document.
WFP. 2020. The evidence base for Anticipatory Action. (also available at:
https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-
0000110236/download/?_ga=2.93701915.728628740.1593440108-683757336.1593440108).
World Bank Group. n.d. Global Risk Financing Facility. Supporting Early Action to Climate Shocks,
Disasters, and Crises. Information Sheet. (also available at:
https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/GRiF%20Information%20Sheet.pdf).

79
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

Appendix 1. People interviewed

Last name First name Institution/Agency Role
Abdulrahman Abdullahi Humanitarian Affairs and General Manager
Disaster Management
Agency Puntland (HADMA)
Acosta Zamorano Paola Guajira Naciente Wash and Nutrition Advisor
Afidra Juma USAID Food Security Specialist
Ahmed Farhan Abdullahi Somaliland Ministry of Director of Somaliland Ministry of
Livestock Livestock
Amling Matthias Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Policy, International
Internationale Organisations, Multilateral
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Coordination
Antonaci Lavinia FAO Technical Coordinator
Arango Carlos Felipe FAO Project Coordinator
Arnal Pablo WFP Monitoring and Evaluation
advisor for Climate and DDR
Programmes
Arrieta Victor Local Authority Albania, Local Government Representative
Colombia
Assabir Hicham FAO EWEA Consultant
Atieno Immaculate FAO Resilience
Analyst/Econometrician
Atozou Baoubadi FAO Economist
Austin Carmichael Zacharey World Bank Team Leader for the Famine
Action Mechanism (FAM) and
Operations Officer
Awino Imelda Action Contre La Faim Regional Nutrition Advisor
(ACF)
Baffo Abdi Independent National Resilience Focal Point in
Somalia 2016-2017
Bakouan Traore Aminata Independent Consultant
Bardi Ariel Sophia FAO Knowledge Management
Specialist
Barrett Christopher Cornell University Professor
Benammour Omar FAO Social Protection Officer
Bernal Leidy FAO Veterinary
Biru Nigist Famine Early Warning Regional Technical Manager, East
Systems Network (FEWS Africa
NET)
Bogale Ayalneh AU Professor
Bori Assad FAO Economist
Buchanan-Smith Margie Independent Researcher
Bukania Christine IGAD IDRISSI Head of Knowledge
Management
Bustamante Clara Agrosavia Agricultural Researcher
Cafiero Carlo FAO Project Manager
Callens Karel FAO Deputy Director SP1

80
Appendix 1. People interviewed

Camara Tidiane Agence Nationale de la Point focal systeme d'alerte

statisque et de la précoce
Démographie
Carbonne Fabrice OCHA Head of Preparedness
Castermans Alain DEVCO Programme Manager
Chana Opaskornkul WFP Head of Monitoring and
Evaluation
Clark Kathryn FAO Food Security and Livelihoods
Coordinator
Collman Sarah REACH Country Coordinator Impact
Initiatives
Contreras Marta University of La Guajira, Professor at the University of La
Castellanos Colombia Guajira
Cortez Sandra Fundaliza Project Coordinator
D'Errico Marco FAO Economist
Daidone Silvio FAO Economist, Impact Evaluation
Davis Benjamin FAO Strategic Programme Leader
Di Giuseppe Stefania FAO Econometrician
Diop Moby IFRC
Drabe Antazio Famine Early Warning Country Representative
Systems Network (FEWS
NET)
Dujanovic Dunja FAO Technical Officer
Ejem Alfred Action Contre La Faim Regional Nutrition Advisor
(ACF)
Emoyo Peter Gerald UNHCR Assistant Livelihoods Officer
Esthete Gezahegn Save the Children Food Security and Livelihood
Technical Adviser
Farr Emily OXFAM EFSVL Team Leader
Ferloni Marco Food Security Cluster (FSC) Food Security Coordinator
Ferrand Cyril FAO Head of the Resilience Team of
East Africa (RTEA)
Ferreira Pedro FAO Programme Officer
Fiorillo Ciro FAO Head of Office
Frankenberger Tim TANGO International Director Tango International
Gichane Benjamin FAO Data Analyst
Gillan Tabitha DfID Livelihoods Advisor
Giuffrida Valerio WFP VAM Database Manager
Glaeser Laura FEWSNET FEWSNET NET CoP
Glinni Ariella FAO Senior Technical Officer
Goddeeris Martijn BRICS NGOs Consortium Heads of BRICS NGO Consortium
Somalia
Gonzalez Cely Omar FAO Project M&E
Groder Joachim WFP Head of Analysis and Early
Warning Unit
Guerten Nora FAO EWEA Consultant
Hailey Peter What Works Head of WhatWorks
Hamdan Nora We Effect Programme Coordinator

81
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

Hannoun Rana FAO Economist

Hee Ban Hyun UNICEF Chief, Social Policy, Planning,
M&E
Herzenstein Leo FAO EWEA Consultant
Hillbruner Chris USAID Head of Analysis
Hoskins Alexis WFP FSIN Secretariat Coordinator
2014-2016
Husain Arif WFP Chief economist and Director of
Research, Assessment and
Monitoring
Innocente Sergio FAO Agriculture Officer
Jackson Julius FAO Technical Officer
Jacqueson Patrick FAO Senior Programme Officer
Jaime Catalina Red Cross Climate Centre Senior Risk Advisor
Jama Abdi IGAD/ICPAC Coordinator of IGAD Food
Security Nutrition and Resilience
Analysis Hub (IFRAH)
Jones Catherine FAO EWEA Specialist
Jore Joice Food Security Technical Coordinator
Secretariat Bureau of
Statistics South Sudan
Kamau David FAO Data Analyst
Kamil Halimatou Institut National de la Directrice de l'Institute National
Statistique du Niger de la Statistique du Niger
Kerandi Nicholas FAO Food Security Analyst
Khawaja Mustafa FAO PCBS Acting Director General
Kimeu Paul National Drought Drought Resilience Manager
Management Authority
(NDMA), Kenya
Klassen Sarah START Network Risk Analysis Advisor
Lago Panduleni Southern African Food Security advisor
Development Community
(SADC)
Lagos Melissa Independent Independent consultant
Lahham Salah WFP VAM Officer
Lanyon Andrew FAO Resilience Coordinator
Laracca Giacomo FAO Food Security Monitoring and
Analyst Specialist
Larfaoui Fairouz FAO Animal Health Officer
Latimer Dennis FAO FAO Country Representative
Lazarus Brenda FAO Emergency Needs Assessment
and Early Warning Advisor
Lekiefs Cyril Action Contre La Faim Head of Food Security
(ACF)
Liku Justus CARE Senior Technical Advisor
Lombardi Niccoló FAO EWEA Specialist
Lopez Jose FAO Senior Programme Coordinator
Lowanyang Nathan WFP Programme Associate

