l&epulJlic of tbe tlbilippines

~upreme (ourt
j½\lantla

THIRD DIVISION

HEIRS OF RAISA DIMAO, NAMELY: G.R. No. 254020

ELIAS D. COMAGUL, EDRES D.
COMAGUL, SAPIA D. COMAGUL,
RASMIA D. DIMACALING, SALEM Present:
RASCAL, SAIDAMEN D. COMAGUL,
AND RAIHANI D. MANGADIRA, CAGUIOA, J.,
Petitioners, Chairperson,
INTING,
- versus - GAERLAN,
DIMAAMPAO, and
NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION SINGH,JJ
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March 1, 2023
X ------------------- -------------- -------------- - - - - - - -- - ----- - \}\\ ,s;.,Ji \e,~ ~ - ----- - ----- X

DECISION

GAERLAN, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari' filed by petitioners

Heirs of Raisa Dimao, namely, Elias D. Comagul, Edres D. Comagul, Sapia D.
Comagul, Rasmia D. Dimacaling, Salem Rascal, Saidamen D. Comagul, and
Raihani D. Mangadira (collectively, petitioners) praying for the reversal of the
July 26, 2019 Decision 2 and August 4, 2020 Resolution 3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 05180-MIN, affinning the right of the
respondent National Grid Corporation of the Philippines to expropriate
petitioners' property, but deleting the award of just compensation.

Rollo, pp. 12-45.

Id. at 51-74; penned by Associate Justice Walter S. Ong, with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello
and Loida S. Posadas-Kahu lugan , concurring.
Id. at 48-49 ; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Oscar V.
Badelles and Loida S. Posadas-Kahulugan , concurring.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 254020

Antecedents

Sometime in 1978, the National Power Corporation (NPC) constructed

the Baloi-Agus 2 138kV Transmission Line (BATL). 4

Pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136, 5 or the "Electric Power

Industry Reform Act of 200 l ," the National Transmission Corporation
(TRANSCO) assumed the electrical transmission functions, including the
authority and responsibility for the planning, construction, operation and
maintenance of the NPC's high voltage transmission facilities, including grid
interconnections and ancillary services. 6

Meanwhile, on January 15, 2009, respondent assumed the management,

operation, and maintenance ofTRANSCO's nationwide transmission business.
To perform its mandate, respondent needed to clear and cut tall vegetation and
other hazardous improvements underneath and within the transmission line
right-of-way corridors of the lots. 7

Accordingly, on August 15, 2014, respondent instituted expropriation

proceedings 8 involving 11,640 square meters on Lot No. 104, Gss-10-000286,
located in Barangay Basagad, Baloi, Lanao del Norte, covered by Katibayan
ng Orihinal na Titulo (KOT) Big. P- 19-080, registered in the name of the late
Raisa A. Dimao (Subject Property). Respondent prayed among other things, for
the issuance of a writ of possession in its favor, authorizing it to enter and take
possession of the subject property for the maintenance of the BATL. 9

Subsequently, respondent deposited with the Land Bank of the

Philippines (LBP) the amount of Pl ,756,400.00, representing 100% of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Zonal Value of the subject property. 10

Consequently, on September 2, 2014, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Lanao Del Norte, Branch 4 issued a writ of possession. Thus, on September 25
and 26, 2014, respondent was placed in possession of the subject property. 11

Id. at 71 and 77.

AN ACT ORDAINING REFORMS IN THE ELECTR IC POWER INDUSTRY, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
CERTAIN LAWS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES ; approved on June 8, 200 I.
6
Rollo, p. 53.
Id.
Id. at 76-84.
9
Id. at 81.
10
Id. at 54.
II
Id.at 187 .
Decision 3 G.R. No. 254020

On October 1, 2014, petlt10ners filed an Answer 12 demanding the

payment of just compensation of Pl 13,552,000.00, with accrued interest and
rentals from the time of the taking of the subject propeiiy. 13

Unfortunately, the parties failed to reach a settlement. Thus, the RTC

appointed a panel of commissioners to aid it in determining just
compensation. 14

Ruling of the RTC

On April 16, 2018, the RTC rendered a Decision 15 granting the complaint
for expropriation and awarding just compensation amounting to
P49,622,050.00.

