us Department

of Transportation
fill • •
Commandant (G-MTH-2)
United States Coast Guard
Mailing Address
Washington, DC 20593-0001
United States
Coast Guard Phone: (202) 267-2206
• COMDTPUB P16700.4
NVIC 2-89
• NAVIGATION ,AND VESSEL INSPECTION CIRCULAR NO. 2-89 14 AUG 1989
Subj: Guide for Electrical Installations on Merchant Vessels and Mobile
Offsho~e Drilling Units
1. PURPOSE. This Circular has been prepared to provide guidance concerning
electrical installations'on merchant vessels and mobile offshore drilling
units. It is intended to provide the marine industry with information on
regulatory intent and background, and on practices which have been found to
provide a level of safety equivalent to that provided for by the specific
regulations.

2. DISCUSSION. Enclosure (1) is a guide to the Coast Guard Electrical'

Engineering Regulations, 46 CFR 110-113. It augments the CFR, giving
details on acceptable methods of complying with those regulations as well as
other important information related to electrical installations. It must be
emphasized that other alternatives may be equally acceptable based upon the
specific installation. Nothing contained in this guide shall be taken as
amending the applicable requirements set forth in the Code of Federal
Regulations, nor as limiting the authority of the Officer in Charge, Marine
Inspection in his determination of acceptable materials and installation
methods.
3. IMPLEMENTATION. Any party interested in electrical installations on
merchant vessels and mobile offshore drilling units should consider the
guidance in this Circular.

Chief, of Marine Safety

Security and Environmental Protection
Encl: (1) Guide for Electrical Installations on Merchant Vessels and Mobile
Offshore Drilling Units
DISTRIBUTION - SOL No. 127
a b c d e f 9 h i j k I m n 0 p q r S t u v w x y z
A
B 2 10 3 3 1 5 132 1 1 5
C 121) 1 1 1
o 1 1 1 1 1 1
E 1 ? ? 2
F 1 1
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NON-STANDARD DISTRIBUTION:
 Encl. (1) to NVIC 2-89

14 AUG 1gen
GUIDE FOR ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS ON MERCHANT VESSELS
AND MOBILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNITS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 Introduction. . 1

l.l Purpose. . . . . 1
l.2 Background . . 1
l.3 The Electrical Program . 2
l.4 Electrical Safety ... 2

Chapter 2 General Provisions of the Electrical Engineering

Regulations. . . . . . . . . . . 3

2.1 Referenced Editions of Specifications, Standards and Codes 3

2.2 Meeting Reference Standards. . . . 3
2.3 Equipment Required to be Listed or Labeled . . . 7

Chapter 3 Electrical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . . . . . . 7

3.1 General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 8

3.2 Equipment Ground, Grounded Systems, and Ground Detection .11
3.3 Power Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
3.4 Batteries and Battery Installations. .18
3.5 Switchboards .19
3.6 SCR's. . . . . . . . .23
3.7 Transformers. . . . .23
3.8 Electric Propulsion. .24
3.9 Panelboards. . . . . .24
3.10 Overcurrent Devices. .24
3.11 Fault Current Analysis and Coordination. .30
3.12 Motor Circuits. .33
3.13 Shore Power. . . . . . . .35

Chapter 4 The Emergency Power System. .35

4.1 General. .35

4.2 Location .... .36
4.3 Emergency Loads. .36

Chapter 5 Communication and Alarm Systems .37

5.1 Fire Detecting and Alarm Systems .37

5.2 General Alarm. . . .39
5.3 Sound Powered Telephones .40
5.4 Engine Order Telegraph .41
5.5 Emergency Loudspeakers . .41
 . ' -.

Chapter 6 Industrial Systems. .42

6.1 Philosophy .42

6.2 Generators .. 42

Chapter 7 Hazardous Locations .42

7.1 General. .42

7.2 Classification .43
7.3 Specific Hazardous Areas .45
7.4 Equipment. .48
7.5 International Standards. .49
7.6 Protection Types .49
7.7 Intrinsic Safety and Nonincendive Systems. .50
7.8 Purged or Pressurized Enclosures .53
7.9 Explosionproof Equipment .56

Chapter 8 Wire and Cable. .62

8.1 General. .62

8.2 Types of Cable .62
8.3 Unique Applications. .66
8.4 Ampacity .67
8.5 Minimum Conductor Size .68
8.6 Flexible Cord. .68
8.7 Color Coding .68
8.8 Cable Installation .69
8.9 Cable Armor. .70

Chapter 9 Components and Equipment. .71

9.1 Miscellaneous Equipment. .71

9.2 Navigation Lights. .71

Chapter 10 Sources of Additional Information 74

Appendices

Appendix 1 Shipboard Electrical System One-Line Diagram

wi th Reference Index . . .76
Appendix 2 Load Analysis. . . . .80
Appendix 3 SCR System Check-Off List. .88
Appendix 4 Miscellaneous Tables .89
Appendix 5 IADC DCCS -1. . . . . . 93
Appendix 6 Motor Circuit Information. .95
Appendix 7 List of Electrical Hazard Group Classifications for
Bulk Dangerous Cargoes . . . . . .. ..... 104
Appendix 8 Recommended Plan Review Check-Off List for Hazardous
Locations. . . 109
Appendix 9 Approvals Under Subchapter Q . 112
Appendix 10 Inspection of Electrical Installations for Vessel
Certification. . 113
Appendix 11 Specific Vessel Types and Requirements 124
Appendix 12 Plan Review of Electrical Systems. 128
Appendix 13 Symbols and Abbreviations. 130
 1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose. The Electrical Engineering Regulations, 46 CFR Subchapter J,

are, in many areas, complex and difficult to understand. The CFR is limited
to telling what must or must not be done. Regulatory intent, explanation,
policy, equivalency information, requirement derivation, inspection aids,
and examples are not provided. Sometimes, the preamble to a regulation can
provide useful information, but this is a one-time issue in the Federal
Register, and is usually lost over time. This NVIC provides information to
fill the void caused by the limitations of the regulations as they apply to
electrical equipment and systems on merchant vessels and mobile offshore
drilling units. It also promulgates information on equipment, systems,
materials and methods that have been determined by the Commandant (MTH) to
provide an equivalent level of safety. Further, it describes how electrical
reviews and inspections are typically performed, and provides useful
training information for novice designers, marine and electrical engineers,
naval architects, or inspectors.

It is not the purpose of this guide to repeat the regulations, but to

augment them. Nothing contained in this guide shall be taken as amending
the Code of Federal Regulations, nor as limiting the authority of the
Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI) in the determination of
acceptable materials, systems, and installation methods. Some information
contained in the Marine Safety Manual (COMDTINST M1600 Series) is repeated
here for convenience.

Generally this NVIC follows the basic outline of the regulations,

starting with the applicability and reference document information, and
progressing to specific items of equipment. It emphasizes those areas of
the regulations where there is a history of repeated inquiries, where
misunderstandings or inconsistent interpretations are known to exist, or
where there have been equivalency determinations or policies made that need
wide dissemination.

Users of this NVIC are encouraged to provide feedback on its contents

and to propose 'adddtions or amendments to the material presented. Proposals
should include the reason for change, and should be forwarded to Commandant
(G-MTH-2), U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, DC 20593-0001.

1.2 Background. Since the first electrical installations on the passenger

ships "CITY OF BERLIN" and "MENDOZA" in 1879, a complex set of standards and
regulations has evolved to address the hazards presented and the benefits
provided by electrical equipment and systems. Domestically, early efforts
involved the early Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation (predecessor
to the Coast Guard's Marine Inspection Program) and the American Institute
of Electrical Engineers (predecessor to the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers). Internationally, these involved the individual
classification societies, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (predecessor to the International Maritime Organization) and
the International E1ectrotechnical Commission. In the last two decades, the
number of standards-making bodies affecting the marine electrical community
has increased significantly.

The current Subchapter J was revised and updated in 1982. It represents

the regulatory philosphy prevalent in the mid-to-late 1970's and is for the

1
 .. ,

most part, technically and environmentally up-to-date. However, with

changes in regulatory philosophy, and the shift of U.S. flag construction
abroad, some minor revisions to the regulations could be beneficial.
Efforts to make such revisions are presently underway. Also, efforts are
underway through ASTM and IEEE to develop complete marine electrical
standards that could be referenced in Subchapter J. This would greatly
simplify regulation development and maintenance, and ease the burden on
industry by allowing for more timely updating to ever-changing
technologies.

1.3 The Electrical Program. The Marine Inspection Program uses plan
review, and on-site inspection to ensure that electrical installations are
designed, built and maintained.in a manner to promote the safety of the
vessel, its crew and passengers. The Electrical Engineering Regulations
provide uniform minimum requirements for electrical equipment and systems in
accordance with the intent of various statutes, the International Convention
for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), and other treaties that contain
requirements regarding electrical installations. These requirements are
intended to ensure electrical installations aboard vessels provide services
necessary to protect passengers, crew members and other persons from
electrical hazards.

1.4 Electrical Safety. Electrical Safety on ships includes the prevention

of shock, fire and panic.

On a steel hulled vessel, a person is usually walking on or touching

ground at all times, and is usually within reach of power cables or
electrical equipment containing lethal voltages. The currents that can flow
from an energized conductor to ground can be very large, even in an
ungrounded system. Currents as low as twenty-five thousandths of an ampere
(25 milliamps) that pass through the heart can cause death. Currents of a
non-fatal magnitude, or currents having a path to ground through other parts
of the body can cause severe burns and injury. Minor shocks can also create
severe secondary injuries when muscles contract involuntarily.

Fire is the greatest dread of seamen, and electricity is one of the most
frequent causes of fire. A fire hazard can exist wherever electrical
potential is present, and on a ship, the electrical installation covers a
far greater area than any other type of installation.

How can electricity start a fire? Current flowing through a conductor

encounters resistance. This resistance generates heat. If the conductor is
properly sized, the heat is harmlessly dissipated. Where the conductor is
not adequate sized for the current, or where the heat generated by the
current is prevented from properly dissipating, whether it is the normal
current, an overload current, or a fault (high or low impedance) current,
the heat can become excessive, and can start a fire in nearby combustible
materials, such as cable insulation.

Electrically-caused fires most often involve wire and cable. Most

vessels have many miles of cable run throughout the entire vessel, spreading
their risks to all locations. Whenever the protective insulation of a wire
or cable is damaged by heat, moisture, oils, corrosive materials, vibration,

2
abrasion, or impact, or where faulty installation or operating conditions
result in loose connections, the threat of fire exists.

Motors are also a frequent source of electrically-caused fires. Motor

fires can be caused by overheating, such as would be caused by overloading,
single phasing, inadequate ventilation, malfunctions, such as i~t7.:nal
faults and arcing, and bearing failure caused by inadequate lubrication.

Proper shipboard electrical installations also help reduce orprevent

panic during an emergency. Put an individual, such as a vessel passenger,
in the dark, in a strange place, in threatening circumstances, and the stage
is set for panic. Electrical installations are designed to keep the lights
on, power vital equipment, and allow needed information to be passed to
passengers and crew.

2. General Provisions of the Electrical Engineering Regulations

The existing Subchapter J applies to vessels contracted for after May

31, 1982, where Subchapters D, H, I, lA, 0, R, T, or U require electrical
installations to meet that subchapter. In general, it is not retroactive.
Installations in accordance with the edition of the electrical regulations
in effect at the time the vessel was contracted for remain acceptable
(unless specifically identified as requiring "upgrade" by other documents
such as SOLAS, Title 33 of the CFR, etc.).

2.1 Referenced Editions of Specifications. Standards and Codes

The regulations reference many industry standards. For the most part,
these standards are dynamic aridever-changing. The "official" referenced
edition of an industry standard is listed in the "Finding Aids" section of
the CFR. Often, that edition may not be the latest edition of the
standard. This could create availability problems; where the requirements
of a standard have changed, and where manufacturers have modified their
equipment to meet the later version, equipment may not be available that
meets the referenced edition. However, standard changes often respond to an
identified problem or hazard, and usually result in safer equipment. In
most instances, equipment constructed and tested in accordance with a more
recent edition of a referenced document can be accepted as providing a level
of safety equivalent to that provided by equipment constructed and tested to
the edition identified in the CFR.

2.2 Meeting Referenced Standards

One of the purposes of the Marine Inspection Program is to provide

passengers and crew on U.S. flag vessels with an environment that has a
level of safety comparable to that ashore. In most domestic "land"
installations, electrical equipment is of U.S. manufacture and is listed by
an independent electrical equipment certification agency acceptable to the
governing jurisdiction. In the majority of installations in this country,
the equipment is listed by Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (UL). The
existing Coast Guard Electrical Engineering Regulations evolved from this

3
 ·
I

situation. With the movement of u.s. flag construction abroad, there has
.been an influx of electrical equipment that is constructed to meet other
standards and that is listed by independent third party certifying agencies
similar to UL. Some equipment is built to manufacturer's standards and is
not third party certified. Both of these types of equipment need to be
evaluated for equivalence to the standards referenced in the Electrical
Engineering Regulations before acceptance for installation.

The Electrical Engineering Regulations require many electrical items to

meet a specific UL Standard. For such items, listing by UL is not
reguired. While evidence of such listing may be the most expeditious method
to determine compliance, it is not the only method. 46 CFR 110.2S-l(p)
requires the submission of "plans and information sufficient to evaluate
equipment required by this subchapter to meet a referenced standard ..."
Equipment may be accepted by having evidence 0['·"'1
isting. by manufacturer's
certification, or by determining the standard it does meet is equivalent to
the referenced standard.

Equipment required to meet an IEEE or NEMA standard or a military

specification (e.g. cable or switchgear) is usually certified by the
manufacturer to be in accordance with the standard. Equipment manufactured
in the u.S. is usually designed to these standards, and it is not uncommon
for foreign equipment to be designed to these standards. The manufacturer's
marking on the item usually indicates compliance with the standard. This is
adequate to demonstrate compliance with the regulations.

More commonly, however, foreign equipment is designed to foreign

national and/or International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards,
and compliance with, or equivalence to, the referenced document must be
determined. The usual starting point for an equivalency determination has
been the "line-by-line comparison" demonstrating that the construction and
testing of the particular equipment meets, or is "equivalent" to, the
referenced document.

Evaluation efforts must involve the exercise of "good engineering

judgment" to reduce the burdens of line-by-line comparisons imposed on a
case-by-case basis. Although "good engineering judgment" is typically
"something someone didn't have when something happened that shouldn't have,"
there are several basic guidelines that recognize limited review resources
and that are appropriate in assessing electrical equipment equivalency:

(1) The level of evaluation should be commensurate with the level of

risk imposed by the item. For example, an outlet box is a relatively
simple passive item, providing protection and access to a few simple
components, while a circuit breaker is a complex active device that is
designed to operate at varying times under both small overloads and
large damaging faults, providing system-wide protection. The evaluation
of a circuit breaker should be far more involved than the review of an
outlet box. This does not mean that evaluation of an outlet box is not
important; however, the evaluator should not need to spend an inordinate
amount of time to obtain a reasonable level of confidence that the
equipment will perform in a safe manner. The evaluator should ask some
basic questions: "What will happen if this equipment fails? Will
someone be shocked? Will it start a fire? Will a failure be readily

4
 apparent during normal operations or will it be hidden and gradually
worsen? Does the system configuration provide additional safety
measures that mitigate the effect of the failure? How likely is this
failure?"

(2) The evaluator should have a reasonable level of confidence in the

equipment. Obtaining this level of confidence with equivalencies often
involves subjective judgements concerning the manufacturer as well as
specific, technical determinations regarding the hardware itself. A
well-known manufacturer that has been in business for an extended
period, is a recognized leader in his field, has contributed to the
development of industry standards, and has a solid reputation may not
need close scrutiny. On the other hand, a "newcomer" to the equipment
field or U.S. market place, or an organization that is outside its
primary business, such as a shipyard that now decides to manufacture its
own panelboards and lighting fixtures just for a particular vessel, may
need a higher initial level of review to obtain that same level of
confidence.

(3) The evaluator should look for the safety intent in referenced
standards. Industry standards have evolved over many years, and for the
most part, represent a national consensus by technical professionals of
what is required to ensure that electrical equipment is safe. It is not
easy to look at a standard, such as a UL standard and identify those
requirements that are not related to safety. Nearly all requirements
are safety related, either directly, such as by ensuring adequate
dielectric strength, or indirectly, such as by ensuring adequate
mechanical strength so the equipment can safely withstand the rigors of
installation and use. For equipment built to another standard, the
evaluator should see if that standard adequately addresses the concerns
addressed by the referenced standard.

Equipment evaluators should use the above guidelines in evaluating

electrical equipment and in comparing it to the requirements of a referenced
standard. To facilitate the review process, the following procedures may be
used:

(1) For equipment required to be constructed to an industry standard

(domestic or foreign) and either listed by a nationally recognized
(domestically or in the foreign nation) independent testing laboratory
or certified by the manufacturer to be in compliance with the standard:

(a) Manufacturer should submit evidence of listing (listing number

in bill of materials, copy of listing card or documentation
provided by the laboratory) or affidavit of compliance. The
documentation should identify the specific construction and testing
standard.

(b) Evaluators should establish that the foreign standard is

complete, applicable and comparable to the referenced standard.
(They may request a copy of the standard and/or that a standards
comparison be submitted). This comparison may establish whether
the overall level of safety provided by the foreign standard is
comparable to that provided by the referenced standard, including
applicable marine supplements.

5
 •

(c) For specific items for which comparability has not been
established by comparing standards, such as would be the case if
the foreign standard was for "land type" equipment and did not have
requirements comparable to those in the marine supplement of a
referenced UL standard, the manufacturer should submit
documentation demonstrating compliance with the supplement
requirements.

(d) Once standard comparability has been established, for similar

applications, no further comparisons need be requested on
subsequent submittals using the same foreign standard. If the
edition of either the referenced standard, as identified in the
Finding Aids Section of the CFR, or of the foreign standard has
changed, the specific changes need to be re-evaluated). To this
end, the evaluators should maintain a listing of acceptable
"equivalent" foreign standards, citing the specific editions
compared. Additionally, the specific submitter should be
encouraged to reference the acceptance letter in future submittals.

(2) For equipment not constructed to nationally (foreign or domestic)

recognized standards:

(a) The equipment manufacturer should submit a complete

line-by-line comparison of actual construction and testing to that
required by the reference standard, including any applicable marine
supplement. Testing may be performed by the manufacturer. For
those areas that are not in complete compliance with the reference
standard, the manufacturer should submit technical arguments for
equivalency. These should be evaluated using the guidelines
previously discussed.

(b) Once equipment comparability has been established, no further

comparisons need be requested for that specific equipment from that
specific manufacturer when equipment use is proposed on another
vessel (again, this assumes the referenced edition has not
changed). Listings should be maintained and notifications should
be made in a manner similar to that used for standards
comparability. The manufacturer should provide a copy of the
acceptance letter with subsequent submittals.

(3) For issues that can be resolved based upon on-site visual
examination, the evaluator may defer the acceptability of that equipment
to the inspection activity (Officer-in-Charge, Marine Inspection or ABS
if acting on behalf of the Coast Guard). In such cases, the specific
issue deferred should be fully identified and documented. The
inspection activity should also document the acceptance or rejection,
and should provide the plan review activity with inspection comments on
the deferred issues.

The above procedure is for equipment required to meet a referenced

standard. It should NOT be used for equipment required to be listed or
labeled by an independent third party certification agency (i.e. fuses and
equipment for use in hazardous locations).

6
 Note that the Marine Safety Manual Vol. II, l2.E.4 permits the oeMI to
accept on vessels of the Military Sealift Command, equipment or materials
complying with any of the following: (1) technical bureaus of the U.S.
Navy; (2) MILSPEC's; (3) federal specifications for military purchases, and;
(4) National Military Establishment (NME) specifications.

2.3 Equipment Required to be Listed or Labeled

The regulations require fuses, explosionproof equipment, and

intrinsically safe systems to be listed by an acceptable independent testing
laboratory. The U. S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) has now established procedures for the acceptance of
equipment required to be labeled or approved for safety by 23 provisions in
OSHA safety standards. Under the procedures, effective 13 June 1988, OSHA
is deleting all current references in its standards to Underwriters
Laboratories Inc. and Factory Mutual Research Corp. (FM), relying instead on
the generic term "nationally recognized testing laboratory" (NRTL). The new
rule establishes criteria for a "nationally recognized testing laboratory,"
sets a procedure to recognize these laboratories, and permits these
laboratories to label or approve equipment for safety as required by OSHA
standards. OSHA will recognize NRTL's for five-year periods, with initial
five-year recognition granted to UL and FM. Other testing laboratories must
apply to OSHA for recognition and will be evaluated by OSHA staff. This
does not affect references to UL standards for construction and testing
requirements (as used in Coast Guard regulations when equipment is required
to meet a UL standard).

The criteria for acceptance by the Commandant as an "other independent

laboratory" under 46 CFR 111.53 and 111.105-7 is acceptance by OSHA as an
NRTL. Accordingly, listing or labeling by an NRTL is an acceptable
alternative to listing or labeling by one of the individual laboratories
specifically mentioned in the regulations, or by a laboratory that has been
subsequently recognized. At this time, the Coast Guard recognizes UL for
listing fuses; UL, FM, CSA, and MET Electrical Testing Company for listing
intrinsically safe systems; and UL, FM, and CSA for listing explosionproof
equipment.

3. Electrical Systems

The Electrical Engineering Regulations are a combination of equipment

and system requirements designed to ensure that electrical installations are
both safe and functional. They consist of general requirements related to
across-the-board "good marine practice," and specific requirements related
to the various apparatus, their proper design, installation and use.

In years past, emphasis was placed on equipment design requirements, as

the system was considered the sum of the components (equipment). Today,
equipment quality has generally improved and manufacturers have become more
aware of product safety and liability. Comprehensive industry standards now
exist and are used for most apparatus. This is allowing the review emphasis
to shift towards a systems approach. As indicated previously, evaluations
of equipment should consider overall safety comparability. With today's

7
limited resources for plan review and inspection, concentration should be on
proper application of equipment, effect of failures on required system
functions, and on vital safety features. Emphasis should be on evaluating
the "system" -

Is the apparatus enclosure appropriate for the location?

Is the fixture adequately grounded to reduce the shock hazard?
Is the fixture enclosure fire retardant and not surrounded by
combustibles?
Will a fault in the fixture be safely cleared by the first upstream
overcurrent device so that other parts of the electrical system are
not needlessly affected?
If it is a vital safety system, is the failure indicated and an
alternative or back-up provided?
Do the components go together?

This is the ftsystems" approach. This does not imply that individual
equipment design details are not important, but stresses that where there
are limiting constraints, the system should be given a higher priority.

A recent casualty can be used to illustrate the necessity of "systems"

thinking. While working on a motor controller, a crew member's screwdriver
caused a short circuit. The upstream circuit breaker on the main board
became damaged and did not open. Eventually, the generator circuit breaker
tripped, but only after the switchboard had been destroyed, with the bus
bars torn from their bases and internal components and wiring destroyed by
fire. Two separate items, a faulty circuit breaker and the cleaning fluid
used in the switchboard months before, were initially blamed. However, upon
further analysis, improper system design features became suspect. The
upstream circuit breaker probably did not clear the fault because it did not
have adequate interrupting capacity for the available fault current. The
switchboard was damaged because it was not braced for the available fault
currents. The common denominator was the fault current analysis. The
existing components were not appropriate for the system in which they were
installed. The electrical plant was, either in the original design or
during subsequent modifications, most likely considered an assembly of
components. These components may have been acceptable if used within their
design limitations, but were not adequate when used in a system with high
available fault currents.

The systems approach usually begins with an analysis of the "one-line

diagram" and it's supporting information. Appendix 1 consists of a
"typical shipboard electrical one-line diagram and index to the applicable
ll

requirements in 46 CFR Subchapter J, the National Electrical Code, IEEE-45,

etc.

3.1 General Requirements

For electrical equipment on ships, it is not the intent of the

regulations to require a separate class of "marine electrical equipment."
The intent is to permit normal, off-the-shelf commercial and industrial
equipment to the maximum extent practicable, with additional "marLne"
requirements only when needed. The acceptance of this type of equipment is
made possible by careful consideration of equipment application, location

8
and placement. Subchapter J contains general requirements for electrical
equipment to ensure that passengers, crew, and other persons, and the vessel
are protected from electrical hazards. It also ensures that equipment
necessary under both normal and emergency conditions is located in a manner
that allows for routine maintenance and testing, thus helping to ensure that
the equipment will function properly when needed.

Location and Placement. Optimal equipment location should be sought. In

general, electrical equipment should be located in as dry a location as
practicable, and electronic equipment located in a controlled environment.
In evaluating location, both normal and abnormal conditions should be
considered. Abnormal conditions include items such as piping leaks
(overhead for lower pressures and "in the vicinity" for higher pressures).
For more critical equipment, such as the main switchboard, the regulations
provide specific construction and location details. Generally, equipment
should be located where it would not be subjected to oil vapors, steam, or
dripping liquids. However, where relocation is not practicable, or where
additional safeguards are warranted, the equipment should be designed to
withstand these influences. Equipment should also be located to minimize
the risks to personnel when routine service is being performed.

Degree of Enclosure. Where exposed to the weather, or in a space exposed to

seas, washdowns, or similar moisture, equipment must be in a watertight
enclosure (NEMA 4 or 4X). A watertight enclosure is one that does not leak
when subjected to a specified hose or immersion test. Motors must be
waterproof. Waterproof motors may experience some leakage when subjected to
the hose test, however, the leakage must not hinder operation, or enter any
oil reservoir, and provision must be made for automatic draining before the
level becomes damaging. Where dripping liquids could fallon equipment,
that equipment enclosure should be dripproof (i.e., NEMA 2, or NEMA 12, or
NEMA 1 with a dripshield). Dripproof equipment is ordinarily designed to
prevent falling drops of liquid or solid particles from interfering with the
operation of the equipment when striking the enclosure downward at any angle
from 0 to 15 degrees from the vertical. Some equipment is designed for
angles up to 45 degrees. It should be verified during vessel inspection
that electrical equipment is suitably located - away from damaging liquid
(unless impracticable, in which case it must be suitably designed), and
accessible for inspection, adjustment and testing.

Corrosion. The corrosiveness of the marine environment is well known, and

protection can usually be accommodated at the design stage. Much of the
equipment that finds its way to sea was originally intended for a commercial
or industrial installation on land, and could quickly fail in a salt-water
environment if additional precautions are not taken. For this reason,
equipment located in the weather, or in other locations subjected to salt
water, must be evaluated to ensure corrosion resistance. Not only must the
enclosure be corrosion-resistant, but current-carrying components and
internal parts whose failure would create an unsafe condition must also be
corrosion-resistant.

Porcelain. Porcelain should not be used for lamp sockets, switches, etc.
unless resiliently mounted. The concern is that rigidly mounted porcelain
may fail under shipboard vibration and create a shock, fire or other hazard
to the vessel and its personnel. Some off-the-shelf equipment, designed for

9
typical land installations, only comes with rigidly mounted porcelain
insulated components. In these instances, it may be necessary to add
resilient mounts to the porcelain insulating material. Only in instances
where porcelain failure would not create a hazard, or where there is data
available to support a shipboard application, such as vibration and shock
(impact) testing, should such rigid installations be evaluated for general
safety equivalency.

Temperature. The present regulations assume an ambient temperature of 40

degrees Celsius, except for enginerooms, boiler rooms, and auxiliary spaces,
which are assumed to be 50 degrees (unless shown or designed to be less, in
which case 40 degrees is assumed). There are, however, differences in
national and international standards on assumed values of ambient
temperatures. IEEE-45, 1983 allows for both 45 and 50 degree ambient
temperatures for enginerooms, and allows switchboard apparatus (other than
molded case circuit breakers) rated for 40 degrees to be used in 50 degree
environments under some conditions (see Section 17.6 of IEEE-45.) The
American Bureau of Shipping's Rules assume a 45 degree ambient for
enginerooms, but indicate that rotating machinery is to be rated for a 50
degree ambient. ABS is in agreement with the requirements in the IEC
standards. In looking at the differences in these standards, it must be
remembered that assumed ambient temperatures reflect an opinion on the
overall average or the typical or expected temperatures, not the range of
tempe~atures that equipment may be expected to experience under all
conditions of operation. It must also be remembered that although consensus
opinions concerning a standard may change, the length of time it takes to
implement those changes varies widely.

In the case of overcurrent devices that are heat dependent, such as a

fuse or the thermal trip on a circuit breaker, temperature is important, as
it relates to the time it takes to remove an undesirable condition
(overload.) A device that is in an temperature lower than it is rated for
will be a little slower to trip on overload. If th~ temperature is higher,
it will trip sooner. In specific instances, either of these could be the
undesired event. In the fault current range, the time effect is
negligible. It should also be noted that many of these mass produced
devices do not perform uniformly.

The National Electrical Code (Code) indicates that for Code applications
with Code wiring, the ampacity of the conductors connected to molded-case
circuit breakers should be limited to that of 60 or 75 degrees Celsius
wiring, even though the attached conductors may have a higher rating.
Shipboard requirements in IEEE-45 and in the Electrical Engineering
Regulations do not impose this limit; such a limitation does not apply on
ships and MODUs. Ship systems do not use Code wiring, and are not typical
of common applications addressed by the Code. IEEE-45 cable constructions
have ampacities based upon rated conductor temperatures up to 100 degrees
Celsius. Shipboard cables may be connected to circuit breakers without
consideration of the NEC limitation.

Standard Voltages and Frequency. The standards indicated in the regulations

are typical. Other voltages have been successfully used on vessels and

10
MODUs. For drilling installations, 600 and 750 v.d.c. are typical. For
large floating industrial plants, 13.8 K.v. has been generated and
stepped-up to 34.5 K.v. for undersea transmission. The regulations require
that non-standard distribution systems, voltages, or frequencies be accepted
by the Commandant. This does not imply some are unacceptable. The concern
is that equipment items are compatible with each other, and with their
environment, and that any unique hazards are adequately addressed. When
high voltage equipment is used, and marine standards and equipment are not
available for equipment at that voltage, technical evaluation is needed to
ensure the safe application of shores ide industrial standards to a marine
installation. Also, higher voltage equipment may need special maintenance
considerations.

3.2 Equipment Ground, Grounded Systems. and Ground Detection

The term "grounding" is often misunderstood due to use in several

different concepts. A basic understanding of the various uses is
important. There are three basic applications of "grounding" associated
with safety of personnel or protection of electrical equipment. These are:
(1) the grounding of metal frames or housings of electrical equipment
(chassis ground); (2) the grounding of the neutral current-carrying
conductor of an electrical distribution system; and (3) the grounding of an
electrical source of power in such a manner that the earth (or its
substitute such as the hull) is used as a current-carrying conductor.

The first application is one of the most important uses of grounding to

protect personnel from electric shock. Fixed equipment is usually grounded
by its method of attachment to the vessel. Isolation mounted equipment is
usually grounded by a flexible grounding strap between the enclosure and the
hull. Portable equipment is usually grounded by a grounding conductor in
the supply cable. This should connect the equipment housing to the vessel's
hull. Under normal conditions, the housing is not energized. However,
internal insulation breakdown or other failure can bring energized
components in contact with the housing. If the housing were not grounded,
the voltage on the housing could equal the voltage of the power source, and
a person touching the housing would be exposed to this voltage. Grounding
the equipment reduces the shock hazard. Conductors used to ground equipment
are called grounding conductors. On an extension or portable tool cord,
this is the green insulated conductor. Portable equipment such as power
tools, that are identified as "double insulated" need not have a grounding
conductor in the attachment cord. These items have a basic (functional)
insulation system and a supplemental (protective) insulation system, with
the two insulation systems physically separated so that they are not
simultaneously subjected to the same deteriorating influences.

The second application is the intentional grounding of a single pole or

terminal of the power supply of an electrical distribution system. This is
accomplished by connecting a low resistance conductor from the pole to the
ground (the hull). The purpose of grounding one of the conductors is to
limit the voltage that the system can be subjected to under certain fault
conditions. Grounding can also be accomplished through a resistor
(resistance grounding) or through an inductor (inductive grounding). In
these methods, the resistor or inductor is used to limit the line-to-ground
fault current; these require special considerations and analysis. It is

11
 .. '

important that a grounded system have only a single point of connection to

the hull, regardless of the number of power sources, and that it be
accessible for inspection. Multiple grounding points could create
potentially dangerous and damaging circulating currents through the hull.

The neutral of each generation and distribution system must be grounded

at the generator switchboard, except for the neutral of an emergency power
generation system. This must have no direct connection to ground at the
emergency switchboard. The emergency switchboard neutral bus must be
permanently connected to the neutral bus on the main switchboard, and there
must not be any fuse, switch, or circuit breaker that opens the neutral
conductor of the bus-tie feeder.

Grounded distribution systems of less than 3000 volts line-to-line are

prohibited on tank vessels by SOLAS. The concern is that fault currents
going through the hull may cross discontinuities, such as riveted joints,
ladders, etc., and there may be an arc and subsequent ignition of flammable
vapors. Systems greater than 3000 volts may be grounded provided any
resultant fault current would not flow through the cargo tank area. This is
usually not a problem as electrical loads operating at these voltages (other
than possibly a bow thruster) are typically not located separate from the
machinery space.

On some merchant vessels, the electrical distribution systems are

ungrounded. There is no intentional connection to ground. This is
primarily for circuit reliability. The electrical system can sustain damage
that "grounds" one of the conductors and still function (i.e. provide
continuity of service).

There is often the assumption that a person can contact an energized

conductor in an ungrounded system, and not receive an electric shock since
there is no return path for the current to flow back to the distribution
system. Such an assumption can lead to fatal consequences. In practical
applications, there is always a return path, and a system is always
"grounded" to a certain extent. Paths exist through deteriorated or damaged
insulation, and moisture, salt and other contaminants that are ever
present. The issue is one of "degree." In ungrounded alternating current
systems there is always a capacitance between conductors and between
conductors and ground. This impedance can effectively "ground" an
intentionally ungrounded system.

The third application is the grounding of a power supply and an

electrical load such that the hull is used as a normal current-carrying
conductor. This is commonly referred to as "hull return" and is prohibited
on vessels except for impressed current cathodic protection systems and
limited and locally grounded systems such as engine cranking batteries.
Insulation level monitoring systems and welding systems (on other than tank
vessels) may also use the hull as a current-carrying conductor. One of the
problems with hull return pertains to galvanic corrosion. Where the hull
current passes through a welded joint or a joint of dissimilar metals,
corrosion is likely to occur.