82
Appendix 1. People interviewed

Mackey Kevin World Vistion International SOMREP Coordinator

(WVI)
Malik Amin FAO Monitoring and Evaluation
Officer
Manni Alemu FAO Chief Technical Advisor
Manning Simon World Vistion International Programme Quality Director
(WVI)
Marquez Ariza Javier FAO Veterinary
Marsland Neill FAO Senior Technical Officer
Mason Jesse WFP Global Coordinator for
Anticipatory Action
Matar Lunba World Vision Economic Development Lead
Matras Frederique FAO Knowledge management and
Capacity Development Specialist
Maxwell Dan Tufts University Professor
Mclean Calum Independent Thematic expert on food security
Minelli Marco FAO Disaster Risk Reduction Expert
and Emergency Focal Point
Minjauw Bruno FAO Global Coordinator
Molla Daniel FAO Chief Technical Adviser
Moloney Grainne UNICEF Regional Manager
Muci Giampiero DEVCO Head of Resilience and Food
Crises
Muhigirwa Louis FAO Emergency Programme Officer
Mungai Maureen FAO Programme Monitoring Officer
Mwangi John National Drought Head of Drought Information
Management Authority Department
(NDMA), Kenya
Mwirigi Louise UNICEF Nutrition Specialist
Negesse Belihu FAO Senior Economist
Ngesa Oscar FAO Econometrician
Nguyen Thaianh FAO NPO on Climate changes and
DDR
Obrien Erin FAO Emergency Preparedness
Specialist
Omolo Danvers FAO Data Analyst
Omtzigt Dirk-Jan OCHA Head, Humanitarian Financing
Strategy and Analysis Unit
Opio Paul FAO Livestock Officer
Opio Paul FAO Livelihoods Programme Officer
Ouédraogo Abdoulaye Government Burkina Faso Government Representative
Pahari Krishna WFP Senior Regional Programme
Officer (VAM/M&E)
Palma Patricia Central American Director of the Central America
Integration System (SICA) Regional Program on Food and
Nutrition Security PRESANCA
Palombi Lucia FAO Knowledge Management
Specialist
Pangech John Ministry of Agriculture Chair of IPC Technical Working
Group

83
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

Pangech John Ministry of Agriculture Director General

South Sudan
Parodi Luca FAO Early Warning Early Action Focal
Point
Peeters Annick Belgian Development Desk Officer Humanitarian Affairs,
Agency (ENABEL) Foreign Trade & Development
Cooperation
Peters Jake DFID Humanitarian Advisor
Pham Hang FAO Senior Resilience Officer
Pietrelli Rebecca FAO Economist
Pitaud Thomas UNDP Resilience Expert
Quattrola Veronica FAO FAO Deputy Representative
Quilla Maria FAO National Project Development
and Coordination Specialist and
PU CDRENR Team Leader, FAOPH
RamadanElSayed Giulia FAO Knowledge Management
Consultant
Ricoy Anna FAO Disaster Risk Management
Coordinator
Rikard Katie REACH Initiative Head of Programmes Africa and
Europe
Rodriguez Humberto FAO Project Coordinator
Rouillard Arnaoud FAO MEL Consultant and Social
Protection
Russo Luca FAO Project Coordinator
Sabdow Bashir DFID Humanitarian Advisor
Sadibou Pene Cheikh FAO Consultant National Agronome
Saeed Haleema Presidency of the International Relations
Palestinian Central Bureau
of Statistics WBGS
Saleh Jawad FAO Assistant to the PCBS President
for the technical affairs
Salih Huyman FAO Agricultural Officer
Senahoun Jean FAO Senior Economist
Sharavnyambuu Munguntuya Mongolian Red Cross Disaster Management
Society Programme Manager

Shibru Mulugeta FAO Programme Officer

Siahaan Kara Red Cross Movement Programme Coordinator -
Forecast based financing
Sibrian Ricardo Central American Expert in statistical analysis
Integration System (SICA)
Smith Ross WFP Senior Regional Programme
Officer (VAM/M&E)
Solarte Henry FAO Project Supervisor
Sonko Mamadou FAO Consultant National Agronome
Sow Coumba FAO Policy Officer
Spano Federico FAO Social Protection Consultant
Sukhbaatar Jigjidpurev FAO Programme Technical Advisor
Takavarasha Tobias FAO FAO Country Representative
Kenya