The dispositive portion of the RTC ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby decides to

declare and confirm that the [respondent] has the lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated to the extent of eleven thousand four
hundred sixty (11 ,460) square meters. Consequently, the [respondent] is now
considered the lawful owner of that portion only of Lot No. 104, Gss-10-
000286, which contained a total area of forty eight thousand four hundred
seventy (48,470) square meters. Considering that the [respondent] deposited
only One Million Seven Hundred Fifty Six Thousand Four Hundred
(Pl,756,400.00) Pesos, the [respondent] is hereby directed to deposit the
deficiency in the amount of Forty Seven Million Eight Hundred Sixty [F]ive
Thousand Six Hundred Fifty (P47,865,650 .00) Pesos to the account of
Rasmia D. Dimaciling as representative of the [petitioners].

The Registry of Deeds for the Province of Lanao de! Norte is hereby
directed to annotate this Decision on the Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo
(KOT) Big. P-19,080. Likewise, the Municipal Assessor of Balo-i, Lanao de!
Norte is directed to issue a Tax Declaration in the name of [respondent] over
the portion only of the property subject of this case.

SO ORDERED. 16

Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for partial reconsideration, which

the RTC denied in its August 9, 2018 Order. 17

12
Id. at 105- 111.
13
Id. at I 08.
14
Id. at 188.
15
Id . at 186-190; penned by Presiding Judge Ali Ombra R. Bacaraman.
16
Id. at 189-190.
17
Id. at 238.
Decision 4 G.R. No . 254020

Dissatisfied with the ruling, respondent filed before the CA an appeal

under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling of the CA

On July 26, 2019, the CA rendered the assailed Decision 18 affirming the
R TC ruling with modification by deleting the additional award of
P47,865,650.00 as just compensation. 19

The CA noted that the area sought to be expropriated is only 30 meters

in width, and since the petitioners' property originated from a free patent, it is
subject to a 60-meter easement of right-of-way in favor of the government as
provided in Section 112 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141. 20 The CA
explained that under the said provision, the owner of the affected property may
only claim just compensation for the value of the improvements on the subject
prope1iy. However, the CA recognized that the taking of the subject property
occmTed during the construction of the transmission lines in 1978, while
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest only acquired title to the property in 2012.21
Accordingly, the CA opined that petitioners cannot claim an actual loss because
the easement of right-of-way had already been established and the BATL had
been standing on the land for more than three decades when their predecessor-
in-interest acquired ownership thereto. 22

Moreover, the CA concluded that there is no evidentiary basis for the

award of just compensation for the value of the improvements on the subject
prope1iy. It elucidated that the parties failed to present evidence as to the
improvements existing in 1978. It stated that the evidence on record only
pertains to improvements planted during the filing of the Complaint. 23

The decretal portion of the CA ruling states:

The appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated

16 April 2018 issued by Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del
N01ie, 12th Judicial Region, Iligan City in Civil Case No. 7720 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of an additional
Php47,865,650.00 in favor of [petitioners] is DELETED. The dispositive
p01iion of the Decision dated 16 April 2018 shall now read, as follows:

18
Id. at 5 I-74 .
19
Id . at 73.
20
Id . at 69; C.A. No . 141 or AN A CT TO AMEND AND COMPILE THE LA ws RELAT IVE TO LANDS OF TH E
PUBLIC D OMAIN; approved on November 7, 1936 .
21
Id.at71-72.
22
Id. at 72 .
23
Id. at 69.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 254020

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court

hereby decides to declare and confinn that the [respondent]
has the lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated to the extent of eleven thousand four hundred
sixty (11,460) square meters. Consequently, the [respondent]
is now considered the lawful owner of that portion only of Lot
No. 104, Gss-10-000286, which contained a total area of fo1iy
eight thousand four hundred seventy (48,470) square meters.

The Registry of Deeds for the Province of Lanao del

Norte is hereby directed to annotate this Decision on the
Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo (KOT) Blg. P-19,080.
Likewise, the Municipal Assessor of Balo-i, Lanao de! No1ie
is directed to issue a Tax Declaration in the name of
[respondent] over the portion only of the property subject of
this case.

SO ORDERED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24

Issues

The mam issues raised for the Court's resolution are whether or not
petitioners are entitled to just compensation and correspondingly, the reckoning
point for its computation.