Ground Detection. Grounds can be a source of fire and electric shock. In

an ungrounded system, a single ground has no appreciable effect on current
flow. However, if low resistance grounds occur on conductors of different
potentials, very large currents can result. In a grounded system, a single

12
 low impedance ground can result in large fault currents. To provide for the
detection of grounds, the regulations require that ground detection means be
provided for each electric propulsion system, each ship's service power
system, each lighting system, and each power or lighting system that is
isolated from the ship's service power and lighting system by transformers,
motor generator sets, or other devices. This indication need not be part of
the main switchboard but should be co-located with the switchboard (i.e. at
the engineering control console adjacent to the main switchboard). The
indication may be accomplished by a single bank of lights with a switch
which selects the power system to be tested, or by a set of ground detector
lights for each system monitored.

In an ungrounded three-phase system, ground detection lamps are used.

The ground lamps are connected in a "wye" configuration with the common
point grounded. A normally-closed switch is provided in the ground
connection. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
C

3-PHASE B
SYSTEM

A
G
FUSES

GROVND
LAMPS

tow IMPEDANCE
GROUND

5 WI T CH

FIGURE 1

If no ground is present on the system, each lamp will see one-half of

the phase-to-phase voltage and will be illuminated at equal intensity. If
line "An is grounded at point "G" by a low impedance ground, the lamp
connected to line "An will be shunted out and the lamp will be dark. The
other two lamps will be energized at phase-to-phase voltage and will be
brighter than usual. If a low resistance ground occurs on any line, the
lamp connected to that line will be dimmed slightly and the other two lamps
will brighten slightly. The switch is provided to aid in detecting high
impedance grounds that produce only a slight voltage shift. When the ground
connection is opened by the switch, the voltage across each lamp returns to
normal (phase Voltage) and each lamp will have the same intensity. This
provides a means to observe contrast between normal voltage and voltages
that have shifted slightly. Lamp wattages of between 5 and 25 watts when
operating at one-half phase-to-phase voltage (without a ground present) have
been found to perform adequately, giving a viewer adequate illumination
contrast for high impedance grounds. Should a solid ground occur, the lamps

13
will still be within their rating and will not be damaged. For lesser
grounds, the lumen output of the lamps will vary approximately proportional
to the cube of the voltage. This exponential change in lamp brightness
(increasing in two and decreasing in one) provides the necessary contrast.

On grounded dual voltage systems, an ammeter is used for ground

detection. This ammeter is connected in series with the connection between
the neutral and the vessel ground. To provide for the detection of high
impedance grounds with correspondingly low ground currents, the regulations
specify an ammeter scale of 0 to 10 amperes. However, the meter must be
able to withstand, without damage, much higher ground currents, typically
around 500 amperes. This feature is usually provided by the use of a
special transducer such as a saturable reactor in the meter circuit. Some
ammeters use a non-linear scale to provide for ease in detecting movement at
low current values. An example of this is shown in Figure 2 below.

DUAL VOLTAGE SYSTEM

NEUTRAL

SATURABLE TEST
REACTOR S~T~ AMMETER

CURRENT
TRANSFORMER

FIGURE 2

Other types of solid-state devices are becoming available that can

provide ground detection. They should not be prohibited, but should be
evaluated to determine that they are functionally equivalent to the lights
and ammeters historically used. Some systems also include a visual and/or
audible alarm at a preset level of ground current.

3.3 Power Supply

Capacity. Determining the number and size of generating sets needed for a
vessel requires a careful analysis of the normal and maximum demands during
various phases of operation, including at sea, maneuvering. and in port.

14
Also, any special or unique operational considerations should be addressed.
It is the intent of the regulations to ensure all normal "ship's service"
loads can be kept energized with the largest generator out of operation, and
without use of the emergency generator. It is not the intent of the
regulations to ensure that the vessel can continue to perform an industrial
function, such as drilling or dredging, with a generator in reserve. Ship's
service loads are defined in detail in 46 CFR 111.10-1.

Of special note is that refrigerated container loads are considered

"ship's service" loads. This is so cargo preservation attempts will not
require sacrificing the more traditional ship's service loads should an
operating generator fail. Other arrangements, such as a separate generating
system, or a reefer load-shedding/load management system can provide an
equivalent level of safety.

Procedures for conducting a thorough load analysis, typical ship's

service operating load factors, and a sample load an~lysis are contained in
Appendix 2.

Main engine dependent generators. The most commonly used prime movers for
ship's service generators are dedicated diesel engines and steam turbines
supplied by the propulsion boiler(s). However, due to escalating fuel
costs, owners and designers are always looking for less expensive means to
provide the necessary electric power. Shaft-driven generators, power
take-off (PTO) generators, and waste heat driven turbogenerators offer
flexibility and greater efficiency. In many cases, however, they are
constrained to certain main engine speed and power operating ranges.

SOLAS states that the arrangements of the ship's main source of power
shall be such that the ships service loads can be maintained regardless of
the speed and direction of the main propelling engines or shafting. This is
reflected in 46 CFR 111.lO-4(b) and (c), which require that ship's service
electrical power be provided continuously, regardless of propulsion shaft
speed or direction. In the worst case, this means that an "engine stop" or
"full astern" command on the bridge propulsion control lever while operating
at the minimum engine speed for full generator output must not result in
interruption of ship's service power.

Generators may be mechanically driven by the main diesel engine directly

by the line shaft, by means of a PTO from the engine, or through
intermediate gearing. Because changes in main engine speed would normally
result in changes in the generator speed (and, therefore, frequency), a
variety of methods has been developed to maintain constant frequency. These
include the operation of the main diesel engine at a constant speed with the
pitch of a controllable pitch propeller independently controlled, the use of
a constant speed gear drive to give a constant output shaft speed over a
range of input shaft speeds, and the application of a static
rectifier-inverter combination to transform yariable frequency AC to
constant frequency AG.

Waste heat energy from the main diesel engine can be recovered in an
exhaust gas boiler to generate low pressure stearn to drive a
turbogenerator. This generator can be operated only when sufficient exhaust
heat is available, so start-up and shutdown are usually manually initiated.
To optimize the recovery of exhaust heat, a generator loading control system

15
may be used with load-sharing and speed (governor) controls to max~m~ze
turbogenerator loading when operating in parallel with other generators.

Any main engine or waste heat driven generator which is not capable of
providing power under all operating conditions, including maneuvering and in
port, cannot be counted towards the required ship's service generating
capacity. Such a generator may, however, be provided as a supplemental
generator. In any case, one of the required generators must be independent
of the main propelling engines and shafting.

Where a supplemental generator is used to supply power for ship's

service loads, it must provide a continuous and uninterrupted source of
power under normal operational conditions, including any speed change or
throttle movement. Automatic start-up of and load transfer to a standby
diesel generator must be provided to prevent power interruptions when
conditions are such that the supplemental generator is unable to supply the
ship's service load. A finite time is required to start, synchronize, and
parallel a standby diesel generator, and the main engine-driven generator
must remain on line until the standby generator has assumed the load. A
signal from the propulsion control and a shaft speed signal may be used to
automatically initiate connection of the standby generator. Once a throttle
change has been made, the time required for the main engine to slow to the
point where the generator cannot supply the ship's service load depends on
the original speed as well as the coast-down characteristics of the hull and
propulsion plant. In many cases, the coast-down time for a two-stroke slow
speed main diesel engine is long enough to allow the standby generator to
assume the load without power interruption. If it is not, the disconnection
of the shaft or PTO generator must be delayed. To prevent power
interruptions from occurring, the speed of the main engine may be
automatically held at or above the lower operating threshold for generator
operation for approximately 10 seconds. This delay, automatically activated
only when needed, is considered to be comparable to the the time necessary
for crew response to maneuvering bells in a manned engineroom. Since the
typical main engine dependent generator installation employs automated start
and synchronization controls for the standby generator(s), Gareful design
and detailed review to the requirements of 46 CFR Part 62 is generally
required to ensure compliance with 46 CFR 11l.10-4.

Ship's Service Supply Transformers. The regulations state that where

transformers are used to supply the ship's service distribution system,
there must be at least two separate ship's service supply systems. The
intent is to duplicate supplies to the ship's service switchboard, as is
done with generating sets. This would normally exist on ~ vessel generating
at a higher voltage, such as 600 or 4160 volts. It is not the intent, nor
is it required, that transformers fed by the ship "s service switchboard,
such as 460/120 volt transformers be duplicated.

Each transformer must have the capacity to supply the ship's service
loads. The duplicated supply should consist of transformers, overcurrent
devices, and cables. Automatic changeover upon a transformer failure is not
required. It could be inferred from the transformer/generator analogy of
SOLAS 11-1/45, that automatic transformer transfer is required by the SOLAS
11-1/53 requirements for automatic starting and connection of a stand-by
generator. That analogy has, however, not been applied to transformers
since the precise wording of Reg. 53 addresses generators, and not

16
"essential parts of the electric supply system." Additionally, the
reliability and availability of a "static" transformer, and its cable and
overcurrent device is much better than a rotating generator, its prime-mover
and control system. Transformer faults are rare, and the requirement for
duplication is considered from a "take-home" standpoint. (This is similar
to the requirement for a split bus arrangement on a ship with a large
electrical syscem . There is no requirement to autiomat.LcelIy disconnect
switchboard sections and attempt to maintain power upon 'a switchboard
fault. The requirement for splitting the bus is to provide the capability
for onboard engineers to be able to isolate a fault and restore limited
service.)

Generator Construction and Protection. Generator excitation, construction,

and voltage regulation, should meet sections 35.23, 35.25, and 35.31,
respectively, of the ABS Rules. Generator protection, provided by power
circuit breakers, should meet the specific requirements in the Electrical
Engineering Regulations. There are many types of circuit breaker trips:
inverse time, instantaneous, reverse-power/current, under and overvoltage,
ground fault, under and over frequency, and trips operated by auxiliary
contacts. 46 CFR 111.12-11 specifies the required trips for generator
circuit breakers. The inverse time trips are devices that open the circuit
breaker in a time that relates to the amount of overcurrent. The greater
the overcurrent, the quicker they open the circuit. They are adjustable and
should be set so that downstream or feeder breakers have had the opportunity
to open and clear faults on the feeder circuits. Instantaneous trips are
quick-acting devices that have no intentional time delay in opening the
circuit breaker under high level currents. Instantaneous trips are not
permitted for generators unless three or more generators can be paralleled.
This is to provide continuity of service under a fault condition.
Reverse-power or reverse current trips are required where generators can be
paralleled. These are quick-acting devices that will open the circuit of a
generator that has current from other generators feeding into it.
Additional information on circuit breakers is provided later.

Generator overcurrent protective devices must be on the ship's service

switchboard and the switchboard and a generator must be in the same space.
An adjacent dedicated switchgear and SCR room on a MOnU, and a control room
inside the machinery casing are not considered separate spaces even though
they may be separated by a watertight bulkhead. In unusual installations
where the switchboard and a generator are separated by a bulkhead or
enclosure that is not required for either subdivision or fire protection
purposes, the spaces may also be treated as a single space for the purpose
of this requirement. Additional precautions may be needed, such as current
sensing at the generators that, upon sensing excessive overcurrent, removes
excitation and shuts down the prime mover.

The Marine Engineering Regulations contain the requirements for prime

movers in 46 CFR 58.10. Additional requirements for prime movers for
emergency generators are found in 46 CFR 112.50, and are discussed later in
this NVIC. Each diesel engine prime mover must have an overspeed device
that is independent of the normal operating governor and is adjusted so that
the speed cannot exceed the maximum rated speed by more than 15%.
Additionally, the prime mover should automatically shut down upon loss of
lubricating oil pressure to the generator bearings. These shutdowns should
be tested at each inspection for certification.

17
 · ,I

3.4 Batteries and Battery Installations

Electrical storage batteries have many shipboard applications, including

engine starting, temporary or final emergency power source, and backup power
supply. In general, the requirements of 46 CFR Subpart 111.15 are
applicable to all such battery installations. Note that storage batteries
used for required emergency power and lighting systems must also comply with
Subpart 112.55.

Battery types & equivalence. Batteries may be classified according to the

chemical composition of their plates and/or the type of electrolyte solution
-- thus the terms lead-acid, alkaline, nickel-cadmium (Ni Cad), etc. A
nickel-cadmium battery is a particular type of alkaline (electrolyte)
battery. Storage batterie; other than the lead-acid or alkaline type may be
accepted provided they do not spill electrolyte when the battery is inclined
at 30 degrees from the vertical, are suitably constructed to comply with 46
CFR 111.ls-2(a), and generate hydrogen at a rate not to exceed that of an
equivalent lead-acid battery installation under worst case conditions.

Hazardous locations. The Electrical Engineering Regulations categorize

battery installations into one of three types, based upon the power output
of the battery charger and the corresponding amount of highly flammable
hydrogen gas which may be generated. Each room, locker, and box containing
storage batteries must be arranged or ventilated to prevent the accumulation
of this gas. Large battery installations may be located only in a dedicated
battery room or in a box on deck. Such a battery room is considered to be a
hazardous location; only electrical equipment approved for use in a Class I,
Division 1, Group B location may be used in such a battery room. The
regulations do not define the hazardous area as extending to a radius of 10
feet (3 meters) from doors, hatches, or other openings into the battery
room. However, the use of explosionproof or intrinsically safe electrical
equipment or apparatus and the avoidance of ignition sources near such
openings is recommended.

The classification of battery installations based upon the power output

of the charger may not be appropriate for some types of batteries (such as
gel-cells) which generate very little hydrogen gas. In such cases, the
quantity of gas generated should be compared to the amount released by
lead-acid batteries to determine whether the installation should be
considered large, moderate, or small. The battery manufacturer, equipment
designer, or shipbuilder should provide this comparison to the Coast Guard.
Sealed batteries, which release gas only when a relief valve opens following
an over-voltage charge, may also be accepted. However, their installation
must consider the over-charge condition, and allow released gas to be safely
dissipated.

Installation. The lining requirement of 46 CFR 111.15-5(g) allows the

acceptance of plastic battery trays and liners certified by the manufacturer
as resistant to the corrosive effects of the battery electrolyte. Battery
chargers which meet UL 1564 (Industrial Chargers) plus the marine supplement
to UL 1236 may be accepted as equivalent to those meeting UL 1236.

Emergency Power Batteries. Automotive-type batteries are not suitable for

emergency power applications, as indicated in NEC Article 700-12.
Automotive batteries are designed for frequent, short duration, high-current

18
loading; emergency power systems usually operate less frequently, for longer
periods, at lower current levels. Automotive batteries also have a shorter
life (3 - 5 years) than lead-acid storage batteries designed for use in
emergency power systems (15 - 20 years). Storage batteries for emergency
power service usually have either a threaded stud or a rectangular blade for
connection of a bus link. They commonly have external cell connectors.
Automotive batteries have either side terminals that can accept a threaded
bolt, or top round posts for the common automotive battery cable.

3.5 Switchboards

Location. The main switchboard is required by 46 CFR 111.12-ll(g) and

111.30-l(a)(4) to be located in a machinery space that contains at least one
ship's service generator. This requirement is consistent with the SOLAS
Amendments, Chapter 11-1, Regulation 41.3. A control room that is located
within the machinery casing or a dedicated switchgear and SCR room on a
Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit which is adjacent to and on the same level as
the generator machinery space, is not considered to be a separate space.
Any such control room containing the main switchboard should, as far as
practicable, be located so that the generator(s) are in sight and direct
access to the generator(s) is facilitated.

Adjacent piping. Each switchboard must be located in as dry a location as

possible. Dripshields are required by CFR 111.30-9(b). An equivalent
installation is a switchboard that extends to the overhead and which cannot
be subjected to leaks or falling objects. Piping above or adjacent to
switchboards should be avoided. Piping which must be located in the
vicinity of a switchboard must be provided with suitable spray shields and
have only welded joints.

Removable Breakers. Sectionalization and Redundant Transformers. The

Electrical Engineering Regulations require molded-case circuit breakers on
switchboards to be mounted so that the breaker can be removed from the front
without first unbolting the bus or cable connections or de-energizing the
supply to the breaker. The intent of this requirement is to make possible
the safe removal of a circuit breaker for repair or replacement without
de-energizing other essential loads. This requirement is for circuit
breakers in ship's service switchboards; removable or draw-out breakers are
not required for dedicated industrial switchboards, but are recommended for
safety. Where the main ship's service bus is subdivided into two sections,
a comparable level of safety can be provided by an arrangement where all
circuits necessary for the safe navigation of the vessel can be supplied by
either section of the bus. This would allow for de-energizing one section
without the loss of essential loads. Note that although the Subchapter J
requirement to sectionalize the main bus is not applicable to Mobile
Offshore Drilling Units, self-propelled MODU's seeking an IMO MODU Code
certificate must meet this requirement (MODU Code Chapter 7, Section 9).

Sectionalized buses increase the ability to provide ship's service power

in the event of a casualty to part of the switchboard. On a single voltage
level system (i.e. t where generated voltage is the ship's service
switchboard voltage), the devices used to connect the sections of the buses
must be manually operable. In a dual level system, (i.e. in which the
t

generators connect to a medium-voltage bus which in turn supplies the

19
 .. "

low-voltage ship's service switchboard) at least two transformers or

transformer banks are required by 46 CFR 111.10-9. If the medium-voltage
bus is required to be sectionalized and the total capacity of these
transformers exceeds 3000 KW, the low-voltage ship's service switchboard
must also be subdivided. On a dual level system, automatic control of the
sectionalizing devices may be permitted when it is part of a load management
system allowing for 'increased system flexibility,\, .
;"~:
.; ~:}
.1
. -:.~.:~

Bus bar sizing. ~Each.hus'im.i'st

be sized so its 'ratirigfs'not'less than the
capacity required in 46 CFR 111.30-19(a). {NOTE: Bus bars for motor
control centers are to be rated per NEC 430-24.] Table A27 of IEEE Standard
No. 45 gives ml.nl.mum
bus bar sizes, based on the cross section and spacings
required for the bus current rating and the allowable temperature rise.

Bus bar bracing. Bus bars must be braced to withstand the mechanical
strains imposed by inrush currents and the maximum available short-circuit
current. These currents can generate electromagnetic fields of considerable
magnitude. The mechanical forces resulting from these fields can bend the
bus bars, shatter insulation, and physically tear the switchboard apart.
Switchboard manufacturers should indicate the fault current their boards are
designed to withstand. The spacing between bus bars and bare metal parts
within the switchboard must meet Section 384-26 of the National Electrical
Code.

Aluminum buses. There has been continued interest in the use of aluminum as
a bus bar material, due primarily to the relative costs of copper and
aluminum. Both marine and shore industrial experience has shown that
careful attention must be paid to materials, joint design, and quality of
workmanship if unsatisfactory and unsafe aluminum bus bar installations are
to be avoided.

The switchboard regulations, in 46 CFR 111.30-19, refer to IEEE Standard

No. 45 for bus bar installations. Section 17.11 of IEEE-45 permits aluminum
to be used in switchboards. The panelboard regulations, in 46 CFR 111.40-1,
require each panelboard to meet UL 67, Standard for Panelboards, and the
Marine Supplement. This supplement restricts current-carrying parts to
copper or copper alloy. The marine supplement to UL 508 requires aluminum
current-carrying parts of motor controllers at 600 volts and less to be
"suitably plated or coated to resist marine atmospheres containing salt."
Motor controllers for use above 600 volts must meet UL 347, which states
only that current-carrying parts "shall be of metal or other material that
is acceptable for the particular application." UL 845, Standard for Motor
Control Centers, permits the use of aluminum bus bars but requires plating
with tin, silver, or cadmium at bolted or plug-in connections. Similarly,
UL 857, Standard for Busways and Associated Fittings, allows aluminum bus
bars but imposes special conditions on joints and connections. Aluminum
must only be used in applications and in a manner permitted by the
regulations.

Certain problems and properties associated with aluminum bus bars are
discussed below. For vessels operating only in fresh water, the corrosion
problem may be minimal; the other three problems are equally applicable to
fresh water and salt water service.

20
 A. Corrosion - Aluminum in contact with certain other metals, such as
steel, forms a galvanic couple susceptible to accelerated corrosion in
the marine environment. Aluminum alloys containing copper are
particularly subject to corrosion in a damp salt atmosphere, even when
not in contact with a dissimilar metal.

B. Oxide Build-up - Most aluminum alloys form a hard, inert oxide coat
whenever a fresh surface is exposed to air. This layer "of aluminum
oxide has a high electrical resistance and can create a hot spot at
connection points.

C. Creep - Aluminum exhibits a phenomenon known as creep, which is a

plastic deformation that occurs at stresses below yield strength.
Periodic tightening of many types of aluminum connections is required to
prevent connections from becoming loose. If connections do become
loose, the surface contact area is reduced, permitting the oxide coat to
form. This, in turn, causes high-resistance hot spots.

D. Thermal Properties -

(1) As the load increases, the bus bar temperature will increase
and the bus bars will expand. The linear coefficient of thermal
expansion of aluminum alloys is significantly larger than that for
steel or copper. Provisions must be made in the design to account
for these different expansion rates. High stresses can occur in
aluminum-bodied connectors, especially when used with bolts of a
dissimilar metal or which have thermal expansion characteristics
different from those of the aluminum device.

(2) The thermal conductivity of aluminum, while alloy dependent,

is approximately half that of copper. Heat is not conducted away
from a hot spot in aluminum as quickly as with copper.

The use of aluminum bus bars in switchboards, large switchboard-type

panelboards, and motor control centers is generally acceptable. The design
and practices recommended below, or equivalents, should be considered.
Aluminum bus bars are generally not suitable for use in panelboards and
motor controllers. The small size and scattered locations of many
panelboards and controllers may discourage the periodic inspections which
should be made to detect unsafe deterioration of aluminum bus b~rs and
connections.

The following design and assembly recommendations will help ensure a

satisfactory installation of aluminum bus bars:

All aluminum current-carrying parts should be made of alloy 6101 or

other alloy with a maximum of 0.1 percent copper.

In areas of contact, the bus bars, including any copper bars,

should be plated with silver, nickel, or tin after all drilling has been
completed. This plating should be performed at the manufacturer's
facility and not in the field.

Copper cable or wire should be connected to the aluminum bus using

plated compression-type terminal connectors.

21
 "

Where aluminum-bodied connectors and fittings are used, they should

be packed with oxide-inhibitor paste. These fittings should be suitable
for use on aluminum.

A shrinkable sleeve should be used to seal the wire to the terminal

connector.

A generous amount of Joint compound should be applied to all joint

surfaces before assembly to seal out air and improve corrosion
resistance. A bead of compound should appear all around the edges of
each joint when the connection is tightened. Excess compound squeezed
out of the joint may be left as is or removed. Abrasive joint compounds
should not be used on flat-bar connections.

A plated copper bar or plated copper terminal fitting may be

connected to a plated aluminum bar. The connection should be made with
a plated steel bolt, plated Belleville spring washers, and wide series
plated steel washers. The Belleville washer should be installed with
the crown or neck against the nut or bolt head and the concave side
bearing on the flat washer. The nut should be tightened until the
Belleville washer is just flat.

An aluminum to aluminum connection may be made with either plated

aluminum or plated steel bolts. If steel bolts are used, the
recommendations of the paragraph above should be followed. Aluminum
bolts should be made of a high strength aluminum alloy. Aluminum bolts,
nuts, and washers should be made of an alloy containing not more than
0.1 percent copper.

A plug-in type circuit breaker should not be directly connected to

an aluminum bus. Circuit breakers or fused switches may be attached to
an aluminum bus if a bolt or plug arrangement is used with joint
preparation as described above. The plug-in type circuit breaker may be
used with a copper bus feeder.

A plated bus bar surface should not be wire brushed or treated with
abrasive cleansers prior to assembly.

Medium voltage switchgear. Medium voltage switchboards are required by 46-

CFR 111.30-23 to meet ANSI C37.20 for metalclad switchgear. This is not a
marine standard, however, and equipment designed to this standard may not be
able to withstand prolonged exposure to the inclinations and vibration which
are common in the marine environment. It is recommended that switchboards
for marine use be designed, constructed, and installed in such a way as to
allow successful operation under 'the environmental conditions listed in
46 CFR 62.25-30.

Equipment. The switchboard equipment listed in 46 CFR 111.30-25 for AC

ship's service switchboards, 111.30-27 for DC ship's service switchboards,
and 111.30-29 for emergency switchboards is considered to be the minimum
necessary to control the electrical plant under normal and manual
conditions. Vessels with unique electrical plants should be evaluated to
determine the necessary instrumentation.

22
Automated systems. SOLAS 11-1/53.2 requires electrical load shedding
arrangements for vessels with periodically unattended machinery spaces. 46
CFR 62.S0-30(k) requires that where the electrical power can normally be
supplied by one generator, load shedding be provided to maintain the
continuity of electrical power to propulsion, steering, and other vital
safety systems. In the case of loss of the (one) generator in operation, a
standby generator of sufficient capacity to supply the propulsion and
steering equipment must be automatically started and connected to the
switchboard in not more than 30 seconds. Where the electrical power is
normally provided by two or more generators in parallel operation, provision
must be made to ensure that, in case of the loss of one operating generator,
the remaining generators are kept in operation without overload to maintain
propulsion, steering, and the safety of the vessel.

3.6 SCR's

The term SCR refers to the solid state equipment for the conversion of
alternating current to direct current which has been called a silicon
controlled rectifier, semiconductor controlled rectifier, and semiconductor
rectifier. Many electric propulsion systems, thrusters, and pieces of
drilling machinery use DC motors in order to obtain more precise speed
control. SeR's are the most common means of converting the ship's service
AC power to DC. Solid state SCR power converters offer the advantages of
high efficiency and low maintenance (compared to motor-generator sets), but
are sensitive to heat and humidity and are frequently located in suitably
air-conditioned spaces.

Subpart 111.33 is applicable to any SCR used as part of the vessel's

electrical power distribution system. Small SCR's which form part of
utilization equipment, such as a semiconductor rectifier battery charger,
need not meet these regulations.

Reguirements. The intent of the regulations is to ensure that the

continuity of power to equipment supplied by SCR's is not jeopardized by
unsuitable SCR design or installation. An adequate means of heat removal is
the primary concern. Due to the criticality of the propulsion system to the
safe navigation of the vessel, additional requirements apply to SCR's in
electric propulsion systems; see 46 CFR 111.33-11.

Appendix 3 contains a checkoff list which may be useful during the

design or plan review of systems using SCR's.

3.7 Transformers

The overcurrent protection for each transformer is required by 46 CFR

111.20-15 to meet Article 450 of the NEG. The transformer overcurrent
protection specified in Section 450-3 is intended to protect the transformer
alone; the primary and secondary conductors may not be adequately
protected. Be careful to ensure that conductor protection is provided.
Note that where the primary feeder to the transformer is provided with
overcurrent protective devices that are set per Section 450-3, it is not
necessary to install an individual overcurrent device at the transformer.
The primary conductors must then be sized so that their ampacity is greater

23
 · "

than or equal to the rating or setting of the primary overcurrent protective

device(s); see 46 CFR 111.50-3(a), (b), and 111.SO-5(a). Secondary
conductors supplied by a transformer must be protected in accordance with
their ampacity. The secondary conductors of a single voltage single-phase
transformer which satisfies the requirements of 46 CFR 111.50-5(a)(4) do not
require overcurrent protection at the supply (the transformer) to the
secondary side conductors.

Aluminum-wound transformers are acceptable. They should be fully

encapsulated by the manufacturer and all connections should be made in
accordance with the guidelines for aluminum current-carrying parts in
section 3.5 of this guide.

See Appendix 4 for full load current ratings for single-phase and
three-phase transformers.

3.8 Electric Propulsion

The reference to the ABS "Rules for Building and Classing Steel Vessels"
in 46 CFR 111.35-1 is out-of-date. Sections 35.79, 35.81, 35.84, 35.125,
35.127, and 35.129 of the latest revision of the ABS Rules may be used for
guidance. In addition, a portion of Table 62.35-50 (Vital System Automation
Rules) applies to electric propulsion systems. The general provisions of
the SOLAS 11-1/31, 49, and 52 are applicable to all propulsion arrangements,
including electric propulsion.

3.9 Panelboards

Ratings. The current rating of a panelboard must not be less than the
feeder circuit capacity. To meet 46 CFR 111.40-15, the load on any
overcurrent device in a panelboard must not exceed 80 percent of that
device's rating if the normal load duration is 3 hours or more. This
requirement does not apply, however, when the panelboard and the overcurrent
device are rated for continuous duty at 100% of the rating.

Number of Circuits. Note that each panelboard must meet UL 67 and the
Marine Supplement. This UL Standard states that lighting or appliance
panelboards must not have provision for more than 42 overcurrent-protective
devices (individual fuseholders or circuit breaker poles), other than those
in the mains. The edition of the UL Marine Supplement referenced in the
Finding Aids Section requires overcurrent protection in grounded conductors
of branch circuits, contrary to present 46 CFR 11l.50-3(a). The specific
regulation, 111.50-3(a), should be followed. UL 67 has been changed.

3.10 Overcurrent Devices

Purpose. Overcurrent devices, the two most common types being fuses and
circuit breakers, offer protection against currents in excess of the rated
current of equipment or the current-carrying capacity (ampacity) of a
conductor. The purpose of properly coordinated overcurrent protection is to
recognize, locate, and isolate faulted portions of the power system in order
to minimize the damage to equipment and conductors, danger to personnel, and
interruption of electrical power which may result from an overload, short
circuit, or ground fault.

24
Circuit Breakers. Circuit breakers are devices which permit manual opening
and closing of a circuit and which open the circuit automatically for a
predetermined fault condition (usually overcurrent, but sometimes reverse
power flow, undervoltage, or underfrequency) without damage to themselves
when applied within their ratings. In effect, they are high current
interrupting capacity switches with automatic trip elements. The circuit
breakers most commonly found in marine applications respond to overcurrent,
tripping when the current magnitude exceeds a specific value for a specific
length of time. Low voltage (600 volts AC and below) circuit breakers are
usually constructed with an integral overcurrent trip element within the
circuit breaker housing.

In medium voltage systems, instrument transformers and protective relays

separate from the circuit breakers are often used. Current transformers and
voltage transformers are connected to the power system and allow the
protective relays to "see" the conditions in the system without exposing
them to the high system current and voltage levels. Protective relays
interpret the information provided by the instrument transformers to
discriminate between tolerable and fault/intolerable conditions. Upon
detection of an intolerable condition, the protective relay initiates a
tripping impulse to the circuit breaker, which isolates the faulted part of
the power system.

When a circuit breaker opens an energized circuit, an arc is drawn

between the opening contacts. This arc must be extinguished in order to
interrupt the circuit. Circuit breakers are commonly classified according
to the medium in which the contacts open. The common designations are air
circuit breaker (which includes molded case circuit breakers), vacuum
breakers, and SF6 (sulfur hexafluoride) breakers. Air circuit breakers are
the most cornmon type found in low voltage, relatively low current circuits
for which the air around us serves as a suitable dielectric, preventing
continued arcing between the contacts after they have parted. Most air
circuit breakers employ a bank of metal fins around the contacts to quickly
extinguish arcs. As the arc passes between the fins it is split, cooled,
and extinguished.

The Electrical Engineering Regulations require circuit breakers to be

the air type (see 46 CFR 111.S4-I(a)(4». Air possesses marginal insulating
value to prevent ionization and continued arcing at medium voltage and/or
high interrupting current levels. Air circuit breakers for medium voltage
applications are large, heavy and expensive. For nearly a decade, trial
installations of vacuum circuit breakers have demonstrated satisfactory
performance on vessels. Vacuum circuit breakers may now be accepted as
providing a level of safety equivalent to air circuit breakers. Similarly,
SF6 circuit breakers have demonstrated acceptable performance in
medium-voltage industrial and utility service and may also be permitted in a
marine electrical system.

The contacts of a vacuum circuit breaker open and close within an

evacuated bottle. With very little gas available to ionize, there is
essentially no arcing between the contacts. Vacuum circuit breakers can be
smaller, lighter, and (usually) less expensive than equivalent air circuit
breakers.

25
 Sulfur hexafluoride, is a nonflammable, nontoxic gas with an insulating
value 2.5 times that of air at atmospheric pressure. Each SF6 interrupter
pole consists of two pairs of contacts sealed in a bottle filled with SF6
gas at slightly more than atmospheric pressure. A puff of gas directed
between the parting contacts cools the arc and allows deionization and
interruption of the current.

SF-6 and vacuum circuit breakers have been accepted aboard inspected
vessels for use in medium voltage metalclad switchgear, and it appears that
air circuit breakers may, in the not-too-distant future, be obsolete for
this service and become unavailable.

A molded-case circuit breaker is a type of air circuit breaker which is

assembled as an integral unit in an insulated housing. Most molded-case
breakers are provided with both a thermal trip for sustained overloads and a
magnetic trip for instantaneous tripping on high fault currents. The
operating mechanism which opens and closes the contacts includes a powerful
spring which is charged when the breaker is closed. The trip actuator may
have a number of inputs, but it must have a common mechanical output which
releases the operating mechanism and uses the spring energy to open the
contacts. Traditional circuit breakers have, for each pole, a bimetallic
thermal trip element and an electromagnetic (instantaneous) trip unit which
initiate the mechanical motion of the trip bar which, in turn, releases the
ope ra t Lng mechanism to open the contacts. Note that actuation of the common
trip bar opens all the poles of the breaker simultaneously. This is
illustrated in Figure 3 below.

HA..'fDU

arHtTALlIC STRIP
HEATER n.rxrxr

I-RATED OR LESS

FIGURE 3

26
 Electronic trip systems have been developed which replace the moving
thermal-magnetic devices with solid-s~Hte electronic sensors and a single
trip solenoid. By reducing the numb-rr of mechanical moving parts used to
release the operating mechanism, electronic trip units can be made
inherently more vibration and shock (impact) resistant. In addition, the
electronic trip unit can be more closely adjusted and is less sensitive to
ambient temperature because no motion of the trip actuator occurs until the
trip signal is sent to the solenoid by the electronic circuit. With these
advantages and the option for additional protection features, electronic
trip units may soon replace thermal-magnetic elements for overcurrent
protection.

