MOD 2 CASES:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN ATIENZA

G.R. No. L-35748 | December 14, 1931 | VILLA-REAL, J.:
DOCTRINE: Mere passive presence at the scene of the crime, mere silence and failure to give
the alarm, without evidence of agreement of conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation
required for complicity in the commission of the crime.
FACTS:
Accused Romana Silvestre (Silvestre), wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage,
cohabited with co-defendant Martin Atienza (Atienza) in the Province of Bulacan. The complaining
husband (Joaquin) filed a complaint for adultery against Silvestre in the Justice of Peace of
Bulacan to which led to the arrest of both the accused. While the case was pending, the two
defendants begged to speak to the complainant Joaquin, urging him to withdraw the complaint,
the two accused binding themselves to discontinue the cohabitation and to not live in the same
municipality – to which Joaquin acceded to and led to the dismissal of the case. Accused left the
municipality of Masocol and moved to Santo Nino wherein she met her son, Nicolas de la Cruz, by
her former marriage and followed him to the village of Masocol under the pretext of asking him
for some nipa leaves. Co-defendant Atienza followed Silvestre and continued to cohabit with the
latter. Until one night while they were all gathered for supper, Atienza advised Nicolas and the
latter’s wife to take out their furnitures as he was about to set the house on fire for the reason
that it was the only way that he could make a revenge against the people of Masocol whom
instigated the charge of adultery against him and his co-defendant Silvestre. As Atienza was
armed, no one dared to stop him, not even Silvestre. At the time Nicolas and his wife was about
to report the matter to the barrio lieutenant, they suddenly heard shouts of “Fire! Fire!” and when
the couple turned back, they saw their house already in flames which also destroyed 48 other
nearby houses. The counsel for the defendants-appellant prays for the affirmance of judgment
with regard to defendant Martin Atienza being guilty of the crime of arson – but not with respect
to Romana Silvestre.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not accused Romana Silvestre has acted in conspiracy with Martin Atienza in the
commission of the offense and therefore criminally liable for the crime of arson;
HELD:
NO. Romana Silvestre has not acted in conspiracy with her co-defendant Atienza in the
commission of the crime of arson.
The Penal Code defines an accomplice to be one who does not take a direct part in the
commission of the offense but cooperates in the execution of the act through previous or
simultaneous actions. The complicity which is penalized under the Code requires a certain
degree of cooperation, whether moral or through advice, encouragement, agreement, or
material, through external acts.
As for accused-defendant Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation. Her
mere presence and silence, while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute the required
cooperation for it does not appear that such an act encouraged Atienza to commit the crime of
arson. Her failure to give the alarm likewise does not make her liable as an accomplice as
omission to do so is not an offense punished by law.
Hence, the criminal liability for the crime of arson befalls upon Atienza for evidently acting with
criminal intent but with respect to Silvestre, the latter is acquitted from the crime charged as
mere passive presence or silence in the scene of the crime does not constitute the requisite
complicity penalized under the Penal Code.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NEMESIO TALINGDAN, et.al
G.R. No. L-32126 | July 6, 1978
DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence states that subsequent acts of mere passive presence, mere silence
do not constitute the cooperation required for complicity in the commission of the crime. But the
subsequent acts of concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime already
makes him/her liable as an accessory.
FACTS:
Bernardo Bagabag (victim-deceased) and appellant Teresa Domogma’s relationship has already
been strained for the reason that latter deserted their family home on several occasions and
each of those time, Bernardo took time to look for her. On several occasions Bernardo was at
work, co-appellant Talingdan visited Domogma at the latter’s house. Not so long when Bernardo
found out about the illicit relationship that was going on between the co-defendants and directly
charged Domogma that in the event the latter bore a child, it was not Bernardo’s. Days before
Bernardo was shot, he and Domogma had a violent quarrel wherein it led to the former slapping
the latter and the latter seeking the help of the police wherein it was Talingdan, who was a police
officer who responded and called Bernardo down. Bernardo ignored Talingdan and the latter also
left the place but not without warning that someday, the former will be killed. On another day,
Corazon, the 12-year old daughter of Bernardo and Teresa saw the latter together with Talingdan
with other co-accused in a small hut owned by Bernardo and had overheard one of them saying,
“Can he elude a bullet?”. Further, on another day, Corazon while cooking food saw her mother
met again with the other appellants. Corazon then informed her father of the presence of
persons downstairs to which made Bernardo proceed to the kitchen and was shortly after fired
upon by the appellants. After the incident, Teresa pulled Corazon aside and questioned her. When
Corazon answered that she recognized the killers, Teresa warned her not to reveal the matter to
anyone or else she will kill her. Corazon, despite of the fear that she experienced due to the
threat made by her own mother, nevertheless was able to reveal the matter of killing to her
immediate relatives which ultimately led to the filing of Information for Murder against the herein
defendant-appellants.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not defendant-appellant Teresa Domogma should be acquitted from the crime of
murder for not having acted in conspiracy with other co-defendants in the commission of the said
felony;
HELD:
NO. Defendant-appellant Domogma is not entirely free from criminal liability and therefore
should not be acquitted for the crime of murder charged in the Information.