Seeking the reversal of the CA Decision, pet1t10ners first assail the

validity and applicability of Section 112 of C.A. No. 141. They argue that the
easement of right-of-way provided under Section 112 of C.A. No. 141 applies
only when the expropriator is a government entity. They likewise allege that
Section 112 of C.A. No. 141, insofar as it allows the taking of private property
by mere notice and without payment of just compensation, is oppressive,
confiscatory and unconstitutional. 25 They further urge that Section 112 has been
superseded by R.A. No. 8974 26 and later by R.A. No. 10752. 27 They point out
that Section 2 ofR.A. No. 1075228 obligates the State to ensure that owners of
real prope1iy acquired for national government infrastructure projects are

24
Id. at 72-73 .
25 Id. at 22.
26 AN ACT TO FACILITATE THE ACQUISITION OF RIGHT-OF-WAY, SITE OR LOCATION FOR NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES ; approved 011 November 7,
2000.
27 AN ACT FACILITATING TH E ACQUISITION OF RIGHT-OF-WAY SITE OR LOCATION FOR NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS; approved on March 7, 2016.
28 REPUBLIC ACT No. 10752, Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - A1ticle III , Section 9 of the
Constitution states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Towards this end, the State shall ensure that owners of real prope1ty acquired for national government
infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation for the expeditious acquisition of the
required right-of-way for the projects.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 254020

promptly paid just compensation for the expeditious acquisition of the required
right-of-way for the projects. 29

Second, petitioners contend that the taking of the subject property

occurred at the time of the filing of the Complaint in 2014. 30 They relate that
NPC's entry in 1978 was without warrant or color of legal authority, since the
latter never sought their predecessor's permission, entered into any contract
with them, or instituted expropriation proceedings. 31 They further assert that
their predecessors were never deprived of the beneficial enjoyment of the
subject property. 32

Third, petitioners stress that their occupation of the subject property

preceded the NPC's entry by 23 years. 33 They claim that the issuance of the
free patent in favor of their predecessor serves as proof that they have been in
continuous, open, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject property
since July 5, 1955. 34

Lastly, petitioners maintain that respondent must abide by the valuation

of the improvements detennined through its own guidelines, and prepared and
approved no less by its own officials, which amounted to P62,822,899.00, as
stated in the Approved Unified Valuation of Crops, Plants and Trees.35

On the other hand, respondent counters that Section 112 ofC.A. No.141
applies to petitioners. It stresses that since petitioners' title stemmed from a free
patent, then the property is subject to the 60-meter easement of right-of-way in
favor of the govemment. 36 Respondent also avers that the validity of Section
112 cannot be collaterally attacked. 37 It further retmis that its status as a quasi-
public entity does not prevent the application of Section 112, as said provision
clearly applies to projects undertaken by quasi-public entities. 38

Additionally, respondent maintains that the taking of the subject property

happened in 1978, and not in 2014. It asseverates that petitioners admitted this
when they demanded the payment of legal interest and rents reckoned from the
taking in 1978. Such fact was also substantiated in Commissioner Gary M.
Salomon's (Commissioner Salomon) Report. 39

19
Rollo, pp. 22-23 .
30
Id . at 34.
3I
Id. at 35-36.
32
Id. at 36-37 .
33
Id . at 25.
34
Id. at 24.
35
Id. at 38.
36
Id. at 295 .
37
Id . at 299.
38
Id . at 297-298 .
39
Id . at 299.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 254020

Furthermore, respondent contends that petitioners' claim of ownership

since 1955 is bereft of proof. 40 It avows that petitioners' predecessor's
application of a free patent is an acknowledgment that the subject property is
in fact part of the public domain. 41

Finally, respondent accuses petitioners of maliciously planting trees on

the subject property. 42 It points to Commissioner Salomon's finding that the
trees were intentionally planted so compactly or very close to each other
underneath the transmission lines. 43 Respondent further insists that most of the
trees were newly planted, or planted two to five years after it assumed the
operation of the BATL. 44

Ruling of the Court

The petition is denied.

Respondent's Right to Expropriate Property

Eminent domain is the right or power of the State to appropriate private

property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. It is an
indispensable attribute of sovereignty and a power grounded in the primary
duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general
welfare. 45

Albeit an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power of eminent domain

is not exclusive to Congress. The latter may delegate the exercise of this
awesome power to government agencies, public officials, and quasi-public
entities. 46 What matters is that there is a law conferring the power of eminent
domain to the delegate 47 and the delegate exercises the right strictly within the
confines of the delegating law. 48

