REPUBLIC vs JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN

(G.R. no. 166676 September 12, 2008)

Facts:

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate in the RTC Laguna. In her petition, she alleged that she was born
on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth,
however while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged
that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age
thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing
and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she
prayed that her birth certificate will be corrected such as her gender be changed from
female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. Furthermore, the
respondent presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a
medical certificate stating that respondent's condition is known as CAH. On January 12,
2005 the RTC granted the respondent's petition.

Issue:

Whether the Regional trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her gender, from female to male, on the ground of her
medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld the RTC's decision, ruling that Jennifer Cagandahan, who
identified as male due to Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), could legally change her
name and sex designation. The Court recognized that sex is not solely determined by
physical attributes at birth but must consider medical and psychological factors. It found
sufficient medical evidence that Cagandahan’s condition caused her to develop male
physical and hormonal characteristics, aligning with her male identity. As for respondent's
change of name under Rule 103, the Supreme Court held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial scretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced
and the consequences that will follow. The Court emphasized the principle of respect to
Cagandahan’s choice to live as male, and highlighted that the law must adapt to scientific
advancements and modern understandings of intersex conditions. It ruled that there is no
legal prohibition against recognizing changes in sex designation for individuals with intersex
conditions when supported by evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition was DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, were AFFIRMED.
 ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. no. 174689 October 22, 2007)

Facts:

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of
live birth. His sex was registered as "male." Furthermore, he alleged that he is a male
transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he
had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he
consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. On January 27, 2001 His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated. He underwent sex reassignment surgery in
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr. a plastic
and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting
that he had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and
was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate
changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." On June 4,
2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. On August 18, 2003, the
Republic of the Philippines, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate
by reason of sex alteration. Moreover, on February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered
a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis.
There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the
ground of sex reassignment through surgery.

Issue:

Whether a person can legally change their sex and first name on the basis of a gender
reassignment surgery.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court did not uphold on the regional trial court's decision and ruled against
Silverio. The Supreme Court held that there is no specific law in the Philippines allowing the
change of sex in the civil registry based on gender reassignment surgery. The supreme
court cited Republic Act No. 9048, wherein it highlighted that before a person can legally
change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason to justify such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name, however, in this case, the respondent failed to show, or
even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name. The Court further emphasized that civil registry records are presumed to be accurate
and immutable, as they are based on factual and biological data, such as the sex assigned
at birth. The Court also stated that sex in legal documents is determined by biological and
anatomical characteristics at birth, not by psychological or emotional factors, or by surgical
procedures that are undertaken later in life. Since the law does not provide for the change
of sex in these circumstances, it concluded that the petition for such a change could not be
granted. The Court likewise found no compelling reason to allow the change of Silverio's
first name, as his request was based on the gender reassignment surgery, which was not
recognized as a valid basis under the current legal capacity.

WHEREFORE, the petition was DENIED.

 CHRISTIAN PANTONIAL ACHARON vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. no. 224946, November 09,2021)

Facts:

The respondent AAA testified that she and Christian have been sweethearts for six (6)
years before they got married on September 30, 2011 in a civil wedding. After only 6 days,
or on October 6, 2011 after their wedding, Christian left to work at Pizza Hut, Brunei as
delivery rider. As for the placement fee, they borrowed the amount of P85,000.00 with 3%
monthly interest from their godmother, Emelina So. She and Christian agreed that the latter
would send money in the amount of Php9,633.00 per month in payment of their loan.
However, Christian did not send money on a regular basis. All in all, he was able to send
money in the total amount of Php71,500.00 only, leaving the balance in the amount of
Php13,500.00. For which reason, she felt so embarrassed with Emelina So because she
could not pay the balance. She even pleaded to So not to lodge a complaint to the
barangay. Furthermore, Emelina So communicated to the employer of Christian in Brunei
about their debt to her. Moreover, while in Brunei, Christian had a paramour in the person
of Melete Domalaon. The manager of Christian and his board mate, Jovelyn Pastrano
disclosed to her the indiscretions of Christian. The womanizing activity of Christian
extremely hurt the respondent's feelings and caused her depression. AAA stated that when
Christian left in December 2011, she was jobless. Presently, she is gainfully employed. On
January 2012, according to the respondent she lost communication with Christian his
employer and friends of Christian, the latter is living with his paramour in Brunei. She filed
this case because she was extremely hurt and she experienced emotional agony by the
neglect and utter insensitivity that Christian made her endure and suffer.