84
Appendix 1. People interviewed

Tall Nourou FAO Emergency and Rehabilitation

Officer
Tamiru Wakweya FAO Monitoring and Evaluation
Specialist
Torero Maximo FAO Assistant Director General
Torres-Miralles Jordi ECHO Technical Assistant Uganda
Touze Camille FAO Technical Consultant
Traoré Modibo Institut National de la Chef du Département Agricole
Statistique du Mali
Tumursukh Altansuvd UN Resident Coordinator Humanitarian Portfolio
Mongolia Coordinator
Ulimwengu John International Food Policy Senior Research Fellow
Research Institute (IFPRI)
Van Aaken Rudi FAO Senior Programme Officer
Verduijn Rene FAO Senior Resilience Officer
Vergara Maria Consuelo FAO Senior Specialist in Risk
Management
Vhurumuku Elliot WFP Head of VAM and M&E
Vos Rob International Food Policy Director of Markets, Trade and
Research Institute (IFPRI) Institutions division
Wabbes Candotti Sylvie FAO Emergency and Rehabilitation
Officer
Walther Ryan USAID Programme Officer
Wiegers Esther Silvana FAO Senior FSN Policy & Monitoring
Expert
Winder Rossi Natalia FAO Senior Social Protection Officer
Wuestenberg Andreas UNICEF Emergency Specialist
Zappacosta Mario FAO Senior Economist
Zuñiga Misael Farmers Association - Farmers Association
Albania, Colombia Representative

85
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

Appendix 2. Evaluation matrix

Evaluation Question Judgement criteria / evidence sought

1. How relevant and appropriate was the What are the specific needs of 'decision makers' that the
INFORMED programme design to the objective programnme responds to?
of increasing resilience of livelihoods to threats
and crises?

Alignment with incidence and causes of food insecurity

Other drivers of the programme design

2. To what extent did the programme adapt Changes in the programme strategy and approach overtime
using lessons learned during implementation?

Use of formal and informal accountability and learning mechanisms

Responsiveness to changing stakeholder information needs

3. To what extent was INFORMED internally Synergies between the three programme outcomes
coherent?

Coherence/overlap with other FAO information systems,

programmes and processes

4. To what extent was INFORMED coherent with Gaps and overlaps with external information systems and networks
external FSN and resilience analysis systems?

Implementation partnerships and factors promoting and hampering

partnerships

Coordination and communication with programme partners

5. To what extent were INFORMED products Examples of how decision makers are using the products, and for
used in policy and programmatic decision- which programming decisions (e.g. preparedness, emergency,
making? response, exit strategy, evaluation, etc.)?

Examples of contributions to improved understanding of the

different needs of men and women and gender-sensitive
programming
References to INFORMED products in policies and programme
documents

Perceptions of ‘value-added’ of INFORMED products over other

information and analyses

6. What factors influenced the utility of Awareness amongst decision makers of INFORMED products
INFORMED information?

Actions undertaken by INFORMED to promote dissemination and

utilization
Perceived quality and credibility of results
Ability of decision makers to understand and interpret results

86
Appendix 2. Evaluation matrix

Evaluation Question Judgement criteria / evidence sought

Timeliness of release of INFORMED analysis relative to key decision-

making points

Remaining gaps in information and analysis

Other factors influencing utility - positively and negatively, e.g.
dissemination approach, data sharing, ad hoc analysis, etc.

7. How appropriate and effective was the Clarity of institutionalization strategy

strategy and approach to institutionalization?

Transfer of capacities to regional and national institutions

Local ownership of INFORMED products and processes and local
adaptation of tools

Other factors facilitating or constraining progress towards

institutionalization

87
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

Appendix 3. Survey results

Introduction
1. As part of the evaluation of the European Union-FAO Partnership Programme “Information
for Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making” (INFORMED) an online
survey was circulated to stakeholders involved in FAO’s work on Early Warning for Early
Action, both at country and global level. The survey was conducted during the period April–
May 2020. This document presents an analysis of the main survey results.

Survey population, response rate and limitations

2. The INFORMED management team provided email addresses of potential respondents’
users of the Resilience Index Measurement Analysis (RIMA), the Early Warning for Early
Action (EWEA) and the Knowledge Sharing Platform for Resilience (KORE). With three
distinct mailing lists, the evaluation opted for launching two surveys: one specific for RIMA
and another one specific for EWEA; both surveys included a set of questions related
implicitly to KORE, as a crosscutting theme.
3. The survey bearing mainly on EWEA work was addressed to over 2000 individuals, including
stakeholders internal and external to FAO. It received a total of 294 responses, with a
completion rate of 45 percent. Out of the total responses received, 159 were used to feed
the analysis. The survey bearing mainly on RIMA work was shared with the RIMA mailing
list subscribers, excluding individuals already targeted with the EWEA survey, to avoid
duplications. Out of 1182 addresses, this survey received 11 responses, of which only 6
where complete. Such response rate was too low to permit a meaningful analysis of the
data received. Therefore, this document presents the results of the first survey only.
4. A limitation that might have affected response rates, was that the evaluation team was not
in a position to isolate population groups according to each theme, owing to overlapping
mailing lists. This led to the decision to separating survey addressees in such way, to avoid
having one person receive several similar surveys. This also led to sending only the EWEA
survey to some people who might have also been appropriate respondents to the survey
on RIMA.

88
Appendix 3. Survey results

1. Respondents profiles
5. A series of profiling questions were asked to understand the final survey sample in
more detail, and to facilitate comparative analysis across respondents’ subgroups.
6. The pied charts below present known characteristics of the respondents.
1.1. Which institution do you work for?