Article 19, par. 3 of the RPC provides that subsequent acts of a defendant that constitute the
“concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime” makes him/her liable as an
accessory.
It may be contended that there is no evidence to prove that Domogma has acted in conspiracy to
kill her husband as there is no showing of actual cooperation on her part with her co-appellants
in their culpable acts but it was nevertheless shown that she knew that it was going to be done
and did not object.
As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the
assailants of her father. When Corazon Identified appellants, Teresa did not only enjoin her
daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't
tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers
investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information, she claimed she had
no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before actual shooting of her husband, she was
passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy. After Bernardo was killed, she
became active in her cooperation with them. She is therefore at the very least, an accessory to
the offense committed by her co-accused.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165842| November 29, 2005 | CALLEJO, SR., J.:
DOCTRINE: Article 349 of the RPC, in relation to Article 41 of the NCC which speaks of the
requirement of judicial declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse constitutes
proof that the petitioner has acted in good faith in contracting the second marriage and would
negate criminal intent on his part as to make him not liable for the crime of bigamy. Good faith or
mistake of fact is a valid defense for felony by dolo and once proven, it negates criminal intent.
FACTS:
On 1975, Eduardo Manuel (Eduardo) was married to a certain Rubylus Gana (Gana). He met
private complainant Tina Gandalera (Tina) in Dagupan City sometime in 1996 wherein Tina was
then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student and Eduardo being 39 years old. Afterwards,
Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit Tina wherein despite Tina’s resistance, the former was able
to succeed in having his way with her. Eduardo then proposed marriage on several occasions and
even brought his parents to meet the parents of Tina to be able to assure her that he was indeed
single. Eventually, they were married and was happy during the first few years of their marriage
up until Eduardo started making himself scarce and went to their home only twice or thrice a
year. Since Tina was jobless, she needed assistance in finances and whenever she asks money
from Eduardo, the latter would slap her. Eduardo thereafter abandoned her and ultimately
stopped in giving her support. Motivated by a hint of curiousity, Tina made inquiries with the NSO
and there she found out that Eduardo was in fact previously married to Gana. On the other hand,
Eduardo narrated a different version of the facts wherein he primarily alleged that when he met
Tina in a bar, who then worked as a GRO, he fell in love with her and eventually married her.
Despite of his advice that he was previously married to Gana, Tina nevertheless agreed to marry
him. Furthermore, he alleged that his declaration of being single in his marriage contract with
Tina was made in good faith on the belief that his first marriage with Gana was invalid for he has
not heard from the latter for more than 20 years and that he did not know that he had to go to
court to seek the nullification of his first marriage with Gana before he may be allowed to
remarry. The trial court found him to be guilty of bigamy to which decision he had appealed from
and contending that he cannot be made criminally liable for bigamy because when he married
private complainant, he did so in good faith without any malicious intent on the belief that his
first marriage no longer subsisted – that there must be malice before one can be held criminally
liable for a felony.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Eduardo Manuel is criminally liable for bigamy for having contracted a second
marriage without first obtaining a judicial declaration of the presumptive death of the absent
spouse – despite of his claim that he acted in good faith on his honest belief that his first
marriage with Gana is no longer valid;
Whether or not the award of moral damages in favor of private complainant Tina Gandalera was
proper;
HELD:
For the first issue:
YES. Eduardo Manuel is criminally liable for the crime of bigamy. Even if he claims that according
to Article 390 of the NCC, one who has been absent for seven years is presumed dead as a
matter of law for all purposes except of succession, this particular provision is said to have been
amended and qualified by Article 41 of the FC.
Article 3 of the RPC provides that there is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with
deliberate intent (dolo). Both intentional and culpable felonies are deemed committed
voluntarily. Furthermore, when the act or omission defined and penalized by the law as a felony
was proved to have been committed, it gives rises to a presumption that the wrongful act was
done intentionally or the actor has acted with criminal intent. For one to be criminally liable for a
felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both the evil act and evil intent – actus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith is a valid defense for a
felony by dolo and such defense negates criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an
excuse – ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove that Eduardo’s previous marriage to Gana
was not judicially declared a nullity and hence, it is presumed to exist. With that being the case,
the act of Eduardo in contracting a second marriage with Rubylus Gana, despite of that prevailing
fact, gives rise to a presumption of malice or criminal intent on his part in doing such act. The
burden of proving rests upon the petitioner that when he contracted the second marriage, he
was of the well-founded belief that his first wife was already dead for not having heard from her
for more than 20 years and this belief would be proven by adducing in evidence a judicial
declaration of the presumptive death of the absent spouse as required by Article 349 of the RPC,
in conjunction with Article 41 of the Family Code. The requirement of instituting a summary
proceeding for judicial declaration of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the consequences of the second marriage,
because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith is based
only on mere testimony. In other words, the judgment is the proof of the good faith of the present
spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage and cannot be convicted of the crime of bigamy
even when the former spouse reappears. However, petitioner failed to discharge this burden.