Version of the defense:

Christian Acharon vehemently denied the accusations against him. According to him, his
original stay in Brunei was two (2) years and three (3) months. However, when he left on
October 6, 2011, he was able to come back to the Philippines only in February 2014. While
he was in Brunei, his rented place was razed by fire and he met a vehicular accident which
required him to spend a significant sum of money. He and AAA had an on and off
communication from October 2011 until April 2013. AAA demanded for him to pay their debt
in the entire amount. He also said that Jovelyn Ranoso Pastrana is her former friend. It is
not true that he was staying in his girlfriend's house while he was in Brunei. On August 26,
2014, the RTC convicted Christian. Then the aggrieved, Christian filed an appeal with the
CA. In its Decision, dated February 17, 2016, the CA denied Christian's appeal and affirmed
the RTC Decision. The CA held that the refusal to give financial support constitutes
violence against women.
Issue:

Whether the CA erred in finding Christian guilty of causing psychological or emotional

anguish when he allegedly failed to: (1) financially support AAA; and (2) keep the
communication lines open with the latter.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Christian Acharon, acquitting him of violating Section
5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The Court highlighted and made it clear that failing to provide
financial support or communicate with a partner does not automatically make someone
guilty of causing psychological violence. Even if the woman experiences emotional or
mental anguish due to the lack of support, the law requires clear evidence that the failure
was deliberate and meant to cause harm. The Court stressed that an obligation to provide
support is based on financial capacity, and if someone cannot provide support due to
genuine inability, it is not a crime. In this case, Christian’s inability to continue support was
not proven to be intentional or malicious. Without evidence that he willfully refused to
support AAA to cause her harm, the prosecution failed to meet the standard of proving guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court concluded that the presumption of innocence must
prevail, setting a strong precedent that criminal liability cannot arise from mere inability to
provide support without clear proof of intent to cause emotional harm.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari was GRANTED.
The Decision dated February 17, 2016 and Resolution dated May 31, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36913 were REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
petitioner Christian Pantonial Acharon was ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
RANDY MICHAEL KNUTSON, acting in behalf of minor RHUBY SIBAL KNUTSON vs.
Hon. ELISA R. SARMINETO-FLORES, in her capacity as acting presiding judge of
branch 69, Regional Taguig City, and ROSALINA SIBAL KNUTSON

(G.R. no. 239215, July 12, 2022)

Facts:

In 2005, Randy Michael Knutson, an American citizen, met Rosalina Sibal Knutson in
Singapore. They got married and had a daughter named Rhuby Sibal Knutson. In 2011, the
family lived in the Philippines. However, Randy and Rosalina became estranged after he
discovered her extra-marital affairs. Randy supported Rosalina and Ruby. Thereafter,
Rosalina got hooked in casinos, and incurred in large debts. Randy learned that Rosalina
spent weeks in gambling dens and left Ruby under the care of strangers. Rosalina then
rented an apartment and got herself a boyfriend. Later, Randy discovered that Rosalina
maltreated her own mother in Rhuby's presence. Rosalina also hurt Rhuby by pulling her
hair, slapping her face and knocking her head. Rosalina pointed a knife at Rhuby and
threatened to kill her. Rosalina even texted Randy about her plan to kill their daughter and
commit suicide. Randy reported the matter to the police station but the authorities explained
that they cannot assist him in domestic issues. On December 7, 2017, Randy, on behalf of
minor Rhuby, filed against Rosalina a petition under RA No. 9262 for the issuance of
Temporary and Permanent Protection Orders before the Regional Trial Court of Taguig
City, Branch 69 docketed as JDRC Case No. 313. Randy averred that Rosalina placed
Rhuby in a harmful environment deleterious to her physical, emotional, moral, and
psychological development. On January 10, 2018, the RTC dismissed the petition
explaining that protection and custody orders in RA No. 9262 cannot be issued against a
mother who allegedly abused her own child. The RTC ruled that the child's mother cannot
be considered as an offender under the law.