The interrupting rating of a circuit breaker is the highest rms current

at rated voltage which the breaker is intended to interrupt in normal
service. In practical circuits containing both resistance and reactance,
most short-circuit currents will be asymmetrical during the first few cycles
after the short occurs. This asymmetry, due to a DC current component, will
decay during the first few cycles until the current becomes symmetrical.
The asymmetrical current, although it lasts only a short time, can greatly
exceed the corresponding symmetrical fault current and the circuit breaker
must be able to withstand the asymmetrical value. Under the ANSI standards
presently applicable to low voltage fuses and circuit breakers, interrupting
ratings are expressed in terms of the symmetrical rms current to facilitate
equipment comparison and selection. Circuit breakers meeting UL 489,
although having only a symmetrical rating, are tested under conditions that
evaluate their ability to withstand the "worst-case" asymmetrical current.
Accordingly, the evaluation of the device for asymmetrical current is not
necessary. Medium voltage circuit breakers have a first-cycle asymmetrical
rating.

The continuous current rating of a circuit breaker is the continuous

current the breaker will carry, without tripping, in the ambient temperature
for which it is calibrated. Higher current will initiate tripping, though
the current level must be sustained for some minimum length of time in order
to actually trip the breaker.

Circuit breakers trip on overcurrent according to a time-current

response curve established by the manufacturer. A typical circuit breaker
time-current characteristic curve is shown in the Figure 4.

Circuit breakers which respond to overcurrent may have an inverse-time

trip, an instantaneous trip, or both. The term "instantaneous here means
l1

only that no intentional time delay has been introduced, although some
finite minimum time is required for any circuit breaker to interrupt a
circuit. The curves indicate the length of time a particular current level
must be sustained in order to trip a particular breaker. These and similar
time-current curves for fuses are used in the process of coordinating the
various overcurrent devices in the power system.

Fuses. Fuses are overcurrent protective devices containing a

circuit-opening fusible element that is heated and severed by the passage of
overcurrent. Fuses are among the few components required by the Electrical
Engineering Regulations to be listed_by UL or other independent laboratory
recognized by the Coast Guard (see 46 CFR lll.S3-l(a)(3)). Fuses listed or
labeled by a "nationally recognized testing laboratory" which has received

27
 "

... eee __ - .---y----r-----r--- .