Other UN agency Academia

11% 9%
Donor
Civil Society/NGO 5% National government
17% 4%
Inter-governmental
organisation
2% Private sector
2%

Other Consultant
6% 2%

International org.
1%
CGIAR
1%

FAO
46%

1.2. What is your area of responsibility?

Communications
Expert Consultant
Food security 1%
FAOR 1%
officer 2% Other
3% Donor 6%
3%
Programme
Policy maker Manager
4% 51%

Technical
staff/experts
9%

Researcher
20%

89
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

1.3. At which level do you mostly work?

Out of respondents who reported to be

28% based at regional level, 55% are based
50%
Global in Africa, and out of those who reported
Regional to be based at country level, 62% are
Country based in African countries.
22%

1.4. Level of engagement with FAO's work on EWEA

60%

50%
52%
40%

30%
28%
20%
21%
10%

0%
Mainy country level Mainly global level Both

2. Survey results
7. In addition to analysing survey results at the aggregate level (i.e. across all
respondents), responses were also compared across sub-groups according to the
following criteria:
• Level of interaction with FAO on EWEA: Respondents who interacted with FAO on
EWEA at Global level vs Country level, and
• Respondents’ institution type: Respondents who work at FAO vs respondents who
work in other institutions.
8. The report below highlights wherever important differences between respondent
subgroups were identified.
9. The distribution of scores is presented along with the weighted average score, whereby
“marks out of 10” are calculated. The higher score the greater the familiarity /
satisfaction / use / etc. expressed.

90
Appendix 3. Survey results

2.1. EWEA Products:44 Familiarity

Weighted
Average
Score (out
PRODUCTS 0 1 2 3 4 5 of 10)
Global Report on Food Crisis 158 5% 3% 13% 18% 32% 28% 7.1
Quarterly EWEA Report on Food Security and Early
158 6% 11% 9% 23% 28% 22%
Action 6.4
EWEA Country Plans 156 15% 15% 17% 14% 26% 13% 5.2
Good Practice factsheets 157 22% 15% 13% 17% 24% 9% 4.6
Webinars on EWEA 157 24% 11% 15% 27% 17% 6% 4.4
IASC EWEA and Readiness Report 155 27% 15% 20% 16% 17% 4% 3.9
Return on Investment Plans 159 30% 14% 14% 25% 9% 8% 3.8
IASC El Nino Oscillation SOP 158 36% 15% 19% 12% 15% 4% 3.3

2.2. EWEA products: Frequency of use

Weighted
Average
Score (out
N/
PRODUCTS A 0 1 2 3 4 5 of 10)*
13 25 21 25
151
Global Report on Food Crisis 4 7% 10% % % % % 6.4
Quarterly EWEA Report on FS and Early 12 20 27 17
146
Action 5 12% 13% % % % % 5.8
13 17 19 15
143
EWEA Country Plans 11 26% 10% % % % % 4.7
14 14 13 10
135
Return on Investment Plans 18 38% 11% % % % % 4.4
13 14 10
127
IASC El Nino Oscillation SOP 25 35% 19% % % % 8% 3.8
15 13 13
135
IASC EWEA and Readiness Report 16 33% 19% % % % 9% 3.7
15 17 12
143
Webinars on EWEA 8 29% 18% % % % 8% 3.6
14 16 19 10
143
Good Practice factsheets 9 24% 17% % % % % 3.4
*Excludes
N/A

44
The evaluation identified products in focus for the survey based on suggestions from the project management
team.

91
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

2.3. EWEA products: perception of value

Weighted
Average
Score (out
PRODUCTS 0 1 2 3 4 5 of 10)
Global Report on Food Crisis 119 3% 3% 10% 18% 40% 26% 7.4
Quarterly EWEA Report on FS and Early
3% 7% 8% 27% 37% 18%
Action 115 6.8
EWEA Country Plans 111 9% 7% 8% 29% 32% 14% 6.2
Good Practice factsheets 111 9% 6% 11% 30% 30% 14% 6.2
Webinars on EWEA 110 12% 9% 17% 24% 25% 13% 5.6
Return on Investment Plans 106 15% 9% 17% 22% 27% 9% 5.3
IASC EWEA and Readiness Report 105 15% 14% 10% 24% 30% 7% 5.2
IASC El Nino Oscillation SOP 105 15% 15% 16% 20% 26% 8% 5.0

2.4. Synthesis on EWEA products

Weighted Average Score (out of 10)

Frequency Added
Familiarity
PRODUCTS of use value
Global Report on Food Crisis 7.1 6.4 7.4
Quarterly EWEA Report on FS and Early
Action 6.4 5.8 6.8
EWEA Country Plans 5.2 4.7 6.2
Good Practice factsheets 4.6 4.4 6.2
Webinars on EWEA 4.4 3.8 5.6
Return on Investment Plans 3.8 3.7 5.3
IASC EWEA and Readiness Report 3.9 3.6 5.2
IASC El Nino Oscillation SOP 3.3 3.4 5.0

i. When comparing the first set of questions, products have the same ranking,
featuring similar scores too: respectively, respondents scored higher (7.0 and
above) the Global Report on Food Crisis (GRPC), followed by the Quarterly
EWEA Report.
ii. On the other hand, the Return on Investment Plans (ROIs), the IASC EWEA
and Readiness Report and IASC El Nino Oscillation SOP are relatively
unknown, not frequently used and with an added value rated 5 out of 10.
10. The overall score of the perception of EWEA products’ added value is on average
slightly higher than the score on the Familiarity and Frequency of use; and the score on
the Frequency of Use is slightly lower than the other two.