Hence, for having contracted a subsequent marriage without a judgement of the presumptive
death of the absent spouse which should serve as the proof of his good faith in contracting said
second marriage, Eduardo Manuel is criminally liable for the crime of bigamy.
For the second issue:
YES. Private complainant is entitled to the award of moral damages.
Though incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate cause of defendant’s wrongful act or omission. The elements that must be satisfied
before moral damages may be awarded are: 1) injury sustained by the claimant; 2) culpable act
or omission; 3) such act or omission is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant and 4) predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 and 2220 of the NCC.
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically listed on the afore-cited provisions but petitioner
is still liable to private complainant for damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles
19,20,21.
Petitioner courted the private complainant and eventually married her. He assured her that he
was single – he even brought his parents to solidify such false representation. The private
complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s heartless deception for having been
believed that Eduardo Manuel was his lawful husband. Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing
a woman to enter into marriage relation has been recognized in other jurisdictions.
Hence, with these circumstances prevailing, the private complainant is entitled to moral
damages.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, et.al

G.R. No. 97471| February 17, 1993 | REGALADO, J.:
DOCTRINE: In determining the crime for which the accused shall be held liable, his motive and
specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct
appreciation and accurate conclusion. Motive of the accused is essential in determining the
specific nature of the crime.
FACTS:
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento (Mrs. Sarmiento) owns Nika Cakes and Pastries in Araneta
Ave., Quezon City. She has a driver of her own, just like his husband. One afternoon, herein
appellant Isabelo Puno (Puno), who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento’s husband, arrived at
the bakeshop and informed Mrs. Sarmiento that Fred, who is the personal driver of Mrs.
Sarmiento would not be able to arrive as he has to go to Pampanga to attend to some
emergency – hence, it is Isabelo who would temporarily take the place of Fred. When Mrs.
Sarmiento’s time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig arrived, she entered the Mercedes-Benz of
her husband, with Isabelo Puno being the driver. As they made a turn in the corner of Araneta
Ave., co-defendant Enrique Puno entered the vehicle and jumped into the back seat of the
vehicle with a gun pointed to Mrs. Sarmiento while the defendants demanding to give them
money. Sarmiento acceded to give them the money that she currently have in her bag,
amounting to P7k but the defendants demanded P100k more to which Sarmiento likewise
acceded to but on the condition that the defendants would drop-off Sarmiento at her gas station
in Kamagong St., Makati where her money is. The car traversed the North superhighway wherein
Isabelo demanded Sarmiento to issue a check for the P100k they demand to which the latter
likewise acceded to. Isabelo turned the car around towards Metro Manila but changed his mind
and turned around again towards Pampanga. That is when Mrs. Sarmiento bravely jumped out of
the vehicle and crossed the other side of the superhighway and after several vehicles ignored
her, she was able to flag down a fish vendor van. Both of the accused were arrested with Enrique
being arrested while he was trying to encash the check that Mrs. Sarmiento issued. Appellant
Puno, on the other hand, tried to mitigate his liability by contending that he had committed such
act due to his dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the accussed-appellant is guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom under
Article 267 of the RPC or a violation of P.D. 532 known as Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery
Law or crime of simple robbery under Article 294 of the RPC;
HELD:
Consistent with the trial court, this Court believes that the crime that was committed was only
simple robbery under Article 294 of the RPC.
Based on our Criminal Laws, in determining which crime or offense should the accused be held
criminally liable for, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the act complained are of
essential consideration. It has also been held that the motive of the accused is essential in
determining the specific nature of the crime.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the appellants had any other motive than to extort
money from complainant Sarmiento under the threat of compulsion or intimidation. To prove that
the accused-appellants are liable for the crime of kidnapping, there must be indubitable proof
that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty and not
where such restraint of freedom of liberty were merely incidental in the commission of another
offense which was primarily intended by the offenders. To reiterate, the defendant-appellants’
primary intention was not to deprive the victim of his personal liberty – it being merely an
incident of them extorting money from the victim. The amounts given to appellant are likewise
not in the nature of ransom considering their immediate obtention from the complainant
personally. The offense is also not highway robbery defined and punished under Presidential
Decree No. 532 because the law’s primary object is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers.
It would not be necessary to show that the members of the band actually committed robbery or
kidnapping – the crime being already proven when the purpose of the band are among those
contemplated in Article 306 of the RPC. The fact that the robbery in this case was committed
inside a car which casually traversed on a highway does not necessarily entail the situation
envisaged by the decree.