¥

...~i_----~-----+----_i-----

CI1
Q
:z:.
B
&oJ
CI1
~~~~~~----~------t_---
Z;
FIGURE 4

cu1tJlD{1' PEl.CDtt
IJ( or 11lF.J,.X£R.
nIP WIt SEttINC

recognition by OSHA are acceptable. Only "one-time" fuses may be used;

renewable link cartridge-type fuses and Edison-base fuses (the screw-in type
formerly used in residential fuseboxes) must not be used.

The interrupting rating (or capacity) refers to the highest rms

alternating current (or direct current depending upon the application) which
the fuse is designed to interrupt without charring or cracking of the fuse
tube or external arcing. The continuous current rating, or ampere rating,
is the current level which the fuse will carry continuously without
deterioration or excessive temperature rise.

While fuses are often regarded as instantaneous circuit interrupting

devices, they actually follow an extremely inverse time-circ~it
characteristic curve as shown in the Figure 5.

The total clearing time curve shows the maximum time, including arcing
time and manufacturing tolerances, for the fusible element to open the
circuit. The minimum melt curve represents the minimum time required for
the fusible element to begin to melt. An assumed "fuse damage," curve,
approximated at 75% of the minimum melting curve, is used to provide a
margin of safety so that applications avoid operation in the time-current
band between the minimum melt curve and the total clearing curve, where
current levels may cause thermal damage to the fuse without opening the
circuit.

28
 \
FIGURE 5
\
\
\

Current-limiting Devices. Current-limiting fuses are used to limit the

magnitude and duration of extremely high fault currents during the total
clearing time. Current limiting becomes effective only above a specific
threshold current and interrupts the circuit in less than one-half cycle
after occurrence of a fault, before the fault current reaches its maximum
magnitude. Current-limiting fuses can be used in combination with circuit
breakers to provide protection of the circuit breaker against high fault
currents while retaining the time delay thermal and instantaneous magnetic
trips for overcurrents of lower magnitude. The heat energy developed in a
circuit during the fuse's clearing time, expressed in ampere-squared-seconds
as r2t, is used as one measure of a fuse's current-limiting ability.

Applications. Overcurr~nt devices are generally required to be located at

the point of supply of the circuit to be protected. The Electrical
Engineering Regulations contain specific exceptions for overcurrent
protection for generators, shore power cables, and transformer secondary
circuits. Most conductors must be provided with overcurrent protection to
protect against thermal damage caused by current in excess of the ampacity
rating of the conductor.

This level of overcurrent protection is not desirable in circuits which

would hazard vessel operation if unexpectedly opened. Only short-circuit
(not overload) protection, set not less than 500% of the expected current,
is allowed in electric propulsion control, voltage regulator, and circuit
breaker tripping control supply circuits. Exceptions are also made for
applications such as motor circuits where a higher trip rating may be
necessary to avoid tripping on motor inrush currents. Similarly, the
overcurrent protection requirements for transformers contained in Article
450 of the National Electrical Code reflect the need to avoid improper
tripping due to magnetizing inrush currents while providing adequate
protection against sustained overcurrent.

29
 Due to the vital role of the steering system in the overall safety of a
vessel, only limited fault-current protection is permitted in steering gear
motor feeder, motor controller, control, and indicating and alarm circuits.
It would be dangerous to "protect" a steering gear motor against a moderate
overload if, by tripping the motor during a maneuvering situation, steering
were lost and the safety of the vessel jeopardized. The fault-current
protection required for steering systems is intended to protect against
fire; components of the system may be sacrificed in order to maintain
control of the vessel for as long as possible in emergency situations.
Steering gear and propulsion circuits must meet 46 CFR 111.93 and 111.35,
respectively.

The requirements of Article 430 of the National Electrical Code,

referenced in 46 CFR Ill. 70, apply-__
to overcurrent protection for motor
circuits other than those for fire pumps, steering gear, or electrical
propulsion. Fire pump motor protection must meet the general motor
protection requirements of Article 430 in lieu of the requirements contained
in the fire pump portions of sections 430-31 and 430-72.

3.11 Fault Current Analysis & Coordination.

Purpose. To provide for an electrical system that m~n~m~zes disruption from
fault conditions, a fault current analysis and a coordination study must be
performed. The fault current analysis is used to determine the magnitude of
available fault current throughout the system so that interrupting devices
can be selected to safely open that magnitude of current. The coordination
study is performed so that the overcurrent devices can be selected or set so
that the device immediately upstream from the fault trips before devices
further upstream, thereby limiting the power loss to equipment downstream of
the fault.

Theory. The available short-circuit current at a given location in the

power system is defined as the maximum current which the power system, when
operating with the maximum generating capacity that can operate in parallel
and the largest "probable" motor load, can deliver to a zero-impedance
(bolted) three-phase fault. The sources of short-circuit current are the
generators, synchronous motors or synchronous condensors, and induction
motors in operation in the system. The connected (spinning) motors function
as generators for a short time after a fault occurs, contributing current
towards the fault. The subtransient reactance should be used to determine
the contribution of induction motors to the fault current during the first
few cycles after the occurrence of the fault.

The current which will flow toward the fault depends upon the power
available from the source(s), the voltage at the fault (assumed to be zero
for a bolted three-phase fault), and the impedance of the circuit components
such as transformers, conductors, and other equipment between the fault and
the power source(s), Short-circuit currents should be assumed to be
asymmetrical during the first few cycles after the short occurs. The
asymmetry will be maximum at the instant the short circuit occurs; in
practical circuits containing both resistance and reactance, the current
generally becomes symmetrical after several cycles. The rms value of the
available asymmetrical current must be within ~he interrupting rating of the
overcurrent device. Note that this maximum asymmetrical current is the

30
average of the three phases at a particular instant in time and is not the
maximum current in anyone phase.

Low-voltage air circuit breakers operate nearly instantaneously for

currents near their interrupting ratings. These breakers must be capable of
interrupting the maximum current which can flow in the circuit. However,
since the interrupting ratings of low voltage circuit breakers are only
expressed in terms of symmetrical rms amperes, only the symmetrical fault
current needs to be determined. The breaker frame size should be selected
to have a (symmetrical) interrupting rating at least equal to the calculated
symmetrical short-circuit current.

Calculation Procedures. There are a number of methods, of various degrees

of accuracy and simplicity, which can be used to determine the available
fault current. The Electrical Engineering Regulations permit the use of the
assumptions contained in 46 CFR 111.52-3 in lieu of detailed short-circuit
calculations for systems with an aggregate generating capacity below 1500
kilowatts. This refers to the condition where the maximum number of
generators which can operate in parallel are operating, generating the
maximum power which can be supplied to the system. Detailed calculations
may utilize any of the following methods:

1. Exact calculations using actual impedances and reactances of

the electrical equipment in the system.

2. Estimated calculations using the Naval Sea Systems Command

Design Data Sheet DDS 9620-3, "A.C. Fault Current Calculations."

3. Estimated calculations using the International Electrotechnical

Commission (IEC) Publication 363 (1972), "Short-circuit Current
Evaluation with Special Regard to Rated Short-Circuit Capacity of
Circuit Breakers in Installations in Ships."

4. Estimated calculations using an established,

commercially-available fault current analysis procedure for utility
or industrial applications, provided sufficient documentation
regarding the procedure is submitted to verify its applicability.

The estimated calculation procedure often contain certain "simplifying

assumptions" regarding the reactance-to-resistance (X/R) ratios for
generators, motors, and transformers, as well as the power factor and
efficiency of induction motors. Low voltage systems are generally assumed
to experience no voltage drop throughout the system. The maximum fault
current is normally calculated at the first half-cycle. Simplifying
assumptions may be used, consistent with good engineering judgment. The use
of such assumptions must be noted in the calculations.

Coordination. Coordination, sometimes called selectivity, refers to the

location of overcurrent protective devices in the system and the selection
of proper trip ratings or settings and coordination time intervals so that
only the smallest practicable portion of the power system will be isolated
following a fault. The protection system can be viewed as a set of
overlapping zones of protection with each zone encompassing a segment of the
power system including at least one circuit breaker or fuse, as shown in
Figure 6.

31
 · "

1......... ------

:f\ :~-: I

r-------- •
I

l~
1-

GENERATOR
.2.
I
I
1
.._-:-~-4~
L __ l- __ ~ _I
I
r--- --,
I
I
I

SWITCHBOARD
- _J TRANS.
L- _
--- I

LOAD
L
DIST. PANEL
-- --'

FIGURE 6

In a properly coordinated radial system, the first circuit interrupting

device on the source side of the fault should respond (by opening the
circuit) the fastest, so that no other interrupting devices open and maximum
continuity of power is provided to the remainder of the system. Each
circuit interrupting device should provide backup protection for the
interrupting devices downstream of it; that is, each interrupting device
should be able to open the circuit for any fault which the next downstream
device fails to clear, but only after allowing sufficient time for the
downstream device to act. The coordination time interval is the time
difference between the slowest operating time for the primary protection and
the fastest time for the backup protection.

Proper coordination of protective devices requires an analysis of the

fault currents av~ilable at the various points in the system, selection of
the circuit breakers and fuses so that each will clear the anticipated fault
currents in an acceptable time, and verification that each breaker or fuse
provides adequate backup protection for the circuit interrupters
downstream. In general, "instantaneous" or extremely inverse characteristic
circuit breakers, or fuses, are used at loads (the farthest downstream
devices) with'progressively less inverse time-current characteristic
breakers employed as one approaches the source(s). An exception is the
requirement of 111.12-ll(c)(2) for an instantaneous trip on the generator
circuit breaker where three or more generators can be paralleled.

Coordination of molded case circuit breakers having thermal-magnetic

trips is sometimes difficult. In view of this, non-selective overcurrent
protection may be accepted for circuits which supply only non-vital
equipment. A fault on such circuits must not affect the continuity of
electric power to equipment vital to the propulsion, control, or safety of
the vessel.

32
3.12 Motor Circuits

General. With the exception of steering gear motor circuits, propulsion

motor circuits (which must meet 46 CFR Subparts 111.93 and 111.35,
respectively) and certain special requirements applicable to fire pump motor
circuits, each other motor circuit, controller, and protection must meet
Article 430 of ANSI/NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code (NEC). Diagram
430-1 in the NEC is a useful diagram of a motor circuit. The diagram serves
as a guide to the applicability of the various sections of Article 430; the
NEC does not require all motor circuits to be arranged as shown in the
diagram. In fact, the vast majority of shipboard low-voltage motor circuits
consist of the motor, a combination motor controller containing overload
protection which meets NEC 430 Part C and a disconnecting means which meets
430 Part H, fuses or a circuit breaker which provide branch-circuit
short-circuit and ground-fault protection per 430 Part Of and motor
branch-circuit conductors meeting 430 Part B.

The nameplate on a motor rated at 0.5 horsepower or larger must list its
code letter (see 46 CFR 111.25-5 and NEC 430-7; this information is very
seldom available to the plan reviewer). Code letters are listed
alphabetically and represent the locked rotor kilovolt-amperes (KVA) per
horsepower. The branch circuit protective device chosen must be large
enough to allow sufficient time for the motor to start. Higher code letters
indicate greater locked rotor currents, requiring larger protective
devices. When starting a motor with full voltage, the locked-rotor current
does not diminish until the motor is very nearly up to its rated speed.
Most motors used have code letters ranging from "Fitto "V". For these
motors, the maximum rating or setting of the branch circuit protective
device, if a fuse, is 300 percent of the motor full-load current; if a
circuit breaker, this value must not exceed 250 percent (see 46 CFR 111.70-1
and NEC Table 430-152). The minimum value is not given but must be capable
of carrying the starting current of the motor (see NEC 430-52). For vital
systems, however, a minimum of 200 percent full-load current is recommended
for motors having "F" to "V" code letters, to ensure starting of the
motors. The trip setting values listed in the Quick Reference tables of
Appendix 6, columns I or J as applicable, may be used to check all motors
having code letters "F" through "V".

Branch-circuit conductors supplying a single low-voltage (600 volts and

below) motor in a continuous duty application must have an ampacity of at
least 125 percent of the rated full-load current of the motor. Motors are
assumed to be assigned to continuous duty unless the nature of the equipment
driven is such that a motor will not operate continuously with load under
any condition of use. Conductors for short-time and intermittent duty
motors should be sized per NEC Table 430-22(a). Conductor ampacity of at
least '125 percent of the motor full-load rated current is required because
the conductors are protected by motor overload protective devices which are
set above the motor full-load current. '

600 volts and above. The above requirement for conductor s1z1ng applies
only to low-voltage applications; Part J of Article 430 adds to or amends
the other provisions of the article for motor circuits over 600 volts.
Specifically, 430-124 permits motor conductors to have an ampacity not less
than the motor overload protective device trip current, which may be 100% of
the rated full-load current. This applies to medium-voltage motors for

33
 .. "

applications such as thrusters and compressors. Cables for DC motors for

.drilling equipment (draw-works, rotary table, mud and cement pumps) may be
sized in accordance with the International Association of Drilling
Contractors "Interim Guidelines for Industrial System DC Cable for Mobile
Offshore Drilling Units," IAOC-OCCS-l. This standard is attached as
Appendix 5.

Motor protection. Motor overload protective devices are required for most
motors in order to protect the motors, motor control equipment, and motor
branch-circuit conductors against excessive heating due to sustained motor
overload, failure to start, or motor stalling. Continuous-duty motors of
more than 1 horsepower must generally be provided with a separate overload
device set to trip at not more than 115% of the motor rated full-load
current. In most cases, overload relays with heater coils responsive to the
motor current are included in the motor controller. The Electrical
Engineering Regulations generally permit the use of only two motor overload
devices for three-phase motors in lieu of the three specified in NEC Table
430-37; see 46 CFR 11l.70-l(b). The size of the overload protective device
should be based upon the actual nameplate full-load current rating. The
values listed in columns "C" and "0" of the Quick Reference tables in
Appendix 6 may be used to check the maximum values for running protection.

Part D of Article 430 specifies the protection of motor circuits rated

600 volts or less against overcurrent due to short circuits or.grounds.
Individual motor circuits must have short-circuit protection rated or set
not to exceed the value specified in NEC Table 430-152 and capable of
carrying the starting current of the motor. A single protective device may
be used to provide both short-circuit/ground-fault and motor overload
protection where the overload requirements of 430-32 are met; see NEC
430-55. NEC 430-52 permits a motor short-circuit protector (MCP) to be used
in lieu of the protection specified in Table 430-152 where the motor
short-circuit protector is a part of a combination controller which has both
motor overload protection and short-circuit and ground-fault protection in
each conductor and where it will operate at not more than 1300 percent of
motor full-load current.

Motor controllers, also called "starters," are used to manually or

automatically start electric motors from a local or remote location. Motor
controllers basically consist of a relay or "contactor," which is used to
connect the motor to the AC line by a pushbutton switch, liquid level
switch, pressure switch, temperature switch, etc.. The two types of
controllers used are "low voltage release" (LVR) and "low voltage
protection" (LVP). Both can appear to be identical, but their electrical
circuits will vary.

LVR controllers are required for vital systems to ensure that the
equipment will re-start following either a loss of power or a reduction in
voltage below the "drop-out" value of the operating coil. These controllers
are usually energized by contacts which mechanically remain closed when
power is lost.

LVP controllers are energized by momentary contacts, such as a

pushbutton. They will not re-start following a power outage until the
momentary pushbutton contact is again depressed.

34
 Motor controllers are furnished with the thermal overload elements
mentioned above. These elements are used to open (or close) contacts which
are used either in the control circuit itself or to provide an overload
alarm to another circuit. Some of these elements are adjustable but most
often the non-adjustable type is specified. Most motors are stopped by
these (normally closed) contacts when an overload occurs. For vital
systems, such as steering, these devices are used only to signal the
overload condition in a separate circuit.

Safety disconnects. Each motor circuit must have a disconnecting means

capable of disconnecting both the motor and the controller from the
circuit. The disconnect and the controller may be contained within the same
enclosure; the disconnect must, however, open all ungrounded supply
conductors to the controller and motor control circuits. Switches and
circuit breakers used as disconnecting means for low-voltage motor circuit
must have ampere rating of at least lIS percent of the motor full-load
current. The use of fuses as disconnects, although permitted by the NEC, is
specifically prohibited by 46 CFR 111.70-lCc). Electric heaters in motor
controller enclo~ures should not be excepted from the disconnecting
requirements in 46 CFR 111.70-S(a). The purpose of this requirement is to
eliminate the shock hazard posed to personnel by an enclosure with more than
one source of potential, and is consistent with the intent of NEC 430-113.
To allow for safe access during maintenance and inspection shutdown periods,
a disconnecting device for an electric heater in a motor controller
enclosure, or one of the protection features required by 111.70-7(d) for
control, interlock or indicator circuits should be provided.

3.13 Shors Power

Electrical shore power connections are not required by the Electrical

Engineering Regulations. Where provisions are made to use shore power, the
connection boxes and switchgear must meet 46 CFR 111.83 and 111.30-2S(f) for
AC switchboards or 111.30-27Cf) for DC switchboards. As an alternative to
the standard shore power connection box, the use of military specification
(MILSPEC) hardware is acceptable. The use of reverse-power or
reverse-current relays should be considered when shore power is used
extensively. In addition, interlocks are recommended to prevent the
paralleling of shore power with the ship's generators.

4. The Emergency Power System

4.1 General. Part 112 of the Electrical Engineering Regulations and SOLAS
11-1/42, 43, and 44 contain the requirements for emergency lighting and
power systems. The requirements of these two sets of requirements (USCG and
SOLAS) , are generally in agreement. Vessels in some categories are
permitted shorter periods of operation of the emergency power supply by 46
CFR Table l12.0S-S(a) than by the SOLAS regulations; these vessels would not
normally carry SOLAS certificates due to their size and/or limited operating
routes. The Electrical Engineering Regulations permit manually connected
emergency power sources only for cargo vessels less than 500 GT or cargo
vessels of less than 1600 GT on other than ocean, Great Lakes, or coastwise
routes and not on international voyages.

3S
 Diesel and gas turbine engines used as emergency generator prime movers
must be capable of starting at an ambient temperature of 32 degrees F (0
degrees C). Electric water jacket heaters are permitted to ensure ready
starting. Due to the impracticality of testing this capability in warm
climates, the manufacturer's certification is generally accepted. A
thermostatically controlled electric lubricating oil heater may be provided
to reduce the accelerated wear which may result from placing the generator
load on a cold engine. Where detached electric motor-driven pumps are
provided to circulate warm oil through the engine while it is stopped, a low
oil level alarm should be installed to indicate any loss of oil through a
leak in the pumps or external piping.

SOLAS 11-1/44.2 requires each emergency generating set to be equipped

with a starting device with a stored energy capability for at least three
starting attempts, with a second source for an additional three starts to be
provided within 30 minutes unless manual starting (not just manual
initiation of the start per 46 CFR 112.35-5) is practicable. This differs
somewhat from the Electrical Engineering Regulations. The requirements for
hydraulic, electric, and compressed air starting systems in 46 CFR 112.50
call for a capacity for at least six cranking cycles, with the capacity for
three of these cranking cycles to be held in reserve until manually released.

The emergency generator is not intended to be used as an "in port

generator"; it may be used to supply necessary electrical power to start the
ship's machinery plant from a dead ship condition. When used in this
manner, the emergency generator must be sized to provide power to all
required emergency loads in addition to any loads on the emergency
switchboard (not bus-tie loads) that are used for starting the ship's main
propulsion machinery.

4.2 Location. SOLAS 11-1/42.1.3 and 43.1.3 and 46 CFR l12.05-5(e) all state
that the emergency generator room and a category A machinery space should
not be adjoining, except where other arrangement is not practicable. The
intent is to maintain the integrity of the emergency electrical distribution
system if there is a fire, flooding, or other casualty in the main machinery
space. When the arrangement has been shown to be impractical, the
installation of an A-60 bulkhead between the emergency generator room and
the category A machinery space has been accepted. Although not required, it
was recommended that the steel bulkhead be insulated to A-60 on both sides.
Casualties such as the recent explosion and fire aboard a U. S. flag
tankship, however, demonstrate the vulnerability of an emergency power
source located in a space adjacent to the main machinery space. It is
preferable to avoid any contiguous boundaries between the emergency
generator room and any category A machinery space or space containing the
main source of electrical power, associated transforming equipment, if any.
and the main switchboard.

4.3 Emergency Loads. The temporary and final emergency loads listed in 46
CFR Subpart 112.15 must be supplied by the emergency power source(s).
Additional safety devices and systems (i.e., vital) may be connected to the

36
emergency power system provided the emergency source is sized to supply
these loads at 100% load factor. Additional loads which are intended to
improve the safety or survivability of the vessel in certain operating modes
(i.e., non-vital) and which have not been considered in sizing the emergency
generator (such as the addition of a secondary debal1asting system on a
semisubmersib1e MODU) may be allowed to be connected to the emergency power
supply when arranged to be functionally equivalent to a bus-tie
configuration. The following conditions would apply:

1) The non-vital loads must automatically trip off the emergency

switchboard (by means of an undervoltage or underfrequency trip or
equivalent) when the normal power supply is lost;

2) these loads must only be manually reconnected to the emergency bus,

(this may be done remotely); and

3) the non-vital loads must be shed automatically prior to overloading

of the emergency generator. Remote load monitoring and manual
disconnection of required emergency loads is allowed, but automatic load
shedding of the non-vital loads is necessary to maintain the integrity
of the emergency power system.

Any bus-tie between a main switchboard and an emergency switchboard must

not have automatic feedback of power from the emergency source to the main
switchboard. When operating in a feedback mode, the bus-tie must open
automatically upon overload before the emergency power source is tripped off
line. Each bus-tie should be provided with short-circuit protection by a
circuit breaker or fuses at both the main and the emergency switchboards.

Cables from the emergency switchboard, other than those which supply
equipment in the machinery spaces, must not be run through the engineroom,
boilerroom, or the casings of these spaces. Emergency power cables must not
be run along decks or bulkheads which form'the boundaries of these spaces.
Again, the intent is to maintain the integrity of the emergency power system
by protecting emergency power cables from thermal damage should there be a
fire in the machinery spaces.

5. COMMUNICATION AND ALARM SYSTEMS

5.1 Fire detecting and alarm systems. An automatic fire detecting and
alarm system consists of a power supply, a control unit on which are located
visible and audible fire and trouble signalling devices, and fire detector
and alarm circuits, as required, originating from the control unit.
Detector and alarm circuits consist of initiating and indicating devices and
alarms. Initiating devices are smoke, heat or flame detectors and manual
fire alarm boxes. Indicating devices are audible and visual alarm devices
such as bells and strobe lights.

Systems are approved by the Coast Guard at two separate levels.

Manufacturers of systems obtain approval of a type system incorporating all
of the components for which they desire Coast Guard approval from Commandant
(G-MTH-4). Systems are approved for use on individual vessels by the Marine
Safety Center based on compliance with the manufacturer's type system

37
 , "

approval. Approved systems are required in designated areas of Passenger

Vessels (46 CFR 76.0S), Cargo and Miscellaneous Vessels (46 CFR 9S.05), and
in machinery spaces of inspected vessels where automated systems are
provided to replace manual control and observation, such as minimally
attended machinery spaces with centralized control rooms or unattended
machinery spaces (46 CFR 62.S0-20(c) and Table 62.35-S0). Approved systems
are also required in cargo spaces intended for the carriage of dangerous
goods per SOLAS 74, as amended, Regulation 11-2/54. NV1C 7-80 "Use of Fire
Detection Systems Which Are Not Approved under 161.002" should be consulted
for guidance on systems for areas where detectors may be installed but are
not required.

Manufacturers of systems may seek approval from Commandant (G-MTH-4),

u.S. Coast Guard, 2100 2nd St. S.W., Washington, DC 20S93-000l, by
submitting system design information and test reports with a letter of
request for approval. Plans should be submitted in triplicate and should
cover fully the arrangement, construction, and materials of the system and
components. Design and testing requirements are found in 46 CFR 161.002.

UL listing of control units is not sufficient evidence of compliance

with the approval requirements. Two features not required by UL must be
included. They are a power transfer switch and automatic circuit test
means. The power transfer switch transfers the energy source from the
normal power source to the emergency source upon loss of normal power (46
CFR l61.002-l0(g)(1». Circuit test means must be provided for individually
testing each zone circuit by simulating a fire alarm condition and a trouble
condition. In addition to the UL required tests, marine related tests must
be conpleted for vibration, humidity, and inclination (46 CFR
l6l.002-l6(c)(3),(4), and (S) respectively). UL listed control units
modified to include a UL listed automatic power transfer switch and circuit
test means need only be tested for vibration, humidity, and inclination.

UL standards are considered appropriate for all initiating and

indicating devices with the exception of detectors for use in exposed
locations such as cargo holds, in the weather, or wet spaces including main
machinery spaces. Such devices must pass the salt spray tests in the
appropriate UL standard. Annunciators are considered to be indicating
devices and should meet UL Standard 404, "Audible Signal Appliances", or UL
Standard 1638, "Visual Signaling Appliances for Fire Protective Signaling
Systems". If the use of annunciators is more complex than indicating
devices, they should comply with the requirements for control units.

Approval of systems designed for specific vessels may be obtained from

Commanding Officer, Marine Safety Center, u.s. Coast Guard, 400 7th St.
S.W., Washington, DC 20S90-0001. Arrangements of the systems must be
submitted in triplicate and all approved components should be readily
identifiable. Only approved components should be used.

The requirements for location of equipment for all systems are found in
46 CFR 76.27 and 3S. Additional requirements for vessels requiring SOLAS
Certificates are found in SOLAS 74, as amended, Chapter 11-2. Further
guidance on locating detectors can be found in NFPA 72. Ventilation effects
should be considered when locating detectors.

38
5.2 General Alarm. A general alarm system meeting 46 CFR Subpart 113.25
must be provided on each manned vessel of over 100 gross tons, except
barges, scows and similar vessels to alert the crew and passengers to the
existence of an emergency situation and the need to report to their muster
stations. Components of the general alarm system, including vibrating bells
and flashing lights, do not require type approval by the Commandant. The
requirement for component approvals was deleted from the regulations by the
revision of 46 CFR Subchapter J which became effective 1 June 1982. Only
the system design and equipment installation need now be approved.

The general alarm is intended to be sounded only after a deliberate

decision by a member of the crew. This position is consistent with SOLAS
Chapter 11-2 Regulation 13.1.14. The general alarm must only be initiated
manually and is intended to be sounded by the person on watch or other
responsible member of the crew only after the determination has been made
that an emergency situation exists which warrants mustering the crew and
passengers (if any). SOLAS permits the general alarm to be sounded
automatically by a safety monitoring system, such as a fire detection and
alarm system, if an initiating fire alarm is not acknowledged within a
reasonable time (two minutes). This is permitted for spaces other than
passenger spaces.

An integrated general alarm, fire alarm and public address system may be
considered for equivalence to the intent of 46 CFR 113.25 and to satisfy
SOLAS chapter 11-2, Regulation 40.5 for a public address system. Any such
arrangement must give priority to the general alarm function. Such a system
would function similarly to the multi-purpose lMC Emergency Announcing
System commonly used on naval vessels. Speakers and electronic tone
generators may be used to produce a bell-like signal or tone distinct from
any other audible signal on the vessel. The location of speakers and the
generated sound level must meet 46 CFR 113.25-9. Either a distinct sound
signal or intermittent operation of the general alarm bells (or speakers
producing bell-like sounds) may be used to warn of fire. An integrated
system must meet the following criteria:

a) The fire alarm activating switch must be in a normally manned space

which can receive alarms from the master fire alarm panel and which has
a general alarm contact maker.

b) The general alarm signal must have priority over the fire alarm
signal.

c) The fire alarm switch should be marked "Fire Alarm" in red letters
on a corrosion-resistant plate or sign.

d) Operation of the fire alarm switch may also activate a fire alarm
page via the public address system. This must not interfere with the
normal operation of the general alarm.

e) If the fire alarm signal is generated external to the general alarm

system, loss of power to it must not affect the general alarm system.

f) The fire alarm signal must be distinct from those signals required
by 46 CFR 109.503 for MODUs.

39
 , .
1

The emergency signals required by 46 CFR 109.503 for Mobile Offshore

Drilling Units differ considerably from those used on other types of
vessels. The intent of this was to recognize and standardize existing
industry practice which was different than for vessels. This promotes
consistency among offshore rigs, both mobile and fixed, so that an offshore
oil worker can recognize the same sound signal and respond in the proper
manner to similar emergency situations on either kind of ~installation. The
emergency signals specified in 46 CFR 109.503 should be used for "emergency
stations" and "abandon unit" situations on MODU's; other signals, such as
fire warnings, must be distinct from these required signals.

Vessels have been allowed, on a case-by-case basis, more than one

general alarm contact maker in addition to those required under 46 CFR
l13.25-5(a), (b), or (c) where justification was presented. For example,
Military Sealift Command vessels have been permitted to use contact makers
in weatherproof boxes in the quarterdeck area in order to sound the general
alarm in a security/intruder situation. Additional contact makers may be
permitted where their installation results in an increase in vessel
safety. Any additional contact makers should meet the construction
requirements of 46 CFR 113.25-11 and should be labeled per l13.25-20(b).
Contact makers in weather locations should be provided with suitable
weatherproof enclosures. Where jack boxes are used for these additional
contact makers, there must be cut-out switches in the wheelhouse that can
isolate the jack boxes from the rest of the general alarm system.

There are no switches available which satisfy the requirements of both

113.25-11 for contact makers and 111.105 for electrical equipment in
hazardous areas. For contact makers that must be in hazardous locations,
the requirements of 111.105 apply. These switches should be labeled as
required for contact makers by l13.25-20(b) and l13.25-ll(d), as applicable.

Flashing red lights which augment the general alarm bells must be
supplied by the general alarm system power supply, except for flashing red
lights in the main machinery space supplied from the emergency source of
power through relays operated by the general alarm system. In general, the
use of the emergency source of power for all general alarm system flashing
red lights meets the intent of 113.25-l0(c).

5.3 Sound-Powered Telephones. Section 37.22 of IEEE Standard 45 and

military specification MIL-T-155l4 may be used as guidance for construction,
installation, and performance standards for sound-powered phones.

Sound-powered telephone headsets and jack boxes are not permitted on any
telephone system that includes any station required by the regulations,
except for use at engineroom local control stations; see 46 CFR
113.30-20(d). The objections to the use of these portable headsets are:

a) Headsets are often not there when needed.

b) Headsets have been more prone to damage than fixed handsets.

c) Headsets introduce noise on the circuit because the earphone is

always on and acts as a microphone.

40
 d) Jack boxes frequently corrode and short the circuit contacts,
causing unreliable circuit operation.

A hard-wired (no jack) headset with a push-to-talk button, a watertight

storage/connection box, and a cut-out switch can overcome these objections
and may be accepted for use in locations with high background noise levels,
such as steering gear rooms.

5.4 Engine Order Telegraph (EOT). The engine order telegraph is a

communication system that is necessary under temporary emergency
conditions. Where an electric EOT is installed, 46 CFR 112.1S-1(h) is
applicable. Electric EOT systems must either be provided with an
independent storage battery source of backup power or be arranged so that
they can be energized from the temporary emergency power source.

NVIC 1-69 specifically allowed automated vessels with pilothouse control

to use a flush mounted, knob-type transmitter for the EOT on the bridge.
This was because the EOT was considered a "standby" device on a vessel with
pilothouse throttle control, and its orientation less critical. That NVIC
has been superseded by 46 CFR 62, which does not address EOT configuration
(there is no longer a conflict). 46 CFR 113.35 requires the EaT transmitter
in the wheelhouse to have a "handle.
1I The intent is to provide for rapid
visual determination of engine order from throughout the wheelhouse, and if
necessary, a determination by feel. This intent should be met by an EaT
considered a secondary or standby device, as well as an EaT used as a
primary control device. In most instances, this precludes consideration of
a flush mounted, knob-type transmitter as an equivalent arrangement.
Transmitters that provide rapid visual and tactile determination of orders,
such as some push-button type transmitters, may be evaluated for equivalency.

5.5 Emergency Loudspeaker Systems. Subpart 113.50 of the Electrical

Engineering Regulations requires an emergency loudspeaker system on each
ocean and coastwise passenger vessel certificated to carry 500 or more
persons, including officers and crew, and each passenger vessel that has
lifeboats stowed more than 100 feet (30.5 meters) from the navigating
bridge. The system permits two-way conversation between the navigating
bridge and each lifeboat or embarkation station. SaLAS Chapter III,
Regulation 6.4.1 requires an emergency means of two-way communication
between emergency control stations, muster and embarkation stations, and
strategic positions on board as part of the lifesaving arrangements for both
passenger and cargo ships.

A combined public address, music distribution, and emergency loudspeaker

system may be used for the system required by 113.50, provided the emergency
loudspeaker function is given priority. If a separate public address or
music system is used, a means to silence that system must be provided at the
emergency loudspeaker system control panel.

41
 6. Industrial Systems

6.1 Philosophy. Subpart 111.107 of the Electrical Engineering Regulations

states that systems on Mobile Offshore Drilling Units that are used solely
for the industrial function of the unit (drilling) may be considered as
industrial systems. Industrial systems need not be restricted to MODU's,
nor must they be related to petroleum exploration and exploitation
functions; the concept of industrial systems can be extended to systems
which serve only an industrial function on other types of vessels.
Subchapter F, Marine Engineering, 46 CFR 56.01-I(c), provides alternative
requirements for piping and pressure vessels in industrial systems on
MODUs. However, the Marine Safety Manual indicates that this can be
extended to other vessels in individual cases under the general equivalency
regulations if the designer prefers to meet the requirements of 58.60.
Similarly, 111.107 can be extended to other industrial systems. An example
of such an industrial system is the crane power generation and distribution
system on a craneship. Unlike the machinery (piping) design, the electrical
aspects of industrial systems are not covered by a registered professional
engineer's certification. Compliance with 46 CFR 111.107 must be
established by plan review and/or inspection.

6.2 Generators. Industrial systems may be provided with dedicated

generators or they may be supplied by the ship's service power distribution
system. Where any generat9r, installed or portable is tied to the main
switchboard so that it can be used to provide ship's service power, that
generator must be considered a ship's service generator. The generator and
switchboard regulations contained in 46 CFR Subparts 111.12 and 111.30 would
then be applicable, as would the requirements for fault current analysis and
(possibly) automatic load shedding. Dedicated industrial system generators,
including containerized generator sets which are not tied to the main
switchboard and have no provision to supply any ship's service loads, need,
from an electrical standpoint, only meet the general safety criteria of the
National Electrical Code and 46 CFR Subpart 111.107.

7. Hazardous Locations

7.1 General. Where flammable gases or vapors may be present, such as on

the drill floor of a Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit or in the pumproom of a
tankship, special precautions must be taken to ensure that electrical
equipment is not a source of ignition. Subpart 111.105 of the Electrical
Engineering Regulations contains the requirements for electrical equipment
and wiring in locations where fire or explosion hazards may exist. In these
locations, it is necessary to exercise more than ordinary care with regard
to the selection, installation, and maintenance of electrical equipment and
w~r~ng. A primary objective of design should be to minimize the amount of
electrical equipment installed in hazardous locations. Through the exercise
of ingenuity in the layout of electrical installations for hazardous
locations, it is frequently possible to locate much of the equipment in less
hazardous or in non-hazardous areas and thus reduce the amount of special
equipment and installations required.

42
 The Electrical Engineering Regulations incorporate by reference Articles
500 through 503 of the National Electrical Code, with the exceptions listed
in 46 CFR 111.105-5(a) through (d). An error is contained in 111.105-5(b),
which excepts all of NEC Section 501-4 from incorporation into the
regulations. By deleting these sections, it was intended to recognize that
shipboard installations use marine cable, not conduit. It was not the
intent to delete the statement that "Boxes, fittings and joints shall not be
required to be explosionproof except as required by sections 50l-3(b)(1),
501-6(b)(l) and 501-l4(b)(l)." Non-explosionproof equipment can be allowed
in accordance with the NEC.

7.2 Classification. National and international codes and regulations

classify materials and locations based upon the experimentally determined
properties of flammable vapors, gases, liquids, or combustible dusts or
fibers that may be present and the likelihood that a flammable or
combustible concentration or quantity is present. North American standards
identify,hazardous locations by Class and Division using the scheme
described in Tables 1 and 2. International standards (such as IEC Standard
79-10) use a different nomenclature, but their classification philosophy is
essentially the same.

For Class I locations, gases and vapors are divided into groups A, B, C,
or D, depending upon experimentally determined maximum explosion pressure,
maximum safe clearance between parts of a clamped joint in an enclosure, and
the minimum ignition temperature of the atmospheric mixture. For Class II
locations, dusts are divided into Groups E, F, and G, depending upon the
tightness of the joints of assembly and shaft openings for preventing
entrance of dust into the dust/ignition proof enclosure, the blanketing
effect of layers of dust on the equipment that may cause overheating,
electrical conductivity of the dust and the ignition temperature of the
dust. In general, equipment must be approved not only for the Class, but
also for the specific Group of the gas, vapor, or dust that may be present.
Flammable and combustible liquid cargoes may be further classified according
to their vapor pressure and flashpoint. These liquids may be assigned both
a Group and a Grade (Grade designation relates to flashpoint). In cases
where differing requirements apply or several different hazardous
atmospheres may be present, the most hazardous condition is presumed to
exist and the most restrictive requirements should be applied. Appendix 7
contains a list of electrical hazard Group classifications for bulk liquid
cargoes.

Once a specific location is classified, and specific materials that may

be present are identified, the permitted types of electrical equipment are
easily determined. For example, an area containing gasoline vapors would
require Class I, Group D equipment. Where vapors would be present under
normal conditions, the area would be a classified as Division 1, and
equipment must be suitable for use in a Class I, Division 1, Group D
location.

This classification system requires the use of some individual judgment,

especially in the designation of "Division." To promote consistency and
ensure safety, standard setting bodies and regulatory agencies have
developed detailed standards, recommended practices, codes, and regulations
applicable to specific situations.

43
Table 1

Classification of Properties of Hazard-Producinq Materials

Class I -- locations where flammable gases or vapors may be present. including:

Group A: Atmospheres containing acetylene.

Group B: Atmospheres such as butadiene, ethylene oxide. propylene oxide, acrolein. or
hydrogen (or gases or vapors equivalent in hazard to hydrogen)
Group C: Atmospheres such as cyclopropane, ethyl ether. ethylene, or gases or vapors of
equivalent hazard.
Group D: A~mospheres such as acetone, alcohol, ammonia, benzene, benzol, butane,
gasoline, hexane. lacquer solvent vapors, naphtha, natural gas, propane, or gases
or vapors of equivalent hazard.

Class II -- Locations where combustible dust may be present, including:

Group E: Atmospheres containing combustible metal dusts or other combustible dusts or

similarly hazardous characteristics.
Group F: Atmospheres containing combustible carbon black, charcoal, coal, or coke dusts.
Group G: Atmospheres containing combustible agricultural or plastic dusts.

Class III-locations where easily ignitable fibers or flyings. such as cotton fibers. sawdust. and
wood shavings. may be present.

Table 2

Classification of the Probability that Material May Be Present

in Flammable or Combustible Quantities

Division 1: Where material can exist under normal operating conditions. or frequently
(Zone n because of repair, maintenance, or leakage.

Division 2: Where material can exist under abnormal conditions (accidental rupture or
(Zone 2) breakdown, abnormal operations. etc.). or locations adjacent to a Division 1
location where material may occasionally be present.

Note: International standards and codes use the term "Zone instead of "Divisiori" and include
t

a "Zone O· d~ignation for locations where vapors are assumed to be present, such as inside a
tank or in a tankship pumproom. Although North American standards, such as the National
Electrical Code (NEC)do not include a comparable "Division O· designation, the Coast Guard's
Electrical Engin~ering Regulations achieve the same effect by limiting electrical installations in
these locations'to the type permitted for Zone 0 applications. i.e., intrinsically safe systems.

44
 7.3 Specific Hazardous Areas. Locations where flammable gases or vapors
." can exist on commercial V-e'sselsinclude battery rooms, paint lockers,
pumprooms and weather deck locations above cargo tanks on tank vessels, mud
pit rooms and the drill floor of MQbile Offshore Drilling Units, and
operating rooms where anesthetics are administered on passenger vessels and
hospital ships. Subpart 111.105 defines specific hazardous locations for
combustible liquid cargo vessels, flammable liquid cargo vessels, liquid
sulphur carriers" Lnor'ganfcv.acfd ltankships,bulk liquefied gas and ammonia
carriers, MODU' s , vessels 'carr)ringcoal,{and vessels (such as ferries and
RO-RO's) with spaces for the carriage of vehicles using gasoline or other
highly volatile motor fuels. Typical hazardous location classifications are
illustrated in Appendix 8.

The Electrical Engineering Regulations define particular areas to be

Division 1 or Division 2 locations; there is no "Division 0" in North
American practice comparable to the lEG Zone 0 designation. In the NEG,
spaces where the hazard is assumed to be present under normal conditions are
classified as Division 1 locations. There is no "higher" classification
(i.e., Division 0). Enclosed locations comparable to tank vessel pumprooms
typically do not exist in National Electrical Gode applications. On shore,
such installations are usually located in the weather, and spread-out over a
much larger area. In Coast Guard regulations, spaces comparable to "Zone 0"
locations such as pumprooms on tank vessels, while not given a Division 0 or
Zone 0 designation, are permitted only limited electrical equipment (i.e.
explosionproof lights, intrinsically safe systems, and cables) similar to
IEC Zone 0 requirements.

Combustible liquids (see definition in 46 CFR 30.10-15) are often

referred to as Grade D and Grade E cargoes. Similarly, flammable liquids
(defined in 46 CFR 30.10-22) may be classified as Grade A, B, or G cargoes.
Due to the high flashpoints of Grade E liquids, vessels carrying only Grade
E cargoes need only meet the requirements of 46 CFR 111.105-29 for
combustible liquid cargo carriers. The requirements of 111.105-31 apply to
vessels carrying Grades A-D cargoes, as well as liquid sulphur and inorganic
acids. Flammable hydrogen sulfide gas evolves from liquid sulphur, and many
inorganic acids produce hydrogen gas when in contact with a number of common
construction metals.

On MODUs, a specific classification for crude oil cannot always be

given, since crude is a mixture of widely varying hydrocarbons. Locations
are usually, however, designated Group D due to the presence of natural
gas. Hydrogen sulfide, which is frequently encountered during drilling
operations, has a Group C designation. Drilling operators often utilize
electrical equipment that is suitable for both hazard groups G and D,
especially when this equipment is readily available, and there is no
economic penalty. It should not be inferred from the presence of some Group
C equipment that the area has been classified as a Group C area. A Group D
classification should be adequate when drilling in a region where the known
or suspected mixture of hydrogen sulfide and natural gas is less than 25
percent hydrogen sulfide (by volume). This is in accord with the
recommendations of the American Petroleum Institute's "Recommended Practice
for Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at

45
 "

Drilling Rigs and Production Facilities on Land and on Marine Fixed and
Mobile Platforms," API RP 500B, Third Edition, October 1, 1987.

Coal carriers and vessels carrying bulk grain and other agricultural
products may be subject to dust explosion hazards. Just as with flammable
gas or vapor explosions, the initial ignition source of a dust explosion may
be a small spark or flame. However, an initial explosion may dislodge
settled dust from the surrounding areaiwhich,may thenbe\ignlted by the
residual energy to cause a second and larger explosion~ Undispersed dust
which has accumulated in layers will not explode but may burn or char,
generating heat which may ignite dispersed dust. NEC Article 502 lists the
primary hazards which must be avoided as the admission of dusts into
electrical equipment enclosures, reaching the heat of ignition due to the
insulating characteristics of accumulated dust, and the formation of current
paths of conductive dusts.

Explosion hazards due to agricultural dusts are not specifically

addressed in the Electrical Engineering Regulations. However, 46 CFR
111.105-17 and 111.105-35 do give the requirements for electrical
installations in Class II locations and specific requirements for vessels
carrying coal. NVIC 9-84 "Electrical Installations in Agricultural Dust
Locations further defines the classification of hazardous areas due to
ll

agricultural dusts. It must be remembered that the enclosure protection

method is different for dust than it is for a gas or vapor, and that "dust
ignitionproof" and "explosionproof" are two different concepts. For a dust,
the enclosure keeps dust out and does not build-up excessive temperatures
when blanketed with dust. For a vapor, the enclosure allows vapor to enter
and be ignited, yet prevents the internal explosion from propagating to the
surrounding atmosphere. Equipment acceptable for use in a dust atmosphere
is not generally suitable for use in a gas atmosphere, and vice-versa.

Vessels carrying coal may be subject to the double hazard of explosive

gas as well as explosive dust. Freshly mined coal releases methane gas that
had been contained within the pores of the coal. Release of methane can
continue for days and even weeks after the coal is mined. If freshly mined
coal is stored in an enclosed space, such as a bunker or closed hold on a
ship, this methane may collect in sufficient quantity to cause an explosion.

Battery rooms and paint stowage or mixing spaces must meet the
electrical requirements pf 46 CFR 111.15 and 111.105-43, respectively. The
regulations do not explicitly state that these spaces are defined as
hazardous. However, equipment within these spaces must be suitable for
installation in Division 1 locations. The hazardous locations are
considered to exist only inside these spaces; the regulations do not define
a hazardous area as extending any specific radius from doors, hatches, or
other openings into these spaces. The use of only explosionproof or
intrinsically safe electrical equipment and the avoidance of open flames and
sparking near such openings is, however, strongly recommended.

The Electrical Engineering Regulations require armored or mineral

insulated cable for most installations in hazardous locations. Unarmored
cable is permitted for intrinsically safe systems, portable equipment,
applications requiring flexible cable, and in Division 2 locations.

46
Industrial systems may use an armored type cable construction, but the
cable must also meet the installation and flammability test requirements of
46 CFR 111.107-1(b) if it penetrates a deck or bulkhead. Conduit systems
that meet the applicable requirements of the NEC provide an equivalent level
of safey and can be permitted.

The minimum safety requirements for electrical equipment located in

spaces intended for the stowage of vehicles with gasoline in their tanks and
batteries connected are contained in 46 CFR 111.105-39. These requirements
apply to spaces designated as "specially suitable for vehiclesfl on passenger
and cargo vessels. A deck, for the purposes of 46 CFR 111.105-39(b), is any
deck or platform for vehicles that has sufficient solid surface area to
cause the accumulation of petroleum vapors or spilled liquid. Where a
vehicle deck or platform is perforated with openings, the next lower space
must also comply with 111.105-39. Cable trays, wiring, lighting fixtures,
and other electrical equipment must not be located directly under any such
openings.

It should be noted that SOLAS 11-2/37.1.6, 37.2.2, and 37.3.2 contain

somewhat different requirements for ventilation and precautions against
ignition of flammable vapors in special category spaces", wh i.chare those
11

vehicle stowage spaces on passenger vessels normally accessible to

passengers. Regulations 38.3 and 38.4 address these issues for other
vehicle cargo spaces on passenger vessels. Similarly, SOLAS 11-2/53.2.3 and
53.2.4 state the ventilation and ignition prevention requirements for
vehicle spaces on cargo vessels, including RO/RO spaces. While 46 CFR
111.105-39 is considered to provide sufficient minimum requirements for the
prevention of ignition by electrical equipment, closed spaces for fueled
vehicles should be provided with ventilation per ABS Section 35.157.1 and
SOLAS 11-2/53.2.3.

Questions frequently arise concerning the acceptability of electric heat

tracing in hazardous locations. Heat tracing is permitted in Division 2
locations by NEC Article 50l-l0(b)(1). Since the NEC requires wiring in
Division 1 locations to be in conduit, it does not recognize heat tracing
cable installations in Division 1 locations. However, since shipboard
Division 1 installations use cable, not conduit, and Subchapter J does not
reference the NEC for Division-l wiring methods, electric heat tracing may
be used in Class I Division 1 locations. The heating cable must not exceed
80% of the autoignition temperature in degrees Celsius of any gas or vapor
involved on any surface which is exposed to the gas or vapor, when
continuously energized at the maximum rated ambient temperature. Any
thermostats, controllers, power supplies, and other associated equipment
must be provided with enclosures approved for Class I Division I locations
or be located outside of the designated hazardous areas.

Hazardous area drawings and a corresponding bill of materials are

normally reviewed by the Marine Safety Center, or cognizant OCMI, prior to
the installation of any electrical equipment in a hazardous location.
Hazardous area drawings and equipment lists should be maintained to reflect
the current arrangement and inventory of electrical equipment in those
locations.

A proper hazardous area drawing is an arrangement plan showing the

boundaries and classification of all hazardous areas, and the location of

47
 " .,

all electrical equipment in those areas. It should be accompanied by a bill

of material or equipment list that identifies each item by manufacturer,
model number, and Class and Group for which approved, and should provide
evidence of approval by a nationally recognized testing laboratory. In
addition, the operating temperature of the electrical equipment must not
exceed the autoignition temperature of the gases or vapors likely to be
present. Confirmation of equipment temperature is usually beyond plan
review capabilities, since it is not usually provided in approval listings.
This information is, however, required to be placed on the label of
explosionproof equipment in the form of an operating temperature
identification code number on the equipment if the temperature exceeds 100
degrees C. (see Table 3). Normally, the only equipment installed in
hazardous locations having a temperature code will be incandescent lighting
fixtures and motors. When such equipment is used in a machinery space, a 50
degrees C. ambient is assumed. The labeled operating temperature is usually
referenced to a 40 degree G. ambient. Unless the equipment has thermally
actuated sensors which limit the operating temperature to that specified on
the label, equipment used in high ambient temperature locations should be
derated.

NVIC 8-84, "Recommendations for the Submittal of Merchant Vessel Plans

and Specifications" provided additional guidance on hazardous area
submittals. Appendix 8 contains a suggested plan review check-off list for
electrical installations in hazardous locations.

7.4 Eguipment~ Specific requirements for electrical equipment in hazardous

locations are contained in 46 CFR 111.105. In that subpart, certain
equipment is required to be listed by Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (UL),
Factory Mutual Research Corp. (FM), or other independent laboratory
recognized by the Commandant (G-MTH-2) for use in the hazardous location in
which it is located. "Listed" means equipment included in a list published
by an independent test laboratory acceptable to the Commandant and concerned
with product evaluation, that maintains periodic inspection of listed
equipment and whose listing states either that the equipment meets
appropriate standards or has been tested and found suitable for use in a
specified manner. The Canadian Standards Association (GSA) is also
recognized for explosionproof and intrinsically safe certification. Also
acceptable is intrinsically safe equipment tested and labeled by MET
Electrical Testing Company.

The following general considerations apply to equipment selection and

installation:

a. Division 1 equipment is satisfactory for Division 2 applications

with the same Class and Group. Note that the explosionproof equipment
label may not say "Division 1." If the label says it is suitable for
Class I Group (__ ) locations, it means it is suitable for both Division
I and Division 2 locations.

b. NEG Section 501-3(b)(I) requires devices in Class I, Division 2

locations, with make-and-break contacts to be within an enclosure
approved for Class I, Division 1 locations or to be in a general-purpose
enclosure with the current interrupting contacts either immersed in oil,
enclosed in a hermetically sealed chamber, or in only nonincendive

48
 circuits. Examples of make-and-break contacts include relays, circuit
breakers, servo-potentiometers, adjustable resistors, switches,
connectors, and motor brushes. A nonincendive circuit is a circuit in
which any arc or thermal effect produced under intended operating
conditions of the equipment is not capable of igniting the specified
flammable gas or vapor-air mixture. A hermetically sealed device is one
which is manufactured so that it is completely seal.ed against entrance
of an external atmosphere and in which the seal is made by soldering,
brazing, welding, or fusion of'glass, or the like.

c. NEC Section sOl-3(b)(2) permits general-purpose enclosures to be

used in Class I, Division 2 locations for resistance devices and similar
equipment used with meters, instruments, and relays provided such
equipment is without make-and-break or sliding contacts and the maximum
operating temperature of any exposed surface will not exceed 80% of the
ignition temperature of the gas or vapor involved.

d. Belt drives are acceptable if the belt is conductive and the

equipment is grounded in accordance with NFPA 77. Acceptable belts have
a resistance of approximately 6 megohms or less over an eight inch
length, as determined by an industry standard test procedure, and are
commonly designated as "static conductive. 1I

e. Cables must not be located in any tanks containing flammable or

combustible liquids, except to supply equipment or instrumentation
specifically designed for, and compatible with, such location, and whose
function requires installation in that location.

f. Vent ducts have the same classification as the space they serve.
Fans for ventilating hazardous locations must be nonsparking; see 46 CFR
110.ls-1(b)(16) for the definition of nonsparking. Nonsparking
construction is not generally indicated by an independent laboratory
listing, and must usually be verified by review and/or inspection. Vent
fan motors must either be approved for the hazardous location or located
outside the duct, 10 feet from the duct termination, in a non-hazardous
area.

g. Alloys of aluminum, magnesium, and titanium, when struck by rusty

steel, react with the iron oxide to produce a highly exothermic
"thermite reaction." Care must be taken to provide adequate physical
separation and/or surface coatings where these metals are used in moving
components around steel.

7.5 International Standards. Electrical installations in hazardous

locations must comply with 46 CFR 111.105, including those portions of the
National Electrical Code, NFPA standards, and ISA standards referenced in
that subpart. Compliance with recognized international standards, such as
those of the International Electrotechnical Commission, may be acceptable
for temporary industrial installations aboard MOnU's. (See Appendix 11 for
guidance.)

7.6 Protection Types. The various methods by which electrical and

electronic equipment is made safe for use in hazardous areas may be divided

49
into two major categories: (1) protection by enclosure or other physical
separation between the electrical equipment and the hazardous atmosphere;
and (2) protection by electrical design (making the circuitry unlikely to
produce ignition of the hazardous atmosphere.) Examples of the first
category include explosionproof and purged and pressurized enclosures, as
well as oil immersion. The second category includes the intrinsically safe
and nonincendive safety techniques.

Ignition-protection is another type of protection by design.

Ignition-protected devices are intended for use aboard recreational boats
and uninspected vessels in enclosed spaces that may occasionally contain
gasoline vapors. They meet the testing requirements of UL 1500, which are
not as stringent as those for explosionproof or intrinsically safe
equipment. Ignition-protected equipment is not suitable for use in
hazardous locations on inspected vessels other than oil recovery vessels.

7.7 Intrinsic Safety and Nonincendive Systems. For low power applications,
such as instrumentation, control, and operation of solenoid valves, the use
of intrinsically safe and nonincendive systems can reduce the likelihood of
fire or explosion due to the ignition of flammable gas mixtures by
electrical arcs or high temperatures. However, safety depends on their
proper application, as these two forms of protection are not equal.

Section 501-3 of the NEC states: In Class 1, Division 2 locations,

switches, circuit breakers, and make-and-break contacts ...shall have
enclosures approved for Class 1, Division I locations ...EXCEPTION:
General-purpose enclosures shall be permitted, if current-interrupting
contacts are ...in circuits that under normal conditions (emphasis added) do
not release sufficient energy to ignite a specific ignitable atmospheric
mixture, i.e., are nonincendive. The word Itnonincendivelt means that under
the conditions specified, there is insufficient energy to cause ignition.
Nonincendive systems are only permitted in Division 2 and non-hazardous
locations.

Nonincendive circuits are similar to intrinsically safe circuits, but no

fault conditions or safety factors are applied, as the existence of a
hazardous atmosphere in a Division 2 location is itself considered a fault
condition.

In the past, much of the nonincendive circuitry that found its way into
Division 2 locations was neither designed nor intended for use in hazardous
locations. Only when a Division 2 application arose for a specific item was
the circuit examined to see if it was nonincendive. Regulatory bodies
typically reviewed manufacturer's analyses to see if voltage and current
levels fell below the appropriate ignition curve with a reasonable margin of
safety. If they did, the circuit was accepted to be nonincendive.

Today, much of the equipment installed in Division 2 locations has been

designed to be nonincendive. This is especially true of sophisticated
electronic equipment used in the drilling industry. Furthermore,
manufacturers are recognizing the value of independent third-party
approvals. In North America, standard setting bodies, such as the
Instrument Society of America, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., and the
Canadian Standards Association, have published or are presently developing

50
safety standards for nonincendive equipment. Third-party certification
agencies are using these standards to evaluate and list or label
nonincendive equipment. Listed or labeled equipment provides the end user
with a greater degree of confidence that the nonincendive equipment has been
properly evaluated and will not present.an unnecessary risk of fire or
explosion. However, manufacturer certification of nonincendive circuits is