92
Appendix 3. Survey results

2.5. Type of decisions EWEA products help inform

Choice
Coordin Other
of Target Policy Account Budget
Advoc with program
intervent decis develop & report alloc
partners decisions
PRODUCTS types
Global Report on
Food Crisis 68 61 52 46 44 39 22 17
Quarterly EWEA
Report 54 49 46 55 42 26 17 16
EWEA Country
Plans 32 36 35 44 32 27 19 24
Good Practice
factsheets 31 29 28 31 24 17 11 10
IASC EWEA &
Readiness Report 28 29 26 19 15 15 9 8
Webinars on
EWEA 30 23 30 21 14 15 10 4
Return on
Investment Plans 27 19 17 25 9 15 12 16
IASC El Nino
Oscillation SOP 19 23 22 12 11 10 7 6
Total Checks 289 269 256 253 191 164 107 101
Total Checks % 18% 17% 16% 16% 12% 10% 7% 6%

i. Overall, EWEA products, when used to inform decisions, are mostly used for
Advocacy purposes (18 percent of checks) and for Coordination with Partners
(17 percent of checks).
ii. Decision which are not very much informed by EWEA products are Accountability
and Reporting (7 percent of checks) and Budget Allocation (6 percent of checks).
iii. The products mostly used to inform decisions are the Global Report on Food
Crisis (GRFC) for Advocacy purposes (19 percent); the Quarterly EWEA Reports,
for Choosing type of interventions (18 percent) and for Advocacy (18 percent); the
EWEA Country Plans are mostly used for Choosing type of interventions
(18 percent).
iv. Over 40 percent of checks received by IASC El Niño Oscillation SOP identified the
product as “non relevant”, followed by the ROI Plans (with 35 percent of checks).

2.6. Disaggregation of results by respondent type:

11. When comparing respondents whose interaction with FAO on EWEA was at country
level vs those whose interaction was at global level, the decision mostly informed by
EWEA products varies:
i. Those interacting at global level rather used EWEA products for being Advocacy
purposes (24 percent of checks)
ii. Those interacting at country level rather used EWEA products to inform Other
Programmatic Decisions (18 percent of checks)

93
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

2.7. Perceptions about data quality, utility, timeliness and release frequency 45

Weighted
Average
PRODUCTS 0 1 2 3 4 5 (out of 10)
I have confidence in the data they generate
145
2% 6% 8% 19% 29% 36% 7.5
The information provided is readily usable for
144
decision-making 4% 4% 8% 27% 31% 26% 7.1
They release timely information to support
145
decision-making 4% 6% 14% 24% 29% 23% 6.7
Their release frequency meets my decision-
143
making needs 4% 6% 15% 31% 29% 15% 6.4

12. All scores indicate that respondents have a high level of confidence in the data
generated and that the information products provide is readily usable for decision-
making. Overall the higher percentage of positive scores (between 4-5) was in regards
to the perception of data quality (65 percent) and timeliness (61 percent). The lowest
rating was for the release frequency of products, with 44 percent of positive scores (4-
5), 46 percent for medium score (2-3), and 10 percent for low score (0-1).

2.8. Disaggregation of results by respondent type

Weighted Average Score (out of 10)

All Country Global Other
FAO
responses Level Level Institutions
PRODUCTS
I have confidence in the data they
7.5
generate 7.0 7.9 7.3 7.7
The information products provide is
7.1
readily usable for decision-making 6.8 7.5 6.9 7.3
They release timely information to
6.7
support decision-making 6.3 7.0 6.3 7.1
Their release frequency meets my
6.4
decision-making needs 6.1 6.4 6.1 6.6

2.9. Utility of EWEA products

13. In the next question, respondents were asked in an open text question to indicate how
to improve the utility of some products. A total of 41 responses received have been
analysed to identify the most frequently raised issue, and accordingly grouped in nine
categories.
14. A word cloud was then created to illustrate visually the most commonly cited sources;
word sizes are weighted according to the quantity of responses received.

45 Ratings and scores ranged from « 0 » for fully disagree to « 5 » for fully agree:

94
Appendix 3. Survey results

Suggestions on how to improve the utility of EWEA products:

i. Suggestions to improve products’ dissemination of products prevailed, followed

by technical-related suggestions (i.e. requests to include specific data such as a
focus on agro-climate zones and soil type).
ii. Interesting and recurrent in following open-text questions too: it emerges the
need for greater partnerships and engagement with other actors, in particular at
country level.

2.10. EWEA perceived value

15. Respondents were then asked if EWEA related products would be missed if they were
to cease, resulting in a total of 125 responses, out of which 26 percent reported NO
and 74 percent YES.
16. The 92 respondents who answered positively to the above question, were asked an
additional open text question requesting to qualify their response. A total of 38
responses were analysed to identify the emerging issues, and a word cloud was
generated.

2.11. Why EWEA would be missed

17. The majority of responses (61 percent) reported the utility of EWEA products to their
usefulness for decision making purposes (such as for programming, resources allocation,
advocacy, etc.).

95
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

2.12. Most used Food Security and Nutrition information sources

18. 115 responses were received and analysed to identify the most frequently mentioned
source, and a word cloud was generated:

19. Sources developed under the INFORMED programme, namely the IPC, EWEA
products and the GRFC, were the first three mostly mentioned sources.
i. Products falling under the FAO EWEA area of work have been grouped to
capture the extent to which various EWEA products were mentioned (these
included generic EWEA reports, the Quarterly EWEA Report, EWEA Country Plans,
Webinars, Good Practice fact sheets, ROIs, the IASC EWEA Report, and the IASC El
Niño Southern Oscillation).
2.13. EWEA Inter-agency processes at Country Level: FAO’s collaboration,
contribution and usefulness of contribution

20. This question was addressed only to respondents who stated in the last profiling
question to engage with FAO on EWEA mainly at country level; however, out of this
respondents’ group (count 115), 29 percent reported to interact with FAO on EWEA
also at global level.
21. In the following analysis all respondents whose engagement with FAO on EWEA was
at country level, but not only, have been considered.