Hence, the defendant-appellants are only guilty of the crime of simple robbery under Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code and not kidnapping for ransom as charged in the Information. The
Court further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the
crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since
the former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which
they are charged.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARLON DELIM, et.al
G.R. No. 142773| January 28, 2003 | CALLEJO, SR., J.:
DOCTRINE: Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged,
such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. It may be
proved by either a direct or circumstantial evidence. Specific intent is not synonymous with
motive as proof of presence or absence of motive does not automatically result in the conviction
or innocence of the accused for the crime charged.
FACTS:
Marlon, Manuel and Robert are brothers. They are uncles of Ronald and Leon Delim. Modesto was
an Igorot and a carpenter who took the surname Delim after he was adopted by the father of
Marlon, Manuel and Robert. However, Modesto’s wife Rita and their 16 years old son Randy,
continued to use Modesto’s original surname of Manalo Bantas. One evening, while Modesto
together with his family and two grandchildren were preparing for supper, the defendant-
appellants suddenly entered the house and Marlon pointed his gun at Modesto while Robert and
Ronald, simultaneously grabbed the victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto
and the latter was brought out of the house. Leon and Manuel ordered Rita and Randy to stay. As
soon as Leon and Manuel left, Randy immediately sought the help of his uncle and other relatives
to look for his father but on the several locations that they went to, they were not able to find
him. Not until they returned to the housing project in Pangasinan where they found the lifeless
body of Modesto under thick bushes and in a state of decomposition. Rita and Randy then rushed
to the police to report the names and addresses of defendant-appellants as the authors of the
crime. Upon autopsy of the cadaver, it revealed that the several wounds were sustained by the
victim Modesto were defensive wounds. Marlon, Leon and Ronald interposed their respective
alibies. The trial court rendered judgment finding the defendant-appellants guilty of the crime of
murder.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the specific intent of the malefactors are only to deprive the victim of his liberty
which would constitute criminal liability for the crime of kidnapping or to ultimately kill the victim
which would make them liable for either murder or homicide;
HELD:
The specific intent of the defendant-appellants was not merely to deprive the victim of his liberty
but to ultimately kill Modesto Delim.
According to People v. Puno, in determining which crime should the accused be held criminally
liable for, his motive or specific intent in perpetrating the act complained is of invaluable aid or
importance. That where specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged,
such specific intent must be alleged in the Information. What is primordial then is the specific
intent of the malefactors as charged or alleged in the Information.
In this case, it is evident in the Information that the specific intent of the defendant-appellants in
barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that their act of abducting or seizing him
was merely incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Furthermore, there is no allegation
on the Information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his
freedom or liberty. The prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus delicti.
Modesto sustained five gunshot wounds and seven stab wounds. The use of deadly weapons by
the malefactors as well as the nature, number and location of the wounds inflicted are evidence
of the intent to kill the victim. Further, the prosecution mustered the required quantum of
circumstantial evidence to prove that accused-appellants conspired to kill and did kill Modesto.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto, each armed with a handgun.
Marlon and Ronald barged into said house while Leon stood guard by the door thereof. After
Marlon and Ronald had left with Modesto Leon stood by the door and warned Randy and Rita not
to leave the house. The overt acts of all the malefactors were so synchronized and executed with
precision evincing a preconceived plan or design of all the malefactors to achieve a common
purpose, namely the killing of Modesto.
Court therefore finds that defendant-appellants are guilty of the crime of homicide and not
murder because qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abused of superior strength
must be alleged and proved clearly and conclusively as the crime itself.
 UNITED STATES v. AH CHONG
G.R. No. L-5272| March 19, 1910 | CARSON, J.:
DOCTRINE: A person who commits an act which is defined and punished as a felony by law is
presumed to have acted with a criminal intent and therefore criminally liable for said offense.
However, the ignorance or mistake of fact is considered to be a valid defense against such
presumption and when proven to be sufficient, negates criminal intent on the part of the actor
provided that the mistake of face was not due to negligence or bad faith.
FACTS:
Defendant Ah Chong, a Chinese man, was employed as a cook at Ft. Mckinley together with him
was Pascual Gualberto (victim) who was then employed as a house boy or muchacho. They were
both staying at Officers Quarters No. 27 which is a detached house about 40 meters away from
the nearest building. The said house was not furnished with a permanent lock and so defendant
and the victim improvised for a temporarily lock which is reinforced by means of fastening the
door by placing it against a chair. One night, Ah Chong was awakened by someone trying to force
his way in the room. He sat up and called out twice, “Who is there?” but to no response and the
intruder was still trying to open the door. Because of the large growth of vines in the porch of the
house and that it was dark, it was difficult for Ah Chong to see and fearing that the intruder
might be a robber, warned that if he/she enters the room, Ah Chong will kill him. Because of the
intruder’s continuous exertion of force, he succeeded in opening the door and the chair which
was placed behind the door struck Ah Chong which led the latter to immediately recourse to his
bed to get the kitchen knife which he had placed under his pillow and eventually struck the
intruder. It turned out that the intruder was Pascual Gualberto, his roommate. Ah Chong then
immediately called his employers for help and secured bandages to bind up Pascual’s wounds.