acceptable; certification by a third-party testing agency is not required,
and many acceptable nonincendive circuits bear no label or other marking by
these agencies.

Section 500-2 of the 1987 NEG states: "Equipment and associated wiring
approved as intrinsically safe shall be permitted in any hazardous
(classified) location for which it is approved ...Intrinsically safe
equipment and wiring shall not be capable of releasing sufficient electrical
or thermal energy under normal or abnormal (emphasis added) conditions to
cause ignition of a specific flammable or combustible atmospheric mixture in
its most easily ignitable concentration. " Additional guidance on
intrinsically safe installations is expected to be included in Article 504
of the 1990 NEG.

Intrinsically safe systems are permitted in all hazardous locations

(Division 1, Division 2, as well as lEG Zone 0), provided they are approved
for the proper hazard group.

Intrinsically safe portable battery-powered equipment, such as

walkie-talkies and combustible gas detectors, are evaluated based on their
internal circuity. However, equipment that is interconnected to other
equipment, such as to the vessel's electrical system, is evaluated on a
system basis. Since evaluations for intrinsic safety consider failure
modes, faults in connected apparatus such as power supplies, meters, and
recorders (regardless of their location, i.e., hazardous or non-hazardous)
may affect energy levels in the circuit, and are fully evaluated.

In determining available energy levels, abnormal conditions include

opening, shorting, and grounding of wires connected to the enclosures in
the intrinsically safe portion of the system. In North America, two
"reasonable" simultaneous faults are considered in assessing available
electrical and thermal energy. Industry standards give detailed criteria
for determining reasonable failure modes. Evaluations usually involve an
in-depth circuit analysis, supplemented by actual ignition testing.

Intrinsically safe systems and portable equipment must be tested and

approved for the intended application by a nationally recognized testing
laboratory (currently UL, FM, GSA, or MET). For installed systems, listing
reports should be reviewed to ensure that restrictions placed upon the
equipment by the certification agency are recognized in the installation.
In general, switches and other simple devices which do not store energy can
be in hazardous locations when used with approved intrinsic safety (Zener)
barriers that limit the energy in the circuit.

Safety also depends on proper installation. It is necessary to ensure

that the system is connected correctly and that unsafe energy levels are not
induced in intrinsically safe circuits by nearby non-intrinsically safe
circuits. In evaluating intrinsically safe systems, it is important to know
the restrictions imposed by the certification agency, and to have the

51
 ·.
I

installation information available that verifies that the restrictions, such

as installed cable impedance, have been met. The following installation
requirements should be followed:

a. Cables for use in intrinsically safe installations should meet the

standards of 46 CFR 111.105-15(b). However, since intrinsically safe
circuits are inherently power limited, cable constructions other than
those specified in 111.60 may be accepted, provided the cable has an
adequate voltage rating. Many specialty cable types, which are not
constructed to meet the standards referenced in 46 CFR 111.60, are used
in intrinsically safe circuits, particularly in industrial systems such
as down-hole well testing instrumentation. Flame propagation is a
concern with any cable which penetrates a deck or bulkhead. If a
particular cable type is self-extinguishing, but cannot comply with the
IEEE-45 or IEC 332-3 (Cat. A) fire tests, then it may be run singly (not
in or near bundles or cable trays with other cables).

b. Equipment in weather locations must be made watertight.

c. Cable insulation must be compatible with the environment. Some

installations may be in cargo tanks.

d. As a general rule, conductors should be no smaller than #18.

e. Cables for intrinsically safe systems must be isolated from other

cables to prevent compromise due to induction or insulation breakdown.
This is to be accomplished by maintaining two inch spacing, or by using
grounded metal barriers or shielded cable.

f. At a termination, intrinsically safe circuits must be isolated from

other intrinsically safe circuits, other low-energy level circuits, and
all power circuits (see ISA RP 12.6).

g. More than one intrinsically safe circuit of the same system may be
run in a multiconductor cable (see ISA RP 12.6).

h. Cables containing conductors for intrinsically safe systems must not

contain conductors of non-intrinsically safe systems.

i. In general, an intrinsically safe barrier should be located in a

non-hazardous location. If it is in a hazardous location, the barrier
itself must be suitable for the location.

j. Energy storing equipment must be explicitly approved by the

certification agency when used with a barrier.

k. Passive devices that do not store energy, such as switches,

thermocouples, resistances, and LED's may be connected to barriers
without further certification, provided they are not part of a unit
containing other electrical circuits.

For low power applications, intrinsically safe systems offer advantages

over "add-on" protection, such as explosionproof or purged and pressurized
enclosures. Intrinsic safety is not jeopardized by a missing or loose bolt,
a scratched flange, an unpoured cable seal, a stuck interlock, or mechanical

52
damage. The intrinsically safe circuit is less maintenance dependent and
provides a lifetime of protection with relatively little care.

Although the Electrical Engineering Regulations reference the 1976

edition of ISA RP12.6 for cables in intrinsically safe systems, that
standard may also be used for other aspects of intrinsically safe
installations. The guidelines of the 1987 revision of this standard may
also be followed. This later edition contains information on the
combination of intrinsically safe apparatus under the entity concept, which
allows users to determine acceptable combinations of intrinsically safe
apparatus and connected associated apparatus that have not been tested and
approved for interconnection in such combination. This· approach requires
each intrinsically safe apparatus to have a control drawing that specifies
parameters for the selection of the associated apparatus. The control
drawing is provided by the manufacturer of the intrinsically safe or
associated apparatus to specify the allowed interconnections between the
intrinsically safe and associated apparatus.

7.8 Purged or Pressurized Equipment.· Purged or pressurized equipment and

enclosures are permitted by the Electrical Engineering Regulations (46 CFR
Subchapter J) for the protection of hazardous area equipment. The
regulations require that this type of equipment be constructed to the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 496, Purged and
Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment.

Purged or pressurized systems pressurize the atmosphere within an

enclosure with a non-hazardous gas (usually air from a non-hazardous
location), thereby preventing the hazardous atmosphere from coming in
contact with electrical equipment within the enclosure.

The NFPA standard addresses pressurized instrumentation and other small

enclosures in Class I locations, power equipment enclosures in Class I
locations, pressurized instruments and other small enclosures in Class II
locations, and pressurized power equipment in Class II locations.

The standard defines pressurization and purging as follows:

Pressurization: The process of supplying an enclosure with clean

air or an inert gas with or without continuous flow at sufficient
pressure to prevent the entrance of combustible dusts.

Purging: The process of supplying an enclosure with clean air or

inert gas at sufficient flow and positive pressure to reduce to an
acceptably safe level the concentration of any flammable gas or
vapor initially present and to maintain this safe level by positive
pressure with or without positive flow.

There are three types of purging protection in NFPA 496, Type X, Y, and
Z:

~ Z purging reduces the classification within an enclosure from

Division 2 to nonhazardous. With type Z purging, a hazard is
created only if the purge system fails at the same time that the
normally nonhazardous areas become hazardous. For this reason, it

53
 is not considered essential to remove power from the equipment upon
failure of the purge system.

~ X purging reduces the classification within an enclosure from

Division 1 to Division 2. The equipment and devices within the
enclosure must be suitable for Division 2. This requires that the
enclosure not contain an ignition source under normal conditions.
Thus, a hazard is created within the enclosure only upon
simultaneous failure of the purge system and of the equipment
within the enclosure. For this reason, it is not considered
essential to remove power from the equipment upon failure of the
purge system.

~ K purging reduces the classification within an enclosure from

Division I to nonhazardous. Because the probability of a hazardous
atmosphere external to the enclosure is high and the enclosure
normally contains a source of ignition, such as a hot element or
arcing contact, it is important that any interruption of the
purging results in deenergizing the equipment. Also, it is
essential that the enclosure be tight enough to prevent the escape
of sparks. When type X purging is used in purged power equipment
enclosures in Class I locations, power to the equipment should be
immediately removed upon loss of pressurization, unless immediate
loss of power would result in a more hazardous condition, such as
not allowing for the safe shutdown of a process or system.

The NFPA standard presents some diagrams of acceptable installations for

Types X, Y and Z purging. These diagrams are shown in Figure 7.

The NFPA standard requires that a nameplate be mounted on the enclosure

in a prominent location so that it can be seen before someone opens the
enclosure. The nameplate should contain the following statement (or
equivalent):

"Enclosure shall not be opened unless the area is known to be

nonhazardous or unless all devices within have been deenergized. Power
shall not be restored after enclosure has been opened until enclosure
has been purged for minutes." (Note: The blank must be filled-in
by the manufacturer with the proper purge time.)

It is apparent from this requirement that purged or pressurized

enclosures should be designed in such a manner that normal operation of the
equipment does not require that the enclosure be opened. Therefore,
openings'in the enclosures for inserting computer disks or slots for
computer printouts and normal procedures that require the enclosure to be
opened to retrieve data or take readings is not acceptable.

All three types of purging require the warning nameplate. Type X

purging generally requires an interlock which immediately deenergizes all
circuits which are not suitable for Division 1 areas. Type Y purging does
not require an interlock but requires an alarm which operates when the
enclosure is opened. Type Y is suitable for Division 1 if the internal
components are suitable for Division 2. Type Z purging is suitable for
Division 2 and requires an alarm, but does not place restrictions on
internal components.

54
 Typical Type X Purging

pressure or
flowa<tuat~
cutoff switch

purge
supply

Typical Type Y and Type Z Purging

pr~~ur~ or
flow .,larm
aeluator

flow
in<1icalof

p<~wr~or
flow aeluator

P<.1f9~ p(oM~Ur~ or
\upply flow ..larm
.a(tu .. tor Of
indiutor

FIGURE 7

55
 Purged or pressurized equipment may be used in lieu of explosionproof •
equipment for all hazardous locations. Purged or pressurized equipment may
not be used as a substitute for intrinsically safe apparatus. Purged or
pressurized systems need not be approved by an independent testing agency,
but are reviewed and approved fot' the, pa1:'ticular application during vessel
plan review.

Special care must be taken to ensure that the protective gas is from a
nonhazardous source and cannot be contaminated by a hazardous source. Vent
fan operation should be monitored by air flow, not simply by motor
operation. Where it is necessary to open a purged or pressurized enclosure,
as for maintenance or repair, gas detection equipment may be required to
ensure that a flammable atmosphere does not become trapped within the
enclosure.

Although the Electrical Engineering Regulations cite the 1974 edition of

NFPA 496, the guidelines of the 1982 revision of this standard may he used.
The revised standard recognizes the use of purged control rooms in Class I
locations and pressurized control rooms in Class II locations. The
requirements for control rooms may be used both for spaces which are
structurally part of the vessel and for containerized compartments such as
may be used for industrial functions aboard a MODU.

Compressed air operated lighting fixtures (turbine lights) are both

powered and purged by the air supply. These fixtures are acceptable for use
in cargo handling rooms.

7.9 Explosionproof Equipment. When electrical equipment is installed where

flammable gases and vapors may be present, an "explosionproof" enclosure may
be used to allow the equipment to operate safely. The explosionproof
enclosure concept recognizes that flammable gases and vapors may enter the
enclosure, and assumes that a source of ignition will create an internal
explosion. The enclosure is designed to withstand the explosion and prevent
it from propagating to the hazardous atmosphere surrounding the enclosure.
Explosionproof enclosures are not designed to be gastight, but are normally
intended to "breath." Flammable gases or vapors may enter an enclosure as
it breathes due to changes in atmospheric pressure, ambient temperature, or
both. Conversely, gastight equipment is not explosionproof.

Explosionproof enclosures usually have cov~rs which can be removed or

opened for making connections and adjustments, and for maintenance. The
dimension of the gap between an enclosure's flanges and metal-to-metal
joints determine its effectiveness. An explosion will propagate through
this gap if the gap's width is greater than the maximum experimental safe
gap (MESG). If the gap is less than the MESG, the velocity of the emerging
jet of hot gases and the velocity of the external gases mixing with the jet
are so great that cooling takes place and ignition cannot occur. When the
hot gases from an explosion pass through this region, some energy is
absorbed by the expansion of gases (refrigeration effect), and some energy
is absorbed by hot gases mixing with cool gases outside of the enclosure. A
sufficient amount of energy must be transferred from the hot gases to the
surrounding air or enclosure; otherwise, an explosion will occur.

56
 O"'y~dva_&
•• CCII,", iftNl Itt.
He:corclo ... A,,,,o.pf..,,,,
."..

i~{':'&'~t;(.t~&~~'i;l
"',.rnol Hot flaming
Pre" ..,. ~o, ••
THREADED JOINT ~ FLANGED JOIN T

FIGURE 8 9
FIGURE

Several explosionproof enclosure cover types are used, depending on

their application. The most simple and effective cover is a threaded joint
(see Figure 8). When an explosion occurs, the cover threads are forced
tight against the body threads. Hot gases are cooled as they spiral along
these threads. A gasket under the cover's flange is located outside of the
cooling region and does not interfere with the metal-to-metal contact of the
threads. Other types of enclosure openings or accesses include flanged
covers (See Figure 9) and cylindrically shaped openings. These enclosures
use precision machined metal-to-metal joints which provide a straight path
from inside the enclosure to the outside atmosphere. During an explosion,
numerous cover screws prevent flange and enclosure distortion.
Explosionproof equipment in weather locations must be made watertight or
waterproof. Explosionproof enclosures are not normally designed to be
watertight. In making these enclosures watertight, care should be taken
that there is not interference with the flame-quenching surfaces and that
gaskets are external to these surfaces.

When a flame ignites a gas, it may result in an explosion which causes a

large increase in pressure. Due to the rapid increase in pressure, less
energy is required for further ignition and flame propagation. An explosion
occurs rapidly, causing a front between burned and unburned compressed gas.
If the expanding gas is restricted, channeled, or impeded, pressure piling
will occur. Pressures can occur which are ten times higher than pressures
which occur when there is no impediment to expansion. Pressure piling is
particularly serious in pipes and conduit. To reduce the effects of
pressure piling, cable seal fittings must be installed within eighteen
inches of the enclosure for each conduit. Where two explosionproof
enclosures are connected and located less than 36 inches apart, only one
seal is necessary in the conduit between them.

57
 Equipment which is required by the Electrical Engineering Regulations to
be explosionproof must be specifically tested and approved by a nationally
recognized testing laboratory (UL, FM, and CSA are presently acceptable) for
use in a Class I Division 1 location and the group of the hazard present, and
be labeled as such.

In typical test programs, the enclosure is placed in a test chamber which

has explosion pressure-recording devices attached to it. Both the enclosure
and the chamber are charged with a specified gas. The gas inside the
enclosure is ignited, and the resulting explosion is observed for propagation
to the surrounding chamber's atmosphere. The explosion tests are repeated
over the entire explosive range of the gas or vapor's fuel-air mixture. The
enclosure must withstand the internal pressure from the explosion without
bursting or loosening its jotnts. Explosion damage to equipment inside the
enclosure must not occur during testing unless the damaged equipment can
readily be replaced. All tests are conducted using maximum loads, short
circuit, or worst case conditions. Typically, ten tests are conducted over
the entire flammable range for each device. Enclosures are usually tested for
a period of one (1) minute using a hydrostatic pressure based on the maximum
observed internal explosion pressure. Seals must withstand for one (1) minute
a hydrostatic test pressure of four times the maximum explosion pressure.

Equipment which generates heat is evaluated to ensure that its surface

temperature is not high enough to cause autoignition of the surrounding
hazardDus atmosphere. North American practice recognizes 14 temperature
ratings for Class I locations. The Class I temperature ratings are listed in
NEC Table SOO-3(b) and the Class II temperature limits are in NEC Section
SOO-3(d). The Class I temperature ratings are included in Table 3 for
convenience.

TABLE 3
NEC ART. 500 - TABLE 500-3(b)

MAX. TEMP.
·c ·F H.ARJ:ING

450 842 T 1
300 572 T 2
280 536 T 2 A
260 500 T 2 B
230 446 T 2 C
215 419 T 2 D
200 392 T 3
180 356 T 3 A
165 329 T 3 B
160 320 T 3 C
135 275 T 4
120 248 T 4 A
100 212 T 5 *
85 185 T 6 *
Marking .ball not exceed auto ignition temp. of the atmo.phere encountered.

* Kon-heat
be aarked.
producing equipment. and that vith a temp. of IOO·C or lea., need not

58
 Flame arresters are sometimes used in explosionproof enclosures to reduce
maximum explosion pressure and to prot~ct any incoming air lines. Types of
flame arresters include porous metal plugs made of sintered metal, a
baffle-type breather similar to an automobile muffler, a special fitting with
a loosely fitted thread, and a spiral wound corrugated metal fitting. These
configurations causes the flame to spread through paths which cool the gases
by heat transfer to the metal from the atmosphere or make the escaping
explosion's hot gases turn sharp corners, allowing them to cool.

Explosionproof receptacles and plugs are designed as a pair. Mechanical

interlocking is used between the plug and receptacle. When a plug is
inserted, electrical contact cannot be made until the mated plug and
receptacle assembly has established its explosionproof integrity. To prevent
explosions from propagating. many threads are usually engaged before
electrical contact is made or broken.

An explosionproof enclosure is not effective without sealed conductor

entrances. Seal fittings allow an explosion to be contained within an
enclosure, prevent pressure piling, and prevent the transmission of gases or
vapors between enclosed electrical systems installed in Division I, Division
2, and ordinary locations. Seal fittings are usually attached by a short
piece of rigid conduit to an enclosure for switches, circuit breakers, fuses,
relays, resistors, or other apparatus which may produce arcs, sparks, or a
high temperature. Not more than eighteen (18) inches of pipe or rigid conduit
may be used, and at least five (5) full nipple threads must be engaged at each
end. Explosionproof unions, couplings, elbows, capped elbows, and conduit
bodies are the only permitted fittings between the sealing fitting and the
enclosure. All such components, including the seal fitting and seal compound,
must be approved by the testing laboratory for the intended purpose. Seal
fittings are either shop fabricated or poured in the field. The cable gland
(shown in Figure 10) is a relatively new type of seal. Use of a cable gland
allows for a cable to be assembled in a clean shop environment and for simple
field connection and installation. A more traditional sealing method uses a
"poured" seal (See Figure 11) which is completed in the field. The seal is
poured after the cables have been brought into the enclosure. Mineral
insulated cables require a different type of explosionproof seal fitting than
shipboard marine cables.

Alterations to explosionproof equipment may destroy explosionproof

protection. Explosionproof enclosures are approved for certain applications,
such as the installation of terminal strips, relays, etc., and may be
internally modified to meet these intended applications within the limits
specified in the approval. Explosionproof assemblies may not be modified in
any way. Enclosure modifications must are limited so that they do not affect
piling from internal volume changes, impair flame-quenching paths and
surfaces, or reduce enclosure structural strength. Alterations different
from the configuration as tested by UL, FM, CSA, or other approved
laboratories, void the approval.

Equipment which is certified for a hazardous location should usually be

repaired by a qualified facility_ Product certification agencies usually
qualify repair facilities that have demonstrated their knowledge, expertise,
and capability to repair explosionproof equipment. Each facility is qualified
to repair specific types of equipment such as motors, generators, telephones,
etc.

59
 • "

ARMOR
EQUIPMENT ClAMPING
OR BOX RING
AR110R CABLE
CONE

FERRULE

CABLE GLAND

FIGURE 10

60
 EX:P LOS ION PROOF
~-ENCLOSURE

NIPPLE

EXPLOSIONPROOF
SEAL COMPOUND

PACKING

SEAL

SEAL

ARMORED CABLE

FIGURE 11

When the explosionproof equipment is repaired, a label is usually affixed

to indicate that the equipment conforms to the same rules which applied when
it was new. The following guidelines can be used to maintain explosionproof
equipment:

1. All cover screws and bolts must always be tight while circuits are
alive. Leaving one screw or bolt loose can render equipment unsafe.
Bolts or screw types other than those provided with the equipment should
not be used.

2. Hammers and other tools must not be allowed to damage threaded joints
or flat machined surfaces of flanged joints. All surfaces that form part
of a flame path must be protected from scratches and other mechanical
defects.

3. Flange surfaces and threaded joints should be cleaned free of old

grease and other foreign materials. A light oil film or lubricant should
be applied to both sides of the joint immediately before assembly. When
reassembling, there should be no foreign particles on joint surfaces.

61
 4. Threaded covers, flat joints, surfaces, rotating shafts, bearings, and
operating shafts should be lubricated to protect against corrosion. \
Abrasives or files should never be used to remove corrosion products from
threaded or flanged joints. Equipment which is corroded should be
replaced.

5. Explosionproof equipment must not be modified, except as allowed by

the approval laboratory, and the equipment nameplate should not be
obscured.

It should be mentioned that encapsulation, often called "potting," is not

considered equivalent to explosionproof protection and is not a recognized
method of protection for electrical equipment in hazardous locations. While
embedding a component in a solid or semi-solid material such as plastic,
epoxy, ceramic, or wax may effectively isolate an ignition source from the
surrounding flammable atmosphere, there are currently no recognized standards
for encapsulation for safety purposes. In some circumstances, potting can
increase the risk of ignition.

8. Wire and Cable

8.1 General. A wire is a conductor with functional insulation only, for use
inside an enclosure. A cable consists of one or more insulated conductors
provided with a protective covering of either a watertight metallic sheath or
an impervious non-metallic sheath compatible with the insulation. Most
shipboard wiring is accomplished using multiconductor cable.

Wire and conduit may be used for shipboard wiring. However, Due to the
high cost, labor-intensive installation, susceptibility to corrosion, and
problems with flexing hull structures, conduit is rarely used. Where it is
used, the installation requirements of the NEC should be followed (i.e.,
requirements for sizes and fill, bends and bending methods, couplings and
connectors, and support methods and locations), and the additional aspects of
a marine installation (corrosion, moisture, watertight bulkhead penetrations,
and flexing) should be addressed. Additionally, the wire must meet the
requirements of 46 CFR Subpart 111.60 for insulated conductors.

8.2 Types of Cable. The regulations for the construction of shipboard

electrical cable are contained in 46 CFR 111.60. These regulations require
shipboard cable to be constructed in accordance with one of the following:

(1) Cable constructed in accordance with Section 18 of IEEE Standard 45

(46 CFR 111.60-1);

(2) Cable constructed in accordance with MIL-C-9l5 and of a type that

meets the flammability tests of Section 18.13.5 of IEEE Standard 45 (46
CRF 111.60-l(a));

(3) A cable with polyvinyl chloride (PVC) insulation with a nylon jacket
that meets 46 CFR 111.60-l(b) (Type N Cable); or

(4) Cable constructed to another standard if accepted for specific

application by Commandant (G-MTH-2).

62
 It should be noted that some types of cable constructed in accordance with
MIL-C-9l5 are not required to meet the flame propagation requirements of IEEE
Standard 45. Therefore, it may be necessary to verify that a MIL-C-9l5 cable
type meets the flammability test of IEEE-45. At this time, there is little
MIL-C-9l5 cable available; most has been replaced with the new low smoke
mil-spec cable.

Type N cable will have embossed or printed on the cable either information
required by Section 18.8 of IEEE-45, or information required by Section 310-11
of the NEC, the manufacturer's name, identification code, voltage rating,
number of conductors, and conductor size. Since this information is not
unique to shipboard cable, the manufacturer may need to provide certification
that the cable meets 11l.60-l(b) including the flammability test of IEEE-45.

The design emphasis for merchant vessel ',(ablehas historically been placed
on the harsh ship construction environment (nearby welding, pulling cable
through bulkheads, and subjecting cable to constant mechanical abuse), as well
as on the shipboard operating environment (clamped assemblies, large cable
bundles, and exposure ·to a wide range of temperatures, high humidity, and
oil). Additional considerations for naval vessels have included longitudinal
water propagation resistance, overload conditions, and circuit integrity under
fire conditions. The U.S. Navy has also had to explore smaller diameter,
lighter weight cable constructions in order to conserve space and reduce
topside weight. Only in recent years, however, have several disastrous
shipboard fires focused attention on the damage to health and property caused
by fire propagated by cables. In fires aboard ships,-cableways have been
blamed for spreading relatively small and confined fires and generating dense
smoke and toxic and corrosive products of combustion, compounding the
firefighting problem.

These issues have led to significant changes in design and approval

procedures affecting both commercial and Navy shipboard cable which are not
addressed in the Electrical Engineering Regulations. Underwriters
Laboratories Inc. (UL) has developed a listing program for shipboard
electrical cable. There are two types of acceptances under this program. The
first lists cable which has been manufactured in accordance with the IEEE-45
standards and bears the IEEE designation on the cable. The second
acknowledges cable that does not meet the specific construction requirements
of IEEE-45 but has been shown by a comprehensive test program to meet the
intent of that standard. Such cable will not have an IEEE designation. It
will have a temperature marking which indicates the appropriate IEEE-45
ampacity ratings to be used for that cable. The ampacities of cables having a
UL shipboard listing may be found in Tables A6, A24, and A25 of IEEE-45. All
UL cable listings for shipboard applications must be for a maximum conductor
temperature of 100°C or less. For cables listed by UL for 100°C conductor
temperature, use the (S, GTV) column ampacities of Tables A6 and A24 of IEEE
Standard 45. For cables listed by UL for 90°C, use the (E,X) column
ampacities. If UL listed for 75°C, use the (T) column ampacities. These
ampacities should be used regardless of the actual insulation composition of
the cables. Where UL cable temperature ratings exceed 100°C, the ampacities
for 100°C rated (S, GTV) IEEE cable should be used.

The 100°C limitation does not apply to DC cable utilized in MODU

industrial systems. As an alternative to the cable construction and s1z1ng
requirements of 46 CFR 111.60, DC cables on MODUs may meet the requirements of

63
the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) Standard DCCS-l,
"Interim Guidelines for Industrial System DC Cable for Mobile Offshore
Drilling Units", attached as Appendix 5. In accordance with this standard,
marine cables may be listed by UL for up to 110°C. The current-carrying
capacity of IlO°C rated cables is 1.14 times the 90°C (E,X) rating column in
IEEE-45. If the UL listing is for 100°C or less, however, the cable cannot be
used at the 110°C rating. Industrial system cable rated and utilized (sized)
at 110°C may be run with other cables, without maintained spacing (i.e.,
banked) if derated in accordance with Note 6 of Table A6 of IEEE-45.

The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) has published two new military
specifications on the construction of shipboard electrical cable. The first,
MIL-C-24640 (Cable, Electrical, Lightweight, for Shipboard Use), addresses
lightweight power, lighting, and communication cable with a crosslinked
polyolefin jacket. The second, MIL-C-24643 (Cable and Cord, Electrical, Low
Smoke, for Shipboard Use), addresses electrical cable which exhibits low smoke
generation characteristics when subjected to specific smoke and flame tests.
The ampacities for these Navy cables may be found in "Cable Comparison
Handbook, HDBK-299, issued 3 April 1989." Although this handbook addresses
standard Navy cable size designations, it should also be used for the AWG
sized cables of MIL-C-24640 having similar (not necessarily identical)
cross-sectional areas.

Industry needs have led to modifications to acceptable cable construction

on vessels. In most cases, these modifications are superior to the minimum
requirements and should be permitted. For example, MODUs operating in the
North Sea are often required by local authorities to have an additional jacket
over cable armor. The addition of such a jacket on an already acceptable
cable construction can be accepted, provided that the finished cable meets the
pertinent cable test requirements of IEEE Std. 45 (i.e. bending, drip test,
flammability). Another example of an acceptable alteration would be the
replacement of the PVC outer jacket on an IEEE cable with a low smoke jacket
meeting MIL-C-24643.

The first standard in the United States that included testing typical
cable installations for flame propagation resistance was IEEE Standard
383-1974, developed as a test standard for cabling in nuclear power plants.
The IEEE Marine Transportation Committee subsequently adopted a similar method
for fire testing in IEEE Standard 45-1977. The Electrical Engineering
Regulations require shipboard cable to meet these IEEE-45 flammability
requirements. The IEEE-45 test attempts to simulate a realistic cableway fire
situation in evaluating flame propagation parameters of a bunched vertical
cable installation. At this time, the IEEE-45 procedure does not address
toxicity, smoke evolution, or corrosive gas generation. The procedure of the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Report 332 Part 3 is another
practical method of testing the flame propagation characteristics of cables in
a bunched configuration. The test is similar to the IEEE-45 procedure, but is
more specific in defining the chamber size and heat input and is basically
concerned with the total volume of combustible material in a cable run.
Category A'of this test uses a sufficient number of 3.5 meter lengths of cable
to obtain 7 liters/meter of total combustible material, with the cables
touching and mounted vertically on a steel ladder. Cables constructed in
accordance with IEC 92-3 (Electrical Installations in Ships, Part 3: Cables
(Construction, Testing, and Installations» may be accepted as equivalent to
those required by 46 CFR 111.60 provided they meet the flame propagation test

64
requirements of lEC Report 332 Part 3, Category A. Flame proagation
resistance should be verified by an independent third party testing
organization. The ampacities tabulated in the ABS Rules, Table 35.2, should
be used for cables constructed to lEC 92-3, except that notes 2 and 3 to that
table should not be used, as they are not comparable to lEEE-45. The values
shown in the table may be used for a single bank installation. For
double-bank installations, the correction factor of IEEE-46 table A6 applies.
The IEC is in the process of replacing IEC 92-3 with significantly revised
requirements in 92-350 series documents. While completion of this task is
several years away, at this time it appears that the newer standards will not
be comparable to present marine cable standards and will not be equivalent to
the cable standards referenced in Subchapter J.

Type N cable (PVC-insulated cable with a nylon jacket over each conductor,
and an outer cable jacket) is based upon shoreside type T building wire
construction, the use of which is addressed in NEC Table 310-13. Shipboard
Type N cable is required by 46 CFR 111.60-l(b)(1) and (3) to meet the PVC
insulation and nylon insulation covering thickness requirements of UL 83 for
type THWN wire, and the other requirements of IEEE-45 for a Type T cable, such
as outer jacket requirements and conductor stranding. The nylon jacket
material must meet the requirements of ASTM D789 Type VIII.

Although NEC Article 310-3 permits solid conductors for size No. 10 AWG
and smaller, solid conductors are unacceptable for shipboard power cables.
Nicks on solid conductors from insulation removal are likely to lead to
conductor breakage with shipboard vibration.

The problem of shipboard cable flammability was addressed internationally

in IMCO Resolution A.325 (IX), which was adopted on November 12, 1975.
Paragraph (e)(ii) of Regulation 23 of that Resolution requires that all
electric cables be at least of a flame retardant type and installed in a
manner that does not impair their original flame retarding properties. This
requirement was subsequently adopted in the 1981 Amendments to SOLAS 1974
which became effective September 1, 1984. Attempting to provide guidance on
how to meet the SOLAS Amendments, IEC Technical Committee 18 developed
guidelines which stated that cables should either be qualified using a flame
propagation test procedure for bunched cables (such as lEC Report 332 Part 3),
or that special precautions be taken. These special precautions can be
achieved by the use of fire barriers as follows:

(1) Fire stops having at least B-O penetrations are to be fitted:

(A) At cable entries at the main and emergency switchboard,

(B) Where cables enter engine control rooms,

(C) At cable entries at centralized control panels for propulsion

machinery and essential auxiliaries,

(D) At each end of totally enclosed cable trunks.

(2) In enclosed and semi-enclosed spaces, cable runs are to:

(A) have either a fire protection coating applied:

65
 (i) to at least 1 meter in every 14 meters for horizontal runs;
and,

(ii) to the entire length of vertical runs; or,

(B) be fitted with fire stops having at least B-O penetrations every
second deck or approximately 6 meters for vertical runs and at every
14 meters for horizontal runs.

The cable penetrations are to be installed in steel pipes of at least

3 mm thickness extending all around to twice the largest dimension of the
cable run for vertical runs and once for horizontal runs, but need not
extend through ceilings, decks, bulkheads or solid sides of trunks. In
cargo areas, fire stops need only be fitted at the boundaries of the
spaces.

In addition to the standards referenced in 46 CFR 111.60-1, cable

constructed in accordance with one of the following can be accepted:

(1) Cable having a UL shipboard cable listing;

(2) Cable constructed and labeled in accordance with MIL-C-24640;

(3~ Cable constructed and labeled in accordance with MIL-C-24643;

(4) Cable constructed in accordance with IEC 92-3 and meeting lEC Report
332-3 Category A (independent test laboratory certification should be
provided);

(5) For DC industrial systems on MODUs, cable meeting the requirements of

IADC Standard DCCS-l;

(6) Cable constructed in general accordance with an above standard but

modified in a manner clearly superior to the minimum requirements
specified. Examples of such modifications have been discussed above.

8.3 Unique Applications. Special purpose cables may be used for unique
applications where there is a compelling reason for deviating from the cable
construction standards discussed above in order to satisfy system
requirements. Such special purpose cables may include coaxial, triaxial, and
low noise signal cables. Exceptions to the construction and testing
requirements for such cables exist in both Section 19.1 of IEEE-45 and SOLAS
11-1/45.5.2. The primary concern with these cables is flame propagation. If
a particular cable type cannot be shown to comply with the IEEE-45 or IEC
332-3 (Cat A) fire tests, then the special precautions discussed earlier
should be used to achieve a flame propagation resistant installation. If
special purpose cables are run singly (not in or near bundles or cable trays
with other cables), then self-extinguishing construction is acceptable.

As discussed in Section 7 of this guide, cables in intrinsically safe

circuits need not meet the cable construction requirements of 46 CFR 111.60.
These cables must have sufficient dielectric strength for the maximum voltage
in the circuit, and must be of self-extinguishing construction and run singly,

66
comply with the IEEE-45 or IEC 332-3 (Cat. A) fire tests, or be installed
using the special precautions to achieve a flame propagation resistant
installation.

Fiber optic cable is not currently addressed in 46 CFR Subchapter J or in

IEEE-45. Since fiber optic cables present no shock or ignition hazards,
concern is limited to the flame propagation issue. Fiber optic cables should
meet the flammability test of Section 18 of IEEE-45, or be installed in
accordance with the special installation precautions discussed earlier.

8.4 Ampacity. The ampacity of a cable is the maximum current-carrying

capacity of the cable, based on the cross-sectional area of the conductors,
maximum allowable conductor temperature for the insulation used, and the
ambient temperature. The temperature rating of a conductor is the maximum
temperature, anywhere along its length, that the conductor can withstand for a
prolonged period without serious degradation of its insulation. Ampacities
for many common conductor sizes and insulation types have been calculated,
using procedures such as the Neher-McGrath method, and tabulated for ease of
reference and consistency. Conductors with a temperature rating above the
maximum ambient temperature must be used. Tabulated ampacities should be
corrected for the anticipated ambient temperature and method of cable
installation (banking of cables) using the ampacity correction factors
applicable to that table. Adjacent or closely-spaced cables both raise the
ambient temperature and impede heat dissipation.

The ampacities of IEEE-45 type distribution, control, signal, and mineral

insulated cables are tabulated in Tables A6, A24, A25, and A21 of IEEE-45,
respectively. It is important to read the notes for each table to know the
ambient temperature and method of cable installation upon which the tabulated
ampacities are based, so that the proper correction factors may be applied.
Ampacities should be adjusted as noted to suit the ambient temperature in
which the cable is installed if it differs from 45°C for Tables A6, A24, and
A25 or from 50°C for Table A2l. IEEE-45 restricts type T conductor insulation
to a maximum ambient temperature of 50°C, types E and X to 60°C, and types S
and GTV to 70°C.

The distribution type cable ampacities in Table A6 are for marine

installations with cables arranged in a single bank per hanger. These values
are 85% of the Insulated Cable Engineers Association (ICEA) calculated
ampacities, which are based on cables installed in free air, that is, with at
least one cable diameter spacing between adjacent cables. Distribution cables
that are double banked must be derated to 80% of the tabulated current.

The ampacity of a four-conductor cable, where one conductor is the neutral

which carries only the unbalanced current (normally small) from the other
conductors, is the same as that of a three-conductor cable as listed in Table
A6 of IEEE-45 or a 3-4 conductor cable as listed in Table 35.2 of the ABS
Rules, as appropriate. Where four or more current-carrying power conductors
are used in a cable, as in a MODU topdrive system, the maximum current
carrying capacity of each conductor must be reduced in accordance with the
number of power conductors in a cable (not in a tray). Derating factors can
be found in Note 8 to Tables 310-16 through 310-31 of the NEC.

67
 ~ "

The tabulated ampacities of IEEE-45 Table A6 are used for UL listed

shipboard distribution type cables, according to the procedure described
.previously in this NVIC. The tabulated ampacities in NAVSEA HDBK-299 are used
for cables constructed in accordance with MIL-C-915, MlL-C-24640, or
MlL-C-24643.

8.5 Minimum Conductor Size. The Electrical Engineering Regulations specify

minimum cable conductor sizes of 22 AWG for thermocouple and pyrometer cables,
14 AWG for lighting and power cables, and 18 AWG for other cable conductors.
The regulations also require each wire to be at least 18 AWG, and wires in
switchboards to be at least 14 AWG. These minimum sizes are considerably
larger than the conductors commonly found in ribbon cables, used to
interconnect printed circuit boards and computer system components.

Where ribbon cables or similar small conductor size cables are recommended
for use in low-power instrumentation, monitoring, and control circuits by the
equipment manufacturer(s), the use of such cables may be pe-rmitted.
Additional mechanical protection may be required to protect the conductors
from parting due to mechanical damage or flexing. Ribbon cables are usually
found within equipment or consoles. However, they are sometimes used
externally to interconnect modules. The location of the cable aboard the
vessel and the function of the circuit will determine the extent of mechanical
protection required, if any.

The requirement for 14 AWG m~n~mum wire in switchboards was written with
full voltage, field-wired switchboard equipment in mind. Wire smaller than 14
AWG may be considered for low voltage, low-power circuits within switchboards.

8.6 Flexible Cord. Flexible electric cords and cables may be used only as
allowed by Table 400-4 and Sections 400-7 and 400-8 of the NEC, per 46 CFR
111.60-13. They must not be used for fixed wiring, unless they are dual rated
as both flexible cable or cord and shipboard cable listed by UL. No. 18 AWG
conductors are permitted in power and lighting circuits only for portable
applications. The lADC Standard DCCS-l for DC cables on MODU's accepts
high-flex single conductor cables constructed to the requirements of the
American Association of Railroads (AAR) Specifications S-50l and 591. Certain
high-flex strandings for large conductor sizes (such as 535,000 circular
mils.), originally developed for locomotive use, have been incorporated (with
flame propagation resistance) into the IEEE-45 cable construction standards.

8.7 Color Coding. The Electrical Engineering Regulations do not require the
use of any particular conductor color coding scheme. The only requirement is
that an insulated equipment grounding conductor in a cable must have green
braid or insulation, per 46 CFR 111.05-33(b). Different color codes for
circuit conductors may be found in lEEE-45 Section 18.5 and NEC Sections 210-5
and 310.12. Although the regulations do not require the use of a specific
color scheme for the ungrounded conductors of a circuit, it is recommended
that some consistent coloring or marking practice be used for multiwire
circuits in order to provide positive identification of circuit conductors and
facilitate troubleshooting and repair.

68
8.8 Cable Installation. Each cable installation must meet the general
requirements of IEEE-45 Sections 20 and 22, with the exception of 20.11 which
is superseded by 46 CFR 111.60-19. The use of nylon or plastic cable straps
is explicitly recognized in 20.5 for horizontal runs where the cable will not
fall if the strap fails. They are permitted where the cable strap is used to
maintain spacing and not for support of the cables.

Section 20.5 of the IEEE Standard requires metallic band strapping to be a

minimum of 5/8 inch wide. Deviations from this dimension may be permitted
where the width of the strap provides sufficient mechanical strength to
support the cables and does not cause chafing of the cable jacket when the
strap is tightened.

Twist-on wire connectors, or "wire nuts," (TM) are pressure-type

connectors which may be used per 46 CFR 111.60-l7(a)(1). Connections using
twist-on connectors must be made within an enclosure. The use of insulating
electrical tape over connectors is recommended. Twist-on connectors are not
recommended for use on small vessels due to the pounding motions frequently
encountered. Additionally, they are not recommended for use in vital
circuits, such as those powered from the emergency switchboard. Pressure
connectors are typically designed for non-marine-stranded conductors. This
may present a problem, especially with smaller conductors. Some twist-on
connectors have sharp metallic inserts that could sever individual wires as
they cut their way into the copper. Installations must be carefully examined
to ensure that connections are tight, and that conductors have not been
damaged. Although twist-on wire connectors are acceptable as pressure-type
connectors, they are no longer covered under the latest edition of UL 486A,
the standard referenced in 46 CFR lI1.60-17(d). (They are covered by the
edition of UL 486A referenced in the Finding Aids section.) UL Standard 486C
is presently used to evaluate these connectors.

When pressure type connectors are used, the proper size is important. The
connection must be tight, yet it must not be necessary to remove strands to
fit the connector body to the conductor. This can sometimes present problems
since marine cable has a different conductor diameter than NEC constructions.

Methods of connection of conductors to terminal parts, other than those

listed in 46 CFR 111.60-17, may be accepted provided they insure a sound
mechanical and electrical connection without damaging the conductors. A
twisted, soldered loop may be used to connect a stranded conductor to a
terminal screw on receptacles and lampholders. Where supplied by a circuit
having a grounded conductor, a lampholder of the screw-shell type should have
the grounded conductor connected to the screw-shell.

Splicing may be used to connect cables in one subassembly to cables in

another subassembly; 46 CFR 111.60-l9(a)(I) permits the use of cable splicing
to facilitate modular construction techniques. The safety and reliability of
a spliced cable is dependent upon the careful selection of the proper
connectors, insulation and jacket replacement material, installation tools,
and installation procedures. It is most important that the right size
connector be used for the cable, with no trimming of the conductors.
Selection of the proper connector for the conductor, the proper compression
die for the connector, and the proper compression tool for the die is critical
to the mechanical and electrical integrity of the splice. The type of crimp
is not really important, as long as it does not leave sharp edges which may

69
 •

damage insulation. Manufacturer's certification of material compatibility is

generally acceptable. The replacement insulation material need not match the
cable jacket material as long as the temperature characteristics and materials
are compatible.

In addition to the heat shrinkable or pre-stretched tubing required by 46

CFR 11l.60-l9(b)(3), poured epoxy, polyurethane, and vulcanized replacement
jackets may be accepted. Flame propagation is not a major concern for the
short lengths of cable splices. While splices made in the open are prohibited
in hazardous locations, cables may be connected in hazardous locations in
junction boxes (explosionproof in Divison 1 and Zone 0). Note that flexible
cables or cords with conductors of 12 AWG or larger may be spliced for
repairs, per 46 CFR 111.60-13(e).

8.9 Cable Armor. The requirement for armored cable is limited to

installations in Class I Division 1 hazardous locations and in the other
hazardous locations for cargoes of Grade A and lower, and for bulk liquefied
gasses or ammonia per 111.105-31 and 32. The purpose of the requirement for
armor is to give added mechanical protection to avoid possible arcing from an
accidentally severed cable and to enable quicker detection, via the ground
detection system, of damaged cable insulation. With intrinsically safe
systems used in hazardous locations, the armor is unnecessary for this purpose
since the energy available in the system is insufficient to constitute an
ignition hazard. However, if there is insufficient cable separation, or there
is no grounded partition, then a metal weave or shield around the cable is
required to prevent the possible induction of current within the intrinsically
safe circuit.. This metallic covering may be inside an outer cable jacket.
See 111.105-l1(b)(3) on the use of shielded cables.

An exception to the requirement for armored cable in hazardous locations

is when flexible cord or cable must be used to connect electrical equipment.
This flexible cable need not be joined to armored cable immediately beyond the
section which requires flexing service. Rather than make such a connection in
an explosionproof junction box within the hazardous location, it is generally
preferable to extend the flexible cable to its point of supply outside the
hazardous area. However, if a run of flexible cable is particularly
vulnerable to mechanical damage, connection to armored cable or some other
means of mechanical protection may be required.

Where single-conductor cables are used for AC circuits or DC circuits with

a high ripple content, the following precautions should be observed in order
to avoid undesirable induced currents and generated heat:

1. cable armor, if any, should be of non-magnetic material;

2. there should be no closed magnetic circuit around any conductor unless

it encircles all conductors of the circuit; where installed in steel
conduits, pipes, or casings, the cables should be bunched so that all
conductors and the neutral, if any, are enclosed by the same conduit,
pipe, or casing;

3. no magnetic material should be located between single-conductor cables

of a circuit; where such cables pass through a steel deck or bulkhead, all
the conductors of the circuit should pass through a non-ferrous plate or
gland so that no magnetic material is located between the conductors.

70
 Cable routing and segregation requirements are contained in 46 CFR
111.60-9 and 111.60-5, which references IEEE-45 Sections 20 and 22, except
20.11. Section 20.3 requires cables to be so routed as to avoid, so far as
practicable, galleys, firerooms, and other spaces where excessive heat and
high risk of fire may be encountered. SOLAS 11-1/45.5.3 includes laundries in
this category of spaces to be avoided.

9. Components and Equipment

9.1 Miscellaneous Equipment: The procedure by which miscellaneous items of

electrical equipment may be reviewed to alternate design standards has been
discussed in "Meeting Reference Standards," section 2.2 of this NVIC. That
approach may be used to evaluate, for example, an inside decorative lighting
fixture for use on a passenger vessel. Fixtures which are designed to a
recognized electrical safety standard such as UL 57, Standard for Electric
Lighting Fixtures, may be reviewed to the general marine requirements of UL
595. These requirements include vibration clamps on fluorescent tubes longer
than 40 inches, secure mounting of glassware, and rigid mounting of fixtures
(suspension by a chain and loose glass globes would be unacceptable). These
requirements reflect concerns about the vibration and motion that a vessel may
experience.

Appendix 9 contains additional information regarding electrical equipment

requiring "approval" under Subchapter Q.

9.2 Navieation Lights. The requirements for navigation light systems are
contained in 46 CFR 111.75-17. Note that dual light sources are required for
certain lights. Annex I of the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, 1972, (72 COLREGS) and the 1980 Inland Navigation Rules,
(80 RULES), specify navigation light requirements in terms of color, arcs,
range of visibility, and position.

Fixtures. The regulations applicable to electric navigation light fixtures

are also contained in 46 CFR 111.75-17. There are no regulations that
specifically prohibit the use of non-electric lights, except where the use of
open flames is prohibited. However, the requirement for a navigation light
indicator panel generally precludes the use of non-electric lights on vessels
subject to the requirements of Subchapter J.

Ranges. Compared to the 1960 Rules, the range requirements of the 72 COLREGS,
for most lights, have increased. The relationship between range of visibility
and luminous intensity has also changed. However, many lights on vessels
built to the 1960 Rules were much brighter than required and may meet the
present Rules. It should be noted that with the change in the value of
assumed atmospheric transmissivity, the old 5-mile lights were required to be
brighter than the COLREGS 6-mile lights.

Color. Compared to the 1960 Rules, color coordinates for green lights have
narrowed. This has resulted in a shift toward a bluish tint in the
manufacturing of "green" dyes for navigation light lenses. The most commonly
manufactured green plastic dyes have not had good ultraviolet stabilization;
constant exposure to solar ultraviolet radiation will alter the green tint in

71
a few years. This may be beneficial, in that it moves the color coordinates
of an older light lens into the region required by the present Rules.
However, it may also move them beyond the acceptable region. [NOTE: Tests
can determine the color coordinates of the lens only at the time of testing;
these coordinates continually change as navigation lights are exposed to
ultraviolet radiation].

Horizontal Sector. Annex I of both sets of Rules gives specific arcs in which
certain intensities of light are required. For example, sidelights as fitted
the vessel must, in the forward direction, reach "practical cut-off" (i.e.,
Q.I!
one-eighth of the minimum required sector intensity) between 1 and 3 degrees
outside the prescribed sector. Prior to adoption of the 72 COLREGS and the
Inland Rules, lights were "eyeballed" for a "reasonable decrease" in intensity
in the cut-off region.

The 72 COLREGS have been interpreted as requiring the intensity between 0

and 1 degrees outside the prescribed sector to be greater than the practical
cut-off value. 'This allows both sidelights to be visible dead ahead of the
vessel, at a distance dependent upon their separation. This may present a
problem for some vessels. For example, containers stacked forward of the
sidelights could act as large screens, preventing the 1 degree "spillover." A
Certificate of Alternative Compliance (CAC) is not appropriate in such cases;
the lights should be relocated or the obstruction removed.

Vertical Sectors. Annex I of both sets of Rules also establishes requirements

for vertical sectors of navigation lights. Previously, this parameter was not
even considered.

Masthead Separation. Masthead lights must be separated by a horizontal

distance of one-half the length of the vessel but need not be more than 100
meters (Annex I 2.(b». Most vessels with a midship house were built with the
after mast located amidships and will not meet this ~eparation requirement
without moving the mast(s). Also, moving the after mast from the midship
house to the after house generally requires the after mast to be higher than
original to meet height separ'at
Lon requirements. For this reason, Rule 38
permanently exempted vessels under 150 meters (492.1 ft ..) and gave larger
vessels 9 years to comply. This extension was made with two-house vessels in
mind and in consideration of the economic hardships involved with
moving/raising masts. Therefore, CAC's would not be appropriate for masthead
separation unless moving the masts would interfere with the special purpose of
the vessel.

Sidelight Placement. Sidelights must not be "in front" of the forward

masthead light (Annex I 2.(g), 3.(b». This rule also applies to single
masted vessels and will require sidelight repositioning on many vessels in the
20-50 meter range. Some vessels (i.e., tugboats, workboats, or fishing
vessels) may qualify for CAC's due to the special purpose of the vessel.

Acceptance and Conformance. Underwriters Laboratories Inc. standard UL 1104

is based on the requirements of the 72 COLREGS and construction requirements
that address lighting fixtures in weather locations. The regulations do not
require UL listing of navigation light fixtures; they require that the
fixtures meet the UL standard. This allows the manufacturer to do his own
testing and submit the reports for acceptance.

72
Premature Bulb Failure. On vessels such as tugs and barges, problems with
vibration and shock (impact) have been reported. Although navigation lights
are subjected to stringent vibration testing, with bulb failure as a rejection
factor (evidenced by one manufacturer failing this test and having to
re-design the fixtures), the accepted fixtures are not tested for impact shock.
When shock or vibration is a problem, shock mounting the fixture is
recommended. This shock mounting can take two forms. The first is internal
isolation of the bulb. This is a manufacturer's modification and could
involve retesting of the fixture. The second is to isolation mount the
fixture on the vessel.

Another factor that has contributed to premature failure of lamps is

inadequate voltage regulation. A 10% increase in voltage will reduce bulb
life to approximately 25% of its rated life. Thus, any action to ensure
proper voltage at the fixture will help to extend bulb life.

Screens. Annex I of the International Regulations for Preventing Collision at

Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS) and Annex I of the 1980 Inland Navigation Rules require
sidelights on vessels over 20 meters in length to have external screens.
These screens are to be painted matte black. Therefore, all sidelight
fixtures on U.S. Coast Guard certificated vessels greater than 20 meters in
length must have screens painted matte black for the sidelights.

The sidelight screens may be utilized to obtain the required cut-off

angles for the sidelights as required by Section 9 of Annex I to the 72
COLREGS and section §84.l7 of the 1980 Inland Rules. If the sidelight
fixtures are fitted with internal screens that provide the proper cut-off
angles, an external screen must still be provided to meet the 72 COLREGS as
well as the Inland Rules. The installation of an internally screened
sidelight in conjunction with an inboard external screen, if properly aligned,
would meet the requirements.

In addition to sidelights, other navigation lights (such as masthead and

anchor) have horizontal sector cut-off requirements. Most manufacturers have
used internal screens to achieve the required cut-off, but external screens
would also be acceptable, although they are not required. These fixtures
would be required to be marked with an indication that they are to be
installed with external screens.

Barge Lights (Battery Powered) Exemptions. COMDTINST M16672.3 has exempted

battery powered barge lights from the vertical sector cut-off requirements of
the 72 COLREGS. This exemption is good until July 1, 1989, at which time it
will be re-evaluated. The COMDTINST is only applicable to unmanned barges
without machinery for the generation of electricity or with such machinery
intended for operation only while moored.

The 1980 Inland Rules permanently exempt electric navigation lights on

unmanned barges from the vertical sector requirements.

Navigation Light Fixture Marking. Navigation light fixture markings generally

indicate compliance with the 72 COLREGS.

73
.10. SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The following references contain electrical information of general

interest and are in addition to those specifically mentioned throughout this
NVIC.

10.1 The Federal Register preambles to the 27 June 1977 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 3 March 1980 Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
and 8 April 1982 Final Rules for Subchapter J contain discussions of
the philosophy and intent of the Electrical Engineering Regulations.
These discussions can provide amplifying and clarifying information
on a number of the regulations.

10.2 The National Electrical Code Handbook, published by the National Fire
Protection Association, is a valuable reference for those parts of
the NEC which are incorporated by reference into the Electrical
Engineering Regulations as well as for other areas of general
interest such as Article 700 on emergency power systems.

10.3 Electrical Instruments in Hazardous Locations, by Ernest C. Magison,

published by the Instrument Society of America.

10.4 Hazardous Locations, A Guide for the Design. Construction and

Installation of Electrical Equipment, by John Bossert and Randolph
Hurst, published by the Canadian Standards Association, 1986.

10.5 NFPA 493, "Intrinsically Safe Process Control Equipment".

10.6 COMDTINST M16465.ll, Chemical Hazard Response Information System

(CHRIS).

10.7 IEEE Std .. 141, IEEE Recommended Practice for Electric Power
Distribution for Industrial Plants, (the IEEE "Red Book").

10.8 IEEE Std .. 142, IEEE Recommended Practice for Grounding of Industrial
and Commercial Power Systems, (the IEEE "Green Book").

10.9 IEEE Std .. 242, IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and
Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, (the IEEE
"Buff Book").

10.10 Instrument Society of America (ISA)-RP12.l -- Electrical Instruments

in Hazardous Atmospheres.

10.11 ISA-S12.4 -- Instrument Purging for Reduction of Hazardous Area

Classification.

10.12 ANSIjISA-RP12.6 -- Installation of Intrinsically Safe Systems for

Hazardous (Classified) Locations.

74
10.13 ISA-S12.10 Area Classification in Hazardous Dust Locations.

10.14 ISA-S12.11 Electrical Instruments in Hazardous Dust Locations.

10.15 ANSI/ISA-S12.l2 -- Electrical Equipment for Use in Class It Division

2 Hazardous (Classified) Locations.

10.16 ANSI/ISA-S12.13 Part I ..~ -Per formance-Requfremenus , Combustible Gas

Detectors.

10.17 ISA-RP12.13 Part II -- Installation, Operation, and Maintenance of

Combustible Gas Detection Instruments.

10.18 Appendices 10 - 13: Appendices 10 and 11 contain guidance on the

inspection for certification of vessel electrical installations and
electrical requirements particular to special vessel types,
respectively.

10.19 Appendix 12 provides guidance concerning the submittal and review of

electrical plans for certificated vessels other than Subchapter T
small passenger vessels.

10.20 Appendix 13 contains a list of abbreviations commonly used on marine

electrical plans, including NEMA enclosure symbols.

75
 APPENDIX 1

INDEX FOR REFERENCE DRAWING TO TITLE 46 CFR, NATIONAL ELECTRICAL CODE (NEe),
INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS (IEEE) STD. 45-1983.
UNDERWRITERSLABOR!TORIES (UL). ETC.

ITEM TITLE REFERENCE* SPECIFIC AREAS

1 Generators 111.12 Ship's service
112.50 Emergency
111.12-1, -11 Parallel operation

2 Generator & Distribution

Switchboards 111.30 General

3 Generator Cables 111.60-3 Application

111.60-1 Demand load
111.60-5 Installation
& 111.12-9.

4 Shore Ties & Connection

Boxes 111.83 Construction

5 Generator Circuit Breaker 111.30-25 Switchboard-mounted

111.50-7 Enclosures
111.50-5(a) Location
111.12-11 Circuits & Protection
111.54-1(a)(3) Interrupting capacity

6 Shore Tie Circuit Breakers 111.30-25(f) Svitchboard-mounted

111.50-5(a) (2) Svitchboard-mounted
111.54-1(a)(3) Interrupting capacity

7 Bus Tie Circuit Breakers 111.60-1 Demand load

8 Generator Neutral Disconnects

or Links 111.30-25 (b) Switchboard-mounted

9 Steering Systems 58.25 Steering apparatus

111.93 Electric steering gear
112.15-5(0) Tankships
33 CFR 164.39

10 Generator Neutral Grounding 111.05-11 Ship' •• ~rvice and

emergency generator

11 Bus Si~es IUE STD 45-1983 Table A-27 & 111.30-19

12 Motor Feeders 111.60-7

76
 APPENDIX 1 (cont'd)

ITEM TITLE REFERENCE* SPECIFIC AREAS

13 Transformers, Feeders, and

Protection 111.20-15 and
NEe 450

14 Transformers, General 111.20

15 Ground Detection 111.30-25 (e)( 1)

l1l.30-27(e)
111.05

16 Motor Controllers NEC 430-86 Location

111.70-3 Enclosures
Ul.70-3(f)&(g) Low voltage protection
(LVP) and lov voltage
release (LVa) types
1l1.70-3(d) Group control panels

17 Distribution Panel Feeders 111.60-7 Demand loads

& Circuit Breakers 111. 54-l(a){3) Interrupting rating
111.51 Selective operation

i8 Battery Chargers UL 1236 Acceptable types

& U1.15-30
111.15-25 Reverse current protec-
tion

19 Storage Batteries 111.15-1 General

111.15-5 Installation and ar-
rangement
111.15-10 Ventilation
111.15-5(g)-(h) Corrosion protection
111.15-20 Conductors
112.55 Emergency pover and
lighting systems

lO Electric Elevators & ANSI A17.l Safety Code

Dumb Waiters 111.91

~l Emergency Lights & Loads 112.43 Emergency lighting systems

U2.01-10 Automatic systems
112.15 Emergency loads
UL 595 Light fixtures standard

~2 Signaling Lights 111.75-18

!3 Switchboard Instrumentation 111.30-25 AC switchboards ship's

& Control Equipment Required service and «mergency

77
 . "

APPENDIX 1 (cont'd)

ITEM TITLE REFERENCE* SPECIFIC AREAS

24 Disconnects (Motors) 111.70-1

NEe430

25 Emergency Shut Down 111.103

26 Disconnects (Switching Means) 111.55

27 Electric Ranges 111.60-7 Demand loads

111. 77-3 Standard

28 Electric Water Heaters 63.15

29 Motor Circuit Protection 111.70-1

NEC 430

30 Distribution Panelboards 111.40

111.50-5,-7

31 Navigation Light Indicator 111. 75-17

Panels

32 Navigation Lighting Circuits 111. 75-17

33 Semiconductor-Controlled 111.33 Electric propUlsion

Rectifier (SCR) Circuits

34 General Alarm Systems 113.25

35 Lighting Fixtures 111.75-20 Marine type

UL 595 Construction
111.05-3 -,- Grounding

36 15- or 20-Ampere Lighting Ill. 75-5(eHl) "Switched" lights and

Branch Circuits & (2) receptacles
37 15- or 20-Ampere Lighting 11l.75-5(e)(1) "Non-Switched" lights
Branch Circuits & (2) and receptacles

38 25- or 30-Ampere Lighting 111. 75-5(£) Non-Switched light

Branch Circuits wattage lighting ckt.

39 Receptacle Circuits Jll.79-1 General

111.05-3 Grounding
UL 498 Attachment plugs and
receptacles
UL 514 Outlet boxes and fitting.
UL 50 Cabinets and boxes

78
 ..... t;t z -
-alii ; t:
~
.., !:! ~
_, i c
:e ::;3 :;
\U ...
~ ~ ...I.M i~t i
~~~Ot.n
e.... 00
:a ~