96
Appendix 3. Survey results

Weighted
Average
Score (out of
1 2 3 4 5 N/A 10)*
Disaster Risk Prioritization
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 61 3% 5% 20% 36% 36% 16 7.9
Extent of FAO Collaboration 63 3% 8% 30% 29% 30% 18 7.5
Extent of FAO Contribution 62 3% 8% 26% 37% 26% 15 7.5
Developing Triggers and Thresholds for early
action
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 58 3% 14% 16% 28% 40% 20 7.7
Extent of FAO Collaboration 59 5% 8% 25% 29% 32% 23 7.5
Extent of FAO Contribution 57 5% 16% 16% 30% 33% 19 7.4
Developing EWEA plans
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 59 7% 7% 24% 25% 37% 18 7.6
Extent of FAO Collaboration 59 7% 10% 24% 29% 31% 24 7.3
Extent of FAO Contribution 57 5% 11% 25% 33% 26% 17 7.3
Launching anticipatory actions
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 60 8% 7% 28% 23% 33% 16 7.3
Extent of FAO Collaboration 62 8% 10% 24% 27% 31% 21 7.3
Extent of FAO Contribution 62 8% 11% 31% 24% 26% 14 7.0
*Excludes N/A

22. All scores are very positive (7.0 or above), indicating that FAO’s collaboration,
contribution and usefulness in relation to the above inter-agency processes is very well
valued.
23. Out of the four processes, when combining FAO’s contribution, collaboration and
usefulness, Disaster Risk Prioritization overall received the highest score, and Launching
anticipatory actions the lowest, although the scores do not differ in a significant way
from the rating received by the other inter-agency processes.

97
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

2.14. Results disaggregated by respondents’ institution type (FAO vs other

institutions)

Weighted Average Score (out of 10)

Country Other
FAO
Disaster Risk Prioritization Level Institutions
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 7.9 7.7 8.3
Extent of FAO Collaboration 7.5 7.2 7.9
Extent of FAO Contribution 7.5 7.5 7.5
Developing Triggers and Thresholds for early
action
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 7.7 7.5 8.0
Extent of FAO Collaboration 7.5 7.1 7.9
Extent of FAO Contribution 7.4 7.1 7.8
Developing EWEA plans
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 7.6 7.4 7.8
Extent of FAO Collaboration 7.3 7.3 7.4
Extent of FAO Contribution 7.3 7.0 7.7
Launching anticipatory actions
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 7.3 6.9 7.9
Extent of FAO Collaboration 7.3 6.9 7.7
Extent of FAO Contribution 7.0 6.7 7.3

24. In this case, similarly to the results from the aggregated data, scores are quite high
(from 6.7 above).
i. However, when compared to aggregated responses, scores from respondents
working at FAO are overall slightly lower, while scores are slightly higher among
respondents who work in other institutions.
2.15. EWEA inter-agency processes at Global Level: FAO’s collaboration,
contribution and usefulness of contribution

25. This question was directed to respondents who stated to engage with FAO on EWEA
mainly at global level, however out of all respondents from this group (count 77),
29 percent of them reported to engage with FAO on EWEA also at country level.
26. In the following analysis all respondents whose engagement with FAO on EWEA was
at global level, but not only, have been considered.

98
Appendix 3. Survey results

Weighted
Average
Score (out
1 2 3 4 5 N/A of 10)*
Food Security Information
Network
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 39 3% 0% 13% 23% 62% 18 8.8
Extent of FAO Contribution 39 3% 0% 21% 31% 46% 19 8.4
Extent of FAO Collaboration 41 0% 7% 15% 32% 46% 18 8.3
IASC Global Analysts Group
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 27 0% 7% 22% 33% 37% 32 8.0
Extent of FAO Contribution 27 0% 11% 30% 26% 33% 32 7.6
Extent of FAO Collaboration 27 0% 15% 30% 19% 37% 32 7.6
Early Action Focus Task Force
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 25 0% 8% 16% 36% 40% 31 8.2
Extent of FAO Contribution 28 0% 14% 21% 29% 36% 29 7.7
Extent of FAO Collaboration 27 0% 7% 26% 26% 41% 32 8.0

*Excludes N/A

27. Scores from this question are extremely high (above 7.0). Overall the Food and Security
Information Network (FSIN) received the higher score when combining FAO’s
collaboration, contribution and usefulness, but again, the scores’ difference compared
to the other inter-agency processes is not particularly meaningful.
2.16. Results disaggregated by respondents’ institution type (FAO vs other
institutions)

Weighted Average Score (out of 10)

Other
Global Level FAO
Food Security Information Network Institutions
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 8.8 8.5 9.0
Extent of FAO Contribution 8.4 8.1 8.5
Extent of FAO Collaboration 8.3 8.1 8.5
IASC Global Analysts Group
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 8.0 8.4 7.8
Extent of FAO Contribution 7.6 7.8 7.5
Extent of FAO Collaboration 7.6 8.2 7.1
Early Action Focus Task Force
Usefulness of FAO Contribution 8.2 7.6 8.5
Extent of FAO Contribution 7.7 7.4 7.9
Extent of FAO Collaboration 8.0 7.6 8.2

28. When compared to the aggregate responses:

i. Scores from respondents working at FAO are slightly lower, while scores from
respondents working in other institutions are slightly higher.
ii. With the exception of the IASC Global Analysts Group (monthly call, 6 monthly
forecast to EDG, El Niño Southern Oscillation SOP), which is overall scored higher
by respondents from FAO, compared both to aggregated responses and other
institutions’ responses.

99
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

2.17. Good (and promising) practices on Anticipatory Action

Do you know that FAO collects information on GP?

The first question received a total of 128 responses,

NO and out of the 91 (71%) of respondents who reported
29% to know about good and promising practices related
to anticipatory action, a set of two more questions was
asked:
YES
71%

Do you know where to find this information?

?

NO
37%

YES
63%

Have you ever capitalized on GP in your own work?