Ah Chong and Pascual had an understanding that whenever either of them returns to the house
at night, either should first knock on the door and acquaint his companion with his identity. Ah
Chong did admit the wrongful act which he has committed but contended that he only did so
because he thought that Pascual was a “ladron” for forcibly entering the room despite the
former’s warnings. Defendant Ah Chong was eventually found guilty of simple homicide.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not ignorance or mistake of fact (ignorantia facti excusat) is a valid defense against
the presumption of malice or criminal intent and therefore defendant Ah Chong acted in good
faith and without criminal intent in the commission of the crime.
HELD:
YES. Ignorance or mistake of fact is considered to be a valid defense against presumption of
malice or criminal intent.
According to our Criminal Law, a proof of innocent mistake of facts overcomes the presumption
of malice or criminal intent and also overcomes the presumption that the “acts punished by law”
was committed “voluntarily”. By this premise, it is recognized in this jurisdiction that no one can
be held criminally liable who, by reason of mistake as to the facts, commits an act for which he
would be exempt from criminal liability had the facts been what he believed it to be – provided
that the alleged ignorance or mistake of facts was not due to negligence or bad faith. If such
ignorance or mistake of fact is innocent and sufficient, it cancels the presumption of criminal
intent for the wrongful act committed and would work an acquittal. The commission of the acts
contemplated in the Code when done without malice, imprudence or negligence, does not
impose criminal liability on the part of the person committing the same.
In this case, defendant Ah Chong struck the fatal blow in the belief that the intruder was a thief,
from whose assault he was in imminent peril. In view of the circumstances as they appeared to
the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief
that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts
been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on
account of his act.
Hence, Defendant Ah Chong must be acquitted for the crime for having successfully proven that
he committed the wrongful act on account of innocent mistake of facts – that where the
circumstances been what appeared to him, he will be justified in committing such act.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA
G.R. No. L-47722| July 27, 1943 | MORAN, J.:
DOCTRINE: A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence. Where an unlawful act is willfully or voluntarily done, a mistake as to the
identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence to support a plea of
mitigated liability. Ignorance or mistake of fact, to be a valid defense, must be completely
innocent – meaning, there is the absence of the idea of malice, imprudence or negligence.
FACTS:
One afternoon, Captain Monsod who is the Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan
received a telegram containing an information regarding escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas and
Irene in Cabanatuan and to have the former dead or alive. Defendant Corporal Galanta reported
at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the telegram and a
newspaper clipping containing the picture of Balagtas. Both Galanta and Oanis were instructed to
arrest Balagtas but if overpowered, to use the necessary force to contain him. When they arrived
at the house where Irene was supposedly living, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare and asked
her where Irene’s room was. Mallare pointed the room and likewise stated that Irene was
sleeping with her paramour. Once Oanis and Galanta step foot in the room of Irene, and upon
seeing a man at the bed with his back towards them beside Irene, immediately fired upon the
man without any hesitation. However, it turned out that the person shot and killed was not the
convict Balagtas but Serapio Tecson, an innocent man. When the Provincial Inspector arrived at
the scene, he asked on who killed the victim and herein defendant-appellants admitted that they
were the author. Defendant-appellants likewise state a different version of the incident primarily
contending that they made an inquiry before they shot the victim.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not herein defendant-appellant should be completely exempted from criminal liability
for the crime they had committed against the mistaken victim Tecson on the ground of ignorance
or innocent mistake of fact;
HELD:
NO. Defendant-appellants should not be exempted from criminal liability on the ground of
ignorance or innocent mistake of facts.
The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat or translates to ignorance of fact is an excuse. However,
this principle / maxim only applies when the mistake as to the facts were made not only in the
absence of malice but also of imprudence or negligence. It must be noted that in culpable
felonies, the element of malice is absent but substituted by the element of imprudence or
negligence. So, it is clear that the defense of mistake of fact to be valid, the actor must not have
committed either an intentional or culpable felony – meaning he is completely innocent and had
only committed such an act because of the facts as it presented themselves to him.
In the case at bar, the true fact is that while Tecson was sleeping in the room together with Irene,
with his back faced towards the door, Oanis and Galanta fired at him successively and
simultaneously, believing him to be the target Anselmo Balagtas without having made any
reasonable inquiry at to his identity. There are no circumstances which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being asleep, the defendant-appellants had ample
time and opportunity to ensure that such person is really their target by ascertaining his identity
and could even effect a bloodless arrest considering that the person being asleep, cannot resist
in any manner by a sudden arrest. Furthermore, this should have been the legitimate action that
they undertaken in consonance with the instruction given to them by their superior to only apply
the reasonable force to contain the convict whenever they are overpowered. According to the
Rules of Court, a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making the arrest. The crime committed by appellants is not
merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice but with imprudence or negligence.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime is murder with the qualifying circumstance of
alevosia. There is a mitigating circumstance, however, as the wrongful act was committed in the
defendant-appellants’ performance of their duties as police officers.
