CUA V.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 80519-21 December 17, 1987

Facts: Private respondent Puzon filed on August 14, 1987 a "motion for reconsideration/appeal"
of the said decision with the COMELEC en banc, where on October 28, 1987, three members
voted to sustain the First Division, with two dissenting and one abstaining (one member having
died earlier). On the strength of this 3-2 vote, Cua moved for his proclamation by the board of
canvassers, which reconvened on November 9, 1987, and granted his motion. Cua took his
oath the same day, but the next day Puzon filed with the COMELEC an urgent motion to
suspend Cua's proclamation or to annul or suspend its effect if already made. On November 11,
1987, the COMELEC set the motion for hearing and three days later it issued a restraining
telegram enjoining Cua from assuming the office of member of the House of Representatives.
The petitioner then came to this Court to enjoin the COMELEC from acting on the said motion
and enforcing its restraining order.

Issue: Whether the 2-1 Decision reached by the First Division of COMELEC is valid.

Held: Yes, the 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under Article IX-
A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted to affirm the First
Division constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated and voted thereon en banc
and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the
proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him
now to assume his seat in the House of Representatives

MATEO V. CA
G.R. No. 113219 August 14, 1995

Facts: The hiring and firing of employees of government-owned and controlled corporations are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. SC Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95. Final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any event, whether under the old rule or the present
rules, RTC’s have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and
employees covered by the Civil Service Law.

Issue: Whether the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over a case involving dismissal
of an employee of Morong Water District,
a quasi-public corporation

Held: No, MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to P.D. No. 198, known as the
provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. Employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil CSC.
Indeed, the hiring and firing of employees of government-own and controlled corporations are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.
Reyes vs. RTC of Oriental Mindoro

AQUILES U. REYES vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, BRANCH XXXIX, COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, ADOLFO G. COMIA, AND THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL
MINDORO

G.R. No. 108886 May 5, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo Comia were candidates for the position of
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Private respondent moved for the
exclusion of certain election returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in counting in favor of
petitioner considering that there was another candidate bearing the same surname. The petitioner was
proclaimed as the eighth winning candidate without resolving the petition and took his oath of office.

Private respondent filed an election protest before the trial court alleging that a vital mistake had been
committed by the Board of Canvassers in the computation of the total number of votes garnered by
petitioner.

The motion to dismiss filed by Petitioner was denied by the Trial Court. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers admitted that it had made a mistake in crediting private respondent with only 858 votes
when he was entitled to 915 votes in the Statement of Votes. The trial court annulled the proclamation
of petitioner and declared private respondent as the eighth winning candidate.

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC and the petition for mandamus and prohibition to
the CA to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to recognize him as the duly proclaimed member. The CA
dismissed the petition because of petitioner's pending appeal in the COMELEC. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but his motion was denied. The appellate court's decision became final and
executory. On the other hand, the COMELEC dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had
failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period.

Petitioner contends that both the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division committed a grave abuse
of discretion, first by assuming jurisdiction over the election contest filed by private respondent despite
the fact that the case was filed more than ten days after petitioner's proclamation, and second by
dismissing petitioner's appeal from the decision of the trial court for late payment of the appeal fee.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc may be
dispensed of by the petitioner?

RULING:

The motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is required for the filing of a petition for
certiorari as provided by Article IX(C), Section 2. Petitioner contention that this requirement may be
dispensed with because the only question raised in his petition is a question of law is not correct. The
questions raised by petitioner involve the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions in
light of the facts of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore, not pure questions of law.

All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in
division. Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration before
the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc that, in
accordance with Art. IX (A) Section 7 may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC GR No. 133486, January 28, 2000 Moot and Academic Principle

FACTS:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing COMELEC en
banc Resolution No. 98-1419 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body

“RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its
agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to
issue the same.”

The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon “information from [a] reliable source that
ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the
elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x vote during the elections for national officials
particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately.” The
electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had
not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We
directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed
Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually
conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998
election has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy
before us.

ISSUE:

Is the “moot and academic” principle a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case?

RULING:

No.

The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998
election, its implications on the people’s fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past
election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very
nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only
postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections.
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it “also has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees.” Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we
have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit
polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.