As an interesting note, 71% of respondents reported to

NO having capitalized on GP, which means that 5
29% respondents who reported not to know how to access
information on GP, have actually capitalized on them in
their work.
YES
71%

100
Appendix 3. Survey results

2.18. Information gaps in relation to EWEA

29. From this question, 61 responses were received and analyzed to identify recurrent
themes; then a word clouds was generated to provide a quick overview of responses
received:

i. Although the question explicitly enquired about information gaps, only 29

responses (46 percent) indicated gaps related to information (such as the need
for further data disaggregation, for country/context specific information, for the
inclusion of the social and conflict dimension, among others);
ii. Other gaps reported: the most predominant one was related to the need for
higher timeliness, followed by that for more collaboration/partnerships, gaps in
data reliability, in capacity and budget, and the need for more guidance on
anticipatory actions.
2.19. Final comments

30. A total of 22 responses was received to the final open-text question and a word cloud
generated:

31. Most responses (7) were related to country level processes and products,
highlighting the lack for inter-agency processes, and the need to expand the work and
collaboration with other actors at country level. Other comments (5) were general
appreciation of EWEA work/products, followed by comments reporting the need to
improve dissemination, the timeliness and the link to early action. Only one
comments judged FAO EWEA very poor.

101
Appendix 4. INFORMED results
Table 1: RIMA reports

Year Type Title Country

2015 Resilience Resilience Analysis in Senegal 2005 Senegal
report
2015 Resilience Resilience analysis in Burkina Faso 1998-2003 Burkina
report Faso
2015 Resilience Resilience analysis in Niger 2011 Niger
report
2015 Resilience Resilience analysis in Mali 2009/2010 Mali
report
2016 Resilience Resilience Analysis in Sudan 2009 Sudan
report
2016 Resilience Resilience Analysis in the Triangle of Hope: Mauritania 2015 Mauritania
report
2016 Resilience Analyse de la résilience dans le Triangle de l’Espoir: Mauritanie 2015 Mauritania
report
2016 Resilience Resilience Analysis in Senegal: Matam 2016 Senegal
report
Analyse de la résilience au SÉNÉGAL: Matam 2016 Senegal
2017 Resilience Resilience Analysis in Senegal 2011 Senegal
report
2017 Resilience Resilience Analysis in Isiolo, Marsabit and Meru: Kenya 2016 Kenya
report
2018 Resilience Resilience analysis of Karamoja, Uganda 2016 Uganda
report
2018 Resilience Resilience analysis of Jordan 2013 Jordan
report
2018 Resilience Food security, resilience and well-being analysis of refugees and host Uganda
report communities in northern Uganda
2019 Resilience Resilience analysis of North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo (in DRC
report FRENCH)
2019 Resilience Resilience analysis of Mauritania (in FRENCH) Mauritania
report
2019 Resilience Resilience analysis of Chad (in FRENCH) Mauritania
report
2019 Resilience Resilience analysis in Borno State, Nigeria Nigeria
report
2019 Resilience Resilience analysis of pastoral and agropastoral communities in South Sudan
report Sudan’s cross-border areas with Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda

2019 Resilience RESILIENCE ANALYSIS IN THE TARGET AREAS OF “CARBON Kirgiztan

report SEQUESTRATION THROUGH CLIMATE INVESTMENT IN FORESTS AND
RANGELANDS (CS-FOR)” PROJECT IN THE KYRZYK REPUBLIC
2019 Resilience Food security and resilience of refugees and host communities in south- Uganda
report west Uganda
2017 IE report Karamoja region (Uganda) - Baseline report for impact evaluation of Uganda
FAO-UNICEF-WFP resilience programming
2019 IE report RAPPORT DE L’ENQUÊTE DE BASE POUR L’ÉVALUATION DE L’IMPACT Niger
DU PROGRAMME DE RÉSILIENCE DE PAM-FAO-FIDA DANS LES
RÉGIONS DE MARADI ET ZINDER, NIGER
2016 IE report DOLOW 2016 Evidence from mid-term review of the impact evaluation Somalia
for the “Building Resilience in Somalia” joint strategy

102
Appendix 4. INFORMED results

Year Type Title Country

2017 IE report RESILIENCE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESILIENCE Somaliland
STRATEGY (JRS) IN BURCO AND ODWEYNE, SOMALILAND
2016 Policy brief Resilience analysis in Sudan: a policy brief Sudan
2016 Policy brief Resilience analysis in the Triangle of Hope (Mauritania): a policy brief Mauritania
2016 Policy brief Investing in education, healthcare and productivity: how to strengthen Senegal
resilience in Matam
2017 Policy brief Strengthening resilience in Senegal through agricultural productivity and Senegal
education
2017 Policy brief Strengthening resilience in Isiolo, Marsabit and Meru counties Kenya
2017 Policy brief ENHANCING RESILIENCE OF CROSS-BORDER COMMUNITIES: THE Kenya
MANDERA CLUSTER
2018 Policy brief Building resilience of livelihoods in Karamoja, Uganda Uganda
2019 Policy brief Pathways to self-reliance for refugees and host communities in Northern Uganda
Uganda
2016 Technical RIMA-II: Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis - II
material
2018 Technical Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis - Short questionnaire
material
2019 Technical Medición y análisis del índíce de resiliencia - Cuestionario abreviado
material
2019 Technical Mesure et analyse de l'indice de résilience - Version réduite du
material questionnaire
2018 Technical Resilience Marking: how to classify projects for more resilient livelihoods
material
2019 Technical FAO video tutorial: how to measure resilience with Excel
material
2019 Technical Tutoriel vidéo de la FAO: Mesure de la résilience à l’aide d’Excel
material
2017 Dashboard Resilience analysis in Karamoja, Uganda
2018 Dashboard Resilience analysis in Mauritania
2018 Dashboard Refugees and host communities in northern Uganda: snap-shot of the
food security, resilience and well-being situation
2019 Dashboard Resilience analysis in Nigeria by LGAs and profiles
2019 Working Paving the way to build the resilience of men and women. How to
paper conduct a gender analysis of resilience
2017 Working The 2012 crisis in Mali and its implications on resilience and food
paper security
2016 Working A dynamic analysis of resilience in Uganda
paper
2020 Working Core Indicators for Resilience Analysis
paper
2017 Journal Resilience and child malnutrition in Mali
article
2018 Journal Resilience mobility in Uganda: A dynamic analysis
article
2018 Journal Household resilience to food insecurity: evidence from Tanzania and
article Uganda
2018 Journal Cross‐country Evidence of the Relationship Between Resilience and the
article Subjective Perception of Well‐being and Social Inclusion: Evidence from
the Regions of Matam (Senegal) and the Triangle of Hope (Mauritania)
2019 Journal Whose resilience matters? Like-for-like comparison of objective and
article subjective evaluations of resilience