 ALEXANDER PADILLA v. HON. JUDGE BALTAZAR DIZON
Admin. Case No. 3086| February 23, 1988
DOCTRINE: Proof of malice or criminal/deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses
punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita – it being sufficient that the act prohibited by
the special penal law is committed, regardless of intent, to warrant conviction with the said
special penal law. Good faith or lack of malice is not a defense for acts mala prohibita.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by then Commissioner of Customs Alexander Padilla
against Judge Baltazar Dizon for having rendered maliciously erroneous decision due to gross
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law, acquitting the accused Lo Chi Fai from the offense of
smuggling of foreign currency out of the country – an act made illegal by Central Bank Circular
No. 960. The case where defendant Judge rendered a decision involved a tourist, Lo Chi Fi who
was caught by a Customs guard in Manila International Airport while on the process of boarding a
plane bound for Hongkong, smuggling foreign currency outside the country. At the time of
apprehension, it was found that Lo Chi Fi was carrying foreign currency of various denominations
totaling the amount of $355,349.57 without any authority provided by law. The accused tried to
establish that he was a businessman from Kowloon, Hongkong, engaged in the garment business
and that the reason of his coming to the Philippines was to invest in business in Philippines and
to play casino. That at the time of his arrival, he already carried considerable amount of foreign
currency. But when asked by the court why did not present all these declarations at the time of
apprehension, he answered that he was not asked to do so and that he does not understand
English. That the reason on why he carries this considerable amount of foreign currency outside
the Philippines was because of the fear that the “revolution” taking place in Manila might
become widespread. It was based on these statements that herein defendant-appellant Judge
Dizon rendered a decision of acquittal in favor of Lo Chi Fi.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not proof of malice or criminal/deliberate intent is necessary before one may be held
criminally liable for offenses punished by special laws, like Central Bank Circular No. 960;
HELD:
NO. Proof of malice or criminal/deliberate intent is not essential to prove conviction for offenses
punished by special laws – it being in the nature of mala prohibita.
According to our Criminal Law, malice or criminal/deliberate intent is not considered as an
essential element before one may be held criminally liable for an act punished by a special law. It
is enough that the actor has committed the act prohibited by the special law, regardless of
whatever his/her intent may be, for him/her to be criminally liable for violation of that particular
special law. Since acts mala prohibita does not give importance to the element of malice, it
likewise follows that the defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent in acts mala in se are
not applicable in acts mala prohibita.
The respondent judge shown gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law when he ruled
that to prove Lo Chi Fi’s conviction for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, it must be
proven by the prosecution that the accused had the intent to violate the law. The respondent
ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses
punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the respondent
has by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go free. The accused at the time of his
apprehension at the Manila International Airport had the amount of US$355,349.57 in assorted
foreign currencies without any specific authority from the Central Bank as required by law.
Further, although lack of malice or wilfull intent is not a valid defense in a case for violation of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 which is a special law – mala prohibita, the respondent nonetheless
chose to exonerate the accused based on his defense that the foreign currency he was bringing
out of the country where brought into the Philippines by him. Furthermore, in invoking the
provisions of CB Circular No. 960 to justify the release of US$ 3,000.00 to the accused, the
respondent judge again displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. CB
Circular No. 960 merely provides for the purpose of establishing the amount of foreign currency
brought in or out of the Philippines. There is nothing in said circular that would justify returning to
him the amount of at least US$3,000.00, if he is caught attempting to bring out foreign exchange
in excess of said amount without specific authority from the Central Bank.
Hence, it is evident from the facts above-stated that respondent Judge has been grossly
incompetent in his duties as a judge and likewise grossly ignorant of the law. With this, it is only
proper for him to be dismissed from service to maintain the people’s faith in the Judiciary.
 ORIEL MAGNO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96132| June 26, 1992 | PARAS, J.:
DOCTRINE: In cases of acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether the accused has
committed or violated the act which is prohibited by a special law, malice or criminal/deliberate
intent of the offender not anymore necessary for the conviction for violation of the special law.
Since malice or criminal intent is not anymore necessary to prove, it only follows that the
defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent is no longer a defense in acts mala prohibita as
compared in acts mala in se.