40
Id. at 30 I.
41
Id . at 298 .
42
Id. at 302.
43
Id. at 302.
44
Id . at 303 .
45 National Transmission Corp. v. Oroville Development Corp., 815 Phil. 91 , 103 (2017), citing Heirs
ofSuguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 384 Phil. 677,687 (2000).
46 PNOC Alternative Fu els Corp. v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G .R. No. 224936,
September 4, 2019, citing Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. .J King and Sons Co. , In c., 603 Phil.
4 71 , 480 (2007).
47
Id ., citing City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349, 358 ( 1919).
48
Supra note 45 .
Decision 8 G.R. No. 254020

In line with this, on December 1, 2008, Congress passed Republic Act

(R.A.) No. 9511 49 granting respondent a franchise to engage in the business of
conveying or transmitting electricity through high voltage back bone system of
interconnected transmission lines:

Section 1. Nature and Scope of Franchise. - Subject to the provisions of

the Constitution and applicable laws, mles and regulations, and subject to the
te1ms and conditions of the concession agreement and other documents
executed with the National Transmission Corporation [TRANSCO] and the
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM)
pursuant to Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9136, which are not inconsistent
herewith, there is hereby granted to the National Grid Corporation of the
Philippines, hereunder refened to as the Grantee, its successors or assigns, a
franchise to operate, manage and maintain, and in connection therewith,
to engage in the business of conveying or transmitting electricity through
high voltage back-bone system of interconnected transmission lines,
substations and related facilities, systems operations, and other activities
that are necessary to support the safe and reliable operation of a
transmission system and to construct, install, finance, manage, improve,
expand, operate, maintain, rehabilitate, repair and refurbish the present
nationwide transmission system of the Republic of the Philippines. The
Grantee shall continue to operate and maintain the subtransmission systems
which have not been disposed by TRANSCO. Likewise, the Grantee is
authorized to engage in ancillary business and any related business
which maximizes utilization of its assets such as, but not limited to,
telecommunications system, pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No.
9136. The scope of the franchise shall be nationwide in accordance with the
Transmission Development Plan, subject to an1endments or modifications of
the said Plan, as may be approved by the Department of Energy of the
Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

For respondent to effectively perform its mandate, Section 4 ofR.A. No.

9511 grants it the right to exercise the power of eminent domain:

Section 4. Right of Eminent Domain. - Subject to the limitations and

procedures prescribed by law, the Grantee is authorized to exercise the right
of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the
construction, expansion, and efficient maintenance and operation of the
transmission system and grid and the efficient operation and maintenance of
the subtransmission systems which have not yet been disposed by
TRANSCO. The Grantee may acquire such private property as is actually
necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is
granted: Provided, That the applicable law on eminent domain shall be
observed, particularly, the prerequisites of taking of possession and the
detennination and payment of just compensation.

49
AN ACT GRANTING THE NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES A FRANCHISE TO
ENGAGE IN TH E BUSINESS OF CONVEYING OR TRANSMITTING ELECTRICITY THROUGH HIGH VOLTAGE
BACK-BONE SYSTEM OF INTERCONNECTED TRANSMISSION LINES , SUBSTATIONS AND RELATED
FACILITIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; approved on December I, 2008.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 254020

Verily, respondent, as a quasi-public entity, enjoys the right of

eminent domain, circumscribed by the limitations and procedures
provided by law, the necessity of the construction, expansion, and
efficient maintenance and operation of the transmission system,
compliance with the prerequisites of taking of possession, and the
determination and payment of just compensation.

Interestingly, in this case, both parties agree on the necessity of the

expropriation and the public purpose it serves. The only bone of contention lies
on the issue of just compensation.

The reckoning point for the payment ofjust

compensation is the date of taking, which in
this case, was in 1978.

Just compensation is defined "as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator." The qualifier "just"
modifies the meaning of the word "compensation" to impress the idea that the
equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample.50 The true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.51

Notably, just compensation shall be determined as of the date of the

filing of the complaint or the date of the actual taking, whichever transpired
earlier. 52 Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi, 53 provides an enlightening discourse on
the requisites of taking:

First, The expropriator must enter a private property[;] xx x.

Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period[;] x x x.

Third, the entry into the property should be w1der warrant or color of
legal authority[;] x x x .

Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise

informally appropriated or injuriously affected[;] xx x [and]

Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.xx x. 54 (Italics supplied; citations omitted)

50 Evergreen Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic, 817 Phil. I 048 , I 058-1 059 (20 17), citing Republic v.
Mupas, 785 Phil. 40 (20 I 6), further citing Apo Fruits Corp. v. land Bank of the Philippines, 647 Phil.
251 (2010).
5I
Id.
52 Republic, represented by the Department ofPublic Works and Highways v. Estate ofPosadas Ill, G.R.
No. 214310, February 24, 2020.
53
Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi, 157 Phil. 329 ( 1974).
54
Id. at 345-346.
Decision G.R. No. 254020

In the case at bar, the NPC entered into the subject property and
constructed the powerlines in 1978. Relatedly, in National Transmission
Corporation v. Oroville Development Corporation, 55 the Court reckoned the
taking of property at the time of the construction of the powerlines therein:

The first and fourth requisites are present in this case. Transco took
possession of Oroville's property in order to construct transmission lines to
be used in generating electricity for the benefit of the public.

The second requisite is likewise present as there can be no question

that the construction of transmission lines meant an indefinite stay in the
property of Oroville. Further, TransCo's exercise of eminent domain is
pursuant to its authority granted under Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9136 or the Electric Power Industry Refom1 Act of 2001.

Finally, Oroville has been deprived of the beneficial enjoyment of its

property. In several rulings, notably National Power Corporation v. Spouses
Zabala, Republic v. Spouses Libunao, and National Power Corporation v.
Tuazon this Court has already declared that "since the high-tension electric
current passing through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the
property owners of the nonnal use of their land, it is only just and proper to
require Napocor to recompense them for the full market value of their
property.56 (Citations omitted)

Similarly, in National Power Corp. v. Vda. De Capin, 57 the Court

elucidated that the act of taking coincided with the installation of the
powerlines, in view of the heavy burdens imposed on the property owners:

After petitioner's transm1ss10n lines were fully constructed on

portions of respondents' lots, petitioner imposed restrictions thereon such as
the prohibition against planting or building anything higher than three meters
below the area traversed by said lines. In addition, respondent-Spouses
Quimco, holders of a Small Scale Quarry Pennit, Series of 1995, were also
prohibited from continuing their quarry business near petitioner's
transmission towers because of the great possibility that it could weaken the
fow1dation thereof. Hence, the respondent-spouses Quimco suffered
substantial loss of income. It is clear then that petitioner's acquisition of an
easement of right of way on the lands of the respondents amounted to an
expropriation of the portions of the latter's properties and perpetually
deprived the respondents of their proprietary rights thereon and for which
they are entitled to a reasonable and just compensation. x x x. 58 (Citation
omitted)

55
8 15 Phi l. 9 1 (2017).
56
Id. at 104- 105.
57
National Power Corp. v. Vda. de Capin, 590 Phil. 665 (2008).
58
Id. at 682.
Decision 11 G.R. No . 254020

The same pronouncements were rendered in National Power Corp. v.

Manalastas, 59 and Republic, represented by National Power Corp. v. Heirs of
Borbon 60 (Republic v. Heirs of Borbon). Highlighting the Court's rumination
in Republic v. Heirs ofBorbon:

There is a sufficient showing that NAPOCOR entered into and

took possession of the respondents' property as early as in March 1993
without the benefit of first filing a petition for eminent domain. For all
intents and purposes, therefore, March 1993 is the reckoning point of
NAPOCOR's taking of the property, instead of May 5, 1995, the time
NAPOCOR filed the petition for expropriation. The reckoning conforms
to the pronouncement in Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., to wit:

Normally, of course, where the institution of an

expropriation action precedes the taking of the prope1iy
subject thereof, the just compensation is fixed as of the time
of the filing of the complaint. This is so provided by the Rules
of Court, the assumption of possession by the expropriator
ordinarily being conditioned on its deposits with the National
or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the property as
provisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of
the proceedings.

There are instances, however, where the expropriating

agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit,
as in this case although, to repeat, the case at bar is quite
extraordinary in that possession was taken by the expropriator
more than 40 years prior to suit. In these instances, this Court
has ruled that the just compensation shall be determined as of
the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of
eminent domain .