~!®
cr
~ f \11- W
• .J ~
X 0 tS :!~
,,;,
~c

-e
......&
;~
Ws til
50 Q-
a::

79
 APPENDIX 2

LOAD ANALYSIS

(1) General Requirements. Ship's service generating plants must be

sized for the anticipated operating load as required by 46 CFR
111.10-4. To determine if the generators are adequate, a load
analysis is .necessary and is required to be submitted for review by
",
110.25-l(b). Demand factors (d.f.) are essential to the load analysis
but often can vary, as can be seen from the typical values in Table
1 of this Appendix. The individual characteristics of the vessel
should be considered in the determination of demand factors. The
load analysis should document that:

(a) Individual load factors used are reasonable.

(b) Application of the load factors is reasonable and thorough.

(c) Generating plant is adequate and in accordance with the

applicable regulations.

(2) Considerations. The load analysis should be prepared and evaluated

with the following considerations in mind:

(a) Loads can be classified by various operating conditions such

as port, anchor, sea, functional, emergency, maneuvering, or
cold start. The load analysis will normally address only the
normal sea load, maneuvering load and emergency load, unless
special considerations for the safety of the ship require
otherwise (e.g., at sea cargo transfer (functional)).

~l A motor may be oversized for its attached load and thus not
operate at its rated capacity.

(c) Formulas for the determination of load factors for major steam
propulsion vessels may be found in SNAME T&R Bulletin 3-11,
"Marine Steam Power Plant Heat Balance practices", Section
3.2.15.

(d) Load factors for individual loads, in general:

Load factor - Operating bhp x No. hours operation

Rated bhp 24 hours

or

Load factor - Operatin~KW x No. hours operation

Rated 24 hours
Often. operating load information is not provided and load
iaCLors become No. hours operation
24 hours

80
(e) A singl~ load factor for group loads may be assigned if they
meet one of the following cr1ter1a:

(1) Two or more loads operate with a definite relationship

to each other (e.g., heating and air conditioning);

(i1) When the relationship described in (i) above is not

clear, but is known to exist (e.g., galley equipment);

(i11) When low power loads in the same space can be assigned
roughly the same load factors (e.g., radios and
electronics).
(f) Known load use data should always be used in lieu of demand
factors, if available.
(8) Power conversions and their efficiency should be considered
(e.g. power factors, transformers, semiconductor controlled
rectifiers (SCR's). Due to efficiency below 1.0, apparent
connected loads may be increased due to the conversion
equipment).
(h) Loads that are provided individual factors in the analysis
should not be addit10nally ass1gned a group factor, and vice
versa (e.g., 0.3 (1ndividual factor) x 0.4 (group factor) -
0.12 (final factor) (either 0.3 or 0.4 could be used, but
not 0.12».
(1) Factors of zero (0) are assigned to equipnent that is seldom
used.

(j) Factors of 0.9 and 1.0 are used where motors operate at full
load for an extended period of time.

(k) Any standby or duplicate units should be listed and assigned

a factor of zero unless they are continuously idling. The
primary unit should be assigned an appropriate factor, e.g.,
Steering pump #1, d.f.=O.9; Steering pump #2, d.f.=O.O (Stby).

(1) The development of standard load factors for given classes of

vessels is encouraged, as time and experience permit.

(m) Large equipment -- unusually large loads, as compared to the

generating capacity -- should be assigned appropriate factors
assuming that other non-essential loads are not operated
simultaneously.

(n) The load analysisJhould show that the generating plant is

adequate to simultaneously carry the loads vital to the
survival of the vessel in an emergency such as fire or flooding.
These loads should include:

81
 _ I

(i)' Steering;

(ii) Vital propulsion auxiliaries;

(iii) Ventilation;
(iv) Communications;

(v) Fire pumps;

(vi) Alarms;
(vii) Bilge pumps;

(viii)Emergency lighting;
(ix) Radar; and
(x) ControIs.

(0) For unmanned machinery spaces, remotely operated emergency

loads, such as bridge started fire pumP1 should_be assigned
a load factor of 1.0.

(p) Automatically started equipment should be provided a load

factor of 1.0 without regard for spinning reserve.
(q) Special functional operations of the vessel, such as
underway replenishment (a Military Sealift Command (MSC)
ship), dredging (a hopper dredge), and at-rig offloading (an
offshore supply vessel) do not require one generator in
reserve. Normal at sea operations such as cargo cooling
(refrigerated ships) and liquid cargo recirculation (offshore
supply vessels) do require one ship's service generator in
reserve.

82
 APPENDIX 2

TABLE 1

TYPICAL OPERATING LOAD FACTORS

LOAD DESCRIPTION NA VY FACTORS MAR. ENG. FACTORS SHAME
Sea Emerg. Sea Emerg • Sea

Main Steering gear pump .3 •3 .1 .2

Stby. steering gear pump o o
Steering gear servo. pump .5 .5
Steering control .5 .5 .1
Steering aux. heater o o
Shaft turning gear o o
Stern tube bearing lube oil
pump .5
Main cond. pump .9 o .4 .75
Main eire. pump .9 o 1.0 .9
Aux. cond. pump .9
Aux. eire. pump .6 o .9
Main feed pump .8
Main feed boost pump .9 .5
Emer. feed boost &
transfer pump 0 o o
Reserve feed transfer
pump .2 o .5
Aux. condenser condensate pump o
Atm. clean drain tank pump .6
L.P. Heater drain pump .65
L.P. Steam gen. feed pump .9
Aux. boiler 0 o
Main turb. gland exhauster .9 o .9 .9
Aux. turb. gland exhauster .5 o
F.W. Drain colI. tank pump .6 o .6
Main L.O. purifier .3 o .9 .35
Main feed L.O. pump .9 o .9 .3 .9
Stby. L.O. serve pump 0 .2 1
L.O. transfer pump .1 o o
L.O. cooler eire. pump .9
L.O. heater .1
F.O. service pump .9 o .4 .85
F.O. transfer pump .1 o .1 .1
F.O. stripping pump o o
F.O. stripping drain
and transfer pump .3 o
Red. gear L!O •• tby. pump o o
Prop. hyde .tby. pump o o
Elec. prop. exciter .9 o
Elec. prop. equip. heater o o
Prop. motor vent fan .9 o
Prop. motor L.O. .9 o
service pump

0')
 TABLE 1 (cont'd)

LOAD DESCRIPTION NAVY FACTORS MAR. ENG. FACTORS 5 NAME

Sea Emerg. Sea Emerg. Sea

T/G eire. pump .5 0

T/G cond. pump .5 0
T/G start L.O. pump 0 .9 .9
Sea valves 0 0
Emer , gen. S.W. booster 0 .9
s.w. boost pump .3 0
Air preheater .9
s. v. service pump .1 0 .6 .8
Bilge and fuel
stripping pump .1 0 .1
Bilge pump .1 0 .1 .1
Flushing pump .1 0 .4
Fire pump .2 .4 0 0
Bilge & ballast priming pump 0 .1
Fire & bilge pump 0
Fire & general service pump 0
Bilge & ballast pump .2
Ballast pump .2
Fog/Foam sys. pump 0 0
Forced draft blower .s
H.W. eire. pump .6 0 .1 .7
H.W. heater .5 .1 .5
Cargo stripping pump 0 0
Liq. cargo
transfer pump 0 0 0 0
Cargo brine eire. pump .7
Cargo air coolers .9
Cargo dehumidifier .5
Window defrosters
and wipers 0 0
Genera tor space heaters 0 0 1
Anchor windlass 0 0
Capstan .0 0
Personnel elevators .2 0
Cranes 0 0
Ca rgo elevators 0 0
Shop tools .1 0 .1 .1
Welder .1 0
Test board .1 0 0 0 .2
Battery charger .2 0 .2
1. C. battery charger 1
Ventilation .9 .4 .9 .85
Duct & space heaters .4 0 .4
Deck mach. heaters 1
1. c. system .4 .4 1 .4
Radar .5 .5 1
Gyro .5 .4

84
 TABLE 1 (cont'd)

LOAD DESCRIPTION NAVY FACTORS MAR. ENG. FACTORS SNAME

Sea ElI.erg. Sea Emerg. Sea

Radio .4 .4
Searchlights 0 0
Mach. space ltg. .9 .9 .9
General ltg. .6 .4 .4 .6
Emergency ltg. .6 .4 .9
Navigation Itg. .6 .2 .4 .5
Service area ltg .4 .35
SS. reefer circ. pump .4
SSe reefer compreS80r .3 0 .1 .4
Cargo reefer cmp. .3 0 .6
A.C. compressor .7 .4 .8 .75
A.C. chill wtr. PUlllp .7 .4 .9 .75
A. C. s.w. circ. pump .7 .4 .75
A.C. Fan .75
A.C. H.W. circ. pump .6 .75
Unit coolers .2 0
Oven/range .4 0
Galley equip. .3 0 .3
Refrig/freez:er .5 0
Refrig. small .3 .3
Pantry ~quip. .2 0 .3
La undry equip. .2 0 .2
Hospital equip. .1 .1 .2
Electronics .5 .2 .5 .45
Distiller plant .7 0
Distiller brine ovbd. .8 .75
Distiller cond. pump .3 .6
Distiller feed pump .8 .75
F.W. transfer pump 0
Ice water eire. pump 1 .7
Potable water ·pump .3 .2
Drinking fountain .4
H.P. air compressor .1
S.S. air compressor .1 .1 .3
Control air compre8sor .6 .2 .4
Sewage pump .1 1.0 .2
Sewage r:acerator .1 1.0
Sewage blower 1
Cathodic protection .7
Ice water circ. pump 1.0 .7
Brine eire. pump 1.0
Reefer container recept. .9
Winches
Bow thruster
Main control console .6
Boiler console .6
R.A.I., E.O.T., fllarms 1

85
 APPENDIX 2

TABLE 2

SAMPLE LOAD ANALYSIS

NOTE: All figures used are purely hypothetical.

DISTRIBUTION A ATTACHED LOAD DEMAND FACTOR DEMAND LOAD

Bilge Pump 5 KW o o
Ballas t Pump 10 KW 0.1 1 KW
AIC - Heater 10/20 KW 0.8 8/16 KW *
Cargo Circ. Pump 15 KW 0.6 9 KW
Dist. A Total 0 + 1 + 16 + 9 -= 26 KW

DISTRIBUTION B

Steering Pump Dl 10 KW 0.9 9 KW

Steering Pump v2 10 KW 0 0 **
Steering Control 1 KW 0.9 .9 K.W
Bow Thruster 40 KW 0.4 16 ~
Dist. B Total 9 + 0 + .9 + l' t::: 25.9 KW
DISTRIBUTION C

Main Deck Ltg. Fwd. 4 KW 0.5 *** 4 leW

Main Deck Ltg. Aft 4 KW 0.5
Eng. Rm. Ltg. Port 2 KW 0.9 *** 3.6 KW
Eng. Rm. Ltg. Stbd. 2 KW 0.9
Dis t • C Total 4 + 3.6 t::: 7.6 KW

DISTRIBUTION D

Range 12 KW 0.4 4.8 KW

Water Heater 15 KW 0.6 9.0 KW

Dist. D Total 4.8 + 9.0 c 13.8 KW

TRANSFORMER iil

Dist. C 7.6 KW 1.0 @ .95

Dist. D 13.8 KW Efficiency ****
Transformer 1 Total is 1.05 (1.0)(7.6 + 13.8) - 26.9 leW

86
 TABLE 2 (cont'd)

SAMPLE LOAD ANALYSIS

MAIN SWBO

Dist. A 26 KW
Oist. B 25.9 KW
Transformer 11 26.9 KW
Generator Demand Load 78.8 KW
Full Load Gen. Capacity 85 KW

* Relationship exists. take larger load. *** Similar loads given group
** One pump is the standby. factor.
**** Reduced efficiency increases
demand load. type transformer eff
.96-.99

87
 · ,

APPENDl1C 3

SCR System Cbeck-off List.

(a) Meets the requirements of 46 CFR111.33, and for a

avitchboard and/or electric propulsion installation, 46 CPR.
ll1.30-11, -19, -21.

(b) Name plate data.

(c) Heat removal system.

(d) Cooling.

(e) Immersed type with non-flammable liquid and no leakage with

vessel inclined.

(f) Located away from heat sources.

(g) Temperature rating and operating range.

(h) Unrestricted air circulation if naturally cooled.

(i) Inlet air temperature within design limits.

(j) Los8 of cooling shutdown.

(k) Inlet cooling water temperature.

(1) Watertight or dripproof rectifier stack.

(m) Vent exhaust does not terminate in a hazardous area.

(n) Vent exhaust does not impinge on electrical equipment in

enclosure.

(0) High temperature alarm or shutdown.

(p) SCR propulsion systems:

(i) Meet ABS Section 35.84.4 (1983).

(11) Current and current rate limiting circuit.

(iii) Overcurrent protection.

(iv) High temperature alarm set below shutdown temperature.

(v) Internal overcurrent device coordination.

(vi) Blown fuse dete~tion system.

(vii) In dry place.

(q) SCR motor control:

(i) Over.peed trip; 108s of load (series); loss of field

(shunt).

(ii) Shunt aotor field excitation interlock.

88
· .

APPENDIX 4

Miscellaneous Tables.

CURRENT RATING, RECTANGULAR BUS BARS ON EDGE, 50"C AXE., 50·C

RISE, IEEE 45-1983, A27 SINGLE BARS IN PARALLEL. COPPER
SIZE (inches) DC '. AC, 60HZ
3/4 x 1/8 250 250
1 x 1/8 330 330
1-1/2x 1/8 500 500
l-1/2x 3/16 580 570
2 x 3/16 760 745
1 x 1/4 490 400
1-1/2x 1/4 685 675
2 x 1/4 920 900
3 x 1/4 1380 1280
4 x 1/4 1730 1650
5 x 1/4 2125 2000
6 x 1/4 2475 2300
8 x 1/4 3175 2875

MINIMUM SWITCHBOARD SPACINGS (inches)

LIVE PARTS, BETWEEN LIVE

OPP. POLARITY, PARTS & GROUNDED
OVER THRU
VOLTAGE SURFACE AIR DEAD METAL
125V or Less 3/4 1/2 1/2
126V - 250V 1-1/4 3/4 1/2
251V - 600V 2 1 1
From NEC Table 384-26

NEUTRAL GROUNDING CONDUCTORS, AC SYSTEMS

A.W.G. OF LARGEST GENERATOR A.W.G. OF

CONDUCTOR OR EQUIVALENT GROUND
FOR PARALLEL GENS. CONDUCTOR

up to #2 18
#2 #0 #6
#0 3/0 #4
3/0 350 HCM #2
350 HeM 600 HeM #0
600 HeM 1100 MeM 2/0
greater than 1100 HCH 3/0

See 46 eFR 111.05-31(b).

89
 Generator Continuous Full Load Ampere Ratings.

3-PHASE O.S POWER FACTOR

115% 115% 115% 115% 115% 115%

W KVA 20SV FLA 230V FLA 240V FLA 460V FLA 4S0V FLA 600V FLA
:-0 6.3 17.5 20 15.S IS 15.2 17 7.9 9 7.6 9 6.1 7
.5 9.4 26.1 30 23.6 27 22.6 26 11.S 14 11.3 13 9.0 10
0.0 12.5 34.7 40 31.4 36 30.1 35 15.7 IS 15.0 17 12.0 14

5.0 lS.7 52.0 60 47.0 54 45.0 52 23.5 27 22.5 26 18.0 21

).0 25.0 69.4 80 62.8 72 60.1 69 31.4 36 30.1 35 24.1 28
5.0 31.3 87.0 100 78.6 90 75.3 S7 39.1 45 37.6 43 30.1 35

:>.0 37.5 104.1 120 94.1 108 90.2 104 47.1 54 45.1 52 36.1 42
).0 50.0 138.8 160 125.5 144 120.3 138 62.7 72 60.1 69 48.1 55
).0 62.5 173.5 200 156.9 180 150.3 173 78.4 90 75.2 86 61.1 70
).0 75.0 208.2 239 188.3 217 180.4 207 94.1 108 90.2 ._104 72.2 83
5.0 93.8 260.4 300 235.4 271 225.6 259 117.7 135 112.8 130 90.3 104
)0.0 125.0 347.0 399 313.8 361 300.7 346 156.9 180 150.4 173 120.3 138
~5.0 156.0 433.0 498 391.6 450 375.3 432 195.8 225 187.6 216 150.1 173
50.0 187.0 519.1 597 469.4 540 449.8 517 234.7 270 224.9 259 179.9 207
75.0 219.0 607.9 699 549.6 632 526.7 606 274.8 316 263.3 303 210.7 242
)0.0 250.0 694.0 798 627.6 722 601.4 692 313.8 361 300.7 346 240.6 277
>0.0 312.0 866.1 996 783.2 900 750.5 863 391.6 450 375.3 432 300.2 345
)0.0 375.0 1040.1 1196 941.3 1082 902.1 1037 470.7 541 451.1 519 361.0 415

NOTES: (1) Generator cables shall be capable of carrying at least

115 percent generator continuous F.L.A. (see 46 eFR
111.60-7).

(2) Generator circuit breaker long time overcurrent trip·

shall not exceed 115 percent generator continuous
F.L.A. (see 46 eFR 111.12-11).