FACTS:
Petitioner Oriel Magno (Magno) was in the process of setting up a car repair shop. However, he
does not have the necessary equipment to put up the same – neither did he had the funds that
will supposedly be used for the purchase of the equipment necessary to put the business in
operation. With this, petitioner, representing the Ultra Sources Internation Corp. went to Corazon
Teng (Teng), the VP of Mancor Industries, the distributor of the equipment which petitioner need
for his business. Teng then advised petitioner Magno to inquire with LS Finance and Management
Corp. through its VP, Joey Gomez. Teng said that she was willing to provide Magno with the
equipment which he needed if LS Finance could accommodate petitioner with his credit needs.
The arrangement continued on the condition that petitioner-lessee was to pay a warranty deposit
equivalent to 30% of the total value of the equipment to be purchased, amounting to P29k. As
petitioner had no resources to satisfy the same, he requested Joey Gomez to look for a third
person to cover the amount. However, Teng had already paid the said warranty deposit without
the knowledge of the petitioner. The equipment was delivered to petitioner to which he issued a
post-dated check and gave the same to Joey Gomez who, without the knowledge of petitioner,
turned over the said check to Corazon Teng. Petitioner advised Gomez not to deposit the check
when it matured since he no longer maintains banking with Pacific Bank. Hence, petitioner issued
another six post-dated checks, two of them were deposited and cleared and four others were
held by Corazon Teng. It came to a point where petitioner failed to pay the monthly rental due
which led to the pulling out of the equipment and it was during this time that he learned that the
person who advanced the deposit was Teng. He then promised to pay the latter but was not able
to do so and when Teng deposited the check in her possession, it bounced for the reason of the
account being closed. Accused-petitioner was then convicted for the crime of BP 22.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the checks issued by accused-petitioner was for “account or for value” which
would warrant conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the “Bouncing Checks Law”
HELD:
NO. The petitioner should not be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
According to our Criminal Law, in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry to be considered is
whether the accused, regardless of the presence or absence of malice or criminal intent, has
committed the act which is prohibited by virtue of a special law. The mere fact that the accused
has committed the act which is prohibited by a special law is already enough for his conviction
for having violated said penal law. Since malice or criminal intent is not anymore essential to be
proven in acts mala prohibita, it bears reason that the defense of lack of criminal intent or good
faith does not also apply.
In this case, it is intriguing that Ms. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that she was the
one who accommodated the needed funds for the warranty deposit. It is a scheme whereby Ms.
Teng, as supplier of the equipment would be able to “sell or lease” its goods and at the same
time, privately financing those who desperately need accommodations. This modus operandi has
victimized unsuspecting businessmen by availing of the deceptively called “warranty deposit”
not realizing that they fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase
agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off business clients. The 4 checks issued by the
petitioner which was in the possession of Teng was subsequently deposited by latter and
bounced were used only to collateralize an accommodation and not to cover an actual “account
or credit value”. In order for there to be a conviction under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22, the issuance
of the check must have been for the purpose of paying an obligation – issued or drawn for
“account or credit value”. The other element of “knowing at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds with the drawee bank for payment of check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds” is not
properly applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did
not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly
intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was
introduced by Mrs. Teng.
Hence, petitioner should not have been made criminally liable for violating B.P. Blg. 22 because
even though he issued a check, the same was only for collateralization of an accommodation and
not for “account or credit value” which is the purpose required by the special law.
 ARSENIA B. GARCIA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 157171 | March 14, 2006 | QUISUMBING, J.:
DOCTRINE: Mala in se felonies are defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code. Acts
mala prohibita, on the other hand, are acts which becomes illegal by virtue of a special law which
makes their commission a criminal act. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral,
they are considered mala in se even if there is a special law punishing that particular act – hence,
criminal intent must be proven in that case.
FACTS:
On the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Pimentel Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections, an
information was filed with the RTC of Alaminos charging herein petitioner with violation of Section
27(b) of RA 6646. On May 1995, within the canvassing period of the 1995 elections, the accused
Election Officer Arsenia Garcia (Garcia) together with other co-accused, decreased the votes
received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel Jr. from 6,998 votes as clearly disclosed in the
159 precincts to 1,921 votes with a difference of 5,077 votes. In a decision of the RTC, it
acquitted all other accused except for herein accused-petitioner Garcia who was convicted for
violating RA 6646 in relation to BP Blg. 881 considering that this is an election offense and was
also disqualified from holding public office and deprived of the right to suffrage.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a violation of Section 27 (b) of RA 6646 is classified as mala in se or mala
prohibita and can the defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent be valid defenses;
HELD:
The acts prohibited in Section 27 (b) of RA 6646 are acts mala in se.
For if the acts prohibited in the above-cited provision is to be considered mala prohibita, it will
come to a point that even errors or mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be
punishable. Considering the volume of votes to be counted within a limited period of time, errors
and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it is not the intention of the law to punish honest
errors or mistakes in the counting and canvassing of votes. The act specifically prohibited by RA
6646 is the act of intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a
candidate since it is inherently immoral as it is done with malice. Hence, the presumption of
criminal intent arises when the accused increases or decreases the votes and burden to prove
otherwise rests upon him.