In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent

domain, there is a "taking" when the owner is actually
deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a
practical destruction or a material impairment of the value of
his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use
thereof. There is a "taking" in this sense when the expropriator
enters private property not only for a momentary period but
for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting
the property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
For ownership, after all, "is nothing without the inherent
rights of possession, control and enjoyment. Where the owner
is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his prope1iy
or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is
taking within the Constitutional sense. x x x. 61 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)

59
779 Ph il. 5 10 (2016) .
60 Republic, represented by National Power Corp. v. Heirs of Borbon, 750 Phil. 37 (20 I 5).
61
Id. at 54-55.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 254020

Indubitably, the taking of the subject property occurred during the

construction of the BATL in 1978. In fact, petitioners admitted this reckoning
point when they demanded the payment of legal interest and rents from 1978.
Also, the parties stipulated during the pre-trial conference that the transmission
line existed on the subject property since 1978. Moreover, Commissioner
Salomon's Report, which contains the Transmission Line Data and
Infonnation, as well as the R TC Decision, confinn the construction of the
BATL in 1978. 62

Petitioners, not being the registered owners

of the subject property during the
construction of the BATL in 1978, are not
entitled to just compensation.

A unique circumstance obtains in this case-the BATL was constructed

in 1978, while Dimao, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, obtained a free
patent over the subject property only on October 2, 2012. Glaringly, at the time
of the construction of the BATL, the government was still the owner of the
subject property. Accordingly, petitioners are not entitled to just compensation.

The following circumstances further bar petitioners from claiming just

compensation:

First, Dimao's application for a free patent evidences her

acknowledgment of the public nature of the subject property.

Remarkably, in Yabut v. Alcantara, 63 the Court held that the filing of a

free patent application constitutes an admission that the property is a public
land, and thus, the applicant may not be regarded as the land's rightful owner.
Additionally, the mere possession of a land for 30 years does not automatically
divest the land of its public character. 64

On this score, petitioners may not argue that the issuance of the
homestead patent in their favor bolsters their possession and ownership of the
subject property since 1955.

Besides, petitioners failed to present an iota of proof of their ownership

or even their possession prior to 1978. At any rate, even assuming that they
have been in possession of the subject property since 1955, no law, rule or
jurisp1udence authorizes an award of just compensation to a mere possessor of
the land.

62
Rollo, p. 299.
63
806 Phil. 745 (20i7) .
64
Id . at 760.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 254020

Further, it is highly questionable that petitioners, who claim to have been

in possession of the subject property prior to 1978, never questioned NPC's
entry thereto; claimed damages for the destruction of their alleged property; or
even instituted inverse expropriation proceedings. Their complete silence for
many years foments doubt on their claim of possession.

Second, petitioners' title over the subject property stemmed from a

homestead patent and is thus, subject to the 60 meter right-of-way in favor of
the Government provided in Section 112 of C.A. No. 141, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 635: 65

Sec. 112. Said land shall further be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding
sixty (60) meters in width for public highways, railroads, in-igation ditches,
aqueducts, telegraph and telephone lines, airport runways, including sites
necessary for tenninal buildings and other government structures needed for
full operation of the airport, as well as areas and sites for government
buildings for Resident and/or Project Engineers needed in the prosecution of
government-infrastructure projects, and similar works as the Government or
any public or quasi-public service or enterprise, including mining or forest
concessionaires, may reasonably require for can-ying on their business, with
damages for the improvements only.

Records reveal that the pmiion of the subject property traversed by the
BATL is only 30 meters wide and is thus well-within the 60-meter width right-
of-way.66 The fact that the BATL is operated by respondent does not foreclose
the application of Section 112, which clearly covers projects undertaken by
quasi-public entities. At best, petitioners may only claim damages for the
improvements in the subject property. 67

Petitioners may not escape the burden imposed by Section 112 of C.A.
No. 141 by collaterally attacking its validity and constitutionality. Notably,
collateral attacks on a presumably valid law are not allowed, and unless the law
or rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, it shall be presumed valid.68

In the same vein, R.A. No. 8974 and later, R.A. No. 10752 did not
impliedly repeal Section 112 of C.A. No. 141. It is settled that repeals by
implication are frowned upon in this jurisdiction. They are never favored,
unless unambiguously demonstrated that the subject laws are clearly repugnant

65
AMENDING SECTION ONE HUNDRED TWELVE OF COMMONWEAL TH ACT NUMBERED O NE HUNDRED
FORTY - O NE, AS AMEN DED, OTHERWIS E K NOWN AS THE PUBLI C LAND LAW; approved on January 7 ,
1975 .
66
Rollo, p. 297.
67
Id . at 295 and 297 .
68
Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Hon. Aquii10 Ill, G.R. No. 210500, Apri l 2, 2019, citing Vivas v. Monetary
Board ofthe Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas , 716 Phil. 132, 153(2013), further citi ng Dasmarinas Water
District v. Monterey Foods Corp., 587 Phil. 403 (2008) .
Decision 14 G.R. No. 254020

and patently inconsistent, and cannot co-exist. 69 "The rule is expressed in the
maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every
statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence." 70 Thus, all doubts must be resolved
against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted to harmonize and
give effect to all laws on the subject. 71