Issue:

Whether the Regional trial Court erred in denying the petition of Randy.

Whether a father can file for protection orders on behalf of his minor child against the
mother as the alleged abuser under RA 9262.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion by interpreting the law
restrictively to exclude mothers as potential offenders. The Court clarified that RA No. 9262
aims to protect women and their children from domestic violence, regardless of the
offender's gender. The Supreme court stated that Randy is not filing for himself but for her
daughter. As intimated earlier, Randy filed the petition on behalf of their minor daughter
Rhuby. The petition is principally and directly for the protection of the minor child and not
the father. Admittedly, Randy also asked for the temporary custody of their daughter
because the mother was allegedly unfit. However, the RTC failed to evaluate this point
whether the mother may be divested of custody over the child.

The supreme court ruled that RA No. 9262 allows the father of the offended party to apply
for protection and custody orders. The Supreme court highlighted that RA 9262 should be a
gender-neutral law that allows parents to including the father to file protection orders for
their children even if it's from the mother of those children.

FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition for Certiorari of Randy was GRANTED. The Orders
dated January 10, 2018 and March 14, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court of Taguig City,
Branch 69 in JDRC Case No. 313 is SET ASIDE.
 XXX261920, vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

(G.R. no. 261920, March 27, 2023)

Facts:

On or about the month of May 2017, in the Province of La Union, Philippines, the petitioner
was accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, cause psychological
and emotional anguish to his wife, AAA261920 by ordering her out of their conjugal house
together with their two-year old daughter, ousting them to their damage and prejudice. On
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges.

On December 23, 2002 AAA261920 testified that she and petitioner got married. Their
union bore two children, BBB261920 and CCC261920. In 2007, AAA261920, the petitioner,
and their children lived in La Union with her parents. She went to Hong Kong to work as an
Overseas Filipino Worker since petitioner had no stable job. While in Hong Kong, she
learned that petitioner took their 4-year-old child, BBB261920, to Mindanao without her
parents' consent. The Petitioner did not communicate with her for two years. Consequently,
she got depressed, could not eat, and could not focus on her job. Upon her return to the
Philippines in 2010, she tried to talk to petitioner but the latter simply retorted "Do not mind
us anymore." She then went to Mindanao to look for her son, and to patch things up with
petitioner. In 2010, she returned to Hong Kong because her family needed her to earn
money. Petitioner constantly demanded money from her, and used their child as leverage.
When her contract ended in 2014, she returned to the Philippines for good. Their family
then transferred to, Pangasinan to live with petitioner's mother. That's where her suffering
was worsened, because the petitioner maltreated her. He would belittle her, and call her
"bobo" and "buwisit." Petitioner also treated her like a "useless woman" and "basahan," and
would say things like "wala kang alam" and "lumayas ka." On May 29, 2017, she and
petitioner had a quarrel regarding petitioner's salary which was not enough to cover the
family's expenses. Petitioner blamed her for mismanaging his earnings. Losing his temper,
he told her to leave the house and to get out of his life. She was thus forced to leave their
dwelling. She proceeded to their family house in La Union. She took their younger child,
CCC261920. Although she wanted to bring BBB261920 as well, he refused to go with her.
She then filed a complaint for support with the BFP in, La Union. They entered into an
Agreement dated December 11, 201718 obligating petitioner to pay PHP 5,000.00 as
monthly support. However, she realized that the amount was not enough to support their
children since they had already begun going to school and had so many other expenses.
On the night of January 12, 2019, petitioner left BBB261920 by the road outside her house
without informing her beforehand. He did not even check if BBB261920 was able to safely
reach their home. Jojet Lamberto R. Mondares, a psychologist, testified that he
administered various psychological tests on AAA261920 and did several clinical interviews
with her, who said that during the time assessment AAA261920 is suffering from MAJOR
DISORDER. Furthermore, on October 30, 2019, the trial court convicted the petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 13026 but acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 13025. Under Decision
dated July 27, 2021, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Reconsideration was denied on June 7,
2022.36