90
 Transformer Full Load Currents.

FULL LOAD CURRENTS

3-PHASE TRANSFORMERS
Voltage (Line to Line)
KVA
Rating 208 240 4BO BOO 2400 4180

3 B.3 7.2 3.6 2.9 .72 .415

6 16.6 14.4 7.2 5.B 1.44 .83
9 25 21.6 10.8 8.7 2.16 1.25
15 41.6 36.0 18.0 14.4 3.6 2.1
30 83 72 36 29 7.2 4.15
45 125 108 54 43 10.8 5.25
75 208 180 90 72 18 10.4
100 278 241 120 96 24 13.9
150 416 360 180 144 36 20.8
225 625 542 271 217 54 31.2
300 830 720 360 290 72-- 41.5
500 1390 1200 600 480 120 69.4
750' 2080 1800 900 720 180 104
1000 2775 2400 1200 960 240 139
1500 4150 3600 1800 1440 360 208
2000 5550 4800 2400 1930 480 277
2500 6950 6000 3000 2400 600 346
5000 13900 12000 8000 4800 1200 694
7500 20800 18000 9000 7200 1800 1040
10000 27750 24000 12000 9600 2400 1366

For other KVA Ratings or Voltages:

Amperes - KVA x 1000

Volts x 1.732

91
 .. "

FULL LOAD CURRENTS

SINGLE PHASE TRANSFORMERS
Voltage

[VA
Rating 120 208 240 480 600 2400

1 8.34 4.8 4.16 2.08 1.67 .42

3 25 14.4 12.5 6.25 5.0 1.25
5 41.7 24.0 20.8 10.4 8.35 2.08
7.5 62.5 36.1 31.2 15.6 12.5 3.12
10 83.4 48 41.6 20.8 16.7 4.16
15 125 72 62.5 31.2 25.0 6.25
25 208 120 104 52 41.7 10.4
37.5 312 180 156 78 62.5 15.6
50 417 240 208 104 83.5 20.8
75 625 361 312 156 125 31.2
100 834 480 416 208 167 41.6
125 1042 800 520 260 208 52-;.0
167.5 1396 805 698 349 279 70.0
200 1666 960 833 416 333 83.3
250 2080 1200 1040 520 417 104
333 2776 1600 1388 694 555 139
500 4170 2400 2080 1040 836 208

For other rYA Ratings or Voltages:

Amperes .:KVA X 1000

Volts

92
 APPENDIX 5
INTERNATIONAt. sar.,r Addreu: 15110Patte Ten P&IIce, SuIte 242
ASSOCIATION- OF . Houlton, ...... 7'7'064-6134
Phone 7tU1'8-7171
..... '518885
DRILLING CONTRACTORS Telefax7'~

.... ing AdcIrea: P. 0. ec. C287

Houlton, ... 77210.C2S7

M'ERJM GUIDELINES

FOR NXJSTRw.. SYSTEM DC CABLE

FOR MOBn.E OFFSHORE DRIl..1..NG UNns
1ADC-OCCS-1

I. Purpose

These interim guidelines have been prepared to establish a method for the selection, installation
and acceptance of DC electrical cables used on industrial drilling systems on mobile offshore
drilling units. These systems are drawworks,pumps and rotary table. These interim guidelines
will provide the necessary guidelines for DC cable on MODUs until a final standard has been
prepared and issued.

II. Single Conductor Cable Selection

For all cable types, the following shall apply:

A. The interim guidelines shall apply to DC motors nominally rated 750 volts DC armature
voftage.

B. The cable size per polarity shall have a current-carrying capacity determined by multiplying
the duty factor times the lesser of:

1. The continuous current rating of the motor; or

2. The continuous current limit setting of the power supply.

C. The duty factors to be used are:

1. Mud pumps, cement pumps: O.BO;

2. Drawworks, rotary table: 0.65.

D. The cable need only be sized for a maximum ambient temperature of 4SoC in machinery
spaces as determined by the U.S. Coast Guard, the American Bureau of Shipping and the
Marine Transportation Committee of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers.

E. The cable shaHmeet the flame retardancy requirements of IEEE-383-1974or IEEE--45-·;~77.

Manufacturer shall supply to the owner of the vessel a certificate of' compliance with this
requirement

F. The voltage rating of the cable shall be 1000 votts minimum.

---------------- RqioJUll v~~ ...:,·"!1Its ----------------

~AWnAooer fIW:tFIC ~ .MIff ~
EXAS GULF c:::o.\ST. 811 ....-.on WEST TEXAS-eAST NEW WEX1CO: &. ~ NarIIon
IlO-CC>HnHeHT: &em E. LDy .• 1 NOR1'l4EAST ~ l.OUtS&AHA-
0l1THEAST 0(),t.ST: WWIertI R........ 93 80UTH AMAH&AS: C. w.-.
 .. "

G. For this specification. the cable insulation and jacket shall meet or exceed the requirements
of the latest edition of one or more of the following standardsas it 'appliesto the construction
of a single conductor power cable; Where the following standards do not specifically list ",
AAR-sized cable, the insulation and jacket thicknesses shall conform to the next larger size J
cable listed.

1. Rubber-insulated Wire and Cable for the Transmission and Distribution of Electrical
Energy (ICEA 5-19-81);

2. Cross-linked Thermosetting Polyethylene-insulated Wire and Cable for the

Transmission and Distribution of Electrical Energy (ICEA 8-66-524);
3. Ethylene-Propylene Rubber-insulated Wire and Cable for the Transmission and
Distribution of Electrical Energy (ICEA $-68-516);
4. Specification for Single Conductor Cleaning-stripping Ethylene-propylene Rubber-
insulated ().600 Volt (see A and E of this interim guideline) Chlorosulfonated
Polyethylene-jacketed Cable for locomotive and Care Equipment (AAR Specification
591). NOTE: The insulation and jacket thickness of AAR 591 are suitable for 1000
volts '.based on comparison with lCEA S-68·516 for 0-2000 volt rating. The
manufacturer shall test, certify and label the cable with appropriate voltage ratings.

5. American Association of Railroads (MR) Wiring and Cable Specification 5-501.

6. IEEE Recommended Practice for Electrical Installations on Switchboards (IEEE-45).

7. General Specifications for Cable and Cord Electrical for Shipboard Use (Military
Specification MIL-C-915E).

8. Any UL.Jisted Marine Shipboard Cable.

94
 APPENDIX 6

MOTOR CIRCUIT INFORMATION

FIGURE 1

3-PHASE, 208 VAC MOTOR BRANCH CIRCUIT QUICK-REFERENCE TABLE

FOR SINGLE BANKED CABLES

A B C D E F G H I J

HP FLA Running Prot. Starter Discon- Max. Prot. Device

115% FLA. Size nect Full Volt Start
Adj. Non- Siz.e Code B-E Code F-V
Adj. C.B. FUBe C.B. Fuse
200% 250% 250% 300%

.25 1.23 1.41 2 00 30 15 15 15 15

.33 1.48 1.7 2 00 30 15 15 15 15
.5 2.0 2.3 3 00 30 15 15 15 15
.75 2.8 3.22 4 00 30 15 15 15 15
1 3.6 4.14 4 00 30 15 15 15 15
1.5 5.7 6.56 8 00 30 15 15 15 20
2 7.8 8.97 10 0 30 20 20 20 25
3 10 11..5 12 0 30 20 30 30 30
5 17 19.6 20 1 60 35 40 50 60
7.5 24 27.6 30 1 60/100 50 50 70 80
10 31 35.7 40 2 100 70 70 90 100
15 46 52.9 60 3 100/200 100 100 125 150
20 59 67.9 70 3 200 125 125 150 200
25 75 86.3 100 3 200/400 175 175 200 250
30 88 101 110 3 200/400 200 200 125 300
40 114 131 150 4 400 250 250 300 350
50 143 164 200 4 400/600 300 300 400 450
60 170 196 225 5 400/600 350 350 500 500
75 212 243 250 5 600 500 500 600
100 273 314 350 5 600 600 600
125 343 394 450 6
150 396 455 500 6
200 528 607 800 6

95
 · "

-/..
' .
.\

FIGURE 1 (cont'd)

3-PHASE, 208 VAC MOTOR BRANCH CIRCUIT QUICK-REFERENCE TABLE

HP K L M N 0 p

125% THREE CONDUCTOR BRANCH CABLE

FLA
A'WG (IEEE 45z 50°C) TSGA - ( )
T EzX AVS 40°C 50°C

.25 1.54 14 14 14 4 4
.33 1.85 14 14 14 4 4
.5 2.51 14 14 14 4 4
.75 3.5 14 14 14 4 4
1 4.5 14 14 14 4 4
1.5 7.13 14 14 14 4 4
2 9.75 14 14 14 4 4
3 12 .5 14 14 14 4 4
5 21.3 12 14 14 9 9
7.5 30.0 10 10 12 9 9
10 38.8 7 8 10 9 14
15 57.5 5 6 7 23 23
20 73.8 3 4 5 30 30
25 93.8 1 2 3 40 50
30 110.0 1/0 1 2 50 60
40 142.5 3/0 2/0 1/0 75 100
50 178.8 4/0 3/0 2/0 125 125
60 212.5 300 250 4/0 150 150
75 265.0 400 350 250 200 250
100 341.3 600 500 400 300 400
125 428.8 400
150 495.0
200 660.0

96
 APPENDIX 6

FIGURE 2

3-PHASE, 460 VAC MOTOR BRANCH CIRCUIT QUICK-REFERENCETABLE

A B c D E F G H I J
HP FLA Running Prot. Start- Disconnect Max. Prot. Device
115%.FLA er size size Full Volt Start
Adj. Non- Code B-E Code F-V
Adj. C.B. Fuse C.B. Fuse
200% 250% 250% 300%
---- ----
.5 1 1.15 2 00 30 15 IS 15 15
.75 1.4 1.61 2 00 30 15 15 15 15
1 1.8 2.07 3 00 30 15 15 15 15
1.5 2.6 2.99 3 00 30 15 15 15 15
2 3.4 3.91 4 00 30 15 15 15 15
3 4.8 5 ..
5'- 6 0 30 15 15 15 15
5 7.6 8.74 10 0 30 20 20 20 25
7.5 11 12.65 15 1 30/60 25 30 30 35
10 14 16.1 20 1 30/60 30 35 35 45
15 21 24.15 25 2 60/100 45 60 60 70
20 27 31.05 35 2 60/100 60 70 70 90
25 34 39.1 40 2 100/200 70 90 90 110
30 40 46 50 3 100/200 90 100 100 125
40 52 59 60 3 200 125 150 150 175
50 65 74.75 80 3 200 150 175 175 200
60 77 88.55 90 4 200/400 175 200 200 250
75 96 110.4 125 4 400 200 250 250 300
100 124 142.6 150 4 400 250 350 350 400
125 156 179.4 200 5 400/600 350 400 400 500
150 180 207 225 5 600 400 450 450 600
200 240 276 300 5 600 500 600 600

97
 "

~\
~
j

FIGURE 2 (cont'd)

HP K L M N 0 P

125% THREE CONDUCTOR BRANCH CABLE

FLA
AWG (IEEE 452 50°C) TSGA-( )
T E,X AVS 40°C 50iC
.5 1.25 14 14 14 4 4
.75 1.75 14 14 14 4 4
1 2.25 14 14 14 4 4
1.5 3.25 14 14 14 4 4
2 4.25 14 14 14 4 4
3 6 14 14 14 4 4
5 9.5 14 14 14 4 4
7.5 13.75 14 14 14 4 4
10 17.5 14 14 14 4 9
15 26.25 10 10 12 9 9
20 33.75 8 10 10 9 9
25 42.5 7 8 8 14 14
30 50 6 7 7 14 23
40 65 4 5 6 23 23
50 81.25 2 3 4 30 40
60 96.25 1 2 3 40 50
75 120 2/0 I/O 1 60 75
100 155 3/0 2/0 I/O 100 100
l.25 195 250 4/0 3/0 125 150
150 225 300 250 4/0 150 200
.200 300 500 400 300 250 300

98
 APPENDIX 6

MOTOR CIRCUIT INFORMATION

Examples Of 3-Phase AC Motor Circuits. Use Quick-Reference

Columns, Figure 1:

(a) Example No.1. Single motor, 25 horsepower, 460V, cOQe

letter J, full voltage start, non-vital, non-adjustable
overloads, branch circuit protected by circuit breaker,
Type T, IEEE 45 Cable, in 50·C ambient temperature space.

From Quick-Reference Columns, Figure 1:

D - Standard overload size nearest 115 percent full load;

current is 40 amperes.

E - Starter size is 2.

F If a disconnect is used near the motor, a 100 ampere

size is sufficient, provided it is not fused above 100
amperes (if fusible). If part of a combination starter, the
complete unit must be rated to handle the 25-horsepower
motor.

I - The maximum standard size for the branch circuit

protective device is a 90 ampere breaker.

L - The cable used to pover the motor must be rated for at

least 42.5 amperes. For Type T cable in a 50·C ambient
location Type T-7 is required.

(b) Example No.2. A 460 volt Motor Control Center (MCC)

supplying one 30 HP, one 15 HP, and two 5 HP motors in 50·C
ambient space. One 5 HP motor is a steering system pump.
All are full-voltage starting; the 30 HP motor starter has
adjustable overloads. The unit has branch circuit
protection with circuit breakers. Navy-type cable TSGA is
used. First get data for each motor load; assume code
letters F-V.

From Quick-Reference Columns, Figure 2:

Col. A Col. B Col. C Col. E Col. F Col. I Col. K Col. P

Std. Max.
Adj. Disc. Branch
Full Over Start- Size, Circ. 50·C
Horse- Load Load er If Bkr. 125% TSGA-( )
Power Amps Size Size Used (250%) F.L.A.
30 40 .;.(; 3 100 100 50 23
15 21 24'.2 2 60 60 26.3 9
5 7.6 8.7 0 30 N/A 9.5 4

99
 « \

Subchapter J does not address ~otor control centers directly; one must-refer
to NEC 430-24 and 430-62(a). Per 430-24, bus or cable in MCC must be sized
for 125 percent of the largest plus 100 percent of the remaining motor full
load currents, 50 + 21 + 7.6 + 7.6 - 86.2 amperes. If the MCC has spare
sections, allowance shall be made for future growth. Breaker protecting
entire MCC must not be larger than the largest rating or setting of the
branch-circuit short-circuit and ground fault protection (based on Table
430-152) for any motor in the group, plus the sum of the full load currents of
the other motors in the group, or 100 + 21 + 7.6 + 7.6 - 136.2 amperes.

A 125 amp circuit breaker would be adequate.

The 5 HP steering pump motor should be protected with a circuit breaker having
adjustable, instantaneous (magnetic) type tripping only. This breaker must be
set to open the motor circuit at 175 to'200 percent of the locked rotor
current. As will be shown below, this setting should be 79 to 90 amperes.
NEMA AC General Pur~se, Class A Full Voltase Controllers,
Single-Speed Squ1rr Cage Motors.

3-PHAS E NON-JOGGING DUTY

CONTINUOUS HORS EPOWER

SIZE DUTY AMPS 200 VAC 230 VAC 460 VAC LIMIT AMPS
00 9 1.5 1.5 2 11
0 18 3 3 5 21
1 27 7.5 7.5 10 32
2 45 10 15 25 52
3 90 25 30 50 104
4 135 40 50 100 156
5 270 75 100 200 311
6 540 150 200 400 621
7 810 300 600 932

3-PHASE JOGCING DUTY

0 lB 1.5 1.5 2 21
1 27 3 3 5 32
2 45 7.5 10 15 52
3 90 15 20 30 104
4 135 25 30 60 156
5 270 60 75 150 311
6 540 125 150 300 621

NOTE: From NEliA IeS 2-321 B

Motor Conversion Formulas.

TO FIND DC AC-S1ngle Phase AC 3 Phase

AMPS when HP x 746 HP x 746 HP x 746

HP Is known Volts x Eff Volts x Eff x PF Volts x 1. 73 x Eff x PF

AMPS when KW x 1000 KW x 1000 lCW x 1000

KW 1s known Volts Volts x PF Volts x 1.73 x PF

AMPS when '¥:.VAx1000 1:!JAx 1000

KVA is known Volts Volts x 1.73
100
TO FIND DC AC-Single Phase AC 3 Phase

Kilowatts AMPS x Volts AMPS x Volts x PF AMPS x Volts x 1.73 x PF

KW 1000 1000 1000

KVA AMPS x Vol ts AMPS x Volts x 1.73

Power Factor KW/KVA KW/KVA

PF

HP Output AMPS x Volts x Eff AMPS x Volts x Eff x PF

746 746

AMPS ~ Volts x 1.73 x Eff x PF

746

NOTES: (1) Power Factor and Efficiency should be expressed in

decimals.

(2) If Power Factor is not given, assume 0.8.

(3) If Efficiency is not given, assume 0.8.

Single Phase Motor: Approximate Full Load Current.

HP 115V HP 115V
.33 7.2 2 24.0
.5 9.8 3 34.0
.75 13.8 5 56.0
1.0 16.0 7.5 80.0
1.5 20.0 10 100.0

NOTES: (1) Values are for motors of normal speed and torque.

(2) For additional values, see NEC Table 430-148.

(3) For other KW ratings, voltages, and power factors:

AMPS c: KW x 1000
1.732 x Volts x PF

Motor Locked Rotor Curren t.

Max. 115VAC 1 Phase 208VAC 3 Phase 230VAC 3 Phase 460VAC 3 Phase

HP
100% 175% 200% 100% 175% 200% 100% 175% 200% 100% 175% 200%
2 144 252 288 n--;:g-~ ~6137f3 2C)~~
3 204 357 408 59 103 118 54 95 108 27 47 54
5 336 588 672 99 173 198 go 158 180 45 79 90

101
 ,. \

-~
/

Motor Locked Fotor Current (cont.)

Max. 115VAC 1 Phase 208VAC 3 Phase 230VAC 3 Phase 460VAC 3 Phase

HP
100% 175% 200% 100% 175% 200% 100% 175% 200% 100% 175% 200%
7.5 480 840 960 145 254 290 132 TIl 264 66TT6TI2
10 600 1050 1200 178 312 356 162 284 324 84 147 168
15 264 462 528 240 420 480 120 210 240
20 343 599 686 312 546 624 156 273 312
25 422 739 844 384 672 768 192 336 384
30 515 901 1030 468 819 936 234 410 468
40 686 1201 1372 624 1092 1248 312 546 624
50 825 1444 1650 750 1313 1500 378 662 756
75 1221 2137 2442 110 1943 2220 558 977 1116
100 1624 2874 3248 1476 2583 2952 738 1292 1476

NOTES: (1) These values are to be used only if motor code letter
is not provided.

(2) Values above calculated from NEC Tables 430-150.

430-151.

(3) If motor nameplate code letter is provided, the

following applies:

(a) See NEC Table 430-7(b) for code letter KVA/HP;

and

(b) Locked rotor current. IL:

3-phase motors IL = HP x (KVA/HP) x 1000

1.73 X Volts

- 577 x HP x (KVA/HP)
Volts

I-phase motors IL = HP x (KVA/HP) x 1000

Volts

Continuous-Dutl, 3-Phase Motor AEEroximate F.L.A.

HP Squirrel Ca~e Wound Rotor

208V 220V 440V 208V nov 440V
.5 2.1 1.9 .95 1.0
1 3.7 3.4 1.7 5.9 5.4 2.7
1.5 5.5 5.0 2.5 7.5 6.8 3.4
2.0 6.9 6.3 3.1 8.8 8.0 4.0
2.5 8.4 7.6 3.8 9.7 8.8 4.4
3.0 9.9 9.0 4.5 ll.5 10.5 5.3
5.0 16.0 14.5 7.2 17.6 16.0 8.0
6.0 18.9 17.2 8.6 19.8 18.0 9.0

102
3-Phase Motor Ap;eroximate F.L.A. (cont. )
HP Sg,uirrel Ca~e Wound Rotor
208V 220V 440V 208V 220V 440V
7.5 23 21 10.5 25:"3 23 ---rr:-5
9.0 27.3 24.8 12.4 28.6 26 13
10 28.6 26 13.5 31.9 29 14.5
20 57.2 52 26 59 54 27
25 71.5 65 32 75- 68 34
30 86 78 39 88 80 40
35 101 92 46 103 94 47
40 112 102 51 114 104 52
45 128 116 58 128 116 58
50 139 126 63 141 128 64
60 167 152 76 169 154 77
75 207 188 94 207 188 94
100 275 250 125 275 250 125
125 341 310 155 341 310 155 ~
150 407 370 185 407 370 185
200 539 490 245 539 490 245
NOTES : (1) To be used in lieu of nameplate data (see NEC 430-6).

(2) Not to be used to size motor running overloads; use

nameplate data.

(3) For multi-speed, low speed, special motors, use

nameplate data.

(4) For additional information, see NEC Table 430-150.

(5) Range6~ 220V 220-240VAC

440V 440-480VAC

103
 APPENDIX 7

LIST OF ELECTRICAL HAZARD GROUP

CLASSIFICATIONS FOR BULK DANGEROUS CARGOES

NOTES:

1. This table is the National Academy of Sciences' (NAS)

"Classification of Gases, Liquids, and Volatile Solids Relative to
Explosion-proof Electrical Equipment," NMAB 353-5 (1982). This
information is is updated as necessary in the Federal Register.

2. "HI!indicates a high flash point (in excess of l50oF.), a Grade E

combustible liquid: less stringent electrical requirements apply per
46 CFR 111.105-29.

3. "N" indicates non-flammable; however, when the non-flammable evolves

hydrogen in contact with mild steel or otherwise results in the
liberation of another flammable gas, an appropriate electrical group
is assigned instead of an "Nilbeing shown.

4. "NAilindicates that no electrical hazard group is applicable; no

electrical restrictions apply.

5. Note that Grade E combustible liquids do have hazardous areas (in

tanks) and that intrinsically safe (IS) equipment (level indicators,
etc.) must be for the proper group.

104
, .

LIST OF ELECTRICAL HAZARD GROUP

CLASSIFICATIONS FOR BULK DANGEROUS CARGOES

C Acetaldehyde
D Acetic acid
D Acetic anhydride
H Acetone cyanohydrin
D Acetonitrile
D Acrylic acid
D Acrylonitrile
H Adiponitrile
C Allyl alcohol
D Allyl chloride
NA Aluminum sulfate solution
H Aminoethyl ethanolamine
D Ammonia, anhydrous (press.)
D Ammonia, anhydrous (atmosphere)
NA Ammonium bisulfite solution (70% or less)
D Ammonium hydroxide (28% or less NH3)
H Aniline
D Anthracene oil (coal tar fraction)
NA Argon, liquified
D Benzene
D Benzene-hydrocarbon mi~tures
B Butadiene
B Butadiene, butene mixtures
D n-Butyl acrylate
D iso-Butyl acrylate
D Butylamine
C Butylmethacrylate
C Butyraldehydes (crude)
C n-Butyraldehyde
C iso-Butyraldehyde
D Camphor oil (light)
H Carbolic oil
A Carbon disulfide
NA Carbon dioxide (liquefied)
N Carbon tetrachloride
N Caustic potash solution
N Caustic soda solution
N Chlorine
D Chlorobenzene
N Chloroform
D Chlorohydrins (crude)
B Chlorosulfonic acid
D Coal tar
D Coal tar naphtha solvent
D Coal tar pitch (molten)
H Creosote
H Cresols
N Cresylate spent caustic
C Crotonaldehyde
D Cyclohexanone
D Cyclohexylamine
H iso-Decyl acrylate
D Dichlorobenzene (all isomers)
105
N Dichlorodlfluoromethane
D l,l-Dichloroethane
D 2,2-Dicbloroethyl ether
N Dichloromethane
NA 2,4-Dichloropbenoxyacetic
acid, diethanolamine
salt solution
NA 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic
acid, dlmethylamine
salt solution
NA 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic
acid, triisopropanol-
amine salt solution
D Dichloropropane
D Dichloropropene, Dichloropropane mixtures
NA 2,2-Dichloropropionic acid
H Diethanolamine
C Diethylamine
H Diethylenetriamine
C Diisobutylamine
H Diisopropanolamine
C Diisopropylamine
D N,N-Dimethylacetamide
C Dimethylamine
C Dimethylethanolamine
D Dimethyl Formamide
C l,4-Dioxane
C Di-n-propylamine
NA Diphenylmethane Diisocyanate
C Epicblorohydrin
H Ethanolamine
D Ethyl acrylate
D Ethylamine (72% or less)
C Ethyl n-butylamine
D Ethyl chloride
C Ethyl cyclohexylamine
D Ethylene ch+orohydrin
H Ethylene cyanohydrin
D Ethylene diamine
N Ethylene dibromide
D Ethylene dichloride
NA Ethylene glycol propyl ether
B Ethylene oxide
C Ethyl ether
H 2-Ethyl bexyl acrylate
C Ethylidene norbornene
D Ethyl methacrylate
C 2-Ethyl-3-proply acrolein
B Ferric chloride solutions
H Formaldehyde solution (37%-50%)
D Formic acid
C Furfural
NA Glutaraldehyde solution (50% or less)
D Bexamethylenediam1ne solutions
C Hexamethylene1mine
B Hydrochloric acid
B Hydrochloric acid, spent (IS! or less)
B Hydrofluorosiliclc acid (25% or less)
106
B Hydrogen chloride
B Hydrogen fluoride
H 2-Hydroxyethyl acrylate
D Isoprene
NA Kraft pulping liquors (free alkali content 3% or more)
D Mesityl oxide
C Methylacetylene Propadiene mixture
D Methyl acrylate
D Methylamine (anhydrous)
D Methylamine solution (42% or less)
D Methyl bromide
D Methyl chloride
B Methylcyclopentadiene dimer
C Methyldiethanolamine
H 2-Methyl-5-ethyl pyridine
D Methyl methacrylate
D 2-Methyl pyridine
D alpha-Methyl styrene
N Monochlorodifluoromethane
H Ethanolamine
C Morpholine
D Motorfuel antiknock compounds
B Nitric acid (70% or less)
D Nitrobenzene
NA Nitrogen, Liquified
C 1- or 2- Nitropropane
NA Octyl nitrates (all isomers)
B Oleum
NA Pentachloroethane
D 1,3-Pentadiene
N Perchloroethylene
H Phenol
H Phosphorous, elemental
B Phosphoric acid
H Phthalic anhydride
H Polyethylene polyamine
H Polymetbylene polyphenylisocyanate
H iso-Propanolamine
D Propionic acid
D iso-Propylamine
B Propylene oxide
D iso-Propyl ether
D Pyridine
NA Sodium aluminate solution
N Sodium chlorate solution (50% or less)
NA Sodium dichromate solution (70% or less)
NA Sodium hypochlorite solution (15% or less)
N Sodium sulfide, hydrosulfide solutions (H2S l5ppm or less)
N Sodium sulfide, hydrosulfide solutions (H2S greater than lSppm but less
than 20Oppm)
N Sodium sulfide, hydrosulfide solutions (H2S greater than 200ppm)
NA Sodium thiocyanate solution (56% or less)
D Styrene mono~e~
C Sulfur (molten)
N Sulfur dioxide

107
B Sulfuric acid
B Sulfuric acid, spent
NA l,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane
H Tetraethylene pentamine
C Tetrahydrofuran
H Toluene diisocyanate
D 1,l,2,-Trichloroethane
D Trichloroethylene
H l,2,3-Trichloropropane
H Triethanolamine
C Triethylamine
H Triethylene tetramine
H Tiiisopropanolamine
C Velaraldehyde (iso-,n-)
NA Vanillan black liquor (free alkali content 3% or more)
D Vinyl acetate
D Vinyl chloride
D Vinylidene chloride
D Vinyl toluene
D Urea, Ammonium nitrate (containing more than 2% NH3)

108
 APPENDIX 8

RECOMMENDED PLAN REVIEW CHECK-OFF FOR HAZARDOUS LOCATIONS

1. Has sufficient information been provided?

____ (a) Hazardous cargoes;

____ (b) An arrangement plan identifying hazardous and non-hazardous areas,

cargo system or hazards, electrical equipment ~ype and locations;

____ (c) A complete and detailed Bill of Materials;

____ (d) Elementary and one-line wiring diagrams, showing all wiring;

__ (e) Electrical installation details;

_(f) Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory (NRTL) label or listing

for explosionproof (EP) and intrinsically safe (IS) equip~ent
and systems; and

____ {g) Maximum temperature ratings of electrical equipment in hazardous areaE.

2. Identify hazardous characteristics:

____ (a) Class and group;

____ (b) Flashpoint and grade;

____ (c) Minimum ignition temperatures; and

____ (d) Special requirements, including material compatibility.

3. Confirm boundaries of hazardous locations and suitability of equipment

installed.

4. Confirm that the installation meets:

____ (8) Subchapter J;

____ (b) Intended application by a NRTL (currently UL, FM, CSA, and MET are
acceptable to the Coast Guard):

____ (c) Specific requirements for the cargo/material; and

____ (d) General considerations of this NVIC.

109
 .,

TANKS HIP WEATHERDECK CRITERIA

CARCO
BLOc~

...

TAN KS

:quipment in cross-hatched areas must be

xplosionproof. watertight. Class 1, Division See 46 eFR 111.105-31(1)

TANK BARGE WEATHERDECK CRITERIA

Grades A-D: See 46 eFR ]11.105-31(1)

valves, flanges (ullage, gauge,

~utterwortht vent

)-foot rule: Equipment in cross-hatched areas must be exp1osionproof, watertight

Class 1, Division 1 110
 SPECIFIED HAZARDOUS LOCATIONS
LOCATION CLASS I CLASS 1 CLASS II CLASS III
DIV. 1 DIV.2

CARGO TANKS· NA NA NA NA
CARGO HANDLING ROOMS· NA NA NA HA
COFFERDAMS * NA NA NA NA
BATTERY ROOMS 'X 'itA NA NA
PAINT STORAGE ROOMS X NA NA HA
PAINT MIXING ROOMS X NA NA HA
OIL STORAGE ROOMS X NA NA HA
ANESTHETIC HANDLING AREA X NA NA NA
TANK VESSEL WEATHERDECK
10 FT. RULE x NA HA
TANK VESSEL WEATHERDECK
CARGO BLOCK x NA NA NA
FLAMMABLE GAS HANDLING
ROOM· NA NA NA NA
FLAMMABLE LIQUID
HANDLING ROOM· NA NA NA NA
AD~ACENT TO CLASS I,
DIV. 1 W/COHMUNICATION X NA NA NA
TANK VESSEL ENCLOSED SPACES
ADJACENT TO CARGO TANK· NA NA NA NA
CRAIN HANDLING AREA NA NA X NA
COAL HANDLING AREA NA NA X NA
COAL PULVERIZING AREA NA NA X NA
CARPENTER SHOP NA NA NA X
FIBER HANDLING AREA NA NA NA X
VENT DUCT SAME AS SPACE SERVED
TANK VESSEL CARGO HOSE
STOWAGE S~A9E~ NA NA NA NA
SPACE CONTAINING CARGO PIPING
ONLY, ON TANK VESSELS. NA NA NA NA
LPG BARRIER SPACE* NA NA NA NA
ENCLOSED SPACE OPENING TO
WEATHER DECK HAZ. AREA X NA NA NA
TANK VESSELS WITHIN 8' OF
CARGO CONTAINMENT SYSTEM X NA HA NA
TANK VESSELS, WITHIN 10' OF
CARGO HANDLING ROOM OOOR
OR VENT X NA NA NA
VESSEL FUEL OIL TANKS,
10' RULEDOES NOT APPLY X NA HA HA
TANK VESSEL, .A-D CARGOES,
AREA FROM~3m TO Sm OF (see SOLAS 11-2/59.1.7.2)
PV VALVES NA X NA NA
TANK VESSEL. A-D CARGOES,
(see SOLAS 11-2/59.1.9.3)
AREA FROM 3m TO 10m OF
VENT OU'fLEIS fOR fREE
FLOW OF VAPORS AND H. V •
VENTS FOR LOADING OR
DISCHARGE NA X NA NA

* These area. are considered .ore hazardoul than C1a.s I, Dlv1810n 1 and
therefore carry apecific requirements in 46 CPR111.105-29,111.105-31. and
111.105-32 •
111
 APPENDIX 9

Approvals Under Subchapter Q

Subchapter Q electrical equipment (see 46 CFR 161) is required to be

"approved" by the Commandant and is listed in Equipment Lists. For the most
part, the specifications in Subchapter Q have not been updated since 1959 and,
therefore, do not reflect changes in the state of the art. The following
electrical equipment receives approval under Subchapter Q:

a. 161.004 - Emergency Loudspeaker Systems. Although this specification

is in need of revision, there have been no new submittals for type
approval of emergency loudspeaker systems in the past several years. The
Coast Guard intends to propose deletion of this Subchapter Q specification
in regulatory project CGD85-043, Miscellaneous Changes to the Electrical
Engineering Regulations. The Coast Guard intends to incorporate
performance requirements in Subchapter J for public address systems on all
vessels subject to Subchapter J.

b. 161.006 - Searchlights, Motor Lifeboat For Merchant Vessels. The

Coast Guard intends to delete the Subchapter Q specification and
incorporate an industry concensus standard, ASTM Fl003-1986 "Searchlights
for Motor Lifeboats," in regulatory project CGD84-049.

c. 161.008 - Hand Electric Flashlights For Merchant Vessels. Until

recently, approved flashlights were required in lifeboats and liferafts.
The Federal Register, Vol. 53, No. 96, dated May 18, 1988 published the
final rule which deletes 46 CFR 161.008. This rule, effective August 16,
1988, requires flashlights for lifeboats and liferafts to be constructed
to ASTM Fl014-l986, "Standard Specification for Flashlights on Vessels",
as a Type I or Type III flashlight. It also requires flashlights in
emergency lockers, fireman's outfits, and as part of the safety equipment
on self-propelled vessels carrying bulk liquefied gases to be constructed
to ASTM F1014-l986 as a Type II or Type III flashlight. Manufacturers of
flashlights who have current Certificates of Approval for their
flashlights may continue to label their flashlights with the appropriate
U.S. Coast Guard approval number up to the expiration date of the
Certificate of Approval. These Certificates will not be re-issued after
their expiration date. Coast Guard approved flashlights in lifeboats
presently installed on U.S. flag vessels need not be replaced as long as
they are in serviceable condition.

d. 161.010 - Floating Electric Waterlights. Many of these lights have

had their approvals superseded by new approvals. Waterlights that are
approved at the time of installation and then have their approvals
superseded may continue in service as long as they are operational. The
Coast Guard intends to adopt the construction requirements of UL 1196,
"Floating Electric Waterlights," to replace the detailed requirements in
the Subchapter Q specification. The UL standard addresses the present
international reqUirements of SOLAS 74 and the 1983 ammendments.

112
 APPEtmIX 10

lNSPECl'IONOF ELECTRICAL INS'IALLAtIONS FOR VESSEL CERTIFICATION

1. Introduction. (NOTE: The material in this Appendix has been taken

substantially from HEM 1I/6.L.) At each inspection for certification. the
inspector shall examine the vessel's electrical equipment and apparatus, the
arrangement and materials of the installation, and the operating condition of
the installation as required by the regulations. The primary purposes of
electrical inspections are to ensure the adequacy and reliability of shipboard
electrical systems, to maximize safety to·personnel from electrical shock, and
to minimize the danger of fire originating within the electrical system.