In fact, a perusal of Section 4 of R.A. No. 10752 confirms that it has

taken into account Section 112 ofC.A. No. 141:

SEC. 4. Modes ofAcquiring Real Property. - The government may acquire

real property needed as right-of-way site or location for any national
government infrastructure project through donation, negotiated sale,
expropriation, or any other mode of acquisition as provided by law.

In case of lands granted through Commonwealth Act No. 141, as

amended, otherwise known as "The Public Land Act", the implementing
agency shall:

(a) Follow the other modes of acquisition enumerated in this

Act, if the landowner is not the original patent holder and
any previous acquisition of said land is not through a
gratuitous title; or

(b) Follow the provisions under Commonwealth Act No.

141, as amended, regarding acquisition of right-of-
way on patent lands, if the landowner is the original
patent holder or the acquisition of the land from the
original patent holder is through a gratuitous title.
(Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

Clearly, R.A. No. 10752 recognizes the existence of Section 112 ofC.A.
No. 141 and even provides a mechanism for the acquisition of lands covered
by the latter law, thereby proving that both laws harmoniously co-exist.

Third, just compensation is measured against the loss sustained by the

owner of the expropriated property. When petitioners acquired ownership of
the subject property in October 2012, the BATL had already been existing for
34 years. Technically, petitioners were never injuriously deprived of their
prope1iy by the construction of the BATL. On the contrary, when they obtained

69 The United Harb or Pilots' Association of'the Philippines, Inc. v. Association of International Shipping
Lines, In c., 440 Phil. 188, 199 (2002).
70
Magkalas v. National Housing Authority, 587 Phil. 152, 166 (2008), citing Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole,
32 1 Phil. 604 , 614 (1995).
71
Id. at 167.

j
Decision 15 G.R. No. 254020

title to the subject property, they were well-aware of the existence and
permanence of the BATL and the consequent inconvenience it may cause.

Fourth, the Court gives credence to the reports 72 that most of the trees
were built on the subject property within a span of four to nine years from
August 8, 2014 and were compactly clustered on the right-of-way corridor. This
reveals petitioners' malicious attempts at earning from the improvements.

Fifth, even if the Court disregards all the aforementioned laws and
jurisprudential tenets, and award damages for improvements, it has no basis for
doing so. The records are completely bereft of evidence confirming the
existence of improvements in 1978.

Based on the foregoing, petitioners are not entitled to the payment of just
compensation. Applying the principle of solutio indebiti, petitioners must
return to respondent the amount of Pl ,756,400.00, which respondent deposited
on the e1Toneous belief that expropriation was necessary for it to maintain the
transmission lines.

The principle of solutio indebiti is enshrined in Article 2154 of the Civil

Code, and ordains that "[i]f something is received when there is no right to
demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return
it arises." 73 This rule stems from the ancient principle that no one shall enrich
himself unjustly at the expense of another. 74 Solutia indebiti applies when
something was unduly delivered through mistake, and that something was
received when there was no right to demand it. 75

As discussed above, respondent deposited Pl,756,400.00, mistakenly

believing that petitioners were entitled thereto. Meanwhile, petitioners had no
right to said amount considering that they were not the registered owners of the
subject property at the time of its taking, and that the subject property is bound
by an easement in favor of the Government.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 26, 2019 Decision and

August 4, 2020 Resolution of the Comi of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05180-
MIN are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners Heirs of Raisa
Dimao are hereby ORDERED to RETURN to respondent National Grid
Corporation of the Philippines the amount of Pl,756,400.00.

72
Rollo, pp. 130-136.
73
CIVIL CODE, Article 2154.
74
Domestic Petroleum Retailer Corp. v. Manila fnlernalional Airport Authority, G.R. No. 210641 ,
March 27, 2019.
75
Metropolilan Bank & Trust Co. v. Absolute Management Corp., 701 Phil. 200,2 13 (20 13).

j)
Decision 16 G .R . No . 254020

SO ORDERED.

s~
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HEN LB. INTING 0

ssocia e ustice

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

AL
Decision 17 G.R. No. 254020

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.