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) decision
that convicted the petitioner of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of RA 9262, and:

Whether the supreme court will grant the Petitioner's petition for acquittal.

Ruling:

In this case the Supreme court did not affirm on the decisions of the lower courts, as the
lower courts failed to establish proof that will convict the petitioner under section 5(I) of RA
9262. The supreme court stated that the presence of the first two elements is undisputed.
Petitioner and AAA261920 both admit they are husband and wife. The third element may
also be said to exist in this case, based on Mondares' conclusion that at the time of his
assessment of AAA261920, the latter was suffering from Major Disorder due to "the abuses
and repeated neglect coming from her husband. However, there is doubt as regards the
fourth element. In the context of Criminal Case No. 13026, the act which should have
caused AAA261920's mental or emotional anguish should be the May 2017 incident the
ouster of AAA261920 and CCC261920 from the conjugal dwelling. As it was, however, the
prosecution's evidence miserably failed to establish this element. Furthermore, because the
prosecution’s evidence admits of an alternative interpretation, the Court is constrained to tilt
the scales in favor of petitioner. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability
hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.

Moreover, the petitioner was acquitted hence the prosecution failed to establish that his
alleged act of ousting AAA261920 and CCC261920 from the conjugal dwelling was
impelled by a guilty state of mind.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition was GRANTED. The Decision dated July 27, 2021 and
Resolution dated June 7, 2022 in CA-G.R. CR No. 44922 were REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner XXX261920 was ACQUITTED of violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act
No. 9262 in Criminal Case No. 13026.

XXX vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

 (G.R. no. 250219, March 01, 2023)

Facts:

The petitioner was charged with a violation of Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262 on January 29, 2016. In
October 2015 up to the present, the petitioner being the husband of victim AAA, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously deprive his minor child of financial support legally
due to the complainant and to her minor child and abandoning them totally, causing
psychological and emotional anguish to the complainant and her minor child. Subsequently,
the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Quash Warrant of
Arrest arguing violation of the constitutional right to due process and consequently praying
for a preliminary investigation. Subsequently the motion was granted by the trial court. After
re-investigation and careful evaluation of the evidence presented by both sides, the
prosecutor found no reason to reverse or modify the Resolution dated January 29, 2016
finding probable cause for violation of Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262 against petitioner. Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.

The petitioner and AAA were married on December 29, 2006 out of their union, a daughter
was born. After their wedding, petitioner and AAA stayed in. However, due to their difficult
circumstances, AAA decided to look for a job abroad to help sustain their family. AAA left
for Singapore in 2018. In May 2015, AAA learned that petitioner is in a romantic relationship
with another woman, CCC. Petitioner even messaged AAA not to communicate with him
anymore. To make things worse, in July 2015, AAA discovered that CCC was pregnant with
petitioner's child. Later on, AAA learned that petitioner brought CCC to their hometown,
prompting AAA to return to the country. Upon learning that petitioner and CCC started to
cohabit. AAA sought the help and assistance of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development in getting her daughter, BBB, from her mother-in-law. BBB, who was 9 years
old at that time also took the stand, testifying that in 2015, her mother fetched her from her
father. According to BBB, while she was not used to having her mother AAA around, she
voluntarily went with her mother when she was being fetched from the house she grew up
in. BBB further confirmed that petitioner, her father, had a girlfriend, CCC, whom petitioner
would bring home every now and then. BBB said that she no longer loved her father. When
the prosecution formally offered its evidence, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the case
on Demurrer to Evidence, claiming that the prosecution failed to establish the allegation in
the criminal Information that petitioner deprived AAA and BBB of financial support. The
RTC denied the same in an Order dated March 21, 2017.