In this case, there is a huge discrepancy in the addition of subtotals in each precinct to arrive at
the grand total of votes received by each candidate. The grand total of votes for complainant
Pimentel was only 1,921 instead of 6,921 which error was also shown in the Certificate of
Canvass. Further, petitioner admitted that she was the one who arranged the Certificate of
Canvass even though it was not her duty. In this Court’s mind, the fact that petitioner prepared
the CoC even if it was not her duty reveals an intention on her part to perpetuate the erroneous
entry in the CoC. Furthermore, the fact that the number of votes deducted from the votes
actually received by the complainant Pimentel was not added to any other senatorial candidate
does not relieve the petitioner from criminal liability attaching from his violation of RA 6646 – his
mere act of decreasing the votes being sufficient cause for him to have violated the aforecited
law.
Hence, it is only proper that petitioner Garcia should be held criminally liable for violating
Republic Act 6646 for having committed the particular act prohibited by the said special law
which is the act of decreasing the votes of any candidate in an election.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN SAMSON y

MAGDALENA
G.R. No. L-74324 | November 17, 1988| MEDIALDEA, J.:
DOCTRINE: Article 4, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code states that, “Criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person who commits a felony although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended”. If the act of the accused turned into a graver offense than that which he
intended, he must still be held criminally responsible for the same.
FACTS:
Bayani Miranda (victim-deceased), a 25 year old retardate and defendant-appellant Fernando
Pugay (Pugay) were friends as Miranda used to run errands for Pugay. On the evening of May
1982, a town fiesta was held in Rosario, Cavite wherein there are various kinds of rides including
a ferris wheel. During midnight, Eduardo was sitting in the ferris wheel while reading a comic
book together with his friend Henry when defendant-appellant Pugay together with co-defendant
Samson and their other companions arrived. They appeared to be drunk as they were happy and
noisy when they suddenly encountered Bayani Miranda and thereafter started to make fun of him
by tickling him with a piece of wood to make him dance. Not contented, accused Pugay grabbed
a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured the same over the body
of Miranda despite Eduardo Gabion’s warning not to do so. After pouring the gasoline, co-
defendant Samson set Miranda on fire. The ferris wheel operator arrived and poured water over
the body of Miranda; some other people also poured sand on the burning body. Accused-
appellants gave their written statements as to the incident which primarily consisted of the
contention that Pugay did not know that the can contained flammable liquid and that Samson, on
the other hand, did not know who lit the body of Miranda on fire.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there existed a conspiracy as between the accused-appellants in the commission
of the crime against Bayani Miranda;
Whether or not accused-appellants Pugay and Samson should be held criminally liable for their
acts despite of their contention that at that time, they thought the can which they poured onto
the body of the victim consisted of water and not gasoline;
HELD:
For the first issue:
NO. There existed no conspiracy in the commission of the crime as between accused-appellants.
There was no animosity between the deceased Miranda and Pugay or Samson. It is clear that
accused-appellants Pugay and Samson merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the
respective criminal liability of Pugay and Samson are individual and not collective – each of them
being liable only for the act committed by him.
For the second issue:
YES. Both of them should be held criminally liable / responsible for the wrongful act they
committed against victim Miranda.
According to our Criminal Law, once a person has committed an act or omission which is
punished by law, it gives rise to a presumption that said person acted with malice or criminal
intent. Considered as valid defenses against this presumption is the defense of good faith or
mistake of fact (ignorantia facti excusat), which can only be invoked when there exists no malice,
imprudence or negligence in the commission of the wrongful act. Furthermore, the Revised Penal
Code likewise attaches criminal liability on the part of the accused even if the wrongful act that
he has committed be different from that which he intended because in the first place, he
intentionally and voluntarily committed the wrongful act and therefore responsible for all
consequences that may result from such act.
As to the criminal liability of accused Pugay:
Since he was the one who took the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and poured it
on the body of victim Miranda, he should have known that the contents of the can were gasoline,
an inflammable liquid, taking into consideration its stinging smell which cannot hardly be
noticed. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable
consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time
were making fun of the deceased. He is therefore guilty of the crime of homicide through
reckless imprudence.
As to the criminal liability of accused Samson:
Samson cannot be convicted for the crime of murder because there is absence of proof that he
had the intent to kill the victim as said act was merely a part of their fun-making in that evening.
However, it cannot be denied that accused Samson knew that the liquid poured on the body of
the victim was gasoline. Giving him the benefit of the doubt, it can be conceded that he only
intended to burn the clothes of the victim as part of their fun-making which act could have
resulted only to physical injuries. But even if that was his original intention, the fact that the
resulting injury was different from that which he intended does not operate to exempt him from
criminal liability pursuant to Article 4, par. 1 of the RPC that criminal liability attaches upon a
person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended.
He is therefore guilty of the crime of homicide.