103
Evaluation of Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED)

Year Type Title Country

2019 Journal The effects of violent conflict on household resilience and food security:
article Evidence from the 2014 Gaza conflict
2019 Journal Food security and violent conflict: Introduction to the special issue
article
2019 Journal Resilience Thresholds to Temperature Anomalies: A Long-run Test for
article Rural Tanzania

Table 2: Early action interventions

Year of Region Country Objective Total Ad-hoc or

approval (USD) Pilot

2019 RAP Philippines To increase resilience of vulnerable rice 400 000 Pilot
farmers by safeguarding production and
complementing with livelihood activities
2019 RAP Pakistan Early Actions in Tharparkar district to 207 000 Ad hoc
mitigate the impact of drought on
herders
2019 RAF Madagascar Southern Africa regional drought induced 400 000 Pilot
by El Nino
2019 RAF Zimbabwe Southern Africa regional drought induced 400 000 Ad hoc
by El Nino
2019 RAF Malawi Southern Africa regional drought induced 400 000 Ad hoc
by El Nino
2019 RAF Zambia Southern Africa regional drought induced 400 000 Ad hoc
by El Nino
2019 RAF Namibia Southern Africa regional drought induced 400 000 Ad hoc
by El Nino
2019 RLC Nicaragua Mitigate the impact of El Nino induced 200 000 Ad hoc
Drought on vulnerable farmers
2019 RLC Guatemala Mitigate the impact of El Nino induced 200 000 Ad hoc
Drought on vulnerable farmers
2018 RAF Madagascar To face the cumulative effect of drought 400 000 Pilot
of past years coupled with a chronic food
insecurity situation
2018 RAP Mongolia To reduce the vulnerability of the poorest 290 000 Ad hoc
pastoralist households in the upcoming
dzud winter.
2018 RAF Sudan To establish an early warning system to 400 000 Pilot
monitor drought and dry spells in both
Kassala and North Darfur states.
2018 RAF Niger Provision of livestock feed and 400 000 Ad hoc
vaccination in two areas (Tahoua / Zinder)
2018 RLA Colombia Incrementar la resiliencia de 400 000 Ad hoc
cumunidades rurales de La Guajira
afectadas por la sequía y la crisis
migratoria de Venezuela de La Guajira.

104
Appendix 4. INFORMED results

Year of Region Country Objective Total Ad-hoc or

approval (USD) Pilot

2017 RAF Kenya Improved food security and nutrition 400 000 Pilot
situation of targeted beneficiaries
through the protection of livelihood
assets in anticipation of worsening
drought situation
2017 RAF Ethiopia Horn of Africa Drought 400 000 Ad hoc
2017 RAF Somalia Horn of Africa Drought 400 000 Ad hoc
2017 RAF Horn of Africa Horn of Africa Drought 400 000 Pilot - Kenya
- REOA - Cross
Border

Table 3: KORE webinars

# Date Title
1 May 2016 Confronting Drought in Africa's Drylands: Opportunities for resilience
2 June 2016 Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis model – RIMA-II: what’s new?
3 July 2016 Caisses de résilience
4 August 2016 Social Protection Webinar I - Shock-responsive social protection for resilience building
5 September Gender equality for resilience in protracted crises
2016
6 September Caisses de résilience (in French)
2016
7 November The experience of the global food security assessment for strengthening resilience
2016
8 April 2017 Webinar on the 2017 Global Report on Food Security Crises
9 May 2017 DRM Webinar I - Governing and managing disaster risk in the agriculture sector
10 May 2017 DRM Webinar II - Assessing risks and impacts from extreme events/natural hazards on
the agriculture sector
11 June 2017 Dimitra Clubs: Enhancing the resilience of rural men and women through community
mobilization
12 July 2017 DRM Webinar III - Benefits of farm-level disaster risk reduction practices in agriculture
13 September SAFE Webinar I - Overview of Terminology, Cross-cutting Issues, Challenges and
2017 Coordination
14 September SAFE Webinar II - Approaches, tools and case studies
2017
15 October 2017 FbF Webinar I - FAO Early Warning Early Action: What's new?
16 December FbF Webinar II - Reducing disaster risk vulnerability in Bangladesh: Partner
2017 perspectives
17 January 2018 Sustaining Peace Webinar I – The role of conflict-sensitive natural resource
management approaches
18 June 2018 DRM Webinar IV - Building resilience to natural hazards and climate-related disasters
in the Caribbean
19 July 2018 FbF Webinar III - From Early Warning to Early Action in Mongolia: Bracing for the cold
to protect livestock and livelihoods
20 October 2018 Social Protection Webinar II - FAO and Cash+: How to maximize the impacts of cash
transfers
21 October 2019 The UN Common Guidance on Resilience for Humanitarian-Development-Peace Actors
22 October 2019 Les Clubs Dimitra - Améliorer la résilience des femmes et des hommes ruraux grâce à
la mobilisation communautaire (in French)

105
Office of Evaluation
E-mail: [email protected]
Web address: www.fao.org/evaluation
CB2936EN/1/01.21

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Rome, Italy