Version of the Defense:

Th petitioner confirmed that BBB is his daughter with AAA. Prior to October 2015, BBB was
living with him, his mother helped in rearing BBB until AAA forcibly took her away. Contrary
to AAA's accusations, it was petitioner who had custody and who primarily took care of their
child since AAA left the country and work in Singapore. Petitioner initially denied knowing
CCC, but subsequently clarified that they went to the same secondary school, but had not
seen CCC in a long time. When asked if he was providing support to BBB, he replied that
since October 2015 when the child was taken from him, he stopped giving support because
AAA does not allow BBB to be near him nor show her to him. The RTC found petitioner
guilty of inflicting psychological violence against AAA and BBB through emotional and
psychological abandonment. In a Decision dated January 31, 2019, the appellate court
found no merit in the Petition.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in affirming the Decision of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a violation of Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262.

Ruling:

The supreme court agreed with the CA and the RTC that all the elements to establish a
violation of Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262 are present. The Supreme court highlighted that all the
elements of violating of Sec. 5(i) of RA 9262 were present in the case, such as the first and
second elements were present since the offended parties are AAA and her child. The
testimonies of AAA and BBB clearly established the presence of the third and fourth
elements, the offender causing on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish
through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of
financial support or custody of minor children, or access to the children, or similar to such
acts or omissions. The supreme court also states that marital infidelity is one of the forms of
psychological violence. The prosecution in this case was able to satisfactorily establish
petitioner's marital infidelity, his cohabitation with CCC who even bore him a child, and his
abandonment of AAA. BBB's psychological trauma was evident when she wept in open
court upon being asked to narrate petitioner's infidelity. In particular, BBB explained that
she was deeply hurt because her father had another family and loved another woman other
than her mother, BBB. Therefore, the RTC and the CA did not err in finding petitioner guilty
of violating Sec. 5 (i) of RA 9262.

WHEREFORE, the petition was DENIED. The January 31, 2019 Decision and the October
18, 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40971 were AFFIRMED.

NORMA A DEL SOCORRO, for and behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, vs ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM
 (G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014)

Facts:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990 and they were blessed with a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen
years of age. Their marriage bond ended in July 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen months old.
Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. According to petitioner,
respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty Gulden which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less. However, since
the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the
son, Roderigo. Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. On August 28, 2009,
petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter. Due to the foregoing circumstances the
petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against
respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E (2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust
refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. Upon motion and after notice and hearing,
the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent. Consequently,
respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. Petitioner also filed a motion
application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition.
Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned. On February 19, 2010, the RTC-
Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal case against
respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien. WHEREFORE, the Court finds that
the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional
liberty was cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

Issue:

Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and

Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

Ruling:
The supreme court find the petition meritorious. because they do not fully agree with the
petitioner’s contentions. To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support exists. Petitioner invokes
Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child.
Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation
to Article 26 of the Family Code, respondent is not excused from complying with his
obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis
presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.
Moreover, the respondent added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated
to petitioner for any financial support. On this point, the supreme court agreed with the
respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code
stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies
to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. The obligation to give
support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent
is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, the supreme court agreed with the RTC-Cebu
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is
obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
Furthermore, being still aliens, does not mean that they're not in the position to invoke the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that
family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, the laws of the nation to which
they belong even when staying in a foreign country. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether. In international law, the
party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. In this case the respondent hastily concludes that being a national
of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity
to support however, he failed to provide burden of proof that the national law of the
Netherlands is in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this
doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus,
since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law,
which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.

WHEREFORE, the petition was GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu were
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case was REMANDED to the same court to conduct
further proceedings based on the merits of the case.