2. Scope of Inspection. The scope of the electrical inspections for vessels

other than small passenger vessels is detailed in the vessel CFR subchapters
and is supplemented by 46 CFR 110.30. The inspection includes the examination
and testing, when necessary, of all electric generators, motors, wiring
circuits, junction boxes, fixtures, and other electric installations. No
electrical repairs or alterations affecting the safety of the vessel, its
equipment, and crew should be made without the knowledge and approval of the
oeMI. Drawings must be approved before work is started when the repairs will
involve alterations.
3. References. The standards for the inspection of electrical installations
on all vessels except small passenger vessels (Subchapter T vessels) are
contained in 4b CFR Subchapter J. As indicated in 46 CFR 110.10, they are
supplemented by recognized specifications, standards, and codes. Subc ha p t er J
applies to small passenger vessels only insofar as it is made applicable by
46 CFR 183. Vessels contracted for prior to November 19, 1952 are not fully
subject to the requirements in Subchapter J. The electrical installations on
these oice~ vessels may be maintained as long as their condition is
satisfactory to the OeMI, unless amended regulations specifically apply to
these vessels. However, major alterations or extensions to such electrical
installations shall be made to the requirements of Subchapter J.

113
4. Initial Electrical Inspections.

a. Introduction. In carrying out tests and inspections prescribed in

the vessel subchapters and in 46 CFR 110.30, the inspector shall
pay particular attention to the items listed below. These tests
and inspections are intended as guides to the inspector; they are
not mandatory unless the OeMI judges them to be necessary. Extreme
caution shail be exercised during all inspections and tests. Tests
and inspections will be done by the shipbuilder, the owner, or the
owners representative. They should be observed by the inspector
and the recorded data obtained for checking and reference purposes.
b. Electrical Cable. Electrical cable shall be checked during
installation for size and type as sho-~ on the approved plans. The
adequacy of cable supports shall also be checked. It shall be
ascertained that cables are not located near pipes and hot objects,
and that they have not been damaged during installation by excessive
pulling, sharp bends, sharp or rough edge9 of cable supports or
bulkhead penetrations, or similar condition9. Cable penetrations
required to be watertight shall be checked for proper packing of
terminal or stuffing tubes, including area9 provided for future takeup
of gland units. Cable penetrations th~ough Cla9s A and Class B
bulkheads and decks shall be chec~:edfor complia~ce with approved
methods.

c. Insulation Resistance. All elect~ic ?Owe~f lighting cables,

generators, and vital sY9tems motors 9hall be checked fOL proper
insulation to ground and between conductor9. The insulation
resistance measuring instr~ent (~e6&er) used should be of the 500
volt, direct-current type, except for equip~ent ~here the normal
operating voltage is less than 100 volt9 in which case a direct
reading ohmmeter of the appropriate voltage should be used.
Insulation resistance varies considerably ~ith humidity, amount of
exposed copper, etc. The~efore, it is difficult to establish firm
rules to guide the inspector. Generally, Figure A-4 should be used as
a guide in determining minimum acceptable values of insulation
resistance. Ordinarily, on a dry day and ~ith nev, clean eq~ipment,
resistance should not be less than the values indicated in the
figure. The insulation resistance in mego~3 shall be at least equal
to that determined by the fo~ula in figure A-4.

114
 FIGURE A-4

IRSULATIOli;, RESISTANC E

1. GENERAL INSULATION RESISTANCE FORMULA,,FOR ,VITAL MOTORS AND GENERATORS

R (In Megohms) II: E _

KVA + 1,CX>O
100

Where: E c Rated line to line voltage of the machine.

KVA c Rated kilovolt amperes.

2. GE1;ERAL RESI STANCE TABLE FOR CABLE1

MINIMUH
CI RCUI T INSULATION RESISTANCE

0-5 ampe r-e s , inclusive 2.0 megohms

6-10 amperes, inclusive 1.0 megohms
11-25 amperes, inclusive 400,000 ohms
26-50 ara peres, inclusive 250,000 ohI!lS
51-1OJ e...::?eres, inclusive 100,000 ohms
101-200 ara peres, inclusive 50,000 ohms
Over 200 e rape r-e s 25,000 ohms

1 The values for a circuit should be determined with the circuit

d~-e~ergized, ~ith all s~itches or circuit breakers connected in the circuit
closed, and W'ithall panelboards, controllers, fuses, and fuseholders in place.

d. Group Control Panels. When two or more motor controllers are grouped
into 8 central panel and supplied by a co~on feeder, the panel shall
be checked for compliance with the requirementg of 46 CFR 111.10.
Each controller, its a8~ociated motor overcurrent protective device,
its motor branch circuit overcurre~t protective device, and
disconnecting mechanism shall be mounted in a common enclosure vith a
disconnect device that prevents the door being opened vheo the circuit
is energized. The enclosure shall be either dripproof or vatertight.
depe~ding on its location. Adequate vorking apace should also be
provided. Thi8 generally ehould ~ no less than ;6 inches in front,

,, ~
 '~

and in no case less than 24 inches in the rear, when access

to the rear may be necessary.

e. Generators. Generators ahall be checked for general condition (both

electrical and mechanical), voltage regulation, parallel operation,
operation of safety -devices'such''8.S reverse-current or reverse-power
trips, overcurrent trips, overspeed trips, low-oil pressure trips, and
similar devices (see 46 eFR 111.12).

f. Rotating Electric Machinery. This equipment shAll be checked to

ensure that rotating and uninsulated electric parts are adequately
shielded from accidental contact by personnel. Nameplate data shall
be examined for correct ratings for the particular application (see 46
CFR 111.01 and 111.25).

g. S~itchboards. Switchboards shall be checked for nonconducting

handrails, guardrails, working spaces, insulating floor coverings,
drip covers, and shields. Switchboard enclosures shall be checked for
proper construction in accordance with 46 eFR 111.30. S~itchboard
mounted apparatus shall be checked for identifying nameplates.
Circuit nameplates shall be compared with the rating or setting of the
overcurrent devices and with approved plans. The accessibility of
items requiring maintenance or adjustment shall be checked. Meters
shall be checked for proper operation. The operation of autornetic
s"itchgear and interlocks shall be observed (see 46 CFR 111.30).

h. Panelboards. The rating or Betting of the overcurrent devices shall

be compared with the values given on the circuit directory and the
approved plans. The accuracy of the directory description of loads
served by each circuit shall also be checked (see 46 eFR 111.40).

i. Kotor Starters. Motor starters shall be checked to ensure proper

starting under service conditions with properly rated, motor running,
overcurrent protective devices. Enclosures shall be checked to ensure
that they are dripproof or watertight, and that required door
positioners are installed on doors with a height of more than 45
inches or a width greater than 24 inches. A fixed heat-resistant
wiring diagram for each motor starter must be on the inside of its
enclosure door. Each motor starter not disconnected from all sources
of potential when the disconnect svitch is opened, due to electrically
interlocked circuits that are necessary for proper operation of the
apparatus or for other valid reasons, shall have attentio~ directed to
these conditions by a warning Bign (see 46 CFR 111.70).

j. Disconnect Switches. The presence and location of disconnect s_itches

required for motor starters, fuses, etc •• shall be checked. Vben a
switch, circuit breaker, switchboard, or distribution panel is
intended to serve as a motor and controller disconnect s~itch, the
inspector shall ensure that the applicable requirements have been met
(see.46 CFR 111.55 and 111.70).

116
 k. Accessibility. The accessibility of electrical apparatus for
inspection and maintenance shall be observed. The accessibility of
junction boxes and ·similarapparatus in vay of paneling shall also be
noted,. Hinged doors 'of lDotor--atart ers-and-simi-la-r-appara
tU8-8ha-ll~'be
checked for interference with adjacent structural parts or apparatus.

1. General Alarm Systems. The general alarm system shall be checked with
a sound level meter, the sound level of the bells being measured in
each stateroom with the doors closed. Where the background.noise
level is questionable. the sound level should be measured while the
vessel is underway (see 46 CFR ll~.25-9).

m. Emergency Loudspeaker Systems. During the initial inspection for

certification, the emergency loudspeaker system ahall be checked with
a sound level meter at each lifeboat handling station, each lifeboat
embarkation station, each passenger assembly station, and throughout
the crew's quarters. Where the background noise level is
questionable, the sound level should be measured while the vessel is
underway (see 46 CFR Table 113.50 for the required sound levels).

n. Electric Installations In Hazardous Locations. Electric equipment and

wiring in hazardous locations shall be checked for compliance with 46
CFR 111.105. Intrinsically safe systems shall be checked to ensure
that they are installed in accordance with the plans and instructions
requi~ed by 46 CFR 111.105-11. Equipment required to be
erplosionproof or intrinsically safe shall also be checked for proper
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL), Factory Mutual Research
Corporation (fl1), Canadian Standards Association (CSA), MET
El'2ctrical Testing Company (MET). or other "nationally recognized
testing laboratory" label or other evidence of listing. Purged or
pressurized equipment shall be checked for adequate air supply and
required interlocks.

o. Steering Gear Circuits. Steering gear circuits shall be separated to

meet the requirements of 46 CFR 111.93. Steering gear motor
controllers shall be located in the steering gear room.
p. Emergency Circuits. Circuits connected to the emergency
switchboard must not pass through the engineroom or boiler room
(except for circuits supplying equipment in those spaces).

q. Low Voltage Release Tests. It shall be determined that motor

controllers required by 46 CFR 111.70-3(f) and (g) to have low voltage
release, do so, and that motor controllers prohibited from having low
voltage release have low voltage protection. All motors should be run
Simultaneously and all generators then tripped off the line. One
generator should be placed back on the line; it should not trip
because of the oncoming load. Motor controllers requiring low voltage
release should start their motors automatically; those prohibited from
having low voltage release should Dot start their motors
automatically. If the motor load exceeds the total ship's service
generating capacity, this test should be conducted with all motors
that have low voltage release and suffici~nt motors with low voltage
protection, adding up to the total generating capacity running. A

117
 q. (cont'd) second teat shall then be conducted with the remaining
motora, Done of the motors in this second test should start
8utomatlCiIry.

r. Miscellaneous Electrical Equipment. The Coast Guard no longer grants

type approvals for miscellaneous electrical equipment. Electrical
equipment can basically be divided into the following categories!

(1) Equipment Required To Be ApprovedEr The Commandant. 1his

equipment is listed in Subchapter Q and viII have an approval
number assigned.

(2) Equipment Required To Meet Various Standards. This equipment is

contained in Subchapter J. It is important to note that the
requirement is to meet the standard, not to be listed by a
listing service. The burden of proof that the standard is met
rests with the manufacturer.

(3) EqUipment Required To Be Erplosionproof Or Intrinsically Safe.

This equipment must be listed by a nationally recognized testing
laboratory (initially UL, FM, CSA, or MET).
[NOTE: Some equipment approvals may require combination of the above
factors.]

5. Subsequent Electrical Inspections.

a. Introduction. In subsequent tests and inspections, inspectors shall

pay particular attention to the items listed in this section of the
manual. The inspector shall determine mechanical and electrical
conditions, performance, safety of personnel against shock hazards,
and safety of the vessel from fire hazards.

b. Nev And Modified Circuits. Circuits and equipment added or modified

since the last inspection shall be given special attention to
determine that they comply with the regulations.

c. Navigation Lights. Navigation lights shall be examined for corrosion

of materials and for satisfactory condition of portable cable and
receptacles. Navigation light panels shall be tested for satisfactory
operation and proper functioning of alarms.

d. Lifeboat ~inch Electrical Equipment. All enclosures for electrical

lifeboat ~inch control equipment, such as limit Bwitches, master
switches, and emergency disconnect svitches, shall be opened and
examine~ for evidence of vater or corrosion. In particular, attention
ehall be given to the proper functioning of limit switches and
emergency disconnect s~itches in the control circuits of lifeboat

118
d. (cont1d) winches. Casualty investigations have indicated the need to
specifically examine the clutch interlock switches on dual winches,
such as those on Victory-type cargo ships. It is essential that
satisfactory limit switches and emergency disconnect switches be used
with gravity davits and power-operated winches. Therefore, a test
operation of the lifeboat winch controls, including limit switches,
emergency disconnects, and clutch interlocks where employed, sha~l be
conducted at each reinspection and as the inspector may require.

e. ~atertight Doors. The inspector shall thoroughly check the watertight

door systems to verify that they are in satisfactory operating
condition. The enclosures for all local control door switches and
controllers should be examined for evidence of water or corrosion. It
has been found that faulty operation of electrically operated
watertight doors may be caused by seawater entering the local control
switch located at the watertight door. If seawater has entered the
switch enclosure, it may short circuit the motor starter and motor so
that the door opens even with the wheelhouse control indf~ating the
"closed" position. To the extent practical, the inspector shall also
be s&tisfiec that the ship's personnel are familiar with the
watertight door system, location of disconnect switches, etc.
f. Electrical Cables. The condition of cables should be determined by
insulation resistance readings (see subparagraph 4.c. above) and by
visual examination. Deterioration of armor should not generally
require replacement. Deteriorated armor may be removed, except where
required in hazardous locations. Where deteriorated armor segments
ar~ not grounded, they must be connected to ground. Deteriorated
armor in hazardous areas must b~ replaced or repaired.
g. Ground Detection Systems. Ground detection systems should function
properly. Where lamps are used, they should be of the proper wattage
with the connections between the lamps grounded. Ground faults shall
be cleared.

h. Te~pc~ary Wiring And Installations. Long extension cords, "juryrigs,"

or temporary modifications are not satisfactory installations.

119
1. Portable Electrical Equipment. Portable electrical equipment may be
accepted in several ways. Portable cargo lights are covered under
the Underwriters Laboratories Inc. "Standards for Marine-Type
Electric Lighting Fixtures." These lights are labeled to indicate UL
approval as "marine types"; portable items covered by this category
are considered satisfactory. Portable items not labeled by UL must
be checked to ensure compliance with 46 CFR Subchapter J. Portable
fixtures should be referred to the Marine Safety Center for
determination. Approval of portable lighting devices by inspectors
is not advisable. Portable tools can be accepted if the design
appears to be commercially sound. This can be verified by a UL
listing under the classification "Tools -- Commercial Type."

Existing equipment shall be serviceable and free from potential shock

or fire hazards. Metal bodies of these items shall be grounded
through grounding leads in the portable cord. To be effective, the
grounding conductor on a tool or light must be connected to a
grounding terminal. This conductor must be electrically continuous
(the wire must not be broken anywhere along its length), this can be
checked with an ohmmeter or megger. Portable devices which are
double insulated need not be furnished with the grounding conductor
in the portable cord and the grounding pole in the attachment plug.
No splices or patching should be permitted in porta~le leads smaller
than No. 12 AWG. Splices shall be in accordance witn 46 eFR
111.60-19. Careful checks shall be made of the condition of the cord
where it enters the light or tool. This is a location of severe
stress and bending fatigue, especially on items such 8S portable
cargo lights. Cracking, brittleness, and heat discoloration of the
cord at this point are sufficient reasons for rejection. If the
device is to be rewired, only cords indicated in 46 eFR Table
111.60-13 for hard or extra-hard service should be used. Lighting
fixtures should be examined to see that the interior insulation is
satisfactory, particularly the lamp holder. Cracked porcelain or
plastic lamp holders should be replaced. Devices in which the
exterior case is cracked or damaged should be replaced or repaired.

j. Fire and Smoke Detection Systems. Fire and smoke detection systems
shall be checked regularly, and faulty detectors shall be
recallbrated or replaced. The following test methods may be used:

(1) Thermal detectors may be tested by replacing the guard and globe
with a sheet metal shield and using a portable light as the heat
source; this will not cause damage to the adjacent paintwork.
The activation temperature range should be as specified in 46
CFR 161.002-11.

(2) Photoelectric and ionization smoke detectors may be tested by

holding "pink sticks" or other smoke sources near the detector.

(3) Infrared detectors may be tested with a candle or other flame

source. (NOTE: These detectors often have a response delay.)

120
I •

k. Vital Machinery. Motors, motor starters, and contro1 switches used

with machinery vital to the safety or propulsion of the vessel shall
be visually examined for condition and suitable nameplate ratings.
When there is evidence of deterioration, they shall be opened for
closer inspection.

~. Electric Cooking Equipment. Electric cooking equipment shall be

maintained in good condition. There should be no evidence of grease
or dirt buildup nor deterioration of the equipment.

a. Leakage onto Propulsion Control Circuits, Switchboards, Etc. A 1974

casualty to a U.S. tank vessel was caused by water spraying onto the
main propulsion control area from a failed cooling water gauge nipple
for the vessel's air conditioning system. In a similar casualty,
water leaked onto a vessel's main switchboard from an exterior
electrical junction box that had filled with water. The conduit and
wire provided the path to the switchboard. These casualties
demonstrate clearly that shielding or other measures must be used to
guard against accidental discharge of water onto
electrical installations. All water lines must be located clear of
control circuits, electrical equipment, and areas of high voltage
whenever possible. Cables to switchboards, controllers, etc~, should
be connected so as to prevent water from entering connectors, through
use of drip loops, joining cables to the bottom side of the
installation, or similar methods.
n. Emergency Lighting And Power Systems. Casualty reports indicate that
in some instances emergency diesel generators and associated
equipment were not maintained in a satisfactory state of readiness
for emergency use. Periodic testing by vessel personnel of the
emergency lighting and power systems installed, and the recording of
such tests in official logbooks, are required by 46 CFR 35.10-15,
78.17-45, and 97.15-30. The regulations for tank vessels, passenger
vessels, cargo and miscellaneous vessels, and the electrical
engineering requirements intend that emergency lighting and power
installations are tested in the presence of an inspector. Testing of
8 properly functioning emergency plant can be accomplished quickly
with little or no interruption of normal service. 46 CFR Table
112.05-5(a) notes vessels required to have an emergency source of
power meeting the requirements of 46 eFR 112. At each inspection,
and whenever emergency drills are conducted, light and power
emergency systems shall be tested as follows:

(1) Automatic Starting and Connecting Power Systems. These systems

should be tested by using the test switch required in 46 CFR
112.45-5. When the switch is put in the test position, the
following should occur in less than 45 seconds:

(a) Bus-tie breaker opens;

(b) Power s.ourceshould automatically start (if the power source

is a battery, this step will be skipped); and

121
 (c) Required loads will be transferred to the emergency power
source when the voltage reaches 85-95 percent of the final .
(nominal) value, i.e., the generator circuit breaker closes. Th1s
will happen immediately for a battery source.

Upon completion of the test, loads should be transferred back to

the normal source and the emergency system set up for automatic
operation.

(2) Manual Transfer System. Test as indicated above, except that

step (b) will occur as the result of a manual action. All other
functions remain automatic.

(3) Alternatives. Some passenger vessels contracted for prior to 19

November 1952 may not be arranged for testing as outlined
above. Tests of such vessels should be performed in a manner
compatible with their arrangements. Many older vessels have an
inport or standby generator (and no "emergency plant" as such).
These are usually arranged to feed directly to the main
switchboard, and cannot be tested in the manner outlined above.
The testing of such standby units shall be prescribed by the
OCMl.
6. Vessel Reinspections.

a. Introduction. Vessel inspections occurring between those required

periodically for certification by the vessel inspection laws are
intended to focus more on the vessel's equipment and operating
practices than on basic hull and machinery conditions.

b. Tank, Cargo and Miscellaneous Vessels. A general examination of the

machinery spaces with particualr attention to the propulsion system,
auxiliary machinery, and the fire and explosion hazards should be
performed. This includes:

(1) Testing of all the means of communication between the navigating

bridge and the machinery control positions, as well as the
bridge and the alternate steering position, if fitted;

(2) Visual and operational examination, as far as feasible, of

electrical machinery, switchgear, and other electrical
equipment; and

(3) Confirmation, as far as practical, of the operation of all

emergency sources of power and, if they are automatic, in the
automatic mode.

(4) On tankers, confirmation that all electrical equip~ent in

hazardous locations is in good condition and has been properly
maintained.

c. Tankers Over Ten Years Old. Regulation 10(a)(11), Chapter 1 of the

1978 SQLAS Protocol, contains additional inspection requirements at
intermediate inspections for tankers over ten years old. Such
inspections ahould include a general examination of the electrical

122
equipment and cables in hazardous locations, such as cargo pump rooms and areas
adjacent to cargo tanks, for defective explosionproof lights and fixtures,
improperly installed wiring, non-approved lighting and fixtures and dead-ended
wiring, and testing the insulation resistance of the circuits. Except in
cases where a proper record of testing is maintained, consideration should be
given to accepting recent readings by the crew. If any of the readings are
marginal, or if the condition of the cables, fixtures, or equipment appears
defective in any way, verification measurements may be required. These
measurements should not be attempted until the ship is in a gas-free or
inerted condition and should be carried out within an acceptable time period.

123
 APPENDIX 11

SPECIAL VESSEL TYPES AND REQUIREMENTS

1. 011 Recovery Vessels. Vessels built fiot ith.~-':p"ti'rpose

of cleaning up
spilled oil are of special interest to the Coast Guard. They are usually
designed to carry various grades of oil (generally mixed with water) as cargo,
and must be able to operate safely in areas where flammable vapors may be
present. The primary safety concern for oil recovery vessels is the
possibility of ignition of flammable vapors from oil spilled on the water and
collected oil stored aboard. The following criteria should be applied to
reduce the likelihood of vapor ignition on oil recovery vessels:

a. Electrical equipment installations should be kept to a minimum.

Hydraulically-powered equipment should be used when available (e.g.,
hydraulically-powered cargo pumps).

b. Where electrical equipment is employed (switches, lights, solenoid

valves, etc. ), it must be one of the following types:

(1) Spark ignitionproof (per Underwriters Laboratories Inc. (UL)

1500) ;

(2) Exp1osionproof; or

(3) IntrinSically safe.

[NOTE: The UL listing "spark ignitionproof"' (UL 1500) employs a

standard that is based on part of the explosionproof test. Those
electrical devices that do not create sparks in normal operation
(lights, solenoids, etc.) are inherently "spark ignitionproof" and
should obtain UL listing as such.]

c. Enclosed machinery spaces must be ventilated at a rate of at least 20

changes of air per hour by fans designated as "nonsparking" under the
provisions of 46 CFR llO.15-l(b)(l6).

d. Belt drives must use conducting belts, pulleys, and shafts to prevent
the buildup of static electrical charges.

e. Machinery exhausts must be fitted with spark arrestors.

f. All exposed surfaces (machinery, light lenses, etc.) must be

.aintained at a temperature below 400Of. When these surfaces are
normally accessible to personnel they must be maintained below
1500F for personnel protection.

g. Oil tank vents must be fitted with flame screens and must have a
cross sectional area at least as large as the f11l lines.

124
 Most oil recovery vessels are designed for use with Grades D and E
liquids. If use ,dtlJ more flammable grades or with hazardous chemicals 1s
d~s!red, Commandant (G-}ITH) should be consulted. Vessels engaged in other
service when not operating as oil recovery vessels must meet normal
requirementf for that service.

2. Non-Se1f-Propelled Harbor Dredg~s and Barges That Change Places of

Employment.

a. General. Non-self-propelled harbor dredges and barges of 100 or more

gross tons, when voyaging on the high seas to change places of
employment, are subject to inspection and certification. 46 CFR
9l.0l-l0(c) provides for a limited or short-term certificate, by
which the vessel may be operated manned or unmanned. In those cases
when the vessel is manned, the intent is to require a more thorough
inspection than 1f it were unmanned.

b. Wiring. Only the electrical wiring that will be energized during any
part of the voyage shall be subject to inspection. Any unsafe or
unsatisfactory condition detected shall be made a matter of record
and the owner of the vessel so advised in writing by the OCMI.

3. u.s. Flag MOnU's Operating In Foreign Waters.

a. Introduction. Full compliance with the U.S. regulations may be

difficult for units operating in foreign waters and subject to
coastal state requirements. When another country's requirements
conflict with ours, U.S. Coast Guard regulations shall take
precedence unless specifically authorized by the cognizant OCMl.

b. Electrical Installations In Hazardous Locations. 46 CFR 111.105 will

require explosionproof and intrinsically safe systems to be listed or
labeled by a "na t Lona l.Ly recognized testing laboratory" which has
been recognized by OSHA. The Coast Guard currently accepts approvals
by Underwri ters Laboratories, Lnc , , Factory Mutual Research Corp.,
Canadian Standards Association, and, for intrinsically safe equipment
only, MET Electrical Testing Company. However, requiring electrical
equipment to be listed by North American laboratories is not always
reasonable in foreign waters because such equipment may not be
available, or it may not meet coastal state equipment listing
requirements. For subcontractor equipment or other temporary
installations, other independent laboratories are acceptable for
listing explosionproof equipment and intrinsically safe systemst~f-'-k~ ?,u..~
~UI~('Ie-,t..

(1) Subcontractor Services. Drilling operations aboard MODU's often

require subcontractor services. Subcontracted services include,
among others, well logging, cementing, and casing perforation.
Typically, these services are obtained locally by the
leaseholder without regard to vessel flag. Contractor
electrical equipment usually meets the certification
TP-ou1 n~mpntF; of the coastal administration. These installations
ar~ cons~dered "temporary" although they may be installed for a
fe~ days or a few years.

125
(2) Temporary Installations. For temporary installations, equipment
approved by an independent laboratory acceptable to the coastal
state may be permitted by the OCM! in whose zone the vessel is
operating. Where the coastal state has no certification
requirements, equipment must be listed by one of the North
American "nationally recognized testing laboratories", by one of
the agencies listed at the end of this section, or by another
agency acceptable to Commandant (G-MTH-2). In no case should
equipment required by 46 CFR 111.105 to be listed, i.e.,
explosionproof equipment or intrinsically safe
systems, be permitted based on manufacturer or classification
society certification. Upon return to U.S. waters and prior to
engaging in OCS activities, MODU's must utilize equipment listed
by one of the North American laboratories. Listed below are
independent laboratories that are acceptable, provided they are
recognized by the coastal state. This list is-not intended to
be all-inclusive; other laboratories acceptable to the coastal
state may be acceptable.

Belgium INIEX Institut Nationale des Industries

Extractives

Denmark DEMKO Danmarks elektriske materielk~ntrol

France LCIE Laboratoire centrale des industries

electriques

CERCHAR Centre d'Etudes Recherches des

Charbonnages de France

Italy CESI Centro Elettrotecnico Sperimentale

Italiano

Norway NEMKO Norges Elektriske Materia1lkontroll

U.K. BASEEFA British Approvals Service for

Electrical Equipment in Flammable
Atmospheres

West Germany PTB Physikalisch-Technische Bundesansta1t

BVS Berggewerkschaftliche Versuchsstrecke

Equipment labeled by one of the laboratories above will

usually be marked in accordance with, or in a manner similar to
~be IEC designation. This marking provides information on the
aethod of protection, the hazard group designation, and the
temperature class, and is illustrated in the following example:

Ex d IIA T2

Equipment marked as such is flameproof ,

suitable for use in Class I, Group D locations, and has a
maximum operating temperature of 300 degrees Centigrade.

126
 "Ex" is the IEC symbol meaning protected for use in
flammable atmospheres. It is followed by a small letter
indicating the type of protection as follows:

Letter Protection Tn~e

d Flameproof (explosionproof)
e Increased Safety
ia Intrinsically Safe for Zone 0
ib Intrinsically Safe for Zone 1
0 Oil-immersion
p Pressurization
q Sand Filling
s Special Protection

A comparison of lEC Group/Zone designations to North

American designations is as follows:

lEC North American

Group I Gaseous Mines

Group II-A Class I, Group D
":-
Group II-B Class I, Group C
Group I1-C Class I, Groups A and B
Zone 0
Zone I Division 1
Zone 2 Division 2

The Temperature class is indicated as follows:

Temperature Class Max. Surface Temp.

Tl 450 degrees C.
T2 300 degrees c.
13 200 degrees C.
T4 135 degrees C.
T5 100 degrees C.
T6 85 degrees C.

127
 APPENDIX 12

Plan Review of Electrical Systems

1. Introduction

a. Objectives. Plan review is performed to ensure that the electrical

arrangement, materials, and installation as shown on the plans comply with
the applicable laws and regulations for the vessel or unit. The primary
purposes of the electrical requirements are to arrive at adequate and
reliable shipboard electrical systems, the components of which provide
safety to personnel from electrical shock, and to minimize the danger of
fire originating from within the electrical system. After the initial
certification of a vessel or unit by the Coast Guard, subsequent plan
review may be required due to electrical repairs or alterations affecting
the safety of the vessel, its equipment, and crew. If considered
necessary by the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI), drawings
must be approved before work is started. Repairs to existing
installations must meet the regulations in effect on the date of the
original installation or the regulations in effect on the date of the
repair.

b. General Procedures. Prior to a vessel's construction, those plans

listed in 46 eFR 110.25 are reviewed. The plans listed are general in
character, but include all plans that normally show construction and
safety features coming under the cognizance of the Coast Guard. In the
case of a particular vessel, all of the plans enumerated may not be
applicable; it is intended that only those plans and specifications be
submitted as will clearly show the vessel's arrangement, construction, and
required equipment. Because the regulations give only a general listing
of the plans and specifications that require review by the Coast Guard,
lNIC 8-84, ~Rtcommendations For the Submittal of Merchant Vessel Plans and
Specifications", was published to provide further clarification. This
circular is a detailed guide on recommended plan submittal procedures.
Some of the plans and specifications required by the Coast Guard are also
necessary for the approval of construction by the American Bureau of
Shipping (ABS) for vessels classed by that organization. In this regard,
NVI(; 10-82, "Acceptance of Plan Review and Inspection Tasks Performed by
American Bureau of Shipping for New Construction or Major Modifications of
U.S. Flag Vessels·', was published to provide information on ABS plan
approval procedures intended to facilitate industry activities and reduce
duplication of effort between the ABS and the Coast Guard.

128
 c. Handling of "Existing" Vessels. The regulations do not include
requirements for vessels existing before the effective date of the
regulation. Persons mbst refer to the regulations in effect for older
existing vessels in order to determine electrical construction'
requirements for those vessels.

2~ Plan Review Guidance

a. This NVIC includes:

(1) Check-off lists for review of typical electrical plans;

(2) A reference for technical data, formulas, and principles used in

routine plan review;

(3) Some ite~s of policy; and

(4) An inde~ for detailed reference information not contained in the

h"V1C or regulations.

This NVIC may oe used as a guide by the plan reviewer, and should not be
considered as containing hard-and-fast requirements. The user's
discretion should be applied during its application.

3. Submittal of Electrical Plans. For uniform administration of 46 CFR

Subchapter J (Electrical Engineering Regulations), certain basic plans for
electrical installations, when submitted to the DeMI, should be acted upon
only by the MSC. Follo~ing examination, the plans and an accompanying action
letter are returned to the cognizant DC~J. Therefore, when electrical plans
are submitted to the ooa, the f olLovf.ugprocedures shall be followed:

a. Initial copies of the plans required by 46 eFR 110.25 should be forwarded

to the Mse for action.

b. Subsequent reV1Slons may be acted upon directly by the OeMI, or they may
be forwarded to the Mse for action. ~en major changes or reV1Slons are made
on these plans. they should be forwarded to the Mse for review.

129
 APPE1mIX 13

SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

(1) NEMA Enclosures. rcs 1-110, HEMA STDS.

TYPE DESCRIPTION PROTECTION

General Purpose, Indoor Personnel and Falling Dirt
2 Dripproof, Indoor Personnel, Dirt, Non-Corrosive
Falling Liquids
3 Dust- and Raintight, Sleet- Personnel, Outdoor Windblown Dirt
and Ice-Resistant, Outdoor and Water
3R Rainproof, Sleet and Ice Personnel, Self-Explanatory
3S Dusttight, Raintight, Sleet- Personnel, Self-Explanatory
and Ice-Proof, Outdoor
4 ~atertight and Dusttight, Personnel, Falling and Splashing
Indoor and Outdoor Dirt and Water, Sleet-Resistant
4X ~atert1ght, Dusttlght, Corro- Personnel, Self-Explanatory
sion-Resistant, Indoor and
Outdoor
70 Submersible, ~atertight, Personnel, Self-Explanatory
Dustt1ght, Sleet- and Ice-
Resistant, Indoor and Outdoor
7 Class I. Groups A - D Hazardous Locations, Indoor
Air Break
8 Class I, Groups A - D Hazardous Locations, Indoor
Oil-Immersed
9 Class II, Groups E - e Hazardous Locations, Indoor
Air Break
10 Bureau of Mines
11 Corrosion-Resistant and Lr1p- r.orrosive Liquids
proof, Oil-Immersed, Indoor
12 Industrial Use, Dusttight and D:l~ and Non-Corrosive Dripping
Driptight, Indoor Liquids
13 Oiltight and Dusttight, Self-Ex plana tory
Indoors
(2) Common Abbreviations.

a amperes
AC alternating current
A1 aluminum
alt alteration
amb ambient
AVC asbeatos-varnished, cambric-insulated cable
AWe American Wire Gage
bhd bulkhead-mounted
aiM bill of material
C degrees Centigrade
chg change
Class I, Class II, etc. (see NEe 500)
cond conductor
corr corrosive
CSA Canadian Standards Association
Cu copper

130
Cu in cubic inches
cy cycles
DC direct current
DIG diesel generator
dp double pole
dp dr1pproof
dpdt double pole, double throw
dpst double pole, single throw
d"'g drawing
EP explosionproof
F degrees Fahrenheit
fig figure
FM Factory Mutual
gnd ground
Group A, Group B, etc. (see NEe 500)
haz hazardous
HP horsepower
IC interrupting capacity
incand incandescent
incl inclusive
inst ins tantaneous
IS intrinsically safe
KVA kilo volt amperes
KW kilowatt
L.C. L. light center length
LVP low voltage protection
LVR low voltage release
m.a.x • maximum
M. r. mineral insulated, metal sheathed
min minimum
mod model
mtg mounting
NEC National Electrical Code
nwt non-watertight
p pole
ped pedelital
pend pendant
PF power factor
ph phase
port portable
psi pounds per square inch
pt point
PYRO pyrometer
R rubber-insulated cable
refl reflector
rev revision
SCR semiconductor controlled rectifier
Bp single pole
spdt single pole, double throw
S.P. Phone sound-powered phone
SS ship service
SWBD BWitchboard
sym symbol

131
 , ,

T thermoplas tic insulated cable

term terminal
Temp Temperature
rIG turbine generator
UL Underwriters Laboratories. Inc.
uv under voltage
v volts
VC varnished cambric-insulated cable
w watts or wire
wt watertight
wI with
# catalog number(s)
& and
@ at

132